Shaw v. Woltman

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
SHANA SHAW,
Plaintiff,
1:23-CV-1623
v. 	(GTS/DJS)
BRIAN WOLTMAN, Ulster County Sheriff’s Dep’t,
Defendant.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
SHANA SHAW
Plaintiff, Pro Se
11 Manchester Rd Apt 1
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
COOK, KURTZ & MURPHY, P.C. 	ERIC M. KURTZ, ESQ.
Counsel for Defendant
P.O. Box 3939
85 Main Street
Kingston, NY 12402
GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this pro se civil rights action filed by Shana Shaw
(“Plaintiff”) against Brian Woltman (“Defendant”), is Defendant's motion for summary
judgment. 	(Dkt. No. 33.) 	For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted.
I. 	RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. 	Plaintiff's Claims
Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff's Complaint claims that, on December 26, 2021,
“Ulster County Sheriff Brian Woltman used excessive force [against her] for a[n] arrest with no
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probable cause.” 	(Dkt. No. 1, at 4 [Plf.'s Compl.].)
B. 	Undisputed Material Facts
Generally, the following facts have been asserted and supported through citations to
admissible record evidence by Defendant in his Statement of Material Facts, and effectively
admitted by Plaintiff in her response by failing to deny those factual assertions with supporting
citations to admissible record evidence in matching numbered paragraphs. 	(Compare Dkt. No.
33, Attach. 4 [Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement] with Dkt. No. 41 [Plf.'s Response].)1
1. 	On December 28, 2020, as Defendant was proceeding along Ulster Avenue in the
Town of Ulster, he observed a black SUV commit a traffic infraction.
2. 	This prompted Defendant to run the license plate of the black SUV with his
onboard computer which is connected to a Law Enforcement Database, at which time he learned
that it was registered to Plaintiff, whose license had been suspended.
3. 	Defendant then activated his overhead lights, followed Plaintiff's vehicle into the
parking lot of the Buffalo Wild Wings on Ulster Avenue, then exited his vehicle and approached
the black SUV.
4. 	After confirming that the operator of the vehicle was Plaintiff, Defendant asked
her to get out of her vehicle.
5. 	Plaintiff complied with this initial request at which time Defendant then advised
her that she was under arrest for driving with a suspended license.
1 	The Court notes that on December 27, 2023, Plaintiff received a courtesy copy of Local
Rule 56.1 and page 42 of the District's Pro Se Handbook (both of which advised her of this
requirement). 	(Dkt. No. 2.) 	She received a similar notice of this requirement on February 13,
2025. 	(Dkt. No. 34.)
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6. 	Plaintiff then climbed back into her car, stated that she was calling her lawyer,
and began reaching across the center console.
7. 	Defendant directed Plaintiff to exit her vehicle and stated that she was under
arrest. 	He placed his right hand on Plaintiffs left arm, and attempted to pull her from the
vehicle, though Plaintiff pulled away and stated that she could not be arrested. 	This went on
for approximately six minutes.
8. 	During the six minutes in which he attempted to remove Plaintiff from her
vehicle, Defendant radioed for backup. Another Officer arrived on scene shortly thereafter.
9. 	After the arrival of the second officer, Defendant was able to successfully pull
Plaintiff from the vehicle, at which time he placed her face-down on the ground and attempted to
apply handcuffs.
10. 	While Plaintiff was on the ground, Defendant directed her to place her hands
behind her back; however, she did not.
11. 	It was only with the assistance of the other officer that Defendant was able to
place Plaintiff in handcuffs and complete the arrest.
12. 	After Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs, she was seated in the rear of Defendant's
vehicle so that a search of her SUV could be performed.
13. 	Following the search of Plaintiffs vehicle, Defendant returned to his patrol vehicle
and input Plaintiff’s information into the Law Enforcement Database utilized by Ulster County.
14. 	During the time Plaintiff was in the patrol vehicle, she made complaints of pain
and a request for an ambulance was radioed in. 	Upon the arrival of the ambulance, Plaintiff was
removed from the rear of Defendant's patrol vehicle and placed on a stretcher, at which time she
complained that her handcuffs had been applied too tightly.
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15. 	Before Defendant could even reach the handcuffs to loosen them, Plaintiff
complained that he was hurting her. 	After Defendant advised Plaintiff that he could not be
hurting her because he was not even touching her, he was permitted to loosen the handcuffs and
received verbal confirmation from Plaintiff that they were looser.
16. 	Defendant retained the services of a Board Certified Neurologist, Dr. Jeffrey
Degen, in connection with this action. Dr. Degen performed an examination of Plaintiff on
November 20, 2024.
17. 	Based upon his examination of Plaintiff and review of her medical records, Dr.
Degen found no objective evidence to support the existence of any wrist injury or neurological
deficits which were causally related to the incident that took place on December 28, 2020.
C. 	Summary of Parties' Arguments on Defendant's Motion
Generally, in support of his motion, Defendant asserts the following three arguments: (1)
based on the current record, he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff as a result of her driving
with a suspended license; (2) based on the current record, he did not use excessive force during
his arrest of Plaintiff; and (3) in any event, based on the current record, he is protected from
liability as a matter of law by the doctrine of qualified immunity. 	(Dkt. No. 33, Attach. 5.)
Generally, liberally construed with the utmost of special leniency, Plaintiff’s response
asserts the following nine arguments: (1) Defendant could not pull her over without probable
cause; (2) his observing her failure to use a turn signal did not provide such probable cause; (3)
his video camera footage does not support his claim that she failed to use her turn signal; (4) he
unreasonably searched her car without her permission; (5) the ultimate dismissal of the charges
against her means no probable cause existed for her arrest; (6) his traffic stop and arrest were
racially discriminatory; (7) the resulting six-month sentence she served violated her Eighth
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Amendment right against excessive punishment; (8) the injuries she sustained support her claim
of excessive force; and (9) Defendant's use of an unmarked police car violated a Senate Bill
introduced in 2023. 	(Dkt. No. 41, at 2.)
II. 	RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is warranted if "the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	A dispute of fact is "genuine" if "the [record] evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the [non-movant]." 	Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).2 	As for the materiality requirement, a dispute of fact is
"material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . . Factual
disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." 	Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must resolve all
ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant. 	Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
In addition, "[the movant] bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the . . . [record] which it believes
demonstrate[s] the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." 	Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-24 (1986). 	However, when the movant has met its initial burden, the non-movant must
come forward with specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. 	Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a),(c),(e).
2 	As a result, "[c]onclusory allegations, conjecture and speculation . . . are insufficient to
create a genuine issue of fact." 	Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998)
[citation omitted]. 	As the Supreme Court has explained, "[The non-movant] must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." 	Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986).
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Implied in the above-stated burden-shifting standard is the fact that, where a non-movant
willfully fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, a district court has no duty to
perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute-even if that non-
movant is proceeding pro se.3 	(Rather, the Court extends special solicitude to the pro se litigant
by, in pertinent part, ensuring that he or she has received notice of the consequences of failing to
properly respond to the motion for summary judgment.)4 	As has often been recognized by both
the Supreme Court and Second Circuit, even pro se litigants must obey a district court's
procedural rules.5
Of course, when a non-movant willfully fails to respond to a motion for summary
judgment, "[t]he fact that there has been no [such] response . . . does not . . . [by itself] mean that
the motion is to be granted automatically." 	Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996).
Rather, as indicated above, the Court must assure itself that, based on the undisputed material
facts, the law indeed warrants judgment for the movant. 	Champion, 76 F.3d at 486; Allen v.
Comprehensive Analytical Group, Inc., 140 F. Supp.2d 229, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (Scullin, C.J.);
N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(3), 56.1(a). 	What the non-movant's failure to respond to the motion does
is lighten the movant's burden.
For these reasons, this Court has often enforced Local Rule 56.1 by deeming facts set
forth in a movant's statement of material facts to be admitted, where (1) those facts are supported
3 	Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F. Supp.2d 416, 426 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 209) (Suddaby, J.) (citing
cases).
4 	Cusamano, 604 F. Supp.2d at 426 & n.3 (citing cases).
5 	Cusamano, 604 F. Supp.2d at 426-27 & n.4 (citing cases).
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by evidence in the record, and (2) the non-movant has willfully failed to properly respond to that
statement6–even where the non-movant was proceeding pro se.7
Similarly, in this District, where a non-movant has willfully failed to respond to a
movant's properly filed and facially meritorious memorandum of law, the non-movant is deemed
to have "consented" to the legal arguments contained in that memorandum of law under Local
Rule 7.1(a)(3).8 	Stated another way, when a non-movant fails to oppose a legal argument
asserted by a movant, the movant may succeed on the argument by showing that the argument
possess facial merit, which has appropriately been characterized as a "modest" burden. 	See
N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(3) ("Where a properly filed motion is unopposed and the Court determined
that the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate entitlement to the relief requested
therein, the non-moving party's failure to file or serve any papers as this Rule requires shall be
deemed as consent to the granting or denial of the motion, as the case may be, unless good cause
is shown."); Rusyniak v. Gensini, 07-CV-0279, 2009 WL 3672105, at *1, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30,
2009) (Suddaby, J.) (collecting cases); Este-Green v. Astrue, 09-CV-0722, 2009 WL2473509, at
6 	Among other things, Local Rule 56.1(b) requires that the non-movant file a response to
the movant's Statement of Material Facts, which admits or denies each of the movant's factual
assertions in matching numbered paragraphs, and supports any denials with a specific citation to
the record where the factual issue arises. 	N.D.N.Y. L. R. 56.1(b).
7 	Cusamano, 604 F. Supp.2d at 427 & n.6 (citing cases).
8 	See, e.g., Beers v. GMC, 97-CV-0482, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12285, at *27-31
(N.D.N.Y. March 17, 1999) (McCurn, J.) (deeming plaintiff's failure, in his opposition papers, to
oppose several arguments by defendants in their motion for summary judgment as consent by
plaintiff to the granting of summary judgment for defendants with regard to the claims that the
arguments regarded, under Local Rule 7.1[b][3]; Devito v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 02-CV-
0745, 2004 WL 3691343, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2004) (McCurn, J.) (deeming plaintiff's
failure to respond to "aspect" of defendant's motion to exclude expert testimony as "a concession
by plaintiff that the court should exclude [the expert's] testimony" on that ground).
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*2 & n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (collecting cases).
III. 	ANALYSIS
After carefully considering the matter, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for the
reasons stated therein. 	(Dkt. No. 33, Attach. 5.) 	To those reasons, the Court adds the following
analysis.
The Court begins by observing that each of the three legal arguments asserted in
Defendant’s memorandum of law is supported by at least facial merit (demonstrating an
entitlement to the relief requested, as a threshold matter). 	(Dkt. No. 33, Attach. 5.) 	However,
in her response, Plaintiff fails to oppose Defendant’s third argument (regarding qualified
immunity), in violation of N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(3). 	(See generally Dkt. No. 41.)9 	As a result,
this third argument is deemed consented to by Plaintiff. 	This alternative ground alone (i.e.,
qualified immunity) can, and does, serve as a sufficient ground on which to grant Defendant’s
motion.
In any event, even if the Court were to base its decision on Defendant’s first and second
arguments, the Court would reach the same result. 	This is because Plaintiff has only obliquely
and/or unpersuasively opposed those two arguments. 	(See generally Dkt. No. 41, at 2.) 	See
also, supra, Part I.C. of this Decision and Order (summarizing Plaintiff’s responsive arguments).
For the sake of brevity, the Court will not linger on the fact that Plaintiff fails to
specifically cite admissible record evidence in support of any of her nine arguments. 	(See
9 	The Court notes that on December 27, 2023, Plaintiff received a courtesy copy of Local
Rule 7.1 and page 44 of the District's Pro Se Handbook (both of which advised her of this
requirement). 	(Dkt. No. 2.) 	She received a similar notice of this requirement on February 13,
2025. 	(Dkt. No. 34.)
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generally Dkt. No. 41, at 2.) 	Nor will the Court linger on the fact that some of those arguments
regard claims that are not pending in this action (e.g., a Fourth Amendment claim of
unreasonable search and seizure, an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive punishment, and a
Fourteenth Amendment claim of racial discrimination). 	(Compare Dkt. No. 41, at 2 with Dkt.
No. 1, at 3, 4 [claiming that Defendant “used excessive force for an arrest with no probable
cause”].)
More important is that Plaintiff is incorrect that a police officer needs probable cause to
conduct a traffic stop. 	See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 235, 242 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment requires that an officer making a traffic stop have probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that the person stopped has committed a traffic violation or is otherwise
engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity.”) (emphasis added).
She is also incorrect that the failure to use a turn signal does not constitute reasonable
articulable suspicion for such a traffic stop. 	See United States v. Goolsby, 820 F. App’x 47, 49
(2d Cir. 2020) (“Miller had more than a reasonable suspicion that Goolsby committed a traffic
violation because he saw Goolsby fail to use his turn signal 100 feet before turning . . . .”).
She is also incorrect that the video camera footage in this case somehow undermines
Defendant’s sworn testimony that she “cut [him] off” (without using her turn signal). 	(Compare
Dkt. No. 33, Attach. 3 [video camera footage at 0:00.10-0:00.21] with Dkt. No. 33, Attach. 2, at
¶ 3 [Def.’s Affid.].)
She is also incorrect to the extent she argues that Defendant did not have probable cause
to stop her for the alternative offense of driving with a suspended license (specifically,
aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree in violation of N.Y. Veh.
& Traf. Law § 511[1]) based on the result of his entering her license plate into a Law
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Enforcement Database, which informed him that her license had been suspended. 	See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Harron, 91-CV-1460, 1995 WL 319943, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 1995) (McCurn,
J.) (“At the time of plaintiff's detention and arrest, it was reasonable for defendants to credit the
DMV computer information as reasonably trustworthy, especially in light of the fact that they
had [with them] no documentary proof to the contrary. Thus, the court concludes that the
Customs Inspectors had probable cause to detain plaintiff and Defendant Triller had probable
cause to arrest him for driving with a suspended license.”).
She is also incorrect to the extent she argues that, before arresting her, Defendant had a
duty to drive to her home and examine the DMV paperwork that had purportedly lifted her
suspension and reinstated her license. 	Of course, had Plaintiff had the purportedly exculpatory
paperwork with her at the time, then Defendant could not have turned a blind eye to it but would
have had to examine it. 	See Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir.2003) (“[A]n officer .
. . [may not] deliberately disregard facts known to him which establish [an exculpatory
defense].”); see, e.g., O’Diah v. Corcoran, 09-CV-3580, 2013 WL 1339413, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2013) (“[P]etitioner told Officer Eddings that there were papers in the van showing that
his license had been reinstated. . . . Officer Eddings looked at the letter that petitioner indicated
and determined that it was a letter from the Department of Motor Vehicles notifying petitioner of
the suspension of his license.”). 	However, he had no duty to expend the considerable time and
effort necessary to drive to Plaintiff home to search for exculpatory evidence. 	See Panetta v.
Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 396 (2d Cir.2006) (“Once a police officer has a reasonable basis for
believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically
plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest. . . . Once officers possess facts sufficient
to establish probable cause, they are neither required nor allowed to sit as prosecutor, judge or
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jury. Their function is to apprehend those suspected of wrongdoing, and not to finally determine
guilt through a weighing of the evidence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Celestin v. City of
New York, 581 F. Supp.2d 420, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[O]nce the evidence establishes probable
cause, an officer is not required to continue investigating, sifting and weighing information, nor
is an officer obligated to investigate the suspect's plausible claims of innocence.”).
She is also incorrect that any subsequent reversal of her criminal conviction means there
was no probable cause to arrest her. 	See Marcano v. City of Schenectady, 38 F. Supp.3d 238,
259 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (McAvoy, J.) (“[T]he eventual disposition of the criminal charges is
irrelevant to the probable cause determination.”); see, e.g., Johnson, 1995 WL 319943, at *9,
n.11 (“The fact that the [DMV computer] information upon which defendants relied later proved
to be erroneous does not negate the earlier finding of probable cause [for arrest for driving with a
suspended license].”).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, based on the admissible evidence in this case
(including, but not limited to, Defendant’s affidavit, Dr. Jeffrey W. Degen’s affidavit, Plaintiff’s
examination before trial, Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s interrogatories, and the video
camera footage), no rational fact finder could conclude that the forced use by Defendant against
Plaintiff to conduct the arrest was excessive, given her prolonged active resistance and lack of
permanent injury. 	(See, e.g., Dkt. No. 33, Attach. 3 [video camera footage of force used at
0:01:42-0:07:35].)
Generally, three elements must be objectively examined to determine whether a Fourth
Amendment claim of excessive force has been established: "(1) the need for the application of
force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force that was used; and (3) the
extent of the injury inflicted." 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 397 (1989). 	The proper
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application of this test requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 	Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Here, liberally construed with the utmost of special leniency, Plaintiff’s response (when
combined with her examination before trial and the video camera footage) suggests that she
bases this claim on the following: (1) the manner in which she was pulled from her vehicle, (2)
the manner in which she was brought to the ground, (3) the tightness of her handcuffs following
her arrest, and (4) her resulting physical injuries (which purportedly included a concussion,
bruises all over her body, bleeding from her fingers, and nerve damage in her right hand). 	(Dkt.
No. 33, Attach. 6, at 23-24, 26-29, 31.)
However, Plaintiff adduces no admissible record evidence controverting the following six
facts: (1) the fact that, upon being advised that she was under arrest for driving with a suspended
license, Plaintiff then climbed back into her car and refused to exit despite repeated commands
by Defendant to do so for approximately six minutes; (2) the fact that it was only with the
assistance of the other officer that Defendant was able to remove Plaintiff from her vehicle; (3)
the fact that, when Plaintiff was face down on the ground outside of her vehicle, she did not
comply with Defendant’s repeated directive to place her hands behind her back; (4) the fact that
it was only with the assistance of the other officer that Defendant was able to place Plaintiff in
handcuffs; (5) the fact that, in response to Plaintiff’s complaint that her handcuffs had been
applied too tightly, Defendant loosened the handcuffs and received verbal confirmation from
Plaintiff that they were looser; and (6) the fact that a Board-certified neurosurgeon (Dr. Degen)
concluded that, based on his review of Plaintiff’s medical records, there was no objective
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evidence of any permanent wrist injury or neurological deficits caused by the incident (but only
“a very mild concussion” and “an injury to the superficial radial nerve, which has since healed”).
(See, e.g., Dkt. No. 33, Attach. 3, at ¶¶ 5-6 [Degen Affid.]; Dkt. No. 33, Attach. 3, at 5-7 [Letter
dated 11/20/24 of Dr. Degen, listing the medical records reviewed].) 	The Court notes that these
facts are in no way controverted by the photographs, text messages, and medical records that
Plaintiff improperly filed with the Court, even if they were sua sponte considered. 	(Dkt. No. 42;
Dkt. No. 46, Attach. 1-8.)
For each of these alternative reasons, Defendant’s motion is granted.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 33) is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED.
The undersigned certifies that an appeal from this Text Order would not be taken in good
faith
Dated: December 9, 2025
Syracuse, New York
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