Stephen v. Public Partnerships LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DARYL STEPHEN,
Plaintiff,
-against-
PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
25-CV-3895 (NRM) (LKE)
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Daryl Stephen, proceeding pro se, seeks a preliminary injunction in
this action against his current employer, Public Partnership LLC. 	For the reasons
discussed below, the motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff 	Daryl 	Stephen 	brings 	this 	action 	against 	his 	employer, 	Public
Partnerships LLC (“PPL”). 	PPL is a fiscal intermediary for the Consumer Directed
Personal Assistance Program (“CDPAP”), a New York Medicaid program that allows
family members to serve as in-home caregivers. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10, ECF No. 13.1
1 The New York State Department of Health website explains that the
Consumer Directed Personal Assistance Program “allows Medicaid members who are
eligible for home care services to choose and hire their own personal caregiver, or
‘personal assistant.’” 	Consumer Directed Personal Assistance Program (CDPAP),
N.Y. Dep’t of Health, available at https://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/
program/longterm/cdpap/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2026).
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Stephen has been employed by PPL as a CDPAP caregiver for a diabetic family
member since April 1, 2025. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
On July 14, 2025, Stephen commenced this action against PPL. 	Am. Compl.
Stephen alleges that PPL’s payroll system is inadequate in two main ways. 	First,
Stephen alleges that PPL requires employees to record their hours through an
electronic timesheet app (the “Electronic Visit Verification” or “EVV” system) that
malfunctions regularly, leading to wage delays. 	Id. ¶¶ 13–16. 	Second, Stephen
alleges that PPL enforces a “rigid weekly payroll cutoff at 11:59 p.m. Saturdays” that
also leads to wages being delayed. 	Id. ¶ 16. As a result of the system malfunctions
and weekly payroll cutoff, Stephen alleges, he has experienced “late wages and
combined paychecks.” Id. ¶ 17. Stephen alleges that these delays led to other harms,
including delayed or reduced funding of medical and transportation benefits, missed
or delayed prescriptions, approximately $500 in unspecified late fees, a missed rent
payment in July 2025, and emotional damages. Id. ¶¶ 17–18a. Stephen claims that
the wage delays violate the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York Labor
Law 	(“NYLL”), 	and 	constitute 	breach 	of 	contract, 	negligence, 	and 	intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 	Id. ¶¶ 27–62. 	Finally, Stephen alleges that PPL
retaliated against him in violation of the FLSA and NYLL by “cutting off technical
support” and “[s]hifting all communications to Defendant’s legal counsel” after he
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brought this case. 	Id at ¶¶ 71–77. 	He seeks damages in an amount not less than
$500,000, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 25–27.2
On September 24, 2025, Stephen moved for a preliminary injunction that
would:
1) Requir[e] 	Defendant, 	within 	30 	days, 	to 	correct 	or 	provide 	a
functional alternative to its defective EVV system;
2) Extend[] Defendant’s payroll submission cutoff by at least 24 hours
beyond 11:59 p.m. Saturday;
3) Allow[] caregivers the option of separate paychecks for late-recorded
hours rather than bundled pay;
4) Adjust[] the [benefits plan] to provide rolling or pro-rata funding of
benefits . . . when hours are delayed; and
5) Order[] Defendant to file quarterly compliance reports for one year,
with the first due within 90 days.
Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“PI Mot.”) at 1–2, ECF No. 14.
In support of his motion, Stephen submitted a declaration in which he states
that “on multiple dates in 2025,” he encountered an error message when he attempted
to log in to the EVV system, that “[e]ach time the EVV system failed, [his] hours were
not processed on time, which delayed [his] wages and sometimes forced multiple
weeks of pay to be bundled together,” and that “[t]hese issues occur weekly.” Decl. of
Sep. 24, 2025, PI Mot. Ex. A at 2, 5, ECF No. 14-1. Stephen also declared that because
his wages were “delayed or bundled,” he suffered a denial of timely benefits funding,
missed 	a 	student 	loan 	payment, 	missed 	or 	delayed 	filling 	prescriptions, 	lost
approximately $50 in paid time off, and incurred an overdraft fee on his bank account.
Id. at 4. In reply, Stephen submitted an additional declaration stating that an EVV
2 Page numbers are given to the numbers generated by the Electronic Case
Filing System (“ECF”) unless otherwise stated.
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malfunction on September 27 and September 28 delayed his wages until October 1,
2025. Decl. of Oct. 31, 2025, at 6, ECF No. 27.
PPL opposes the motion in full. 	Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“PI
Opp’n”), ECF No. 23. In opposition to the proposed preliminary injunction, PPL relies
on a declaration from Escalation Manager Bennedette Mendez. Mendez Decl., ECF
No. 23-5. Mendez affirmed that there is no requirement that caregivers submit their
time by 11:59 p.m. Saturday. Id. ¶ 11. Instead, there is a weekly payroll cutoff, such
that hours worked before 11:59 p.m. Saturday count towards the week’s pay, and
hours worked after 12:00 am Sunday count towards the following week. 	Id. ¶¶ 14–
15. 	Mendez additionally alleges that Stephen’s delayed wages resulted not from
system malfunctions but from his own failure to timely submit his timesheets. 	Id.
¶¶ 16–21. 	In any case, Mendez states, there are at least four mechanisms for
caregivers to submit their hours. 	Id. ¶ 22. 	Finally, Mendez claims, there is “no
outstanding payment amount owed to [Stephen].” Id. ¶ 27. Therefore, PPL argues,
Stephen has neither shown that he faces irreparable, imminent harm, nor that he is
likely to succeed on the merits. PI Opp’n at 7–17. PPL also argues that the requested
injunction would not be in the public interest; that the balance of equities weighs
against the requested injunction; and that Stephen has failed to add a necessary
party, namely the person receiving home health care (the “Consumer”). Id. at 17–24.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Stephen seeks a preliminary injunction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). 	A
preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not
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be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”
Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)). 	A plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish the following elements:
(1) [I]rreparable harm; (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits,
or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of its claims to
make them fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of the hardships
tipping decidedly in favor of the moving party; and (3) that a preliminary
injunction is in the public interest.
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d Cir. 2015)
(citation modified). Additionally, when a movant seeks a mandatory injunction that
“will alter, rather than maintain the status quo . . . the moving party must show a
clear or substantial likelihood of success.” 	Beal v. Stern, 184 F.3d 117, 122–23 (2d
Cir. 1999) (citation modified). 	Such a movant must also “make a strong showing of
irreparable harm” and that “the preliminary injunction is in the public interest.”
Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 650 (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Irreparable Harm
The Second Circuit has “described a showing of irreparable harm as the sine
qua non for preliminary injunctive relief.” 	USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon,
66 F.3d 1272, 1294–95 (2d Cir. 1995). That is because the “purpose of a preliminary
injunction . . . is only to preserve the status quo by preventing during the pendency
of the suit the occurrence of that irreparable sort of harm which the movant fears will
occur.” Kane v. De Blasio, 19 F.4th 152, 163 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation modified). Thus,
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“the moving party must first demonstrate that irreparable harm would be likely . . .
before the other requirements for the issuance of a preliminary injunction will be
considered.” JBR, Inc. v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., 618 F. App’x 31, 33 (2d Cir.
2015) (citation modified) (quoting Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d
227, 234 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Here, although the cause of the alleged wage delays is contested, the parties
agree that payment of Stephen’s wages is sometimes delayed from one week to the
next. 	See Mendez Decl. ¶ 20 (explaining that “[t]ime submissions that are entered
past the payroll submission deadline cannot be processed for payment until the
following payroll period”); id. ¶ 15 (explaining that hours worked after 12:00 a.m.
Sunday are “considered part of the next work week for payroll purposes”); Decl. of
Sep. 24, 2025 ¶ 6 (claiming that EVV malfunctions “sometimes forced multiple weeks
of pay to be bundled together”). Stephen argues that such wage delays have resulted
and will continue to result in irreparable harms. Decl. of Sep. 24, 2025 ¶¶ 9–11. In
particular, he claims that wage delays led to a missed student loan payment, forced
him to delay filling a prescription, caused him to lose about $50 in paid time off, and
led to an overdraft fee on his bank account.3 	Id. ¶ 11. 	Stephen supports his
declaration with exhibits. First, he submits a student loan account balance statement
in his name, dated May 20, 2025, which shows a regular monthly payment amount
3 In his reply, Plaintiff also argues that the wage delays threaten his housing
and employment stability. Pl. Reply in Support of Prelim Inj. (“PI Reply”), ECF No.
27 at 3. 	Because these statements are unsworn, the Court does not accord them
evidentiary weight at this stage.
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of $51.28, a next payment date of June 11, 2025, and an “amount already paid for this
month” of $0.00. 	PI Mot Ex. B at 12, ECF No. 14-1. 	The student loan balance
statement does not list a missed payment. 	Id. 	Second, he submits a document
showing a $34 overdraft fee dated August 20, 2025, on a bank account in his name.
PI Mot. Ex. B-1 at 15, ECF No. 14-1. 	Third, he submits a benefits plan document
describing the PPL Flex Benefit Plan, which “provides [employees] with a benefit card
. . . that is funded with money each month” that can be used for medical expenses,
cell phone bills, transit, and more. Benefits Plan, PI Mot. Ex. X at 21, ECF No. 14-1.
Although the Amended Complaint alleges that benefits are “based on reported hours,”
Am. Compl. ¶ 18, the plan document does not state whether or how benefits funding
is affected by when wages are paid, Benefits Plan.
PPL argues that Stephen’s motion should be denied because the alleged harms
— delayed wages and benefits — are, by definition, money damages and compensable
at law. PI Opp’n at 15. “Where there is an adequate remedy at law, such as an award
of 	money 	damages, 	injunctions 	are 	unavailable 	except 	in 	extraordinary
circumstances.” Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 118 (2d
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th
266, 294 (2d Cir. 2021) (“It is well settled . . . that adverse employment consequences
are not the type of harm that usually warrants injunctive relief because economic
harm resulting from employment actions is typically compensable with money
damages.”). As the Second Circuit has held, “the temporary loss of income, ultimately
to be recovered, does not usually constitute irreparable injury.” Jayaraj v. Scappini,
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66 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974))
(vacating preliminary injunction barring city from terminating employee and finding
that harms related to wrongful termination would not be irreparable).
However, that general rule is not without its exceptions. 	As relevant here,
“when the outright denial or undue delay in the provision of subsistence benefits” —
those that “provide for the most basic needs” — is at issue, courts have found
irreparable harm. Islam v. Cuomo, 475 F. Supp. 3d 144, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (LDH)
(finding irreparable harm for rideshare drivers seeking unemployment benefits); see
also Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. NYNEX Corp., 898 F.2d 887, 891 (2d Cir.
1990) (finding that termination of medical benefits threatened irreparable harm of
denial of medical care). Where a plaintiff “has limited financial means and is living
nearly paycheck to paycheck . . . even a small amount of lost income in one month”
could lead to irreparable harm. 	Vidal v. Advanced Care Staffing, LLC, No. 22-CV-
05535 (NRM) (MMH), 2023 WL 2783251, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2023), aff’d, 2024
WL 980634 (2d Cir. Mar. 7, 2024).
Here, the overdraft fee on Stephen’s bank account provides some support for
his contention that he is living under conditions of financial insecurity. On the other
hand, the Court notes that Stephen paid the $405 filing fee in this action on July 14,
2025, Filing Fee, ECF No. 2, and has not otherwise submitted evidence of his savings,
income, or household expenses. At this stage, the Court cannot conclude that Stephen
is living “paycheck to paycheck,” Vidal, 2023 WL 2783251, at *22, such that the
delays in his wages jeopardize his “basic needs,” Islam, 471 F. Supp 3d at 153. This
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conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Stephen waited over ten weeks after filing
this action to move for a preliminary injunction. 	Cf. Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v.
Luigino’s, Inc., 423 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We have found delays of as little as
ten weeks sufficient to defeat the presumption of irreparable harm that is essential
to the issuance of a preliminary injunction.”) (collecting cases). Accordingly, Stephen
has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is not granted preliminary
injunctive relief, particularly in light of the general rule that where (as here) a
plaintiff complains of injuries compensable through an award of money damages if
he prevails, that standard is rarely met. 	Because the present record on Stephen’s
claimed financial insecurity is limited, however, the Court will also address Stephen’s
likelihood of success on the merits.
II. 	Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Because Stephen requests a mandatory injunction that would alter the status
quo, see PI Mot. at 1–2, it is his burden to show “a clear or substantial likelihood of
success” on the merits. 	Beal, 184 F.3d at 123 (citation modified). 	The requested
injunction must be denied because Stephen has not shown a likelihood of success on
any of his claims.
A. 	Alleged EVV System Malfunctions
As an initial matter, the Court finds that Stephen has not shown that PPL’s
alleged EVV system malfunctions prevent him from reporting his hours worked and
being paid in a timely fashion. 	In a sworn statement, Stephen claims that “on
multiple dates in 2025,” he encountered an error message when he attempted to log
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his time, each of which led to delayed wages, and that “[t]hese issues occur weekly.”
Decl. of Sep. 24, 2025 ¶¶ 3–5, 15. Stephen also claims in a supplemental declaration
that a malfunction in the timesheet app on September 27, 2025, and September 28,
2025, delayed his wages until October 1, 2025. 	Decl. of Oct. 31, 2025, at 6. 	To
substantiate this alleged wage delay, Stephen includes two screenshots of the PPL
EVV phone application, the first of which displays “in process payroll” for the weeks
of April 27, 2025, and September 21, 2025, and the second of which displays “in-
process timesheets” listing “no data found” under Stephen’s name. 	Id. at 8–9.
Stephen argues that the screenshots “support[] the allegation of recurring portal
synchronization failures described in Amended Complaint” and “demonstrate[] direct
interference with payroll authorization for that week.” 	Id. at 7. 	The Amended
Complaint, however, does not describe portal synchronization failures, and the
paragraph to which Stephen refers describes delays caused by the Saturday 11:59
p.m. payroll cutoff. Id. (citing Am. Compl. ¶ 16). Moreover, because the screenshots
are neither dated or timestamped, they do not prove either that the payroll cutoff led
to delayed wages or that the EVV system experienced synchronization failures.
Meanwhile, PPL argues that any wage delays were caused by Stephen’s own
actions and has presented evidence to support that claim. 	In a sworn declaration,
Mendez attests that Stephen’s delayed wages resulted solely from his own failure to
timely submit the data necessary to process his wages, and that while PPL attempted
to troubleshoot Stephen’s issues with the EVV system, Stephen “failed to participate
in productive dialogue.” 	Mendez Decl. ¶¶ 23–24. 	Mendez also claims that PPL
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maintains at least four different mechanisms for caregivers to submit their hours,
i.e., Stephen need not rely on the EVV system alone if he is having technical
difficulties. Id. ¶ 22. Indeed, Stephen’s timesheets show that he submitted his hours
worked one to a few days late on several occasions. Timesheets, PI Opp’n Ex. 2, ECF
No. 23-2. On some of those occasions, Stephen submitted his hours worked by paper
and explained that he “did not have a phone or tablet.” Id. At other times, Stephen
submitted his hours manually and noted that “[t]he app was not working.” Id. These
timesheets corroborate Mendez’s statement that PPL provides multiple timekeeping
options to caregivers. 	Mendez Decl. ¶ 22. 	They also appear to show that Stephen
was able to submit his hours manually within a day or two of performing the work
after alleged system malfunctions. 	Accordingly, without prejudice to raising these
claims later in the case, the Court finds that Stephen has not shown that EVV
malfunctions prevent him from recording his hours.
B. 	FLSA and NYLL Wage Delay Claims
Stephen claims that the EVV system malfunctions and 11:59 p.m. Saturday
cutoff lead to wage delays in violation of the FLSA and the NYLL.4 	Stephen is
4 The Amended Complaint also alleges that Stephen was underpaid, but
Stephen submits no sworn statement or other evidence to that effect in the instant
motion. Although “[t]he admissibility of [evidence] goes to weight” at the preliminary
injunction stage, Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010), the
allegations in the Amended Complaint are not evidence, see Yupa v. Country Stone &
Fence Corp., No. 14-CV-7384 (DRH), 2017 WL 27957, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,
2017). Therefore, the Court accepts Mendez’s statement that Stephen has been paid
in full as uncontradicted and does not consider any underpayment claims at this time.
Mendez Decl. ¶ 27.
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unlikely to succeed on the merits that either the Saturday weekly rollover or the
alleged EVV malfunctions violate the FLSA or the NYLL.
1. 	NYLL Wage Delays
The NYLL provides that employers of manual workers must pay employees
weekly. 	NYLL § 191(1)(A)(i); see also Gamboa v. Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 719 F.
Supp. 3d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (summarizing NYLL requirements). PPL concedes
that Stephen is a manual worker as defined by the NYLL and therefore must be paid
weekly, but argues that because Stephen’s wage delays were self-inflicted, they do
not violate the law. PI Opp’n at 20–21. The Court need not reach that issue, however,
because even if true, the delays Stephen claims do not violate the provisions of the
NYLL. 	In particular, the NYLL provides that manual workers must be paid “not
later than seven calendar days after the end of the week in which the wages are
earned.” 	NYLL § 191(1)(A)(i). 	Here, Stephen does not submit any evidence from
which the Court could conclude that EVV system malfunctions caused his payments
to be delayed beyond seven days after the end of the week in which his wages were
earned. See Decl. of Sep. 24, 2025 ¶ 6 (claiming that EVV malfunctions “sometimes
forced multiple weeks of pay to be bundled together”); Decl. of Oct. 31, 2025, at 6
(claiming that wages were delayed between three and four days). 	Moreover, as
Mendez explains, PPL pays caregivers weekly for all hours worked before midnight
on Saturday, and any hours worked after that time are counted towards the following
week’s payroll. 	Mendez Decl. at 2. 	This payroll structure, which Stephen does not
dispute, see Decl. of Sep. 24, 2025 ¶ 7, would not cause wages to be delayed more than
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seven days after the end of the workweek in which they were earned. 	By contrast,
the injunction Stephen requests — that PPL “process all hours submitted within one
(1) day after the workweek ends for payment in the same weekly cycle,” PI Reply at
4 — reaches beyond what the NYLL requires and is unlikely to succeed on the merits.
2. 	FLSA Wage Delays
Stephen also has not shown a likelihood of success on his claims brought under
the FLSA. 	As PPL acknowledges, the FLSA includes an implicit prompt payment
requirement. PI Opp’n at 18; see also Rosenbaum v. Meir, 658 F. Supp. 3d 140, 147
(E.D.N.Y. 2023) (clarifying that complaint “does not allege overtime claims in
violation of the FLSA but rather contends Defendants violated the Act by failing to
issue prompt payment.”); Rogers v. City of Troy, 148 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting
that 	courts 	have 	“long 	interpreted 	the 	statute 	to 	include 	a 	prompt 	payment
requirement”). 	However, the Second Circuit has held that the prompt payment
requirement does not bar an employer from adopting a payroll system that delays
wages as much as two weeks, as long as it “(a) is [adopted] for a legitimate business
reason; (b) does not result in an unreasonable delay in payment; (c) is intended to be
permanent; and (d) does not have the effect of evading the FLSA’s substantive
minimum wage or overtime requirements.” Rogers, 148 F.3d at 58; see also id. at 57
(approving lagged payroll system that “still yielded wages that conformed with the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the [FLSA]”).
Here, Stephen has not submitted any evidence that either the 11:59 p.m.
rollover or the EVV system were not adopted for a legitimate business reason, would
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“result in an unreasonable delay” of wages, were not intended to be permanent, or
would allow Defendant to evade the substantive provisions of the FLSA. See id. Even
assuming Stephen had shown that his wage delays were caused by EVV system
malfunctions, minor delays of one to a few days do not amount to a violation of the
substantive provisions of the Act. 	Cf. Coley v. Vannguard Urb. Improvement Ass’n,
Inc., No. 12-CV-5565 (PKC) (RER), 2016 WL 7217641, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2016)
(finding plausible FLSA prompt payment claim where wages were chronically
delayed and were delayed as much as twelve weeks). The same is true of a Saturday
midnight rollover that causes hours worked after midnight to be paid in the following
week’s payroll. 	See Mendez Decl. ¶¶ 19–20. 	Thus, Stephen has not carried his
burden of showing a likelihood of success on his FLSA claims.
C. 	Breach of Contract and Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
Stephen 	argues 	that 	the 	wage 	delays 	violated 	a 	Memorandum 	of
Understanding (“MOU”) between the Consumer receiving CDPAP care and PPL. PI
Reply at 2.5 Stephen also asserts that he is a third-party beneficiary of that contract
and may sue to enforce it. 	Id. 	PPL argues that Stephen is not a third-party
beneficiary. PI Opp’n at 14–15. The Court need not resolve this question, however,
because Stephen has not shown that PPL is in violation of the MOU.
5 In his Amended Complaint, Stephen also argues that he was a third-party
beneficiary of PPL’s contract with the New York State Department of Health. 	Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 40, 56–62. Stephen does not make that argument in the instant motion,
and because PPL’s alleged agreement with the Department of Health is not in
evidence, the Court cannot assess his likelihood of success on it.
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As relevant here, the MOU provides that PPL will “issu[e] paychecks to the
consumer’s [caregivers].” 	Mem. of Understanding at 4–5, ECF No. 23-3. 	The MOU
does not set a payment time, and the delays Plaintiff alleges do not amount to a
violation of any express or implied contractual obligation. Nor does Stephen provide
any authority stating that payment delays of the kind he alleges amount to a violation
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 	Therefore, he has not shown that he is
likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.
D. 	Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Stephen 	alleges 	that 	PPL’s 	wage 	systems 	have 	caused 	negligent 	and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44–55. These claims are
not likely to succeed on the merits.
The Court must construe Stephen’s submissions “liberally” to “raise the
strongest arguments they suggest.” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d
154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 	Therefore, the Court construes Stephen’s
negligence claims to be based on PPL’s alleged failure to maintain a functioning
payroll system. 	However, as already discussed, Stephen has not carried his burden
at this stage of showing that the EVV system is defective. 	Additionally, while
Stephen alleges that he “suffered severe and ongoing emotional distress requiring
psychological evaluation and treatment,” and that he “intends to submit a forensic
report” documenting these injuries, he has not provided any evidence of emotional
distress in his motion. 	Am. Compl. ¶¶ 53–54. 	Nor has Stephen shown that PPL’s
conduct was “extreme and outrageous” as required to support a claim for intentional
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infliction of emotional distress. See Higgins v. Metro-N. R. Co., 318 F.3d 422, 426 (2d
Cir. 2003). Accordingly, on the present record, Stephen is not likely to succeed on his
claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
E. 	Retaliation
Finally, Stephen’s retaliation claim is unlikely to succeed. Stephen claims that
PPL retaliated against him by informing him in an email that he was not entitled to
seek troubleshooting assistance, and instead that “all further communications would
go through PPL’s legal counsel.” Decl. of Sep. 24, 2025 ¶¶ 12–14. Stephen therefore
seeks an immediate order that “PPL and its counsel shall not interfere with Plaintiff’s
ability to communicate with PPL’s technical, payroll, and benefits support personnel”
for the purpose of resolving wage payment issues. PI Reply at 4.
The full email exchange, however, contradicts Stephen’s version of events.
After counsel for PPL asked Stephen to “cease and desist any communications
directly to PPL regarding your lawsuit,” Stephen informed defense counsel that he
had refused several calls from a PPL representative regarding the EVV failures,
which he said “appeared aimed at eliciting self-incriminating statements.” PI Opp’n
Ex. 4 at 2, ECF No. 23-4. Defense counsel then instructed Stephen to “[p]lease keep
working with [technical support] to resolve [the issues with submitting your time]”
and explained that “the only restriction is that you should not discuss the lawsuit
directly with PPL.” Id. at 3. Defense counsel followed up with another email to the
same effect. Id. at 4. Counsel’s emails directly contradict Stephen’s claims that PPL
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cut him off from technical support. Thus, Stephen’s retaliation claim is not supported
(and, indeed, appears to be refuted by) the evidence now before the Court.
CONCLUSION
Because Stephen has not carried his burden of showing that any of his claims
are likely to succeed on the merits, the preliminary injunction is DENIED.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from
this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status
is denied for the purpose of an appeal. 	See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 444–45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to pro
se plaintiff Daryl Stephen and to note the mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: January 22, 2026
Brooklyn, NY
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