Gazzola et al v. Hochul et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NADINE GAZZOLA, individually, and as co-owner,
President, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives Federal Firearms Licensee (“BATFE FFL”)
Responsible Person for Zero Tolerance Manufacturing,
Inc., SETH GAZZOLA, individually, and as co-owner,
Vice President, and BATFE FFL Responsible Person for
Zero Tolerance Manufacturing, Inc., JOHN A. HANUSIK,
individually, and as owner and BATFE FFL Responsible
Person for AGA Sales, JIM INGERICK, individually, and
as owner and BATFE FFL Responsible Person for
Ingerick’s, LLC, d/b/a Avon Gun & Hunting Supply,
CHRISTOPHER MARTELLO, individually, and as owner
and BATFE FFL Responsible Person for Performance
Paintball, Inc., d/b/a Ikkin Arms, MICHAEL
MASTROGIOVANNI, individually, and as owner and
BATFE FFL Responsible Person for Spur Shooters Supply,
CRAIG SERAFINI, individually, and as owner and
BATFE FFL Responsible Person for Upstate Guns and
Ammo, LLC, and NICK AFFRONTI, individually, and as
BATFE FFL Responsible Person for East Side Traders
LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STEVEN G. JAMES, in his official capacity as the
Superintendent of the New York State Police, and
LETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as the Attorney
General of the State of New York,
Defendants.
1:22-cv-1134 (BKS/DJS)
Appearances:
For Plaintiffs:
Paloma A. Capanna
Law Office of Paloma A. Capanna, P.C.
106-B Professional Park Drive
Beaufort, North Carolina 28516
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For Defendants:
Letitia James
Attorney General of the State of New York
Aimee Cowan
Assistant Attorney General
300 South State Street, Suite 300
Syracuse, New York 13202
Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, licensed firearms dealers engaged in the commercial sale of firearms and
ammunition, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Steven G. James, in his
official capacity as the Superintendent of the New York State Police, and Letitia James, in her
official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of New York. (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiffs allege
that New York’s ammunition background check and semiautomatic rifle license requirements
violate the Second Amendment and seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary
damages. (Id.). Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c).1 (Dkt. No. 144). The motion is fully briefed. (Dkt. Nos. 145, 151, 152, 155).
For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.
II. 	FACTS2
The facts and procedural history of this case are set forth at length in the Court’s prior
decision. (Dkt. No. 136, at 3–16). The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with those facts and
recites only those facts relevant to the remaining claims.
1 This is Defendants’ second motion for judgment on the pleadings; the Court granted Defendants’ first motion and
dismissed all claims except the two remaining claims. (Dkt. No. 136).
2 The facts are drawn from Plaintiffs’ complaint and the attached exhibits. (Dkt. No. 1). See Chambers v. Time Warner,
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as
an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”) (citation omitted). The Court assumes the
truth of and draws all reasonable inferences from the well-pleaded factual allegations. Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). Defendants have attached exhibits to their answer, (Dkt. No. 79), and both parties
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A. 	The Plaintiffs
The eight individual Plaintiffs hold Federal Firearms Licenses (“FFL”), authorized by the
federal government through the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”)
to engage in the business of buying and selling firearms. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 17.b); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 923. Plaintiffs are “owners, employers, and employees” of “businesses engaged in lawful
commerce in firearms and in gun shows” in the Northern District of New York. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶
1, 15). Plaintiffs Nadine Gazzola and Seth Gazzola own Zero Tolerance Manufacturing, Inc., in
Ghent, NY. (Id. ¶ 6). Plaintiff John Hanusik does business as AGA Sales, a sole proprietorship in
Catskill, NY. (Id. ¶ 7). Plaintiff Jim Ingerick owns Ingerick’s LLC, d/b/a “Avon Gun and
Hunting Supply,” in Avon, NY. (Id. ¶ 8). Plaintiff Christoper Martello owns Performance
Paintball, Inc., d/b/a/ “Ikkin Arms” in Rochester, NY. (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff Michael Mastrogiovanni
“does business as ‘Spur Shooters Supply,’” a sole proprietorship in Syracuse, NY. (Id. ¶ 10).
Plaintiff Craig Serafini owns Upstate Guns and Ammo, LLC in Schenectady, NY. (Id. ¶ 12).
Plaintiff Nick Affronti works for East Side Traders LLC in Ontario, NY. (Id. ¶ 13).
B. 	Ammunition Background Check
Plaintiffs assert that “[h]istorically, there has not been an ammunition background
check.” (Id. ¶ 216). In 2022, however, the New York State Legislature passed the Concealed
Carry Improvement Act (“CCIA”) requiring, as relevant here, an ammunition seller conduct a
background check on a prospective purchaser of ammunition before the sale and keep a detailed
record of every sale of ammunition. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 400.02(2), 400.03(2)–(3); N.Y. Exec.
Law § 228(5)(a). Before completing an ammunition sale, a “seller of ammunition” or “dealer in
have submitted exhibits in connection with the pending motion for judgment on the pleadings. None appear
appropriate for judicial notice and none are referenced in or integral to the Complaint. The Court therefore has not
considered these exhibits in deciding the present motion.
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firearms” must “verif[y] the identity” of the purchaser by examining “a valid [state-issued]
identification document” and contact “the statewide license and record database” and provide it
“with information sufficient to identify” the purchaser of ammunition. N.Y. Penal Law §
400.03(3)(a), (c). “If the . . . [database] notifies the . . . seller that the information available . . .
does not demonstrate that the receipt of ammunition by” the purchaser “would violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) or state law,”3 and that the purchaser is “eligible to possess ammunition,” the system
“assigns a unique identification number to the [transaction],” which it provides to the seller to
record. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.03(4)–(5).
In addition to conducting a background check, the CCIA requires sellers to keep detailed
records of ammunition transactions. Section 400.03(2) directs “[a]ny seller of ammunition or
dealer in firearms” to keep a record “approved as to form by the superintendent of state police.”
See also N.Y. Penal Law § 400.02(2) (directing that the New York State Police “shall[]”
“create[] and maintain[]” “a statewide license and record database specific for ammunition
sales”). Each record must include “the date, name, age, occupation and residence of any person .
. . to whom ammunition is delivered, and the amount, calibre, manufacturer’s name and serial
number” of such ammunition. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.03(2). However, as of November 1, 2022,
the date this action was filed, Defendant Superintendent James “ha[d] failed to promulgate” a
“form” for recording ammunition sales. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 217(a)). Thus, in order to comply with the
recordkeeping provisions, “Plaintiffs are writing the [requisite ammunition sales] information
down on plain paper,” and “wonder whether this” method of recording ammunition sales “would
. . . comply with the law.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 217(a), (c); see also id. ¶ 288 (“Plaintiffs are thus
3 Section 922(g) states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for” an individual in certain prohibited categories, including, among
others, an individual who has been convicted of a felony, “is a fugitive,” or “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any
controlled substance,” to possess “any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)–(9).
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mandated to indefinitely create ammunition purchase records by their own hand, until and unless
Defendant NYS Police specifies a format or otherwise converts into an electronic system.”)).
“Any form of ammunition background check or sales record-keeping involves Plaintiff and
employee time for creation and maintenance.” (Id. ¶ 289). Further, Plaintiffs “protest”
Defendants’ expenditure of “resources to try to make up its own background check system or to
try to add an ammunition background check system—particularly . . . if it is the Plaintiffs who
will bear the cost and that cost will drove them out-of-business from offering the very firearm
that is protected by the Second Amendment.” (Id. ¶ 215).
C. 	Semiautomatic Rifle License
The CCIA also includes provisions governing the sale and purchase of semiautomatic
rifles and requires a license for such purchases after September 4, 2022. N.Y. Penal Law §
400.00(1), (2). The new provisions govern new semiautomatic licenses, N.Y. Penal Law §
400.00(1), as well as amendments, id. § 400.00(9), and recertifications, id. § 400.00(10)(c).
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have “created” “confusion . . . around the new laws,” (Dkt. No.
1, ¶ 160(g)), by: (1) publishing a “wrongful instruction” in a “memorandum” stating that
“[e]xisting firearm license holders can add a Semi-Automatic Rifle to their [existing] firearm
license,” when the statutory provisions require “that a unique [semiautomatic rifle] license will
issue,” (id. ¶ 160(c)–(d)) (emphasis added); (2) publishing a semiautomatic rifle license
application entitled “Semi-Automatic Rifle License Amendment,” when license “[a]mendments”
and new license applications “are separately dealt with,” (id. ¶ 160(a)–(b) (asserting the title of
the application “is adding to the confusion, not clarifying the laws”). In addition, Plaintiffs assert
that “[n]o semi-automatic license is known to have issued or to be available to request,” except
in “[c]ounties allowing existing concealed carry permit holders to add a semi-automatic rifle to
their existing concealed carry permit,” resulting in a near total stoppage of the sale of all semi-
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automatic rifles in New York.” (id. ¶ 160). Since September 4, 2022, the effective date of the
legislation, “Plaintiffs have been unable to engage in commerce of semi-automatic rifles because
of the confusion created by the Defendants around the new laws,” (id. ¶ 160(g)), and are
“refusing to sell semi-automatic rifles to such customers for fear of being arrested for non-
compliance and committing a crime,” (id. ¶ 160), and Plaintiffs’ “sales of semiautomatic rifles
have plummeted and, along with it, general store inventory, as well,” (id. ¶ 160(g)).
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The same standard applicable to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss applies to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings.” Bank of N.Y. v. First Millennium,
Inc., 607 F.3d 905, 922 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus, “[t]o survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the complaint
‘must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Id. (quoting Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010)). “Although a
complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it may not rest on mere labels,
conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action, and the factual
allegations ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Lawtone-
Bowles v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-4240, 2017 WL 4250513, at *2, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
155140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). The Court will grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings “if, from the pleadings, the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” VCG Special Opportunities Master
Fund Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 594 F. Supp. 2d 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
“On a 12(c) motion, the court considers ‘the complaint, the answer, any written
documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the
factual background of the case.’” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir.
2011) (quoting Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 2009)).
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings dismissing Plaintiffs’ derivative Second
Amendment claim, with respect to the ammunition background check and semiautomatic rifle
license requirement, for failure to state a claim for relief. (Dkt. No. 144-22). Plaintiffs oppose
Defendants’ motion. (Dkt. No. 152).
The Second Amendment provides that, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
U.S. Const. amend. II. The Supreme Court has held that the Second Amendment protects an
individual’s right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n,
Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022).4 More specifically, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the Second Amendment “forbids a State from banning the in-home possession of common-use
weapons by law-abiding, responsible citizens,” Gazzola v. Hochul, 88 F.4th 186, 195 (2d Cir.
2023) (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)), and forbids a state from
“requiring them to show a special need to carry such weapons outside the home,” id. (citing
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 70).
In Bruen, “the Supreme Court . . . prescribed a two-step framework to evaluate Second
Amendment challenges.” New York State Firearms Assn. v. James (“NYSFA”), 157 F.4th 232,
244 (2d Cir. 2025) (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. 1). A court must “ask first ‘whether the Second
Amendment’s text applies to the challenged regulation; second, if it does, we ask whether the
regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Vereen, 152 F.4th 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2025)).
4 “Strictly speaking, [states] [are] bound to respect the right to keep and bear arms because of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Second.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 37.
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The first step requires a plaintiff to allege “that ‘the Second Amendment’s plain text
covers an individual’s conduct’—namely, to ‘keep’ and ‘bear’ arms.” Id. (quoting Bruen, 597
U.S. at 24). “Of course, to ‘keep’ and ‘bear’ arms, one must also be able to acquire them and
maintain them in operable condition,” Vereen, 152 F.4th at 95, which “necessarily involves the
right to purchase them, to keep them in a state of efficiency for use, and to purchase and provide
ammunition suitable for such arms, and to keep them in repair,” Gazzola, 88 F.4th at 196
(quoting Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 178 (1871)). Courts refer to the rights to purchase
firearms and suitable ammunition as “ancillary rights.” Vereen, 152 F.4th at 95 (citing Gazzola,
88 F.4th at 197); see also NYSFA, 157 F.4th at 244 (describing “the acquisition and maintenance
of firearms and ammunition” as “ancillary conduct”). An “ancillary right” “is ‘only protected to
the extent that [it is] necessary to the realization of the textually specified right to keep and bear
arms.’” NYSFA, 157 F.4th at 244 (quoting Vereen, 152 F.4th at 95). “Thus, ‘regulations on the
means of acquiring, transporting, and storing firearms only implicate the text of the Second
Amendment if they meaningfully constrain the right to possess and carry arms.’” Id. (quoting
Vereen, 152 F.4th at 95); see, e.g., Gazzola, 88 F.4th at 196 (“[C]ommercial regulations on
firearms dealers, whose services are necessary to a citizen’s effective exercise of Second
Amendment rights, cannot have the effect of eliminating the ability of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to acquire firearms.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized “laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” as “presumptively lawful
regulatory measures.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26.
“A law regulating the means of acquiring firearms and ammunition does not
meaningfully constrain the right to possess arms unless it ‘is so restrictive that it threatens a
citizen’s right to acquire firearms [and ammunition].” NYSFA, 157 F.4th at 244 (quoting
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Gazzola, 88 F.4th at 196). The Second Circuit has therefore found the “modest administrative
burdens that naturally follow” laws regulating the commercial sales of firearms and ammunition,
“will not ordinarily be sufficient to overcome” the presumption of lawfulness. NYSFA, 157 F.4th
at 245. For example, “[m]ere inconveniences” related to a preferred gun store location or “retail
experience” “do not constitute such threat” to an individual’s right to acquire firearms. Id. at
244–45; see Gazzola, 88 F.4th at 197–98 (“[G]un buyers have no right to have a gun store in a
particular location . . . [n]or a right to travel only short distances or receive a certain type of retail
experience”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]onsequences that are part and parcel of
ordinary regulatory measures—such as reasonable processing times and the hassle of filling out
paperwork—generally will not meaningfully impair one’s ability to acquire arms,” either.
NYSFA, 157 F.4th at 245. In contrast, the Second Circuit has cited a commercial sale regulation
“put toward abusive ends,” a lengthy processing delay on a firearm permit, an exorbitant fee, and
a ban on the purchase of more than one firearm in a thirty-day period, as examples of regulations
that may impose a “substantial burden” sufficient to constitute a meaningful constraint on an
individual’s right to bear arms. Id. at 245–247 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing inter
alia Nguyen v. Bonta, 140 F.4th 1237, 1242 (9th Cir. 2025)).
A. 	Ammunition Background Check
Plaintiffs allege that New York’s imposition of a background check on ammunition sales,
violates the Second Amendment,” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 216 (alleging that “[h]istorically, there has not
been an ammunition background check”)), and assert the cost will drive them out of business,
(id. ¶ 215). Defendants assert that the ammunition background check provisions do not implicate
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the Second Amendment and that Plaintiffs’ claim therefore fails under step one of Bruen. (Dkt.
No. 144-22, at 14–26). Plaintiffs oppose dismissal. (Dkt. No. 152, at 38–43).5
1. 	NYSFA v. James
Defendants argue that NYSFA, where the Second Circuit recently found the plaintiffs
were unlikely to succeed in their Second Amendment challenge to New York’s ammunition
background check requirements, forecloses Plaintiffs’ challenge in this case. (Dkt. No. 144-2, at
14). While the ammunition background check is a central issue in both NYSFA and the present
case, because the two cases involve different aspects of the regime, NYSFA does not
automatically necessitate dismissal. Compare NYSFA, 157 F.4th 232 (challenging, as violating
the Second Amendment, the delay in purchase caused by a background check, the $2.50 fee, and
the requirement that ammunition sellers be licensed by the state), with Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 216–17
(challenging the ammunition background check in general and ammunition seller recordkeeping
requirements). However, the framework the Second Circuit utilized in NYSFA is equally
applicable here.
5 Much of Plaintiffs’ brief concerns the implementation of the background check system, which occurred after the
filing of the original complaint, and references facts outside the complaint. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 152, at 41 (asserting
that “responses [to ammunition background checks] vary and have little actual meaning,” that “[a]t least one Dealer
received additional remarks such as ‘No DQs,’ ‘No remarks approved’” and that “[d]ealers have received denials on
ammunition purchases by persons with concealed carry licenses and/or SAR license ‘endorsements’ or ‘amendments”)
(internal citations omitted)). The Court declines to consider these facts or the corresponding arguments to the extent
they fall outside the Complaint and confines its review to the Complaint and the claims raised therein. Further, the
Court declines to consider these new factual assertions as a basis for amendment or supplementation of the Complaint.
This case has been pending for more than three years and Plaintiffs have had more than one opportunity to seek
amendment. Plaintiffs previously moved to amend the complaint, but as their motion failed to comply with the Local
Rules, the Court denied the motion without prejudice to renewal and directed Plaintiffs to file a letter brief “describing
each cause of action they seek to bring . . . and the legal basis for each cause of action.” (Dkt. No. 136, at 41–43).
Plaintiffs filed a letter brief, (Dkt. No. 137), but as they failed to identify any additional facts in support of their original
claims, the Court found amendment would be futile, (Dkt. No. 143). However, Plaintiffs’ letter brief also indicated
that they sought to challenge allegedly unconstitutional enforcement activities that had occurred following the filing
of the original complaint. (Dkt. No. 137). The Court therefore considered whether to permit the filing of a
supplemental complaint but denied the request because the factual allegations Plaintiffs outlined in their brief were
“vague and wholly untethered to any individual Plaintiff.” (Dkt. No. 143).
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In NYSFA, at the first step of the Bruen analysis, the Circuit found that because “New
York’s [ammunition] background check regime” was “a ‘commercial sale regulation’ that
imposes ‘conditions and qualifications’ on the ammunition retailer,” it concerned “ancillary,” as
opposed to “individual” conduct, and that the plaintiffs were therefore required to show that the
provisions at issue “meaningfully constrain[ed] an individual’s right to ‘keep’ and ‘bear’ arms.”
NYSFA, 157 F.4th at 244–46 (quoting Vereen, 152 F.4th at 97). The Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the delay allegedly caused by the background check, explaining
that because the “system is designed to return a ‘proceed’ response immediately for those who
are not disqualified from purchasing ammunition, there are at least some circumstances in which
the delay caused by the background check process is de minimis.” Id. at 246 (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). It explained that because “‘a short delay does not violate an
individual’s Second Amendment rights,’ so as to rebut the presumptive validity of a challenged
law,” the Second Amendment was not implicated, and the plaintiffs were therefore unlikely to
succeed on their facial challenge. Id. (quoting Giambalvo v. Suffolk Cnty., 155 F.4th 163, 183–84
(2d Cir. 2025)). The Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ as-applied argument—that the one-day
delay due to a downed background check system violated the Second Amendment—for the same
reasons. Id. at 247 (explaining that “the modest delays reflected in the present record do not
meaningfully constrain Plaintiffs’ ability to ‘keep’ or ‘bear’ arms.”).
The Circuit found the plaintiffs’ second argument—that the $2.50 fee was a meaningful
constraint—failed as a matter of law. Id. at 248. It explained that because the statute imposed the
fee on the seller, “not on purchasers like the individual plaintiffs,” the fee “would have no impact
whatsoever (not even a marginal or incremental one) on the purchaser’s Second Amendment
rights.” Id. The Circuit explained that in order “to facially challenge a fee imposed on the
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retailer, a purchaser-plaintiff must show that, at a minimum, all retailers pass the fee onto the
consumer.” Id. And as the plaintiffs had alleged “only that, ‘on information and belief,’ licensed
dealers are passing the fee onto the purchasers” and offered only “anecdotal evidence that some
retailers are passing the fee onto the purchasers” and had otherwise failed to submit any evidence
or “articulate plausible factual allegations supporting the contention that every seller passes this
fee onto the purchaser,” the Circuit found the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their facial
challenge to the fee.6 Id.
The Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ third argument—that the provisions requiring
sellers of ammunition to be licensed by the state meaningfully constrained their Second
Amendment rights. Id. at 249. The Circuit acknowledged that in Gazzola, it had “quoted the
Tennessee Supreme Court’s observation that the right to keep arms involves, among other rights,
‘the right to purchase and provide ammunition suitable for such arms.’” Id. at 249 (citing
Gazzola, 88 F.4th at 196 (quoting Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 178 (1871)). It stated,
however, that “in doing so, [it] did not suggest that there is a separate right to sell ammunition
under the Second Amendment,” and that it had, instead, “quoted that passage for the more
general proposition that the government cannot effectively ‘circumvent’ the Second
Amendment’s prohibitions by targeting ancillary rights.” Id. (quoting Gazzola, 88 F.4th at 195–
96). The Circuit therefore found “that the proposed course of conduct—to sell ammunition
without first registering with the Superintendent—is not conduct independently covered by the
Second Amendment’s text.” Id. Further finding there was “no evidence . . . that Plaintiffs lack
easy access to licensed or registered ammunition sellers” it concluded the plaintiffs were unlikely
6 The Second Circuit found that even if the plaintiffs were able to establish that sellers were passing the fee onto
purchaser, they were unlikely to succeed on an as-applied challenge. See NYSFA, 157 F.4th at 249 (“Plaintiffs submit
no evidence, nor seriously contend, that the $2.50 fee is exorbitant or prohibitively expensive.”).
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to succeed on their claim that the “licensing provisions meaningfully constrain a purchaser’s
right to keep and bear arms.” Id. With these considerations in mind, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’
arguments.
2. 	General Challenge to Ammunition Background Check
“A facial constitutional challenge is the ‘most difficult challenge to mount successfully,
because it requires a [plaintiff] to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
[challenged provision] would be valid.’” NYSFA, 157 F.4th at 246 (quoting United States v.
Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 693 (2024)). In order to prevail, “the [state] need only demonstrate that
[the challenged provision] is constitutional in some of its applications.” Id. (quoting Rahimi, 602
U.S. at 693). New York’s background check regime is no doubt a “commercial sale regulation”
that imposes “conditions and qualifications” on the ammunition retailer and purchaser. NYSFA,
157 F.4th at 246 (quoting Vereen, 152 F.4th at 97). In general, courts have identified background
checks as a “presumptively lawful regulatory measure” in the commercial sale of ammunition
and firearms. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25 & n.26; see also Giambalvo, 155 F.4th at 181, 184
(noting that firearm safety courses and background checks are presumptively constitutional).
Here, the Complaint offers no facts that would allow a plausible inference that New
York’s ammunition background check regime impairs any individual’s right to “keep” or “bear”
arms so as to rebut the presumptive lawfulness of New York’s ammunition background check
regime. In their briefing, Plaintiffs assert, among other things, that: the new provisions contain
“no legal metric for disqualification from an ammunition purchase”; there is “no definition (or
limit) of the ‘databases’ trolled for a record that may relate to said unspecified disqualifiers”; and
the “NYSP did not disclose the name of their external software vendor” or whether a denial that
is the result of “automated programming is audited by a human person.” (Dkt. No. 152, at 38–
40). None of these assertions suggest a basis for finding an impairment on an individual’s right
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to purchase ammunition. Plaintiffs’ argument that the statutory scheme lacks disqualifiers is
without merit. Section 400.03(5) specifically references 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) which states that
“[i]t shall be unlawful for” an individual in certain prohibited categories, including, among
others, an individual who has been convicted of a felony, “is a fugitive,” or “is an unlawful user
of or addicted to any controlled substance,” to possess “any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1)–(9). Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding software vendors and audits lack any factual
connection to the allegations in the Complaint.
To the extent Plaintiffs assert that the cost of implementing the background check “will
drive them out-of-business” and ultimately prohibit them “from offering the very firearm that is
protected by the Second Amendment,” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 215), they proffer no facts from which to
draw a plausible inference that such costs will impair their businesses to the point of closure, or,
indeed, to any degree. The Court therefore finds Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that the
ammunition background check requirement will meaningfully constrain the individual right to
“keep” or “bear” arms.
3. 	Recordkeeping Requirement
Plaintiffs allege that having to manually create and maintain an ammunition sales record
containing the information specified in Section 400.003(2), is a significant burden on “Plaintiff
and employee time.” (Dkt. No. 160, ¶ 289). Each record must include “the date, name, age,
occupation and residence of any person . . . to whom ammunition is delivered, and the amount,
calibre, manufacturer’s name and serial number” of such ammunition. N.Y. Penal Law §
400.03(2). Plaintiffs identify no facts in the Complaint that would allow a plausible inference
that these administrative tasks are so burdensome, that implementation would lead to closure of
any firearms retailer or impair the sale of ammunition to any purchaser. NYSFA, 157 F.4th at 245
(observing that “consequences that are part and parcel of ordinary regulatory measures—such as
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reasonable processing times and the hassle of filling out paperwork—generally will not
meaningfully impair one’s ability to acquire arms”). Thus, the Court finds the Complaint fails to
plausibly allege that the recordkeeping requirements meaningfully constrain the individual right
to “keep” or “bear” arms.
B. 	Semiautomatic Rifle License
Plaintiffs assert that since September 4, 2022, the effective date of the provisions
requiring a license to purchase a semiautomatic rifle, they “have been unable to engage in
commerce of semi-automatic rifles” and their “sales of semiautomatic rifles have plummeted”
“and ground to a near halt” “because of the confusion created by the Defendants around the new
laws.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 160(g)–(h), (k)). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that: (1) Section 400.00(2),
titled “Types of licenses,” does not provide any “licensing criteria” or “process” for obtaining a
semiautomatic rifle license, (id. ¶ 160(f)); (2) the license application the New York State Police
created, which is titled “Pistol/Revolver License Amendment and Semi-Automatic Rifle License
Amendment,” is confusing because “[a]n ‘amendment’ contemplates an original license already
issued to an individual” and is “separately dealt with under NY Pen § 400.00(9),” (id. ¶ 160(b));
(3) the “Frequent Questions & Answers” document published by the New York State Police and
DCJS, which says that “[e]xisting firearm license holders can add a Semi-Automatic Rifle to
their firearm license through their local licensing officer,” “appears to be a wrongful instruction”
because the new laws “clearly contemplate that a unique SAR license will issue,” (id. ¶ 160(e)(i)
(emphasis added) (citing N.Y. Penal Law §§ 400.00(1) and (6)); and (4) while some counties
“are offering to add semi-automatic rifles to . . . concealed carry permit[s],” Plaintiffs “are
unaware of any county licensing officer that is offering a separate SAR license to individuals
without concealed carry permits,” (id. ¶ 160(i)). Plaintiffs are “refusing to sell semi-automatic
rifles” to individuals who obtained licenses through an add-on to their concealed carry permits
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because they “believe this violates the letter, if not the spirit, of the new laws.” (Id. ¶ 160).
Plaintiffs argue that the semiautomatic rifle licensing provisions have the effect of a categorical
prohibition on an “entire class of arms.” (Dkt. No. 152, at 13 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 628)).
Defendants seek dismissal on the grounds that “Plaintiff’s Complaint does not attack any
particular aspect of the Semiautomatic Rifle Law as unconstitutional” and to the extent Plaintiffs
contend that no licenses have been issued or that “regulatory confusion has prevented the sales of
semiautomatic rifles, those assertions are not well-pled.” (Dkt. No. 144-22, at 27). In their
opposition, Plaintiffs reiterate their contention “that there is no statewide, uniform
[semiautomatic rifle] license” and request “a permanent injunction against enforcement.”7 (Dkt.
No. 152, at 44).
Plaintiffs assert that Section 400.00(2), titled “Types of licenses,” does not provide any
“process” or “licensing criteria” for obtaining a semiautomatic rifle license. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶
160(f)). However, this appears to be an objection regarding where the process and criteria are
located because section 400.00(3), which is titled “Applications,” addresses the process:
applications for a semiautomatic rifle license “shall be made and renewed . . . to the licensing
officer in the city or county” of the applicant’s residence and details the information that must be
included in the application, see N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(3)(a) (“An application shall state the
full name, date of birth, residence, present occupation . . . , whether or not he or she is a citizen
of the United States, whether or not he or she complies with each requirement for eligibility
7 Plaintiffs also assert that the New York State Police “is approving county-level amendments on new CCPs and onto
existing CCPs” and published a semiautomatic rifle licensing form that is “printed on the same form that is used for
the CCP application.” (Dkt. No. 152, at 44). Plaintiffs point out that although New York’s concealed carry permit
requires a training course, the new laws do “not impose the CCP requirements onto those who want to purchase an
SAR.” (Id.). Plaintiffs also refer to “coupons,” which apparently are required for “each addition of a requisite firearm
to the license and off the license,” and state that although a “P-12 form that is required to be sent by a dealer to the
New York State Police upon the sale of a handgun” a P-12 form is not required for the sale of a semiautomatic rifle.
(Id. at 44–45). The relevance of these assertions, which constitute the majority of Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’
motion, is not clear to the Court and Plaintiffs offer no explanation or legal analysis. (See id.).
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specified in [New York Penal Law 400.00(1)] and such other facts as may be required to show
the good character, competency and integrity of each person or individual signing the
application.”), and Section 400.00(1) outlines the criteria an applicant must satisfy to obtain a
semiautomatic rifle license, see N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1) (a)–(m). Plaintiffs do not otherwise
challenge the constitutionality of this provision, thus the Court finds they have failed to allege
that the process or criteria for a semiautomatic rifle license are so confusing or burdensome to
overcome the presumption that “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms” are “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 &
n.26. See NYSFA, 157 F.4th at 245 (explaining that “modest administrative burdens that naturally
follow” from regulatory measures “will not ordinarily be sufficient to overcome that
presumption”).
The remainder of Plaintiffs’ challenge to the semiautomatic rifle licensing provisions
concerns the form of the licenses that are being issued (as add-ons to the concealed carry
permits) and the confusion resulting from different licensing practices by different counties as a
result of NYSP’s failure to create a unique semiautomatic rifle license.8 Although Plaintiffs
alleged in the Complaint that they were refusing to sell semiautomatic rifles when presented with
licenses in a form they believed did not comply with Section 400.00, Plaintiffs do not allege that
licenses are not being issued or that the licensing scheme has prevented any individual who
obtained a license (even one in an improper form) from purchasing a semiautomatic rifle
elsewhere in the state. See NYSFA, 157 F.4th at 248 (finding facial challenge to fee provision
failed where there was no allegation or evidence that provision impacted purchasers of
8 Plaintiffs do not appear to be alone in their confusion. See McGregor v. Suffolk Cnty., 690 F. Supp. 3d 147, 150 &
n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (observing that “[i]n practice, the administrative shortcut of adding a rifle endorsement to a pistol
license has led to some confusion” and noting the plaintiffs’ contention that at least one county “considers pistol
licenses” sufficient “to purchase rifles”).
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ammunition and where the plaintiffs offered “anecdotal evidence that some retailers are passing
the fee onto the purchaser”); see also Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 680 (9th Cir.
2017) (en banc) (“[T]he Second Amendment does not elevate convenience and preference over
all other considerations.”). Nor have Plaintiffs pled any “factual content” to support their
otherwise conclusory allegations that their sales have “plummeted” and “ground to a near halt,”
such as the number of semiautomatic rifles they keep in inventory, the number they sold prior to
the effective date of the licensing provisions compared to the number they sold after. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that a complaint that “tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement” does not suffice (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 557)). Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that the
administrative burdens of the semiautomatic licensing provisions in Section 400.00 constitute
meaningful restraint on any individual’s right to keep or bear arms.
Accordingly, as Plaintiffs have failed to allege, under the first step of the Bruen analysis,
“that any of the challenged provisions—individually or collectively—meaningfully constrain an
individual’s right to keep and bear arms so as to implicate the plain text of the Second
Amendment,” the Court does not “engage in the historical analysis at step two.” NYSFA, 157
F.4th at 249–50. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is therefore granted.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 144) is
GRANTED; and it is further
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ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 24, 2026
Syracuse, New York
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