Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Tacoaman et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------- x
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
x
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
No. 25-CV-1698-MKB-JRC
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
COMPANY, as Trustee of the HOME EQUITY
MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET-BACKED TRUST
Series INABS 2006-D, HOME EQUITY
MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET-BACKED
CERTIFICATES Series INABS 2006-D under the
POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT
DATED SEPT 1, 2006,
Plaintiff,
-against-
SEGUNDO F. TACOAMAN A/K/A SEGUNDO
FRANCISCO TACOAMAN A/K/A SEGUNDO
TACOAMAN; CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA),
N.A.; COMMISSIONER OF LABOR OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK; EXTECH BUILDING
MATERIALS, INC.; “JOHN DOE #1” through
“JOHN DOE #12,” the last twelve names being
fictitious and unknown to plaintiff, the persons or
parties intended being the tenants, occupants,
persons or corporations, if any, having or claiming
an interest in or lien upon the Subject Property
described in the Complaint,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES R. CHO, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee of the Home Equity
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust Series INABS 2006-D, Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates Series INABS 2006-D under the Pooling And Servicing Agreement dated
Sept 1, 2006 (“plaintiff”) brings this foreclosure action against defendants Segundo F. Tacoaman
(“Tacoaman”), Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. (“Citibank”), Commissioner of Labor of the State
of New York (“Commissioner”), and Extech Building Materials, Inc. (“Extech”), pursuant to
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 1 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
New York’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”), Article 13.1 See Compl.
¶ 1, Dkt. 1. Plaintiff seeks damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and a judgment of foreclosure and
sale. Id. at Wherefore Clause; Prop. J.; see generally Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Default J.
(“Pl.’s Mem.”), Dkt. 19-20. Upon plaintiff’s application and in light of defendants’ failure to
appear in or otherwise defend this action, the Clerk of the Court noted the default of the
defendants on May 27, 2025. See Clerk’s Entry of Default, Dkt. 18.
Currently pending before this Court, on a referral from Chief U.S. District Judge Margo
K. Brodie, is plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. See Order Referring Motion dated June 27,
2025; Mot. for Default J., Dkt. 19. For the reasons set forth below, this Court respectfully
recommends granting the motion and awarding plaintiff damages and additional relief as
described below.
Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
The following facts are drawn from plaintiff’s Complaint, supporting affidavits, and
accompanying exhibits, and are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. See Bricklayers &
Allied Craftworkers Loc. 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 187-89 (2d Cir.
2015).
Plaintiff brought this diversity action to foreclose on a mortgage encumbering 92-29 76th
Street, Woodhaven, New York 11421 in Queens County (the “Subject Property”). See Compl.
¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that it is a citizen of the State of California. See id. ¶ 2.
On July 26, 2006, Tacoaman executed and delivered a promissory note in the principal
1 The Court recommends granting plaintiff’s request to dismiss the claims brought against “John
Doe #1” though “John Doe #12,” who were never served. See Notice of Motion, Dkt. 19;
[Proposed] Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale (“Prop. J.”) at 7, Dkt. 19-21. The Court further
recommends amending the caption to substitute “Citibank, National Association” for “Citibank
(South Dakota) N.A. See Prop. J. at 7.
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 2 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
amount of $430,000.00, plus interest (the “Note”), secured by a mortgage on the Subject
Property (the “Mortgage”), to IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. See Compl. ¶ 10; Note, Dkt. 1-5;
Mortgage, Dkt. 1-6. On the same day, Tacoaman executed and delivered the Mortgage to
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as mortgagee and as nominee for
IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., its successors and assigns, which was duly recorded in the Office of the
City Register for the City of New York, on August 10, 2006. See Compl. ¶ 11; Mortgage, Dkt.
1-6. Thereafter, on January 28, 2008, the Mortgage was assigned from MERS, as mortgagee and
as nominee for IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., to IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., which assignment was recorded
in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, on February 15, 2008. See
Assignment of Mortgage, Dkt. 1-8 at ECF page2 3. By written assignment dated June 19, 2010,
the Mortgage was assigned from IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. to plaintiff, which assignment was
recorded in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, on September 28, 2010. See
Compl. ¶ 13; Assignment of Mortgage, Dkt. 1-8 at ECF page 6. The Note was transferred via
allonge indorsed in blank. See Compl. ¶ 14; Dkt. 1-5 at ECF page 8.
After Tacoaman defaulted on the original loan, by loan modification agreement effective
on July 1, 2014, the missed payments were deferred to the loan’s maturity date, and the principal
balance increased to $643,546.98. See Compl. ¶ 12; Home Affordable Modification Agreement
(“Loan Modification Agreement”), Dkt. 1-7. Under the modification, interest would continue to
accrue only on $261,200.00 of the principal balance. See Loan Modification Agreement, Dkt. 1-
7 at ECF page 3. Under the Mortgage and Note, Tacoaman was obligated to make monthly
principal and interest payments, plus taxes and insurance. See Compl. ¶ 10. Under the
2 References to the page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic case filing system appear
as “ECF page.”
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 3 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
Mortgage, if Tacoaman failed to make a payment within thirty days of the due date, he would be
in default. See Mortgage ¶ 22. If Tacoaman defaulted, the Note holder could exercise the right
to force immediate payment of the full amount of the remaining principal, all accrued interest,
and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred. Id. ¶ 22. Since October 1, 2024, plaintiff has
failed to make the required monthly payments. See Compl. ¶ 17. As a result, plaintiff alleges
that Tacoaman has defaulted under the Mortgage by leaving an outstanding principal balance of
$482,409.36. See Compl. ¶ 17; Decl. of Juliana Thurab (“Thurab Decl.”) ¶¶ 8, 12, Dkt. 19-9.
On March 27, 2025, plaintiff commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that Tacoaman
had failed to make payments in accordance with the terms of the Mortgage and Note. See Dkt. 1.
Plaintiff also named the nominal defendants, alleging that they hold liens on the Subject Property
that are subordinate to plaintiff’s Mortgage. Compl. ¶¶ 4-6 & Exs. 2-4, Dkts. 1-2, 1-3, 1-4.
Tacoaman was served with the Summons and Complaint on April 14, 2025, and the
nominal defendants were also served in April 2025. See Dkts. 9-12; see also Dkts. 13-16.
Plaintiff properly served Tacoaman by delivering and leaving copies of the Complaint and
Summons at the Subject Property with a person of suitable age and discretion. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(e)(1); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(2). On May 27, 2025, the Clerk of the Court entered a
Certificate of Default against defendants after they failed to respond to the Complaint. See Dkt.
18. To date, defendants have not appeared or moved to vacate the entries of default.
On June 26, 2025, plaintiff filed the instant motion for default judgment. See Dkt. 19.
By the instant motion, plaintiff seeks to recover: (1) $482,409.36 in outstanding principal; (2)
interest through May 5, 2025 in the amount of $2,881.40 and at the rate of $11.65 per day until
the entry of judgment; (3) escrow advances (including taxes and hazard insurance) in the amount
of $5,110.95; (4) property inspection fees in the amount of $180.00; (5) attorneys’ fees in the
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 4 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
amount of $6,800.00; and (6) costs in the amount of $1,807.50. See Decl. of Jamie C. Krapf in
Support of Attorneys’ Fees (“Atty. Fee Decl.”) ¶¶ 9, 12, Dkt. 19-6; Thurab Decl. ¶ 12, Dkt. 19-9;
Decl. of Jamie C. Krapf in Support of Mot. For Def. J. (“Krapf Decl.”) ¶ 16, Dkt. 19-1; Prop. J.
Plaintiff further requests the appointment of a Referee to effectuate the sale and disburse the
funds from such sale. See Prop. J. In support of the motion, plaintiff submitted a declaration,
along with a copy of defendant Tacoaman’s payment history and other payment and billing
business records.
After the instant motion was referred to the undersigned, this Court issued an Order to
Show Cause raising several issues, including diversity of citizenship of the parties and
compliance with the procedural requirements of New York’s Civil Procedure Law & Rules
(“CPLR”) and the RPAPL. See Order to Show Cause, Dkt. 21. The Court is satisfied with
plaintiff’s response to the Order to Show Cause, as discussed below. See Resp. to Order to Show
Cause, Dkt. 26.
At a hearing held on the instant motion on January 30, 2026, defendants failed to appear
despite being served with notice of the hearing. See Min. Entry dated 1/30/2026; Cert. of
Service, Dkt. 28.
Discussion
I. 	Standing
Since plaintiff is not an original party to the Note, this Court will first address plaintiff’s
standing to bring this foreclosure action. See Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare
Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Because the standing
issue goes to this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it can be raised sua sponte.”). “Under New
York law, ‘[a] plaintiff establishes its standing in a mortgage foreclosure action by demonstrating
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 5 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
that, when the action was commenced, it was either the holder or assignee of the underlying
note.’” E. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Thompson, 631 F. App’x 13, 15 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Rooney, 19 N.Y.S.3d 543, 544 (2d Dep’t 2015)). “[E]ither a written
assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the
commencement of the foreclosure action is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and the mortgage
passes with the debt as an inseparable incident.” Id. (quoting U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Collymore, 890
N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 (2d Dep’t 2009)). “Holder status is established where the plaintiff possesses
a note that, on its face or by allonge, contains an indorsement in blank or bears a special
indorsement payable to the order of the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Ostiguy,
8 N.Y.S.3d 669, 671 (3d Dep’t 2015)).
Here, plaintiff alleges, and submits documentation to establish, that it has been in
possession of the Note and has been assigned the Mortgage since June 19, 2010, which
assignment was recorded on September 28, 2010. See Compl. ¶ 13; Assignment of Mortgage,
Dkt. 1-8 at ECF page 6; Allonge, Dkt. 1-5 at ECF page 8. Plaintiff has provided copies of the
Note and Mortgage as exhibits to the Complaint. See Note, Dkt. 1-5; Mortgage, Dkt. 1-6. Since
plaintiff has submitted uncontroverted evidence that it held the Note and Mortgage when it
commenced this action on March 27, 2025, this Court finds that plaintiff has standing to pursue
this action. See Thompson, 631 F. App’x at 15-16; Blue Castle (Cayman) LTD v. 1767 TP Ave
LLC, No. 22-CV-9577, 2024 WL 4135194, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2024) (“Attachment of the
Note as an exhibit to the Complaint was sufficient to establish standing since it demonstrated that
the plaintiff was in physical possession of the [N]ote at the time the action was commenced.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); JXB 84 LLC v. Khalil, No. 15-CV-6251, 2017
WL 1184001, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 6 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
1184141 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017).
II. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Before a court can issue a default judgment, it must “determine whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). “[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and may be
raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v.
Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, this Court has an independent obligation to
determine if subject matter jurisdiction exists over this case. See Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87,
89 (2d Cir. 2006).
Here, plaintiff alleges subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.
Compl. ¶ 8. Diversity jurisdiction exists when the parties have complete diversity of citizenship
and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Complete diversity
means that “all plaintiffs [are] citizens of states diverse from those of all defendants.”
Pennsylvania Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 772 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir.
2014). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Platinum-Montaur Life Scis., LLC v. Navidea Biopharms.,
Inc., 943 F.3d 613, 617-18 (2d Cir. 2019) (“It is well-settled that the party asserting federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction,” and district courts “may not assume
subject-matter jurisdiction when the record does not contain the necessary prerequisites for its
existence.”); Fountain v. Karim, 838 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2016).
In the Complaint, plaintiff alleges that it is “organized under the laws of the United
States” and that it “is a citizen of California.” Compl. ¶ 2. However, plaintiff is suing in its
capacity as a trustee of the Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust Series INABS
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 7 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
2006-D, Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series INABS 2006-D under
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated Sept 1, 2006. A trustee’s own citizenship controls
for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction only if the trustee “possesses certain customary
powers to hold, manage, and dispose of assets for the benefit of others,” because that authority is
what makes the trustee “a real party to the controversy.” Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S.
458, 464 (1980); Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB as Tr. For Premium Mortg. Acquisition Tr.
v. Okunola, No. 18-CV-2084, 2023 WL 9507759, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2023). The Court
must examine “the scope of [the trustee’s] authority as delineated by the Trust Agreement.” U.S.
Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. for RMAC Tr., Series 2016-CTT v. Desrosiers, No. 17-CV-7338, 2021
WL 5630899, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2021); see Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB as Tr. Of
Aspen Holdings Tr. v. Fernandez, 712 F. Supp. 3d 324, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2024); Okunola, 2023
WL 9507759, at *2-3.
In response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, plaintiff has established that the trust
was created and is governed by a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the “PSA”), which shows
that plaintiff has these customary powers. See PSA, Dkt. 26-1. Sections 2.01 and 8.13 of the
PSA describe the required level of control to make plaintiff (as the trustee) the real party in
interest for diversity purposes. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. as Tr. For Deutsche Alt-A Secs.
Mortg. Loan Tr. v. Fenelon, No. 24-CV-7716, 2025 WL 3546115, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9,
2025); Okunola, 2023 WL 9507759, at *2.
A national banking association is, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a citizen of the
state where its main office is located as designated in its articles of association. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1348; Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006); OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Melina,
827 F.3d 214, 219 (2d Cir. 2016). Although plaintiff did not allege in the Complaint the state in
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 8 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
which its main office is located per its articles of incorporation, in a supplemental filing, plaintiff
submitted proof that its headquarters is located in California. See printout from the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency’s website, Dkt. 26-2. Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff is a citizen of
California.
In response to the Court’s show cause order, plaintiff has also clarified defendant
Tacoaman’s citizenship. Counsel has confirmed through searches, including a Department of
Motor Vehicles search, a Board of Elections search, and a postal search that the Subject Property
is plaintiff’s domicile. See Resp. to Order to Show Cause ¶ 9; Tacoaman searches re: domicile,
Dkt. 26-3. As a result, the criteria for diversity jurisdiction is met, and this Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over the dispute.
III. 	Legal Standards
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth a two-step process for entry of
a default judgment. See Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1993). First,
the Clerk of Court enters the default pursuant to Rule 55(a) by notation of the party’s default on
the Clerk’s record of the case. See id.; see also Fed R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a party against
whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that
failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”). This first
step is nondiscretionary. See United States v. Conolly, 694 F. App’x 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2017).
Second, after the Clerk of Court enters a default against a party, if that party fails to appear or
otherwise move to set aside the default pursuant to Rule 55(c), the plaintiff may apply to the
court for a default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), (b)(2).
In light of the Second Circuit’s “oft-stated preference for resolving disputes on the
merits,” default judgments are “generally disfavored.” Enron Oil, 10 F.3d at 95-96. When
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 9 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
evaluating a plaintiff’s application for a default judgment, “a court is required to accept all []
factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Finkel v.
Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009). “Nevertheless, it remains for the court to consider
whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default
does not admit conclusions of law.” Labarbera v. ASTC Labs., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 263, 270
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also TAGC Mgmt., LLC v.
Lehman, Lee & Xu Ltd., 536 F. App’x 45, 46 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[P]rior to entering default
judgment, a district court is required to determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations establish the
defendant’s liability as a matter of law.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
IV. 	Pre-Foreclosure Procedures
Article 13 of the RPAPL provides for certain requirements that must be complied with in
a foreclosure action, even in federal court. See, e.g., Windward Bora LLC v. Durkovic as Tr. of
McQueen Fam. Tr., No. 22-CV-411, 2024 WL 3455841, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2024);
Fernandez, 712 F. Supp. 3d at 333-34. Section 1303 requires the plaintiff to serve a specific
notice on the defendant, with the summons and complaint. See RPAPL § 1303. Section 1304
requires that plaintiff serve an additional notice at least ninety days before commencing a
foreclosure action. See id. § 1304(1). That notice must be sent “by registered or certified mail
and also by first-class mail to the last known address of the borrower, and to the residence that is
the subject of the mortgage.” Id. § 1304(2). RPAPL § 1306 requires that plaintiff file certain
information with the Superintendent of Financial Services, within three business days of mailing
the notice required by section 1304.3 See RPAPL § 1306. Plaintiff is also required to serve a
3 Section 1306(2), in turn, requires that “[e]ach filing delivered to the superintendent shall be on
such form as the superintendent shall prescribe, and shall include at a minimum, the name,
address, last known telephone number of the borrower, and the amount claimed as due and
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 10 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
special summons once the foreclosure action is filed. See RPAPL § 1320. Finally, RPAPL
§ 1331 requires that plaintiff file a notice of pendency of the action, as well as a copy of the
complaint, in the clerk’s office of the county where the subject property is located. See RPAPL
§§ 1331, 6511(a) (“Unless it has already been filed in that county, the complaint shall be filed
with the notice of pendency.”).
After review of plaintiff’s response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, the Court finds
that plaintiff has complied with each of the statutory requirements. First, plaintiff’s process
server avers that he served on Tacoaman the notice required by section 1303 with the Summons
and Complaint, and the notice attached to the Complaint complies with the requirements
contained in section 1303. See [Amended] Summons Returned Executed, Dkt. 13. Plaintiff has
also submitted a Proof of Filing Statement from the New York State Department of Financial
Services stating that plaintiff filed the information required by section 1306 on November 8,
2024. See Proof of Filing Statement, Dkt. 19-18. Plaintiff’s process server further avers that he
served the special summons required by section 1320 on Tacoaman, and the summons submitted
contains the content required by section 1320. See [Amended] Summons Returned Executed,
Dkt. 13; Resp. to Order to Show Cause ¶ 13; email to process server with documents sent for
service, Dkt. 26-6. Plaintiff has also established compliance with section 1304(2)’s requirement
that the 90-day notice be mailed to the borrower. See Thurab Decl. ¶ 10, Dkt. 19-9; Dkt. 19-17
(mailings). Finally, plaintiff has demonstrated that it filed the Complaint with the Notice of
Pendency in the Queens County Clerk’s Office. See Resp. to Order to Show Cause ¶ 12; Dkt.
26-5.
owing on the mortgage, and such other information as will enable the superintendent to ascertain
the type of loan at issue.” RPAPL § 1306(2).
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 11 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
Section 3012-b(a) of the CPLR requires that a plaintiff seeking foreclosure on a
residential home attach to the complaint “a certificate, signed by the attorney for the plaintiff,
certifying that the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case and that . . . to the best of such
attorney’s knowledge, information and belief there is a reasonable basis for the commencement
of such action.” CPLR § 3012-b(a). In response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, plaintiff
concedes that it did not file the required certificate with the Complaint, but has now corrected its
omission. See Resp. to Order to Show Cause ¶ 14, Dkt. 26; Certificate of Merit, Dkt. 26-7.
Since counsel avers that she prepared such a certification, but inadvertently failed to file it with
the original Complaint, the Court deems the certificate filed nunc pro tunc. See Bank of New
York Mellon v. Silverberg, 156 N.Y.S.3d 874, 875 (2d Dep’t 2022) (CPLR “authorizes, but does
not require, dismissal of the action . . . as a sanction for the willful failure to” comply with
section 3012-b). Plaintiff, therefore, has now demonstrated its compliance with New York’s
statutory foreclosure requirements.
V. 	Mortgage Foreclosure
A. Applicable standards
Under New York law, “[t]o foreclose on a mortgage, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) the
existence of a mortgage; (2) ownership of the mortgage; and (3) the defendant’s default in
payment on the loan [secured by the mortgage].” Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v.
Kings Cnty. Pub. Admin., No. 22-CV-7925, 2023 WL 7169000, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2023)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL
7167515 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2023); Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Robedee, No.
22-CV-809, 2022 WL 18284844, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted, 2022 WL 17850116 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2022). Once the plaintiff submits the
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 12 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of the default, it has established a prima facie
entitlement to judgment, and the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s evidence.
See Wilmington PT Corp. v. Tiwana, No. 19-CV-2035, 2023 WL 4673777, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June
12, 2023); Kings Cnty. Pub. Admin., 2023 WL 7169000, at *3.
B. Plaintiff is entitled to foreclosure
Here, the allegations in the Complaint, as well as the evidence submitted in support of
plaintiff’s motion, establish that plaintiff is entitled to foreclosure. Plaintiff has produced copies
of the Note, Mortgage, and assignments, thereby establishing the borrower’s obligations arising
thereunder. The Note, Mortgage, and accompanying documents establish the existence of a debt
owed by the borrower, and plaintiff’s ownership of the Note and Mortgage. See Wilmington
Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB as Tr. for Carlsbad Funding Mortg. Tr. v. White, No. 17-CV-2288, 2022
WL 5432771, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2022) (finding that the plaintiff had “the right to enforce
the . . . [m]ortgage” when it had “demonstrated possession of the [n]ote and accompanying
[m]ortgage prior to the commencement of the instant action [and] ha[d] produced . . . all relevant
assignment documents”), report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2022 WL 4235326
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2022); Gustavia Home, LLC v. Bent, 321 F. Supp. 3d 409, 415 (E.D.N.Y.
2018) (finding that “copies of the Mortgage, Note, allonges, and chain of assignments” was
“evidence . . . that establishes a prima facie case of entitlement to judgment”). Plaintiff also has
established that the borrower defaulted by failing to make the required monthly payments
beginning October 1, 2024 (see Thurab Decl. ¶ 8; Compl. ¶ 17). See Freedom Mortg. Corp. v.
McLain, No. 23-CV-1309, 2023 WL 8473948, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 7320257 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2023); Bent, 321 F. Supp. 3d at
415 (finding that affidavit stating that “defendant . . . failed to cure the default” was sufficient
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 13 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

14
proof of borrower’s default). Tacoaman’s default triggered plaintiff’s right to accelerate the loan
and to require full payment of the principal amount outstanding. See Mortgage ¶ 22.
Because defendants have not answered the Complaint or otherwise opposed the instant
motion, they have failed to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie case showing that it is entitled to
foreclosure. See Kings Cnty. Pub. Admin., 2023 WL 7169000, at *3; Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urb. Dev. V. Nassau Cnty. Pub. Admin. As Admin. Of the Estate of Ella Mae Key a/k/a
Mae Key, Deceased, No. 19-CV-3547, 2023 WL 2421676, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2023).
C. Other subordinate lienholders
Plaintiff names Citibank, the New York Labor Commissioner and Extech Building
Materials as subordinate lien holders. In attachments to the Complaint, plaintiff has submitted
proof of the judgments held by each of the lien holders. See Citibank Judgment, Dkts. 1-2,
Commissioner of Labor Judgment, Dkt. 1-3; Extech Building Judgment, Dkt. 1-4. Plaintiff
alleges that these nominal defendants “have or may claim to have, some interest in, or lien upon
the Property, or some part thereof, which interest or lien, if any, is subject and subordinate to the
lien of the Mortgage being foreclosed herein.” Compl. ¶ 23.
Section 1311 of the RPAPL requires that the necessary parties to a mortgage foreclosure
action include “[e]very person having any lien or incumbrance upon the real property which is
claimed to be subject and subordinate to the lien of the plaintiff.” RPAPL § 1311(3). “This rule
‘derives from the underlying objective of foreclosure actions – to extinguish the rights of
redemption of all those who have a subordinate interest in the property and to vest complete title
in the purchaser at the judicial sale.’” Bank of Am., N.A. v. 3301 Atl., LLC, No. 10-CV-5204,
2012 WL 2529196, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012) (quoting NC Venture I, L.P. v. Complete
Analysis, Inc., 803 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97-98 (2d Dep’t 2005)). Default judgment is appropriate
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 14 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

15
against such a defendant where the complaint alleges “nominal liability,” i.e., that any judgments
or liens a defendant may have against the property are subject and subordinate to plaintiff’s lien.
See E. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Rabito, No. 11-CV-2501, 2014 WL 4804872, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,
2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 4804901 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2014).
“When a default judgment is entered against a defendant with a ‘nominal interest’ in the
property, any such interest in the relevant property is terminated.” Windward Bora LLC v. Baez,
No. 19-CV-5698, 2020 WL 4261130, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020).
Plaintiff has properly served the nominal defendants with the Summons and Complaint,
as well as the motion for default judgment. See Dkts. 10, 11, 12, 20. These defendants have not
challenged the claim that their interests are subordinate to plaintiff. Since plaintiff has
established the existence of these judgments by submitting evidentiary documentation
demonstrating the lien holders’ interests in the property, there is sufficient evidence to find that
Citibank, the Commissioner of Labor of the State of New York and Extech Building are
necessary parties in this matter and that the Court should enter default judgment against them.
See McLain, 2023 WL 8473948, at *4 (recommending granting default judgment based on
documents demonstrating defendant’s interest in the subject property); CIT Bank, N.A. v.
McDonnell, No. 18-CV-476, 2023 WL 2361381, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2023) (recommending
granting default judgment against nominal defendants alleged to have liens subordinate to
plaintiff); Courchevel 1850 LLC v. Donaldson, No. 16-CV-6803, 2018 WL 1830809, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2018) (recommending granting default judgment against the Commissioner of
Labor of the State of New York), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 5777018
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2018).
Accordingly, this Court respectfully recommends granting plaintiff’s motion for default
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 15 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

16
judgment as discussed further below.
VI. 	Damages
While the allegations of a complaint concerning liability are deemed admitted upon entry
of default, allegations relating to damages are not. See Cement & Concrete Workers Dist.
Council Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund, Educ. & Training Fund & Other Funds v.
Metro Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Greyhound
Exhibitgroup v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)). Rather, a court must
ensure that there is an evidentiary basis for the damages sought by a plaintiff before entering
judgment in the amount demanded. See Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 873 F.2d 38, 40
(2d Cir. 1989). A court may make this determination based upon evidence presented at a hearing
or upon a review of detailed affidavits and documentary evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2);
Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Levin, No. 18-CV-9389, 2019 WL 3050852, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July
12, 2019) (holding that a hearing is “not necessary as long as [the Court] ensure[s] that there was
a basis for the damages specified In the default judgment”) (alterations in original, internal
quotations omitted); Fustok, 873 F.2d at 40 (noting that a court may rely on detailed affidavits
and documentary evidence as the basis for determining damages to be awarded in a default
judgment).
For the reasons set forth below, this Court concludes that a hearing on the issue of
damages is unwarranted and respectfully recommends awarding plaintiff relief as discussed
below.
A. Outstanding Principal
Plaintiff requests recovery of a principal balance of $482,409.36 ($212,611.37 +
$269,797.99). See Thurab Decl. ¶ 12. Pursuant to the terms of the Loan Modification
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 16 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

17
Agreement, Tacoaman agreed to pay $643,546.98 in principal. See Compl. ¶ 12; Loan
Modification Agreement ¶ 3(B), Dkt. 1-7. The terms of the loan provide that in the event of the
borrower’s default, plaintiff is entitled to the full amount of the outstanding loan principal. See
Mortgage ¶ 22. As set forth in the Thurab declaration, and supported by plaintiff’s data
compilations, Tacoaman failed to make payments on the unpaid principal balance of
$482,409.36, as of October 1, 2024. See Fenelon, 2025 WL 3546115, at *8; Durkovic, 2024 WL
3455841, at*7; McLain, 2023 WL 8473948, at *5; Dkt. 19-19 at ECF pages 4-8, 23. The Court,
therefore, recommends awarding plaintiff $482,409.36 for the unpaid principal balance.
B. Interest
Plaintiff requests interest on the interest-bearing portion of the unpaid principal balance
from September 1, 2024 through May 5, 2025. See Thurab Decl. ¶ 12 (unpaid interest-bearing
principal balance of $212,611.37); Prop. J. The terms of the Loan Modification Agreement
provide that interest accrues on the “Interest Bearing Principal Balance” at a rate of 2 percent per
year. See Loan Modification Agreement ¶ 3, Dkt. 1-7.4 Applying the 2 percent annual interest
rate to the unpaid interest-bearing principal balance of $212,611.37, interest accrues at a rate of
$11.65 per day (($212,611.37 x 2 percent) / 365 days). See Dkt. 19-19 at ECF pages 8, 23.
Accordingly, based on the Court’s calculations, the Court recommends awarding plaintiff
$2,877.555 in interest from September 1, 2024 through May 5, 2025 ($11.65 x 247 days), plus
additional interest at the rate of $11.65 per day from May 6, 2025 until the entry of judgment.
4 As discussed above, under the terms of the Loan Modification Agreement, the new principal
balance on the loan became $643,546.98. Dkt. 1-7 at ECF page 3. Of that principal balance
outstanding, $382,346.98 was treated as a non-interest bearing principal forbearance. Id. Thus,
the interest-bearing principal balance at the time of the loan modification was $261,200.00. Id.
As of the filing of the motion for default judgment and as set forth in the Thurab declaration, the
unpaid interest-bearing principal balance totaled $212,611.37. Thurab Decl. ¶ 12.
5 Plaintiff requested interest in the amount of $2,881.40. See Thurab Decl. ¶ 12.
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 17 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

18
C. Escrow Advances and Property Inspection Fees
Plaintiff seeks to recover escrow advances totaling $5,110.95, including $2,463.41 in tax
disbursements and $2,647.69 in insurance disbursements, minus a deduction of $0.15 for an
“Escrow Credit.” See Thurab Decl. ¶ 12. In addition, plaintiff seeks to recover $180 in property
inspection fees. Id. The Mortgage provides that Tacoaman is required to pay with each monthly
payment, “escrow items,” including, “taxes, assessments, water charges” and “hazard or property
insurance covering the Property.” Mortgage ¶¶ 3, 4, Dkt. 1-6. Tacoaman further agreed that
“[i]f, at any time, Lender has not received enough Escrow Funds to make the payments of
Escrow Items when the payments are due . . . I will pay to Lender whatever additional amount is
necessary to pay the Escrow items.” Id. Moreover, Tacoaman agreed that if he fails to make
insurance payments, “Lender may obtain insurance coverage, at Lender’s option and
[borrower’s] expense. . . . Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 5 will become
my additional debt secured by this Security Instrument
. . . [and] will bear interest at the interest rate set forth in the Note.” Id. ¶ 5. In addition, the
Mortgage provides that plaintiff “may charge me fees for services performed in connection with
my default, for the purpose of protecting Lender’s interest in the Property . . . including, but not
limited to, attorneys’ fees, property inspection and valuation fees.” Id. ¶ 14.
Plaintiff provides an “escrow transaction history,” with a breakdown of itemized charges
and payments or “credits” that make up the escrow balance, including those payments made by
plaintiff. See Account History, Dkt. 19-19 at ECF pages 14-22. Plaintiff has sufficiently
demonstrated that it is entitled to recover the cost of insurance and taxes that it paid related to the
Subject Property in the amount of $5,110.95.
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 18 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

19
In addition, plaintiff has submitted a list of the individual property inspections and
corresponding charges. See Dkt. 19-19 at ECF pages 25-26.
In sum, since plaintiff has corroborated its request for these costs with a declaration and
the relevant business records, the Court recommends granting the amount sought of $5,110.95 in
escrow advances and $180.00 in property inspection fees. See ARCPE Holding, LLC v. 9Q4U5E
LLC, No. 19-CV-6417, 2022 WL 2467085, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2022).
VII. 	Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of $6,800.00 and $1,807.50 in costs. See
Atty. Fee Decl. ¶ 12, Dkt. 19-6. A plaintiff in a foreclosure action may recover attorneys’ fees
and costs against a borrower-defendant if the note or mortgage provides for such an award. See
Kings Cnty. Pub. Admin., 2023 WL 7169000, at *5; Onewest Bank N.A. v. Louis, No. 15-CV-
597, 2016 WL 3552143, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2016), report and recommendation adopted,
2016 WL 4059214 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2016). The Note provides that in the event of default, “the
Noteholder will have the right to be paid back by me for all of its costs and expenses in enforcing
this Note, . . . includ[ing], for example, reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Note ¶ 7(E). The Mortgage
provides: “In any lawsuit for foreclosure and sale, Lender will have the right to collect all costs
and disbursements . . . and will have the right to add all reasonable attorneys’ fees to the amount
I owe Lender[.]” Mortgage ¶ 22. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable
attorneys’ fees resulting from the foreclosure proceeding and defendant’s default.
In this Circuit, the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded a prevailing party is
determined by calculating the “presumptively reasonable fee.” Simmons v. New York City
Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 2009). To determine this fee, the Court begins by
multiplying the number of hours spent on the litigation by “a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v.
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 19 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

20
Eckherhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Generally, “contemporaneous time records are a
prerequisite for attorney’s fees in this Circuit.” N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Child., Inc. v.
Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147 (2d Cir. 1983).
Here, however, plaintiff’s counsel explains that because plaintiff’s counsel “is paid a flat
fee of $6,800 from its client for each foreclosure action handled,” counsel provided an average of
time spent on this action based on volume. Atty. Fee Decl. ¶ 9.
“In general, courts in this Circuit will not award attorney’s fees assessed at a flat-rate
unless the supporting documentation is detailed enough to satisfy the Second Circuit’s
requirement that attorneys’ fees must be based on contemporaneous time records specifying
relevant dates, time spent and work done.” United States v. Basile, No. 19-CV-7022, 2023 WL
5152519, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), report
and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5525096 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2023). Indeed, “[t]he
absence of contemporaneous records precludes any fee award in all but the most extraordinary of
circumstances.” Id.
In similar cases in this District, courts have reduced counsel’s fee by 50 percent of the
requested amount based on the record and affidavit provided. See Freedom Mortg. Corp. v.
D’Amato, No. 22-CV-7804, 2024 WL 662486, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2024) (overruling
plaintiff’s objection); McLain, 2023 WL 8473948, at *8; see also Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Rich,
No. 22-CV-4827, 2024 WL 4250330, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2024) (recommending award of
$3,650, amounting to reduction of $2,000); Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Phillip, No. 19-CV-1215,
2020 WL 9812917, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2020) (recommending reducing counsel’s fee to
$2,500).
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 20 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

21
Based on the work reflected in the record in this matter and the work described in
counsel’s affidavit, it would be unfair to deny fees entirely. See Nationstar Mortg. LLC v.
Mullany, No. 16-CV-5501, 2018 WL 4658437, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018) (“Given the
amount of work reflected in the plaintiff’s submissions and the work described in counsel’s
affirmation as having been performed, this Court finds an award for attorneys’ fees is appropriate
under the circumstances.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4637352 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2018). Instead, this Court finds it appropriate to reduce counsel’s request by half to
$3,400.00, which is generally consistent with the amount of fees awarded by courts in this
District in similar circumstances. Accordingly, this Court respectfully recommends awarding
attorneys’ fees in the amount of $3,400.00 or half of the amount requested.
Plaintiff also seeks an additional $1,807.50 for costs in this action, including the Court’s
filing fee, title search fees, service of process fees and the fee for filing the Notice of Pendency.6
See Atty. Fee Decl. ¶ 12, Dkt. 19-6; Bill of Costs, Dkt. 19-5. As discussed above, the Mortgage
permits plaintiff to “collect all costs and disbursements” in an action for foreclosure and sale.
Mortgage ¶ 22. In addition, plaintiff has provided a detailed breakdown in the Bill of Costs, and
supporting receipts. See Dkt. 19-5. Based upon the documentation plaintiff provided, this Court
recommends awarding $1,807.50 for costs and disbursements. See McLain, 2023 WL 8473948,
at *8.
VIII. 	Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale and Appointment of Referee
Plaintiff requests appointment of a referee to effectuate a sale of the mortgaged property
and to disburse the funds from such sale, pursuant to RPAPL § 1611. See Prop. J., Dkt. 19-21.
6 Although the Bill of Costs includes “Nassau County Clerk Filing Fee for Notice of Pendency,”
the receipt demonstrates that the filing fee was paid to the Queens County Clerk. See Dkt. 19-5
at ECF page at 5.
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 21 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

22
Specifically, plaintiff requests the appointment of Scott H. Siller, Esq. as a referee to conduct the
sale under the conditions outlined in the proposed Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, including
that the Subject Property be sold as one parcel. See Prop. J.
A plaintiff is entitled to foreclose upon and sell a property if it demonstrates “the
existence of an obligation secured by a mortgage, and a default on that obligation.” 1st Bridge
LLC v. 682 Jamaica Ave., LLC, No. 08-CV-3401, 2010 WL 4608326, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 13,
2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 4607409 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2010); see
also OneWest Bank N.A. v. Cole, No. 14-CV-3078, 2015 WL 4429014, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 17,
2015) (authorizing foreclosure and sale of property upon entry of default judgment). Further,
courts routinely appoint referees to effectuate the sale of foreclosed properties. See, e.g.,
Fenelon, 2025 WL 3546115, at *9; Cole, 2015 WL 4429014, at *5 (awarding a judgment of
foreclosure and sale under the supervision of specific referee requested by plaintiff).
Having determined that plaintiff has established its presumptive right to foreclose upon
the Subject Property due to Tacoaman’s default, this Court respectfully recommends the
appointment of Scott H. Siller, Esq. as referee to conduct the sale of the Subject Property under
the terms set forth in the proposed Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale (Dkt. 19-21). See McLain,
2023 WL 8473948, at *8 (recommending approval of referee); Kings Cnty. Pub. Admin., 2023
WL 7169000, at *5 (same).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully recommends granting plaintiff’s motion
for default judgment against defendants Segundo F. Tacoaman, Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,
Extech Building Materials, Inc., and the State of New York Commissioner of Labor, and further
recommends entry of a final judgment awarding damages as follows:
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 22 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

23
(1) 	$482,409.36 in unpaid principal;
(2) 	$2,877.55 in interest from September 1, 2024 through May 5, 2025, plus
additional interest at the rate of $11.65 per day from May 6, 2025 until the entry
of judgment;
(3) 	$5,110.95 in escrow advances and $180.00 in disbursements (i.e., property
inspection costs); and
(4) 	$3,400.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,807.50 in costs.
This Court further recommends the appointment of Scott H. Siller, Esq., as referee to
conduct the foreclosure and sale of the Property under the terms set forth in the proposed
Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale (Dkt. 19-21). Finally, the Court recommends that the claims
brought against “John Doe #1” through “John Doe #12” be dismissed and the caption be
amended to substitute “Citibank, National Association” for “Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.”
Any objections to the recommendations made in this Report must be filed with the
Honorable Margo K. Brodie within 14 days after the filing of this Report and Recommendation
and, in any event, on or before February 26, 2026. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s
order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Small v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (discussing waiver under the former
ten-day limit).
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being electronically served on counsel.
Further, by February 17, 2026, the Court directs plaintiff’s counsel to serve on defendants a
copy of this Report and Recommendation by overnight mail and first-class mail at the addresses
below, and to file proof of service on ECF:
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 23 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>

Segundo F. Tacoaman a/k/a Segundo
Francisco Tacoaman a/k/a Segundo
Tacoaman
92-29 76th Street a/k/a 9229 76th Street
Woodhaven, New York 11421
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.
250 Conklin Street
Farmingdale, New York 11735
Commissioner of Labor of the
State of New York
W.A. Harriman Campus, Bldg. 12
Albany, New York 12226
Extech Building Materials, Inc.
43-87 Vernon Blvd.
Long Island City, New York 11101
SO ORDERED
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
February 12, 2026
s/ James R. Cho
James R. Cho
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:25-cv-01698-MKB-JRC Document 30 Filed 02/12/26 Page 24 of 24 PageID #:
<pageID>