Randolph v. Bisignano

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________________________________________
Lyric R.,1
Plaintiff,
v. 1:25-CV-234
(MAD/MJK)
Frank Bisignano,
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
Justin M. Goldstein Esq., for Plaintiff
Amy Bland Esq., Special Asst. U.S. Attorney, for Defendant
Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge
To the Honorable Mae A. D’Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
Lyric brought this action under the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g)) seeking judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner’s
final decision denying her application for benefits. (Dkt. 1.). Lyric did
not consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. 4). So, the
Honorable Mae A. D’Agostino, U.S. District Judge, referred this matter
to the Court for a Report and Recommendation. Both parties filed briefs
1 This Report-Recommendation will identify the plaintiff using only his first name
and last initial to protect his privacy.
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(Dkts. 7, 14, 15) which the Court treats as motions under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c), in accordance with General Order 18.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 20 2023, Lyric filed an application for Title II
Disability Insurance and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income
benefits. (T. 16).2 In both applications, Lyric alleged disability beginning
August 26, 2022. (Id.). The Social Security Administration denied the
claims initially on July 18, 2023, and again upon reconsideration on
November 15, 2023. (Id.). Two days later, Lyric requested a hearing.
(Id.) Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Michael Stacchini held a
hearing on May 14, 2024. (T. 35-54). At the hearing, Attorney Matthew
Nutting represented Lyric. (T. 39). Both Lyric and Vocational Expert
Linda Vause testified. (T. 41-53). On June 7, 2024, ALJ Stacchini issued
an unfavorable decision. (T. 13-30). The appeals council denied review.
(T. 1-6).
2 All page references are to the Administrative Transcript (“T.”) and not the page
numbers assigned by the CM/ECF pagination system.
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II. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW
The Court need not repeat the five-step-sequential analysis that
ALJs use to evaluate disability insurance and supplemental security
income claims because both parties and the District Court are familiar
with the standard. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Petrie v.
Astrue, 412 F. App'x 401, 404 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order)
(identifying the five-step-sequential analysis). Likewise, the parties,
and the District Court, are both familiar with the substantial evidence
standard: Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012).
III. FACTS
The record includes Lyric’s medical and mental health treatment
records which the parties are familiar with. The Court will refer to the
pertinent records and the hearing testimony in its analysis of the
parties’ claims, as appropriate.
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IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION
Before reaching step one the five-step-sequential analysis, ALJ
Stacchini determined that Lyric “last met the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2027.” (T. 19).3
Then, at step one, ALJ Stacchini found that Lyric “has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 26, 2022, the
alleged onset date.” (T. 19) (citations omitted).
At step two, ALJ Stacchini held that Lyric “has the following
severe impairments: Chiari malformation, benign cerebral meningioma,
migraine headaches, djd right knee, and obesity” (Id.) (cleaned up).
At step three, ALJ Stacchini determined Lyric did not have a
single impairment, or combination of impairments, that equaled the
severity of impairments listed in 20 C.F.R Part 404, subpt. P, app. 1.
(Id.) (internal citations omitted).
Next, ALJ Stacchini discussed the “paragraph B” criteria. (T. 20).
“To satisfy the paragraph B criteria,” mental impairments “must result
in one extreme limitation or two marked limitations in a broad area of
functioning.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b)
3 The Court is unsure what date the ALJ meant when including this, but the Court
assumes it is typo.
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(cleaned up). The four broad areas of mental functioning are: (1)
understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting
with others; (3) maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4)
adapting and managing oneself. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1,
§ 12.00(C). Here, ALJ Stacchini found that Lyric did not meet the
“paragraph B” criteria. (T. 20). When making this finding, ALJ
Stacchini quickly noted there is no “evidence of a marked limitation in
physical functioning and a marked limitation in one of the four areas of
mental functioning.” (T. 20) (cleaned up).
After this, ALJ Stacchini determined that Lyric had the residual
function capacity (“RFC”) to perform:
light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)
in that the claimant can sit for six hours and can stand and/or
walk for six hours in an 8-hour workday with regularly
scheduled breaks, typically defined as one 15-minute break in
the morning and in the afternoon, and a half hour to hour
break midday. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and
stairs, but cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The
claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl. The claimant must avoid unprotected heights and
hazardous machinery.
(T. 21).
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To make this finding, ALJ Stacchini considered “the medical
opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s)” pursuant to 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c. (Id.).
At step four, ALJ Stacchini reasoned that Lyric “is capable of
performing” her “past relevant work as a Nursing Assistant as it was
actually performed.” (T. 27).4
Finally at step five, ALJ Stacchini held that “considering” Lyric’s
“age, education, . . . work experience and residual functional capacity,
there are a significant number” of jobs Lyric “can perform.” (T. 28).
Accordingly, ALJ Stacchini determined that Lyric is not disabled as
defined by the Social Security Act. (T. 30).
V. ISSUES IN CONTENTION
Lyric argues that this Court should reverse and remand ALJ
Stacchini’s decision because substantial evidence does not support the
ALJ’s conclusion. Specifically, Lyric makes four arguments: (1) ALJ
Stacchini failed to properly evaluate Lyric’s migraines; (2) ALJ
Stacchini mischaracterized the evidence; (3) ALJ Stacchini’s reasoning
does not provide an adequate basis for meaningful judicial review; and
4 Lyric performed her Nurse Assistant work at the light exertional level. (T. 51).
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(4) Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group (“E.C.O.G.”) performance
scores are medical opinions that ALJ Stacchini needed to address, but
he did not address Lyric’s E.C.O.G. scores. (Pl. Br. at pgs. 15-21). In
opposition, the Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports
ALJ Stacchini’s decision. (Def. Br. at pg. 4-12).
VI. DISCUSSION
Substantial evidence does not support ALJ Stacchini’s decision.
The Court recommends the District Court find that substantial
evidence does not support ALJ Stacchini’s decision. In Section VI.A the
Court recommends finding that ALJ Stacchini’s decision erroneously
analyzed Lyric’s migraines. In Section VI.B, the Court recommends
finding that ALJ Stacchini mischaracterized the record. In Section VI.C,
the Court recommends finding that ALJ’s Stacchini’s decision does not
create a logical bridge, preventing appellate review.
A. ALJ Stacchini’s decision misunderstands the insidious
nature of migraines.
ALJ Stacchini erred when assessing Lyric’s migraines.
“Corroborating objective evidence is not necessary to establish the
presence of headaches.” Karlene S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-
06005, 2023 WL 1097463, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. 2023). “Many, many cases
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have noted the elusive nature of migraines and have rejected opinions
of ALJs that have found migraines not to be severe based upon the lack
of objective evidence.” Brandy Marie T. A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
18-CV-0510 (DEP), 2019 WL 2264977 (N.D.N.Y. 2019). “While a lack of
objective findings is not wholly irrelevant, it cannot alone be the basis of
a conclusion as to the severity of plaintiff[s]’ migraines.” Nichole B. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-06723, 2022 WL 4462234, at *6
(W.D.N.Y. 2022) Still, ALJ Stacchini discounted the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of Lyric’s migraines. (T. 24). In his
analysis, ALJ Stacchini put blinders on, examined only the objective
medical evidence, and refused to acknowledge other parts of the record.
(Id.). That was error.
To be sure, one sentence in ALJ Stacchini’s migraine analysis did
not address the objective medical evidence, but it was a narrow analysis
of the record. When examining the intensity of Lyric’s migraines ALJ
Stacchini noted that Lyric’s “headaches and other symptoms appear to
be well managed and controlled with medication and vestibular
therapy.” (Id.) (cleaned up). But the record does not support that
finding. In January 2023, Lyric’s primary care physician increased her
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Gabapentin to 600 mg twice a day. (T. 538). Yet, that same month,
Lyric returned to the hospital with headaches inflicting 8-10 pain on a
scale of 1-10. (T. 761). In response, Lyric’s PCP increased her Gabpentin
dosage to 900 mg three times a day. (Id.). Following the increased
dosage, Lyric continued to report daily headaches. (T. 530). Ultimately,
in May 2023, Lyric underwent surgery, which relieved her headaches.
(T. 590; 614). But even surgery wasn’t enough. In August 2023, Lyric
continued to complain of headaches. (T. 589). Two months later, Lyric’s
PCP increased Lyric’s Gabapentin dosage to 1500mg. (T. 587). Yet in
December 2023, Lyric continued to report headaches. (T. 624). Lyric
continued to report headaches in January 2024 and April 2024. (T. 608,
847). To be frank, it is unclear what the ALJ reviewed to determine that
Lyric’s migraines were “well managed and controlled with medication.”
(T. 24); see Lee F. v. Dudek, No. 3:24-CV-212 (MJK), 2025 WL 843748,
at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2025) (“The ALJ does not get to use the phrase
‘fair control’ as a tarp to cover the pool of symptoms Plaintiff is
experiencing”).
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B. ALJ Stacchini mischaracterizes the record and relies on
the mischaracterization to deny Lyric benefits.
Next, ALJ Stacchini mischaracterized the evidence when
evaluating Lyric’s activities of daily living. ALJs may not
mischaracterize evidence. See Seignious v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-06065,
2016 WL 96219, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. 2016). ALJs “mischaracterization” of
evidence “is indicative that [their] analysis [are] not based upon
substantial evidence.” Richardson v. Barnhart, 443 F. Supp. 2d 411, 421
(W.D.N.Y. 2006). And here, ALJ Stacchini mischaracterized the
evidence in two ways.
First, ALJ Stacchini overrated how much Lyric can lift. ALJ
Stacchini writes that Lyric “is able to take care of her cat, such as
feeding [it] and changing [its] litter.” (T. 24). But that is false. The
function report, which ALJ Stacchini may be referring to (there is no
citation), notes that Lyric needs help from her mother and brother
“especially when [changing] the litterbox . . . because the bag is too
heavy” for her. (T. 200). In fact, the Commissioner concedes that ALJ
Stacchini erred here. See (Def. Br. at pg. 10) (“but apart from one
misstatement regarding changing the cat’s litter. . .”). ALJ Stacchini’s
decision to overrate how much Lyric can lift supports the assertion that
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substantial evidence does not support the decision. See Heather C. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-663 (AMN/MJK), 2025 WL 2379694,
at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (cleaned up) (finding that substantial
evidence did not support the ALJ’s decision where the ALJ did not
examine “how Plaintiff conduct[ed] her activities of daily living.”).
Second, ALJ Stacchini overestimated Lyric’s dexterity. ALJ
Stacchini writes that Lyric “is able to prepare simple basic meals for
herself daily” including, among other things, “chicken or pasta.” (T. 24).
But there is no support for ALJ Stacchini’s statement. In the function
report, Lyric wrote that she could make simple meals like “soup or
frozen meals.” (T. 201). There is no mention of more complex meals like
chicken or pasta. See (T. 199-206). Indeed, when ALJ Stacchini asked
Lyric whether she can cook “chicken in the oven or pasta on the stove,”
Lyric answered, “no, my mom does most of the cooking.” (T. 44) (cleaned
up)
These inaccuracies—which are not grounded in the record—
should give the District Court pause. It is “plainly improper for the ALJ
to bolster his own RFC assessment with a blatant misstatement of the
record.” Ellis v. Colvin, 29 F. Supp.3d 288, 302 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). But
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ALJ Stacchini improperly bolstered his analysis with mischaracterized
evidence. So his “RFC assessment [is] legally flawed and unsupported
by substantial evidence.” Seignious, 2016 WL 96219, at *5 (cleaned up);
see also King v. Colvin, No. 15-cv-6137, 2016 WL 1398987, *4 (W.D.N.Y.
2016) (“[w]here an ALJ mischaracterizes the evidence” to “support a
conclusion of ‘not disabled,’ a remand is necessary”).
C. ALJ Stacchini does not create a logical bridge of
reasoning, limit judicial review.
Additionally, ALJ’s Stacchini’s conclusion does not follow from his
evaluation of Lyric’s activities of daily living. ALJs must “conduct a
distinct analysis that” permits “adequate review on appeal.” Aung Winn
v. Colvin, 541 F. App’x. 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2013). Every conclusion the ALJ
reaches must be supported by relevant medical evidence. See Heckman
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-CV-6032, 2019 WL 1492868 at * 3
(W.D.N.Y. 2019). Indeed, the ALJ’s decision must create “an accurate
and logical bridge from the evidence to” their “conclusion.” Shanaye
S.M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-CV-0217 (TWD), 2019 WL 1988672,
at *4 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (cleaned up). So when ALJs “determine the
specific amount of time a claimant can spend on certain activities” that
assessment cannot be based on their “own surmise.” William C. v.
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Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-06341, 2023 WL 4361366 at *3
(W.D.N.Y. 2023) (cleaned up).
ALJ Stacchini’s activities of daily living evaluation again is
insufficient in two ways.
First, ALJ Stacchini relies on the fact that Lyric can walk for the
proposition that she can work. ALJ Stacchini relies on Lyric’s mile-long
walks to support his not disabled finding. (T. 25). But a not disabled
finding does not logically follow from the evidence. The record shows
that Lyric takes one-mile walks with a partner. (T. 42-43). Yet the
record is silent on how long these walks take or how often Lyric does
these walks. (T. 42-43). The function report does not shed any light on
this. The report only notes that Lyric tries to take a short walk “a few
times a week.” (T. 206). The only thing the Court can glean from ALJ
Stacchini’s analysis is the fact that Lyric can walk a mile is enough for
a not disabled finding. But that cannot be so. “A claimant is not
required to be in a vegetative state before being deemed disabled for
purposes of receiving benefits.” Cintron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-
CV-06017, 2018 WL 507156, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).
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Second, ALJ Stacchini relies on the fact that Lyric reads, watches
television, and plays games for the proposition that she can work. To
start, ALJ Stacchini asserts that “despite reports of vision problems,
headaches, and concertation difficulties,” Lyric “reports that she enjoys
spending her time reading books, including on an e-reader, and playing
games on her phone.” (T. 24).5 But, just like walking, ALJ Stacchini
neither investigates how long Lyric does these activities nor how long
she can sustain these activities before taking a break. See (T. 35-54). In
capsule form, ALJ Stacchini’s analysis is Lyric reads, watches
television, and plays games, so she is not disabled. But again, that is
not enough. See Doyle v. Apfel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 115, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that ALJ erred in relying on claimant's activities of daily living,
“such as reading, watching TV, doing light household work, going out to
dinner periodically, and taking occasional trips;” this evidence “could
not support a finding that [the claimant] is not disabled” and is “not
5 As an aside, ALJ Stacchini seems skeptical of Lyric’s ability to concentrate given
her activities. But when performing the Paragraph B criteria analysis, ALJ
Stacchini asserts—without any support—“nor is there evidence of marked
limitation in” any “of the four areas of mental functioning.” (T. 20). Worse still, ALJ
Stacchini never identifies what mental limitations Lyric suffers from. See (T. 13-
30). While not grounds for remand, this cursory analysis supports the assertion that
ALJ Stacchini mischaracterized evidence and failed to create a logical bridge to
reach the desired outcome.
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indicative of an ability to satisfactorily perform a job, much less [the
claimant]’s previous job as a personnel manager”). All in all, the fact
that Lyric can read, watch television, and play games on her phone
alone is insufficient evidence to say Lyric can perform full time
employment. See Renee M. B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-00922,
2021 WL 716704, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“There are critical differences
between activities of daily living (which one can do at his own pace
when he is able) and keeping a full-time job.”).
* * *
The Court recommends remanding this case. In combination,
these errors shows that the substantial evidence does not support the
ALJ’s findings. The ALJ misunderstood the insidious nature of
migraines, mischaracterized evidence, failed to a create a logical bridge
of reasoning that this Court could follow, and failed to assess medical
evidence that directly speaks to Lyric’s inability to work. These
mistakes were fatal. As a result, the Court recommends the District
Court reverse and remand ALJ Stacchini decision.
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VII CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Dkt. 7) be GRANTED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that Defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Dkt. 14) be DENIED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that the decision of the Commissioner be
AFFIRMED.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c),
the parties have 14 days within which to file written objections to the
foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the
Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW.
Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of
Health and Hum. Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.
Dated: December 2, 2025
_______________________
Hon. Mitchell J. Katz
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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