Leonhardt v. Bisignano

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
___________________________________________
MARTIN L.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	1:24-CV-01594
(AJB/ML)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF 	STEPHEN J. MASTAITIS, ESQ.
NORTHEASTERN NEW YORK INC. 	MICHAEL J. TELFER, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
95 Central Avenue
Albany, New York 12206
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. 	MOLLY CARTER, ESQ.
Counsel for Defendant
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Martin L. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking
judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or
“Commissioner”) denying his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (Dkt. No. 1.) This matter was referred to me for Report
and Recommendation by the Honorable Anthony J. Brindisi, United States District Court Judge,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(d). (Dkt. Nos. 3, 4.) This case has
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proceeded in accordance with General Order 18.
Currently before this Court are Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 16, 18.) For the reasons set
forth below, this Court recommends the District Court grant Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings, deny Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and remand the
Commissioner’s decision for further administrative proceedings.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 15, 2022, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging that
he became disabled on August 2, 2006, due to post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), major
depression, and bipolar disorder. (Administrative Transcript (“T.”) 275-85, 304.) His
applications were initially denied on March 20, 2023, and on reconsideration January 30, 2024.
(T. 116, 125, 135, 146-47.) Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held on August 26, 2024
before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Asad Ba-Yunus. (T. 59-95, 202-204.) During the
hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and from vocational expert (“VE”) Cherie
Plante. (T. 68-94.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on October 4, 2024. (T. 16-29.)
This became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review on October 31, 2024. (T. 1-7.)
II. 	GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW
A. 	Scope of Review
In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a court must determine whether the
correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the decision.
Featherly v. Astrue, 793 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (citations omitted); Rosado v.
Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985
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(2d Cir. 1987)). A reviewing court may not affirm the ALJ’s decision if it reasonably doubts
whether the proper legal standards were applied, even if the decision appears to be supported by
substantial evidence. Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986.
A court’s factual review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited to the
determination of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (2015); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991). To facilitate the
court’s review, an ALJ must set forth the crucial factors justifying his or her findings with
sufficient specificity to allow a court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the
decision. Roat v. Barnhart, 717 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Ferraris v.
Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984). “Substantial evidence has been defined as ‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). It must
be “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence scattered throughout the administrative record.
Featherly, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 630; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
“To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides,
because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams, 859 F.2d at 258 (citations omitted). Where substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s findings they must be sustained “even where substantial evidence may
support the plaintiff’s positions and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence
may differ from the [ALJ’s].” Rosado, 805 F. Supp. at 153. In other words, a reviewing court
cannot substitute its interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner if
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the record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s decision. Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685
F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
B. 	Standard for Benefits1
To be considered disabled, a plaintiff-claimant seeking benefits must establish that he or
she is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). In addition, the plaintiff-claimant’s
physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in
the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job
vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied
for work.
Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Acting pursuant to its statutory rulemaking authority (42 U.S.C. § 405(a)), the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) promulgated regulations establishing a five-step sequential
evaluation process to determine disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (2015). Under that five-
step sequential evaluation process, the decision-maker determines:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or
equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of
Impairments; (4) based on a “residual functional capacity”
assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her
1 The requirements for establishing disability under Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)
and Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), are identical, so that “decisions under these sections are cited
interchangeably.” Donato v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 721 F.2d 414, 418 n.3 (2d Cir.
1983) (citation omitted).
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past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there
are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the
claimant can perform given the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience.
McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). “If at any step a finding of disability or
non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Barnhart v. Thomas,
540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003).
III. 	FACTS
As of the date of the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff was 52 years old. (T. 27.) He testified that
he had received special education assistance with math while in high school, before leaving in
the twelfth grade just prior to graduation. (T. 70, 438.) At the time of his August 26, 2024
hearing, Plaintiff resided with his wife, and had two adult children who lived independently. (T.
69, 438.) He has a limited employment history that most recently includes work as a service
technician at a car dealership. (T. 72-73, 324-325.) Plaintiff testified that he left this position due
to mental health issues. (T. 73, 438.)
Plaintiff reported a mental health treatment history dating back to his teens, including
multiple “nervous breakdowns” stemming from childhood trauma and stress. (T. 75-76, 438.)
During the relevant period, Plaintiff was engaged in regular mental health counseling and was
prescribed psychiatric medication for diagnosed PTSD, bipolar disorder, and depression. (T. 429,
438, 441, 528-529.)
With regard to physical impairments, Plaintiff reported suffering from constant stabbing
and aching neck pain for the past ten years. (T. 433, 523.) He also reported lower back pain that
was made worse with prolonged sitting and standing, bending, and climbing stairs. (T. 78, 523.)
He treated these conditions with physical therapy and pain medication. (T. 390.)
The record includes Plaintiff’s relevant medical history. Rather than summarizing the
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records at the outset, I will refer to the pertinent records during my discussion of Plaintiff’s
arguments.
IV. 	THE ALJ’S DECISION
As an initial matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements
through June 30, 2009. (T. 18.) After finding that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful
activity (“SGA”) since the protective filing date of July 15, 2022, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
had the following severe impairments: cervical degenerative disc disease; sciatica; obesity;
depressive disorder; and PTSD. (T. 19.) The ALJ found no evidence of any medically
determinable impairments prior to the date last insured. (Id.)
At step three of the evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments either singly or
in combination did not meet or medically equal the severity of a listed impairment. (T. 20.) At
step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform light work. (T. 23.) Specifically, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff
may only occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, climb
ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he may occasionally
interact with the general public; and he and [sic] tolerate occasional
changes to a routine work setting.
(Id.)
In making the RFC determination, the ALJ stated that he considered all of Plaintiff’s
symptoms and the extent to which those symptoms could “reasonably be accepted as consistent
with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20 CFR
404.1529 and 416.929” and Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p. (Id.) The ALJ further stated
that he considered opinion evidence and prior administrative medical findings in accordance with
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c. (Id.) The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms and found
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them “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. . . .” (T.
23-24.) The ALJ next found Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (T. 27.) However, based upon
the RFC and the VE testimony, the ALJ determined that there were jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (T. 27-28.) Accordingly, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged onset date through the date of his decision.
(T. 28.)
V. 	ISSUES IN CONTENTION
Plaintiff raises a number of procedural and substantive arguments challenging the
Commissioner’s disability determination. First, he contends that the Appeals Council failed to
properly consider new and material evidence related to his functional limitations, including a
previously unavailable opinion of his current mental health provider. (Dkt. No. 14 at 13-15.)
Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion evidence available at
the time of his disability determination and erred in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s activities of daily
living. (Dkt. No. 14 at 17-25.) Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred at step five by
failing to apply the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. (Dkt. No. 14 at 25-27.)
Defendant contends that the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinion, testimonial, and
vocational evidence was supported by substantial evidence, and the Appeals Council properly
concluded that Plaintiff’s new proffered evidence does not show a reasonable probability that it
would change the ALJ’s decision. (Dkt. No. 16 at 5-20.)
VI. 	APPEALS COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF NEW EVIDENCE
A. 	Legal Standards
As the Second Circuit held in Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1996):
When the Appeals Council grants review, the decision of the Appeals Council
is the final decision of the Secretary. 	See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
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However, if the Appeals Council denies review, the ALJ’s decision becomes
the Secretary’s final decision. See §§ 404.981, 416.1481. The final decision of
the Secretary is subject to judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
In cases such as this one, where the Appeals Council has denied review of the ALJ’s decision, “it
is well-settled that ‘[t]he role of the district court is to determine if the Appeals Council erred
when it determined that the new evidence was insufficient to trigger review of the ALJ’s
decision.’” Kirah D. v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-CV-0110 (CFH), 2019 WL 587459, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 13, 2019) (citing, inter alia, Allborty v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:14-CV-1428
(DNH/ATB), 2016 WL 770261, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016), rep’t-rec. adopted, 2016 WL
796071 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2016)).
In Amanda L. C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0817 (GTS), 2020 WL 4783169,
at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2020), Judge Suddaby provided an excellent explanation of the nature
of the court’s review:
“The Appeals Council shall consider evidence submitted after the ALJ’s decision
if the petitioner can show ‘good cause’ for not submitting the evidence to the ALJ
and that the additional evidence is ‘new, material, and relates to the period on or
before the date of the hearing decision.’ ” Tricario v. Colvin, 681 Fed. App'x 98,
102 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970[a][5], [b]). Additionally, even if
a court determines that the Appeals Council erred by rejecting new and material
evidence, “remand is only appropriate where there is a ‘reasonable possibility’
that this evidence would have influenced the ALJ to decide the disability
determination differently.” Tricario, 681 Fed. App'x at 102 (citing Lisa v. Sec'y
of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 940 F.2d 40, 43 [2d Cir. 1991]).
“Evidence is ‘material’ if there is ‘a reasonable possibility that the new evidence
would have influenced the Secretary to decide claimant's application differently.”
Davidson v. Colvin, 12-CV-0316, 2013 WL 5278670, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 18,
2013) (Bianchini, M.J., D'Agostino, J.). The Second Circuit has indicated that
“medical evidence generated after an ALJ’s decision [can] not be deemed
irrelevant solely because of timing, [as] subsequent evidence of the severity of a
condition suggests that the condition may have been more severe in the past than
previously thought.” Suttles v. Colvin, 654 Fed. App's 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2016).
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B. 	New Evidence Submitted to Appeals Council in this Case
Plaintiff was represented by counsel at all relevant times in this proceeding. In
correspondence dated August 19, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel advised the ALJ of several
outstanding records requests, including (1) treatment records from Plaintiff’s orthopedist for the
period after November 1, 2023 and (2) updated mental health records, including a Medical
Source Statement from Plaintiff’s current mental health provider, Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) Amy
Nistico. (T. 387.) Counsel requested that the record be left open for a suitable period. (Id.)
At Plaintiff’s August 26, 2024 hearing, counsel repeated this request, advising that the
orthopedic treatment notes in the record end in “late fall or winter of ’23,” and did not contain
any updates from 2024. (T. 64.) The ALJ provided Plaintiff a two week period to supplement
the record, and advised counsel to promptly notify him if further extensions were necessary. (T.
64-65.) The ALJ repeated this deadline and the extension offer at the close of the hearing. (T.
94.)
On or about August 27, 2024, Plaintiff’s orthopedist provided counsel with
approximately fourteen pages of records, including a February 2024 imaging report and
treatment notes dated between February 20, 2024 and February 29, 2024. (T. 35-47.) The
records reflect Plaintiff’s complaint of worsening neck pain that radiated down his left arm and
physician observation of reduced range of motion. (T. 37.) The observed deterioration in
Plaintiff’s condition prompted his physicians to order an MRI and surgical consultation, although
Plaintiff ultimately opted to continue with physical therapy and other conservative treatment. (T.
41-42, 44.)
NP Nistico provided a completed Medical Source Statement to counsel on or about
October 4, 2024. (T. 48-58.) Correspondence indicates that the opinion was delayed because
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Plaintiff had missed several mental health appointments while he was involved in eviction
proceedings. (T. 48.) In her Medical Source Statement, NP Nistico reported a treatment
relationship with Plaintiff dating back to October 2023, with Plaintiff attending seven
appointments and missing four during that time. (T. 49.)
Utilizing a check-box form with some narrative, NP Nistico opined that Plaintiff had
“marked” limitations in certain aspects of social interaction, concentration, and adaptation. (T.
53-56.) Specifically, she opined that Plaintiff had marked limitations in asking for help when
needed; keeping social interactions free of excessive irritability, sensitivity, argumentativeness,
or suspiciousness; assuming increased mental demands associated with competitive work;
sustaining tasks without undue interruptions or distractions; working a full day without excessive
rest periods; responding to demands; and managing his psychologically based symptoms. (Id.)
NP Nistico opined that Plaintiff would be off-task approximately fifteen percent of the workday
due to his mental health symptoms and was likely to miss approximately four days of work per
month. (T. 56, 58.)
In correspondence dated October 7, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel provided this new evidence
to the ALJ. (T. 35-58.) By this time, the ALJ had already issued his October 4, 2024 decision.
(T. 13-34.) The ALJ’s decision notes that he had repeatedly notified Plaintiff of the deadline for
supplementing the record or requesting an extension, but that no further medical evidence or
correspondence had been received after the hearing. (T. 16, 388.)
In connection with Plaintiff’s request for review, the Appeals Council found this new
evidence “does not show a reasonable probability that it would change the outcome
of the [ALJ’s] decision.” (T. 2.)
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C. 	Recommendation for Remand for Further Evaluation of New and Material
Evidence.
The Appeals Council’s October 31, 2024 denial implicitly recognized that Plaintiff’s
proffered evidence was new and relevant to the period on or before the ALJ’s decision. (T. 2.)
The Commissioner’s brief recognizes this as well and focuses its arguments on whether the
records and mental health opinion “significantly undermine the ALJ’s decision.” (T. 15.) Still, in
the interest of clarity, this Court will walk through the various elements of its analysis.
To begin with, this Court finds that the orthopedic notes and mental health opinion are
both “new” in that they were never presented to the ALJ. See Ovitt v. Colvin, No. 12-CV-1522
(DNH), 2014 WL 1806995, at* 3 (N.D.N.Y. May 7, 2014) (defining new evidence as “any
evidence that has not been considered previously during the administrative process”). Although
the ALJ was notified that such evidence may be forthcoming, the documents had not been
provided by the time of the ALJ’s decision. In the case of NP Nistico’s Medical Source
Statement, the document was not completed until October 4, 2024, the same date as the ALJ’s
decision.
This Court also finds that Plaintiff had “good cause” for failing to provide the documents
earlier. In particular, the Court notes that at least some of the delay was attributed to Plaintiff’s
involvement in eviction proceedings. (T. 35.) Although Plaintiff’s counsel should have (1)
provided the orthopedic notes to the ALJ more promptly and (2) timely requested an extension of
time to solicit NP Nistico’s opinion, the record otherwise documents his diligent efforts to keep
the ALJ informed about his attempts to supplement the record. (T. 35, 48, 64, 387.) This Court
also notes the ALJ’s flexibility regarding the availability of extensions. (T. 16, 64-65, 97, 388.)
Moving to materiality, this Court finds that NP Nistico’s opinion and the orthopedic
treatment notes are material, in that they all relate to the period covered by the ALJ’s decision
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and there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ that this evidence would have influenced the ALJ to decide
the disability determination differently.
Addressing NP Nistico’s mental health opinion first, this Court notes that the ALJ’s step
three listings analysis and RFC determination relied upon the “persuasive” opinions of non-
examining consultant Dr. Ochoa, who reviewed Plaintiff’s mental health records in January
2024, and Dr. Vanessa Laird, who performed a consultative psychiatric examination of Plaintiff
in November 2023. (T. 22, 25, 143-146, 517-521.) In doing so, the ALJ rejected the more
restrictive opinions from Dr. Brett Hartman, who performed a consultative psychiatric
examination in February 2023, and Licensed Mental Health Counselor Mary Baker, who
completed a mental health opinion in March 2023. (T. 438-442, 478-480.)
The ALJ based his assessment of the functional limitations imposed by Plaintiff’s mental
health impairments on the opinions available to him. However, the Second Circuit has
“frequently cautioned that ALJs should not rely heavily on the findings of consultative
physicians after a single examination . . . . This is even more pronounced in the context of mental
illness where . . . a one-time snapshot of a claimant's status may not be indicative of [his]
longitudinal mental health.” Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2019). (internal
quotations omitted). Likewise, even under the amended regulations that eliminate the deference
afforded to treating source opinions, courts have recognized the “foundational nature” of direct
observation of a patient, and “consistency with those observations” is a factor in evaluating the
value of a medical opinion. Shawn H. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:19-CV-113, 2020 WL
3969879, at *8 (D. Vermont July 14, 2020) (remanding where ALJ relied upon opinion of non-
examining consultant who had no opportunity to review treating source opinions that described
greater restrictions).
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Although Ms. Baker had a treatment relationship with Plaintiff, that appears to have
ended in January 2023, and her opinion is dated March 2023. (T. 475, 544.) The ALJ also
appears to have discounted her opinion in light of Ms. Baker’s dual role as Plaintiff’s “therapist
and landlord.” (T. 21-22, 543-544.) It thus appears a more than reasonable possibility that the
opinion of an acceptable medical source addressing Plaintiff’s psychiatric functional limitations
based upon multiple in-person evaluations between October 2023 and October 2024 could
influence the ALJ to reach a different disability determination.
This Court reaches the same conclusion regarding the new orthopedic records provided to
the Appeals Council. The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s treatment history for back and neck pain
dating back to October 2021 and emphasized November 2023 consultative examination results
that suggested an improvement in Plaintiff’s physical function. (T. 26, 389, 410, 435.) At his
August 26, 2024 hearing, Plaintiff testified that he aggravated his back pain in “February or
March” 2024, and a contemporaneous MRI “found a tumor.” (T. 74-75.) Thus, it is reasonably
possible that treatment notes from this period and the associated imaging report documenting a
deterioration of Plaintiff’s back and neck pain could bolster Plaintiff’s testimony and influence
the ALJ’s evaluation of the relevant medical opinions and the ultimate physical RFC
determination.
In recommending remand, this Court is not making any comment on how persuasive the
ALJ should find this new evidence. In addition, Plaintiff’s brief correctly notes that evaluation
of NP Nistico’s opinion and the orthopedic records will necessarily impact the ALJ’s evaluation
of the other opinion evidence, Plaintiff’s testimony, and the step five determination. (Dkt. No. 14
at 15-16.) Accordingly, this Court recommends that the District Court refrain from additional
examination of Plaintiff’s remaining challenges to the ALJ’s decision. See, e.g., Bell v. Colvin,
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No. 5:15-CV-01160 (LEK), 2016 WL 7017395, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2016) (declining to
reach remaining arguments where the court had already determined remand was warranted);
Hamilton v. Astrue, No. 5:11–cv–954 (GLS), 2012 WL 5303338, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2012)
(“Because [plaintiff’s] remaining arguments are contingent upon the ALJ’s resolution of the
foregoing issue on remand, the court need not address them.”); Morales v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-
06844, 2015 WL 13774790, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015) (the court need not reach additional
arguments on the ALJ's factual determinations “given that the ALJ’s analysis may change on
these points upon remand”), rep’t-rec. adopted by 2015 WL 2137776 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2015).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 14)
be GRANTED; Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 16) be DENIED
and that the matter be REVERSED AND REMANDED to the Commissioner pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this Report and
Recommendation.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have 14 days within which to file written
objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court.
FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN 14 DAYS WILL PRECLUDE
APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated:
Binghamton, New York
February 27, 2026
Binghamton, New York
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