Allison Lending, LLC v. Landa App 3 LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ALLISON LENDING, LLC,
Plaintiff,
-against-
LANDA APP 3 LLC, et. al.,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-cv-01939(EK)(MMH)
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Defendants Landa App 3 LLC and Yishai Cohen move for a
temporary restraining order in this pending foreclosure action.
Complaint, ECF No. 1; Defs.’ Emergency Decl. in Supp. of TRO
(“Defs.’ Emergency Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-6, ECF No. 36-1. 	The action was
filed in April, and the docket reflects that defendant Yishai
Cohen was served on April 28 and defendant Landa App 3 on June
25. 	ECF Nos. 10, 12. 	Appearing for the first time on November
10, defendants now assert that they did not receive notice of
the clerk’s July entry of default.1
As to the merits, the defendants contend that
plaintiff improperly acquired Landa App 3 at an auction in
August and proceeded to “exercise dominion over the subject
membership interests and real property” in a variety of ways,
1 However, the docket indicates that Magistrate Judge Henry ordered
plaintiff to mail defendants the court’s July entry of default and related
docket order, and that plaintiff did so. 	ECF Nos. 28-29.
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including by collecting rent payments from tenants. 	Defs.’
Emergency Decl. ¶¶ 3-9. 	The current record does not permit a
high-confidence assessment of whether this is consistent with
the fact that no final order of foreclosure has issued. 	At this
point, the defendants seek a TRO that would, among other things,
restrain plaintiff from “disposing of the real property known as
1363 Hancock Street” in Brooklyn. 	Defs.’ Order to Show Cause
with TRO 3, ECF No. 36.
A TRO is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy.”
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam).2 	To
obtain a TRO, a party must show: “(1) a likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) that [the movant] is likely to suffer
irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction; (3) that the
balance of hardships tips in the [movant’s] favor; and (4) that
the public interest would not be disserved by the issuance of
the injunction.” 	Capstone Logistics Holdings, Inc. v.
Navarrete, 736 F. App'x 25, 25–26 (2d Cir. 2018).
Defendants have not met these requirements. 	First and
foremost, they have not established irreparable harm — “the
single most important prerequisite for the issuance” of
injunctive relief. 	Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp.,
559 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2009). 	To show irreparable harm, a
2 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
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movant must establish “a continuing harm which cannot be
adequately redressed by final relief on the merits and for which
money damages cannot provide adequate compensation.” 	Wickapogue
1 LLC v. Blue Castle (Cayman) Ltd., 657 F. Supp. 3d 234, 239
(E.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Wickapogue 1”). 	Defendants argue that they
will lose their “ownership and possessory interest” in the
property if relief is not granted. 	Defs.’ Emergency Decl. ¶ 6.
The loss of an interest in property is not sufficient
to constitute irreparable harm. 	See Sung Chul Lee v. Choi, 140
F. App'x 299, 300 (2d Cir. 2005). 	There are exceptions to this
rule, such as where the property is a primary residence or its
sale would have “catastrophic” implications. 	G.L.A.D. Enters.,
LLC v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. as Tr. for Am. Home Mortg.
Inv. Tr. 2006-1, No. 23-cv-3985, 2023 WL 5127835, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2023); see also Medgar Evers Houses Assocs.,
L.P. v. Carro, No. 01-CV-6107, 2001 WL 1456190, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 6, 2001). 	But loss of a commercial interest in property,
which is what the defendants allege, does not qualify for
irreparable harm.
Thus, for example, the mortgagor in Atlas MF Mezzanine
Borrower, LLC v. Macquarie Texas Loan Holder, LLC, sought to
enjoin a foreclosure sale. 	No. 17-cv-1138, 2017 WL 729128, at
*1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2017) (“Atlas”). 	The court held that
the movant’s injury was ultimately compensable because “the
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interest in the real estate is commercial, and the harm it fears
is the loss of its investment” rather than the loss of a home or
unique property. 	Id. 	On that basis, the court found no
irreparable injury. 	Id. 	Similarly, in Wickapogue 1, the sale
of the movant’s 100% membership interest in an LLC did not
constitute irreparable harm, because the interest at issue was
in commercial real estate. 	Wickapogue 1, 657 F. Supp. 3d at
240. 	Defendants’ ownership interest here is plainly commercial
in nature because it concerns a residential rental property.
See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of TRO (“Defs.’ Mem.”) ¶ 72, ECF No.
36-3. 	Landa App 3 manages the real property as a rental
property at which tenants pay rent. 	Aff. of Yishai Cohen
(“Cohen Aff.”) ¶¶ 24-26, ECF No. 36-2; Tenant Emails, ECF No.
36-6.
Defendants’ claim of irreparable harm is also
undermined by their delay in seeking relief. 	Tom Doherty
Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 39 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“A district court should generally consider delay in assessing
irreparable harm.”). 	Defendants assert that they learned of the
contested August sale on September 10, but they did not seek
injunctive relief until November 10. 	Defs.’ Mem. ¶ 8; Tenant
Emails, ECF No. 36-6. 	Further, they advise that the sale of
“100% membership interest in Landa App 3” has already occurred,3
3 The ship has sailed, so to speak.
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which undercuts the claim of “imminent” harm. 	Affirmation and
Certificate of Sale, ECF No. 36-10; Mullins v. City of New York,
626 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The standard for preliminary
injunctive relief requires a threat of irreparable harm, not
that irreparable harm already have occurred.”).
Defendants have also not shown that the balance of
hardships tips in their favor. 	Defendants have asked the Court
to, among other requests, enjoin plaintiff from “representing
any managerial rights over Landa App 3 . . . .” 	Defs.’ Order to
Show Cause with TRO 1. 	The court in Wickapogue 1 confronted a
similar situation. 	That movant sought to prevent a sale of its
membership interest in an LLC that served as collateral.
Wickapogue 1, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 237. 	The court found the
balance of hardships weighed against the movant because the harm
“comes from business realities” that did not justify “court
intervention.” 	Id. at 242. 	Here, too, defendants’ requests do
not provide a suitable basis for intervention at this stage,
especially considering the broad and vague nature of defendants’
multiple requests. 	See Ferri v. Berkowitz, 293 F.R.D. 144, 145
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing prior order “declin[ing] to enter the
requested injunctive relief as far too vague and broad to be
justified or enforced”).
Finally, defendants do not address the question of
whether an injunction is in the public interest at all.
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The request for a TRO is denied. 	A hearing will take
place before Judge Komitee on November 20, 2025, at 10:00 a.m.,
in Courtroom 6G North, on the request for a preliminary
injunction.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	November 16, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
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