Moody v. Broadview Federal Credit Union

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
AMARI J. MOODY,
Plaintiff,
1:26-CV-229
v. 	(AMN/DJS)
BROADVIEW FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
AMARI J. MOODY
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Dacula, GA 30019
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
The Clerk has forwarded for review a Complaint filed by Plaintiff. 	Dkt. No. 1,
Compl. The filing fee in this action has not been paid, but Plaintiff has filed a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. That Motion has been granted. Dkt. No. 10. The
matter has been referred to the undersigned for an initial review pursuant to L.R. 72.3.
Also pending are several motions filed by Plaintiff. Dkt. Nos. 12, 13, 17, & 18.1
1 Because the Court recommends that the Complaint be dismissed, the Court also recommends denial of Plaintiff’s
motions noting structural defects and requesting supervisory review (Dkt. No. 12) and compelling emergency review
(Dkt. No. 17), and further recommends that Plaintiff’s motion to compel judicial assignment and issuance of an
initial screening order (Dkt. No. 13) be denied as moot.
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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
The 	Complaint 	alleges 	that 	“Plaintiff 	maintains 	a 	checking 	account 	with
Defendant,” Compl. at ¶ 6, and “requested a standard replacement debit card” in mid-
2025. Id. at ¶ 7. The Complaint further alleges that, while “Defendant represented that a
replacement card would be issued, . . . no functioning card was received” by Plaintiff. Id.
at ¶ 8. 	According to the Complaint, Defendant informed Plaintiff that an incorrect ZIP
code was associated with Plaintiff’s address, id. at ¶ 9, and “refused to issue a replacement
debit card unless Plaintiff provided additional ‘proof of address’ documentation” to
Defendant. Id. at ¶ 12.
The Complaint asserts that Plaintiff “is an individual with a documented medical
disability,” id. at ¶ 4, that his “disability limits the ability to repeatedly generate and
submit 	documentation,” 	and 	that 	he 	“request[ed] 	a 	reasonable 	modification 	of
Defendant’s procedures.” 	Id. at ¶ 13. 	The Complaint does not, however, provide any
additional details, such as the names of Plaintiff’s disabilities or how those disabilities
substantially limit major life activities. 	See generally Compl. 	The Complaint alleges
that, 	in 	response, 	“Defendant 	refused 	to 	reasonably 	modify 	its 	procedures 	to
accommodate Plaintiff’s disability,” id. at ¶ 15, and that, as a result, “Plaintiff had no
functioning debit card,” restricted access to funds, and “accrued overdrafts and fees.” Id.
at ¶ 16.
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The Complaint brings three causes of action against Defendant alleging violations
of: Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (the “ADA”);
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the “RA”); and the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (the “EFTA”). Id. at pp. 1 & 3.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as an award of costs against
Defendant. Id. at pp. 3-4.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
– . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro
se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should
exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)
have had an opportunity to respond,” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1983) (internal citations omitted). 	Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if
2 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
at 679 (quoting F ED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Thus, 	a 	pleading 	that 	only 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Transfer Order
The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s Motion to Declare the Transfer Order Void
(Dkt. No. 18).
On February 3, 2026, Chief United States District Judge Laura Taylor Swain
concluded that venue was improper in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York because “Plaintiff d[id] not allege facts showing that a substantial
part of the events giving rise to his claim occurred in th[at] district, or that Defendant
resides in th[at] district.” Dkt. No. 15 at p. 3. Consequently, Judge Swain transferred the
case to this Court on the basis that “[d]ocuments attached to the complaint . . . show that
Defendant is located in Albany, New York, which falls within the Northern District of
New York.” 	Id. at pp. 2-3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 112(a)). 	Judge Swain further explained
that transfer to the Northern District of New York was appropriate for the additional
reasons that “Albany, New York . . . appears to be where [Defendant] made the decisions
Plaintiff is challenging,” relevant documents and witnesses would likely be located in this
district, and it would be “equally convenient” for Plaintiff, who is a resident of Georgia,
“to litigate this action in the Northern District of New York as it would be to litigate this
action in” the Southern District of New York. Id. at p. 3.
Plaintiff, however, argues that the February 3, 2026 Order is void because it: (1)
applied the wrong venue statute; (2) rested on incorrect factual premises; (3) ignored
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nondiscretionary federal access duties; and (4) foreclosed judicial review of ongoing
discrimination and constructive denial. 	Dkt. No. 18 at p. 1. 	With regard to the first
argument, Plaintiff asserts that “[v]enue properly lies under § 1391(e) and federal-access
standards—not a narrow § 1391(b)(2) geographic tort analysis.” Id. at p. 2. However, 28
U.S.C. § 1391(e) only applies where “a defendant is an officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal
authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e),
and thus would not be applicable to Defendant, which is alleged in the Complaint to be
“a federally insured credit union.” Compl. at ¶ 5.
Second, Plaintiff makes several assertions with regard to the “locus of events,”
including that: “[t]he challenged servicing decisions were made through centralized
banking 	and 	compliance 	systems”; 	Defendant 	is 	“a 	New 	York-based 	financial
institution”; the ADA and the RA “violations arise from policies, not physical events”;
and the “EFTA violations rise from national electronic networks, whose administration
impacts this District.” Dkt. No. 18 at pp. 2-3. Nevertheless, Plaintiff continues to fail to
provide a factual basis for jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York.
Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that the Order does not acknowledge or address rights
that Plaintiff believes he is entitled to under the ADA, RA, and EFTA, Dkt. No. 18 at p.
3, does not provide a basis for voiding the Order, as a transferring court is not required to
address the merits of a case before transferring it to another venue. See, e.g., Melwani v.
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Amazon.com, Inc., 2021 WL 4429604, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2021) (“Because the
case must be transferred, the Court will not address Defendants’ motion to partially
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint.”).
Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion to Declare the Transfer
Order Void (Dkt. No. 18) be denied. Having determined that the Order transferring this
case to the Northern District of New York is proper, the Court proceeds with its review
of the Complaint pursuant to L.R. 72.3.
B. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
The first cause of action alleges that Defendant violated the ADA, and the second
cause of action alleges that Defendant violated the RA. Compl. at p. 3.
The ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis
of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(a). Similarly, the RA provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29
U.S.C. § 794(a).
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“Because the ADA and RA’s statutory language is nearly identical, courts treat
those claims identically.” Ramrattan v. New York, 2025 WL 2549075, at *7 (N.D.N.Y.
July 9, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Ramrattan v. Guzman, 2025
WL 2315310 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2025) (citing Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261,
272 (2d Cir. 2003)). To establish a violation under the ADA and the RA, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) defendant “is an entity subject to the acts”; (2) plaintiff is a “qualified
individual[] with a disability”; and (3) plaintiff was “denied the opportunity to participate
in or benefit from [defendant’s] services, programs, or activities or [defendant] otherwise
discriminated against” plaintiff because of plaintiff’s disability. 	Id. (quoting Wright v.
New York State Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA and the RA, and thus his claims pursuant to the ADA and the RA are not sufficient
to withstand initial review. “Disability” is defined under the ADA and the RA as “(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment.” 	Lewis v. Adirondack Med. Ctr., 2024 WL 4712880, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. May 10, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)), report and recommendation
adopted, 2024 WL 4448870 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2024).
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Here, the Complaint contains only vague and conclusory assertions that Plaintiff
has “a documented medical disability affecting cognitive and executive functioning,”
Compl. at ¶ 4, that he “is medically disabled,” and that his “disability limited the ability
to repeatedly generate and submit documentation.” Id. at ¶ 13. The Complaint does not
specify any particular physical or mental impairment suffered by Plaintiff. See generally
Compl. Further, the Complaint does not contain any non-conclusory factual allegations
explaining how any impairment suffered by Plaintiff prevented him from providing
Defendant with documentation of his proof of address so that Defendant could mail him
a replacement debit card. See id.
Without additional factual allegations to show that Plaintiff suffered a physical or
mental impairment and to evidence how “a major life activity is or was substantially
limited” by any such impairment, Plaintiff has failed “to satisfy his pleading burden under
either prong (A) or prong (B) of the definition.” 	Lewis v. Adirondack Med. Ctr., 2024
WL 4712880, at *4 (quotation, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); see, e.g.,
Moody v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 2026 WL 174460, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2026)
(citations omitted) (holding that Plaintiff, who alleged that he has “documented medical
impairments affecting cognition, vision, and executive functioning,” failed to state a
claim under Title III of the ADA and the RA because, “[a]lthough Plaintiff states that he
is disabled, he neither identifies his disability nor sets forth any facts showing that his
alleged disability substantially limits one or more major life activities”); Moody v. United
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States Postal Serv., 2026 WL 353611, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2026) (“Plaintiff, in many
of his submissions, asserts that he is disabled . . . , but in none of these submissions does
he: (1) describe his disability, or (2) demonstrate how the actions of the USPS have denied
him the opportunity to participate in or benefit from its services, programs, or activities,
or how the USPS has otherwise discriminated against him, by reason of his disability.”)
(emphasis in original).
Separately, to the extent that the Complaint seeks an award of monetary damages
in connection with Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and the RA, such claims are also
subject to dismissal for the additional reason that monetary damages are not an available
remedy pursuant to these statutes. See Lewis v. Adirondack Med. Ctr., 2024 WL 4712880,
at *4; Lopez v. YWCA of Ne. New York, 2025 WL 641569, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2025)
(citing Powell v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 364 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s first cause of action
pursuant to the ADA and second cause of action pursuant to the RA.
C. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq.
The third and final cause of action alleges that Defendant violated the EFTA, and
makes specific reference to “Regulation E” of the EFTA. Compl. at p. 3.
To state a claim under the EFTA, a plaintiff must allege that an “unauthorized
electronic fund transfer was initiated through an electronic terminal, telephone, computer,
or magnetic tape for the purpose of ordering, instructing, or authorizing a financial
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institution to debit or credit a consumer’s account.” Bernstein v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 775 F. Supp. 3d 701, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2025), reconsideration denied, 2025 WL
3753911 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2025) (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Complaint fails to allege that any unauthorized electronic fund transfer
was initiated in relation to his account or otherwise. 	See generally Compl. 	To the
contrary, the only allegations contained in the Complaint in support of Plaintiff’s claim
that Defendant violated the EFTA relate to Defendant allegedly not providing Plaintiff
with access to electronic fund transfer services and not issuing Plaintiff a replacement
debit card. 	See id. at ¶¶ 28-29. 	It remains unclear to the Court what connection these
allegations have to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant violated the EFTA.
Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s third cause of action
pursuant to the EFTA.
D. Leave to Amend
“Ordinarily, a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant
without granting leave to amend at least once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint
gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.’” Bruce v. Tompkins Cnty. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Kephart, 2015 WL 151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting
Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)). 	Accordingly, the Court
recommends that the Complaint be dismissed, but that Plaintiff be afforded an opportunity
to amend.
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The Court advises Plaintiff that, should he be permitted to amend his Complaint,
any amended pleading he submits must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Any such amended complaint, which shall supersede and replace in
its entirety the previous Complaint filed by Plaintiff, must contain sequentially numbered
paragraphs containing only one act of misconduct per paragraph. 	Plaintiff is further
cautioned that no portion of his prior Complaint shall be incorporated into his amended
complaint by reference. Any amended complaint submitted by Plaintiff must set forth all
claims he intends to assert and must demonstrate that a case or controversy exists between
Plaintiff and Defendant that Plaintiff has a legal right to pursue and over which this Court
has jurisdiction. 	If Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant violated a law, he should
specifically refer to such law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(4) Motion to Declare the Transfer
Order Void (Dkt. No. 18) be DENIED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED with
leave to amend; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Notice of Structural Defects and Request for
Article 	III 	Supervisory 	Review 	(Dkt. 	No. 	12) 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Compel
Emergency Review (Dkt. No. 17) be DENIED; and it is further
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RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Judicial Assignment and
Issuance of Initial Screening Order (Dkt. No. 13) be DENIED as moot; and it is
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)3 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: March 11, 2026
Albany, New York
3 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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