Mendez et al v. Prime Management Consultants LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ANGEL MENDEZ, VICENTE ARMIJOS, ERICK
IXIM, REYNALDO LOPEZ, and LEDWIN
APARICIO,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PRIME MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS LLC
and DAVID RYAN FRIEDLANDER,
Defendants.
1:24-cv-01301 (AMN/PJE)
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
WORKER JUSTICE CENTER OF NEW YORK 	CRISTINA BRITO, ESQ.
245 Saw Mill River Road – Suite 106
Hawthorne, New York 10532
9 Main Street 	MAUREEN HUSSAIN, ESQ.
Kingston, New York 12401
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On October 23, 2024, plaintiffs Angel Mendez, Vicente Armijos, Erick Ixim, Reynaldo
Lopez, and Ledwin Aparicio (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 	commenced this action against defendants
Prime Management Consultants LLC (“Prime Management”) and David Ryan Friedlander
(together, “Defendants”), alleging 	violations of the federal Fair 	Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),
29 U.S.C. § 201 	et seq., and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). 	Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”).
Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for a default judgment under Rule 55(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 15 (the “Motion”).
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For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Motion.
II. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Parties
Plaintiffs are adults who reside in New York state. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 9-13. Their primary
and native language is Spanish. 	Id. 	at ¶ 21. Defendant Friedlander is alleged to be the owner of
Prime Management, 	id. 	at ¶ 28, an entity organized under New York state law and with a principal
place of business in Ulster Park, New York, 	id. 	at ¶ 22.
B. 	Plaintiffs’ Factual Allegations
Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants to perform renovation and construction work
throughout New York’s Hudson Valley. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 35-36. Plaintiffs’ work was exclusively manual
and non-clerical and involved demolition, excavating, breaking concrete, framing, painting,
carpentry work, some plumbing, and some electrical work. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 35, 37. Largely as a result of
Plaintiffs’ labor, Defendant Prime Management had annual gross sales in excess of $500,000 for
years. 	Id. 	at ¶ 27. 	As part of that enterprise, Defendant Friedlander hired and fired employees,
determined the work schedules of employees, determined the amount of wages that employees
received, and maintained employment records. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 29-30. 	He also assigned work
responsibilities and supervised and directed the work of employees, including by being regularly
present on work sites. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 30, 32-33. Defendant Friendlander also exerted this control over
Plaintiffs, and would additionally pay them with cash and checks. 	See, e.g., id. 	at ¶¶ 29, 34, 46,
56, 77, 86. Plaintiffs further detail their alleged employment by Defendants as follows.
Plaintiff Mendez was employed by Defendants from approximately 2014 through February
29, 2024. 	Id. 	at ¶ 14. 	During this time, Plaintiff Mendez’s usual work schedule was Monday
through Saturday from approximately 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with a thirty-minute lunch break
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each day, totaling approximately fifty-one hours per week. 	Id. 	at ¶ 39. Plaintiff Mendez worked
as many as seventy to eighty hours per week when there was a particularly heavy workload. 	Id.
Plaintiff Mendez was to be paid fifteen to thirty dollars per hour. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 40-45.
Plaintiff Aparicio was employed by Defendants from approximately March 2022 through
late January 2024. 	Id. 	at ¶ 18. 	During this 	time, Plaintiff Aparicio’s 	usual work schedule was
Monday through Saturday from approximately 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with a thirty-minute lunch
break each day, totaling approximately fifty-one hours per week. 	Id. 	at ¶ 82. 	Plaintiff Aparicio
worked as many as sixty hours per week when there was a particularly heavy workload. 	Id.
Plaintiff Aparicio was to be paid twenty-two dollars per hour. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 83.
Plaintiff Lopez was employed by Defendants from approximately December 2022 through
February 19, 2024. 	Id. 	at ¶ 17. 	During this 	time, Plaintiff Lopez’s usual work schedule was
Monday through Saturday from approximately 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with a thirty-minute lunch
break each day, totaling approximately fifty-one hours per week. 	Id. 	at ¶ 72. 	Plaintiff Lopez
worked as many as sixty hours per week when there was a particularly heavy workload. 	Id.
Plaintiff Lopez was to be paid twenty to twenty-two dollars per hour. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 73-74.
Plaintiff Armijos was employed by Defendants from approximately January 2023 through
February 29, 2024. 	Id. 	at ¶ 15. 	During this time, Plaintiff Armijos’ usual work schedule was
Monday through Saturday from approximately 7:00 a.m. or 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.,
with a thirty-minute lunch break each day, totaling between approximately forty-five and fifty-five
hours per week. 	Id. 	at ¶ 52. Plaintiff Armijos worked as many as sixty hours per week when there
was a particularly heavy workload. 	Id. 	Plaintiff Armijos was to be paid twenty-two dollars per
hour. 	Id. 	at ¶ 53.
Plaintiff Ixim was employed by Defendants from approximately March 2023 through
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February 29, 2024. 	Id. 	at ¶ 16. During this time, Plaintiff 	Ixim’s usual work schedule was Monday
through Saturday from approximately 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with a thirty-minute lunch break
each day, totaling approximately fifty-one hours per week. 	Id. 	at ¶ 64. Plaintiff Ixim worked as
many as sixty hours per week when there was a particularly heavy workload. 	Id. 	Plaintiff Ixim
was to be paid twenty dollars per hour. 	Id. 	at ¶ 65.
Each Plaintiff alleges that he was not paid overtime wages, that he was not always paid his
promised wages and that, instead of being paid weekly, he was repeatedly paid late. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 45,
49-50 (Plaintiff Mendez); 	id. 	at ¶¶ 85, 88, 90 (Plaintiff Aparicio); 	id. 	at ¶¶ 76, 79-80 (Plaintiff
Lopez); 	id. 	at ¶¶ 55, 58-60, 62 (Plaintiff Armijos); 	id. 	at ¶¶ 66, 68-70 (Plaintiff Ixim).
All Plaintiffs except Plaintiff Ixim also allege that they were sometimes paid with checks
that bounced and that they were not compensated for the resulting bank fees. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 46-48
(Plaintiff Mendez); 	id. 	at ¶¶ 86-87 (Plaintiff Aparicio); 	id. 	at ¶¶ 77-78 (Plaintiff Lopez); 	id. 	at
¶¶ 56-57 (Plaintiff Armijos). 	Plaintiffs Aparicio and Armijos also allege that they were not
reimbursed for certain out-of-pocket expenses. 	Id. 	at ¶ 89 (Plaintiff Aparicio); 	id. 	at ¶ 61 (Plaintiff
Armijos).
Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants never furnished, 	inter alia, written wage notices in
Plaintiffs’ primary language, nor 	proper wage statements that included Plaintiffs’ hourly rates of
pay and all hours Plaintiffs had worked. 	See, e.g., id. 	at ¶¶ 92-97.
C. 	Plaintiffs’ Legal Claims
Plaintiffs assert one claim under the FLSA, for overtime compensation. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 98-101.
Plaintiffs also assert four claims under the NYLL, for overtime compensation, late payment of
wages, failure to pay promised wages, and wage notice and wage statement violations. 	Id. 	at
¶¶ 102-121. The Motion requests a default judgment 	“of at least $381,204.81” plus interest. Dkt.
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No. 15-1 at 5.1
D. Procedural History
Plaintiffs commenced this action on October 23, 2024. 	Dkt. No. 1. 	Plaintiffs served
Defendant Prime Management on January 14, 2025, Dkt. No. 9, and Defendant Friedlander on
January 16, 2025, Dkt. No. 10. Defendants have not appeared or responded to the Complaint. 	See
generally 	Docket Sheet.
On March 4, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a request for the entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(a)
of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, a request which the Clerk of Court subsequently granted.
Dkt. Nos. 12-13. On April 18, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the Motion, requesting the entry of a default
judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 15.2
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “provides a ‘two-step process’ for the entry
of judgment against a party who fails to defend: first, the entry of a default, and second, the entry
of a default judgment.” 	City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir.
2011) (citing 	New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005)). The first step is governed by
Rule 55(a), which provides that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise,
the clerk must enter the party’s default.” 	Id. 	(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)); 	see also 	N.D.N.Y.
L.R. 55.1 (setting forth affidavit requirements). 	Entry of a default “formalizes a judicial
recognition that a defendant has, through its failure to defend the action, admitted liability to the
1 	Citations to docket entries utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic
filing system, and not the documents’ internal pagination.
2 	Plaintiffs also each submit a factual affidavit in support of the Motion. Dkt. Nos. 15-7, 15-8, 15-
9, 15-10, 15-11. 	See Hunter v. Shanghai Huangzhou Elec. Appliance Mfg. Co., Ltd., 505 F. Supp.
3d 137, 150-51, 150 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. 2020).
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plaintiff.” 	Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 128. The second step “requires the plaintiff to seek a judgment
by default under Rule 55(b).” 	Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 505 (2d Cir. 2011).
Entry of a default judgment “converts the defendant’s admission of liability into a final judgment
that terminates the litigation and awards the plaintiff any relief to which the court decides it is
entitled[.]” 	Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 128. 	A default judgment 	“ordinarily must be entered by the
district judge, rather than by the clerk of 	court, except in certain circumstances[.]” 	Id.; 	see also
N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2 (setting forth requirements for requesting a default judgment).
“Before entering a default judgment, the court ‘must ensure that (1) jurisdictional
requirements are satisfied, (2) the plaintiff took all the required procedural steps in moving for [a]
default judgment, and (3) the plaintiff’s allegations, when accepted as true, establish liability as a
matter of law.’” 	Windward Bora, LLC v. Brown, No. 21-cv-03147, 2022 WL 875100, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting 	Jian Hua Li v. Chang Lung Grp. Inc.,
No. 16-cv-6722, 2020 WL 1694356, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 	7, 2020)). Additionally, “[t]here must
be an evidentiary basis for the damages sought by plaintiff, and a district court may determine
there is sufficient evidence either based upon evidence presented at a hearing or upon a review of
detailed affidavits and documentary evidence.” 	Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council
Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund, Educ. & Training Fund & Other Funds v. Metro
Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). When evaluating
a request for a default judgment, a 	“district court is empowered under 	Rule 55(b)(2), in the exercise
of its discretion, to 	‘conduct hearings or make referrals’ as may be necessary, 	inter alia, to
determine the amount of damages or establish the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.” 	Mickalis,
645 F.3d at 129 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(B)-(C)).
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While a court may enter a default judgment if the requisite standard is satisfied, the Second
Circuit has cautioned that default judgments “are 	generally disfavored and are reserved for rare
occasions[.]” 	Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993). 	“Because we have ‘a
strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits,’ and because ‘a default judgment is the most
severe sanction which the court may apply,’ . . . we have characterized a district court’s discretion
in proceeding under Rule 55 as ‘circumscribed.’” 	Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 129 (first quoting 	Green,
420 F.3d at 104; then quoting 	Enron, 10 F.3d at 95; and then citing 	State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v.
Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2004)).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdictional Requirements
The Court first addresses its jurisdiction over this matter. While a “plaintiff has the burden
to establish jurisdiction, a federal court has an independent obligation to determine whether
subject-matter jurisdiction exists ‘even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’” 	Wilmington
Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB as tr. of Aspen Holdings Tr. v. Fernandez, 712 F. Supp. 3d 324, 330
(E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting 	Chapman v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 558 F. Supp. 3d 45, 48 (E.D.N.Y.
2021)). 	Federal question jurisdiction exists over Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
supplemental jurisdiction exists 	over Plaintiffs’ NYLL claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court has
personal jurisdiction over Defendants, who are alleged to reside or do business within the Northern
District of New York and who were served here. 	Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 8, 22, 33; Dkt. Nos. 9-10.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.3 	Windward Bora,
2022 WL 875100, at *2.
3 	Venue is also proper in this District, as it is where a substantial part of relevant events allegedly
occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391; Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 7.
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B. 	Procedural Requirements
Here, Plaintiffs requested and received an entry of default in compliance with Rule 55(a)
and Local Rule 55.1. Dkt. Nos. 12-13. Plaintiffs then filed the present Motion in accordance with
Rule 55(b) and Local Rule 55.2. Dkt. No. 15. The Motion does not include a certificate of service
demonstrating that Defendants received the Motion. 	See generally id. 	But because Defendants
were served at the commencement of this action and have not 	“appeared personally or by a
representative,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), Plaintiffs were not required to effectuate further service
with respect to the Motion. 	See, e.g., Alston v. City of New York, No. 22-cv-5395, 2024 WL
4100175, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2024) (“This limitation in the rule is based on the common-
sense assumption that if a party has ignored service of a summons and complaint, a plaintiff does
not have to chase him down with subsequent notices to see if he has changed his mind.”), 	appeal
filed, No. 24-2521 	(2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2024); 	Rove LLC v. Antonio168, No. 20-cv-02124, 2023 WL
6796034, at *3 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2023) (similar). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
have satisfied the procedural requirements for seeking a default judgment. 	Windward Bora, 2022
WL 875100, at *2.
C. 	Liability as a Matter of Law
“To enter a default judgment, 	a district court must determine whether—after taking all
well-pleaded allegations as true and making reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor—the
plaintiff’s ‘allegations establish . . . liability as 	a matter of law.’” 	Henry v. Oluwole, 108 F.4th 45,
55 (2d Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (first quoting 	Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d
Cir. 2009); and then citing 	Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 137 n.23); 	see also Moore v. Booth, 122 F.4th 61,
69 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[W]e have explained that ‘prior to entering [a] default judgment, a district
court is required to determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations establish the defendant’s liability
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as a matter of law.’”) (second alteration in original) (quoting 	Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 137).
1. 	FLSA Claim
The Complaint’s first claim is 	that Defendants violated the FLSA by undercompensating
Plaintiffs for the overtime they worked. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 98-101.
i. 	Employment Relationship
“To establish liability under the FLSA, ‘a plaintiff must show that he or she is an
‘employee’ of the defendant within the meaning of the FLSA’ and that the defendant is an
employer subject to 	the FLSA.” 	Yanchaliquin v. Chuqui Builders Corp., No. 23-cv-504, 2023 WL
7299810, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2023) (first quoting 	Fermin v. Las Delicias Peruanas Rest.,
Inc., 93 F. Supp. 3d 19, 31-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); and then citing 	Chen v. Major League Baseball,
6 F. Supp. 3d 449, 453-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
“The FLSA defines ‘employee’ by tautology: an ‘individual employed by an employer.’”
Wang v. Hearst Corp., 877 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1)). Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants employed each of them as manual laborers 	throughout New York’s Hudson
Valley for between one and ten years. 	See supra 	Section II.B. 	Plaintiffs each performed
renovation and construction work and were paid, or were supposed to be paid, on a weekly basis.
Id. 	As other district courts have found in the default judgment context, such allegations are
sufficient to establish employee status under the FLSA. 	See, e.g., Yanchaliquin, 2023 WL
7299810, at *3 (“Plaintiff alleges that Defendants employed him for approximately six months in
2022. He performed roof-building duties and was paid wages on a biweekly basis. Accordingly,
‘for purposes of this default, [Plaintiff] qualifies as an ‘employee’ under the FLSA.’”) (alteration
in original) (citations omitted).
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Next, the Motion argues that both Defendants were Plaintiffs’ employers for purposes of
the FLSA. Dkt. No. 15-1 at 9-10. An employer 	is subject to the FLSA’s 	overtime provisions if
“(1) their employees are ‘engaged in commerce,’ or (2) the employer is an ‘enterprise engaged in
commerce.’” 	Sanchez v. Ms. Wine Shop Inc., 643 F. Supp. 3d 355, 366-67 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (first
quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207; and then citing 	Padillia v. Manlapaz, 643 F. Supp. 2d 298, 299
(E.D.N.Y. 2009)). 	These two categories are commonly referred to as individual coverage and
enterprise coverage, respectively.
The Motion argues that the Complaint sufficiently alleges enterprise coverage with respect
to Defendant Prime Management. Dkt. No. 15-1 at 	9-10. “An employer is an ‘enterprise engaged
in commerce’ if it is an enterprise that ‘has 	employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on
goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person and [ ] has
an annual gross volume of sales made or business done of not less than $500,000.’” 	Lozada v.
Haitech Works LLC, No. 24-cv-01041, 2025 WL 2912659, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2025)
(citation omitted). 	The Court agrees that the Complaint alleges that these requirements are
satisfied. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 26-27; 	Gonzales v. Gan Israel Pre-School, No. 12-cv-06304, 2014 WL
1011070, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014) (“Most cases in 	this Circuit that discuss this issue require
that a plaintiff plead the specific fact that the defendant did $500,000 or more in annual gross
business.”). 	And while such a “bare recitation, amounting to a legal conclusion, is not
automatically assumed to be true, in this 	context, the Court finds it sufficient.” 	Yanchaliquin, 2023
WL 7299810, at *3 (finding complaint had adequately alleged FLSA enterprise coverage for
purposes of default judgment). 	Moreover, the Complaint’s factual allegations—regarding the
number of individuals employed by Defendants, the length of their employment, the value of their
labor, and the nature of their renovation and construction work—permit the Court to reasonably
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infer that the requirements for enterprise coverage are satisfied here. 	See supra 	Section II.B; 	see
also Yanchaliquin, 2023 WL 7299810, at *3 (“[H]ere, it is reasonable to infer that the goods
necessary to provide roof building services—and generate over $500,000 in annual sales—do not
come exclusively from New York 	State.”) (citations omitted); 	Varghese v. Plecosystems Inc., No.
23-cv-03830, 2025 WL 2318593, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2025) (“[V]irtually every enterprise in
the nation doing the requisite dollar volume of 	business is covered by the FLSA.”) (quoting 	Archie
v. Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
The 	Motion 	further 	argues 	that 	the 	Complaint 	sufficiently 	alleges 	that 	Defendant
Friedlander is also Plaintiffs’ employer for purposes 	of the FLSA, based on his control over various
aspects of their employment. Dkt. No. 15-1 at 9-10. As the Second Circuit has made clear, “this
Circuit ‘treat[s] employment for 	FLSA purposes as a flexible concept to be determined on a case-
by-case basis by review of the totality of the circumstances.’” 	Perez Perez v. Escobar Constr.,
Inc., No. 23-1240-cv, 2024 WL 3594325, at *2 (2d Cir. July 31, 2024) (summary order) (alteration
in original) (quoting 	Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141-42 (2d Cir.
2008)). 	“The underlying inquiry in determining ‘employer’ status is whether the individual
possessed operational control over 	employees: ‘control over a company’s actual ‘operations’ in a
manner that relates to a plaintiff’s employment.’” 	Tapia v. Blch 3rd Ave LLC, 906 F.3d 58, 61 (2d
Cir. 2018) (quoting 	Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2013)). Courts frequently
consider certain factors to examine the degree of control exerted by an alleged employer, including
“whether the alleged employer (1) 	had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised
and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and
method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” 	Kolonziaa v. Allied Cmty. Res.,
Inc., No. 25-1034-cv, 2026 WL 707268, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2026) (summary order) (quoting
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Barfield, 537 F.3d at 142-43). 	The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Complaint plausibly
alleges that Defendant Friedlander controlled their employment to an extent sufficient to render
him an employer for purposes of the FLSA. Dkt. No. 15-1 at 9-10; 	see also supra 	Section II.B.
The factual affidavits Plaintiffs submit provide additional details about this control, including
communications demonstrating Defendant Friedlander’s supervision and direction of where, how,
and when Plaintiffs worked, as well as the amount and timing of their wages. 	See, e.g., 	Dkt. No.
15-7 at 2-5, 7-14, 25-29; Dkt. No. 15-8 at 2-5, 8-11, 17-23; Dkt. No. 15-9 at 2-4; Dkt. No. 15-10
at 2-4, 9-11, 13; Dkt. No. 15-11 at 2-5; 	see also Hunter, 505 F. Supp. 3d at 150-51, 150 n.6.
In sum, Plaintiffs have established that they were employees and that both Defendants were
employers for purposes of a default judgment on their FLSA overtime claim.
ii. 	Overtime Claim
As relevant here, the FLSA “requires a regulated employer who ‘employ[s] any of his
employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours’ to compensate that employee ‘at a rate not
less than one and one-half times the regular rate at 	which he is employed.’” 	Herrera v. Comme
des Garcons, Ltd., 84 F.4th 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a)(1)). 	“[I]n order to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently
allege 40 hours of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of
the 40 hours.” 	Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2013)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)).
The Motion argues that the Complaint sufficiently alleges that each Plaintiff “routinely
worked more than 40 hours per week and was not paid 	at the overtime rate.” 	Dkt. No. 15-1 at 10.
The Second Circuit has stated that the pleading standard applicable to FLSA overtime claims is
satisfied “if plaintiffs allege that their regularly scheduled workweek for a given period of time
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included more than forty hours of work, so that they were eligible for overtime during every week
in which they worked their regular schedule.” 	Herrera, 84 F.4th at 117. As detailed above, the
alleged regular work schedule of each Plaintiff consisted of more than forty hours in a given week.
See supra 	Section II.B. “In that case, a 	plaintiff, as the Plaintiffs have done here, need only allege
the period of time during which they 	were employed.” 	Herrera, 84 F.4th at 117. As also detailed
above, the Complaint further alleges the dates during which Defendants employed each Plaintiff.
See supra 	Section II.B. 	Plaintiffs’ submission in 	connection with the Motion enhances the
plausibility of these allegations by specifying the number of hours each Plaintiff worked each week
he was employed by Defendants and the overtime work for which he was undercompensated. 	See
generally 	Dkt. No. 15-12; 	see also Herrera, 84 F.4th at 114 (“[T]he plaintiff need not keep ‘careful
records’ of the numbers of hours worked each week or calculate and ‘plead their hours with
mathematical precision.’ In fact, a complaint need not even ‘set 	forth the approximate number of
unpaid regular and overtime hours allegedly worked,’ although such an ‘approximation . . . may
help draw a plaintiff’s claim closer to plausibility.’”) 	(first quoting 	Dejesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs.,
LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2013); and then quoting 	Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian
Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 201 n.10 (2d Cir. 2013)).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have established that Defendants violated the
FLSA by undercompensating Plaintiffs for the overtime they worked.
2. 	NYLL Overtime Claim
The 	Complaint’s 	second 	claim 	is 	that 	Defendants 	also 	violated 	the 	NYLL 	by
undercompensating Plaintiffs for the overtime they worked. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 102-05.
The Motion argues that since the Complaint’s factual allegations are sufficient to state an
FLSA overtime claim, these allegations are also sufficient to state an NYLL overtime claim. Dkt.
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No. 15-1 at 10. The Court agrees. “Because ‘the relevant portions of [the] NYLL do not diverge
from the requirements of the FLSA, conclusions about FLSA allegations apply equally to NYLL
overtime claims.’” 	Vega v. Fox Bldg. Grp., Inc., No. 24-cv-785, 2025 WL 1785045, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. June 27, 2025) (first quoting 	Dejesus, 726 F.3d at 89 n.5; and then citing 	Yanchaliquin,
2023 WL 7299810, at *4). 	As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have established that
Defendants violated the NYLL by undercompensating Plaintiffs for the overtime they worked, for
the same reasons as those set forth with respect to their FLSA claim. 	See supra 	Section IV.C.1.
3. 	NYLL Late Payment Claim
The Complaint’s third claim is that Defendants violated the NYLL by paying Plaintiffs
late, including through piecemeal payments. 	Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 106-11. 	The Motion argues that
Defendants violated Section 191(1)(a) of the NYLL by doing so. Dkt. No. 15-1 at 11.
“Section 191(1)(a) requires, by law, that employers pay a manual worker ‘weekly and not
later than seven calendar days after the end of the week in 	which the wages are earned.’” 	Bazinett
v. Pregis LLC, 720 F. Supp. 3d 154, 165 (N.D.N.Y. 2024). “As of the date of this Memorandum-
Decision and Order, there is no New York Court of Appeals decision regarding a private right of
action under NYLL § 191.” 	Shugars v. Masonite Corp., No. 22-cv-1237, 2023 WL 7280902, at
*6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2023). There 	is, however, presently “a split at 	the appellate level in the New
York state courts as to whether NYLL § 191, in conjunction with NYLL § 198, provides a private
right of action[.]” 	DeDyn v. Gintzler Graphics, Inc., No. 23-cv-1291, 2026 WL 221434, at *6
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2026). 	The Appellate Division, First Department, of the New York State
Supreme Court has found that such a private right of action exists. 	Vega v. CM & Assocs. Constr.
Mgmt., LLC, 107 N.Y.S.3d 286 (App. Div. 2019). The Appellate Division, Second Department,
of the New York State Supreme 	Court has “respectfully disagree[d] with the reasoning of 	Vega
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and decline[d] to follow it.” 	Grant v. Glob. Aircraft Dispatch, Inc., 204 N.Y.S.3d 117, 122 (App.
Div. 2024).
“The central dispute between the 	Vega 	and 	Grant 	courts—and among the federal district
courts assessing those opinions—has been whether 	late 	payment under § 191(1)(a) is a form of
underpayment 	as contemplated by § 198 and, therefore, whether a claim under § 191(1)(a) is a
‘wage claim’ for which employees have a private cause of action.” 	DeDyn, 2026 WL 221434, at
*6. The vast majority of federal courts that have considered this issue have followed 	Vega. 	See,
e.g., Johnson v. Best Bev LLC, No. 24-cv-1260, 2025 WL 2734204, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
2025) (Brindisi, J.) (“[T]he Court finds the First Department’s decision in 	Vega 	more persuasive,
declines to adopt the Second 	Department’s reasoning in 	Grant, and predicts the Court of Appeals
will do the same.”); 	Euson v. TRC Eng’rs, LLC, No. 24-cv-1168, 2025 WL 2591847, at *8
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2025) 	(Suddaby, J.) (“[T]he Court joins the 	vast majority of other federal
district courts within the Second Circuit in finding that New York law creates a private right of
action (whether it is express or implied) for a violation of pay frequency under Section
191(1)(a).”); 	Covington v. Childtime Childcare, Inc., No. 23-cv-710, 2024 WL 2923702, at *4-5
(N.D.N.Y. June 10, 2024) (Sannes, C.J.) (“District 	courts sitting in this Circuit have had the
opportunity to weigh-in on 	Grant 	and address the split in authority—all but one have continued to
follow 	Vega 	as the predominate authority and predict that the Court of Appeals is more likely to
adopt the First Department’s conclusion. . . . The 	Court is persuaded by the reasoning of, and the
conclusion reached by, the majority of its sister courts and sees no reason to depart from such
rulings.”) (collecting cases). 	This 	Court agrees with the majority of district courts and finds,
pursuant to 	Vega, that a private right of action exists for violations of Section 191(1)(a). 	See also
Euson, 2025 WL 2591847, at *8 (“In any event, recent amendments to the New York Labor Law
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appear to have resolved the contentious legal issue surrounding whether N.Y. Lab. L. § 198(1-a)
creates a private right of action for the enforcement of violations of N.Y. 	Lab. L. § 191(1)(a).”)
(citation omitted); 	DeDyn, 2026 WL 221434, at *7 (“[E]ven disregarding the recent amendment
to § 198, almost every district court to address the split between 	Vega 	and 	Grant 	has adopted
Vega’s reasoning.”) (collecting cases).
As detailed in the Motion, and above, the Complaint plausibly alleges that each Plaintiff
was not consistently paid on a weekly basis and was instead repeatedly paid late, including through
piecemeal payments. 	See 	Dkt. No. 15-1 at 11; 	supra 	Section II.B. “Thus, because ‘money has a
real time value,’ a late payment is an under payment.” 	Bazinett, 720 F. Supp. 3d at 163 (quoting
Zachary v. BG Retail, LLC, 716 F. Supp. 3d 339, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)). Accordingly, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs have established that Defendants violated the NYLL by paying them late.
4. 	NYLL Failure to Pay Promised Wage Claim
The Complaint’s fourth claim is that Defendants violated the NYLL by failing to pay
Plaintiffs their promised wages for the hours they worked. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 112-15.
As the Motion notes, “[s]everal courts have 	held that Section 191 of the New York Labor
Law requires employers to pay owed wages at the promised rate, even if that rate exceeds the
minimum wage.” 	Dkt. No. 15-1 at 11 (first citing 	Cavalotti v. Daddyo’s BBQ, Inc., No. 15-cv-
6469, 2018 WL 5456654, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2018); and then citing 	Calle v. Yoneles Enters.,
Inc., No. 16-cv-1008, 2017 WL 6942652, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2017)); 	see also Goldberg v.
Jacquet, 667 F. App’x 313, 314 n.1 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Wholesale withholding of wages is covered
by NYLL § 191[.]”).
As detailed above and in the Motion, all Plaintiffs allege numerous instances in which they
were not paid their promised hourly wages, which ranged from $15 to $30 per hour over the course
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of their employment. 	See supra 	Section II.B; Dkt. No. 15-1 at 11-12. “Under the NYLL, a plaintiff
can recover for unpaid time at the agreed-upon rate, even if it exceeds minimum wage. 	Section
191 of the NYLL mandates that workers ‘be paid . . . in accordance with the agreed terms of
employment.’” 	Shi v. TL & CG Inc., No. 19-cv-08502, 2022 WL 2669156, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July
11, 2022) (first citing 	Kernes v. Glob. Structures, LLC, No. 15-cv-659, 2016 WL 880199, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2016); and then quoting N.Y. Lab. L. §§ 191(1)(a)(i), 191(1)(d)). Accordingly,
the Court finds that Plaintiffs have established that Defendants violated the NYLL by failing to
pay them their promised wages.
5. 	NYLL Wage Notice and Wage Statement Claim
The Complaint’s fifth and final claim is that 	Defendants violated the NYLL by failing to
provide them with the necessary wage notices and wage statements. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 116-21.
Adopted as part of New York 	State’s Wage Theft Prevention 	Act, Section 195 of the NYLL
requires an employer to provide an employee, at the time of hiring, with a notice
(1) describing the employee’s rate of pay for regular and for overtime hours; (2)
stating whether the employer intends to credit allowances for items such as tips,
meals, and lodging toward the employee’s minimum wage; (3) describing certain
health care benefits; and (4) providing other basic information. 	N.Y. Lab. L.
§ 195(1)(a). 	In addition, each time wages are paid, the employer must furnish a
statement detailing the calculation of regular and overtime pay for that pay period,
along with information on deductions and minimum wage allowances. 	Id. 	§ 195(3).
Guthrie v. Rainbow Fencing Inc., 113 F.4th 300, 303 (2d Cir. 2024). The Second Circuit has also
clarified that in order to establish standing with respect to a statutory violation of Section 195, “a
plaintiff must show some casual connection between the lack of accurate notices and the
downstream harm.” 	Id. 	at 308.
The Motion first argues that the Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendants violated
Section 195(1) by failing to provide Plaintiffs with written notice of their wage rates and related
information in Plaintiffs’ primary 	language, either at the time Plaintiffs each began working for
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Defendants or at any time thereafter. 	Dkt. No. 15-1 at 12. 	The Motion next argues that the
Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendants violated Section 195(3) by failing to provide
Plaintiffs, throughout their employment, with accurate wage statements that included all hours
Plaintiffs worked and their hourly rates of pay. 	Id. 	The Motion concludes that Defendants are
liable as a result. 	Id. 	at 12-13. 	The Court agrees that the Complaint sufficiently alleges these
violations of Section 195. 	See supra 	Section II.B. 	The Court also notes the Complaint’s
allegations that Plaintiffs were harmed by these statutory violations, because Defendants’ failure
to provide proper wage notices and wage statements 	to Plaintiffs “hindered their ability to confront
Defendants sooner about their owed wages[,]” prevented Plaintiffs from “discover[ing] the
violation of their rights sooner and avoiding some of the harm 	they experienced[,]” and thus
“directly contributed 	to the amount of wage theft experienced by Plaintiffs.” 	Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 95-
97. 	“Courts in this Circuit recognize that such allegations satisfy the downstream-harm
requirement under 	Guthrie.” 	Rueda v. A & G Iron Works Corp, No. 25-cv-1791, 2026 WL 183692,
at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2026) (collecting cases) (finding that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged
injury as a result of defendants’ 	violation of Section 195 for purposes of a default judgment).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have established that Defendants harmed them
by failing to provide the necessary wage notices and wage statements in violation of the NYLL.
D. 	Damages
Plaintiffs seek a substantial sum of damages as a result of the years during which
Defendants violated the FLSA and NYLL. 	Dkt. No. 15-1 at 13-29. 	Plaintiffs argue that an
evidentiary hearing is unnecessary because their submissions provide a sufficient basis on which
to calculate damages. 	See, e.g., id. 	at 13; Dkt. No. 15-2 at ¶ 13. The Court disagrees.
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For instance, as detailed above, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that their usual weekly
schedule consisted of working Monday through Saturday and a minimum of approximately fifty
hours. 	See supra 	Section IV.C.1.ii. But that does not plausibly suggest, for example, that Plaintiff
Mendez maintained this schedule, working fifty or more hours a week, six days a week, fifty-two
weeks a year, for years. It may be conceivable that 	Plaintiff Mendez worked this schedule—with
no holidays, no sick days, no vacation days, and no stop 	in work—but it appears implausible that
he did so from October 2018 through February 2024, which is what his damages calculation
appears to indicate. Dkt. No. 15-12 at 2-3.4
Those years included a global pandemic, which, if Plaintiffs’ damages calculations are
credited, had no effect on the hours Plaintiff Mendez (and others) worked performing construction
in New York state. 	Id. 	More importantly, Plaintiff Mendez and at least one other Plaintiff have
submitted documentation suggesting that, instead of working six days and fifty hours every week,
at times they worked fewer days and less hours. 	See, e.g., 	Dkt. No. 15-7 at 30, 33, 36; Dkt. No.
15-8 at ¶ 21; Dkt. No. 15-8 at 26. The communications Plaintiffs have submitted also indicate that
inclement weather prevented them from working at times, 	see 	Dkt. No. 15-7 at 8, 10 (Tuesday,
January 23, 2024 text from Plaintiff Mendez to Defendant Friedlander stating that “[t]omorrow
there is a lot of rain, we cannot 	work”), and also reference “the 	slow season for all construction [
] in New York State[,]” Dkt. No. 15-10 at 9, further calling into question the calculation of damages
that Plaintiffs have presented. 	See, e.g., Cotton v. NY Minute Movers, Inc., No. 20-cv-6153, 2022
WL 3684715, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2022) (“‘Where, on a damages inquest, a plaintiff fails
to demonstrate its damages to a reasonable certainty, the court should decline to award any
4 	Except for the week of January 28, 2024 through February 3, 2024, when Plaintiff Mendez
indicates that he worked approximately thirty-eight hours. Dkt. No. 15-12 at 2.
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damages even though liability has been established through default.’ 	That being said, because
under [the] FLSA ‘[t]he burden is on an employer properly to record hours,’ a ‘plaintiff need not
compute FLSA damages with precision.’ 	An 	employee may meet his burden of showing the
amount and extent of his hours work[ed] through his own recollection.”) (second 	alteration in
original) (citations omitted), 	report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3682833 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 25, 2022).
Given the nature of the damages sought, the Court finds that “it is ‘necessary and proper’
to hold an inquest on damages” with respect to Plaintiffs’ FLSA 	and NYLL claims. 	Cement &
Concrete Workers, 699 F.3d at 234 (quoting 	Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 54 (2d
Cir. 1993)). 	The Court further exercises its discretion pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) and refers this
matter to United States Magistrate Judge Paul J. Evangelista for a damages inquest. 	Mickalis, 645
F.3d at 129.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS 	that Plaintiffs’ Motion, Dkt. No. 15, is 	GRANTED, as set forth in Section IV
of this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and the Court further
ORDERS 	that this matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Paul J. Evangelista for a damages
inquest; and the Court further
ORDERS 	that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 30, 2026
Albany, New York
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