Young v. Lugo et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------X
JAMIE E. YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
18-cv-04216 (JS) (JMW)
-against-
MARK LUGO, et al.,
Defendants.
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A P P E A R A N C E S:
Frederick K. Brewington
Albert Darnell Manuel, III
Cobia Malik Powell
Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington
556 Peninsula Boulevard
Hempstead, NY 11550
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Valerie Singleton
NYS Office of the Attorney General
200 Old Country Road, Suite 240
Mineola, New York 11501
Attorney for the State Defendants
WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
Jamie E. Young (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983 and New York State law, against New York State parole officer Defendants Mark Lugo,
Orrison McLean, Alonzo Payton, Joseph Rahal, Ross Botwinick, Catherine Mencarelli (the
“State Defendants”), Suffolk County police officer Defendants Alberto Acevedo, Matthew
Spilotros, and John Does 1-4 (the “County Defendants”), and Dr. Carl Goodman (“Goodman”)
2/6/2026
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
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and Nurse Henry Hernandez (the “Medical Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges violations of the
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution in addition to
various state law causes of action. (See generally ECF No. 158.)
Before the Court on referral from the Honorable Joanna Seybert is the State Defendants’
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 234) on all claims asserted against them in the
Corrected Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 158). For the reasons set forth below, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that the State Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 234) be
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are gleaned from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1(a) Statements and are
uncontested unless otherwise noted.1
A. The State Defendants
1 The facts set forth above are taken from the State Defendants’ 56.1 Statement (ECF No. 237-18) and
corresponding responses from Plaintiff (ECF No. 236-1). Unless otherwise noted, a standalone citation to
a party’s Rule 56.1 statement means that the Court has deemed the underlying factual allegation
undisputed. Any citation to a Rule 56.1 statement incorporates by reference the documents cited in it.
Where relevant, however, the Court may also cite directly to an underlying document. The Court has
deemed true undisputed facts averred in a party’s Rule 56.1 statement to which the opposing party cites
no admissible evidence in rebuttal. See Stewart v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., No. 18-CV-12297 (LJL), 2020
WL 6712267, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2020) (“‘[P]ursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 [the movant’s]
statements are deemed to be admitted where [the non-moving party] has failed to specifically controvert
them with citations to the record.’”) (quoting Knight v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 03-CV-2746 (DAB), 2007
WL 313435, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2007)); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Dinow, No. 06-CV-3881
(TCP), 2012 WL 4498827, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (“Local Rule 56.1 requires . . . that
disputed facts be specifically controverted by admissible evidence. Mere denial of an opposing party’s
statement or denial by general reference to an exhibit or affidavit does not specifically controvert
anything.”). “Additionally, to the extent [a party’s] 56.1 statement ‘improperly interjects arguments and/or
immaterial facts in response to facts asserted by [the opposing party] without specifically controverting
those facts,’ the Court has disregarded [such] statement[s.]” McFarlane v. Harry’s Nurses Registry, No.
17-CV-06350 (PKC) (PK), 2020 WL 1643781, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020).
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Catherine Mencarelli is an Investigator with the Office of Special Investigations for the
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”). (ECF No. 236-1 at ¶ 5.)
She has held this position for six years and has worked for DOCCS for sixteen years. (Id.) Mark
Lugo has been an Investigator with the Office of Special Investigations for DOCCS since 2014.
(Id. at ¶ 6.) Orrison McLean has worked for DOCCS for twenty years and is an Investigator with
the Office of Special Investigations for DOCCS. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Investigator Payton was an
Investigator with the Office for Special Investigations for DOCCS. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Ross Botwinick
has worked for DOCCS for nine years as a Parole Officer. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Joseph Rahal was a Parole
Officer with DOCCS for over nineteen years. (Id. at ¶ 10.) At all times in this action, the State
Defendants were New York State DOCCS Officers and/or Investigators employed by DOCCS
and were acting under color of law and color of their authority as Parole Officers. (Id. at ¶ 11.)
B. Plaintiff’s Arrest
Plaintiff is an individual with a history of cocaine abuse and been to drug rehabilitation in
the past. (See id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff was convicted by trial of Criminal Possession of a Controlled
Substance in the Second Degree, Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third
Degree, and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree and was sentenced on April 1,
1996 to 8 years to life, among other charges. (Id. at ¶ 12.) On September 5, 2014, Plaintiff was
released to parole. (Id. at ¶ 13.) As part of his conditions of release, he consented to search of his
person or property while on parole. (Id.) He was also required to notify his Parole Officer
immediately when he is in contact with or arrested by any law enforcement agency. (Id.) Plaintiff
also agreed that he would not be in the company of or fraternize with any person with a criminal
record. (Id.) Plaintiff was not only prohibited from acting in a manner that threatens his safety
and well-being or that of others, but also from using or possessing any controlled substance. (Id.)
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On December 14, 2017 at or around 3:00PM, Plaintiff and a “parole absconder,” Shati
Roy, pulled into the parking lot of the Radisson Hotel in Holtsville in separate vehicles to engage
in what State Defendants allege was a drug transaction. (See id. at ¶ 15.) Once the vehicle pulled
into the parking lot, parole officers and Suffolk County police officers swarmed the vehicle and
ordered Plaintiff out of the vehicle. (See id. at ¶ 16.) Plaintiff and Roy were identified as being on
parole and placed in handcuffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.) Shati Roy was arrested after being found with
crack cocaine on his person and was found hiding crack cocaine in his body after attempting to
destroy evidence in his vehicle. (See id. at ¶¶ 17-18.)
C. Search of Plaintiff at the Precinct
Plaintiff was arrested for violating the terms of his parole and for fraternizing with a
known felon and parolee absconder, Shati Roy. (Id. at ¶ 19.) After Plaintiff was placed under
arrest, he was placed in Investigator Lugo’s vehicle with Investigator McLean and transported to
Suffolk County’s Fifth Precinct to be searched and processed. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Though the State
Defendants contend that Plaintiff was “acting suspiciously,” “fidgeting in his pants quite
feverishly” with his hands placed down the back of his pants, and was told to take his hands out
of his pants (see ECF No. 237-18 at ¶ 21), Plaintiff denies these actions. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff
was then brought into the precinct to be searched for his own safety and well-being and to ensure
that he did not bring contraband into the correctional facility. (Id. at ¶ 22.) The parties dispute
whether Investigator Lugo had concerns that something was wrong with Plaintiff based on
Plaintiff’s purported actions in the vehicle and that Lugo was concerned for Plaintiff’s safety
especially given the potential presence of drugs inside of Plaintiff which, if they exploded, could
kill Plaintiff. (See id.)
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Plaintiff was taken to a holding or searching cell along with Investigator Lugo and
Suffolk County Detective Acevedo. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff’s handcuffs were also removed and he
was then advised he would be stripped and searched. (See id. at ¶¶ 23-24.) Plaintiff complied
without any issues or concerns. (Id.) During the search, Detective Acevedo instructed Plaintiff to
bend over and squat at which point Investigator Lugo observed what he believed to be something
in Plaintiff’s rectum. (See id. at ¶¶ 25-26.) The parties sharply dispute whether what Lugo
observed was a bag of drugs with three balloon knots protruding from Plaintiff’s rectum. (See
id.) Investigator Lugo asked Plaintiff to remove the object to which Plaintiff cursed at
Investigator Lugo and denied he had anything in his anus. (Id.) At this point, according to the
State Defendants, Plaintiff said “if you want to know what’s in my ass, take me to the hospital,”
a statement Plaintiff denies making. (See id. at ¶ 26.)
Plaintiff was then transported to the Brookhaven Memorial Hospital (“Hospital”) by
Investigator Lugo and Investigator Payton, with Investigator McLean following in a separate
vehicle, for an internal search of Plaintiff to be conducted. (Id. at ¶¶ 27, 29.) During the
transport, Plaintiff was handcuffed, had a waist chain to keep his hands in front of him, and had
shackles on his feet. (Id. at ¶ 28.) The parties dispute whether while enroute to the hospital
Plaintiff was banging his head against the window stating he was “going to give you something
to take me to the hospital for.” (Id.) Once at the Hospital, Plaintiff was allegedly non-compliant
and tightened his body in a fetal position on the floor of the police vehicle to prevent being
removed. (See id. at ¶ 29.) While the State Defendants contend that Plaintiff locked his legs to
prevent being removed, even making contact Investigator Lugo’s hand in the process causing
alleged wrist and thumb injuries, Plaintiff denies kicking of this sort. (Id.) With the assistance of
Investigator Payton and hospital staff, Plaintiff was removed from the police vehicle and placed
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in a wheelchair. (Id. at ¶ 30.) While being transported to the emergency room’s nursing station,
Plaintiff was yelling that he did not want to be treated. (See id.) The parties dispute whether, in
addition to this yelling, Plaintiff was trying to spit on and bite Investigator Lugo. (See id.)
Investigators Lugo, and Payton, members of the Suffolk County Police Department,
nurses and a doctor were present in Plaintiff’s treatment room, Trauma 1, while Investigator
Mencarelli, Officers Botwinick and Rahal remained in the hallway of Trauma 1. (Id. at ¶ 31.) In
fact, Plaintiff did not recall seeing Investigator Mencarelli, Investigator McLean, Investigator
Payton, Officer Botwinick, or Officer Rahal at the precinct or Hospital. (See id. at ¶¶ 39, 40.) At
the Hospital, Plaintiff was treated by Goodman who observed Plaintiff acting extremely agitated
and belligerent, making it difficult for Goodman to speak to, or perform a physical evaluation of,
Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 32, 33.) The parties largely disagree on the circumstances surrounding
Goodman’s care of Plaintiff. (See id. at ¶¶ 33, 34.)
The State Defendants allege that Goodman was told that Plaintiff may have put a foreign
body in his rectum and they observed something protruding from his rectum, Goodman was
concerned about Plaintiff’s capacity to make an informed decision, Goodman decided to sedate
Plaintiff allegedly without seeking input from any of the DOCCS or Suffolk County
investigators, detectives, or officers. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Conversely, Plaintiff avers Goodman did not
consider Plaintiff's statement regarding not having anything in his rectum and made the decision
to force treatment as per law enforcement request. (See id.) Plaintiff was then sedated and
examined by Goodman, specifically given x-rays and a rectal examination. (See id. at ¶ 34.)
There was no foreign body present in Plaintiff’s body. (See id. at ¶ 35.) Consequently, Plaintiff
sustained, inter alia, swollen, red ankles and wrists, and had pain in his rectal area for a couple of
days on and off following the examination. (Id. at ¶ 42.)
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After Plaintiff was sedated, Investigator Lugo left the room to get medical attention for
his hand that Plaintiff kicked, and to file charges for Assault 2nd and Obstruction of
Governmental Administration against Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 36.) At 11:15PM, Plaintiff was formally
arrested for breaking Investigator Lugo’s thumb and charged with Assault 2nd and Obstructing
Governmental Administration 2nd. (Id. at ¶ 37.) As Plaintiff rebuts, the Assault and Obstruction
charges were either dismissed and/or lacked evidence to warrant a guilty plea on both charges.
(See id.) Plaintiff was then transported back to the precinct and then to Yaphank Correctional
Facility. (Id. at ¶ 38.) Plaintiff eventually pled guilty to a parole violation revocation charge and
to promoting prostitution as part of an offered plea deal. (See id. at ¶ 41.)
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
On a summary judgment motion, the movant must demonstrate there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Radwan v. Manuel, 55 F.4th 101, 113 (2d Cir. 2022). A genuine dispute
of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The initial burden
is on the movant to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, which can be
met by pointing to a lack of evidence supporting the nonmovant’s claim. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett¸ 477 U.S. 317, 323, 325 (1986); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2004).
Once the movant meets its initial burden, the burden shifts and the nonmovant may defeat the
motion only by adducing evidence of specific facts that raise a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; Davis v. New York¸ 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).
“The Court is to believe the evidence of the non-movant and draw all justifiable
inferences in her favor, but the non-movant must still do more than merely assert conclusions
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that are unsupported by arguments or facts.” Sosa v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 406 F. Supp.
3d 266, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal citations omitted). The role of the court at the summary
judgment phase is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but only undertake an analysis to identify
whether triable issues of fact exist. See Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 167 (2d Cir. 2021).
That is, the court’s function is “issue-finding,” not “issue-resolution.” Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Cap. Trucking Inc., 523 F. Supp.3d 661, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Gallo v. Prudential
Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d. Cir. 1994)). Au fond, the court’s role is to
decide whether, “after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the
nonmovant, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.” Miller v. N.Y. State
Police, No. 20-3976, 2022 WL 1133010, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 18, 2022) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248 and Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 127, 129 (2d Cir. 2013)).
DISCUSSION
The State Defendants seek summary judgment on “all claims” asserted against them in
the Corrected Second Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 234-1 at p. 2.) In his Corrected Second
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following nine causes of action2 against the State
Defendants: (i) Fourth Amendment violation for an unreasonable search/violation of privacy
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (ii) Fourth Amendment violation for unreasonable
seizure/excessive force pursuant to § 1983; (iii) malicious prosecution pursuant to § 1983; (iv)
abuse of process pursuant to § 1983; (v) fabrication of evidence pursuant to § 1983, (vi) Eighth
Amendment violations for cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to § 1983; (vii) Fourteenth
Amendment violations for substantive due process violations pursuant to § 1983; (viii) assault
2 Plaintiff asserts additional causes of action for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional
distress, negligence, and medical malpractice but solely against Defendants Goodman and Hernandez.
(See ECF No. 158 at pp. 21, 23, 24.)
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and battery; and (ix) false imprisonment. (See generally ECF No. 158.) The Court considers each
asserted cause of action in turn.
A. State Action
To determine whether Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims survive summary judgment, the Court
must first decide whether the State Defendants were functioning as a state actor. A § 1983 claim
“requires the plaintiff to establish two elements: ‘(1) the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law.’” Clay v. County of Suffolk, 404 F. Supp. 3d 737, 753
(E.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District, 801 F.3d 72, 87-88 (2d
Cir. 2015)). There are three tests used by courts to determine whether the conduct of a private
entity may be attributed to the state, satisfying the state action requirement: (1) the compulsion
test; (2) the joint action test; and (3) the public function test. Rene v. Mustafa, No. 16-CV-4072
(JS) (ST), 2024 WL 1332556, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2024) (discussing the three tests).
The compulsion test considers whether the private entity acts pursuant to the “coercive
power” of the state or is “controlled” by the state. Id. The joint action test, sometimes referred to
as the close nexus test, is satisfied when the state provides significant encouragement to the
entity, the entity is a willful participant in joint activity with the state, or the entity's functions are
“entwined” with state policies. McNulty v. New York Racing Association, Inc., No. 03-CV-1368
(JS) (WDW), 2006 WL 8441289, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006). The public function test
considers whether the entity “has been delegated a public function by the [s]tate.” Rene, 2024
WL 1332556, at *21 (quoting Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255,
257 (2d Cir. 2008)).
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Here, the State Defendants are comprised of six parole officers: Parole Officer Mark
Lugo, Parole Officer Orrison McClean, Parole Officer Catherine Mencarelli, Parole Officer
Alonzo Payton, Parole Officer Joseph Rahal, and Parole Officer Ross Botwinick. (See ECF No.
234.) As such, they are state actors for purposes of § 1983 claims. See Murray v. New York City
Dep’t of Corrs., No. 13 CV 7090 (KAM) (LB), 2016 WL 11395007, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18,
2016) (noting that state parole officers are state actors), report and recommendation adopted,
2016 WL 5928672 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016). The parties do not dispute this either. (See ECF
No. 236-1 at ¶ 11 (State Defendants “were acting under color of law and under color of their
authority as Parole Officers”)).
B. Personal Involvement of Each of the State Defendants
“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged
constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Sepulveda v.
City of New York, No. 15-cv-5187 (RRM) (CLP), 2020 WL 2836952, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 29,
2020) (quoting Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). “Personal involvement can be shown by evidence that the defendant
‘participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation’; or that the defendant acted in a
supervisory capacity by creating a policy or custom under which violations occurred, by
negligently supervising subordinates, or by failing to act or remedy wrongs after being aware of
them.” Anderson v. City of New York, 817 F. Supp. 2d 77, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Colon, 58
F.3d at 873). Like here, where an action involves multiple officer defendants, a “defendant
officer may be personally involved either because he directly violated the plaintiff’s rights or
because he failed to intervene to prevent another officer from violating such rights.” Smith v.
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Village of Brockport, No. 19-CV-6404 CJS, 2024 WL 3791240, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2024)
(alteration omitted).
For instance, in Sepulveda where the court granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s §
1983 claim because, inter alia, plaintiff “fail[ed] to present evidence to establish defendants’
personal involvement” in the allegedly violative search at the hospital. 2020 WL 2836952, at *9.
There, though officers drove plaintiff to the hospital after believing drugs were hidden in his
rectum, the officers played “no role” in the search that took place at the hospital nor were the
officers involved in plaintiff’s treatment at the hospital. See id. Accordingly, plaintiff failed to
“plead facts” establishing the officers “participated directly in the alleged constitutional
violation” or “fail[ed] to act or remedy wrongs after being award of them.” Id. (alterations in
original).
Here, unlike in Sepulveda, the record demonstrates that PO Lugo and PO Payton were
personally involved in the allegedly violative conduct. Indeed, Lugo was personally involved not
only at the precinct as the officer performing the cavity search (ECF No. 236-1 at ¶¶ 23-27), but
also during the transport to the Hospital as the driver who subsequently attempted to remove
Plaintiff from the vehicle. (See ECF No. 236-1 at ¶¶ 28-31.) The same holds true for Payton. (See
ECF No. 236-1 at ¶ 30 (Payton and hospital staff removed Plaintiff from the vehicle into the
wheelchair), ¶ 31 (Payton, Lugo, and nurses present before Plaintiff was sedated); see also ECF
No. 236-5, Young Dep. Tr. at p. 105:14-18 (noting Payton was putting shackles and handcuffs on
Plaintiff at the Hospital)).
Sepulveda applies with greater force to officers McLean, Mencarelli, Rahal, and
Botwinick. For example, it is undisputed that McLean was not with Lugo or Plaintiff while on
the way to the Hospital as he followed in a separate vehicle. (ECF No. 236-1 at ¶ 27.) Moreover,
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it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not recall seeing Investigator McLean at the Hospital. (ECF No.
236-1 at ¶ 40.) Indeed, McLean, in his deposition, affirms that he did not go into the hospital,
never went in the vehicle that Plaintiff was in, and was “just for safety following the vehicle that
was taking him to the hospital.” (ECF No. 236-20, McLean Dep. Tr. at p. 28:3-11.) Nothing in
the record demonstrates that McLean was present at the precinct during the initial search or in
the vicinity to intervene.
Similarly, while Plaintiff avers that he was certain Mencarelli was present at the Hospital
because “[a]ccording to her notes, she described what happened to [Plaintiff]” (ECF No. 236-1 at
¶ 39), it is undisputed that Investigator Mencarelli, along with Officers Botwinick and Rahal
were not in the Trauma 1 room with Plaintiff considering they “remained in the hallway of
Trauma 1” while Plaintiff was with Goodman. (See ECF No. 236-1 at ¶ 31.) Nothing is presented
to indicate Rahal or Botwinick played a role either in the search conducted at the precinct or the
search conducted at the Hospital or that an opportunity to intervene presented itself. In fact, it is
undisputed that Plaintiff did not recall seeing McLean, Botwinick, or Rahal at the Hospital or the
precinct. (ECF No. 236-1 at ¶ 40.) Though Plaintiff contends, in his Opposition Memorandum,
that Botwinick and Rahal were called to the Hospital to assist, and that records generated by
Mencarelli “place [Mencarelli, Botwinick, Rahal, and McLean] at the scene,” mere presence at
the scene of a constitutional violation is insufficient to constitute personal involvement. See
Snead v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 3d 386, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“An officer's mere
presence at the scene of [the alleged constitutional violation] generally does not constitute
sufficient personal involvement for § 1983 liability.”) (collecting cases); see also Jordan v.
Wright, No. 3:24-cv-1166 (VAB), 2024 WL 3742767, at *10 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2024) (noting
that “merely being present when a constitutional violation occurs is insufficient to establish
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personal involvement”). Plaintiff’s argument on an alleged “failure to intervene” as sufficing for
personal involvement is equally conclusory and unsupported by the record. (See ECF No. 236 at
pp. 22-23.)
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment on all § 1983
claims Plaintiff asserted against State Defendants McLean, Mencarelli, Rahal, and Botwinick
given the lack of evidence demonstrating their personal involvement or their failure to intervene.
C. Federal Claims
i. 	Fourth Amendment Violations
i. 	Unreasonable Search/Violation of Privacy
Plaintiff’s unreasonable search/violation of privacy centers around the visual body cavity
search performed while at the precinct (see ECF No. 158 at ¶¶ 41-43) but also the allegedly
invasive search at the Hospital (see ECF No. 158 at ¶¶ 46, 49). The Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A search occurs
when the Government acquires information by either ‘physically intruding on persons, houses,
papers, or effects,’ or otherwise invading an area in which the individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.” United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013)). “Fourth Amendment protections extend only to
‘unreasonable government intrusions into . . . legitimate expectations of privacy.’” United States
v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7
(1977)). “As the text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.’” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
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Indeed, the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment is “determined by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.” United States v. Massey, 461 F.3d 177, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). For an
individual's expectation of privacy to be legitimate, he must have “exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy” and the expectation must be “one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’” United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 457 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
Relevant here, “[w]e have held that among ‘[t]he rights diminished by parolee status
[are] Fourth Amendment protections.’” Reyes, 283 F.3d at 458 (quoting Thomas, 729 F.2d at 123
(emphasis added); accord United States v. Grimes, 225 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir.2000) (“[P]arole
justifies some departure from traditional Fourth Amendment standards.”). This is largely because
“[o]ne of the principal purposes of a . . . parole officer’s observation and supervision
responsibilities is to ensure that a convicted person under supervision does not again commit a
crime.” Reyes, 283 F.3d at 458 (recognizing a parole officer’s duty to “investigate whether a
parolee is violating the conditions of his parole”).
Further, in order to conduct a visual body cavity search, “one where the police observe
the suspect’s body cavities without touching them (as by having the suspect to bend over, or
squat and cough, while naked,” police must have “a specific, articulable factual basis supporting
a reasonable suspicion to believe the arrestee secreted evidence inside a body cavity.” Sepulveda,
2020 WL 2836952, at *6 (quoting Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 158 (2013) and
Sloley v. VanBramer, 945 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 2019)). When “an arresting officer has reason to
believe, based on specific and articulable facts, taken together with rational inferences from
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those facts, that an arrestee is secreting contraband inside a body cavity, then the officer is
permitted to conduct a visual body cavity search.” Sloley, 945 F.3d at 158 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
In Sepulveda, the Court granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
unreasonable search claims. There, plaintiff was transferred to a precinct following plaintiff’s
arrest for possession of a gravity knife. 2020 WL 2836952, at *1. Following the arrest, officers
had reason to believe that plaintiff inserted a plastic bag of drugs into his rectum, namely because
the officer noticed plaintiff place something down near his pants, allegations that plaintiff denies.
See id. at *1-2. While at the precinct, officers asked plaintiff if he wanted to remove the plastic
bag from his rectum which plaintiff refused. Id. at *2. The officers proceeded to conduct a visual
body cavity search after which time they decided to take plaintiff to the hospital for his safety. Id.
While at the hospital, plaintiff was given an x-ray which “showed no foreign body” and no drugs
were ever recovered from plaintiff. See id. at *3. Plaintiff contended that the officers were
holding him at the hospital despite telling offices he had nothing to give them. See id.
Consequently, plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim alleging that the police officers “conducted a
visual body cavity search without probable cause, in violation of [his] rights under the Fourth
Amendment” and a § 1983 claim “based on his detention at the hospital alleging he was
subjected to an unlawful search by the hospital at the direction of the officers.” Id. at *4.
In granting summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim based on the search
conducted at the precinct, the court noted that no reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff
“did not insert drugs – or something that appeared to be a plastic bag containing drugs – into his
rectum” because plaintiff presented nothing beyond his own testimony to refute the evidence to
the contrary. Id. at *7-8. As such, the “arresting officers had ‘reason to believe, based on specific
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and articulable facts, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, that [plaintiff was]
secreting contraband inside a body cavity’ and were thus ‘permitted to conduct a visual body
cavity search. Id. at *8 (quoting Sloley, 945 F.3d at 38). Similarly, the court granted summary
judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim for the search conducted at the hospital. See id. at *8-
9. Namely, the court noted that plaintiff failed to present evidence to support the alleged
pretextual motive for transport to the hospital (performing a digital body cavity search) while
also determining defendants were justified by their safety concerns surrounding hidden drugs in
plaintiff’s rectum. Id. at *8.
The conclusion rendered in Sepulveda compels a similar outcome here. Plaintiff was
taken to the precinct after fraternizing with Shati Roy, an individual found with drugs on his
person. (See ECF No. 237-6, Lugo Dep. Tr. at p. 110:13-25 (noting “Mr. Roy being caught with
an amount of crack cocaine that he was hiding on his body”). Moreover, in the ride to the
precinct, Plaintiff was “acting suspiciously,” “fidgeting,” and, like the plaintiff in Sepulveda,
appeared to put his hands near his pants. (See id. at p. 79:13-25, p. 80:8-15 (highlighting that
Plaintiff’s “fidgeting” behavior was “placing his hands down the back of his pants while in the
back of the car”; ECF No. 237-9, McLean Dep. Tr. at p. 22:21-25, p. 23:2-6 (confirming the
same fidgeting behavior)). These circumstances, together, formed the basis for bringing Plaintiff
in the precinct to search him. (See ECF No. 237-7, Lugo Dep. Tr. at p. 241:3-18 (“He was being
searched because of what was found on Shati Roy, the evidence Shati Roy tried to destroy in his
vehicle. Mr. Young’s actions in the vehicle were not normal or somebody being transported with
the way he was moving, so it raised some concerns that something may be wrong with Mr.
Young, that’s why we brought him in to search him.”) Accordingly, like in Sepulveda, the
officers had “reason to believe, based on specific and articulable facts, taken together with
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rational inferences from those facts, that [Plaintiff was] secreting contraband inside a body
cavity,” and were thus “permitted to conduct [the] visual body cavity search.”
Additionally, during the same visual body cavity search as the one conducted in at
Sepulveda, PO Lugo observed what appeared to be a balloon protruding from Plaintiff’s rectum.
(See ECF No. 236-1 at ¶ 26.) The record demonstrates that, at that stage, Lugo decided it was in
Plaintiff’s best interest and for his safety to take him to the Hospital. (See ECF No. 237-6, Lugo
Dep. Tr. at 110:13-25; see also ECF No. 237-7 at p. 192:19-25.) Plaintiff presents no evidence
other than conclusory assertions to refute that he was brought to the Hospital for reasons other
than to provide for his safety and to ensure no harmful foreign objects burst inside of him. (See,
e.g., ECF No. 236-1 at ¶ 22 (counsel for Plaintiff pointing to no support in the record for the
contention that “Parole Officer Lugo did not have concerns that something was wrong with
Plaintiff and was not concerned for Plaintiff’s safety”). Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends granting State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s first cause
of action—his Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search/violation of privacy.
ii. 	Unreasonable Seizure/Excessive Force
Plaintiff, in his cause of action for unreasonable seizure/excessive force, contends that he
“was subjected to excessive and unnecessary force by Defendants Lugo and Payton when they
dragged him out of the patrol vehicle in order to force him to submit to a body cavity
search . . . .” (ECF No. 158 at ¶ 54.) Similarly, while at the Hospital, Plaintiff avers that the State
Defendants “participated in the efforts to forcibly restrain Plaintiff . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 55.)
Under the scope of the Fourth Amendment, a “seizure” occurs where, “in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave.” Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 762 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.
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Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (internal marks omitted). “Claims that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its
‘reasonableness’ standard[.]” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). A use of force
violates the Fourth Amendment if the police officer’s conduct is “objectively unreasonable ‘in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.’” Cruz v. City of New York, 232 F. Supp. 3d 438, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting
Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted)).
Under this test of objective reasonableness, the inquiry weighs the particular facts and
circumstances of the disputed incident to balance the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment interests
against the concerns of law enforcement. Harrison v. Inc. Vill. Freeport, 498 F. Supp. 3d 378,
394 (E.D.N.Y. 2020); Amnesty Am. v. Town W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2004). For a
court to grant summary judgment on Fourth Amendment seizure/excessive force claims, “the
evidence must demonstrate that ‘no rational jury could have found the force used was so
excessive that no reasonable officer would have made the same choice.’” McKinley v. Crevatas,
No. 20 Civ. 3606 (KPF), 2023 WL 4364182, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2023) (quoting Lennon v.
Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Here, genuine issues of fact persist as to the reasonableness of the force exercised upon
Plaintiff’s arrival at the Hospital. Indeed, while Plaintiff denies kicking and flailing his feet, other
documentary evidence exists to counter this point like the grand jury indictment against Plaintiff
for assaulting PO Lugo after Plaintiff kicked his hand. (See ECF No. 238-7.) Further, Plaintiff
testifies that was “placed” in a wheelchair once removed from the vehicle. (See ECF No. 237-5,
Young Dep. Tr. at p. 187:10-13 (noting Lugo and Payton “picked [Plaintiff] up and put [him] in a
wheelchair”), p. 188:3-5) (emphasis added). A juror should therefore be entitled to consider
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whether the force leading up to merely “placing” Plaintiff in the wheelchair was warranted or
excessive. Lastly, not only is it disputed that Lugo and Payton even were participants in the
restraint of Plaintiff at the Hospital (see ECF No. 238-1 at ¶ 42), but there is also a dispute as to
whether the level of force necessary to assist Goodman in sedating Plaintiff was reasonable
under the circumstances. (See ECF No. 237-16, Goodman Dep. Tr. at pp. 147-148). Indeed, one
of the reasons submitted for the force exercised by Lugo was that Plaintiff tried to spit and bite
Lugo ((See ECF No. 237-5 at p. 159:4-9 (stating Lugo had to “control [Plaintiff] from not”
spitting and biting him)), yet Plaintiff denies this conduct entirely.
A reasonable juror, therefore, could find that the force used was excessive in light of
behavior exhibited by Plaintiff. See Esperanza v. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d 288, 304
(E.D.N.Y. July 12, 2018) (concluding summary judgment was not appropriate where the use of
force used could be considered excessive to a reasonable juror in light of the factual
circumstances that plaintiff was not trying to resist or that he was an immediate threat to the
safety of officers); see also Graham v. City of New York, 928 F. Supp. 2d 610, 619 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (denying summary judgment on an excessive force claim where a reasonable jury could
find that forcibly removing plaintiff from his car was excessive under the circumstances).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends denying State Defendants’ motion for summary
judgement on Plaintiff’s second cause of action—his Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable
seizure/excessive force.
ii. 	Qualified Immunity
Should the District Judge agree with the undersigned’s recommendations that the Court
deny summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure/excessive force claim,
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the Court proceeds to analyze whether the doctrine of qualified immunity precludes State
Defendants liability on the unreasonable seizure/excessive force claim under the Fourth
Amendment.
Qualified immunity shields “government officials performing discretionary functions ...
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Kelsey v. County of Schoharie, 567 F.3d 54, 60-61 (2d Cir.
2009); Gonzalez, 728 F.3d at 154. In assessing whether an officer is entitled to qualified
immunity, the Court must consider (1) whether the official violated a statutory or constitutional
right, (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct; and (3)
“even if the right was ‘clearly established,’ whether it was ‘objectively reasonable’ for the officer
to believe the conduct at issue was lawful.’” Gonzalez, 728 F.3d at 154 (quoting Taravella v.
Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2010)); Matusak v. Daminski, 2026 WL 233791,
at *6 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2026) (noting that for qualified immunity to apply, the actions of law
enforcement must be reasonable based on the “particular facts of the case”). “Relevant for
purposes of this action, ‘it is axiomatic that the right that plaintiff asserts—namely plaintiff’s
right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from excessive force—is clearly established.’”
Frederique v. County of Nassau, 168 F. Supp. 3d 455, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Hodge v.
Village of Southampton, 838 F. Supp. 2d 67, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)).
Indeed, the overwhelming majority of courts echo the idea that “where there are
questions of material fact as to the reasonableness of the force used . . . summary judgment on
the ground of qualified immunity is not appropriate.” John, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 246; see
Frederique, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 479 (finding that the questions of material fact that existed as to
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whether the officer’s use of force upon plaintiff was “objectively reasonable,” summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds was denied); Matusak, 2026 WL 233791, at *6, *12
(citing cases where questions of whether the force was excessive substantially overlaps with the
questions underlying the determination of qualified immunity); Smith v. Fields, No. 95 Civ.
8374, 2002 WL 342620, at *6, n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2002) (holding that allegations pertaining to
the reasonableness of force used, specifically that plaintiff was “slapped and kicked about the
face,” were sufficient to defeat a claim of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage).
Here, as demonstrated above, because material questions of fact persist over the reasonableness
of force used, the undersigned recommends finding that summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds inappropriate. Thomas v. Roach, 164 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate when there are facts in dispute that
are material to a determination of reasonableness.”).
iii. 	Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff avers that “Defendants caused Plaintiff to be falsely and maliciously charged”
with Assault in the Second Degree and Obstruction of Government Administration by falsely
claiming that he assaulted Lugo. (ECF No. 158 at ¶ 63.) Similarly, “Defendants also caused
Plaintiff to be charged with parole violations” related to the search of Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 63.)
“In order to prevail on [a malicious prosecution] claim under both Section 1983 and New
York State law, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate: (i) the commencement or continuation of a
criminal proceeding against her; (ii) the termination of the proceeding in her favor; (iii) that there
was no probable cause for the proceeding; and (iv) that the proceeding was instituted with
malice.” Morrison v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-04508, 2019 WL 175121, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
10, 2019) (quoting Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2016) (citations and
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internal quotation marks omitted)); Torres v. Jones, 47 N.E.3d 747, 760 (N.Y. 2016) (“The
elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are: (1) the commencement or continuation of a
criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding
in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding and (4)
actual malice” (citations omitted)).
It follows, therefore, that existence of probable cause behind each criminal charge is a
complete defense to a malicious prosecution claim. See Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150,
166 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Probable cause to prosecute is a complete defense to a claim of malicious
prosecution ... [but] ‘such probable cause must be shown as to each crime charged in the
underlying criminal action.’”) (citation omitted). Probable cause exists when “the arresting
officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that
are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested
has committed or is committing a crime.” Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.
2016) (cleaned up). If probable cause existed at the time of an arrest, it continues to exist at the
time of prosecution unless it is undermined “by the discovery of some intervening fact.” Kinzer
v. Jackson, 316 F.3d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 2003).
Here, Plaintiff already pled guilty to the parole violation. (See ECF No. 236-1 at ¶¶ 37,
41.) In doing so, Plaintiff struck a fatal blow to his malicious prosecution claim. See LaRocco v.
Jackson, No. 10-cv-01651 (NGG) (LB), 2012 WL 947554, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2022)
(noting plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim failed not only because plaintiff failed to show a
lack of probable cause for the commencement of proceedings against him, but also because the
guilty plea entered by plaintiff “preclude[d] a finding of termination of the proceedings in [his]
favor”) (internal marks and citation omitted). With respect to the Assault and Obstruction of
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Government Administration charges, probable cause existed to bring these criminal claims
against Plaintiff. Indeed, Lugo testified he was kicked in the hand while trying to remove
Plaintiff from the police vehicle before bringing him into the Hospital. (See ECF No. 237-6,
Lugo Dep. Tr. at p. 148:2-7.) The same holds true for the Obstruction of Government
Administration considering Plaintiff was curled up in the fetal position on the floor of the police
vehicle to prevent being taken into the Hospital to ensure Plaintiff’s safety was not jeopardized
by the presence of drugs inside his rectum. (See ECF No. 236-1 at ¶ 29.) Plaintiff was also
indicted by a grand jury of Assault in the Second Degree and Obstructing Governmental
Administration in the Second Degree. (See ECF No. 238-5, 238-7 (grand jury indictment)).
Moreover, Plaintiff fails to present any admissible evidence supporting another element
of malicious prosecution—that the State Defendants instituted the proceedings with “actual
malice.” The only support adduced by Plaintiff as to this mental state are conclusory allegations
in the Corrected Second Amended Complaint (see ECF No. 158 at ¶ 64 (alleging the State
Defendants were “motivated solely by their vindictive desire to make Plaintiff suffer for resisting
their unlawful and unreasonable conduct toward him” very well knowing there was no probable
cause to bring the charges against Plaintiff)), Opposition Memorandum of Law (ECF No. 236 at
p. 18 (“Defendants intentionally falsified and misrepresented documents stating that Mr. Young
allegedly committed an assault”), and Plaintiff’s 56.1 statement (see ECF No. 236-1 at ¶ 4
(noting Plaintiff was “maliciously prosecuted, without reason, legal basis or justification” by the
defendants)).
Without more, these barebone assertions are insufficient for Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claim to survive summary judgment. See EZ Pawn Corp. v. City of New York, 390 F.
Supp. 3d 403, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim
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where plaintiff provided no more than conclusory allegations that plaintiff was arrested for
wrongful, improper purposes). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting State
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim.
iv. 	Abuse of Process
Plaintiff’s cause of action for abuse of process asserts that the State Defendants, in
initiating the proceedings against Plaintiff for Assault and Obstruction of Governmental
Administration, “subjected Plaintiff to extensive, unnecessary, and fundamentally baseless
criminal process, including felony grand jury proceedings, supported solely by Defendants’
malicious desire to humiliate Plaintiff for challenging their abuse of him.” (ECF No. 158 at ¶
70.) Plaintiff makes a similar assertion his Opposition: “the record is clear that Defendants Lugo
and Payton improperly used the criminal process to take Mr. Young to the hospital to have an
invasive anal search performed, without authorization, for the collateral purpose to embarrass
and humiliate Mr. Young as a means of retribution.” (See ECF No. 236 at p. 20.)
To survive summary judgment on a § 1983 claim for abuse of process, a defendant must
show he “(1) employs regularly issued legal process to compel performance or forbearance of
some act[,] (2) with intent to do harm without excuse of justification, and (3) in order to obtain a
collateral objective that is outside the legitimate ends of the process.” Hernandez v. United
States, 939 F.3d 191, 203 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 76 (2d
Cir. 2003)); Rivera v. Jahmi, 801 F. Supp. 3d 129, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2025). It is not sufficient to
allege that a defendant had an improper motive in initiating the legal process, but rather a
plaintiff must allege that the legal process was instituted to gain a collateral objective — that a
defendant had “an ulterior purpose or objective” in pursuing a plaintiff's prosecution. Savino, 331
F.3d at 77–78 (“Although [the complaint] does allege that . . . defendants acted with an improper
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motive, [the plaintiff] has not presented any evidence that they had an ulterior purpose or
objective in facilitating his prosecution.”) (emphasis in original).
Here, Plaintiff fails to plead or allege that the State Defendants had any collateral purpose
beyond pursuing Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution. See Savino, 331 F.3d at 76. Indeed, Plaintiff’s
contention that the collateral purpose was to “embarrass and humiliate,” without more, is
insufficient. See Posner v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 4859 (JMF), 2014 WL 185880, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014) (granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s abuse of process claim
where the assertion that “Defendants’ goal was ‘to embarrass and humiliate plaintiff’” was not
supported by any evidence “beyond her speculation, which is insufficient to avoid summary
judgment”). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting State Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim.
v. 	Fabrication of Evidence
To survive summary judgment on a claim based on fabrication of evidence, a plaintiff
must show that “an (1) investigating official (2) fabricates information (3) that is likely to
influence a jury's verdict, (4) forwards that information to prosecutors, and (5) the plaintiff
suffers a deprivation of life, liberty, or property as a result.” Gutierrez v. New York, No. 18-CV-
3621 (MKB), 2021 WL 681238, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) (quoting Ganek v. Leibowitz,
874 F.3d 73, 90 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d 265, 279
(2d Cir. 2016))).
Plaintiff, in his Corrected Second Amended Complaint, contends that the State
Defendants “created false reports in an attempt to retroactively justify the unlawful search of
Plaintiff’s rectal cavity” and “filed false reports claiming that Plaintiff assaulted Defendant
Lugo” all in “an effort to support parole and criminal charges against Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 158 at
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¶ 74.) Notwithstanding these conclusory allegations, Plaintiff fails to pinpoint any information
that was fabricated, how this information would have swayed a verdict or decision, or that any
information was given to prosecutors. Indeed, in his Opposition, Plaintiff merely says that
“[w]hat was charged by the State Defendants was untrue. That is how the records were falsified.”
This is insufficient for a fabrication of evidence claim. See Falls v. (Police Officer) Detective
Michael Pitt, No. 16-CV-8863 (KMK), 2021 WL 1164185, at *51 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021)
(“But as courts have routinely held, a plaintiff may not survive summary judgment through a
conclusory assertion that relevant records were forged or falsified.”) (collecting cases).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting State Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s fabrication of evidence claim.
vi. 	Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.
Const. Amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment also prohibits the “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). “A claim of cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment has two components, one subjective, focusing
on the defendant's motive for his conduct, and the other objective, focusing on the conduct's
effect.” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 298 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Sims v. Artuz,
230 F.3d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1992))); see Harris
v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 63 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that the two elements to an Eighth Amendment
cause of action involve the allegation that the defendant “acted with a subjectively sufficiently
culpable state of mind” and “that the conduct was objectively harmful enough or sufficiently
serious to reach constitutional dimensions”).
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The subjective component of the claim requires a showing that the defendant “had the
necessary level of culpability, shown by actions characterized by ‘wantonness’” in light of the
particular circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct. Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252,
262 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991)). The objective
component of a cruel and unusual punishment claim focuses on the harm done, but the amount of
harm that must be shown depends on the nature of the claim and turns on contemporary
standards of decency. Govan, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 299; DeJesus v. Malloy, 531 F. Supp. 3d 650,
659 (W.D.N.Y. 2021).
As Plaintiff concedes in the Correct Second Amended Complaint, he was not yet
incarcerated at the time of the allegedly unconstitutional behavior, but pleads this Eighth
Amendment cause of action “in case the court determines otherwise given his status as a
parolee.” (ECF No. 158 at ¶ 79.) Indeed, “[a]lthough a parolee, plaintiff had been convicted of
nothing when he was subjected to the deeply perverse and arbitrary indignity of being sedated
and subjected to an involuntary body cavity search. In fact, Plaintiff had not even been arraigned
for his supposed parole violation.” (Id. at ¶ 80.)
Notwithstanding the fact that the purported “cruel and unusual punishment” Plaintiff cites
to does not even involve the conduct of the State Defendants but rather the sedation and body
cavity search that occurred in the Hospital, Plaintiff does not fall within an ambit of those
protected by the Cruel and Unusual punishment clause. See Clark v. City of New York, No. 13-
CV-210 (ENV) (ST), 2016 WL 11469535, at *5 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2016) (granting summary
judgment on plaintiff’s cruel and unusual punishment claim against municipal defendants where
plaintiff was not charged with a crime let alone convicted and punished for one); see also Dunn
v. Schultz, No. 98-cv-693 (LEK/DRH), 2010 WL 3522326, at *1 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2010)
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(“The Eighth Amendment protections apply to those who have been convicted of a crime,
sentenced, and are thus suffering the “punishment” contemplated by the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.”) (citing Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2003)); see Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979) (discussing “punishment” in the context of pretrial detention).
Even so, Plaintiff falls short of identifying, let along establishing, the requisite level of
“wantonness” on the part of the State Defendants to progress this cause of action past the
summary judgment phase. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.
vii. 	Substantive Due Process
“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embodies a substantive
component that protects against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.” Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 692 F.3d 202, 217 (2d Cir.
2012) (quoting Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 460 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). “[W]here a constitutional wrong is alleged and the protection at issue
is governed specifically by a constitutional amendment, ‘that Amendment, not the generalized
notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” See Barkai
v. Mendez, 629 F. Supp. 3d 166, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
395 (1989)). Notably, “[a] plaintiff cannot succeed on a substantive due process claim where the
state action in question is a Fourth Amendment seizure.” Greenaway v. County of Nassau, 97 F.
Supp. 3d 225, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44
(1998)).
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In fact, a line of case law has emerged in this Circuit under circumstances like those
here—where a plaintiff is involuntarily hospitalized by law enforcement and/or medical staff and
consequently brings substantive due process claims and Fourth Amendment claims against those
violating parties. In those cases, the courts have dismissed the substantive due process claims as
duplicative after finding the conduct underlying the substantive due process claims also formed
the basis for an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Greenaway, 97 F.
Supp. 3d at 237 (granting summary judgment on the Nassau Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment considering “the complained-of conduct” forming the substantive due process claim
“occurred in the course of the Nassau police officers’ seizure of [plaintiff]”); Heller v. Bedford
Central School District, 144 F. Supp. 3d 596, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (dismissing the substantive
due process claim premised on plaintiff’s allegations of involuntary confinement by defendants
at the hospital where it was pleaded alongside an unlawful seizure claim under the Fourth
Amendment); Barkai, 629 F. Supp. 3d at 203 (concluding that “substantive due process claims
cannot be brought ‘against law enforcement officers who bring a person into a hospital’ in the
civil confinement context”) (quoting Matthews v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-2311, 2016 WL
5793414, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016)).
Here, the same conduct underlying the substantive due process claim also underlies
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim. (Compare ECF No. 158 at ¶ 89
(Plaintiff alleging that the State Defendants subjected Plaintiff to the invasive rectal exam and
sedative drug being injected into him without good cause or a warrant, all without “the process
he was due before depriving him of his bodily autonomy”), with ECF No. 158 at ¶ 54 (“Plaintiff
was subjected to excessive and unnecessary force by Defendants Lugo and Payton when they
dragged him out of the patrol vehicle in order to force him to submit to a body cavity search,
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without any legal justification, causing Plaintiff significant pain and injury.”). In fact, in
Opposition, Plaintiff squarely characterizes the conduct underlying his substantive due process
claim as a “seizure.” (See ECF No. 236 at p. 13 (“That is exactly what we have here in the
teaming up, and enlistment, of Goodman, Suffolk County Police and State Defendants to
physically force Mr. Young to be doped to sleep, x-rayed and digitally searched in his rectum.
The seizure was accompanied by a pure disregard for any rights to process to which Mr. Young
was unquestionable entitled.”)) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, “in light of the Supreme Court’s prior admonition against creating
substantive due process rights where other Amendments provide relief” and considering the
“complained-of conduct occurred in the course of the [State Defendants] seizure of [Plaintiff],”
the undersigned recommends granting State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim. Matthews, 2016 WL 5793414, at *6; Greenaway, 97 F.
Supp. 3d at 237.
D. The State Law Claims
i. 	Supplemental Jurisdiction
Should the District Judge agree with these recommendations, and conclude that some
federal claims survive, the Court must undertake an analysis to determine whether Plaintiff’s
state law claims should be heard. The Court’s jurisdiction in this action is predicated on federal
question jurisdiction by reason of the § 1983 claims. (See ECF No. 158 at ¶ 5.)3 As such,
Plaintiff’s remaining state law causes of action for assault and battery and false imprisonment
rest upon the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Romero v.
Bestcare, Inc., No. CV 15-7397 (JS) (GRB), 2018 WL 1702001, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018)
3 Diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case, nor do the parties argue or plead the existence of
diversity. (See ECF No. 158 at ¶¶ 7-18.)
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(finding where a claim does not otherwise carry an independent basis for subject matter
jurisdiction, i.e. federal question or diversity, that claim must meet § 1367's criteria for
supplemental jurisdiction.), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1701948 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2018).
Section 1367(a) confers on the Court “supplemental jurisdiction over all [ ] claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a). “For purposes of section 1367(a), claims ‘form part of the same case or controversy’ if
they ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.’” Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest.
Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 245 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures,
Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Here, Plaintiff has met the “common nucleus of operative fact standard set forth in in
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (“The federal claim must have substance
sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. The state and federal claims must
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”) (internal citation omitted). State and federal
claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact when, as a practical matter, they are so
related that the plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding.” Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Loc. 272, 642 F.3d 321, 332 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725). The exercise of jurisdiction is proper over state law claims
when “the facts underlying the federal and state claims substantially overlapped,” or “the federal
claim necessarily brought the facts underlying the state claim before the court.” Lyndonville Sav.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 704 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Plaintiff’s Corrected Second Amended Complaint is premised upon Lugo and Payton’s
offensive contact, extraction of Plaintiff from the police vehicle, and unlawful searching of
Plaintiff’s body—conduct which also forms the basis behind the causes of action for assault and
battery and false imprisonment. (See ECF No. 158 at ¶¶ 3, 93-94, 122, 124-25.) Both the state
law claims in the Corrected Second Amended Complaint and the federal claims involve the same
facts, the same misconduct, and the same or similar parties. Styleline Studios Int’l Ltd. v. Litvack,
No. 24-cv-01192 (OEM) (JMW), 2025 WL 2306738, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2092288 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2025). Moreover, the
“conclusion [here] is further buttressed by considerations of fairness, judicial economy,
convenience and comity. See Itar–Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d
442, 446–48 (2d Cir. 1998). As such, the state law claims in the Corrected Second Amended
Complaint arise from the common nucleus of operative facts as the federal claims.
But that is not all. The “trial court must consider whether any of the four grounds set out
in subsection 1367(c) are present to an extent that would warrant the exercise of discretion to
decline assertion of supplemental jurisdiction.” Jones, 358 F.3d at 214. Under subsection
1367(c), a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive
counterclaim if: “(1) the claim raises novel issues or complex issues of State law; (2) the claim
substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction;
or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.” Here, none of the four exceptions apply, nor do the parties even address why the
Court should refuse to hear the state law claims under one of these grounds. Accordingly, should
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the District Judge agree that some federal claims survive summary judgment, the undersigned
recommends exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
Should the District Judge disagree with the undersigned’s recommendation and find that
no federal claims survive, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims. “The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims once
the claims over which the district court had original jurisdiction have been dismissed ‘is within
the sound discretion of the district court.’” Silverman v. Miranda, 116 F. Supp. 3d 289, 300
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Silverman v. Teamster Loc. 210 Affiliated Health & Ins. Fund,
725 F. App'x 79 (2d Cir. 2018), as amended (June 7, 2018) (quoting Lundy v. Catholic Health
Sys. of Long Island, 711 F.3d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2013)). “Where a court dismisses all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction, it may, in its discretion, decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over remaining claims.” Kneitel v. Silvery, No. 15-CV-6811 (NGG) (SJB), 2018 WL
526486, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it had original jurisdiction....”)). “In the interest of comity, the Second
Circuit instructs that ‘absent exceptional circumstances,’ where federal claims can be disposed of
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment grounds, courts should ‘abstain from exercising
pendent jurisdiction.’” Snyder v. Neurological Surgery Practice of Long Island, PLLC, No. 24-
cv-06911 (JMW), 2025 WL 1434032, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2025) (quoting Walker v. Time
Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1986)). The “trial court must consider whether any of
the four grounds set out in subsection 1367(c) are present to an extent that would warrant the
exercise of discretion to decline assertion of supplemental jurisdiction.” See Jones, 358 F.3d at
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209. One of these grounds includes where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Consistent with the approach adopted by most courts in this Circuit, the undersigned
recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims should the District Judge dismiss
the federal question claims. See, e.g., Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 307-08 (2d
Cir. 2003) (finding that the district court abused its discretion by exercising jurisdiction over a
state-law claim following summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' federal claims); Delaney
v. Bank of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In general, where the federal claims are
dismissed before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well”); Paschalidis v. Airline Rest.
Corp., No. 20-cv-2804 (LDH) (LB), 2024 WL 4607230, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2024)
(“Because the Court has granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
federal claims, it ‘decline[s] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ over Plaintiff's state law
claims [because] ‘it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”’”) (quoting
Kolari v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).
This is particularly appropriate in the § 1983 context. See e.g., Chroscielewski v. Chroscielewski,
No. 16-CV-6640 (DG) (CLP), 2024 WL 5089540, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2024) (“In light of
the dismissal of Plaintiff's federal-law claim (the First Cause of Action, brought under Section
1983) . . . the Court declines at this stage to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining claims and those claims are dismissed without prejudice to the parties pursuing any
appropriate relief in state court.”); Rivera v. Jahmi, No. 22-cv-2233 (KAM) (VMS), 801 F. Supp.
3d 129, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (dismissing state law claims after granting summary judgment on
the § 1983 claims—the only federal claims brought); Myers v. Davenport, No. 21-cv-0922
(AMN/CFH), 2024 WL 4892741, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2024) (granting summary judgment
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on all “remaining state law claims” after granting summary judgment on “the sole federal
claims” under § 1983).
ii. 	Qualified Immunity and State Law Claims
Similarly, should the District Judge disagree with the undersigned’s recommendation on
qualified immunity and find that the State Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their
actions, the undersigned recommends dismissing the state law claims against the State
Defendants under the same grounds.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity is generally understood to only protect government
officials from federal, not state, causes of action. However, New York common law fills this gap
by providing government officials with a similar form of protection against state law claims.”
Bancroft v. City of Mount Vernon, 672 F. Supp. 2d 391, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Jenkins v.
City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2007)). Indeed, “New York law . . . grant[s]
government officials qualified immunity on state-law claims except where the officials’ actions
are undertaken in bad faith or without a reasonable basis.” See Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 63
(2d Cir. 2006)). “The only difference between the federal and state doctrines is that the
reasonableness of an officer's action is judged with references to state law and the state, not the
federal, constitution.” Bancroft, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (citing Doyle v. Rondout Valley Central
School District, 3 A.D.2d 669, 670-71 (App. Div. 3rd Dep’t 2004)). Notably, under New York
law, “governmental officers are immune from tort liability based on ‘official action involving the
exercise of discretion even if resulting from negligence or malice.’” Lynch v. City of Mount
Vernon, 567 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Tango by Tango v. Tulevech, 459
N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1983)).
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For example, in Rene, defendants argued “if the Court determines they are state actors
entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's federal and constitutional law claims, then the
Court should also afford them qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's state law claims” and “[based]
upon such immunity, Plaintiff's medical malpractice and false imprisonment causes of action
should be dismissed.” 2024 WL 1332556, at *19. The Hon. Joanna Seybert agreed, concluding
that if the court were to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, “Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s state law claims because the record evidence
established the Defendants acted reasonably” in making their determinations, thus supporting the
finding of qualified immunity on “Plaintiff’s federal and constitutional claims” as well. Id. at
*23.
Accordingly, like in Rene, if the Court concludes that the State Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity on the constitutional claims, the undersigned recommends dismissing the
state law claims of assault and battery and false imprisonment. See Bancroft, 672 F. Supp. 2d at
408-09 (dismissing state law claims of, inter alia, assault, battery, and false imprisonment/false
arrest under the doctrine of qualified immunity where the officers acted reasonably and
consistent with acceptable practices considering the same reasonableness determination guided
the court’s decision to grant qualified immunity on the federal and constitutional claims).
Alternatively, should the District Judge agree with the undersigned’s recommendation
that material facts preclude a finding that the State Defendants are subject to qualified immunity,
the undersigned proceeds to analyze each of Plaintiff’s state law claims. See Jones, 465 F.3d at
64 (affirming decision to deny defendants motion for summary judgment on the constitutional
claims considering disputed material facts were presented as to the reasonableness of force used,
and denying qualified immunity on the state law claims of false arrest and imprisonment, assault,
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battery because the “resolution of these claims rests heavily on the same facts [and
reasonableness] that form the heart of the federal claims”).
iii. 	Assault and Battery
Under New York law, “assault is an intentional placing of another person in fear of
imminent harmful or offensive contact” and a “battery is an intentional wrongful physical contact
with another person without consent.” Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 86 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citing Charkhy v. Altman, 678 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (App. Div. 1998)); see Baker v. City of New York,
551 F. Supp. 3d 258, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Under New York law, to plead an assault claim,
Plaintiff must allege “physical conduct placing [her] in imminent apprehension of harmful
contact. To plead a battery claim, Plaintiff must allege “bodily contact, made with intent, and
offensive in nature.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted) (quoting Fugazy v. Corbetta, 825
N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2006)). Notably, “[f]ederal excessive force claims and
state law assault and battery claims against police officers are nearly identical.” Graham, 928 F.
Supp. 2d at 624 (citing Humprey v. Landers, 344 Fed. App’x 686, 688 (2d Cir. 2009)). It follows,
therefore, that where an excessive force claim under § 1983 does not survive summary judgment,
claims for assault and battery will similarly be dismissed because “except for § 1983’s
requirement that the tort be committed under color of state law, the essential elements of
excessive force and state law assault and battery claims are substantially similar.” Cornell v.
Village of Clayton, 691 F. Supp. 3d 608, 622 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing Lee v. City of Troy, 520 F.
Supp. 3d 191, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 2021)).
As explained supra, issues of material fact persist over Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
excessive force claims to preclude a grant of summary judgment. Consequently, denial of
summary judgment is also appropriate for Plaintiff’s assault and battery claims which are
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premised on the same conduct forming the basis for the excessive force claim. See John v. City of
New York, 406 F. Supp. 3d 240, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (concluding that because questions of fact
precluded summary judgment on the excessive force claim, questions of fact similarly precluded
summary judgment on assault and battery claims); Graham, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (“Since there
are questions of fact regarding Plaintiff's excessive force claim, there are also questions of fact
regarding Plaintiff's state law assault and battery claims . . . .”) Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends denying State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s cause of
action for assault and battery.
iv. 	False Imprisonment
“To succeed on a claim of false imprisonment [at the summary judgment stage], a
plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) that the plaintiff
was aware of the confinement, (3) that the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4)
that the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” King v. Crossland Sav. Bank, 111 F.3d 251,
256 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original) (citing Brouhgton v. State, 335 N.E.2d 310, 314 (N.Y.
1975)). A confinement is “privileged” when it is based on probable cause which, if established,
serves as a complete defense to an action for false imprisonment. See Jackson v. Suffolk County,
87 F. Supp. 3d 386, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding the same four elements for false arrest,
including that probable cause constitutes justification, “hold[] true for [] false imprisonment
claims because, under New York law, the claim is identical to a false arrest claim . . . .”) (quoting
Kilburn v. Village of Saranac Lake, 413 Fed. App’x 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2011)).
Probable cause exists where the officer has “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy
information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has
been committed by the person to be arrested.” Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir.
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2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, probable cause “does not require a
prima facie showing of criminal activity” but rather requires “that the possibility of criminal
activity or the possibility of evidence of a crime will be found.” Sarnicola v. County of
Westchester, 229 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis added) (citing United States v.
Cruz, 834 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1987) and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983)). It follows, therefore,
that granting summary judgment on false imprisonment claims is only appropriate where there is
no dispute as to whether the arrest or confinement was done “with legal justification,” meaning
with probable cause. See Arum v. Miller, 332 F. Supp. 2d 99, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“A claim for
wrongful imprisonment cannot succeed where the undisputed facts establish probable cause
because it vitiates a required element of this causes of action: that the arrest or confinement be
without legal justification.”).
In Plaintiff’s Corrected Second Amended Complaint, he alleges he was falsely
imprisoned by the State Defendants’ “willful[] and malicious[] detain[ment]” of him through
physical restraint “for the purposes of subjecting Plaintiff to an involuntary, unnecessary, and
invasive rectal cavity search.” (ECF No. 158 at ¶ 122.) Plaintiff’s Opposition Memorandum
seemingly expands this cause of action to “[a]ll aspects of transport, removal from the police car,
entry into the hospital, use of drugs and all procedures . . . .” (ECF No. 236 at p. 19.)
Notwithstanding, the Parole Officers were justified in use of force considering Plaintiff’s
refusal to enter the Hospital and curling into the fetal position in the car, the alleged biting and
kicking of PO Lugo, and Plaintiff’s agitated and belligerent state up to and including the time of
injection. As noted above, this confinement was legally justified considering the Parole Officers
had reason to believe that Plaintiff was secreting drugs from his rectum—a conclusion generated
after picking up Plaintiff’s passenger, Shati Roy, who had drugs on his person, Plaintiff’s fidgety
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and peculiar behavior in the police vehicle, Plaintiff placing his hands down the back of his
pants, and PO Lugo observing what he believed to be a bag of drugs protruding from Plaintiff’s
rectum. Courts find similar observations and conduct to amount to probable cause to grant
summary judgment on a false arrest/false imprisonment claim. See Falls, 2021 WL 1164185, at
*13 (noting probable cause existed to grant summary judgment on plaintiff’s false imprisonment
claim considering the police officers had knowledge that plaintiff was selling narcotics and
police officers witnessed behaviors typical to drug dealing and smuggling, thus “it was
objectively reasonable for the [responding] officer[s] to believe that probable cause existed” to
detain plaintiff); see also Kneitel v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-6942 (NGG) (LKE), 2025 WL
2712136, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2025) (granting summary judgment on claims for false
imprisonment where under the totality of circumstances, the officers had probable cause for their
confinement). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting State Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends GRANTING in part and
DENYING in part State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 234), specifically
as follows:
(i) 	GRANTING as to Plaintiff’s causes of action for Fourth Amendment unreasonable
search/violation of privacy, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, fabrication of
evidence, cruel and unusual punishment, substantive due process, and false
imprisonment; and
(ii) 	DENYING as to Plaintiff’s causes of action for Fourth Amendment unreasonable
seizure/excessive force, assault and battery, and on the defense of qualified immunity.
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OBJECTIONS
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being electronically served through ECF
on all counsel. 	Any written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of service of this Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2011); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(a), 72(b); see also Nambiar v. The Central Orthopedic Group LLP, No. 24-1103 (2d Cir.
Oct. 28, 2025) (addressing timing and scope of objections to Reports and Recommendations) .
Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to the District Judge
assigned to this action prior to the expiration of the fourteen (14) day period for filing objections.
Failure to file objections within fourteen (14) days precludes further review of this Report and
Recommendation either by the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 145 (1985) (“a party shall file objections with the district court or else waive right to
appeal”); Caidor v. Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008) (“failure to object timely
to a magistrate's report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the magistrate’s
decision”); see Monroe v. Hyundai of Manhattan & Westchester, 372 F. App’x 147, 147–48 (2d
Cir. 2010) (summary order) (same).
Dated: Central Islip, New York.
February 6, 2026
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED,
/S/ James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge
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