USA v. Gonzalez

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
vs. 1:14-CR-144
(MAD)
ADAM REY GONZALEZ,
Defendant.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NICHOLAS C.E. WALTER, AUSA
STATE ATTORNEY
445 Broadway, Room 218
Albany, New York 12207
Attorney for the Government
ADAM REY GONZALEZ
21399-052
Danbury Federal Correctional Institution
Route 37
Danbury, Connecticut 06811
Defendant, pro se
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 14, 2015, Defendant Adam Rey Gonzalez pled guilty to one count of distribution
of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A), (b)(1), and 2256(8)(A). See
Dkt. No. 41. Defendant was sentenced on August 10, 2025, by United States District Judge
Thomas J. McAvoy to 220 months' imprisonment following by a life-term of supervised release,
and judgment was entered two days later. See Dkt. Nos. 56, 57. Presently before the Court is
Defendant's motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which he
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filed on March 7, 2025. See Dkt. No. 62. The Government opposes the motion. See Dkt. Nos.
65, 73. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is denied.
II. BACKGROUND
Defendant is currently 39 years old, and he came to federal court after having two state
court convictions for child sex offenses. As explained in the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report,
in 2006, Defendant was convicted of three counts of possession of child pornography in Vermont
state court. See Dkt. No. 52 at ¶ 49. As part of the investigation which led to the conviction,
Defendant was discovered with 190 videos of child pornography, admitted to an undercover agent
that he was working at a YMCA near young children where they "did not care about running
around 'naked,'" and admitted to sexually abusing a minor relative. Id. That same year, defendant
was convicted in New York state court of having sexual contact with an individual under the age
of fourteen and acting in a manner injurious to a child under the age of seventeen. See id. at ¶ 50.
Defendant's latest probation release date for those offenses was May 24, 2013. See id. at ¶ 49.
Defendant was then arrested for the underlying federal offense on March 28, 2014. See id.
at ¶ 9. The arrest was based on Defendant's conversations with an undercover federal agent on an
online platform, beginning on September 9, 2013. See id. at ¶ 10. Defendant used the username
"'Redart-yob' (boy-trader spelled backwards)." Id. Defendant sent the agent numerous videos of
child pornography. See id. at ¶ 15. Following the execution of a search warrant on Defendant's
residence, law enforcement discovered 475 child pornography files on Defendant's desktop
computer. See id. at ¶ 22. An additional 431 images were found which "depicted children in
underwear, swimwear, nudist lifestyle, or were not considered to be child pornography as the
individual's age was difficult to determine." Id. Defendant had a criminal history category of III
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and a total offense level of 37; therefore, the Probation Department calculated Defendant's
guideline range of imprisonment to be 262 to 327 months. See id. at ¶ 85.
As part of Defendant's sentencing memorandum, he noted that he has a close relationship
with his maternal grandmother. See Dkt. No. 53 at 4. Judge McAvoy sentenced Defendant to
220-months imprisonment, which was below the guidelines range. See Dkt. No. 57. Defendant
did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
Now, Defendant seeks a reduction in his sentence because (1) he has completed numerous
rehabilitative programs; (2) his grandmother suffers from Alzheimer's disease, and he wants to
care for her; (3) the conditions of his confinement during the Covid-19 pandemic were harsh; (4)
"there is a disparity between [Defendant's] 220-month sentence and other defendants which
involved similar or more egregious conduct in violating the same or similar statutes;" and (5) he
has served seventy-five-percent of his sentence. See Dkt. No. 62 at 3-18. Defendant argues that
the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) also support his request. See id. at 18-20.
The Government opposes Defendant's motion for several reasons: (1) Defendant failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) he did not raise all of his claims in his administrative
request; (3) he is not the only person who could care for his grandmother; (4) Defendant's
rehabilitation efforts are insufficient to warrant a sentence reduction; (5) the harsh circumstances
of confinement during the Covid-19 pandemic are not specific to Defendant; and (6) the § 3553(a)
factors do not support the requested relief. See Dkt. No. 65. According to the Government, and
as demonstrated through Sentencing Computation Data, "[a]s of the date of the defendant’s
motion, he had served 70% . . . of his sentence when accounting for good time credit, and 60% of
his full term." Id. at 2.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
It is well established that "[a] court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has
been imposed except pursuant to statute." United States v. Gotti, 433 F. Supp. 3d 613, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 2020). Section 3852(c)(1)(A)(i), the compassionate release statute, as modified by the
First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (Dec. 21, 2018), is one such exception: It
permits a court to "reduce" a term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), if "it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
By the statute's plain terms, however, a court may do so only "upon motion of the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons" or "upon a motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully
exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion
on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden
of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Once the prison warden
denies a request for a sentence reduction, the defendant must appeal within the appropriate
timeframe to the Regional Director, and if that appeal is denied, he must appeal again to the
General Counsel to receive a final administrative decision. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 571.63(a),
542.15(a); see also United States v. Eisenberg, 470 F. Supp. 3d 111, 113 (D.N.H. 2020) (citations
omitted); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons Program Statement No. 5050.50,
Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence: Procedures for Implementation of 18 U.S.C. §
3582 and 4205(g), (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5050_050_EN.pdf.
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In his motion, Defendant asserts he applied for a sentence reduction to the Warden at FCI
Danbury on January 3, 2025. See Dkt. No. 62 at 1. Attached to his motion is the application he
sent the Warden. See Dkt. No. 62-1 at 35-36. Defendant also presents e-mail communications
whereby he notified the Warden of his submission on January 3, 2025, the Warden e-mail back on
January 6, 2025, stating "[o]nce it is ready from the RIS coordinator, it will be reviewed," and an
e-mail Defendant sent to the Warden on January 31, 2025, noting that he had not received a
response, and "the last business day before the 30 day wait (2/2/2[5])" was that day. See Dkt. No.
62-1 at 37. Defendant has not stated whether the Warden ever responded to his January 31, 2025,
email, or his initial request for a sentence reduction. Defendant filed his presently pending
motion on March 7, 2025. See id.
The Government argues that this is insufficient to prove that Defendant exhausted his
administrative remedies. See Dkt. No. 65 at 3-4. As noted, a defendant cannot file a motion for
compassionate release until "the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a
failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days
from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier."
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The Government contends there are two possible
readings of the statutory exhaustion requirement: (1) "that an inmate may only file a motion after
waiting 30 days from the BOP's [("Bureau of Prison")] receipt of his request without receiving a
response. If the BOP does timely respond, then the inmate must exhaust the administrative
procedures made available by the BOP . . . , id. at 4 (quoting United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th
120, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2021)); or (2) "that an inmate may file a motion after 30 days, whether the
BOP has responded or not," id. (citing Saladino, 7 F.4th at 124). The Government argues that
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"[D]efendant has not shown that he did not receive a response from the BOP between Friday,
January 31 and Monday, February 3." Id.
"'A defendant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a threshold matter preventing
the [c]ourt from considering a Section 3582 application[, i.e., a compassionate release motion].'"
United States v. Osborne, No. 14-CR-264, 2026 WL 523162, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2026)
(quoting United States v. Robinson, No. 10-CR-0789, 2022 WL 16924176, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
2022)). "And, '[i]f any one requirement is not satisfied, the district court may deny the motion
without considering the remaining requirements.'" Id. (citation omitted). "'[A] defendant seeking
release should include evidence of compliance with the First Step Act's mandatory administrative
exhaustion requirement,' such as documentation of the request submitted with the compassionate
release motion." Id. (citing United States v. Friedlander, No. 20-CR-0441, 2022 WL 2305370, *3
(E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2022)); see also United States v. Hernandez, No. 14-CR-0264, 2026 WL
111639, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2026) (finding sufficient defendant providing a copy of
compassionate release request to warden, even though it was unclear if the warden received
same); United States v. Cabral, No. 12-CR-0336, 2025 WL 3628402, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13,
2025) (finding defendant satisfied his exhaustion burden where he provided copy of his "Inmate
Request" even though there was "no indication in the record as to the warden's response").
However, "§ 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional." United States
v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911
(11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1179 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v.
Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467-68 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833 (6th Cir.
2020)). Section "3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement is a 'claim-processing rule[ ]' and
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accordingly 'may be waived or forfeited.'" Id. (quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of
Chicago, 583 U.S. 17, 19 (2017)).
Neither party has indicated whether the Warden ever responded to Defendant's request,
but Defendant submitted his request two months before he filed his present motion. See Dkt. Nos.
62, 65. The Warden did respond to Defendant's e-mail stating that once the request was ready
from a coordinator, it would be reviewed. See Dkt. No. 62-1 at 37. It, therefore, appears that
Defendant waited longer than thirty days from the time he sent the request before filing his
motion such that the Court could deem Defendant's claims to be exhausted. See, e.g., United
States v. Boccanfuso, No. 15-CR-341, 2023 WL 3741980, *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2023) ("The
Court finds that Mr. Boccanfuso has adequately demonstrated exhaustion of his administrative
remedies—he has proffered a sworn declaration asserting that he presented his request to the
warden more than 30 days prior to filing this Motion, and has also submitted (albeit in a reply
brief) a copy of the request to the warden. Moreover, the Government has not provided any
declaration from any individual with personal knowledge of BOP records or databases to support
its assertion that the BOP has no record of Mr. Boccanfuso's request").
The Second Circuit has "not decide[d]" the issue presented by the Government as to
whether "an inmate may only file a motion after waiting 30 days from the BOP's receipt of
his request without receiving a response'" where it is unclear whether the Warden reviewed the
request. Dkt. No. 65 at 2 (quoting Saladino, 7 F.4th 124). In a different but related context, the
Second Circuit has held "that, because the [applicable statute] imposes a mandatory deadline for
the [administrative body] to respond, an inmate exhausts administrative remedies when he follows
the procedure in its entirety but the [the administrative body] fails to respond within the 30 days it
is allocated under the regulations." Hayes v. Dahlke, 976 F.3d 259, 270 (2d Cir. 2020). Such a
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conclusion lends credence to the idea that the Second Circuit would come to a similar conclusion
in the compassionate release context—that where the statute permits a defendant "to bring a
motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the
warden of the defendant's facility," 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the Defendant may file such a
motion if he has not received a response within 30 days.
However, the Court does not need to definitively decide this issue because exhaustion is
not jurisdictional, and Defendant has failed to establish that he is entitled to compassionate release
on the merits.1
B. Merits of Defendant's Motion
The Court may grant compassionate release only "after considering the factors set forth in
section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In a policy
statement, the United States Sentencing Commission has defined "extraordinary and compelling
1 The Government also argues that Defendant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
because he applied for compassionate release to the Warden only based on his alleged need to
care for his grandmother. See Dkt. No. 65 at 8-9. The Government is correct that, in Defendant's
application to the Warden, which he attached to his motion, Defendant requested a reduction in
his sentence only "to care for [his] elderly grandmother who is experiencing deteriorating health
and [he is] the only available caregiver." Dkt. No. 62-1 at 35. Defendant did not mention Covid-
19 or his rehabilitative efforts. See id. Some "courts have generally required an inmate to present
to the warden of his or her facility the 'the same or similar ground for compassionate release' he or
she plans to raise in a motion to the court, in order to properly exhaust that ground." United
States v. Collado, No. 14-CR-731, 2021 WL 2555838, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2021) (citation
omitted) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Dejesus-Santiago, No. 08-CR-6210, 2025
WL 3140242, *5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2025). However, that holding is not universal. Another
judge in the Southern District of New York has held "that issue exhaustion is not required. . . .
[T]he Supreme Court has emphasized that 'requirements of administrative issue exhaustion are
largely creatures of statute.'" United States v. Torres, 464 F. Supp. 3d 651, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(quoting Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000)). The Torres court noted that the statute does
not include an issue exhaustion provision. See id. The Court declines to decide whether issue is
exhaustion is required because Defendant has failed to provide meritorious justifications to
warrant compassionate release.
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reasons," in part, as a circumstance in which "[t]he defendant is . . . suffering from a serious
physical or medical condition . . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to
provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not
expected to recover." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)(i).
"The moving defendant bears the burden of proving that 'extraordinary and compelling
reasons' justify a reduction of his or her sentence." United States v. Andrews, 705 F. Supp. 3d
142, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 1026 (2d Cir. 1992))
(additional citation omitted). "A motion for compassionate release is 'not an opportunity to
second guess or to reconsider the sentencing court's original decision.'" Id. (quoting United States
v. Roney, 833 Fed. Appx. 850, 854 (2d Cir. 2020)).
The "extraordinary and compelling" "language is intended to impose an exacting
standard." United States v. Diaz, 779 F. Supp. 3d 226, 233 (N.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting United
States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2021)). "Indeed, the Second Circuit has emphasized
that an 'extraordinary' reason is something 'most unusual,' 'far from common,' with 'little or no
precedent,' 'beyond or out of the common order,' 'remarkable,' and synonymous with 'singular.'"
Id. (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 104 F.4th 420, 428 (2d Cir. 2024)). "Likewise, a
sufficiently 'compelling' reason is one that 'is both powerful and convincing.'" Id. (citation
omitted).
"In addition to these exacting requirements, a sentence reduction must be 'consistent with
the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.'" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i); citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (delegating authority to the Commission to "describe
what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons . . ., including the criteria to be
applied and a list of specific examples")). "The applicable policy statement for compassionate
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release is found in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.13 and its commentary." Id. (citing United
States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 2020)). "Recently, the Sentencing Commission
amended [its] policy statement to provide a somewhat expanded definition of 'extraordinary and
compelling reasons.'" Id. (citations omitted). "'The latest definition was meant to accord with the
First Step Act's purpose of increasing the use of sentence reduction motions under [§]
3582(c)(1)(A).'" Id. at 233-34 (quoting United States v. Donato, No. 03-CR-929, 2024 WL
665939, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2024)).
Section 1B1.13 provides examples of what might suffice to establish an "extraordinary
and compelling" reason for compassionate release including (1) a defendant's medical
circumstances; (2) a defendant's age; (3) a defendant's family circumstances; and (4) abuse
suffered by the defendant while in custody. See U.S.S.G. 1B1.13(b). "The amended policy
statement also includes a catch-all provision that authorizes a court to consider 'Other Reasons' a
defendant might present that, considered alone or in combination with the enumerated reasons,
are sufficiently 'similar in gravity' to qualify as extraordinary and compelling reasons." Diaz, 779
F. Supp. 3d at 234 (quoting 7 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(b)(5)).
Courts have concluded that a district court may rely solely on the § 3553 factors or a
determination regarding extraordinary and compelling reasons to deny compassionate release.
See United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 73 n.4 (2d Cir. 2021) ("In reaching this conclusion, we
join our sister Circuits that have similarly held that a district court may rely solely on the §
3553(a) factors when denying a defendant's motion for compassionate release") (collecting cases).
That is because it is only if all of the requirements are met—there is an extraordinary and
compelling reason, reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission, and all relevant sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support
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a reduction—that compassionate release will be granted. United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516,
518 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 2020); citing
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)); see also United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1043 (10th Cir.
2021) ("District courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three
prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the others").
As explained in more detail below, Defendant has not established an extraordinary and
compelling reason that warrants a sentence reduction, and his sentence does not create a
sentencing disparity.
First, Defendant argues that his participation in rehabilitation programs during his
incarceration constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. Defendant notes
he completed over eighty-five programs between 2016 and 2025. See Dkt. No. 62-1; Dkt. No. 68
at 7. He asserts that the "programs clearly demonstrate a commitment to bettering himself while
in prison." Dkt. No. 68 at 8. Defendant states there is "a distinction between ordinary
rehabilitation that many inmates complete and the extraordinary rehabilitation efforts of the
Defendant." Dkt. No. 62 at 4. He calls his conduct "more than mere rehabilitation" and he
considers his conduct to constitute "unique and impressive post-offense rehabilitation." Id. at 5-6.
The Government argues Defendant's participation in the programs "is unremarkable" because
incarcerated individuals "are 'expected' to make good use of their time" while incarcerated "[a]nd
the courses that the defendant has completed, for the most part, do not indicate any focus on
rehabilitation." Dkt. No. 65 at 9 (citation omitted).
The Sentencing Guidelines specifically state that "rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by
itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason," but rehabilitation "may be considered in
combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to what extent a reduction in
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the defendant's term of imprisonment is warranted." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d). "At minimum,
'rehabilitation requires the court to examine whether a defendant has taken responsibility for his ...
actions and acted to reintegrate [him]self into a productive society.'" Mayzick v. United States,
No. 16-CR-429, 2026 WL 879520, *24 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026) (quoting United States v. Byam,
No. 12-CR-0586, 2024 WL 1556741, *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2024)); see also United States v.
Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). "And, nonetheless, 'a productive institutional
record while incarcerated is what is expected . . . .'" Mayzick, 2026 WL 879520, at *24 (quoting
United States v. Baptiste, No. 15-CR-854, 2024 WL 3425818, *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2024)).
Defendant has engaged in continuously learning new skills or information during his
incarceration. However, his efforts are insufficient for the Court to find that he is sufficiently
rehabilitated or that his purported rehabilitation supports a sentence reduction.
Most concerning to the Court is that Defendant does not appear remorseful for his actions.
Throughout his three different filings related to his motion for compassionate release, he does not
once apologize for his conduct, attest to how egregious and horrific his actions were which led to
his incarceration, or otherwise state that he regrets what he did. See Dkt. Nos. 62, 68, 77. He has
not submitted any letters or statements from other incarcerated individuals, work supervisors,
corrections officers, or mental health professionals attesting to his rehabilitation. See United
States v. Hernandez, No. 14-CR-264, 2026 WL 111639, *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2026) (denying
compassionate release where the defendant "has not, for example: (a) offered his own letter of
contrition; (b) provided letters of support from prison staff; or (3) presented evidence of
maintaining familial relationships"); United States v. Martinez, No. 06-CR-987, 2024 WL
4188311, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2024) (granting compassionate release because the defendant
"completed 73 programs, including every psychology program available to improve his mental
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health. Martinez has continued to work and excel at his job. Martinez's work supervisor wrote
that he is a 'hard working[,] dedicated employee determined to do his best at anything he is tasked
with.' . . . Martinez has also demonstrated a sincere commitment to mentoring other inmates in
the prison. Martinez's mentorship of others is illustrated by his participation in the Suicide Watch
Companion Team. Finally, Martinez has acknowledged the gravity of his offenses and 'fully
accepts responsibility for his actions without seeking to justify or minimize them'").
There is also no indication Defendant has paid anything toward the $12,000 he owes in
restitution. See Dkt. No. 57; cf. United States v. Snype, 683 F. Supp. 3d 351, 363-64 (S.D.N.Y.
2023) ("Snype's rehabilitation is further evidenced by his full satisfaction, as of April 15, 2016, of
'restitution in the amount of $13,419.00 and the special assessment in the amount of $100.00
amounting in all to the sum of $13,519.00'").
Defendant did take "exploring anxiety," "exploring depression," "creating a healthier life,"
and "anxiety versus depression" classes in late 2021 and early 2022. Dkt. No. 62-1 at 2.
Otherwise, his classes concern biological sciences, art, history, and business. See id.
Defendant blames the Government and the BOP for this. Defendant argues that "the
Government failed to provide this Court with any information regarding any mental health or
mental health programs that were offered at FCI-Otisville while [Defendant] was incarcerated
there or are currently available at FCI Danbury where [Defendant] is currently incarcerated."
Dkt. No. 68 at 9. He contends "the BOP has failed to provide the Defendant with any specialized
mental health treatment programs and the BOP has failed to house the Defendant at a facility that
offers such treatment." Id. Defendant states that he "is on the waiting list to participate in sex
offender treatment, which the BOP will not offer the Defendant until he has less than 36 months
remaining on his sentence." Dkt. No. 77 at 3.
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Through the Court's research, it found that the BOP instructs incarcerated individuals after
their admission about "Psychology Services." Specifically, the admission handbook states that
"Psychology Services Departments in all BOP institutions offer basic mental health care to
inmates. This care may include screening, assessment and treatment of mental health or drug
abuse problems, individual and/or group counseling, psycho- educational classes, selfhelp and
supportive services, or referral to Health Services for medicaltreatment of a mental illness."2 The
handbook states as follows:
There are a number of ways to contact Psychology Services at this
institution. You may:
• Submit an Inmate Request to a Staff Member (a "Cop-out") to
Psychology Services or by TRULINCS messaging.
• Speak with a Psychology Services staff member during mainline
or as they make rounds in your unit.
Id. at p. 31. The handbook also notes that "[g]roups are offered . . . on a rotating basis and include
topics such as Anger Management, Criminal Thinking, Basic Cognitive Skills, Seeking Strength,
and Emotional Self- Regulation. When a group is offered, an announcement will be displayed on
Trulincs and inmates must submit an electronic request . . . to Psychology Services in order to
participate." Id. at p. 36.
Beyond taking the four previously identified course in 2021 and 2022, Defendant has not
indicated that he once contacted Psychology Services in an effort to obtain any counseling or
other help regarding mental health, his history of sex offenses, etc.
2 Inmate Admission & Orientation Handbook,
https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/dan/dan_ao-handbook.pdf?v=1.0.0, p. 30 (last visited
May 20, 2026).
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Defendant says his "sentence was substantially higher than those with far more egregious
conduct than" his. Dkt. No. 62 at 14. He states that "[w]hile the instant offense was serious," that
does not foreclose the possibility of a sentence reduction. Dkt. No. 62 at 16. He indicates that he
is a low security risk and low recidivism risk. See id. at 18. Defendant also contends that "[i]t is
clear that the Government does not either understand or fully appreciate the amount of time,
work, energy, and commitment required to be part of these rehabilitation programs." Id. at 8. He
states he has made productive use of his time and has "demonstrate[d] a commitment to bettering
himself while in prison." Id. He argues "[t]he Defendant cannot be faulted for not participating
in treatment the FCI Otisville and FCI Danbury do not provide in the first place." Id. at 10.
Defendant states "the Government has provided absolutely no indication as to when, if ever, the
BOP will provide any specific mental health treatment to" Defendant. Id.
Defendant does not contend that he ever sought out mental health treatment. He does not
state that he reached out to Psychology Services, spoke to anyone working in the mental health
field within DOCCS, or otherwise sought out treatment and was denied. Defendant takes great
pains to blame the Government and DOCCS for his lack of mental health treatment, but he does
not attest that he has ever sought such treatment. As to Defendant's low security and recidivism
risk scores, see Dkt. No. 62-1 at 40, those scores appear to be based on the number of classes he
has taken, his high school degree, and that he has not received any incident reports while in
prison, see id. Therefore, that score does not sway the Court into believing that Defendant is
entirely rehabilitated.
The Court finds that Defendant's participation in four mental-health-focused classes in the
ten years he has been incarcerated does not demonstrate rehabilitation. The other courses he has
taken do not alter this conclusion because he is expected to make good use of his time while
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incarcerated and one's rehabilitation concerns far more than becoming educated on new topics or
hobbies.
Defendant's criminal history and the offense conduct underlying his current conviction
involve egregious sexual crimes against children. Defendant chose to work in jobs that put him in
close proximity to young children. And he started to engage in the conduct underlying his present
conviction only a few months after getting off of probation from his prior offenses. The Court
ordered sex offender treatment as part of Defendant's sentence because he needs to work on his
mental health, emotional stability, etc. He does not appear to have done so which is especially
concerning to the Court considering Defendant's failure to express any remorse in his filings. As
such, Defendant's purported rehabilitation does not establish an extraordinary and compelling
reason for his early release.
Regardless, even if Defendant's efforts demonstrated serious rehabilitation, "[b]ecause the
Court concludes that none of the other reasons [Defendant] raises is extraordinary and
compelling, [Defendant]'s asserted rehabilitation by itself does not constitute an extraordinary and
compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction . . . ." United States v. Larkin, No. 19-CR-833,
2026 WL 456596, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2026); see also United States v. Carey, No. 09-CR-441,
2026 WL 1004627, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2026) ("Given the Court's finding that Defendant's
other arguments do not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons, 'even evidence of
complete rehabilitation cannot suffice'") (quoting United States v. Raposo, No. 98-CR-185, 2024
WL 165195, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2024)).
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to a sentence reduction because he was
incarcerated during the Covid-19 pandemic. See Dkt. No. 62 at 10. Defendant argues COVID-19
pandemic "severely impeded [his] ability to participate in group programming and interact with
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his family and support system." Id. Defendant contends "the unforeseen and particularly harsh
conditions of confinement during the pandemic have rendered [Defendant's] sentence more
severely punishing than could have been contemplated when the sentence was imposed." Id. at
11.
"Since the incidence of COVID-19 infections has declined, '[c]ourts in this Circuit have
repeatedly held that a Defendant's elevated risk of developing COVID-19 symptoms is
insufficient to justify compassionate release.'" United States v. Miller, No. 20-CR-216, 2026 WL
1257331, *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2026) (citing United States v. Bradley, No. 19-CR-632, 2023 WL
3004660, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2023)); see also United States v. Johnson, 671 F. Supp. 3d 265,
280 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) ("Since the decline of COVID-19 cases and proliferation of vaccines, courts
in this Circuit have generally rejected compassionate release motions based on the threat posed by
the virus, asserting that the risks posed by the pandemic alone do not constitute extraordinary and
compelling reasons for release, absent additional factors"); United States v. Valdez, No. 17-CR-
487, 2026 WL 864532, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026); United States v. Baker, No. 24-2560, 2026
WL 860793, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 2026) ("Baker argued that the COVID-19 pandemic and
related prison conditions warranted release. But as the district court observed, case counts were
now low, and Baker did not adequately demonstrate that he had a medical condition that placed
him at an increased risk of severe illness. . . . Accordingly, the district court's denial of a sentence
reduction was well 'within the range of permissible decisions'"). Another judge in this district has
rejected a "[d]efendant's [] argument [that] the conditions of confinement during the pandemic at
FCI Danbury" justified compassionate release. United States v. Williams, No. 1:19-CR-74, 2026
WL 875232, *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026).
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Defendant has not presented a single specific reason as to why Covid-19 placed him at an
increased risk of harm while incarcerated. He has not stated any medical conditions which make
him more susceptible to getting Covid-19 or being harmed by it. Defendant has only noted the
increased harm and stress that all incarcerated individuals had to endure during the height of the
pandemic. As such, the risk that the defendant might contract Covid-19 or that he had to suffer
harsher conditions than normal during the pandemic is not a compelling reason to grant
compassionate release.
Defendant also argues that it is an extraordinary and compelling circumstance warranting
a sentence reduction that he is the only person who can care for his grandmother who has
Alzheimer's and her health has been declining. See Dkt. No. 62 at 6. Defendant submitted a letter
from his mother along with his reply which states that Defendant's grandmother "has been
declining rapidly" since November of 2024. Dkt. No. 68 at 54. She notes that "[t]he doctor
recommended a Memory Care facility or 24/7 car in her home." Id. The letter is dated April 23,
2025. See id.
As to family circumstances, the Sentencing Guidelines requires that "the defendant would
be the only available caregiver for such family member or individual." U.S.S.G. § 1B.13(b)(3).
"'[M]ultiple courts within this Circuit have found that a defendant seeking compassionate release
based on that person's caregiver status must provide "several sources" of evidence to buttress such
a claim.'" United States v. Sharma, No. 19-CR-24, 2023 WL 4305054, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 30,
2023) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Khan, No. 20-CR-117, 2024 WL 5154195, *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2024) )("And courts 'generally require a showing of evidence from several
sources indicating that the defendant is the only available caregiver for a family member in dire
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conditions'") (quoting United States v. Lindsey, No. 13-CR-71, 2021 WL 37688, *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 4, 2021)).
Courts have denied requests for compassionate release where the defendant has "fail[ed]
to establish that no alternative sources of care are available, including other family and friends or
social service and community programs." United States v. Wilson, No. 10-CR-363, 2021 WL
2327312, *4-5 (W.D.N.Y. June 8, 2021) (citing United States v. Irizzary, Criminal Action No. 14-
CR-652, 2021 WL 735779, *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2021); United States v. Pabon, 17-CR-312,
2021 WL 603269, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2021); Lindsey, 2021 WL 37688, at *3; United States v.
Moore, No. 14-CR-209, 2020 WL 7024245, *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2020)).
The Court appreciates Defendant's desire to care for his grandmother. However, he has
not established that he is the only person who can care for her. Importantly, Defendant's mother's
letter is dated April 23, 2025, and no subsequent letter or information has been provided to the
Court which indicates that Defendant's grandmother has been left uncared for, for the past year.
See Wilson, 2021 WL 2327312, at *4 ("While this Court understands that Wilson and his mother
prefer that Wilson serve as caregiver given their close relationship, this preference does not
amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction").
Finally, one of the § 3353(a) factors is "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); see also United States v. Russo, 643 F. Supp. 3d 325, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2022)
("One of the sentencing court's requisite considerations is 'the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct'") (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)). This provision "was intended to eliminate national
disparity." United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2007); cf. United States v.
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Daugerdas, 613 F. Supp. 3d 807, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) ("Moreover, granting [the defendant's]
motion would create an "unwarranted sentence disparit[y] among defendants").
Defendant cites ten cases from across the country which he argues demonstrates a
sentencing disparity. See Dkt. No. 62 at 13-15. Defendant is incorrect. Each case he cites
involves different facts underlying the conviction, a different criminal history, and/or different
personal characteristics, which are not present in Defendant's case.
First, Defendant cites United States v. Austin, No. 8:13-CR-105, 2023 WL 1995284, *1
(D. Neb. Feb. 14, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-1383, 2023 WL 5572683 (8th Cir. Mar. 9, 2023). In that
case, the defendant had child pornography charges that did not concern hands-on offenses. Here,
Defendant, has a criminal history involving a hands-on offense. Next, in United States v. Burris,
No. 08-CR-25, 2015 WL 9305652, *5 (D. Mont. Dec. 21, 2015), the defendant had "extensive
involvement with child pornography," "he admitted that he preferred females around the age of
12" and "admitted he planned to travel to Montana to have sexual intercourse with the two girls,
ages 8 and 12." Id. (citations omitted). The "[d]efendant also admitted having actual sexual
contact with a girl in his neighborhood (claiming that the girl told him she was '18 or 19 years
old') and having fantasies about three other children in the neighborhood whom he and his wife
babysat." Id. However, the defendant was not convicted of any hands on offenses and "[d]uring
the sentencing hearing, and in response to the government's expression of concern about the
possibility of a prior hands-on sexual offense, the Court specifically stated that it would not
sentence the Defendant as being a prior hands-on sex offender because there was no corroboration
of Defendant's admission." Id. Here, Defendant has a criminal history involving sexual contact
with a minor.
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Defendant also cites United States v. Kushmaul, 984 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2021), in which
the defendant was convicted of distribution and possession of child pornography and law
enforcement's "download revealed twenty images of 'child sexual abuse material.' Most of the
images were of nude, prepubescent girls in sexually provocative poses, but there were additional
images of nude children in non-provocative poses." Here, Defendant was found with
"approximately 475 child pornography files, fifty-two of which depicted known victims." Dkt.
No. 52 at ¶ 22.
Defendant's reliance on United States v. Sullivan, 414 Fed. Appx. 477 (3rd Cir. 2011) is
the most persuasive. There, the defendant "forwarded 137 images of child pornography to" a law
enforcement agent. Id. at 478. The defendant's "computer's hard drive revealed 292 images of
child pornography, including the 137 images that were forwarded to [the agent]. Among those
images that had not been forwarded to [the agent] were three images determined to contain
sadistic or masochistic conduct involving children." Id. at 479. The defendant "was charged with
one count of Distributing Child Pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (a)(2)(B) to which he pled
guilty on December 29, 2009" and he had two prior convictions involving inappropriate contact
with minor children. Id. The Defendant was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment and the
sentencing court "expressly factored-in [the defendant's] poor health in imposing a non-guideline
sentence of 180 months under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which was 8 months below the advisory
guidelines' sentencing range." Id. The defendant "suffer[ed] from chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, emphysema, sleep apnea, and blindness in his right eye." Id.
First, in Sullivan, the defendant's guideline range was between 188 and 235 months, which
is lower than Defendant's guideline range. See id. Second, Defendant does not have health issues
that supported a reduction in his sentence.
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Defendant also references Asmodeo v. United States, No. 15-CR-327, 2020 WL 6083556,
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2020). In that case, a search of the defendant's computer "revealed more
than 3,000 pornographic images and 20 pornographic videos of children" Id. Then, "the
government obtained a superseding indictment . . . charging two new offenses—sexual
exploitation of a minor in 2002 and possession of child pornography in 2005. Those charges
related to [the defendant's] sexual abuse of a 12-year-old girl . . . and his use of a camera to record
his engaging in sexual intercourse with Victim-1.2" Asmodeo v. United States, No. 20-CV-8330,
2021 WL 6126991, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2021). Asmodeo's offense level was 31 and he was a
criminal history category of I. See United States v. Asmodeo, 15-CR-327, Dkt. No. 86 at 4
(Government Sentencing Memorandum). Here, Defendant's offense level was 37 and his criminal
history category was III. See Dkt. No. 52 at ¶ 85.
In Porter v. United States, No. 6:11-CR-95, 2022 WL 2195465, *1 (E.D. Tex. May 18,
2022), R. & R. adopted, 2022 WL 2195015 (E.D. Tex. June 17, 2022), the defendant did not have
prior sex offense convictions, and he downloaded eight images. In United States v. Murphy, No.
15-CR-3163, 2021 WL 254267, *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2021), despite the defendant engaging in
hands on offenses and having a guideline range was 210 to 262 months, "[t]he court sentenced the
defendant to the mandatory minimum 180 months of custody, moderately below the low end of
the guidelines, finding it an appropriate sentence balancing the defendant's age at the time of
sentencing, almost 64 years old, and his chronic health conditions with his lengthy history
involving sexual contacts with children."
As stated, here, Defendant was found with hundreds of images of child pornography files,
had a prior hands-on offense conviction, and was 28 years old at the time he was sentenced.
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In Laubacker v. United States, No. 16-CR-86, 2020 WL 2113461, *1 (W.D.N.Y. May 4,
2020), the defendant pled guilty to enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity and
cyberstalking, and he was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. The case Defendant cites does
not provide any details about the offense conduct or the defendant's criminal history. Defendant
does not provide any of that information. See Dkt. No. 62 at 15. It appears that Laubacker's
offense level was 35 and his criminal history category was I. See United States v. Laubacker, No.
16-CR-86, Dkt. No. 82.
Defendant also cites United States v. Rodarmel, No. 15-CR-10105, 2020 WL 2840059, *2
(D. Kan. June 1, 2020). See Dkt. No. 62 at 15. There, the defendant received a 204-month
sentence after her plea of guilty to transportation of a minor with intent that such minor engage in
sexual activity. "The nature and circumstance of Defendant's offense are egregious, as they
involved [the d]efendant's knowing subjection of a 13-year old minor to a planned sexual assault
by the co-defendant." United States v. Rodarmel, No. 15-10105, 2022 WL 2064901, *1 (D. Kan.
June 8, 2022). "The co-defendant received a 300-month sentence for his part in the offense" and
the "[d]efendant had no criminal history at the time she committed the instant offense." Id.
As has already been stated, here, Defendant had a criminal history and received a lesser
sentence than the co-defendant in Rodarmel.
Finally, Defendant cites White v. United States, No. 13-CR-255, 2022 WL 4244219, *1
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2022), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Connelly, No. 22-2337, 2023 WL
8446806 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2023). In that case, the defendant was sentenced to 156 months'
imprisonment for sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591
(a)(1) and (b)(1). The defendant "used force and other forms of coercion against the women
(including one minor female) who worked for him, including physical assault, rape, charging
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'debts' for disobeying his rules, making them payoff their 'debts' by prostituting themselves, and
taking all of the money the women collected." Id. The defendant "used fear to gain compliance,
and plied the women with drugs and alcohol to keep them awake to have sex with as many clients
as possible." Id. "Some women were forced to have sex with up to 20 men per day." Id. White's
offense level was 33 and his criminal history category was II. See United States v. White, No. 13-
CR-255, Dkt. No. 85.
In sum, none of the cases cited by Defendant support the conclusion that Defendant's
original sentence created a sentencing disparity. He was sentenced according to the total offense
level, his criminal history category, and the § 3553(a) factors. As the Government argues,
granting Defendant's request for immediate release would create a sentencing disparity because it
would result in Defendant being released prior to serving the mandatory minimum sentence of
fifteen years. See Dkt. No. 65 at 6; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) (noting that a person
convicted under the statute with a qualifying prior offense "shall be fined under this title and
imprisoned for not less than 15 years nor more than 40 years").
Additionally, United States Sentencing Commission Interactive Data Analyzer
demonstrates that in the 2015 fiscal year, 22.2% of the reported defendants were sentenced to 15
years to less than 20 and 33.3% were 10 years to less than 15.3 Based on the foregoing,
Defendant's sentence does not create a sentencing disparity and Defendant's argument does not
support compassionate release.
3 The Court used the following criteria: "Fiscal Year: 2015; Circuit: All; State: All; District: All;
Race: White,Hispanic; Gender: Male; Age: 26-30; Citizenship: All; Education: All; Crime Type:
Child Pornography; Guideline: §2G2.2; Drug Type: All; §2B1.1 Offense Type: All; Sentencing
Zone: D; Criminal History: III; Career Offender Status: All." United States Sentencing
Commission Interactive Data Analyzer, https://ida.ussc.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard.
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In sum, Defendant has not presented any cognizable grounds upon which compassionate
release can be granted.4
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions and the
applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant's motion for a sentence reduction (Dkt. No. 62) is DENIED;
and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 22, 2026
Albany, New York
4 The Court need not analyze each of the other § 3553(a) factors because it is clear that Defendant
has not established an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.
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