Chaney v. Delarosa et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NAKIA CHANEY,
Plaintiff,
1:25-cv-1299
v. 	(GTS/DJS)
RANDOLFO DELAROSA, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
NAKIA CHANEY
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Troy, New York 12180
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
The Clerk has forwarded for review a civil Complaint filed by Plaintiff. Dkt. No.
1, Compl. The filing fee in this action has not been paid, but Plaintiff has filed a motion
to proceed in forma pauperis. 	Dkt. No. 6. 	That Motion has been granted. 	The matter
has been referred to the undersigned for an initial review pursuant to L.R. 72.3. The Court
recommends that the Complaint be dismissed.
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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
The Complaint alleges that, in or about October 2019, Defendant Randolfo
Delarosa 	(“Defendant 	Delarosa”) 	filed 	“unlawful 	and 	erroneous 	illegal 	eviction
proceedings” against Plaintiff Nakia Chaney (“Plaintiff”) for alleged non-payment of
rent. Compl. ¶ 20. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff “was never served any notices or
rent demands” in connection with the eviction proceedings. 	Id. at ¶¶ 33 & 45. 	The
Complaint further alleges that, on November 13, 2019, and before Plaintiff’s court
appearance on November 15, 2019, Plaintiff was evicted from the premises. Id. at ¶ 25.
Consequently, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was not given the opportunity to be
heard or challenge the non-payment allegations, that the issue of Plaintiff’s non-payment
of rent “was not addressed on its merits,” and that Plaintiff was denied federal due
process. Id. at ¶¶ 23 & 25.
The Complaint also names as Defendants: the City of Schenectady, the County of
Schenectady, Schenectady Sheriff Derrick Schimdt, Jennifer Martin, Section 8 Inspector,
Schenectady Municipal Housing Director, New York State Court System, State of New
York, Requan Donovan, Donna Gonzalez, John Does, and Sheriff Dominic Dagostino.
Id. at p. 1. 	The specific factual assertions made against these Defendants need not be
recited at length given the deficiencies noted below.
Attached to the Complaint is a Warrant of Eviction, dated October 18, 2019. Id.
at p. 22. 	Notably, the Warrant of Eviction states that a “[f]inal decision in favor of
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[Defendant Delarosa] ha[d] been granted based on the judgment of possession entered in
the Schenectady City Court on 10/18/2019, which awarded [Defendant Delarosa] the
delivery of the premises.” Id. The Warrant of Eviction further provides that the “[e]arliest
date upon which execution may occur is 11/01/2019,” id., a fact of which Plaintiff
acknowledges and is aware. Id. at ¶ 27.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
– . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro
se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should
exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)
have had an opportunity to respond,” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1983) (internal citations omitted). 	Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if
the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
1 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
at 679 (quoting F ED. R. C IV. P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Thus, 	a 	pleading 	that 	only 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
To the extent that the Complaint asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see
Compl. at pp. 1-2, it should be dismissed as untimely. 	The statute of limitations for a
section 1983 action in New York is three years. Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d 547, 548 (2d
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Cir. 1995). “[A] cause of action under section 1983 accrues ‘when the plaintiff knows of
or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.’” Walker v. Cuomo,
2012 WL 4490760, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012) (quoting Pearl v. City of Long Beach,
296 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2002)).2 Here, Plaintiff had reason to know that his rights to be
free from unlawful arrest and cruel and unusual punishment, as well as his rights to due
process and the assistance of counsel, may have been violated at the time of the alleged
eviction on November 13, 2019. 	This Complaint, filed more than five years later, is
clearly untimely.3
Though the Complaint is far from a model of clarity, it appears that the remaining
claims Plaintiff seeks to pursue are state law claims related to the eviction proceedings.
However, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Home Depot U. S. A., Inc.
v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435, 437 (2019) (quotations omitted). Jurisdiction in federal court
generally exists only when diversity of citizenship is present. 	28 U.S.C. § 1332. 	“To
have 	complete 	diversity, 	‘each 	plaintiff’s 	citizenship 	must 	be 	different 	from 	the
citizenship of each defendant.’” 	Johnson v. Glob. Promotion & Pub. Corp., 2013 WL
828744, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013) (quoting Hallingby v. Hallingby, 574 F.3d 51, 56
2 Copies of unreported cases from Westlaw are attached to this opinion for Plaintiff’s reference.
3 Plaintiff’s state law claims for eviction and trespass are likely also untimely under New York’s statute of limitations
for such claims. See In re 1115 Tird Ave. Rest. Corp., 2000 WL 1346824, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2000) (holding
that plaintiff’s claim for wrongful eviction was time barred because it is governed by a one-year statute of
limitations); Gentry v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 159 F. Supp. 280, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (holding that plaintiff’s
claim for trespass was time barred because it is governed by a three-year statute of limitations).
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(2d Cir. 2009)). 	Here, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and the Defendants are all
residents of New York. Compl. at pp. 1-2. As a result, there is clearly a lack of complete
diversity, and no diversity jurisdiction exists in this case. See Butler v. Geico Gen. Ins.
Co., 2019 WL 330591, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2019), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 652197 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019).
Finally, while a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims if certain conditions are met, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the court may decline to do so
where it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in
its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the
exercise of jurisdiction.” 	Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
Here, having recommended dismissal of the federal claims over which the Court has
original jurisdiction, the Court also recommends that the District Court decline to exercise
its supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice
as to Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and it is further
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RECOMMENDED, 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	be 	DISMISSED 	without
prejudice to refiling in state court in accordance with the governing limitations period as
to Plaintiff’s state law claims; and it is
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)4 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED. R. C IV. P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: January 5, 2026
Albany, New York
4 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV . P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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