Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Felipe Hernández Lazo,
Petitioner,
-v-
Kristi Noem, in her official capacity, Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Pamela Bondi,
in her official capacity, Attorney General of the United
States; Joseph B. Edlow, Director of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services; Carmen Nunez, Supervisor,
USCIS Long Island, New York Field Office; Patrick J.
Ryder, in his official capacity, Commissioner of the
Nassau County Police Department, responsible for
oversight of ICE detainees held at the Nassau County
Correctional Center; Errol D. Toulon, Jr., in
his official capacity, Sheriff of Suffolk County,
responsible for oversight of ICE detainees held at the
Suffolk County Correctional Facility,
Respondents.
2:25-cv-6639
(NJC)
OPINION AND ORDER
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:
On December 1, 2025, Felipe Hernández Lazo filed this combined habeas petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 and civil action for injunctive and declaratory relief under the U.S.
Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06. Mr. Hernández Lazo
challenges the lawfulness of his detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
and any removal proceedings that had been or may be initiated against him by the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”). (Pet. For Writ of Habeas Corpus & Compl. For Injunctive Relief
(“Pet.”), ECF No. 1.) Through the habeas petition, Mr. Hernández Lazo seeks the following
relief: (1) a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to immediately release Mr.
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Hernández Lazo because his detention in ICE custody violates his due process rights; (2) a
declaration that the “process as applied to Petitioner by Respondents violates the Suspension
Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the INA, the
APA, and federal regulations”; and (3) a writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents to pursue a
constitutionally adequate process to justify adverse immigration actions against Petitioner. (Pet.
at 24–25.) Before the Court is only the petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 on the grounds that ICE’s detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo without notice and an
opportunity to be heard violates Section 236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“Section 1226(a)”), and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. (Pet. ¶¶ 26–35, 59–60.)1
Respondents are federal government officials named in their official capacities: Kristi
Noem, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); Pam Bondi, United
States Attorney General; Joseph B. Edlow, Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”); Carmen Nunez, Supervisor with the USCIS Long Island, New York Field
Office; Patrick J. Ryder, Commissioner of the Nassau County Police Department; Errol D.
Toulon, Jr., Sheriff of Suffolk County. Noem, Bondi, Edlow, and Nunez (the “Federal
Respondents”) argue that Mr. Hernández Lazo’s detention falls under a different INA provision,
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (“Section 1225(b)(2)”), which governs the mandatory detention of certain
noncitizens who are “seeking admission” to the United States. (Mem. L. Resp. Show Cause
Order (“Resp.”) at 8–9, ECF No. 13.) According to Respondents, Section 1225(b)(2) requires
1 On January 15, 2026, Mr. Hernández Lazo withdrew his civil action claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief. (ECF No. 21.)
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Mr. Hernández Lazo’s detention, and he has no right to any additional process under the Due
Process Clause.
Respondents are incorrect, as the vast majority of courts throughout this District, Circuit,
and even the country have held in similar cases. Moreover, the conditions in which they held Mr.
Hernández Lazo for around twenty-three-hours spread across December 2, 3, and 4, 2025 shock
the conscience, falling below any minimum standards for ICE detention facilities.
Mr. Hernández Lazo has been living in the United States continuously since 1997—
nearly 30 years. In 1999, he was granted Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”), and USCIS
extended that status or granted his application to re-register for TPS at least ten times, thereby
determining that Mr. Hernández Lazo did not pose any public safety risk. Mr. Hernández Lazo
duly re-registered for TPS, applied for and was granted advance parole to travel abroad on
numerous occasions, was granted work authorization, and applied for permanent residence and
an adjustment of status. However, several months after Noem terminated TPS for Honduras
effective September 8, 2025, ICE agents arrested and detained Mr. Hernández Lazo without any
notice, opportunity to be heard, or individualized consideration, when Mr. Hernández Lazo
appeared for an interview for his adjustment of status application.
ICE’s detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo deprived him of his significant liberty interest in
remaining free from detention—the paramount interest triggering the procedural due process
protections of the Fifth Amendment. While ICE detained him in several different locations, they
kept him in shocking conditions for around twenty-three hours in what is known as the “Central
Islip Hold Room”—an ICE facility located in the Alfonse D’Amato U.S. Courthouse in Central
Islip, New York. There, Mr. Hernández Lazo was one of six people locked in a small, unheated
or poorly heated cell containing an open toilet that is designed for the brief detention of a single
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individual. He was detained without access to a bunk, proper bedding, soap, a shower, a
toothbrush, or clean clothes. These deplorable conditions are documented by witness testimony
not just in this case, but in two others: Minarcaja Concha v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-6695, 2026 WL
215417 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2025), and Clarke v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al.,
2025 WL 3674471 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2025).
These appalling conditions underscore precisely why, in our nation governed by the rule
of law, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard to guard against the erroneous
deprivation of liberty. Freedom is precious. And when at liberty, a person is not subject to being
locked up in a crowded, cold room that may reek of urine from the open toilet, where the lights
are kept on for twenty-four hours a day.
For the reasons explained below, Respondents’ detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo is
unlawful. The detention is governed by Section 1226(a)—not Section 1225(b)(2) or any other
INA provision requiring mandatory detention—based on the plain text of these statutory
provisions. Neither at the time of his arrest, nor at any point thereafter, was Mr. Hernández Lazo
subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2) as a noncitizen who, among other
things, was “seeking admission” to the United States. Moreover, Mr. Hernández Lazo’s regular
applications for extension or re-registration of his TPS were predicated on his submission of
information showing that he had not been arrested, cited, charged, indicted, fined, or imprisoned
for breaking or violating any law, excluding minor traffic violations, among other things. Mr.
Hernández Lazo has absolutely no criminal record in the United States whatsoever, and nothing
in the record suggests that he poses a public safety or flight risk. Rather, Mr. Hernández Lazo has
resided in the United States for nearly thirty years and has been a productive member of the
community, working in construction with authorization from the federal government. Although
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Noem terminated TPS for all Honduran nationals, that termination does not suddenly transform
Mr. Hernández Lazo into a non-citizen “seeking admission” to the United States under Section
1225(b)(2).
Respondents provided Mr. Hernández Lazo no notice or opportunity to be heard prior to
his sudden arrest and detention, much less the minimum requirements of an individualized
determination by a DHS officer that he posed a flight or safety risk. In light of Mr.
Hernández Lazo’s significant interest in physical liberty—even as a noncitizen subject to
discretionary detention under Section 1226(a)—the high risk of erroneous deprivation resulting
from detention without notice or opportunity to be heard, and the government’s failure to show
that Mr. Hernández Lazo’s detention is needed to protect public safety or guard against any flight
risk, Respondents’ detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo without any notice or opportunity to be
heard is a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process. The petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is therefore granted.2
BACKGROUND
I. 	Factual Background
A. Mr. Hernández Lazo’s Entry into the United States and Temporary Protected
Status
Mr. Hernández Lazo, a Honduran national, entered the United States for purposes of this
action in around January of 1997. (Supp. Decl. of Tony Petito (“Second Petito Decl.”) ¶ 7, ECF
2 The Court granted the Petition orally on December 12, 2025, providing its reasons on the
record and noting that a more detailed written opinion would follow. (Hr’g Tr. 39:2–53:1.) This
Opinion and Order provides the Court’s full analysis.
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No. 13-1; Pet. ¶ 14; Notice to Appear, Dec. 2, 2025 (“2025 NTA”), ECF No. 18-1 at 7.)3 Over
the course of the next year, Mr. Hernández Lazo left and returned to the United States several
times. (Second Petito Decl. ¶¶ 8–11.)
On December 21, 1999, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)—the
predecessor to ICE—granted Mr. Hernández Lazo, as a Honduran national, Temporary Protected
Status through July 5, 2000. (Id. ¶ 12.) Between 2000 and September 25, 2025, USCIS extended
the TPS designation or granted Mr. Hernández Lazo’s application to re-register for TPS at least
ten times. (Id. ¶¶ 13–17, 20, 27, 28, 32–35.) The record contains several of these applications,
which show that Mr. Hernández Lazo reported to USCIS that he had not been arrested, cited,
charged, indicted, fined, or imprisoned for breaking or violating any law, excluding minor traffic
violations. (See, e.g., ECF No. 18-1 at 82.) During that same 25-year period, USCIS also
authorized Mr. Hernández Lazo to travel abroad and re-enter the United States under advance
parole on numerous occasions. (Second Petito Decl. ¶¶ 18–31.)4 Each of these trips abroad were
brief, lasting anywhere from a few weeks to a few months. (Id.)
3 Although not material to the issues here, Mr. Hernández Lazo had previously entered the
country on February 17, 1988, applied for and was denied asylum, and departed the United
States in 1992 after it was determined that he had overstayed. (Second Petito Decl. ¶ 4–6.)
4 The record reflects that Mr. Hernández Lazo has lived in the United States since 1997, aside
from brief trips abroad, most, if not all of them, taken with advance parole. On one occasion—
when Mr. Hernández Lazo traveled abroad from December 31, 2009 to March 26, 2010—the
record does not reflect whether Mr. Hernández Lazo received authorization before departing the
United States, but evidence shows that DHS paroled him back into the United States upon his
return. (Second Petito Decl. ¶¶ 18–19.)
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Since January 2005, Mr. Hernández Lazo has lived at an address in Mastic, New York.
(ECF No. 18-1 at 28.) He has not resided outside of the United States since 1997. (Id. at 28–29.)5
USCIS most recently approved Mr. Hernández Lazo’s TPS registration on February 26,
2024. (ECF No. 18-1 at 52.) That approval was valid from January 6, 2024 through July 5, 2025.
(Id.) With TPS, Mr. Hernández Lazo was authorized to work and “considered as being in, and
maintaining, lawful status” for purposes of adjustment of status. ECF 18-1 at 52; see also 8
C.F.R. § 244.12(a) (“Upon approval of an application for Temporary Protected Status, USCIS
shall grant an employment authorization document . . . .”). There is no evidence in the record
showing that this work authorization was terminated by virtue of Noem’s September 2025
termination of TPS for all Honduran nationals. See 8 C.F.R. § 244.12(b) (providing that if a
noncitizen’s TPS is withdrawn, employment authorization expires upon the date of the notice of
withdrawal or the date on the employment authorization document, whichever is later).6
Since being granted TPS, Mr. Hernandez Lazo has worked as a carpenter for a
construction company. He has a U.S. citizen daughter who is 22 years old and resides with him
in New York. (ECF No. 18-1 at 13.)
5 The record shows that Mr. Hernández Lazo last resided outside of the United States in
Honduras from 1966 to 1997. (ECF No. 18-1 at 28–29.) Petito does not provide any facts to the
contrary. (See Second Petito Dec. ¶¶ 11–18.) This Court provided Respondents ample
opportunities to submit evidence concerning such issues. (See Elec. Orders, Dec. 8, 2025, Dec.
10, 2025.)
6 While on TPS, Mr. Hernández Lazo could not “depart the United States without prior approval
of the Attorney General of the United States.” (ECF 18-1 at 52.)
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B. Termination of TPS and Application for Adjustment of Status
On July 8, 2025, Noem published a federal registrar notice that terminated TPS for
Honduras effective September 8, 2025. See 90 Fed. Reg. 30089–92.7 In the meantime, on or
around August 16, 2025, Mr. Hernández Lazo applied for an adjustment of status by submitting a
Form I-485 to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status along with his daughter’s
submission of a Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative. (Second Petito Decl. ¶ 36; Pet. ¶ 16;
Pet., Ex. A.)
As of the date of the Form I-485, Mr. Hernández Lazo had never been placed in removal
proceedings since entering the United States in 1997. (ECF No. 18-1 at 39–40.) As noted, he has
no criminal record in the United States whatsoever.
On September 25, 2025, while Mr. Hernández Lazo’s application for adjustment of status
was pending, USCIS terminated his TPS. (Second Petito Decl. ¶ 35.)8 USCIS did not provide
any notice to Mr. Hernández Lazo of the termination. (Pet. ¶ 14.)
7 On July 31, 2025, a court in the Northern District of California ordered the termination of TPS
for Honduras postponed “to preserve the status quo and until a hearing on the merits” scheduled
for November 18, 2025. Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 798 F.Supp.3d 1008, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2025).
However, on August 20, 2025, the Ninth Circuit stayed the District Court’s July 31, 2025 order
pending further order of the Ninth Circuit, while district court proceedings continued. Nat’l TPS
All. v. Noem, No. 25-4901-cv (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2025).
8 Respondents’ opposition to the Petition did not provide any admissible evidence showing that
USCIS had terminated Mr. Hernández Lazo’s TPS, because, as set forth below, the Petito
Declaration consists entirely of hearsay statements based not on personal knowledge, but on
information gathered from unidentified sources and persons. The Court ordered Respondents to
produce “any documents relating to the termination of Petitioner’s TPS status on September 25,
2025.” (Elec. Order, Dec. 10, 2025.) In response, Respondents provide what appears to be a
screenshot of an online USCIS “Case Status” search tool with the search input,
“EAC123456890” and output, “[t]he TPS designation associated with your Receipt Number
IOE0923552977 has been terminated by Federal Register Notice.” (ECF No. 18-1 at 54.) The
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On December 1, 2025 Mr. Hernández Lazo appeared on time with his attorney for an
interview in support of his application for adjustment of status. (Id. ¶ 17.) He waited for nearly
three hours for USCIS to begin the interview. Although it started late, USCIS conducted the
interview. (Id.) There is a factual dispute as to the events that followed.
The Petition alleges that near the conclusion of the interview, but before it had ended, the
interviewer invited ICE agents into the “private room where the interview was being conducted.”
(Id. ¶ 18.) According to the Petition, the ICE agents “refused to provide [Mr. Hernández Lazo’s]
counsel with any warrant or Form I-200, despite repeated requests.” (Id.) By contrast, the Federal
Respondents provide a declaration from Tony Petito, an ICE Supervisory Detention and
Deportation Officer, consisting of hearsay statements based not on personal knowledge, but on
information gathered from unidentified sources and persons. (See Second Petito Decl. ¶ 2
(“[T]he following representations are based on my review of Petitioner’s administrative file,
consultation with colleagues, and ICE’s electronic records and databases.”).) Petito asserts that
“ICE Officers arrested [Hernández Lazo] outside the USCIS office,” although he was not present
during these events and fails to identify either the sources or individuals on which he relies for
such hearsay. (Petito Decl. ¶ 37.)
printout does not list Mr. Hernández Lazo’s name or the date of termination, but Receipt Number
IOE0923552977 appears on Mr. Hernández Lazo’s TPS approval notice. (See id. at 52.)
Nonetheless, the record reflects that Mr. Hernández Lazo’s TPS is no longer in effect. Under 8
C.F.R. § 244.19, nationals afforded TPS lose that designation “upon the sixtieth [] day after the
date notice of termination is published in the Federal Register . . . automatically and without
further notice or right of appeal,” and Noem published the termination on July 8, 2025. 8 C.F.R.
§ 244.19. Moreover, the district court’s decision in National TPS Alliance is stayed. Natl’ TPS
All., No. 25-4901-cv (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2025). Mr. Hernández Lazo does not contest that he “no
longer holds TPS.” (Reply at 20.)
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Nevertheless, Hernández Lazo and the Federal Respondents agree that following the
arrest, ICE agents detained Hernández Lazo, purportedly “pursuant to . . . 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).” (Second Petito Decl. ¶ 37; see also Hr’g Tr. 27:16–28:4.)
C. Detention in the Central Islip Hold Room and Other Facilities
Following the arrest, ICE transported Mr. Hernández Lazo “for processing” to the Central
Islip Hold Room located at 535 Federal Plaza, New York, New York in the Alfonse D’Amato
U.S. Courthouse. (Decl. of Tony Decl (“First Petito Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 10-1.) He was detained
there on two separate occasions, once for nine hours and later for another fourteen hours. (First
Petito Decl. ¶¶ 2–3, 5–6.)
ICE initially transported Mr. Hernández Lazo to the Central Islip Hold Room at around
12:22 a.m. on December 2, 2025, and kept him there until around 9:24 a.m., when they
transferred him to the Nassau County Correctional Center (the “Nassau County Jail”). (First
Petito Decl. ¶ 2.) Sometime that same day, DHS issued Mr. Hernández Lazo a Notice to Appear
(“NTA”) initiating removal proceedings against him on the grounds that he is “an alien present
in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.” (ECF No. 18-1 at 7.)
ICE returned Mr. Hernández Lazo to the Central Islip Hold Room at around 11:38 a.m.
on December 3, 2025, because they had been unable to secure “permanent placement [for him] at
an ICE detention facility.” (First Petito Decl. ¶ 5.) He remained in the Central Islip Hold Room
until around 1:20 a.m. on December 4, 2025, when he was transported to ICE’s Delaney Hall
Detention Facility in Newark, New Jersey. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6.)
Mr. Hernández Lazo appeared in person at the December 12, 2025 hearing on his habeas
petition and testified before the undersigned about his detention in the Central Islip Hold Room
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with the assistance of a Spanish-language interpreter. (See Hr’g Tr. 7:3–19:14.)9 The Court finds
his testimony to be credible.
When Mr. Hernández Lazo arrived at Central Islip Hold Room, ICE did not tell him how
long he would be detained there. (Hr’g Tr. 7:12–14, 19–20.) On both occasions on which he was
detained in the facility, Mr. Hernández Lazo was held with five other men in what he estimated
to be a six foot by six foot “cell.” (Hr’g Tr. 7:22-8:1, 8:6–13, 18–24.) During the day, the six
men sat on cushions and at night they slept “[c]lose, one right next to each other,” without sheets,
on three-inch thick “mattress[es] that you fold in three.” (Id. 9:4–5, 11–20.) There was a toilet in
the room, “right there where [the men] sle[pt],” so the men had to position themselves such that
they were sleeping on all sides of the toilet. (Id. 10:8–11:8.) The cell in which he was detained
was not cleaned on either of the two occasions in which Mr. Hernández Lazo was detained in the
Central Islip Hold Room, and the cell “smelled like pee pee, all of it.” (Id. 10:8–13, 11:13–14.)
The lights were kept on during the entirety of Mr. Hernández Lazo’s detention in the
Central Islip Hold Room. Lights were not turned off so the men could sleep, even though Mr.
Hernández Lazo was detained during nighttime hours: from around 12:22 a.m. to around 9:24
a.m. on December 2, 2025, and from around 11:38 a.m. on December 3, 2025 to around 1:20
a.m. on December 4, 2025. (Id. 9:21–10:3; ECF No. 10-1 ¶¶ 2–3, 5–6.)10
9 At the hearing, Respondents stated that they did not have any objections to the Court asking
Mr. Hernández Lazo questions. (Hr’g Tr. 7:3–6.) Neither party requested that Mr. Hernández
Lazo be placed under oath. Without objection, the Court relied on Mr. Hernández Lazo’s
unsworn statements about certain factual matters during the hearing.
10 Petito refers to specific times at which Mr. Hernández Lazo was “booked into the Central Islip
hold room” or another facility and to times at which he “was transferred” to a facility without
defining these terms or referencing the sources or records on which he relies. (See, e.g., Petito
Decl. ¶¶ 2–7.)
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With respect to food and hygiene at the Central Islip Hold Room, Mr. Hernández Lazo
was fed rice and beans “out of a bag of food.” (Hr’g Tr. 11:23–25.) When he and his cell mates
needed water, they would knock on the door and would be given water. (Id. 11:15–22.) Although
the toilet had a built-in sink, Mr. Hernández Lazo was not provided with soap, toothpaste, a
toothbrush, or other hygiene products. (Id. 12:24–13:10.) Mr. Hernández Lazo was not able to
brush his teeth or change into clean clothes for the first 48 hours of his detention in ICE custody,
from the time he was first detained in the Central Islip Hold Room just after midnight on
December 2, 2025, until his arrival at Delaney Hall at around 1:20 a.m. on December 4, 2025.
(Id. 13:11–23, 14:3–13.) Neither of the cells in which he was detained in the Central Islip Hold
Room had a shower, and he was not provided access to a shower when detained in the Central
Islip Hold Room. (Id. 12:21-23.)
ICE permitted Mr. Hernández Lazo to make one call to his family when he was first
arrested, but did not permit any additional calls, including a call to his lawyer, at any time during
his confinement in the Central Islip Hold Room. (Id. 14:14–25, 15:1–24.) After his one call to
family, Mr. Hernández Lazo was unable to speak with family again until he was transported to
Delaney Hall in New Jersey, more than 48 hours later. (Id.) Mr. Hernández Lazo’s family were
not permitted to visit him in the Central Islip Hold Room. (Id. 16:7–15.)
Mr. Hernández Lazo is treated with blood pressure medication, but ICE did not give him
his medication during either of his stays at the Central Islip Hold Room. (Id. 16:24–17.) When
ICE transferred him to the Nassau County Jail after his first period of detention in the Central
Islip Hold Room, a check-up revealed that Mr. Hernández Lazo was experiencing symptoms of
high blood pressure and he received a reading of “200.” (Id. 17:2–18, 19:3–15.) The facility “did
a cardio and . . . an x-ray because [his] blood pressure was so high” and gave him medication to
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lower his blood pressure. (Id. 17:13–18, 18:8–18.) Nonetheless, when ICE transferred Mr.
Hernández Lazo back to the Central Islip Hold Room on December 3, 2025, ICE again did not
provide him with his blood pressure medication. (Id. 17:9–12.) Mr. Hernández Lazo alerted staff
when he arrived at the Central Islip Hold Room that he took blood pressure medication, but none
was provided. (Id. 19:12–15.)
Mr. Hernández Lazo’s testimony about the detention conditions in the Central Islip Hold
Room is corroborated by two other ICE detainees who were detained there during the same time
period and who testified in court proceedings on December 11 and 12, 2025 in the Alfonse
D’Amato U.S. Courthouse before the undersigned and Judge Gary Brown. The testimony of
these other ICE detainees corroborates Mr. Hernández Lazo’s testimony about conditions in the
Central Islip Hold Room.
ICE detained Mr. Minarcaja Concha in the Central Islip Hold Room for around twenty-
four hours, starting at around 10:10 a.m. on December 3, 2025 and ending at around 10:00 a.m.
on December 4, 2025. Id. at *5.11 During processing in the Central Hold Room, ICE permitted
Mr. Minarcaja Concha to make one phone call, which he used to call his wife and request that
she contact his attorney. Id. ICE did not permit Mr. Minarcaja Concha to make another phone
call to speak directly with his attorney. Id. His family was not permitted to visit. Id. An
11 In Minarcaja Concha, Dennis Alexander Minarcaja Concha appeared by telephone at the
December 12, 2025 hearing on his habeas petition and testified before this Court with the
assistance of a Spanish-language interpreter about the conditions of his detention in the Central
Islip Hold Room. 2026 WL 215417, at *5 & n.6. At the hearing, Respondents stated that they did
not object to the Court asking Mr. Minarcaja Concha questions. Minarcaja Concha, 2026 WL
215417, at *5 n.6. Neither party requested that Mr. Minarcaja Concha be placed under oath.
Without objection, the Court relied on Mr. Minarcaja Concha’s unsworn statements about certain
factual matters during the hearing.
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interpreter was not present, although one of the ICE officers who detained him spoke “a little”
Spanish. Id.
Mr. Minarcaja Concha estimates that there are around four different rooms for detainees
in the Central Islip Hold Room. Id. ICE detained Mr. Minarcaja Concha with “about seven or
eight people” total in a room that he estimates was around four feet by four feet in size. Id. The
conditions of detention mirror those experienced by Mr. Hernandez Lazo. Mr. Minarcaja
Concha’s room contained a toilet and a sink, which were in view of the other detainees and were
not sectioned off from the area where detained persons sat, slept, and ate. Id. ICE did not provide
Mr. Minarcaja Concha with a blanket, pillow, mat to sleep on, a clean change of clothing, or any
hygiene products, such as hand soap, toothpaste, or a toothbrush. Id. The room did not have a
shower and Mr. Minarcaja Concha was not provided access to a shower during his detention in
the Central Islip Hold Room. Id. ICE officers provided meals and bottled water around usual
mealtimes in the morning, afternoon, and evening. Id. The lights remained on during Mr.
Minarcaja Concha’s twenty-four hours in the room and were not turned off at any point to allow
detained persons to sleep. Id.
Erron Anthony Clarke described substantially similar experiences in the Central Islip
Hold Room when he was detained there on December 5 to December 6, 2025 and again from
December 9 to December 10, 2025. Clarke, 2025 WL 3674471, at *3. Like Mr. Hernández Lazo,
Mr. Clarke was held in the Central Islip Hold Room on two separate occasions—the second of
which exceeded 36 hours. Id. Mr. Clarke was confined to a single-occupancy room with eight
other men. Id. Mr. Clarke, like the petitioners before the undersigned, stated that the facility had
no shower facilities and no beds, that detainees “had to lie straight on the ground,” and that ICE
did not provide changes of clothing or toothbrushes. Id. Despite being detained overnight—
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including for a period of time that exceeded 36 hours—Mr. Clarke testified that the lights
remained on “[a]ll night, all day,” and that the nights were “cold.” Id.
In response to the Court’s order requiring Respondents to address conditions in the
Central Islip Hold Room, Respondents provided another declaration from Tony Petito, which
consists of hearsay statements based not on personal knowledge, but on information gathered
from unidentified sources and persons. (See Second Supp. Decl. of Tony Petito (“Third Petito
Decl.”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 18-1 at 1–5 (“The following representations are based on my review of
Petitioner’s administrative file, and consultation with my colleagues.”).) Petito attests to the
following without identifying the sources of his information:
5. By way of background ICE Hold Room facilities such as the one in Central Islip are
temporary areas used for post-arrest processing including fingerprinting, completing
paperwork, and making transport and bedspace arrangements at long-term detention
facilities. Currently, absent extraordinary circumstances, ICE detainees are not kept at
Hold Rooms beyond seventy-two hours, and most detainees are transferred out of the
Central Islip Hold Room within twenty-four hours.
6. Detainees in the Central Islip Hold Room are interviewed during arrest processing
to determine if they have any medical issues. For any medical issues arising at the Hold
Room, detainees are transported to local hospitals for further evaluation and treatment.
For detainees requiring medication or special accommodation, ICE arranges placement in
a facility that can medically accommodate their needs and can administer medication.
. . .
8. ICE provides detainees with mats to rest on and a change of clothes as needed and/or
requested.
9. Detainees are provided with phone calls upon arrival and ICE allows additional calls
as/if needed. As the facility is a short-term processing space, ICE does not have facilities
to accommodate in-person family or attorney visitation.
10. Detainees in the Central Islip Hold Room have bathroom access. As a temporary
arrest processing space, it does not have showers.
(Id. ¶¶ 5–6, 8–10.)
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II. 	Procedural History
As noted, on December 1, 2025, Petitioner’s counsel filed the combined habeas petition
and civil action for injunctive and declaratory relief. (See Pet.) On December 2, 2025, the Court
issued the Order to Show Cause, which among other things, ordered that Respondents show
cause why the Petition should not be granted and barred Mr. Hernández Lazo’s removal from the
United States and transfer out of the Eastern District of New York, the Southern District of New
York, or the District of New Jersey absent further order of this Court. (Order to Show Cause at
2–3.) That same day, the Court ordered the parties to appear for a telephone conference on
December 3, 2025 to address scheduling and case management matters. (Elec. Order, Dec. 2,
2025.)
During the December 3, 2025 teleconference with the Court, counsel for Mr. Hernández
Lazo represented that a search of the ICE Online Detainee Locator System on or around
December 2, 2025 indicated that Mr. Hernández Lazo was located in Broome County, New
York, which is located in the Northern District of New York. (Elec. Order, Dec. 3, 2025.)
Counsel for Respondents represented that Mr. Hernández Lazo had never been moved outside of
the Districts identified in the Court's Order, and that Mr. Hernández Lazo was being held in the
Central Islip Hold Room. (Id.; Min. Entry, Dec. 3, 2025.) The Court then heard from the parties
regarding the relief being sought by Mr. Hernández Lazo and ordered the parties to meet and
confer regarding a briefing schedule on the claims brought in Mr. Hernández Lazo’s civil action.
(Min. Entry, Dec. 3, 2025.) The Court also advised the parties of the decision in National TPS
Alliance v. Noem, 798 F.Supp.3d 1008, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-4901
(9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2025), which postponed the termination of the TPS Designation for Honduras.
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The Court directed the parties to address in their submissions on the Petition the relevance, if
any, of National TPS Alliance on the claims and defenses in this action. (Id.)
Following the telephone conference, the Court issued an order directing Respondents to
file a submission addressing where Mr. Hernández Lazo was presently detained and the
authority, if any, for Respondents to detain Mr. Hernández Lazo in the Central Islip Hold Room
overnight. (Elec. Order, Dec. 3, 2025.) On December 4, 2025, Respondents addressed these
issues in a letter accompanied by the first Petito Declaration. (ECF No. 10; First Petito Decl.)
On December 5, 2025, the Court issued an Order to Produce, requiring the Federal
Respondents to bring Mr. Hernández Lazo “under safe and secure custody” before this Court for
the Show Cause hearing on December 12, 2025. (Order to Produce, ECF No. 11, at 1.)
Additionally, based on the Court’s review of the First Petito Declaration, on December 8, 2025,
the Court required Respondents to file supplemental submissions addressing several issues,
including what sleeping accommodations, food, access to showers and bathroom facilities,
access to medications, medical screening, counsel, and family visitation were provided to Mr.
Hernández Lazo during the time he was detained in the Central Islip Hold Room. (Elec. Order,
Dec. 8, 2025.)
Respondents submitted their opposition to the Petition on December 9, 2025, and
attached the Second Petito Declaration. (See Resp.; Second Petito Decl.) Although the Response
and Second Petito Declaration referred to certain documents, neither attached any of those
documents as exhibits. (See id.) Therefore, upon review of Respondents’ response to the Petition,
on December 10, 2025, the Court required Respondents to file a supplemental submission
providing several categories of documents referenced in the Second Petito Declaration. (Elec.
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Order, Dec. 10, 2025.) Mr. Hernández Lazo submitted a reply the next day. (Reply, ECF No.
14.)
On December 11, 2025, Respondents filed two letters, accompanied by the Third Petito
Declaration, which address Mr. Hernández Lazo’s detention in the Central Islip Hold Room and
the records Respondents had been ordered to produce. (ECF Nos. 18–19; Third Petito Decl.)
Attached as exhibits, Respondents produced:
• 	a December 2, 2025 Notice to Appear relating to Mr. Hernández Lazo (ECF No.
18-1 at 7–10);
• 	Mr. Hernández Lazo’s Form I-130 Application and Approval (id. at 11–24);
• 	Mr. Hernández Lazo’s Form I-485 Application and an August 19, 2025 “USCIS
Account Access Notice” acknowledging USCIS’s receipt of the Form I-485
Application on August 14, 2025 (id. at 26–50);
• 	a February 26, 2024 TPS Approval for Mr. Hernández Lazo and a December 11,
2025 printout of the USCIS “Case Status Online” portal reporting the termination
of TPS for “Receipt Number IOE0923552977” (id. at 52–53);
• 	two parole approvals, dated March 21, 2016 and October 15, 2012, authorizing
Mr. Hernández Lazo to “return to the United States [from abroad] to resume his
. . . TPS” (id. at 56–57); and
• 	four applications by Mr. Hernandez Lazo to renew his TPS dated: December 28,
2017; June 13, 2016; December 6, 2014; and May 11, 2013 (id. at 58–98).
Petito attested that “unfortunately we were not able to locate” Mr. Hernández Lazo’s initial TPS
application. (Third Petito Decl. ¶ 14.)
The Court held a hearing on Mr. Hernández Lazo’s habeas petition on December 12,
2025. (Min. Entry & Order, Dec. 12, 2025, ECF No. 22.) At the hearing, the Court heard Mr.
Hernández Lazo’s testimony about his detention in the Central Islip Hold Room and argument
from counsel for the parties. (Id.) Considering the parties’ written and oral arguments and
submissions, the Court granted Mr. Hernández Lazo habeas relief for the reasons explained on
the record, which the Court indicated would be set forth in more detail in this written Opinion
and Order. (Id.) The Court further ordered Respondents to immediately release Mr. Hernández
Lazo pursuant to the procedures to which the parties agreed on the record. (Id.; Hr’g Tr. 55:10–
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58:20.) The Court did not rule on Mr. Hernández Lazo’s civil action for injunctive and
declaratory relief, and instead issued a briefing schedule on those claims. (Id.; Elec. Order, Dec.
12, 2025.) On January 15, 2025, Mr. Hernández Lazo filed a letter withdrawing his civil action
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 21.)
LEGAL STANDARD
The Petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which
“authorizes a district court to grant a writ of habeas corpus whenever a petitioner is ‘in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wang v. Ashcroft, 320
F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)); see also Hechavarria v. Sessions,
891 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2018). Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus claims by
noncitizens challenging the constitutionality of their detention. Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978
F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Hechavarria, 891 F.3d at 53 (“[A]t its historical core, the
writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and
it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.”). Additionally, “[c]laims that the
discretionary process [used to detain someone] . . . was constitutionally flawed are cognizable in
federal court on habeas because they fit comfortably within the scope of § 2241.” Velasco Lopez,
978 F.3d at 850.
DISCUSSION
As noted, the Court incorporates by reference the entirety of its Opinion and
Order in Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 25-cv-6065, 2025 WL
3314420 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 26-219 (2d. Cir. Feb. 2, 2026), and
provides this additional analysis to explain the relevance of specific facts in the record relating to
Mr. Hernández Lazo. The Court also notes that since its decision in Rodriguez-Acurio, the first
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Court of Appeals decision to weigh in preliminarily on the interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)
that Respondents advanced here has tentatively rejected Respondents’ argument:
[T]he mandatory detention provision upon which Defendants rely, limits its scope to
an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission,” § 1225(b)(2)(A). Put another
way, “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking
admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”
Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025) (emphasis
in original, quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)).
I. 	Statutory Framework
As noted, the Court’s detailed opinion in Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar is entirely
incorporated by reference, including the Court’s explanation of the statutory framework for
removing noncitizens from the United States through removal and expedited removal
proceedings, ICE’s mandatory and discretionary detention of noncitizens under the INA, and the
release of applicants for admission detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2)
“temporarily . . . [on parole] for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which is known as the humanitarian parole statute
(“Section 1182(d)(5)(A)”). See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *8–11.
II. 	Analysis
The Petition seeks a writ of habeas corpus and order requiring Petitioner’s “immediate
release.” (Pet. at 24.) It argues that ICE’s detention violates Mr. Hernández Lazo’s right to
procedural and substantive due process because he was arrested and detained by ICE without
notice and an opportunity to be heard, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. (Id. ¶ 60.) Mr. Hernández Lazo maintains that he never received an “individualized
custody determination” by DHS. (Id.)
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Respondents argue that the detention is lawful for two reasons. First, they contend that
Mr. Hernández Lazo’s detention is governed by the mandatory detention provision of Section
1225(b)(2), not the Section 1226 discretionary detention framework, and that under the “entry
fiction,” Mr. Hernández Lazo has no right to any additional process than what Section
1225(b)(2) affords. (Resp. at 9–23.) And second, Respondents contend that Mr.
Hernández Lazo’s arguments against his detention amount to a request to “equitably estop” ICE
from detaining him under Section 1225(b)(2). (Id. at 23–25.)12 For the reasons explained below,
contrary to Respondents’ contentions, Mr. Hernández Lazo’s detention does not fall under the
mandatory detention provision of Section 1225(b)(2) based on the statutory text. As addressed in
detail in Rodriguez-Acurio, Respondents’ framing of this Court’s reasoning as one premised on
the doctrine of “equitable estoppel” is inaccurate. See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at
*18 n.10. Accordingly, Mr. Hernández Lazo is necessarily detained pursuant to Section 1226(a),
and his detention by ICE without any notice or opportunity to be heard violates his rights to
procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment. Considering Mr. Hernández Lazo’s weighty
liberty interests alongside Respondents’ interests in enforcing immigration laws and the
substantial risk of erroneous deprivation stemming from Respondents’ arrest and detention of
Mr. Hernández Lazo without any notice or opportunity to be heard, Mr. Hernández Lazo’s
detention violates his right to procedural due process.
12 Respondents also addressed questions raised by the Court regarding the applicability of
National TPS Alliance, 798 F.Supp.3d at 1015 and Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-
cv-1873, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), reconsideration granted in part, No.
5:25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 3713982 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), and amended and superseded on
reconsideration, No. 5:25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 3713987 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), judgment
entered sub nom. Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) to this action. (Resp. at 25–29.) However, the parties agree that neither case
is applicable here. (See id.; Reply at 15–16, 18–19.) The Court agrees.
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A. Mr. Hernández Lazo is Detained Under Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)
Respondents invoke Section 1225(b)(2) as a basis for Mr. Hernández Lazo’s detention,
arguing that he “falls squarely within the ambit” of the statute’s mandatory detention
requirement. (Resp. at 11.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). As other courts have
recognized, this language requires that “several conditions must be met” to impose mandatory
detention under Section 1225(b)(2). Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 487
(S.D.N.Y. 2025). The noncitizen must be: “(1) an applicant for admission; (2) seeking
admission; and (3) not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Id.; Martinez v. Hyde,
792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025). It is undisputed that Mr. Hernández Lazo is “an
applicant for admission” and that he is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.”13 Instead, the question here is whether he is “seeking admission” such that he is
subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
This Court finds that he is not. Mr. Hernández Lazo cannot be “seeking admission”
because he clearly is not presenting himself at the border and was not recently apprehended just
after entering this country. Aside from brief trips abroad, most of them taken with advance
parole, Mr. Hernández Lazo has been living in the United States since around 1997. (Pet. ¶ 14;
13 See Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 593 U.S. 409, 416 (2021) (holding that the TPS statute permits a
noncitizen to remain in the United States, but “does not constructively ‘admit’ a TPS recipient—
that is, ‘consider [ ]’ him as having entered the country ‘after inspection and authorization’”).
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Second Petito Decl. ¶ 7–31.) Respondents do not identify any active process of seeking
admission attributable to Mr. Hernández Lazo. While he does have an application for permanent
residence pending, just as the petitioner in Rodriguez-Acurio had a pending application for
asylum, such an application only demonstrates that Mr. Hernández Lazo seeks “a lawful means
to remain here,” “not ‘admission’ or ‘lawful entry’ to the United States.” Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025
WL 3314420, at *22.
Respondents argue that because Mr. Hernández Lazo is an “applicant for admission,” he
is “inherently and necessarily ‘seeking admission,’” and that he therefore satisfies all three
Section 1225(b)(2) criteria. (Resp. at 15.) This Court has already addressed and rejected
Respondents’ interpretation in Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *22–23, including
Respondents’ invocation of Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018).
Respondents make no effort to distinguish Rodriguez-Acurio or the hundreds of district
court decisions rejecting their interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2) from this action other than to
point to the termination of Mr. Hernández Lazo’s TPS. Yet, when asked about the legal
significance of the termination of Mr. Hernández Lazo’s TPS, Respondents asserted only that
Mr. Hernández Lazo was “no longer in the country legally at [the] point [that his TPS status was
terminated],” and that this sole fact rendered him a noncitizen who was necessarily “seeking
admission” (Hr’g Tr. 28:11–30:5.)
This argument entirely fails to grapple with the plain text of Section 1225(b)(2), which as
explained in Rodriguez-Acurio, requires some active process of seeking admission. Courts have
concluded that the termination of TPS does not render a noncitizen a person seeking admission
to the United States such that they are subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2).
See, e.g., Francois v. Noem, No. 25-cv-7334, 2026 WL 27565, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2026) (slip
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opinion) (“The fact Francois had TPS which then expired also does not impact his [habeas]
petition. Courts in this district and around the country have found a petitioner’s TPS status does
not materially impact their right to habeas relief under similar circumstances.”) (collecting
cases). The termination of Mr. Hernández Lazo’s TPS in September 2025 does not change the
fact that he was a noncitizen who had been residing in the interior of the United States for
decades at the time that ICE detained him, thereby firmly placing his detention under Section
1226(a). See Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 491 (discussing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289).
Accordingly, Section 1225(b)(2) does not govern Mr. Hernández Lazo’s detention, for all
of the reasons explained above. His detention, therefore, must necessarily fall under Section
1226(a), which “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country
pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added).14
B. Procedural Due Process
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. When evaluating a procedural
due process claim, there are “two elements: (1) the existence of a property or liberty interest that
was deprived and (2) deprivation of that interest without due process.” Radwan v. Manuel, 55
F.4th 101, 123 (2d Cir. 2022); see also Nnebe v. Daus, 931 F.3d 66, 80 (2d Cir. 2019).
i. 	ICE’s Detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo Infringes on his Protected
Liberty Interest
Mr. Hernández Lazo argues that ICE’s detention of him infringes on his protected interest
in liberty, triggering a right to procedural due process. Respondents rely on the Supreme Court’s
14 Respondents do not contend that Mr. Hernández Lazo is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1) (“Section 1225(b)(1)”) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (“Section 1226(c)”). (Hr’g Tr. 27:16–
28:4, 30:6–9.)
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decision in Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), and other cases to
argue that because Mr. Hernández Lazo is an applicant for admission to the United States, “‘the
Due Process Clause provides nothing more’ than the procedural protections set forth in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225.” (Resp. at 10 (quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139–40).)
Respondents advanced the same arguments in Rodriguez-Acurio, and this Court has
already carefully considered and addressed them in ruling on the habeas petition in that action.
See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *26–27. In summary, as a preliminary matter, Mr.
Hernández Lazo is not detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2); accordingly, his detention is
governed by Section 1226(a), and he is entitled to the protections afforded by that statute—not
just the procedures afforded under Section 1225(b)(2). Moreover, “[f]reedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at
the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The
Due Process Clause “covers noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 850; see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189
U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (noncitizen who entered the country in violation of the law cannot be
“deprived of [her] liberty” without receiving “due process of law”). In habeas proceedings
concerning executive detention, courts must conduct “the most searching review” to ensure the
legality of detention that “occur[s] without the procedural protections required in courts of law.”
Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 850–51.
Thuraissigiam does not support Respondents’ position that Mr. Hernández Lazo has no
rights to due process beyond what is afforded by Section 1225 because that decision “stands for
the limited principle that those ‘at the threshold of entry’ stand on a different footing for due
process purposes than noncitizens ‘who have established connections in this country.’”
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Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *26 (quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107). Mr.
Hernández Lazo has been living in the United States continuously since around January 1997.
(Pet. ¶ 14; Second Petito Decl. ¶¶ 7, 12; ECF No. 18-1 at 28–29; see also supra note 5.) DHS
granted him TPS in December 1999, and USCIS extended his TPS designation or granted Mr.
Hernández Lazo’s applications to re-register for TPS at least ten times, as recently as February
2024. (Second Petito Decl. ¶¶ 12– 17, 20, 27, 28, 32–35).15 During his nearly thirty-year
residence in the United States, Mr. Hernandez Lazo has developed deep community ties in this
country, where his U.S. citizen daughter resides and where he works as a carpenter. (ECF No.
18-1 at 33–37.) Accordingly, the scope of Mr. Hernández Lazo’s rights to procedural due
process are not analogous to those of Thuraissigiam, who was stopped within 25 yards of the
border. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 11. As addressed in Rodriguez-Acurio, the cases on which
Respondents rely, including Thuraissigiam, are therefore distinguishable. 2025 WL 3314420, at
*26 n.17 (distinguishing cases cited by Respondents in support of proposition that a non-citizen
residing in the interior of the United States has no right to due process beyond the procedures
required by Section 1225).
Respondents contend that the entry fiction applies to “aliens with sympathetic claims,
including those . . . [with] significant ties to this country.” (Resp. at 10.) They miss the point.
15 Respondents do not argue that Mr. Hernández Lazo’s brief trips abroad are material to the
analysis here. But even if they did, because USCIS extended Mr. Hernández Lazo’s TPS
numerous times and as recently as February 26, 2024, the agency necessarily treated him as
someone who had remained “continuously physically present in the United States” the entire
time he had TPS notwithstanding his brief trips abroad, which were made with advance
permission. See 8 C.F.R. § 244.15 (providing that “[a]fter the grant of Temporary Protected
Status, the alien must remain continuously physically present in the United States” and that
failure to obtain advance parole prior to a TPS recipient’s departure from the United States may
result in withdrawal of TPS).
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The issue here is not whether Mr. Hernández Lazo has a “sympathetic” claim. Rather,
Respondents rely on Thuraissigiam for the notion that Mr. Hernández Lazo has no right to due
process beyond that which is provided under the terms of Section 1225(b)(2). That argument
does not hold water both because Mr. Hernández Lazo’s detention is governed by Section
1226(a) and because the cases on which Respondents rely, including Thuraissigiam, are
distinguishable for the reasons explained in Rodriguez-Acurio and here.
Accordingly, Mr. Hernández Lazo has a liberty interest in being free from detention that
is afforded procedural due process protection. ICE’s detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo, which
commenced on December 1, 2025, and did not end until ICE released him in response to this
Court’s December 12, 2025 oral order granting the Petition, necessarily infringed on that liberty
interest.
ii. 	Respondents Did Not Provide Mr. Hernández Lazo Adequate Notice and
an Opportunity to be Heard.
Courts apply the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test “when determining the adequacy of
process in the context of civil immigration confinement.” Munoz Materano v. Artera, __ F.
Supp. __, No. 25-cv-6137, 2025 WL 2630826, at *12 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 12, 2025). Under that
test, a court’s determination of what procedures are required under the Fifth Amendment
involves considering: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (3) the
government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedures would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Applying
this balancing test, Respondents’ detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo from December 1, 2025 until
December 12, 2025, when ICE released him pursuant to this Court’s order, violated his Fifth
Amendment rights to procedural due process.
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1. 	Private Interest
With respect to the first factor, Mr. Hernández Lazo invokes “the most significant liberty
interest there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851.
On December 1, 2025, ICE officers detained Mr. Hernández Lazo without any notice,
explanation, or an opportunity to be heard, and held him in the Central Islip Hold Room and
other detention facilities in New York and New Jersey, separating him from his daughter and
preventing him from working as a carpenter. Before ICE suddenly arrested him in 2025, Mr.
Hernández Lazo was being considered for permanent residence and adjustment of status. He had
also consistently complied with the requirement of TPS to apply for approval before departing
the United States for any trips abroad. (See ECF No. 18-1 at 52; Second Petito Decl. ¶¶ 21–31.)
While detained in the Central Islip Hold Room for around twenty-three hours, Mr.
Hernández Lazo was not only deprived of his freedom, he was confined in a small, crowded
room, no more than six feet by six feet,16 shared with around five others who slept and ate next
to an open toilet, used the toilet without privacy, and lacked access to proper bedding, showers,
soap, toothpaste, a toothbrush, and a clean change of clothing. ICE did not permit him to speak
or meet with his lawyer despite his pending habeas petition and immigration court proceedings.
Moreover, although both of Mr. Hernández Lazo’s periods of detention in the Central Islip Hold
Room included nighttime hours, the lights in the room remained on at all times, impeding sleep.
16 Mr. Hernández Lazo testified that the room in which he was detained in the Central Islip Hold
Room was six feet by six feet, while Mr. Minarcaja Concha described being detained in a room
that was four feet by four feet. (Hr’g Tr. 7:22–8:1; Minarcaja Concha, 2026 WL 215417, at *5.)
The discrepancy may be explained by Mr. Minarcaja Concha’s testimony that there are around
four different rooms, or the fact that Mr. Hernández Lazo was detained with five other people,
whereas Mr. Minarcaja Concha was detained with six or seven others. (Hr’g Tr. 8:6–13;
Minarcaja Concha, 2026 WL 215417, at *5.)
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As Judge Brown observed, the conditions in the Central Islip Hold Room violate ICE’s
own minimum standards for such facilities, which were established “to ensure the safe and
humane treatment of detainees.” Clarke, 2025 WL 3674471, at *7. For example, the rooms used
to hold Mr. Hernández Lazo, Mr. Minarcaja Concha, and Mr. Clarke were each designed to hold
a single detainee for several hours at a time. Id. at *3, *7. Yet, these rooms are being used to
detain anywhere from six to nine detainees for extended periods of time, including periods
lasting twenty-four hours or more. (Id.; Hr’g Tr. 8:6–10; Minarcaja Concha, 2026 WL 215417,
at *5.) Thus, as Judge Brown observed, “ICE has been deploying its ‘holding rooms’ in a manner
that shocks the conscience . . . it appears that the conditions maintained at the Central Islip hold
room, given the recklessly expanded use of these facilities by ICE, may well violate
constitutional requisites.” 2025 WL 3674471, at *6.17
The fact that Mr. Hernández Lazo was detained in such conditions for even part of his
detention by ICE underscores why freedom from detention is a precious liberty afforded
protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution.
Accordingly, ICE’s detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo from December 1, 2025 through December
12, 2025—the date of this Court’s order requiring his release—infringed on his weighty private
interest in personal liberty.
2. 	Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
There is a high risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used to detain Mr.
17 Moreover, ICE’s decision to house detainees overnight in the Central Islip facility appears to
contravene “the Suffolk County Bargain and Sale Deed conveying the land on which the
Courthouse in Central Islip [ ] sits to the federal government,” which provides that “[t]he Federal
Courthouse and Federal Building shall not be designed or altered for the overnight housing
and/or custody of prisoners or detainees.” (See Elec. Order, Dec. 8, 2025 (citing USA v.
Deonarain, 2:25-cr-00210 (E.D.N.Y.), ECF Nos. 29 and 21-1) (emphasis added).)
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Hernández Lazo. Respondents did not provide him with any notice or any opportunity to be
heard before a DHS officer or immigration judge before ICE detained him on December 1, 2025.
For the same reasons set forth fully in Rodriguez-Acurio, there is a high risk of erroneous
deprivation of liberty in detaining Mr. Hernández Lazo without any notice or opportunity to be
heard. See 2025 WL 3314420, at *29–30. There is little cost and significant benefit from
providing the procedural safeguard of requiring that any detention be preceded by an
individualized determination by a DHS officer as to whether Mr. Hernández Lazo poses a flight
or safety risk. See id.; Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 495; Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 24-cv-
4304, 2025 WL 2829511, at *13–14 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (finding an “extremely high” risk
of erroneous deprivation where a person is detained under Section 1226(a) without any pre-
deprivation notice or an opportunity to be heard).
3. 	The Government’s Interest in Detaining Mr. Hernández Lazo
Without a Hearing
Here, Respondents have not addressed any of the Matthews v. Eldridge factors, much less
any government interests advanced by ICE’s detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo without notice or
an opportunity to be heard.
Although the Attorney General may have a legitimate government interest in ensuring the
appearance of noncitizens at immigration proceedings and preventing danger to the community,
there is absolutely nothing in the record showing that Mr. Hernández Lazo is a flight risk or a
danger to the community or that anything has changed since his TPS was last renewed on
February 26, 2024, aside from termination of that status on account of Noem’s termination of
TPS for all Honduran nationals. USCIS’s decision to renew Mr. Hernández Lazo’s TPS,
therefore, necessarily involved the determination that he posed no flight or public safety risk. See
8 C.F.R. § 244.4(a) (rendering persons convicted of any felony or two or more misdemeanors
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ineligible for TPS); 8 C.F.R. § 244.15(b) (providing that failure to obtain advance parole prior to
a TPS recipient’s departure from the United States may result in withdrawal of TPS); see
also Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 854 (holding that “the Attorney General’s discretion to detain
individuals under [Section 1226(a)] is valid where it advances a legitimate governmental
purpose,” such as “ensuring that noncitizen[s] do not abscond and . . . ensuring they do not
commit crimes”); Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 496. Respondents therefore fail to
demonstrate that ICE’s detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo without any notice or opportunity to be
heard advances any legitimate government interests.
* * *
Weighing all of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors—the significant liberty interest at stake,
the high risk of erroneous deprivation, and Respondents’ failure to demonstrate that Mr.
Hernández Lazo’s detention was required to advance any legitimate government interest in
preventing danger to the community or ensuring appearance at removal proceedings—
Respondents’ detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo with no notice or opportunity to be heard and no
showing of changed material circumstances following the most recent renewal of his
TPS, violates his Fifth Amendment rights to procedural due process. See, e.g., Rodriguez-
Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *25–31; Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 496; Huamani Tumba
v. Francis, No. 25-cv-6065, 2025 WL 3079014, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025).
Because the Court finds that Respondents’ detention of Mr. Hernández Lazo violates his
rights to procedural due process, it declines to reach his Fifth Amendment substantive due
process claim.
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III. 	Remedy
As addressed at length in Rodriguez-Acurio, upon finding a constitutional violation, a
district court “may” grant a writ of habeas corpus and “dispose of the matter as law and
justice require.” 28 U.S.C §§ 2241(a), 2243. Release from detention is the “typical remedy” for
“unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008).
Here, Mr. Hernández Lazo seeks a writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents to
immediately release him. (Pet. at 24.) He also seeks, in the alternative, “injunctive relief ordering
Respondents to immediately release Petitioner” and any “such further relief as the Court deems
just and proper.” (Id. at 24–25.)
In Rodriguez-Acurio, this Court provides the legal basis for ordering release from ICE
detention as well as limited injunctive relief enjoining Respondents from invoking Section
1225(b) as the basis for subjecting a non-citizen habeas petitioner to mandatory detention, absent
a change in relevant circumstances. See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *31–32. Those
same reasons support the grant of similar injunctive relief in addition to release in this action. A
bond determination by a DHS officer or an immigration judge would not remedy the core
constitutional violation at issue here. Mr. Hernández Lazo’s detention was unlawful from
its inception because ICE detained him under the wrong statute and without any notice or
opportunity to be heard, much less the procedures required under Section 1226(a). Accordingly,
“dispos[ing] of the matter as law and justice require,” 28 U.S.C. § 2243, necessitates both release
and narrow injunctive relief guarding against re-detention in violation of this Court’s
determination that Mr. Hernández Lazo is not subject to mandatory detention under Section
1225(b). Martinez v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“As Petitioner’s
arrest and detention were blatantly unlawful from the start, the only commensurate and
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appropriate equitable remedy to even partially restore Plaintiff is to immediately release him and
enjoin the Government from further similar transgressions” against him).18
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above and in Rodriguez-Acurio, the habeas petition is granted
as to its request for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243 seeking Mr.
Hernández Lazo’s immediate release from detention. Pending the issuance of any final removal
order against Mr. Hernández Lazo, Respondents are enjoined from denying him bond in any
subsequent proceeding on the basis that he must be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b),
absent a change in relevant circumstances consistent with this Opinion and Order.
Because Mr. Hernández Lazo withdrew his civil action claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief, those claims are dismissed without prejudice. (ECF No. 21.) The schedule for
briefing Defendants’ motion to dismiss the civil action claims is therefore terminated. (See Elec.
Order, Dec. 12, 2026.) This action remains held in abeyance.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
February 4, 2026
/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY
United States District Judge
18 As in Rodriguez-Acurio, this limited grant of injunctive relief to guard against re-detention by
ICE without a bond hearing on the basis of Section 1225(b)(2) absent a change in relevant
circumstances is necessary to ensure that the release of Mr. Hernandez Lazo is not rendered
meaningless. Accordingly, this narrow injunctive relief falls within the “core of habeas.”
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 119.
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