Moore v. The Secretary Department of Veterans Affairs et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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VERMILYEA MOORE,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
25-CV-05355 (FB) (JMW)
-against-
THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, VENDOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, INC.,
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, BSI FINANCIAL
SERVICES, LLC, ITS SUCCESSORS AND/ OR
ASSIGNS,
Defendants.
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A P P E A R A N C E S:
Ronald David Weiss
Rosemarie Klie
Ronald D. Weiss, Esq.
445 Broadhollow Road, Suite CL-10
Melville, NY 11747
Attorneys for Plaintiff
John J. Kuster
Sidley Austin, LLP
787 Seventh Avenue
New York, NY 10019
Attorney for Defendant Vendor Resource Management, Inc.
Leland S. Solon
Lisa A. Azzato
County of Suffolk Law Department
100 Veterans Memorial Highway, Ste 5th Floor
Hauppauge, NY 11788
Attorneys for Defendant County of Suffolk
Richard D. Femano
Stern & Eisenberg, P.C.
20 Commerce Drive, Suite 230
Cranford, NJ 07016
Attorney for Defendant BSI Financial Services, LLC
11/20/2025
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
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WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Vermilyea Moore (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on September 24, 2025
against Defendants the Secretary of Veteran Affairs (“VA”), Vendor Resource Management, Inc.
(“Vendor Resource”), County of Suffolk (“Suffolk County”), and BSI Financial Services (“BSI”
and collectively, the “Defendants”) for declaratory judgment, namely, to declare Plaintiff as the
lawful owner of the premises known as 27 Brook Avenue, Wyandanch, NY 11798 (the
“Property”), and for damages incurred from the failure to record the deed that allegedly
transferred title to Plaintiff. (See generally, ECF No. 1.)
As alleged, Plaintiff purchased the Property from the VA in 1997 for $65,000.00 and
financed the purchase through a mortgage with BSI for $55,000. (ECF Nos. 1 at ¶ 7; 14 at 5.)
This mortgage was fully paid on July 16, 2019. (ECF No. 1-3.) However, Plaintiff learned that
the deed was never recorded upon the purchase of the Property. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff
received a special warranty deed dated August 29, 2019, from Vendor Resource. (ECF No. 1-4.)
Yet, due to lack of transfer tax forms, Plaintiff was not able to record this deed. (ECF No. 1 at ¶
11.) Prior to that, Suffolk County allegedly received title to portions of the Property (Lots
003.000, 004.000, and 006.000) by a deed that was dated October 26, 2018, due to Plaintiff not
paying certain property taxes of which Plaintiff was unaware of.1 (Id. at ¶¶ 15-19; ECF No. 14 at
57.) Thereafter, Suffolk County commenced eviction proceedings on those Lots. (ECF No. 1 at ¶
20.)
Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Emergency Order to stay the eviction originally
scheduled for November 20, 2025, and Defendants’ ability to transfer title. (ECF No. 14.)
1 The Court has not been provided with this deed.
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Suffolk County opposed the relief requested.2 (ECF Nos. 16, 20.) On November 19, 2025, the
Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), that all proceedings and actions by
Suffolk County were stayed pending a hearing and determination of the instant motion (ECF No.
17) and held a hearing on November 20, 2025. For the reasons that follow and those that were
stated on the record, Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay the Eviction (ECF No. 14) is DENIED.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK & DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks a stay of the eviction proceedings, originally scheduled for November 20,
2025, and Defendants ability to transfer title of the Property. (ECF No. 14 at 4.) Plaintiff
received the 14-day eviction notice from the Suffolk County Sherriff dated November 5, 2025.
(See id. at 16.) Suffolk County opposes citing to “an identical motion” that Plaintiff filed in the
Second Department in which the Appellate Division removed any restraining order language and
dismissed an appeal for failure to perfect. (See ECF Nos. 16 at 1, 16-1, 20-5.) Suffolk County
also cites to two principles that bar this Court’s ability to grant the relief requested here—the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Anti-Injunction Act. (ECF No. 16 at 1.) Moreover, Suffolk
County contends that the only portion of the Property that Plaintiff resides in is Lot 005.000,
which is not subject to the eviction.3 (Id. at 1-2.) Interestingly enough, Plaintiff has already
attempted to vacate the eviction proceedings in Suffolk County District Court, which the Hon.
James. F. Matthews denied on January 8, 2024 (see ECF No. 20-4), and the dismissal of her
similar state court action for failure to prosecute is now under appeal pending before the
Appellate Division, Second Department. (See ECF Nos. 20-3, 20-5.)
2 Apart from Suffolk County, no other Defendants have appeared for the instant motion. However,
Vendor Resource and BSI appeared for the November 20 Hearing and took no position.
3 Defendants argue and provide geographic map photos to illustrate that Lots 003.000 and 004.000 are
vacant, and Lot 006.000 includes a pool and a portion of the driveway. (ECF Nos. 16 at 1-2; 16-3-6.)
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“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. “Courts in this Circuit
have long held that the Anti-Injunction Act [28 U.S.C. § 2283] applies to state-court evictions
proceedings.” Gomez v. Yisroel, No. 21-CV-2172 (PAC), 2021 WL 2138462, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 26, 2021) (quoting Ochei v. Lapes, No. 19-CV-3700 (CM), 2020 WL 528705, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2020) (citing Watkins v. Cesar, 88 F. App'x 458, 459 (2d Cir. 2004)
(affirming district court’s decision to deny enjoining eviction proceedings).
Indeed, many cases have denied a party’s request for an injunction or TRO in connection
with state eviction hearings. See e.g., Keir v. Schoeberl, No. 25-CV-056 (ECC) (MJK), 2025 WL
437953, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2025), reconsideration denied, No. 25-CV-056 (ECC) (MJK),
2025 WL 520764 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025) (discussing the prohibition against granting
injunctions to stay state eviction proceedings and denying plaintiff's request for such relief);
Quinn v. Ross, No. 25-CV-0645-MAV, 2025 WL 2020142, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 19, 2025)
(denying Plaintiff’s TRO request as it was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act); Manning v. City of
New York, No. 24-CV-4747 (LGS), 2024 WL 3377997, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2024) (same).
Moreover, there are narrow exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. State proceedings
“‘should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts,
with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and ultimately’ the United States
Supreme Court.” Id. (quoting Szymonik v. Connecticut, 807 F. App'x 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2020)). So,
any “doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be
resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed.” Charisma Mosley v. Selip &
Stylianou, LLP, No. 25-CV-02919 (NCM) (CLP), 2025 WL 2614972, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,
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2025) (citing Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 306 (2011). The Hon. Judge Natasha C. Merle
explained that the limited exceptions are,
The first exception to the Anti-Injunction Act allows a federal court to stay a state
court proceeding where expressly authorized by Congress and applies where an Act
of Congress clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court
of equity could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court
proceeding. …The second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which allows a
federal court to stay a state court proceeding where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, is generally reserved for state court actions in rem4, because the state
court's exercise of jurisdiction necessarily impairs, and may defeat, the federal
court's jurisdiction over the res. … Lastly, the third exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act, which is called the relitigation exception, permits a federal court to enjoin a
state court proceeding to protect or effectuate [the federal court's] judgments. This
exception allows a federal court to enjoin state litigation of a claim or issue that was
previously presented to and decided by the federal court.
Id. at *2-3 (citations and quotations omitted) (cleaned up).
Here, none of the exceptions apply. First, the Complaint does not contain any claims that
would expressly authorize a stay of the state proceedings. (See ECF No. 1.) Nor does Plaintiff
identify any in the instant motion. Second, the Suffolk County District Court action is against
Plaintiff. (See generally, ECF No. 16-2.) There, the case deals with the eviction process. (Id.)
Third, there are no claims or issues that were previously decided by this Court in connection with
the state court action, that would be harmed if the state proceedings continue.
Therefore, a stay of proceedings or issuance of a preliminary injunction is barred
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2283.5 See e.g., Tupper v. New York, No. 24-CV-2582 (GRB)(SIL),
2024 WL 5399241, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2024) (denying stay of foreclosure proceedings as
4 Judge Merle also clarified that in rem “is an action ‘[i]nvolving or determining the status of a thing’” …
whereas “‘in personam’ [refers to] an action ‘brought against a person rather than property.’” Id.
5 It is unnecessary for the Court to address whether Plaintiff has met the burden for a preliminary
injunction since the Anti-Injunction Act precludes such relief under the circumstances presented here. See
Tupper, 2024 WL 5399241, at *3 (discussing the Anti-Injunction Act preclusion and not entertaining the
merits of the relief sought).
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no exception to the Anti-Injunction Act was identified); Isaac v. Schiff, No. 21-CV-11078
(PMH), 2022 WL 3290679, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2022) (same); Manning, 2024 WL
3377997, at *2 (“TRO Application is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act because it seeks to enjoin
a state court proceeding”); Charisma Mosley, 2025 WL 2614972, at *2 (“Here, plaintiff's motion
for a preliminary injunction does not identify any exception to the Anti-Injunction Act that
would permit this Court to issue an injunction interfering in the state court debt collection
proceeding”); Powell v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 25-CV-02178 (GRB) (JMW), 2025 WL
2714236, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2025) (same).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Stay the Eviction (ECF No.
14) is DENIED and the TRO issued on November 19, 2025, is hereby vacated.
Dated: Central Islip, New York.
November 20, 2025
S O 	O R D E R E D:
/S/ James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge
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