Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:
On November 8, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arrested and
detained the petitioner, Zhi Ye, when he reported for a check-in appointment with ICE. (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 2; ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 9.) On November 11, 2025, the petitioner was transferred to the
Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn, where he remains detained. (ECF No. 1
¶ 2; ECF No. 1-6 at 1; ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 11.) The petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1 at 11.) For the reasons that follow, his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is granted.
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ZHI YE,
Petitioner,
– against –
RAUL MALDONADO, JR., in his official
capacity as Warden of the Metropolitan
Detention Center; JUDITH ALMODOVAR,
in her official capacity as Acting Director of
the New York City Field Office of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
KRISTI NOEM in her official capacity as
Secretary of Homeland Security; PAM
BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney
General,
Respondents.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
25-CV-6417 (AMD)
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BACKGROUND1
The petitioner, a Chinese national, arrived in the United States after fleeing religious
persecution by the Chinese government because of his Christian beliefs. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 13; ECF
No. 1-4 at 12–13.)
Factual Background
a. Arrival in the United States and Release on Own Recognizance
On December 17, 2023, the petitioner entered the United States, crossing the United
States-Mexico border at or near the town of Tecate, California. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 13; ECF No. 1-3 at
1; ECF No. 8 at 12; ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 3.) Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) agents briefly
detained him after he entered the country. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 13; ECF No. 8 at 12–13; ECF No. 8-1
¶ 3.) According to the government, the petitioner informed the agents that he was a Chinese
national, that he lacked the necessary legal documents to enter the United States, and that “he
had illegally crossed the international border without being inspected by an immigration officer
at a designated port of entry.” (ECF No. 8 at 13; ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 3.) The same day, CBP issued
the petitioner a Form I-862 Notice to Appear (“NTA”). (ECF No. 1-3 at 1; ECF No. 8 at 13;
ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 4.) The NTA states that the petitioner is “an alien present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled” and that the petitioner is subject to removal pursuant to
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (ECF No. 1-3 at 1.) The NTA
1 The Court bases the discussion of the facts, which are undisputed unless otherwise noted, on the parties’
submissions, including exhibits. See Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-CV-4304, 2025 WL 2829511, at *2 n.1
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25-CV-6137, 2025 WL 2630826, at *1 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025).
Having reviewed all the submissions, the Court finds that the petition “present[s] only issues of law,”
and it may, therefore, be adjudicated without a hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (directing courts to
“determine the facts, and dispose” of habeas petitions expeditiously, “as law and justice require”); see
also Tumba Huamani v. Francis, No. 25-CV-8110, 2025 WL 3079014, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
2025).
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instructed the petitioner to appear for removal proceedings before an immigration judge in New
York, New York on October 23, 2024. (Id.) Invoking its authority pursuant to Section 1226,
CBP then released the petitioner on his own recognizance pending this appearance, with certain
conditions. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 13; ECF No. 1-5 at 1; ECF No. 8 at 13; ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 5.) In the
almost two years since his release, the petitioner has worked as a laborer. (ECF No. 14-2 at 1.)
The parties agree that he has no criminal record and has complied with all the terms of his
release, including reporting to the Department of Homeland Security whenever he was told to do
so. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 8.)
b. Asylum Application
On April 17, 2024, the petitioner applied for asylum and requested that removal be
withheld. (ECF No. 1-4; ECF No. 8 at 13; ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 7.) On October 17, 2024, six days
before the petitioner’s scheduled removal proceeding, he received a notice scheduling an
individual hearing before the immigration court on December 7, 2027. (ECF No. 1-7 at 1.)2
c. Re-Arrest in New York City
On October 21, 2025, ICE informed the petitioner that he was required to appear for an
in-person check-in on November 8, 2025 at 26 Federal Plaza in Manhattan. (ECF No. 8 at 13;
ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 8.) The government maintains that ICE cancelled the order of release on
recognizance and arrested the petitioner at this check-in “pursuant to . . . 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).” (ECF No. 8 at 8, 13; ECF No. 8-1 ¶¶ 9–10.)3 The Form I-213 (Record of
2 It is not clear whether the October 23, 2024 removal hearing took place.
3 The petitioner asserted in his petition that he was arrested on November 11, 2025 (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 14),
possibly because the Form I-830 stated that the petitioner was “[d]etained by ICE and transferred on
11/11/2025,” (ECF No. 1-6 at 1). The government has since filed the arrest warrant (Form I-200) and
certain underlying records, which show that he was arrested on November 8, 2025. (ECF No. 14-1 at
1.)
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Deportable/Inadmissible Alien) says that the petitioner “is in removal proceedings,” and “[a]fter
a review of all relevant information, the release on the Order of Recognizance was canceled
following appropriate procedures.” (ECF No. 14-2 at 2.) At some point, agents prepared a form
arrest warrant, signed by an immigration officer. (ECF No. 14-1 at 1.)4 As noted above, the
government appears to concede that the petitioner was fully compliant with the terms of his
release. The government does not provide any justification for the arrest, and the only
explanation anywhere in the record appears in an ICE form related to the arrest, which says that
the petitioner is “subject to be re-detained now that bedspace is available.” (ECF No. 14-2 at 3.)
ICE transferred the petitioner to the MDC — a detention facility that courts in this district have
described as “dangerous,” “barbaric,” and “inhumane”5 — on November 11, 2025. (ECF No. 1
¶ 14; ECF No. 1-6 at 1; ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 13.) It is undisputed that the petitioner was not given any
prior notice or warning that he was going to be re-arrested, nor any individualized explanation
for his arrest or detention or opportunity to be heard.
Procedural History
The petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus on November 19, 2025.
(ECF No. 1.) On November 24, 2025, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause directing the
government to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued.6 On December 3,
4 There is no information in the record about when and under what circumstances the arrest warrant was
prepared. Under the INA implementing regulations, certain immigration officers can issue arrest
warrants without judicial oversight. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(b)(1), 1236.1(b)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2)
(listing “authorized officers”).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Colucci, 743 F. Supp. 3d 452, 454–60 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (describing
“dangerous, barbaric conditions” in the MDC, where “[c]haos reigns, along with uncontrolled violence,”
including “two apparent homicides, two gruesome stabbings and an assault so severe that it resulted in a
fractured eye socket for the victim”).
6 The Court originally directed the government to show cause by 6:00 p.m. on November 28, 2025, but
granted its application for an extension of time to reply. (ECF Orders dated Nov. 24, 2025.)
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2025, the government filed its opposition to the petition and response to the Court’s Order to
Show Cause (ECF No. 8), along with a declaration by Deportation Officer Mincheol So (ECF
No. 8-1). The petitioner replied on December 4, 2025. (ECF No. 9.) On December 5, 2025, the
Court ordered the government to produce the ICE records to which it referred in its filing by 3:00
p.m. the same day. (ECF Order dated Dec. 5, 2025.) Instead, the government filed a letter in
which it notified the Court of two recent decisions in this circuit that support its position. (ECF
No. 10.)7 The government asked for an extension to respond to the Court’s order (ECF No. 12),
which the Court granted in part (ECF Order dated Dec. 5, 2025). The government filed certain
underlying records on December 6, 2025. (ECF Nos. 14, 15.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2241 “authorizes a district court to
grant a writ of habeas corpus whenever a petitioner is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution
or law or treaties of the United States.’” Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)). “Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus claims by
non-citizens challenging the constitutionality of their detention.” Lopez v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-
4189, 2018 WL 2932726, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018) (citing Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
516–17 (2003)).
7 To the Court’s knowledge, the courts in these cases — Candido v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-867, 2025 WL
3484932 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025) and Chen v. Almodovar, 25-CV-8350, 2025 WL 3484855 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 4, 2025) — appear to be the only courts in this circuit that agree with the government’s
interpretation of the statutory provisions that authorize the government to detain noncitizens in the
course of immigration proceedings. As explained below, every other court in this circuit to have
considered the issue has rejected the government’s arguments.
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DISCUSSION
In seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleges that the government violated his
procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, as well as Section 236 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
The Petitioner Is Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226
The issue before the Court is which of two statutory sections apply to the petitioner’s
detention. Depending on the answer, the petitioner is or is not subject to mandatory detention
pending removal proceedings. The first, the one the government says applies, is 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225, which provides that “an alien seeking admission [who] is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted . . . shall be detained.” The second is 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which the
petitioner says applies. That section “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already
in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings,” including noncitizens “who” —
“[e]ven once inside the United States” — “were inadmissible at the time of entry.” Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89 (2018). Under Section 1225, a noncitizen must be detained,
except that the government may parole him for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Under Section 1226, detention is discretionary; a
noncitizen who is detained may request a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). At that hearing, the noncitizen “may secure his release if he can
convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the
community.” Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–98 (2019).
The government asserts that the petitioner was arrested “pursuant to . . . 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)” and “falls within the ambit § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention requirement,”
which does not require a hearing. (ECF No. 8 at 8, 16–17.) The government’s theory is that the
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petitioner “has not yet been admitted” and is both “an applicant for admission” and “seeking
admission.” Therefore, he must be detained under Section 1225(b)(2). (Id. at 16–20.)
The petitioner responds that Section 1225 applies only to noncitizens at the border who
are “seeking admission” into the country. (ECF No. 1¶¶ 19–22; ECF No. 9 at 1–7.) The
petitioner says that he is not “seeking admission” into the country; he is already in the country,
awaiting the outcome of his asylum application and the pending removal proceedings. (ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 30–31; ECF No. 9 at 5–7.) For these reasons, the petitioner argues, the applicable
section is Section 1226, which “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the
country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” (ECF No. 9 at 5 (quoting Jennings, 583
U.S. at 289).)
The petitioner is the latest of hundreds of noncitizens who have been detained this year
pursuant to the government’s new Section 1225 theory,8 and who have sought emergency relief
from the courts. Courts who have considered these applications have overwhelmingly rejected
the government’s new interpretation of the INA.9 The Court is persuaded by the cogent
8 According to a July 2025 internal ICE memorandum, the government recently “revisited” its position
about which statute applies, and has now “determined that [Section 1225] of the [INA], rather than
[Section 1226] is the applicable immigration detention authority for all applicants for admission.”
Savane v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6666, 2025 WL 2774452, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2025).
9 “By a recent count, the central issue in this case — the administration’s new position that all noncitizens
who came into the United States illegally, but since have been living in the United States, must be
detained until their removal proceedings are completed — has been challenged in at least 362 cases in
federal district courts. The challengers have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 of
those cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the
United States.” Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
26, 2025); see also id. at *4 n.22 (collecting cases). According to a recent article, “[a]t least 225 judges .
. . in more than 700 cases” have rejected the government’s argument, and “[t]he number of judges
opposing the administration’s position has more than doubled in less than a month.” Kyle Cheney,
More than 220 judges have now rejected the Trump admin’s mass detention policy, Politico (Nov. 28,
2025), https://www.politico.com/news/2025/11/28/trump-detention-deportation-policy-00669861. “In
contrast, only eight judges nationwide . . . have sided with the administration’s new mass detention
policy.” Id.
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reasoning of those courts, and concludes that the government’s interpretation of the INA is
inconsistent with the text, statutory scheme, and binding precedent, as well as with ICE’s own
records in this case, all of which make it clear 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies. However, even if the
Court found the government’s reasoning persuasive, the outcome would not be different.
The parties agree that the petitioner is an “applicant for admission,” but disagree on
whether he is “seeking admission” to the country. The government argues that even though the
petitioner has been in the country for nearly two years, he is “subject to mandatory detention for
the duration of [his] immigration proceedings” pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2) because he
“entered the United States without admission or inspection and ha[s] been residing in the country
for years without lawful status” and is therefore still “seeking admission.” (ECF No. 8 at 20
(citation omitted).) The petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that he is not “seeking
admission” to the country because he is already here; the government detained him briefly in the
United States after he had already entered, and then, pursuant to Section 1226, released him on
his own recognizance pending removal proceedings. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 13; ECF No. 9 at 1–7.)
As Judge Komitee and Judge Gonzalez recently observed in Sarmiento Guerrero v.
Noem, No. 25-CV-5881, 2025 WL 3214787 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2025) and O.F.B. v.
Maldonado, No. 25-CV-6336, 2025 WL 3277677 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025), the government’s
interpretation is inconsistent with (1) canons of statutory interpretation and (2) recent binding
precedent. See also J.G.O. v. Francis, No. 25-CV-7233, 2025 WL 3040142 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28,
2025); Tumba Huamani v. Francis, No. 25-CV-8110, 2025 WL 3079014 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
2025).10
10 As noted earlier, on December 5, 2025, the government alerted the Court to two recent decisions in this
circuit that adopted the government’s reasoning. (ECF No. 10 at 1 (citing Candido, 2025 WL 3484932,
at *2–4 (holding that the terms “applicant for admission” and one “seeking admission” “are
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Section 1225(b)(2)(a), which the government cites as the basis for detaining the
petitioner, reads:
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is
an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond
a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a of this title.
If the government’s interpretation were correct, the Court would have to conclude that
“applicant for admission” and an individual “seeking admission” “mean the same thing in the
same provision.” Sarmiento Guerrero, 2025 WL 3214787, at *3; see also Tumba Huamani,
2025 WL 3079014, at *3–5 (“[F]ollowing the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that ‘every
clause and word of a statute should have meaning,’ . . . ‘[i]f, as [the government] argue[s],
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) were intended to apply to all ‘applicants for admission,’ there would be no need
to include the phrase ‘seeking admission’ in the statute.” (first quoting United States ex rel.
Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023); then quoting Lopez Benitez v.
Francis, No. 25-CV-5837, 2025 WL 2371588, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025))).
The broader statutory scheme also favors this interpretation. “[T]he canon against
surplusage is strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same
statutory scheme.” Tumba Huamani, 2025 WL 3079014, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025) (quoting
Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013)). The government’s reading of Section
1225(b)(2) — that all noncitizens present in the United States and subject to removal
proceedings are necessarily “seeking admission” — is “entirely inconsistent” with the recent
synonyms”); Chen, 2025 WL 3484855, at *5 (finding that “‘applying for something’ ordinarily is
synonymous with ‘seeking something’”)).) The Court respectfully disagrees with the conclusions in
those cases, and adopts the rationale adopted by the overwhelming majority of courts in this circuit, and
in the country.
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amendment of the INA by the Laken Riley Act. Id. at *4. The Laken Riley Act, passed earlier
this year, “makes noncitizens subject to mandatory detention if (1) they are inadmissible under
certain provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1182 and (2) are charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or
admit to having committed certain crimes.” Id. (quoting Artiga v. Genalo, No. 25-CV-5208,
2025 WL 2829434, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025)). If the government’s reading of Section 1225
correct — that detention is mandatory for noncitizens in immigration proceedings in the United
States — it is not clear why Congress “thought it necessary to specifically add a provision
making [inadmissible] noncitizens subject to mandatory detention if they are charged with
certain crimes.” Id. (collecting cases). Apart from the recent amendment, the government’s
interpretation of “Section 1225 would also all but read Section 1226 off the books.” Id. (citing
Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *8). Interpreting the statutory scheme as a whole,
“‘[t]ogether’ the sections ‘cover aliens presenting at arrival (under § 1225) and then everybody
else (under § 1226).’” Id. (quoting J.G.O., 2025 WL 3040142, at *4). The Court therefore
agrees with the nearly unanimous view of courts in this circuit that “the most basic interpretive
canons,” “context,” and “overall statutory scheme” support applying Section 1226 to the
petitioner’s detention. Sarmiento Guerrero, 2025 WL 3214787, at *3.
Binding Supreme Court precedent further supports the petitioner’s read of the statute. In
Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court analyzed Sections 1225, 1226, and 1227 to determine
whether “detained aliens have a statutory right to periodic bond hearings.” 583 U.S. at 285. The
Court made it clear that “Section 1225 authorizes ‘the Government to detain certain aliens
seeking admission into the country,’ while Section 1226 ‘authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.’” Sarmiento
Guerrero, 2025 WL 3214787, at *5 (quoting Jennings, 582 U.S. at 288) (emphasis in Sarmiento
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Guerrero); see also Nielsen, 586 U.S. at 396–97 (holding that Section 1226(a) applies to
noncitizens “present in this country”).
The government claims that Jennings stands for the proposition that “[a]pplicants for
admission fall into one of two categories, ‘those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by
§ 1225(b)(2).’” (ECF No. 8 at 11 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287).) The government’s
interpretation is not persuasive, because it takes the above language out of context. The quote
upon which the government rests its theory appears in a discussion about “decid[ing] (1) who
may enter the country and (2) who may stay here after entering.” Jennings, 538 U.S. at 286.
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, explained:
That process of decision generally begins at the Nation’s borders
and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether
an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible. Under § 302,
110 Stat. 3009–579, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an alien who “arrives in the
United States,” or “is present” in this country but “has not been
admitted,” is treated as “an applicant for admission.” § 1225(a)(1).
Applicants for admission must “be inspected by immigration
officers” to ensure that they may be admitted into the country
consistent with U.S. immigration law. § 1225(a)(3).
As relevant here, applicants for admission fall into one of two
categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by
§ 1225(b)(2).
Id. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225). Read in context, the quoted language clearly refers to the
“process . . . at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry.” Id.; see also id. (“As relevant here,
applicants for admission fall into one of two categories . . .” (emphasis added)). Any possible
doubt about the Court’s meaning is erased by the Court’s summary:
In sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under
§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to
detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).
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Id. at 289. Thus, the government’s argument that all “[a]pplicants for admission fall into one of
two categories” under Section 1225 is inconsistent with the broader statutory scheme and with the
Supreme Court’s recent, clear explanation of that statutory scheme.
Additionally, the government’s own records establish that it was acting under Section
1226. The November 8, 2025 arrest warrant, which government agents prepared, cites
“authori[ty] pursuant to sections 236 and 287,” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1357. (ECF No. 14-1.)
Similarly, records from the petitioner’s initial arrest reflect that when he was detained “at or near
Tecate, California, outside of a port of entry” (ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 3; ECF No. 1-3 at 1), the detention
was pursuant to Section 1226. The Notice of Custody Determination (Form I-286) and Order of
Release on Recognizance (Form I-220A) indicate that the petitioner was released on
recognizance “[i]n accordance with section 236 of the [INA],” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (ECF No. 1-5
at 1; ECF No. 14-4 at 1.) Dismissing its own records as “paperwork,” the government argues
that it “[can]not be estopped from taking the position that the petitioner . . . was subject to
detention under § 1225(b) simply because the [g]overnment previously treated him as detained
pursuant to § 1226(a).” (ECF No. 8 at 27.) The government is free to argue, despite what it said
before, that it is detaining the petitioner under Section 1225, but the fact that the government
took precisely the opposite position is a relevant factor for the Court’s consideration. The
records in which it did so are additional evidence that Section 1226 applies here.
In short, the Court rejects the government’s arguments as unpersuasive and concludes
that Section 1225 does not apply to a noncitizen like the petitioner, who has been living in the
United States while his asylum application is pending, and that his detention can only be
authorized if ICE complied with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The Court next addresses whether the
government violated the petitioner’s due process rights under that section.
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Denial of Due Process
a. Constitutional Due Process Protections Apply
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the Government from
depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment — from government custody, detention, or other forms
of physical restraint — lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citations omitted). It is well established that this
protection extends to noncitizens, including those in removal proceedings. See id. at 693
(“[O]nce an alien enters the country, the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.”); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings” (citation omitted)).
The “essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be
given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). “The Supreme Court has been unambiguous that executive
detention orders, which occur without the procedural protections required in courts of law, call
for the most searching review.” Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020)
(citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781–83, 786 (2008)).
In the face of this precedent, the government cites the “entry fiction doctrine,” and argues
that the petitioner’s “claim that his detention violates procedural due process fails because
applicants for admission (such as Petitioner) have only those due process rights that Congress
provided by statute” and “lack any constitutional due process rights with respect to admission
aside from the rights provided by statute.” (ECF No. 8 at 14–16.) The “entry fiction,” the
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government argues, means that applicants for admission “are treated for due process purposes as
if stopped at the border.” (Id. at 15 (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 139 (2020); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953))
(cleaned up).)
The petitioner counters that cases on which the government relies are inapplicable to this
case, because those applicants were “conclusively denied entry” when they arrived at the border.
(ECF No. 9 at 6 (quoting Al-Thuraya v. Warden, Orange County Correctional Facility, No. 25-
CV-2582, 2025 WL 2858422, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2025)).)
The petitioner has the better argument. “The entry fiction is a doctrine that dictates what
constitutional rights are due to a noncitizen who is physically present in the United States (for
example, because of detention or parole) but hasn’t been lawfully admitted.” J.G.O., 2025 WL
3040142, at *4 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). For example, in Mezei, the Supreme
Court emphasized that “the alien’s extended departure from the United States required him to
seek entry into this country once again. His presence on Ellis Island did not count as entry into
the United States. Hence, he was ‘treated,’ for constitutional purposes, ‘as if stopped at the
border.’” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215). By contrast, “[r]elease
on your own recognizance isn’t parole ‘into the United States,’ which permits a non-citizen to
physically enter the country, subject to a reservation of rights by the Government that it may
continue to treat the non-citizen ‘as if stopped at the border,’” J.G.O., 2025 WL 3040142, at *4
(quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139 (2020)) (citations omitted); “it ‘instead releases a non-
citizen already in the country from domestic detention.’” Id. (quoting Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F.
Supp. 3d 211, 215 (D. Mass. 2025)). Here, the petitioner was released on recognizance from
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domestic detention, not paroled, and then arrested inside the United States (ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 3),
“[a]nd that ma[kes] all the difference.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
The petitioner was in this country when ICE agents arrested him without notice and
transferred him to the MDC. He is therefore, like any other person in this country, entitled to
due process.
b. Due Process Under Section 1226
In this circuit, courts assessing the adequacy of the process afforded in the civil
immigration context apply the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See
Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851. Under that test, the Court balances: (1) “the private interest that
will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
The petitioner argues that his “unexplained re-detention violates due process.” (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 24.) On this point, the government asserts only that the petitioner “was arrested pursuant
to a warrant” and is not entitled to constitutional due process protections. (ECF No. 8 at 9, 14–
16.)
The first Mathews factor — the private interest affected by the government’s action —
overwhelmingly favors the petitioner whose interest is “the most significant liberty interest there
is — the interest in being free from imprisonment.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 25 (quoting Artiga, 2025 WL
2829434, at *8; Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851).) “A person’s liberty cannot be abridged
without ‘adequate procedural protections.’” Artiga, 2025 WL 2829434, at *8 (quoting Zadvydas,
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533 U.S. at 690). The government does not deny that it afforded the petitioner no process before
agents arrested him at the “check-in” appointment — which the government directed him to
attend — and detained him. It is well-established that a “parolee has relied on at least an implicit
promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions,” that
“liberty [interest] is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the [Due Process
clause]” such that “its termination calls for some orderly process.” Savane v. Francis, No. 25-
CV-6666, 2025 WL 2774452, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2025) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 482 (1972)) (alterations in Savane). Here, the agents released the petitioner “provided
[he] comply with [certain] conditions.” (ECF No. 1-5 at 1.)11 The petitioner “report[ed] for [his
November 8, 2025] hearing as directed by the Department of Homeland Security,” (id.), in
compliance with those conditions, and thus relied on the government’s “implicit promise that
[his release] will be revoked only if he fails to live up to [those] conditions.” Savane, 2025 WL
2774452, at *9. Even in cases where revocation of release is discretionary, courts have held that
“a noncitizen has a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody once [release] is
granted.” Id. (collecting cases). The first Mathews factor thus weighs heavily in the petitioner’s
favor.
As for the second Mathews factor — the value of additional safeguards — the record
demonstrates that the government has made no individualized determination to justify detaining
the petitioner. The sole reason in the record — that the petitioner is “subject to be re-detained
now that bedspace is available” (ECF No. 14-2 at 3) — does not justify arresting and holding the
petitioner in the MDC. The government originally released the petitioner on his own
recognizance pursuant to Section 1226 (ECF No. 1-5 at 1), which permits release only after “the
11 The petitioner was released on his own recognizance, not paroled.
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alien [ ] demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger
to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R.
§§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8). Significantly, the government does not argue that the petitioner is
dangerous or a flight risk; indeed, other than citing Section 1225, which as explained above does
not apply, the government gives no justification at all for detaining the petitioner. “In fact,
nothing in the record reflects . . . (1) who made the decision to detain him, (2) when that decision
occurred, (3) on what basis the decision to detain him was made, [or] (4) whether there was any
material change in circumstances with respect to [him] that triggered his detention.” Lopez
Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *11. The value of additional safeguards — an individualized
hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where the government has the burden of showing that the
petitioner’s detention is authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and related regulations — thus also
weighs heavily in the petitioner’s favor.
For the third Mathews factor — the government’s interest — the government’s interest in
detaining individuals under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is valid if it “advances a legitimate governmental
purpose,” such as “‘ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings’ and
‘preventing danger to the community.’” Valdez v. Joyce, No. 25-CV-4627, 2025 WL 1707737,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). As discussed above, the
government does not argue that the petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk, nor
could it do so on this record. The petitioner has no criminal history and has complied with the
conditions of his release on recognizance, including appearing when the government directed
him to do so.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the “ongoing detention of Petitioner with no process at
all, much less prior notice, no showing of changed circumstances, or an opportunity to respond,
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violates his due process rights.” Valdez, 2025 WL 1707737, at *4 (citing Lopez, 2018 WL
2932726, at *15).
Even if Section 1225 Applies, the Petitioner Was Denied Due Process
Even if the mandatory detention provision in Section 1225 applied — and the weight of
authority says that it does not — the government violated the petitioner’s due process rights
because it gave him no process before agents arrested him and detained him. As discussed
above, the petitioner was initially arrested and released on his own recognizance pursuant to
Section 1226. If, however, he was previously arrested and released under Section 1225, his
“initial release into the United States was only legally authorized under § 1182(d)(5)(A) because
that provision is the sole statutory authority under which a noncitizen subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)
may be paroled,” which the government has conceded in other cases. Savane, 2025 WL
2774452, at *7 (citing Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 814–15 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring)). The question is what process is required to revoke parole granted pursuant to
Section 1182.
Applicants for admission, including those noncitizens who are paroled into the United
States for a limited purpose, are “treated, for constitutional purposes, as if stopped at the border.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (citation omitted) (cleaned up). Accordingly, for a paroled applicant
for admission, “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned.” Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (citation omitted); see also Augustin v.
Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 36 (2d. Cir. 1984) (“Although aliens who petition for admission have no
constitutional rights regarding their applications, they do have such statutory rights as Congress
grants.”). The implementing regulations for Section 1182(d)(5)(A) require “written notice to the
alien” prior to parole revocation. Savane, 2025 WL 2774452, at *8 (quoting 8 C.F.R.
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§ 212.5(e)(2)(i)). Additionally, the implementing regulations provide previously-paroled
individuals with process, including:
Any further inspection or hearing shall be conducted under section
235 or 240 of the Act and this chapter, or any order of exclusion,
deportation, or removal previously entered shall be executed. If the
exclusion, deportation, or removal order cannot be executed within
a reasonable time, the alien shall again be released on parole unless
in the opinion of the official listed in paragraph (a) of this section
the public interest requires that the alien be continued in custody.
8 C.F.R. § 215.5(e)(2)(i). There is no suggestion anywhere in the record that the petitioner “was
given any prior notice — much less written notice — that he was going to be arrested following
his court appearance.” Savane, 2025 WL 2774452, at *8 (citing Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-
CV-4212, 2025 WL 2402780 at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025)). Nor has the government
provided the petitioner with the process required pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). And, as
described above, the government has made no individualized determinations as to the petitioner
to justify his ongoing detention. The Court therefore finds that even if Section 1225 applies, the
government violated the petitioner’s due process rights because it did not comply with the
statutorily required process for revoking parole.
Scope of Relief
Under either section of the INA, the government’s detention of the petitioner in
November was invalid because it denied him due process. The “typical remedy” for “unlawful
executive detention” is “of course, release.” Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008); see also
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484–85 (1973) (“The traditional function of the writ [of
habeas corpus] is to secure release from illegal custody;” it is the “usual remedy by which a man
is restored again to his liberty, if he ha[s] been against law deprived of it”).
Here, the constitutional violation the petitioner suffered — the government’s failure to
conduct any kind of individualized assessment before detaining him, failure to make any
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showing of changed circumstances, and failure to provide him with an opportunity to respond —
renders any post-deprivation review by an immigration judge inadequate. That is especially true
because “[d]etention under § 1226(a) is frequently prolonged because it continues until all
proceedings and appeals are concluded.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 852.
The government’s ongoing detention of the petitioner, in the face of this complete failure
of process, entitles him to immediate release. Pending a final determination in his removal
proceedings, Mr. Ye will remain free of detention or any other restraint under the immigration
laws of the United States to which he was not subject upon his release on recognizance in 2023.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the petitioner’s detention without an individualized custody
determination violates the INA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ECF No. 1, is granted.
The government is directed to release the petitioner from custody within 24 hours of this
Order. The government is further directed to return to the petitioner any and all funds and/or
property — including the “$927.00 USD” — that was seized from the petitioner at the time of
arrest. (ECF No. 14-2 at 3 (listing Receipt #1493598 and Receipt #1493597).) The government
is directed to certify compliance with the Court’s Order by filing a letter on the docket no later
than 10:00 p.m. on December 9, 2025. The parties are directed to file status letters regarding the
petitioner’s December 9, 2025 hearing by 5:00 p.m. on December 11, 2025. The Court further
orders that the petitioner shall not be re-detained without notice and an opportunity to be heard at
a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, where the government will have
the burden of showing that his detention is authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Should the
petitioner seek an award of reasonable fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act,
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he may do so by filing a letter application on the docket within thirty days of this Order. The
Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment consistent with the Order and close the
case.
SO ORDERED.
___________________________
ANN M. DONNELLY
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
December 8, 2025
s/Ann M. Donnelly
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