Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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J.R.R.,
Petitioner,
- against -
KENNETH GENALO, Acting Director of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.,
Respondents.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
26-CV-1245 (PKC)
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:
On March 3, 2026, Petitioner J.R.R.1 filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Emergency Pet. Writ. Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”), Dkt. 1.) He argues
that his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 121.) The
Court agrees. For the following reasons, the Petition is GRANTED, and Respondents are ordered
to release Petitioner from custody immediately.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner J.R.R. is a 24-year-old asylum seeker from El Salvador who entered the United
States at age 17. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 14, 21.) He was detained by the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) when he arrived in the United States in 2019 and was placed in removal proceedings.
(Id. ¶ 1.) Because Petitioner was an unaccompanied minor, DHS transferred him to the custody
1 Petitioner was granted leave to proceed under a pseudonym. (Order to Show Cause,
Dkt. 6, at 1.)
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of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”).2 (Id.) ORR subsequently released him into the
care of a family member pursuant to a “Sponsor Care Agreement.” (Id.) Since then, Petitioner
has lived in Long Island, New York. (Id. ¶ 2.) He is the primary supporter of his family, including
his partner and their 20-month-old son. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 27.)
Petitioner has approved Special Immigration Juvenile Status (“SIJS”), which provides him
with a pathway to lawful permanent residence. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 3–4; Pet’r’s Reply (“Reply”), Dkt. 10,
at 2.) Petitioner was previously granted deferred action, a form of temporary protection from
removal, based on his SIJS. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 4, 7; I-797 Grant of Deferred Action, Dkt. 1-1.) He
also has an application for asylum that has been pending before U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) since 2020, and he cannot be removed while that application is pending due
to his membership in the J.O.P v. Department of Homeland Security settlement class. (Pet., Dkt. 1,
¶¶ 3, 53–58; J.O.P. Settlement Agreement, Dkt. 1-4); see also J.O.P. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
779 F. Supp. 3d 570, 575–76 (D. Md. 2025) (describing the settlement agreement and the court’s
certification and approval thereof). Due to his SIJS, pending asylum application, and J.O.P. class
member status, an Immigration Judge terminated Petitioner’s removal proceedings in August
2025, without any opposition from DHS. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 5; Immigration Judge Order, Dkt 1-3.)
Petitioner was arrested for an incident that took place on February 6, 2026,3 and charged
with a class B misdemeanor under New York Penal Law Section 245.00(a) (“public lewdness”).
(Pet, Dkt. 1, ¶ 28.) At his arraignment on March 2, 2026, he was told to go to the Glen Cove City
Police Department the following day to have his fingerprints taken. (Id.) When he did so, he was
2 DHS was required to transfer Petitioner to ORR custody under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1).
3 The date of Petitioner’s initial arrest is unclear from the petition. (See Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 28
(“Mr. R. was arrested for an incident that took place on February 6, 2026.”).)
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apprehended, arrested, and detained by ICE. (Id.) Later that day, March 3, 2026, he filed this
Petition. (See generally id.) At the time, he was detained at the Nassau County Correctional
Center in East Meadow, New York, a temporary staging facility for ICE detainees. (Resp’ts’ Ltr.,
Dkt. 7, at 1.) In addition, by letter dated March 3, 2026, USCIS abruptly terminated Petitioner’s
deferred action; Petitioner’s partner received that letter on or about March 9, 2026. (Reply,
Dkt. 10, at 2.)
On March 6, 2026, this Court entered an order to show cause directing Respondents to
show cause, in writing, “why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued and why Petitioner
should not be immediately released.” (Order to Show Cause, Dkt. 6, at 1.)4 Respondents filed
their response on March 10, 2026. (Resp’t’s Resp. to Order to Show Cause (“Resp.”), Dkt. 9.)
DISCUSSION
Respondents concede that “[t]his case turns on ICE’s statutory detention authority and
whether Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing,” and that the Court “has previously ruled on these
central legal issues” in Yin v. Maldonado, No. 26-CV-0103 (PKC), 2026 WL 295389 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 4, 2026), and R.A.R.R. v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-6597 (PKC), 2026 WL 323040 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 6, 2026)—both of which rejected the same arguments Respondents make here. (Resp., Dkt. 9,
4 The Order to Show Cause also restrained Respondents from transferring Petitioner to a
facility outside of this District. (Order to Show Cause, Dkt. 6, at 2.) Later that day, Respondents
filed a letter informing the Court that ICE had transferred Petitioner to the Delaney Hall Detention
Facility (“Delaney Hall”) in Newark, New Jersey, approximately half an hour after the Court
issued the Order to Show Cause. (Resp’ts’ Ltr., Dkt. 7, at 1.) Respondents requested permission
to transfer Petitioner to, and detain him at, 26 Federal Plaza in New York City. (Id. at 1–2.) The
Court instead authorized Petitioner’s continued detention at Delaney Hall rather than approving
his transfer to 26 Federal Plaza, and ordered that ICE “not transfer Petitioner again during this
action unless directed by the Court.” (3/09/2026 Am. Dkt. Order.) The Court retains jurisdiction
over this matter despite Petitioner’s transfer outside this District. See Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th
382, 391–92 (2d Cir. 2025) (explaining that jurisdiction over an immigration habeas petition is
with the district of confinement at the time the petition is filed, and petitioner’s subsequent transfer
to another district does not deprive the court of jurisdiction).
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at 1, 4.)5 Respondents “acknowledge that these decisions would control the result in this case” if
the Court adheres to its prior conclusions. (Id. at 4.)6
The Court adheres to its prior reasoning and holds that Petitioner, who was already in the
country when ICE arrested him, cannot be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(“Section 1225(b)(2)(A)”). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires mandatory detention of noncitizens
“seeking admission” while their removal proceedings are pending (absent certain exceptions
inapplicable here).7 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); accord Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289
(2018) (explaining that “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” and, in contrast, authorizes
the Government to detain “certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of their
5 The Court has also adhered to the same or similar reasoning in several other cases. See
Figueroa Ocampo v. Noem et al., No. 26-CV-0999 (PKC), 2026 WL 587643 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3,
2026); Colindres v. Tellez et al., No. 26-CV-0663 (PKC), 2026 WL 509493 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,
2026); Ambroladze v. Maldonado et al., No. 26-CV-0473 (PKC), 2026 WL 295405 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 4, 2026); Order Dismissing Case, Cordova Vera v. Tellez et al., No. 26-CV-0018 (PKC)
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2026); Galeas Miranda v. Maldonado et al., No. 25-CV-6882 (PKC), 2026
WL 25405 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2026).
6 Again, the Court appreciates Respondents’ brevity as part of their desire to “conserve
judicial and party resources.” (Resp., Dkt. 9, at 1.) Nonetheless, Respondents’ decision to
continue making these arrests and detaining noncitizens who were already in the country pursuant
to a statutory interpretation that has been almost universally rejected by district courts in this
Circuit—rather than waiting for the Second Circuit to weigh in on the relevant legal questions—
has exacted an unnecessary and avoidable toll on the resources of the judiciary and Respondents
themselves. See Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025
WL 3295903, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (documenting overwhelming rejection of
Respondents’ arguments in this Circuit, beginning in the summer of 2025).
7 Specifically, mandatory detention does not apply if the noncitizen is “clearly and beyond
a doubt entitled to be admitted,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), or if the Secretary of Homeland
Security discretionarily and temporarily paroles them from custody for “urgent humanitarian
reasons or significant public benefit,” id. § 1182(d)(5)(A). See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.
281, 300 (2018) (explaining that the “express exception to detention” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) “implies that there are no other circumstances under which aliens detained under
§ 1225(b) may be released” under the statutory scheme).
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removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c)” (emphasis added)). The overwhelming majority
of courts in this District and across the country have found that noncitizens like Petitioner—who
were detained by ICE after living in the United States for years—are not “seeking admission” and
therefore cannot be detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A). See, e.g., Barco Mercado v.
Francis, --- F. Supp. 3d. ----, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (“By a recent
count, the central issue in this case—the administration’s new position that all noncitizens who
came into the United States illegally, but since have been living in the United States, must be
detained until their removal proceedings are completed—has been challenged in at least 362 cases
in federal district courts. The challengers have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in
350 of those cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread
across the United States.”); id. at *13–14 (collecting cases).
Respondents’ invocation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is particularly puzzling here, where
Petitioner has no removal proceedings pending and in fact cannot be removed due to his
membership in the J.O.P. settlement class. (See Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 3, 5, 7, 25–26, 40–48, 53–58.) If
Petitioner were subject to detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) until the end of his removal
proceedings, his detention would be indefinite, perhaps permanent, and he would have received
absolutely no notice or opportunity to be heard. To say that that result “would raise a serious
constitutional problem” would be an understatement. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690
(2001); see also Castro-Vasquez v. Thompson, No. CV H-25-5164, 2026 WL 206761, at *5 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 27, 2026) (granting habeas petition of J.O.P. class member with pending asylum claim
because he was detained “with no indication of any end point”); Martinez v.
Hyde, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3152847, at *3 n.10 (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2025) (“[T]he J.O.P.
Settlement Agreement is striking evidence that Petitioner’s removal is apparently neither imminent
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nor inevitable—indeed, it is unclear whether DHS’s moving to recalendar Petitioner’s removal
proceedings is even consistent with the J.O.P. Settlement Agreement—making the reasonableness
of related detention constitutionally suspect.”).
In sum, Respondents are detaining Petitioner under the wrong statute, without any
individualized custody determination, prior notice, or an opportunity for Petitioner to be heard.
That is unconstitutional. Respondents have unacceptably and inexplicably violated Petitioner’s
due process rights. Accordingly, Petitioner must be immediately released.8
Additionally, the Court is concerned about the abrupt revocation of Petitioner’s deferred
action and how that revocation could impact his work authorization. See Garcia Lanza v. Noem,
--- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 585130, at *7–8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2026) (holding that similar
revocation of deferred action was both arbitrary and capricious and unconstitutional); id. at *11
(vacating purported revocation of the petitioner’s deferred action and work authorization). The
Court therefore grants Petitioner thirty (30) days to file an amended petition, if he so chooses,
addressing this issue.
8 Given that Petitioner was not afforded due process prior to his re-detention, the
appropriate remedy is release, not an order directing Respondents to give Petitioner a bond hearing.
See Yao v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-9982 (PAE), 2025 WL 3653433, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17,
2025) (“A bond hearing after the fact, by definition, would not and cannot cure [the] constitutional
violation. Although [the petitioner’s] release today cannot cure his loss of liberty . . . , this remedy,
relative to the procedural one of ordering a bond hearing, is the one that comes closest to doing
so.”); id. at *12 (compiling cases holding the same); Y-C- v. Genalo, No. 25-CV-6558 (NCM),
2025 WL 3653496, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (concluding that “no relief short of petitioner’s
immediate release would be appropriate or sufficient” in the case in light of the constitutional
violations suffered).
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CONCLUSION
The Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (Pet., Dkt. 1), is GRANTED.
Respondents are ordered to release Petitioner from custody immediately and no later than within
24 hours of this Order. Respondents are ordered to release Petitioner subject to the conditions at
which he was at liberty before he was detained, without any additional constraints on his liberty.
Respondents are further directed to return to Petitioner any and all funds or property seized from
Petitioner at the time of his arrest. Respondents are directed to certify compliance with the Court’s
Order by filing a letter on the docket no later than 9:00 p.m. tomorrow, March 12, 2026.
The Court further orders that Respondents may not administratively recharacterize the
release granted by this Order as grounds to impose conditions or re-impose existing conditions in
conjunction with release (including release on recognizance or similar instruments) without prior
notice to and authorization from the Court. Petitioner must not be re-detained by Respondents
without notice and an opportunity to be heard at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker, at which Respondents will have the burden of showing that Petitioner is removable,
(see J.O.P. Settlement Agreement, Dkt. 1-4), and that Petitioner’s re-detention is authorized under
a statutory authority other than Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
Petitioner is granted thirty (30) days to file an amended petition, if he so chooses,
addressing the revocation of his deferred action (and work authorization, if applicable). If an
amended petition is not filed within 30 days, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter
judgment in this case.
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Any application for attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act will be
held in abeyance pending the conclusion of all proceedings in this matter. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(B) (authorizing fees application under Equal Access to Justice Act to be filed within
30 days of final judgment).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Pamela K. Chen
Pamela K. Chen
United States District Judge
Dated: March 11, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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