Cannon v. City of New York et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JOSEPH SHEROD CANNNON,
Plaintiff,
-against-
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-2547 (EK)(SIL)
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Joseph Sherod Cannon brings this action
against the City of New York, numerous City, State, and federal
agencies, and certain individuals. 	Proceeding pro se, he
alleges constitutional claims arising from his housing eviction,
his time in Nassau County detention, and certain trademark
applications. 	His request to proceed in forma pauperis under
28 U.S.C. § 1915 is granted. 	For the reasons set forth below,
the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
Background
Plaintiff’s complaint and attached exhibits total 776
pages and complain broadly of various civil rights violations.
See Compl., ECF No. 1. 	Plaintiff’s core claims, and the bases
underlying them, remain largely unclear. 	Cannon was “approved
for [social] Housing through the NYS Office of Mental Health,”
which led to him living at the Charles Evans Center. 	Id. at 5.
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Without providing factual detail, he claims he was harassed
there. 	Id. 	Inexplicably, in August 2024, he was detained for
fifty-five days in Nassau County Jail, despite being told he
would be released the next day. 	Id. at 8. 	In April 2025, he
claims he was locked out of his apartment and thereafter
received an eviction notice. 	Id. at 10; ECF No. 1-23, at 31.
The County did not provide him with housing. 	Compl. 12. 	Cannon
separately contends that he filed two trademark applications For
“Joseph Cannon, Inc.” and “Space Gear Royal” but, since paying
the filing fee at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, “ha[s]
been receiving mail and threats.” 	Id.
He asserts violations of his First, Fourth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 	Id. at 13. 	He
requests $56 billion in relief and an injunction that would
allow him to move to single-occupancy housing. 	Id. at 14.
Standard of Review
A district court will dismiss an in forma pauperis
action when the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 	At this stage, “the
court’s task is to assess the legal feasibility of the
1 This refers to the ECF pagination, as there are multiple documents
within this single exhibit that have separate sets of internal pagination.
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complaint.” 	Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir.
2020).2 	In doing so, the court “must take the facts alleged in
the complaint as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in [the
plaintiff’s] favor.” 	In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503
F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2007). 	Pro se complaints are “held to less
stringent standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys, and
the court will read a pro se complaint liberally and interpret
it as raising the strongest claims it suggests. 	Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed
Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).
Still, a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from
“compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive
law.” 	Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). 	Thus,
to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead
sufficient “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). 	“A claim is plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011). 	Courts
“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
2 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
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of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Discussion
Cannon’s complaint does not comply with Section 1915.
Liberally construed, Cannon’s invocation of his constitutional
rights may suggest one or more claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Still, the complaint falls short of alleging a Section 1983
violation. 	Cannon cites numerous constitutional provisions but
insufficient factual content to make any of these claims
plausible. 	See Baradji v. Delta Airlines, No. 23-CV-2125, 2923
WL 8283719, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2023) (dismissing without
prejudice where plaintiff “d[id] not allege adequate factual
content to render plausible” his claim). 	Moreover, he fails to
plead basic elements of a Section 1983 claim. 	See Pimentel v.
Port Auth. of NY & NJ, Nos. 23-CV-6560 & 23-CV-6603, 2024 WL
3637803, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2024) (dismissing without
prejudice for failure to plead the basic elements of a Section
1983 claim).
State Action. 	To bring a Section 1983 case, a
plaintiff must allege that “a person acting under color of state
law” has violated a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). 	Section 1983
does not generally apply to claims against private individuals
or private organizations. 	Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,
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526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999). 	Cannon brings claims against several
private individuals without claiming or illustrating that they
are acting under color of state law.
Monell Claim. 	The City may be liable under Section
1983, but only if Cannon shows that a municipal policy or custom
caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights. 	See Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). 	He cites
no such policy or custom.
Leave to Amend
Given his pro se status, Plaintiff is granted thirty
days from the date of this order to amend his complaint. 	Any
amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the
prior complaint. Therefore, the amended complaint must include
all claims and factual allegations against all defendants, must
be captioned an “Amended Complaint,” and should bear the same
docket number as this Memorandum and Order. 	Plaintiff should
state his claims in numbered paragraphs, each limited as much as
possible to a single set of circumstances. 	If Plaintiff submits
exhibits, the complaint should clearly reference the exhibit and
explain its relevance. 	However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Plaintiff’s prior submission far exceeds that length.
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If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within
the time allowed or cure the deficiencies identified in this
order, the case will be dismissed with prejudice, and judgment
shall enter.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s complaint
is dismissed without prejudice. 	The Court certifies pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in
good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for
the purpose of any appeal. 	Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 444-45 (1962). 	The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed
to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and to note the
mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	December 19, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
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