Addams v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
ZACKARY A.,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 3:24-CV-1208
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 	(PJE)
Defendant.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
Lachman, Gorton Law Firm 	PETER A. GORTON, ESQ.
P.O. Box 89
1500 East Main Street
Endicott, New York 13760
Attorneys for plaintiff
Social Security Administration 	JASON P. PECK, ESQ.
Office of the General Counsel
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Attorneys for defendant
PAUL J. EVANGELISTA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER1
Zachary A.2 (“plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42
U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) seeking review of a decision by the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (“the Commissioner”) denying his application for “Social Security
1 Parties consented to direct review of this matter by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, L.R. 72.2(b), L.R. 72.3(b), and General Order 18. See Dkt. No. 7.
2 In accordance with guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, which was adopted by the Northern District of New York in 2018
to 	better 	protect 	personal 	and 	medical 	information 	of 	non-governmental 	parties, 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order will identify plaintiff’s last name by initial only.
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disability and supplemental security income disability benefits” (“SSI”). 	See Dkt. No. 1.
Plaintiff moved for the Commissioner’s decision to be vacated and remanded for the
calculation of benefits, or in the alternative, for further proceedings. See Dkt. No. 10. The
Commissioner moved for the decision to be affirmed. See Dkt. No. 12.3 Plaintiff filed a
reply. See Dkt. No. 13. For the following reasons, plaintiff’s cross-motion is granted, the
Commissioner’s cross-motion is denied, and the Commissioner’s decision is reversed
and remanded for further proceedings.
I. Background
On January 21, 2022, plaintiff filed Title II and Title XVI applications for SSI
benefits, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2022. See T. at 210-164 (See Dkt.
No. 8-5)5. On June 9, 2022, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied plaintiff’s
claim. 	See id. at 86-91 (See Dkt. No. 8-4). 	Plaintiff sought reconsideration, which the
SSA denied on November 4, 2022. See id. at 105, 111-24, 217 (See Dkt. Nos. 8-4, 8-5).
Plaintiff appealed and requested a hearing. See id. at 125-37, 218 (See Dkt. Nos. 8-4, 8-
5). On November 15, 2023, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Mary Jane Pelton. See id. at 29-50 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). On December 14, 2023, the ALJ
issued an unfavorable decision. See id. at 12-28 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). On August 8, 2024,
the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s determination, and the decision became final. See
id. at 1-6. Plaintiff commenced this action on October 2, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1.
3 This matter has been treated in accordance with General Order 18. Under that General Order, once issue
has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally as if cross-motions for judgement on the
pleadings have been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 “T.” followed by a number refers to the pages of the administrative transcript. See Dkt. No. 8. Citations
to the administrative transcript refer to the pagination in the bottom, right-hand corner of the page. Citations
to the parties’ briefs refers to the pagination generated by the Court’s electronic filing and case management
program located at the header of each page.
5 Due to the voluminous nature and many parts of the administrative transcript, in addition to the record
citation, the Court will include the docket cite for factual citations.
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II. Legal Standards
A. Standard of Review
“In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court may not
determine de novo whether an individual is disabled.” 	Joseph J. B. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4217371, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4216048
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1388(c)(3)); see also Wagner v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	“Rather, the
Commissioner’s determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were
not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence.” 	Id. (citing Johnson v.
Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464,
467 (2d Cir. 1982). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ meaning that in
the record one can find ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971))). 	“The
substantial evidence standard is a very deferential standard of review . . . [This] means
once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject [them] only if a reasonable factfinder would have
to conclude otherwise.” 	Id. (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443,
448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“Where there is
reasonable doubt as to whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards,
the decision should not be affirmed even though the ultimate conclusion is arguably
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986)). 	“However, if the correct legal
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standards were applied and the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, such
finding must be sustained ‘even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s
position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from
the [Commissioner’s].’” Id. (quoting Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
B. Determination of Disability
“Every individual who is under a disability shall be entitled to a disability . . . benefit
. . . .” 	42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). 	Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months[.]” 	Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). 	“A medically-determinable impairment is an
affliction that is so severe that it renders an individual unable to continue with his or her
previous work or any other employment that may be available to him or her based upon
age, education, and work experience.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *2 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). “Such an impairment must be supported by ‘medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.’” 	Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3)).
“Additionally, the severity of the impairment is ‘based on objective medical facts,
diagnoses[,] or medical opinions inferable from [the] facts, subjective complaints of pain
or disability, and educational background, age, and work experience.’” 	Id. (quoting
Ventura v. Barnhart, No. 04-CV-9018 (NRB), 2006 WL 399458, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,
2006) (citing Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983))).
The Second Circuit employs a five-step analysis, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,
to determine whether an individual is entitled to disability benefits:
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First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity.
If he [or she] is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant
has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his [or her] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether,
based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an
impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him [or her] disabled without
considering 	vocational 	factors 	such 	as 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted
with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry
is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he [or she] has the
residual functional capacity to perform his [or her] past work.
Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his [or her] past work, the
[Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the
claimant could perform . . .
Berry, 675 F.2d at 467 (spacing added). 	“If at any step a finding of disability or non-
disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL
4217371, at *2 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003)). “The plaintiff bears
the initial burden of proof to establish each of the first four steps.” Id. (citing DeChirico v.
Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)). 	“If the
inquiry progresses to the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that
the plaintiff is still able to engage in gainful employment somewhere.” 	Id. (citing
DeChirico, 134 F.3d at 1180 (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)).
III. The ALJ’s Decision
Applying the five-step disability sequential evaluation, the ALJ first noted that
plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 20, 2022, the
application date.” T. at 17 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff “has
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the following severe impairments: a depressive disorder, an anxiety disorder and [post-
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”)].” 	Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	At step three, the ALJ
determined that plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id. at 18 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
Before reaching step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, and the claimant can
understand, remember and carry out simple instructions. The claimant can
use judgment to make simple, work-related decisions. They should work in
a job with only occasional changes in the routine work setting. The claimant
cannot perform work that requires a specific production rate or work that
requires 	hourly 	quotas. 	They 	can 	have 	occasional 	interaction 	with
supervisors, coworkers and the public.
Id. at 20 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). At step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “has no past
relevant work.” 	Id. at 23 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	At step five, the ALJ determined that
“[c]onsidering age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can
perform.” Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). The ALJ concluded that plaintiff “has not been under a
disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since January 20, 2022, the date the
application was filed.” Id. at 24 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
IV. Discussion
A. Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence. 	See Dkt. No. 10 at 3, 13-26. 	More specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ
failed to consider his gender dysphoria at step two, and his gender dysphoria constitutes
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a severe impairment. See id. at 13-14. Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ (1) cherry picked
evidence and failed to consider SSR 85-15 when she concluded that he can work without
consistently without limitation, (2) erroneously concluded that he can occasionally interact
with other people, (3) improperly assessed the medical opinions of record, and (4) failed
to consider his time off-task and attendance limitations. See id. at 14-26.
The Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision
which should be affirmed. See Dkt. No. 12 at 5-15. The Commissioner contends that the
ALJ’s 	RFC 	determination 	considered 	plaintiff’s 	gender 	dysphoria 	and 	related
impairments, considered plaintiff’s “medically determinable work-related impairments,”
and “adequately explained the RFC’s limitation for occasional social interaction with
others.” 	Id. at 5. 	The Commissioner argues that the ALJ considered plaintiff’s gender
dysphoria after step two because the ALJ discussed Dr. Long’s consultative examination
report that noted plaintiff was diagnosed with gender dysphoria. See id. at 8 (citing T. at
565-68). Further, the Commissioner claims that the ALJ’s RFC determination specifically
“contained mental work-related limitations” and plaintiff testified that gender dysphoria
was not the main cause of his mental health difficulties. 	Id. at 6; see id. at 8. 	The
Commissioner also claims that the ALJ properly considered the medical opinions of
record, and therefore, SSR 85-15 is not relevant to this matter. See id. at 11-17. Finally,
the Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not cherry-pick the evidence to support her
decision and plaintiff is asking the Court to reweigh the evidence. See id. at 16-17.
In reply, plaintiff asserts that the Commissioner’s argument regarding the ALJ’s
consideration of his gender dysphoria is factually and legally incorrect. See Dkt. No. 13
at 2-3. 	Plaintiff asserts that Commissioner’s argument is factually incorrect because
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neither of the state non-examining psychological consultants (1) recognized gender
dysphoria or dissociative identity disorder as an impairment, (2) acknowledged his claim
that he was disabled due to gender dysphoria, and (3) considered dissociative identity
disorder. See id. at 2. Plaintiff also claims that Dr. Long was unaware of his dissociative
identity disorder. 	See id. Plaintiff asserts that Commissioner’s argument is legally
incorrect because the state medical consultants’ consideration of his gender dysphoria
does not absolve the ALJ of her “duty to consider that diagnosis and related symptoms at
Step 2, in evaluating the medical opinions, and in forming the RFC.” 	Id. at 3. 	Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ cannot delegate her duty to consider the evidence to others. See id.
Plaintiff claims that “[t]he ALJ’s ‘lumping’ all of [his] psychiatric impairments together and
failing to make an individualized assessment of [his] particular symptoms is prejudicial
error warranting remand.” 	Id. at 4 (citing Rucker v. Kijakjazi, 48 F.4th 86, 92 (2d Cir.
2002)).
B. Severe Impairments
“At the second step of the evaluation, the medical severity of a claimant’s
impairments is considered.” 	Richard H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:17-CV-0515
(DNH/TWD), 	2018 	WL 	4627118, 	at 	*4 	(N.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	15, 	2018), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, No. 5:17-CV-0515 (DNH/TWD), 2018 WL 4625402 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 26, 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). 	A claimant’s impairment “must
result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that can be shown
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 	Therefore, a
physical or mental impairment must be established by objective medical evidence from
an acceptable medical source.” 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. A claimant’s own “statement of
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symptoms, 	a 	diagnosis, 	or 	a 	medical 	opinion 	to 	establish 	the 	existence 	of 	an
impairment(s)” is not sufficient. Id.
“A ‘severe impairment’ is defined as any impairment or combination of impairments
which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities.” Richard H., 2018 WL 4627118, at *4. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c);
404.1521) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Basic work activities are defined as “the
abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). Basic work
activities include
(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,
pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;
(4) Use of judgment;
(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work
situations; and
(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
Id. § 404.1522(b)(1)-(6). The claimant is responsible for submitting evidence establishing
the severity of their disability. See id. § 404.1512(a)(2)(i).
Here, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had severe impairments consisting of
depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, PTSD. 	T. at 17 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	The ALJ
explained that
[t]he claimant has complained of depression, anxiety and PTSD (Exhibit 4F,
p.2). They have a history of suicidal ideation (Exhibit 7F, p.2). At times, they
have appeared anxious with circumstantial thought processes (Exhibit 1F).
On other occasions, they have had impaired cognition (Exhibit 7F, p.4).
They received outpatient mental health treatment throughout the period in
question.
The 	impairments 	above 	cause 	more 	than 	minimal 	limitations 	in 	the
claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. 	Accordingly, they are
severe impairments.
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Id. at 17-18 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider his gender dysphoria at step two,
and that this condition constitutes a severe impairment. See Dkt. No. 10 at 13-14. Plaintiff
was diagnosed with gender dysphoria in March 2021. See T. at 332, 492, 650 (See Dkt.
No. 8-7). 	The prior administrative medical findings (“PAMFs”) note this diagnosis. 	See
id. at 63-64, 80 (See Dkt. No. 8-3). The record indicates that plaintiff’s symptoms include
depression, anxiety, visual impairment, feelings of hopelessness and anger, lethargy,
somnolence, panic attacks, suicidal ideation, difficulty concentrating and completing
tasks. See id. at 330, 337, 340, 343, 346, 349, 352, 362, 610-11, 616, 694, 720 (See Dkt.
No. 8-7). Plaintiff’s depression was described as leaving him “unable to work, leave the
house, [or] get out of bed.” T. at 364 (See Dkt. No. 8-7). Plaintiff’s symptoms were also
described as impacting most areas of his life, including his ability to function, work, and
his “work life.” Id. at 435, 459 (See Dkt. No. 8-7); see id. at 364, 373, 656 (See Dkt. No.
8-7). 	Plaintiff reported going to the bathroom and crying at work because “‘no one
understands’ how he feels.” Id. at 362. Similarly, he stated that “he feels like he cannot
handle working because of his speed and the frequent criticism he experiences.” 	Id. at
376. Neither plaintiff’s treatment providers, nor the PAMFs, explain which symptoms are
attributable to which of plaintiff’s mental health condition(s) in the treatment records listed
above.
Based on the foregoing, it is unclear whether plaintiff’s gender dysphoria is a
severe impairment because the ALJ’s decision does not discuss or reference plaintiff’s
gender dysphoria, and plaintiff’s treatment records state that his symptoms affect his
physical and mental abilities, including his ability to work. See T. at 15-24, 364, 373, 435,
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459, 656 (See Dkt. Nos. 8-2, 8-7); see also Richard H., 2018 WL 4627118, at *4. (citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c); 404.1521); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b)(1)-(6). Therefore, as the
ALJ did not determine whether this condition constitutes a severe impairment, judicial
review is frustrated, and remand is necessary for the ALJ to render a determination in the
first instance. See Kaliegh O. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:19-CV-940 (TWD), 2020 WL
5751171, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2020) (citing Bartrum v. Astrue, 32 F. Supp. 3d 320,
331 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)) (“[I]t is the ALJ’s responsibility to make factual findings in the first
instance, 	not 	this 	Court’s.”); 	Rodgers 	v. 	Saul, 	No. 	3:19-CV-653 	(JCH), 	2020 	WL
13551952, at *4 (D. Conn. May 28, 2020) (noting that “it is the role of the ALJ, the
factfinder in the first instance” to consider the evidence); Williams v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-
5521 (CBA), 2012 WL 3096694, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2012) (“[I]t is for the Social
Security Administration, not this Court, to weigh conflicting evidence in the first instance
and fully develop the record[.]”).
Additionally, as the adjudication of plaintiff’s gender dysphoria may potentially
impact the remainder of the ALJ’s five-step analysis, the Court will not address plaintiff’s
remaining arguments, which the ALJ may consider on remand. 	See Devra B. B. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-CV-643 (BKS), 2021 WL 4168529, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.
14, 2021) (“Because the Court has determined that remand is required, the Court does
not reach Plaintiff's remaining arguments.”); Shields v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-2088 (FB), 2012
WL 1865505, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012) (“In light of the decision to remand this case
with instructions to consider new evidence on Shields's cardiac condition, it is not
necessary to address this argument.”); Mary S. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:21-CV-1095 (RMS),
2022 WL 4074536, at *17 (D. Conn. Aug. 26, 2022) (quoting Lockwood v. Comm'r of Soc.
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Sec. Admin., 914 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[S]ince the ‘case must return to the agency
either way for the reasons already given . . . the Commissioner will have the opportunity
on 	remand 	to 	obviate 	th[ese] 	dispute[s] 	altogether 	by’ 	addressing 	the 	remaining
arguments on remand.”); Annunziato v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-606 (JAM), 2019 WL
156934, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2019) (“The ALJ shall also consider plaintiff's remaining
arguments on remand.”).
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that plaintiff’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No.
10) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Commissioners cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Dkt. No. 12) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED, and the matter
REMANDED for further proceedings; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision & Order on
all parties in accordance with Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 	March 3, 2026
Albany, New York
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