Fairbanks v. Bisignano

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________________________________________
Edward F.,1
Plaintiff,
v. 3:25-CV-374
(GTS/MJK)
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
Jeanne Murray Esq., for Plaintiff
Hugh Dun Rappaport Esq., Special Asst. U.S. Attorney, for Defendant
Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge
To the Honorable Glenn T. Suddaby, U.S. District Judge:
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Edward brought this action under the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. § 405(g)) seeking judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s final decision denying his application for benefits. (Dkt.
1). Edward did not consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge.
(Dkt.4). So, the Honorable Glenn T. Suddaby, U.S. District Judge,
referred this matter to the Court for a Report and Recommendation.
Both parties filed briefs (Dkts. 11, 15, 16) which the Court treats as
1 This report and recommendation will identify the plaintiff using only his first
name and last initial to protect his privacy.
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motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), in accordance with General Order
18.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 15, 2022, Edward filed applications for Title II
disability insurance and Title XVI supplemental security income
benefits, alleging disability beginning on September 1, 2022. (T. 179-85,
186-92)2. The Social Security Administration denied the claims initially
on June 12, 2023, and again upon reconsideration on July 24, 2023. (T.
61, 80). Edward requested a hearing that same month. (T. 113-14).
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Jeremy Eldred held a hearing
on May 24, 2024. (T. 37-51). Edward appeared and testified at the
hearing along with vocational expert Christine Ditrinco. (T. 41-50). At
the hearing, Edward, through his representative, amended his alleged
onset date of disability to November 4, 2022. (T. 40). On June 14, 2024,
ALJ Eldred issued an unfavorable decision. (T. 20-31). The Appeals
Council denied Edward’s appeal. (T. 7-12).
2 All page references are to the Administrative Transcript (“T.”) and not the page
numbers assigned by the CM/ECF pagination system.
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II. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW
A. Disability Standards
To be considered disabled, plaintiffs seeking disability insurance
or supplemental security income benefits must establish that they are
“unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months…” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A). In addition, plaintiffs’
physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of
such severity that [they are] not only unable to do
[their] previous work but cannot, considering [their] age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which [they] live[], or whether a
specific job vacancy exists for [them], or whether [they]
would be hired if [they] applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner uses a five-step process, set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520 and 416.920, to evaluate disability insurance and
supplemental security income disability claims.
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [they are]
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not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant
has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits [their]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the
claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has
an impairment which meets or equals the criteria of an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will
consider [them] disabled without considering vocational
factors such as age, education, and work experience …
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe
impairment, [they have] the residual functional capacity to
perform [their] past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to
perform [their] past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant
can perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing
disability at the first four steps. See Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 418
(2d Cir. 2013). If they establish that their impairment prevents them
from performing their past work, the burden then shifts to the
Commissioner to prove the final step. (Id.).
B. Scope of Review
When reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, courts must
determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and
whether substantial evidence supported the decision. Id. at 417; see also
Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012); 42
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U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012). It must be “more
than a scintilla” of evidence scattered throughout the administrative
record. Id. Yet this standard is a very deferential standard of review “—
even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous standard.’” Brault, 683 F.3d at
448. “To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported
by substantial evidence, reviewing courts consider the whole record,
examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the
substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258
(2d Cir. 1988). But reviewing courts may not substitute their
interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner
if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s decision. Id.; see
also Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
ALJs need not explicitly analyze every piece of conflicting
evidence in the record. See Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d
Cir. 1983); see also Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981)
(“[W]e are unwilling to require an ALJ explicitly to reconcile every
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conflicting shred of medical testimony[.]”). But ALJs cannot “‘pick and
choose’ evidence in the record that supports [their] conclusions.” Cruz v.
Barnhart, 343 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Fuller v.
Astrue, No. 09-CV-6279, 2010 WL 5072112, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,
2010).
III. FACTS
The record includes Edward’s medical and mental health
treatment records which the parties are familiar with. The Court will
refer to the pertinent records and the hearing testimony in its analysis
of the parties’ claims as appropriate.
IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION
At Step One of the five-step sequential analysis, ALJ Eldred
determined that Edward has “not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since November 4, 2022, the amended alleged onset date of
disability.” (T. 22).
At Step Two, ALJ Eldred concluded that Edward “had the
following ‘severe’ impairments: a hereditary neuromuscular disorder,
lumbar radiculopathy, obstructive sleep apnea, and obesity.” (T. 23)
(cleaned up). ALJ Eldred also determined that Edward’s right shoulder
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pain, migraine headaches, hypertension, and psychiatric symptoms
were not severe. (Id.).
At Step Three, ALJ Eldred determined that Edward “does not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (T. 25).
Next, ALJ Eldred discussed the “paragraph B” criteria. (T. 23-24).
“To satisfy the paragraph B criteria,” mental impairments “must result
in one extreme limitation or two marked limitations in a broad area of
functioning.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b)
(cleaned up). The four broad areas of mental functioning are: (1)
understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting
with others; (3) maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4)
adapting and managing oneself. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1,
§ 12.00(C). Here, ALJ Eldred found the Paragraph B criteria unsatisfied
because he determined that Edward had (1) mild limitations in
understanding, remember, or applying information; (2) no limitations in
interacting with others; (3) mild limitations in maintaining
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concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) mild limitations in adapting
or managing oneself. (T. 24).
After this, ALJ Eldred determined that Edward had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work. Specifically:
he can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can climb
ramps or stairs occasionally; can stoop, kneel, or crawl
frequently; can balance or crouch occasionally; and must
avoid exposure to hazardous working conditions, such as work
done at unprotected heights and work done in proximity to
dangerous moving machinery.
(Id.) To make this finding, ALJ Eldred considered “the medical
opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s) in accordance
with the requirements of” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). (Id.).
At Step Four, ALJ Eldred reasoned that Edward “is unable to
perform any past relevant work,” is within the “younger individual” age
category, has “a high school education,” and “transferability of skills is
not an issue.” (T. 29).
Finally, at Step Five, ALJ Eldred concluded that “considering”
Edward’s “age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that” he “can perform.” (Id.). Accordingly, ALJ Eldred
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determined that Edward is not disabled as defined by the Social
Security Act. (T. 30).
V. ISSUES IN CONTENTION
Edward argues “the ALJ improperly rejected the disabling opinion
from Dr. Crocket.” (Pl. Br. at pgs. 9-14).3 In response, the Commissioner
argues that Edward “has failed to sustain his burden of establishing
that the ALJ committed any reversible error when he evaluated Dr.
Crocket’s opinion.” (Def. Br. at pgs. 4-14).
VI. DISCUSSION
The Court recommends the District Court affirm ALJ Eldred’s
decision. ALJs are specifically required to explain how they considered
the supportability and consistency factors for a medical opinion. Here,
ALJ Eldred erred when performing the supportability analysis on Dr.
Crocket’s medical opinion, but that error was harmless. ALJ Eldred
properly performed the consistency analysis when he found that it was
unclear how Dr. Crocket determined these marked limitations, and
substantial evidence shows her medical source statement is inconsistent
with other opinions of record. Remand is therefore not recommended.
3 (Pl. Br.) refers to Plaintiffs Brief, Dkt. 11, and (Def. Br.) refers to Defendants Brief,
Dkt. 15.
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ALJs must consider all medical opinions and evaluate their
persuasiveness based on their supportability, consistency, the author’s
relationship with the claimant, the author’s specialization, and other
factors. Tyler W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-CV-01345 (CFH), 2024
WL 1075209, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2024). “The two most important
factors for determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are
consistency and supportability[.]” Stephanie F. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-
1528 (BKS), 2022 WL 3355964, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2022). ALJs
must therefore “explain how [they] considered the supportability and
consistency factors” for a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2),
416.920c(b)(2).
“Supportability” means that “the more relevant the objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical
source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical
opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. §§
404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1) (cleaned up). “Consistency” means that
“the more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and
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nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. §§
404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). In plain English, supportability is an
internal check—examining whether the medical source references
medical evidence that comes from the medical source. Consistency is an
external check—examining whether the medical sources references
evidence from other medical and non-medical sources.
ALJs’ “failure to explain the supportability and consistency of the
medical opinions in the record is procedural error.” Stephanie F., 2022
WL 3355964, at *9. And procedural errors are subject to harmless error
review. See id; see also Loucks v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CV-1749, 2022 WL
2189293, at *2 (2d. Cir. 2022) (summary order) (applying harmless
error review to a procedural error).
ALJ Eldred did not properly perform a supportability analysis of
Dr. Courtney Grace Crocket’s opinion. To satisfy the supportability
factor, an ALJ must consider whether the medical source supported his
or her opinion with “objective medical evidence and supporting
explanations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Although the ALJ did not
properly discuss supportability in the paragraph he devoted to
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addressing the persuasiveness of Dr. Crocket’s opinion, ALJ Eldred
concluded Dr. Crocket’s opinion was less persuasive, noting “Dr.
Crocket’s opinion is vague, considering that she did not specify the
length of time or the frequency with which the claimant could perform
various physical activities, or the amount of weight that the claimant
could lift, carry, push, or pull.” (T. 28). From this, it is apparent that the
ALJ considered the supportability of Dr. Crocket’s opinion and found it
lacking because, as shown below, it was based on Edward’s own reports
about his lower extremity pain and was not based on any findings on
examination. Therefore, since the Court can glean that the ALJ
considered the supportability of Dr. Crocket’s opinion based on his
analysis of medical evidence, the Court concludes that the substance of
the regulation was not traversed and the ALJ’s procedural error in
omitting an express reference to supportability is harmless. See
Ricky
L v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-7102-FPG, 2022 WL 2306965 at *4
(W.D.N.Y. June 27, 2022) (“[I]nsofar as the Court can adequately ‘glean’
how the ALJ weighed the consistency and supportability factors for Dr.
Sandler’s opinion, the Court finds the ALJ’s procedural error harmless
as ‘the substance of the [regulation] was not traversed.’” (collecting
cases).
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During Dr. Crocket’s examination, Edward’s mother described his
chief complaint as “his nerve endings are dying progressively and he is
losing functioning in his feet and his hands.” (T. 409). At the time of the
examination, Edward was not in any pain and reported “when he is in
pain just getting off of his feet or lying down actually helps quite a lot
when it is present.” (Id.). “The only assistive devices he uses at the
moment are braces [for his legs that extend from the entire base of his
foot to just beneath his knee], and he has only had those for the last
three months or so.” (T. 409-10). He lives with his mother and eight-
year-old nephew. (T. 410). Edward reported “[h]e is able to cook seven
days a week,” cleans and does laundry about once a week, is
responsible for childcare when his mother leaves for errands, “is able to
shower or bathe by himself once to twice a week and dress himself
daily,” “enjoys watching TV, doing online social media activities,
playing video games, socializing with friends, and going over to friends’
houses.” (Id.).
Dr. Crocket noted Edward uses braces on his legs and with them,
his gait is fairly steady. (T. 411). Dr. Crocket opined the braces were
medically necessary. (Id.). Edward could walk on his heels with
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difficulty but declined to walk on his toes. (Id.). His squat was limited to
10% secondary to pain from his braces which hit “patellae” when he
leans forward. (Id.). Edward declined changing for the examination,
needed no help getting on and off the exam table and was able to rise
from the chair without difficulty. (Id.). Edwards’ cooperation and effort
were good. (Id.). Edwards lumbar spine showed full flexion, extension,
lateral flexion bilaterally, and full rotary movement bilaterally. (T. 412).
His seated straight leg raise test was negative bilaterally, and supine
straight leg raise tests were positive at 90 degrees bilaterally with pain
radiating to his knee on the right side and localized to his lower back on
the left side. (Id.). Edwards knee flexion and extension were full
bilaterally; his hips forward flexion was 100 degrees bilaterally, interior
rotation were 15 degrees on the right and 10 degrees on the left, and his
exterior rotation was 50 degrees bilaterally. (Id.). His right hip was
tender to palpation. (Id.). There were trigger points evident at his
iliosacral joints bilaterally and at the right hip. (Id.). His ankles
dorsiflexion were 20 degrees bilaterally and plantarflexion 20 degrees
bilaterally. (Id.). Edwards joints were stable. (Id.).
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Edward’s deep tendon reflexes were physiologic and equal in his
upper and lower extremities. (Id.). He had full strength in his upper and
lower extremities, except extension of his upper extremities bilaterally,
“4/5” with extension or push command. (Id.). Lastly, Edward’s plantar
flexion of his feet were also 4/5 bilaterally. (Id.). Ultimately, Dr. Crocket
opined Edward has marked limitations to lifting, carrying, squatting,
standing, walking, sitting, reaching, pushing, handling, or use of foot
controls; and additional limitations via medically induced fatigue. (T.
412-13).
Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court finds Dr.
Crocket’s opinion not to be supported. Dr. Crocket’s examination
revealed that Edward’s deep tendon reflexes were physiologic and
equal, his strength was full in the upper and lower extremities, except
for “4/5” strength with extension or push command and “4/5” strength
with plantar flexion of the feet bilaterally. (T. 412). These findings do
not support marked limitations. See Johnathan M. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 3:21-CV-1076 (DNH), 2022 WL 18831465, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Nov.
9, 2022) (ALJ properly considered supportability were he observed “that
marked findings conflicted with Dr. Grassl’s own findings from her
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examination, which were ‘relatively unremarkable.’”) Indeed, the focus
of an ALJ’s evaluation of the supportability of an opinion is whether the
conclusion is supported – not whether it sets forth a comprehensive
summary of the evidence. See Jacqueline L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 515
F. Supp. 3d 2, 7 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)). So,
although the Court finds that ALJ Eldred erred in performing the
supportability analysis as to Dr. Crocket’s opinion, this error was
harmless.
ALJ Eldred properly performed the consistency analysis of Dr.
Crocket’s opinion. ALJs “must specifically set forth how they considered
the consistency of a medical opinion in the analysis of the medical
opinion, not merely refer to the other medical evidence at some point in
the decision.” Kathleen A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:20-CV-
1034 (LEK), 2022 WL 673824, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022). When
performing the consistency analysis, ALJ Eldred concluded that Dr.
Crocket’s “opinion was inconsistent with the opinions of Dr. Ahmed and
Dr. Randall, and was inconsistent with the evidence referenced above
regarding the Edward’s improvement with physical therapy and use of
braces, inconsistent with physical examination findings set forth above,
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and inconsistent with Edward’s work activity as a cleaner during the
period at issue.” (T. 28).
It is apparent from the record how ALJ Eldred found Dr. Crocket’s
marked limitations inconsistent with the other opinions. ALJ Eldred
found the opinions of state agency medical consultants S. Ahmed, M.D.
and J. Randall, M.D. persuasive, which Edward does not challenge. (T.
28). After reviewing the medical evidence, including Dr. Crocket’s
consultative examination, Dr. Ahmed opined that Edward could
occasionally lift and/or carry 10 pounds and frequently lift and/or carry
less than 10 pounds. (T. 66). Drs, Ahmed and Randall opined that
Edward could stand and/or walk with normal breaks for a total of two
hours and could sit with normal breaks for a total of more than six
hours on a sustained basis in an eight-hour workday. (Id.). Dr. Ahmed
further opined that Edward could occasionally climb ramps/stairs,
balance, and crouch; he could frequently stoop, kneel and crawl; and
could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Id.). Ultimately, Dr.
Ahmed concluded “[b]ased on the seven strength factors of the physical
RFC (lifting/carrying, standing, walking, sitting, pushing, and pulling),”
Edward demonstrates the maximum sustained work capability of
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sedentary work. (T. 69). Additionally, they noted that Edward was not
limited to unskilled work because of the impairments. (T. 68).
It is “well settled that an ALJ is entitled to rely upon the opinions
of both examining and non-examining State agency medical
consultants, since such consultants are deemed to be qualified experts
in the field of social security disability. . . . The opinion of a non-
examining source may override that of an examining source, even a
treating source, provided the opinion is supported by evidence in the
record.” Maleski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:18-CV-1378 (WBC), 2020
WL 210064, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2020).
ALJ Eldred further demonstrated that the record supported
Edward’s ability to perform sedentary work. For example, in October
2022, Edward “had a normal musculoskeletal examination, and no
neurological deficits were present.” (T. 27 (citing T. 381)). In January
2023, Edward was wearing bilateral lower extremity braces but was
able to walk without assistance. (T. 27 (citing T. 383)). He had 5/5
strength in his lower extremities and no pain at examinations. (T. 367,
378, 412, 471). Neurology records from April 2023 indicated that
Edward was sitting comfortably. (T. 27 (citing T. 396)). As noted above,
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ALJ Eldred limited Edward to sedentary work, and as explained in SSR
83-10, “[b]y its very nature, work performed primarily in a seated
position. . . .” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251 at *5.
The ALJ also noted that Edward “has worked during the period at
issue as a cleaner.” (T. 27). The Second Circuit has held that the fact
that a plaintiff performed work during the period of alleged disability is
substantial evidence supporting an RFC finding. See Rivers v. Astrue,
280 F. App’x 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2008). An “‘ALJ may also properly consider
a claimant’s demonstrative ability to work part-time during the
relevant period as evidence that the claimant is not completely
disabled.’” Khyana B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-CV-6408-HKS,
2026 WL 265571, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2026) (citing Silva v. Saul, 18-
CV-6206 CJS, 2019 WL 1569595, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2019) (citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.1571)) (collecting cases).
* * *
Edward asserts that the ALJ’s analysis establishes that there is a
gap in the record, which the ALJ was duty bound to fill. See (Pl. Br. at
pg. 10). On appeal, the Commissioner argues that Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31
F.4th 64 (2d. Cir. 2022) is indistinguishable from the case here; the
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Court agrees. In Schillo, the ALJ discounted the medical opinion
because it contained “vague, undefined terms.” Id. at 72. The claimant
argued that “the ALJ was duty bound to obtain a more detailed and
clarified statement from Dr. Shukri before rejecting statements due to
‘vague, undefined terms.’” Id. at 76. The Second Circuit rejected that
argument, holding that (i) although an ALJ may need to develop the
record to fill a gap in treatment records, “a deficiency in reasoning by a
[medical source] is not the same as a gap in treatment records” and (ii)
the ALJ “did not err in failing to supplement the administrative record”
because “there was a complete record before the ALJ,” “[t]he ALJ
pointed to specific portions of the record that undercut Dr. Shukri’s
opinion,” “the claimant has not identified any missing records that
should have been included in the record ,” and “we are aware of no [such
missing records].” Id. That is not the case here.
Having concluded that the ALJ’s assignment of lesser weight to
Dr. Crocket’s medical opinion was based on substantial evidence, we
also hold that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s ultimate RFC
determination. ALJ Eldred still considered the medical opinion to
assess Edward’s RFC including other sources in the administrative
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record and notes documenting Edward’s visits with other medical
providers. Thus, remand is not recommended.
VII. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE for the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED that Edward’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Dkt. No. 11) be DENIED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Dkt. No. 15) be GRANTED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision denying
Edward’s benefits be AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days
within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such
objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO
OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL
PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85
(2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892
F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated: April 29, 2026 __________________________
Hon. Mitchell J. Katz
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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