Cruz v. Sannes et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ROGELIO CRUZ, JR.,
Plaintiff,
1:26-CV-441
v. 	(AMN/DJS)
BRENDA K. SANNES, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
ROGELIO CRUZ, JR.
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Austin, Texas 78750
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
On March 19, 2026, Plaintiff pro se filed a Complaint asserting claims against two
United States District Court Judges, a retired United States Magistrate Judge, the
Northern District of New York, and ten John Does. Dkt. No. 1, Compl., p. 3. That same
day he filed an Amended Complaint against the same Defendants and added an additional
Defendant, a Courtroom Deputy Clerk from the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon. 	Dkt. No. 2, Am. Compl., pp. 2-3. 	The allegations in the Amended
Complaint primarily concern an order transferring an action previously filed in this
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District by Plaintiff. 	Id. at pp. 3-4. 	Plaintiff asserts violations of his rights under the
United States Constitution, two federal anti-discrimination statutes, local court rules and
28 U.S.C. § 1915. Id. at pp. 6-8. 	Plaintiff has filed an application for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, Dkt. No. 3, which this Court has granted by separate order.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has filed multiple other lawsuits in this District in 2026. 	Cruz v.
Williamson County, Texas, et al., 5:26-cv-80 (ECC/TWD); Cruz v. United States
Department of Agriculture, et al., 5:26-cv-90 (ECC/TWD); Cruz v. Clerk of Court, United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, et al., 5:26-cv-144 (ECC/TWD); Cruz
v. United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, et al., 5:26-cv-185
(ECC/TWD). 	Each of those matters was transferred to a different federal district court
because venue was not proper in this District. 5:26-cv-80, Dkt. No. 11; 5:26-cv-90, Dkt.
No. 4; 5:26-cv-144, Dkt. No. 4; 5:26-cv-185, Dkt. No. 4. In transferring Cruz v. United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the assigned Magistrate Judge
advised Plaintiff
that if he continues to file cases in this District where venue is improper,
sanctions may be imposed including, but not limited to, referring Plaintiff
to Chief U.S. District Judge Brenda K. Sannes for consideration of an Order
directing Plaintiff to show cause in writing why he should not be enjoined
from filing any future pleadings or documents of any kind in the Northern
District of New York pro se without the permission of the Chief Judge or
her designee.
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5:26-cv-185, Dkt. No. 4. 	In this action, Plaintiff challenges that notice as a “threat” to
prevent Plaintiff from filing future lawsuits. Am. Compl. at p. 3. Plaintiff contends that
the notice is part of a “pattern of obstruction” taken against him by other federal courts.
Id. at p. 2.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
– . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro
se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should
exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)
have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1983). 	Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
1 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Thus, 	a 	pleading 	that 	only 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint sets forth constitutional claims under the First and
Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 	Am. Compl. at pp. 6-7. 	It also
asserts statutory claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the
Rehabilitation Act. 	Id. at pp. 7-8. 	Finally, it purports to assert claims under certain
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procedural rules and statutes. Id. at p. 6. As set forth below, Plaintiff’s claims are subject
to dismissal.
A. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are both subject to
dismissal because neither statute is applicable to the federal judiciary.
“Title II of the ADA is not applicable to the federal government.” Cellular Phone
Taskforce v. FCC, 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2000). The ADA applies to public entities,
which the statute defines to include: “(A) any State or local government; (B) any
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States
or local government.” 	42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). “Thus, by definition, Title II of the ADA
does not apply to the federal government or an agency, such as the federal courts.” Moore
v. United States, 2022 WL 1104986, *1 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing Cellular Phone
Taskforce v. F.C.C., 217 F.3d at 73).
The only Defendants specifically named in this action are judicial officers or
employees and the District Court itself, Am. Compl. at pp. 2-3, and so the Complaint also
fails to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act because “[t]he Rehabilitation Act
applies to the federal Government but not the United States Courts.” In re Chapman, 777
F. Supp. 2d 196, 197 (D. Me. 2011); see also Davidson v. Judicial Council of the Second
Circuit, 2026 WL 901338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2026) (the “programs and activities
of the federal judiciary are not covered, and therefore not bound, by the [Rehabilitation]
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Act.”); Murray v. Murguia, 2025 WL 1101515, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2025), report
and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1442705 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2025), aff’d, 2025
WL 2092839 (9th Cir. July 25, 2025) (“neither Title II of the ADA nor Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act apply to the federal judiciary.”); Snider v. United States, 2018 WL
4760840, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2018) (“[t]he Rehabilitation Act does not cover the
judicial branch.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s statutory claims, therefore, should be dismissed.
B. Constitutional Claims
As mentioned, Plaintiff asserts violations of his rights under the First and Fifth
Amendments. Am. Compl. at pp. 6-8. He relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) as the basis
for bringing these claims. Id. Neither provides a basis for asserting a claim here.
“Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code creates a private cause of
action against individuals acting under color of state law but does not extend to federal
actors acting under color of federal law.” 	Sutera v. Transportation Sec. Admin., 708 F.
Supp. 2d 304, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see also United States v. Dorio, 483 F. Supp. 3d 145,
158 (D. Conn. 2020) (citing Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403 (1997)) (“42
U.S.C. § 1983 applies only to state, not federal, actors.”). 	Given that the only named
Defendants are federal judicial officials and a federal court, section 1983 is clearly
inapplicable.
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Nor may Plaintiff pursue a Bivens claim here. 	There is presently no statutory
analog to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of constitutional rights by individuals acting
under color of federal law. 	Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130 (2017). 	In 1971, the
Supreme Court did allow an implied claim for money damages for a Fourth Amendment
constitutional violation suffered at the hands of federal officials. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1999). 	Since that time,
however, extending the reach of Bivens has become a “disfavored judicial activity.”
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 135.
Neither of Plaintiff’s claims may be pursued under Bivens. 	The Supreme Court
has definitively held that Bivens does not extend to a “First Amendment retaliation
claim.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 498 (2022).
With respect to Plaintiff’s due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, the Court
is aware of no direct controlling authority regarding the availability of such a claim under
Bivens. 	The Supreme Court has provided clear guidance for how to proceed in that
situation.
When asked to extend Bivens, we engage in a two-step inquiry. We first
inquire whether the request involves a claim that arises in a new context or
involves a new category of defendants. 	And our understanding of a new
context is broad. We regard a context as new if it is different in a meaningful
way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court. When we find that
a claim arises in a new context, we proceed to the second step and ask
whether there are any special factors that counsel hesitation about granting
the extension. If there are - that is, if we have reason to pause before
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applying Bivens in a new context or to a new class of defendants - we reject
the request.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 102 (2020) (internal citations, quotations, and
alterations omitted). Under this standard, Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment due process claim
should be dismissed.
Plaintiff’s allegations, concerning the issuance of judicial opinions, would clearly
be a new context for purposes of Bivens. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the
Supreme Court recognized a Bivens claim for gender discrimination under the Fifth
Amendment. 	That Plaintiff also relies on the Fifth Amendment here does not get his
claim through the first step, however, because “[a] claim may arise in a new context even
if it is based on the same constitutional provision as a claim in a case in which a damages
remedy was previously recognized.” 	Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. at 103. Imputing a
claim for actions taken by judges or judiciary officials in pending judicial matters would
clearly be a new context for federal actions.
“When we find that a claim arises in a new context, we proceed to the second step
and ask whether there are any special factors that counsel hesitation about granting the
extension.” Id. at 102. Numerous factors counsel against permitting such claims in this
context. 	First, the ability to challenge a federal judge’s actions in a civil proceeding is
unnecessary since “declaratory relief against a judge for actions taken within his or her
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judicial capacity is ordinarily available by appealing the judge’s order.” 	Caldwell v.
Pesce, 83 F. Supp. 3d 472, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 639 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2016).
Second, permitting such claims would encourage collateral litigation and interfere with
the finality judicial orders provide. 	Third, such actions would largely be futile. 	Courts
have recognized the same judicial immunity that applies to damages claims under section
1983 would apply to Bivens claims. 	Andrews v. Hall, 2023 WL 309609, at *1 (2d Cir.
Jan. 19, 2023) (discussing application of the doctrine of judicial immunity in the context
of claims under Bivens brought against a federal judge).2 Finally, Bivens actions do not
provide for the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks. Id. at *2 n.2.
C. Other Claims
The Amended Complaint also purports to assert claims for violation of local court
rules and 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 	See Am. Compl. at p. 6. 	These claims should also be
dismissed.
Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that any Local Rule of this Court or the
District of Oregon has been violated. But in any event, this Court agrees with other courts
to have considered the question that “violation of the Local Rules of this Court neither
gives rise to a cause of action nor create an actionable legal duty.” 	P.D. v. Comegno,
2 Nor has Plaintiff alleged a basis for establishing the personal involvement of Judges Sannes and Coombe in this
matter since the order objected to was not issued by either. See generally Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618
(2d Cir. 2020).
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2008 WL 11367520, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2008); see also Eakin v. Borough of Polk,
2020 WL 7239560, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2020) (“there is no cause of action before this
Court for a violation of a local rule.”).
Similarly, Plaintiff may not assert a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “since § 1915
does not create a cause of action under which an individual could bring claims to federal
court.” Steele v. Miller, 2025 WL 1755188, at *2 (D. Kan. June 25, 2025); see also Kinsey
v. United States, 177 Fed. Cl. 208, 211 (2025) (“Section 1915 does not create a private
cause of action for plaintiffs to bring suit.”). Instead, section 1915 is merely a procedural
statue regulating the ability of parties to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff’s claims under local court rules and section 1915 must be dismissed.
D. Disposition of the Matter
Generally, dismissal of a pro se complaint should include leave to amend “when a
liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”
Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991). Here, however, where the grounds
for dismissal offer no basis for curing the defects in the pleading, dismissal without leave
to amend is appropriate. Kunz v. Brazill, 2015 WL 792096, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,
2015). Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Amended Complaint be dismissed.3
3 The pending Motion for injunctive relief, Dkt. No. 5, should be denied for the same reasons.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be DISMISSED as set
forth above; and it is
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)4 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: April 28, 2026
Albany, New York
4 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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