Rickson v. Albany-Schoharie-Schenectady-Saratoga Board of Cooperative Educational Services et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ADRIANNE RICKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALBANY-SCHOHARIE-SCHENECTADY-
SARATOGA BOARD OF COOPERATIVE
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES et al.,
Defendants.
1:25-cv-00667 (AMN/DJS)
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
MANN LAW FIRM, PC 	MATTHEW J. MANN, ESQ.
426 Troy-Schenectady Road
Latham, New York 12110
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC 	HOWARD M. MILLER, ESQ.
68 South Service Road – Suite 400
Melville, New York 11747
One Lincoln Center 	KATE I. REID, ESQ.
Syracuse, New York 13202
Attorneys for Defendants
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On May 23, 2025, plaintiff Adrianne Rickson (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and New York State law, against more than one hundred
defendants (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting claims arising from the termination of her
employment as a probationary teacher with the Albany-Schoharie-Schenectady-Saratoga Board of
Cooperative Educational Services (“Defendant BOCES”). Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). Presently
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 1 of 17

2
before the Court are Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 12”), Dkt. No. 12 (“Motion”), and Plaintiff’s cross-motion
to amend, Dkt. No. 13 (the proposed “Amended Complaint”). See also Dkt. Nos. 21, 23. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court reviews the allegations in the Amended Complaint for purposes
of resolving the Motion, grants the Motion, and denies Plaintiff’s cross-motion.
II. 	BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from the proposed Amended
Complaint, its attachments, or materials it incorporates by reference, and are assumed to be true
for purposes of ruling on the Motion, see Div. 1181 Amalgamated Transit Union-N.Y. Emps.
Pension Fund v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 9 F.4th 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam), or are otherwise
matters of public record, see Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 816 F. App’x 532, 534 (2d Cir. 2020).
A. The Parties
Plaintiff resides in New York State and was employed as a teacher at Defendant BOCES.
Dkt. No. 21-2 at ¶ 1.
Defendant BOCES, located in Albany County, is a public educational organization and
public body organized under New York State law. Id. at ¶ 2.
Defendant Lauren Gemmill resides in New York State and served as the superintendent of
Defendant BOCES. Id. at ¶ 3. Defendant Naomi Hoffman resides in New York State and served
as the president of the board of Defendant BOCES. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that one hundred
additional Defendants reside in New York State and “were the board members, administrators,
employees, agents and assigns of [Defendant BOCES].” Id. at ¶ 5.
B. Plaintiff’s Employment
Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant BOCES began on January 3, 2019. Id. at ¶ 12.
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 2 of 17

3
Plaintiff alleges that she was “properly classified” as a probationary teacher between
January 3, 2019 and January 2, 2023. Id. at ¶ 13. On January 3, 2023, Plaintiff asserts, her four-
year probationary term pursuant to N.Y. Educ. Law § 3014 ended and she “was granted tenure by
estoppel.” Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result, she was a tenured teacher at the time
of her termination. 	Id. at ¶ 16. 	Plaintiff contends that “[o]n or about February 29, 2024,
Defendants summarily terminated Plaintiff’s employment” without due process. Id. at ¶ 35.1
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants previously terminated her employment on two occasions.
Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff contends that both times, the Commissioner of Education of the State of New
York (“Commissioner”) “determined that such terminations were improper” and that Plaintiff was
restored to employment as a result. Id. at ¶ 19.
Defendants submit the administrative decisions from these prior proceedings, as well as
related judicial opinions and a third administrative decision.2 See Dkt. Nos. 12-2, 12-3, 12-4, 12-
5, 12-6. According to the Appellate Division, Third Department, of the New York State Supreme
Court:
In January 2019, petitioner hired respondent Adrianne Rickson (hereinafter the
teacher), on a probationary basis, as a criminal justice instructor. 	In November
2021, the teacher used her work email account to forward a message to other
colleagues notifying them of an after-school rally concerning COVID–19 policies.
1 Throughout both the Complaint and the proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff engages in
impermissible group pleading, rarely if ever identifying which Defendant(s) out of the more than
one hundred Defendants took any particular action. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 21-2.
2 According to the parties, the Court can take judicial notice of these materials in order to resolve
Defendants’ Motion. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 12-7 at 13; Dkt. No. 21 at ¶¶ 25, 36; see also Giraldo v.
Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (“We also take judicial notice of relevant matters of
public record.”) (citations omitted); Casler v. W. Irondequoit Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 3d 60, 66
(W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Although Plaintiff omitted from his complaint that he appealed his suspension
to the Commissioner, the Court may consider the Commissioner’s decision in connection with
ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss because it is a matter of public record of which the Court
may take judicial notice.”) (citation omitted). 	Citations to docket entries utilize the pagination
generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic filing system, and not the documents’ internal
pagination.
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 3 of 17

4
Consequently, the teacher received a memorandum counseling her for the improper
use of petitioner’s email system. In January 2022, the teacher offered her students
an optional extra-credit assignment for viewing a podcast interview of a physician
critical of COVID vaccinations and answering written questions related to the
podcast. In February 2022, petitioner’s superintendent notified the teacher that she
intended to recommend to the Board of Education to discontinue her probationary
employment. 	The Board of Education terminated the teacher’s probationary
appointment effective April 21, 2022. 	The teacher appealed to respondent
Commissioner of Education, who determined that the superintendent’s statement
of reasons for discontinuance under Education Law § 3031 was too vague and
remanded to petitioner to clarify and resubmit the statement of reasons for
dismissal.
Thereafter, the superintendent articulated the grounds to discontinue the teacher’s
employment and she was terminated a second time in August 2022. 	Again, the
teacher appealed. This time, the Commissioner reviewed the merits and determined
that petitioner’s probationary appointment was discontinued in bad faith and
violated the teacher’s right to academic freedom. 	As such, the Commissioner
ordered that the teacher be reinstated with back pay and benefits. 	Petitioner
thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding against respondent New
York 	State 	Education 	Department 	and 	the 	Commissioner 	challenging 	the
determination as arbitrary, capricious and an error of law. Supreme Court denied
petitioner’s request to annul the Commissioner’s determination and dismissed the
petition. Petitioner appeals.
In the interim, the teacher was once again terminated from her position, for reasons
unrelated to those at issue here. Respondents then moved to dismiss this appeal as
moot, 	pointing 	to 	the 	fact 	that 	this 	latest 	termination 	was 	upheld 	by 	the
Commissioner and the time to initiate a CPLR article 78 proceeding with respect to
this has expired. Petitioner opposes this motion contending that the appeal is not
moot and that, even if it is found to be so, the exception to the mootness doctrine
applies.
. . . .
As the issues raised by the petition are moot and the circumstances do not warrant
application of the exception to mootness doctrine, we dismiss petitioner’s appeal[.]
Albany-Schoharie-Schenectady-Saratoga Bd. of Educ. Servs. v. Rosa, 222 N.Y.S.3d 822, 823-24
(App. Div. 2025) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff also administratively appealed Defendant BOCES’ February 2024 decision “to (1)
not grant petitioner tenure and (2) discontinue her probationary appointment.” Dkt. No. 12-5 at 1.
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 4 of 17

5
Plaintiff argued “that she gained tenure by estoppel prior to her separation from employment, thus
preventing her termination without a hearing” and that her termination “was unlawful because it
violated her constitutional and statutory rights.” Id. at 2. Defendant BOCES argued that it had
properly denied Plaintiff tenure and terminated her employment for the reasons set forth in
contemporaneous correspondence. Id. As the Commissioner noted in her May 20, 2024 decision:
In a letter dated December 29, 2023 the DS [district superintendent] explained that
petitioner had not met the standard for a recommendation of tenure, as exemplified
by “basic ratings in [her] last observation.” The DS also identified five examples
of “poor professional judgment, including”:
 	Creation and application of an unapproved grading policy;
 	Unprofessional communication with a parent;
 	Failing 	to 	comply 	with 	a 	supervisor’s 	directive 	regarding 	parent
communications; and
 	Using personally identifiably information of a student for personal reasons.
On January 12, 2024, BOCES received complaints from a parent and a student
concerning petitioner. BOCES thereafter placed petitioner on administrative leave
and revoked its offer of [a one-year extension of her probationary appointment].
On February 12, 2024, BOCES denied tenure to petitioner and terminated her
probationary appointment, based on the DS’s recommendation. 	These appeals
ensued.
Dkt. No. 12-5 at 2 (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted). The Commissioner ultimately
denied Plaintiff’s appeals because Plaintiff had not demonstrated that (i) she received tenure by
estoppel, or (ii) “that BOCES discontinued her probationary appointment for an impermissible
reason.” Id. at 3-4. More specifically, the Commissioner stated that:
Petitioner has failed to prove that she acquired tenure by estoppel. . . . Petitioner’s
argument hinges upon whether her probationary term continued during the
pendency of the Rickson II litigation in spring 2023. . . . [I]mplementation of this
decision was complicated by the ensuing article 78 litigation during which
petitioner was largely on administrative leave. As such, I find that BOCES did not
knowingly accept petitioner’s teaching services beyond her probationary period, as
required for a finding of tenure by estoppel. . . .
I further find that BOCES reasonably elected not to credit the time petitioner spent
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 5 of 17

6
on administrative leave toward her probationary term. . . . [T]he Appellate Division
[has] reasoned that a teacher claiming tenure by estoppel could not receive credit
for time in which he “rendered no actual service” to the district[.]
. . . .
Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that respondent’s discontinuance was
motivated by continued dissatisfaction with the outcome of Rickson II. . . . This is
corroborated by the fact that BOCES returned petitioner to a classroom assignment
in September 2023 and, despite performance concerns, offered to extend her
probation. 	Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the DS or other
administrators were motivated by anything other than the numerous complaints
identified in the December 2023 letter[.]
Id. at 3-4 (citations and footnotes omitted).
C. Plaintiff’s Claims
The proposed Amended Complaint asserts four claims in connection with the termination
of Plaintiff’s employment: two under Section 1983, for violation of due process and retaliation,
and two under New York State law. Dkt. No. 21-2 at ¶¶ 29-68. Plaintiff seeks various forms of
relief as a result. Id. at 14-15.
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a party’s claim for relief. Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007). In
considering legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint and
draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,
493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). This presumption, however, does not extend to legal conclusions.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead “a short and plain statement of the
claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual “heft to sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 6 of 17

7
relief,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (alteration in original) (quotation
omitted). Under this standard, a pleading’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level,” id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are
“plausible on [their] face,” id. at 570. 	“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). 	“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Ultimately, “when
the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has “not nudged [his or her] claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed,” id. at 570.
B. Leave to Amend
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to amend its pleading
once as a matter of course “no later than: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one
to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21
days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(A)-(B). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When a cross-motion for leave to
file an amended complaint is made in response to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), leave
to amend will be denied as futile only if the proposed new claim cannot withstand a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, i.e., if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
plead no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. See Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 941 F.2d
119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991). When assessing futility, the court employs a standard comparable to that
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 7 of 17

8
utilized in assessing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp.,
244 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that “leave to amend will be denied as futile only if
the proposed new claim cannot withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss”).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim and that Plaintiff’s request for
leave to amend is futile.3 	See generally Dkt. Nos. 12, 24. 	Given the comparable standard for
addressing these arguments, the Court proceeds to consider Defendants’ pending Motion in light
of the allegations in Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint. 	See, e.g., Pettaway v. Nat’l
Recovery Sols., 955 F.3d 299, 303 (2d Cir. 2020) (“District courts in this Circuit have repeatedly
explained that, when faced with an amended complaint, they may either deny a pending motion to
dismiss as moot or consider the merits of the motion, analyzing the facts as alleged in the amended
pleading. . . . This is a sound approach that promotes judicial economy by obviating the need for
multiple rounds of briefing addressing complaints that are legally insufficient.”) (citations
omitted).
A. Procedural Due Process
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim. Dkt. No. 12-7
at 13-15. The Court agrees.
“A procedural due process claim is composed of two elements: (1) the existence of a
property or liberty interest that was deprived and (2) deprivation of that interest without due
process.” Radwan v. Manuel, 55 F.4th 101, 123 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ.
Dep’t, 692 F.3d 202, 218 (2d Cir. 2012)).
3 The Court agrees with the parties that leave to amend is required. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 21 at ¶¶ 45-
52; Dkt. No. 24 at 11-13.
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 8 of 17

9
Plaintiff has not alleged a valid property interest in continued employment as a
probationary teacher. See, e.g., Cummings v. City of New York, No. 21-1380, 2022 WL 2166585,
at *2 (2d Cir. June 16, 2022) (summary order) (“Here [plaintiff] did not allege a valid property
interest. She did not have a property interest in her probationary employment[.]”) (citing Finley
v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1297 (2d Cir. 1996)) (affirming district court’s dismissal of
probationary teacher’s procedural due process claims); Catania v. United Fed’n of Tchrs., No. 21-
cv-1257, 2025 WL 638625, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2025) (“Under New York law, it is well
settled that a probationary employee, unlike a permanent employee, has no property rights in his
position and may be lawfully discharged without a hearing and without any stated specific
reason.”) (citation omitted) (dismissing probationary principal’s procedural due process claim).
In addition, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that she was no longer a probationary teacher
at the time of her termination. Plaintiff claims she had obtained tenure by estoppel after four years
of continuous employment, Dkt. No. 21 at ¶ 17, but does not offer well-pled factual allegations to
support this legal conclusion. See, e.g., DeNigris v. Smithtown Cent. Sch. Dist., 193 N.Y.S.3d 175,
180 (App. Div. 2023) (“Tenure by estoppel results when a school board accepts the continued
services of a teacher or administrator, but fails to take the action required by law to either grant or
deny tenure prior to the expiration of the teacher’s probationary term.”) (citation omitted). Indeed,
it is implausible that Defendants “continued to accept the services of” Plaintiff between January
2019 and January 2023, given Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants twice terminated her
employment during this time. Dkt. No. 21-2 at ¶¶ 13, 18-19. Plaintiff’s assertion that she obtained
tenure by estoppel is thus a legal conclusion that is entitled to no weight.4 See, e.g., Iqbal, 556
4 In any event, Plaintiff agrees that the Court can take judicial notice of the Commissioner’s
decision, which states that Plaintiff had not obtained tenure by estoppel because, inter alia, her
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 9 of 17

10
U.S. at 678 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Because Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that
she had obtained tenure by estoppel, she has not alleged a valid property interest. See, e.g., Regan
v. Vill. of Pelham, No. 19-cv-7987, 2021 WL 1063320, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2021)
(“[N]umerous courts have held that a probationary school employee has no property interest in his
position.”) (citing Kahn v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 18 N.Y.3d 457, 467 (2012)) (dismissing
probationary administrator’s procedural due process claims).
Even if Plaintiff had plausibly alleged a valid property interest, Defendants are also correct
that she fails to sufficiently allege a deprivation without process. Dkt. No. 12-7 at 13-15. Plaintiff
had the opportunity to raise claims regarding her tenure and termination to the Commissioner
(which she did, unsuccessfully) and then to further raise those claims in an Article 78 proceeding.
See, e.g., Desir v. City of New York, 453 F. App’x 30, 36 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiff] claims that
he had achieved tenure by virtue of his years of services as a probationary teacher and a substitute
teacher. He was afforded an opportunity to present this claim in an Article 78 proceeding . . . .
Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Desir’s procedural due process claim.”) (citation
omitted); Camhi v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 920 F. Supp. 2d 306, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“In
addition, the Plaintiff could have brought her grievances to the New York State Commissioner of
Education, which would have also afforded her ‘a full and fair opportunity for administrative
review of her assertion of tenure rights.’ . . . ‘Accordingly, [the] [P]laintiff can assert no actionable
claim for denial of due process under section 1983.’”) (second and third alterations in original)
(citations omitted); see also Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 436 F.3d 147, 157 (2d Cir.
probationary term did not continue throughout the pendency of administrative and judicial
proceedings related to her prior terminations. See supra Section II.B.
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 10 of 17

11
2006) (“An Article 78 proceeding is adequate for due process purposes even though the petitioner
may not be able to recover the same relief that he could in a § 1983 suit.”) (citation omitted). In
fact, Plaintiff acknowledges that “as a general rule,, [sic] ‘the Second Circuit has found New York’s
CPLR Article 78 review to be ‘a perfectly adequate post-deprivation remedy’ in the context of
employment termination.’” 	Dkt. No. 21 at ¶ 23 (quoting Quattrone v. Erie 2 Chautauqua-
Cattaraugus Bd. of Co-op Educ. Servs., No. 08-cv-367, 2011 WL 4899991, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.
13, 2011)). As a result, Plaintiff has also failed to plausibly allege a deprivation without process.5
For each of these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a Section 1983 procedural due process
claim.
B. First Amendment Retaliation
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a First Amendment retaliation claim
under Section 1983. Dkt. No. 12-7 at 17-25. The Court again agrees.
“To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff ‘must plausibly allege that (1) his
or her speech or conduct was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took an adverse
action against him or her; and (3) there was a causal connection between this adverse action and
the protected speech.’” Quinones v. City of Binghamton, 997 F.3d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting
5 Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has not pled a stigma-plus claim. Dkt. No. 12-7 at 15-17;
see generally Cummings, 2022 WL 2166585, at *2. By failing to argue otherwise, Plaintiff has
abandoned any stigma-plus claim. Colbert v. Rio Tinto PLC, 824 F. App’x 5, 11 (2d Cir. 2020)
(“As a general matter, district courts frequently deem claims abandoned when counseled plaintiffs
fail to provide arguments in opposition at the motion to dismiss stage.”) (citation omitted).
Regardless, neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint explicitly lists a stigma-plus claim
among the causes of action, see generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 21-2, and Plaintiff’s factual allegations are
insufficient to state such a claim, see, e.g., Waronker v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 788 F.
App’x 788, 794 (2d Cir. 2019) (“To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege ‘(1)
the utterance of a statement sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that is capable
of being proved false, and that he or she claims is false, and (2) a material state-imposed burden
or state-imposed alteration of the plaintiff’s status or rights.’”) (quoting Sadallah v. City of Utica,
383 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 11 of 17

12
Montero v. City of Yonkers, 890 F.3d 386, 394 (2d Cir. 2018)). 	“When asserting a First
Amendment retaliation claim, public employees, like [plaintiff], face greater burdens than private
citizens to demonstrate that their speech is protected by the First Amendment, because ‘[t]he
government as employer . . . has far broader powers [to restrict speech] than does the government
as sovereign.’” 	Long v. Byrne, 146 F.4th 282, 291 (2d Cir. 2025) (second, third, and fourth
alterations in original) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)). 	“A public
employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment when ‘the employee spoke as a private
citizen and . . . the speech at issue addressed a matter of public concern.’” Quinones, 997 F.3d at
466 (alteration in original) (quoting Montero, 890 F.3d at 393).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim fails as a matter of law because
she does not allege that she spoke as a private citizen. Dkt. No. 12-7 at 19-23; see also Montero,
890 F.3d at 395 (“The Supreme Court [has] stated that ‘when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties,’ . . . ‘the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.’”) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421). Plaintiff does not dispute this. See generally
Dkt. No. 21. Instead, Plaintiff argues that her speech was related to a matter of public concern.
See, e.g., id. at ¶ 31 (“In sum and substance, Plaintiff spoke freely about her viewpoints on this
government intrusion through mandating vaccination with staff and encouraged students to read
multiple sources rather than simply accept government dogma.”).
Regardless of whether Plaintiff has adequately pled public concern, however, her First
Amendment claim still fails. See, e.g., Miceli v. Mehr, 830 F. App’x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2020) (“To
determine whether or not a plaintiff’s speech is protected, a court must begin by asking whether
the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. 	If the court determines that the
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 12 of 17

13
plaintiff either did not speak as a citizen or did not speak on a matter of public concern, the
employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the
speech.”) (quoting Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff does not plausibly
allege that she spoke as a private citizen to her colleagues and students.6 See, e.g., Dkt. No. 21-2
at ¶¶ 44-54; see also Rosa, 222 N.Y.S.3d at 823 (“In November 2021, the teacher used her work
email account to forward a message to other colleagues notifying them of . . . [a] rally concerning
COVID–19 policies. Consequently, the teacher received a memorandum counseling her for the
improper use of petitioner’s email system. In January 2022, the teacher offered her students an
optional extra-credit assignment for viewing a podcast interview of a physician critical of COVID
vaccinations and answering written questions related to the podcast.”); see also Lynch v. Ackley,
811 F.3d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has identified three circumstances in
which public employee speech is not protected from retaliation by State employers. First, speech
about personal matters, as opposed to ‘matters of public concern,’ is not protected from retaliation.
. . . Second, even speech on matters of public concern is not protected from retaliation unless the
employee’s First Amendment interests outweigh government employers’ legitimate interests in
efficient administration. . . . Third, speech made by employees ‘pursuant to . . . official duties’
rather than ‘as a private citizen’ is not protected from retaliation.”) (final alteration in original)
(citations and footnote omitted).
In any event, Plaintiff has also failed to sufficiently allege some causal connection between
6 To the extent that the proposed Amended Complaint could be liberally construed to allege speech
beyond what Plaintiff discusses in her opposition brief, any such allegations still suffer from the
same deficiency. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 12-5 at 2; Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 237 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“As a rule of thumb, activities required of the employee as part of his employment duties are not
performed ‘as a citizen’ if they are not ‘the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work
for the government.’”) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423); Montero, 890 F.3d at 393.
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 13 of 17

14
her speech in 2021 and 2022 and her termination in February 2024.7 See generally Dkt. No. 21-2.
And “only conclusory connections between the protected activity and the alleged adverse action”
are “insufficient to plead a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim.”8 Applewhite v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Educ., No. 24-2131-cv, 2025 WL 783650, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 2025) (summary order)
(affirming district court’s dismissal of teacher’s First Amendment retaliation claim).
For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation
under Section 1983.
C. New York State law claims
The proposed Amended Complaint does not state a viable federal claim and fails to allege
any other basis for original jurisdiction. 	See generally Dkt. No. 21-2. 	After considering the
relevant factors, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims
under New York State law. Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 117-18
7 Given the other deficiencies with Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court does not reach Defendants’
argument that certain alleged conduct is also time-barred. Dkt. No. 12-7 at 23.
8 The materials that the parties agree the Court may consider do not warrant a different result. See,
e.g., Dkt. No. 12-5 at 2 (“In a letter dated December 29, 2023 the DS [district superintendent]
explained that petitioner had not met the standard for a recommendation of tenure, as exemplified
by ‘basic ratings in [her] last observation.’ 	The DS also identified five examples of ‘poor
professional judgment, including’: [] Creation and application of an unapproved grading policy; []
Unprofessional communication with a parent; [] Failing to comply with a supervisor’s directive
regarding parent communications; and [] Using personally identifiably information of a student
for personal reasons. 	On January 12, 2024, BOCES received complaints from a parent and a
student concerning petitioner. 	BOCES thereafter placed petitioner on administrative leave and
revoked its offer of [a one-year extension of her probationary employment].”) (second alteration
in original) (footnote omitted); Rosa, 222 N.Y.S.3d at 823 (“In [February 2024], the teacher was
once again terminated from her position, for reasons unrelated to those at issue here.”); see also
Dkt. No. 12-5 at 4 (“Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that respondent’s discontinuance was
motivated by continued dissatisfaction with the outcome of Rickson II. . . . This is corroborated by
the fact that BOCES returned petitioner to a classroom assignment in September 2023 and, despite
performance concerns, offered to extend her probation. Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate
that the DS or other administrators were motivated by anything other than the numerous
complaints identified in the December 2023 letter[.]”) (footnote and citations omitted).
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 14 of 17

15
(2d Cir. 2013); see also Quattrone, 2011 WL 4899991, at *15 (“Declining supplemental
jurisdiction over remaining state law claims is particularly appropriate here, where the plaintiff
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of her employment rights under New York State
Education Law on administrative and Article 78 review[.]”); Rosa, 222 N.Y.S.3d at 823.
D. Leave to Amend
As noted, Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend and argue that
amendment would be futile. Dkt. No. 24 at 11-13; see also Absolute Activist Value Master Fund
Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[A] request to replead should be denied in the event
that amendment would be futile.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff acknowledges that leave to amend
is properly denied when “the amendment would be futile.” Dkt. No. 21 at ¶ 45.
Certain of the flaws with Plaintiff’s federal claims could, in theory, be cured with better
pleading. 	For example, most of Plaintiff’s factual allegations are conclusory and addressed to
more than one hundred “Defendants.” See, e.g., Dkt. No. 21-2 at ¶ 35 (“On or about February 29,
2024, Defendants summarily terminated Plaintiff’s employment . . . .”); id. at ¶ 52 (“Upon
information and belief, Defendants terminated Plaintiff in retaliation for exercise of her First
Amendment [rights] . . . , the contents of which were disagreeable to Defendants.”). Such vague
and impermissible group pleading fails to establish the personal involvement of “Defendants” in
the constitutional violations Plaintiff seeks to allege. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe #1, No. 25-cv-0765,
2025 WL 3095868, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2025) (“[T]o state a cognizable Section 1983 claim,
a complaint must allege the personal involvement of each of the defendants.”). This pleading also
fails to satisfy the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g.,
Calderon v. Annucci, No. 9-20-cv-0645, 2020 WL 13801789, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2020)
(“Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a complaint include sufficient
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 15 of 17

16
allegations to provide ‘each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and ground upon
which it rests.’”) (citations omitted). “By lumping all the defendants together in each claim and
providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct, [plaintiff]’s complaint fail[s] to satisfy this
minimum standard[.]” Athuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001).
Beyond these flaws, however, the federal claims in Plaintiff’s proposed Amended
Complaint suffer from a host of other pleading deficiencies.9 See generally supra Section IV.A-
B; see also, e.g., Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport Bd. of Educ., 801 F. App’x 811, 813-14 (2d Cir.
2020) (“[Plaintiff] was required to plead more than a conclusory assertion that th[e] adverse actions
were the result of retaliation in order to render a casual connection plausible. . . . [Plaintiff]’s
proposed complaint was therefore insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, warranting the denial
of leave to amend.”) (affirming district court’s denial of principal’s motion for leave to amend
First Amendment retaliation claim as futile). 	These deficiencies persist even after they were
identified in Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 	See, e.g., Dkt. No. 12-7 at 13-25; Kane v. Mount
Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 80 F.4th 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2024) (“Proposed amendments are futile if
they would fail to cure prior deficiencies or state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.”) (quoting IBEW Loc. Union No. 58 Pension Tr. Fund & Annuity Fund v.
Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., 783 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2015)). 	As a result, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend as futile.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants’ motion dismiss, Dkt. No. 12, is GRANTED, as set forth in
Section IV.A-C of this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and the Court further
9 Plaintiff’s cross-motion also fails to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 15.1(a).
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 16 of 17

17
ORDERS that the Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff’s cross-motion to amend, Dkt. No. 21, is DENIED, as set forth in
Section IV.D of this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the
parties in accordance with the Local Rules and close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 4, 2026
Albany, New York
Case 1:25-cv-00667-AMN-DJS Document 25 Filed 03/04/26 Page 17 of 17