State of New York et al v. Rinner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
STATE OF NEW YORK and STATE OF
COLORADO,
Movants,
v.
WILLIAM J. RINNER,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
26-MC-00652 (NRM)
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
In this miscellaneous action, the State of New York and the State of Colorado
(“Movants”) move to compel Respondent William J. Rinner to comply with a subpoena
to appear at a deposition issued by the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California. 	The Court directed Respondent to file any opposition to the
motion by noon on February 25, 2026, and Respondent did not do so. 	The Court
accordingly issued an order granting Movants’ unopposed motion in full. 	Order
Granting Mot. to Compel dated Feb. 25, 2026 (“Feb. 25 Order”), ECF No. 7.
On February 25, 2026, counsel for Respondent contacted the Court’s deputy
and advised that they were unaware of the Court’s earlier deadline for a response to
the 	motion, 	but 	that 	they 	intended 	to 	file 	an 	opposition 	brief 	expeditiously.
Respondent then filed his opposition brief early the following morning, on February
26. Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to Compel (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 8. The Court then directed
Respondent to file a letter on the docket setting forth an explanation for the belated
filing. Counsel for Respondent filed a letter stating that they were not aware of this
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Court’s orders directing a response by February 25, 2026 because “the movant States
did not serve [them] with, or otherwise alert [them] to, the deadline orders.” Letter
re Timing of Opp’n at 1,1 ECF No. 10. Counsel also noted that although the Electronic
Case Filing System listed two attorneys from the United States Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) at the time the Court issued its orders, they “d[id] not understand
how that came to be,” and that they did not receive any electronic notifications for
those orders. Id. at 2.
“Although courts may excuse an untimely filing, there generally must be good
cause to do so.” United States v. Sessum, No. 15-CR-6676 (KPF), 2020 WL 6392817,
at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2020) (citing Davidson v. Scully, 172 F. Supp. 2d 458,
462–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). 	The Court finds that Respondent has not provided such
cause. 	Movants 	filed 	a 	certificate 	of 	service 	showing 	that 	Respondent 	was
electronically served with the motion to compel along with all annexed exhibits on
the same day that the action was filed. 	Certificate of Service dated Feb. 20, 2026,
ECF No. 3. Indeed, Movants served seventeen different attorneys in total, including
seven of Respondent’s counsel from the DOJ. Id. at 2. Regardless of whether counsel
continued to receive any electronic notifications from Movants or otherwise, as this
Court previously observed, it is difficult to understand how counsel failed to monitor
the docket in this matter for a full week after the action was filed, especially given
that the parties were both aware of the time-sensitive nature of the underlying
litigation.
1 References to page numbers use ECF pagination unless otherwise noted.
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In light of the nature and complexity of the underlying litigation and the
significant interests at stake, however, the Court nevertheless entered an order
accepting the late filing and issued a temporary stay of its earlier order directing
Respondent to appear for his deposition by March 2, 2026. The Court now construes
Respondent’s opposition as a motion for reconsideration of its February 25 Order
granting the motion to compel. 	Such a motion is “generally granted only upon the
showing of exceptional circumstances.” Mendell v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir.
1990), aff’d, 501 U.S. 115 (1991). 	Respondent has failed to demonstrate such
circumstances. 	Further, even if the opposition had been timely filed and the Court
were to consider Respondent’s arguments de novo, they are insufficient to defeat the
motion to compel on its merits.
Respondent makes three arguments in his opposition. 	First, he argues that
his testimony is not relevant to the question of whether, under the Tunney Act, the
proposed settlement is in the public interest. 	Second, he claims that Movants’
discovery request is not proportional due to the allegedly duplicative nature of
Respondent’s testimony. Finally, he argues that he will be unduly prejudiced because
of the privileged nature of much of his relevant knowledge.
As Movants note, all three of these arguments were considered and rejected by
the Hon. P. Casey Pitts in the underlying case. See United States v. Hewlett Packard
Enter. Co., No. 25-CV-00951 (PCP) (N.D. Cal.) (the “HPE Action”), ECF No. 378 at 4;
Decl. of Michael Schwartz dated Feb. 19, 2026 (“Schwartz Decl.”), Ex. 3 (“Disc. Hr’g
Tr.”) at 40, 52 & 57, ECF No. 1-6. 	The law of the case doctrine thus alone justifies
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denial of reconsideration. 	“Courts should reconsider prior decisions only when
presented with compelling circumstances, namely: ‘(1) an intervening change in
controlling law, (2) new evidence, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or to
prevent manifest injustice.’” Nat’l Coal. on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl, 661 F.
Supp. 3d 78, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting United States v. Carr, 557 F.3d 93, 102 (2d
Cir. 2009)). Respondent points to no such circumstances. And indeed, even if he did,
he would have to overcome not only the “exceptional circumstances” necessary to
grant a motion for reconsideration, Mendell, 909 F.2d at 731, but also the additional
deference required when the prior decision was made by another court, see Ali v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 490 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[C]ourts are understandably reluctant to
reopen a ruling once made, especially when one judge or court is asked to consider
the ruling of a different judge or court.”).
In any case, none of Respondent’s arguments has merit. First, on relevance,
Respondent argues that Judge Pitts only generally found that depositions would be
permitted, and not that his deposition specifically would be relevant. However, in his
written ruling, Judge Pitts explicitly “overrule[d] the United States’s objection” to the
“deposition subpoenas for former DOJ officials Roger Alford, William Rinner, and
Chad Mizelle.” 	HPE Action, ECF No. 378 at 4 (emphasis added). 	Judge Pitts also
specifically noted that “the Tunney Act evinces Congress’s recognition that the
decision-making process that result[s] in a proposed final judgment may be relevant
in determining whether the judgment serves the public interest.” HPE Action, ECF
No. 350 at 5. Moreover, to the extent that Respondent is correct that “any discovery
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by the states must therefore be targeted to the issues that are pending before the
Court,” Opp’n at 6, there is no indication that Movants have any intention of deposing
Respondent on matters that fall outside the scope of these issues, and as such, this is
not a reason to quash the subpoena in its entirety, see, e.g., Daniel J. Edelman Inc. v.
Prime Hydration LLC, No. 25-CV-8904 (PAE), 2025 WL 3563179, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
12, 2025).
Respondent next argues that his testimony would not be proportional to the
Movants’ needs because it would largely be duplicative of discovery already obtained,
such as the testimony of Roger Alford, another DOJ official. 	See Opp’n at 8–9.
However, this argument is in significant tension with Respondent’s prior contention
regarding 	the 	lack 	of 	relevance 	of 	Respondent’s 	testimony, 	as 	Respondent 	is
simultaneously arguing that his deposition will bear no relevance to the court’s
Tunney Act review and should be quashed, while at the same time claiming that his
testimony will be duplicative to information and material that has already been the
subject of discovery pursuant to the Tunney Act. 	Furthermore, as Judge Pitts has
noted, it is difficult to evaluate this argument at this juncture given that neither the
Court nor the Movants are yet privy to the contents of Respondent’s deposition. See
Disc. Hr’g Tr. at 39 (“[Y]ou seem to be saying unless a party knows in advance what
it’s going to get from a particular witness, that they can’t use the discovery process,
and that’s not how discovery generally works in federal court.”). Even so, Movants
have put forth numerous examples of communications that Respondent had with
individuals at Hewlett Packard Enterprise that did not involve the other witnesses
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whose testimony forms the basis of Respondent’s claim that his deposition would be
duplicative. See, e.g., Schwartz Decl. Ex. 6, ECF No. 2-4; id. Ex. 8, ECF No. 2-6; id.
Ex. 10, ECF No. 2-8.
Third, Respondent argues that he will be unduly prejudiced by appearing for
the deposition because much of his knowledge comes from communications and
activities that are subject to various privileges held by the United States, including
attorney-client 	privilege 	and 	the 	deliberative 	process 	privilege. 	However, 	as
Respondent himself admits, the Department of Justice has explicitly authorized him
to testify as to certain topics. See Opp’n at 10. The fact that Respondent maintains
the right to object to being asked about certain issues on a case-by-case basis does not
justify quashing the subpoena itself. 	See Sanstrom v. Rosa, No. 93-CV-7146 (RLC),
1996 WL 469589, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1996) (“[T]he mere fact that a witness may
be asked questions that seek to elicit privileged matter does not provide a colorable
basis for precluding the entire deposition.”). 	That is especially so given that here,
Judge Pitts — who is intimately familiar with the details of the proposed settlement
and is much better positioned evaluate the propriety of certain deposition topics —
has already ruled that he would make individualized privilege determinations as the
case progresses. See Disc. Hr’g Tr. at 40–41, 52 (ruling on Respondent’s deposition
“subject to the discussion that we are going to have about deliberative process
privilege,” and noting that “we can revisit that as we go”).
Finally, Respondent argues that even if this Court were to grant the motion to
compel, no exceptional circumstances exist to transfer further disputes about his
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deposition to the issuing court. 	See Opp’n at 11–12. 	But the only argument
Respondent 	makes 	in 	support 	of 	this 	contention 	is 	that 	Judge 	Pitts 	has
accommodated for delayed discovery by giving the Intervenor-States an opportunity
to file a Sur-Reply by March 22, 2026, one day prior to the hearing on the public
interest determination at issue. 	However, even under this new timeline, Movants
have less than a month to prepare for Respondent’s deposition, take the deposition,
and incorporate any deposition testimony into their submissions to Judge Pitts. More
importantly, this argument is completely non-responsive to all of the other factors
that this Court already analyzed in its February 25 order, including Judge Pitts’s
extensive knowledge of the underlying litigation, the significant risk of inconsistent
rulings, and the minimal burden likely to be placed on Respondent given the history
of remote discovery hearings and Respondent’s counsel’s decision to affirmatively
litigate the underlying case in the Northern District of California. See Feb. 25 Order
at 4–6.
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent has failed to meet the high bar
necessary for reconsideration of the Court’s February 25 Order, and his arguments
fail on their merits in any event. Respondent’s opposition, construed as a motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s February 25, 2026 Order, is denied. 	Respondent is
ordered to comply with the subpoena by appearing for his deposition by Friday, March
6, 2026. All remaining disputes related to or arising from his deposition are hereby
transferred to the Hon. P. Casey Pitts of the Northern District of California.
SO ORDERED.
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/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: 	March 2, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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