Chevannes v. ProHEALTH Care Associates LLP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Kristine Chevannes,
Plaintiff,
-v-
ProHEALTH Care Associates LLP,
Defendant.
2:22-cv-2475
(NJC) (AYS)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s February 13,
2026, Memorandum and Order. (Mot. Recons., ECF No. 52; Mem. Supp. Mot. Recons.
(“Recons. Mem.”), ECF No. 52-1.) Defendant makes three arguments: (1) the Court erred in
denying summary judgment on claims under the New York Labor Law, which Plaintiff
purportedly abandoned by not opposing summary judgment on these claims in her opposition
brief, (2) the Court improperly denied summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, and
(3) the Court should clarify its findings related to claims that this Court denied without prejudice,
particularly the New York state law claims. (Recons. Mem.)
The Motion for Reconsideration was filed on February 27, 2026––14 days after this
Court’s ruling denying Defendant summary judgment on the retaliation claims based on
Plaintiff’s complaint to ProHEALTH Human Resources Generalist Haley Breen. Therefore, the
Motion for Reconsideration is timely. See Local Rule 6.3.
However, having carefully reviewed Defendant’s Motion, it is denied in its entirety for
the following reasons.
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LEGAL STANDARDS
“A motion for reconsideration should be granted only when the defendant identifies an
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a
clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL
Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013). In other words, “reconsideration will generally
be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked . . . that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.”
Commerzbank AG v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 100 F.4th 362, 377 (2d Cir. 2024).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Defendant’s Violation of this Court’s Order
Defendant has violated this Court’s Order requiring the parties to participate, in good
faith, in an in-person settlement conference before the assigned magistrate judge before
resolution of a motion for summary judgment. (See Min. Entry, Sept. 23, 2025; Individual Rule
5.1.1.) On September 23, 2025, after closely reviewing the parties’ submissions and hearing oral
argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court provided guidance to the parties on
the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments in support of and in opposition to the motion
and referred them to a settlement conference before the assigned magistrate judge in light of its
“broad authority to compel participation in mandatory settlement conference.” United States v.
U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Mariana Islands, 694 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Bulkmatic
Transp. Co. v. Pappas, No. 99-cv-12070, 2002 WL 975625, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002) (“[I]t
is well established that a court can require parties to appear for a settlement conference, and
impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 16(f) if a party fails to do so.” (collecting cases)).
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However, rather than comply with this Court’s Order, Defendant demonstrated disrespect
for the assigned magistrate judge, Plaintiff, and this Court in failing to participate in good faith in
the January 21, 2026 settlement conference. (Elec. Order, Jan. 21, 2026.) Accordingly, in line
with the issues that I raised during oral argument on September 23, 2025, I set forth my analysis
denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim
based on the Breen complaint, denied without prejudice the remainder of the motion, and ordered
parties with settlement authority for both parties to appear before this Court for a conference.
(ECF No. 48.) The parties have filed letters indicating that such persons will appear at the March
4, 2026 conference. (See ECF Nos. 51, 53.) At the conference, this Court will address a schedule
to advance the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of this action, in line with the directives
of Rule 1, Fed. R. Civ. P.
It is of note that since October 2025, this Court has required all parties in civil actions to
participate in good faith in a settlement conference before the assigned magistrate judge prior to
any request for a conference in anticipation of filing a summary judgment motion. See Individual
Rule 5.1.1. Defendant may not renew any portion of the summary judgment motion that was
denied without prejudice without first complying with this Court’s directive to participate in
good faith in an in-person settlement conference before the assigned magistrate judge. See id.
Defendant complains that this Court’s February 13, 2026 Order purportedly failed to
deem certain New York Labor Law claims by Plaintiff abandoned or to explain the status of
Plaintiff’s other New York state law claims. However, Defendant fails to point to any
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a
clear error or prevent manifest injustice in the Court’s ruling denying without prejudice
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on claims other than Plaintiff’s retaliation claims
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based on the Breen complaint (which are addressed separately below). Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil
of Tartikov, 729 F.3d at 104. The Court has not issued a merits ruling on Defendant’s argument
that Plaintiff purportedly abandoned New York Labor Law claims by not by not opposing
summary judgment on these claims in her opposition brief. Nor has the Court ruled on the merits
of Defendant’s request for summary judgment on the federal hostile work environment or failure
to accommodate claims. The Court will provide guidance to the parties at the March 4, 2026
conference concerning a schedule for any renewed motion for summary judgment.
II. 	The Court did not err in Denying Summary Judgment on the Retaliation Claim
The Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of summary judgment on the
retaliation claim stemming from the Breen Complaint fails to show “an intervening change of
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.” Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, 729 F.3d at 104. Defendant argues
that I committed clear error warranting reconsideration (1) in holding that a four-month gap
alone establishes prima facie causation, and (2) in finding that a jury could reasonably conclude
pretext. (Recons. Mem. at 5–6.) Defendant is wrong on both counts.
A. Causation
With respect to causation, Defendant objects to my characterization of Banks v. General
Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242, 277 (2d Cir. 2023). As I explained in the order denying summary
judgment,
The Second Circuit has made clear that “[w]hile [it] has not drawn a bright line defining
the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish
causation . . . we have previously held that a period of several months can demonstrate a
causal connection between the protected activity and the alleged adverse action.”
Mem. & Order at 2–3, ECF No. 48; see also Banks, 81 F.4th at 277 (citing Gorman-Bakos v.
Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001) for the
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proposition that “four months between employment action and protected activity was sufficient
to support an inference of a causal connection”). Defendant argues that “as ProHEALTH
explained in its Reply, Banks involved ‘strong direct evidence’ of retaliatory animus and did not
treat direct temporal proximity as the sole basis for finding causation.” (Recons. Mem. at 5.)
However, the relevant reasoning from Banks did not turn on the retaliatory animus in that case.
To the contrary, the Second Circuit in Banks first set out the rule I relied upon in denying
summary judgment before then going on to explain, “[w]here temporal proximity is not the only
evidence that bears on a causal connection, we have recognized that the lapse in time between
the protected activity and adverse action can be longer.” Banks, 81 F.4th at 277–78. On that
basis, the Second Circuit concluded that the longer six-month gap at issue in Banks was
sufficient to establish causation where there was also direct evidence of a causal relationship. Id.
at 278. Thus, under Banks, 81 F.4th at 277, and Gorman-Bakos, 252 F.3d at 554, my reasoning
that four months between employment action and protected activity was sufficient to raise a
question of fact as to a causal connection was sound.
On reconsideration, Defendant cites two unpublished Second Circuit decisions for the
proposition that a four-month gap, standing alone is not enough to establish causation. (Recons.
Mem. at 5–6 (citing Gehlaut v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 24-1741, 2025 WL 2586770, at *2
(2d Cir. Sept. 8, 2025) (summary order) and Sealy v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 834 F.
App’x 611, 614 (2d Cir. 2020)).) However, Defendant fails to satisfy its burden on
reconsideration to point to “controlling decisions . . . expected to alter the conclusion reached by
the court.” Commerzbank AG, 100 F.4th at 377 (emphasis added). As I explained in the Order
denying summary judgment on the retaliation claim, “Defendant ha[d] not identified any circuit
authority indicating that four months between protected activity and an allegedly retaliatory
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action is too attenuated to support the causation prong of the prima facie case.” (Mem. & Order
at 3.) In fact, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant failed to cite any decisions
whatsoever providing guidance as to how courts had considered causation based on temporal
proximity following Banks. (Def.’s MSJ Mem. at 19–20, ECF No. 38-1; Reply at 6, ECF No.
40.) Moreover, all Gehlaut held is that close temporal proximity “usually means less than three
or four months.” 2025 WL 2586770, at *2 (emphasis added). Here, the four-month temporal
relationship is near the outer limit in Gehlant and is sufficient to raise a material question of fact
as to causation in light of the other record evidence discussed in the portion of the Order that
concludes that the record presents a question of fact as to pretext. (See Mem. & Order at 4.)
Nor does Sealy represent controlling law overlooked by this Court. First, notwithstanding
Defendant’s failure to cite Sealy in its summary judgment submission, this non-precedential
Second Circuit decision pre-dates Banks, a precedential decision, which I considered in denying
summary judgment on the retaliation claim based on the Breen Complaint. (See Mem. & Order
at 2.) Moreover, in Sealy, the Second Circuit concluded that the challenged conduct took place
“at least four months, and as many as eleven months, after any assertedly protected activity,”
relying primarily upon Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85–86 (2d Cir.
1990), where the Second Circuit concluded that a three-month gap was too attenuated. Sealy, 834
F. App’x at 614 (emphasis added). However, in its later decision in Gorman-Bakos, 252 F.3d
545, the Second Circuit surveyed authority on this issue, including Hollander and decisions of
other Circuits, and held that although it “need[ed] not nail down the elusive outer limit” after
which a plaintiff cannot indirectly establish a causal connection by temporal proximity, four
months “is sufficient to support an allegation of a causal connection strong enough to survive a
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summary judgment motion.” Id. at 555. Accordingly, the causation analysis in my Order adhered
to Second Circuit precedent.
Finally, Defendant argues that I did not address the “absence of any evidence that Cintron
or Hartman . . . knew about Plaintiff’s alleged July 2020 complaint” and that “[c]ausation
requires proof that a decisionmaker had direct or circumstantial knowledge of the protected
activity.” (Recons. Mem. at 6 (citing Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 147–48 (2d
Cir. 2010).) However, in Henry, the Second Circuit held that because “[n]either this nor any
other circuit has ever held that, to satisfy the knowledge requirement, anything more is necessary
than general corporate knowledge,” a plaintiff is not required to “show that the particular
individuals who carried out an adverse action knew of the protected activity.” Henry, 616 F.3d at
147–48 (emphasis added). To the extent Henry requires a showing of circumstantial knowledge
on the causation prong, such circumstantial evidence is satisfied by temporal proximity. Id.
(citing Gorman-Bakos, 252 F.3d at 545 for the rule that causation can be established by temporal
proximity).
B. Pretext
With respect to pretext, Defendant makes three arguments: (1) the Order did not “address
the undisputed evidence directly contradicting [Plaintiff’s] self-serving testimony” that she
submitted leave paperwork to FMLASource, (2) the Order “did not address critical undisputed
facts demonstrating that Plaintiff had already stopped communication with ProHELATH and
FMLASource” when Cintron mailed her a letter alerting her of the possibility of termination, and
(3) the Order did not address that Plaintiff had “adduced no evidence that Cintron or Hartman
were aware of [Plaintiff’s] purported complaint to Breen in July 2020” at the pretext prong.
(Recons. Mem. at 7–9.) Defendant is wrong on all three fronts.
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First, although Plaintiff’s testimony may be “self-serving,” it is for the jury to assess the
credibility of her testimony that she applied for leave in light of the absence of corroborating
documentation and the representations made by FMLASource that it had no record of any
communication from Plaintiff for a certain period of time. It is true that “conclusory,
unsupported assertions . . . are insufficient to cast doubt on the otherwise undisputed evidence in
the record,” (Recons. Mem. at 7), but Plaintiff’s testimony that she recalled making a leave
request to FMLASource is not rendered conclusory just because neither she nor FMLASource
possess documentation of the leave request. To the contrary, Plaintiff testified to the sequence of
events surrounding the request. (Pl. Dep. 245:18–19, 246:25–247:3 (Plaintiff testifying that she
“believe[s] [she] called FMLASource via the phone” and “when they suggested the ADA leave,
[she] did go ahead and try to apply for that”; id. 247:5–6 (testifying that “I believe they sent me
paperwork and I filled it out and sent it back”); id. 247:22–248:2 (responding to a question about
whether the paperwork requesting ADA leave exists by testifying, “I believe so, but, again, that
was such a time where I was on medications. I really don’t recollect every detail”).)
Second, Defendant is mistaken that the Order overlooked several communications from
ProHEALTH and FMLASource appearing at paragraphs 136, 140, and 141 of Defendant’s 56.1
Statement. (See Recons. Mem. at 7–8.) Those paragraphs discuss the email requiring that
Plaintiff apply for leave with FMLASource and the November 10, 2020 letter that are addressed
in the portion of the Order explaining the denial of summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
(See Mem. & Order at 4; SUMF ¶¶ 136, 140–41.)
Finally, although there is no direct evidence that Cintron or Hartman were aware of the
Breen Complaint, I explained that the following facts alongside temporal proximity were enough
to satisfy but-for causation when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party:
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although Plaintiff had told Cintron that she had been in and out of the hospital, Cintron
only notified Plaintiff of the deadline to respond to ProHEALTH by: (1) calling Plaintiff
from a blocked number; and (2) mailing Plaintiff a letter that did not arrive until
November 14, 2020—two days before the November 16, 2020 deadline for Plaintiff to
contact Cintron about her leave request.
(Mem. & Order at 4.) Plaintiff may have been discharged from the hospital already, but the
critical fact here is what Cintron knew at the time. Because she had been told that Plaintiff had
been in and out of the hospital, a reasonable jury could conclude, construing all facts in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, that the termination for job abandonment was pretext.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration
(ECF No. 52) is denied.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
March 2, 2026
/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY
United States District Judge
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