Hiscox Insurance Company Inc. v. CMNT LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
—————————————————————x
HISCOX INSURANCE COMPANY INC., 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	REPORT AND
: 	RECOMMENDATION
-versus- 	: 	24-CV-8322 (PKC) (CHK)
:
CMNT LLC, DENIS MOSES CAMPOS, 	:
1950 OCEAN REALTY LLC, EURO 	:
BUILDING GROUP INC., DENIS MOSES 	:
CAMPOS, XAVIER MARIDUENA, 	:
:
:
Defendants. 	:
—————————————————————x
CLAY H. KAMINSKY, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Hiscox Insurance Company Inc. (“Hiscox”) brought this action against
defendant CMNT LLC (“CMNT”) and several nominal defendants, including 1950
Ocean Realty LLC (“Ocean Realty”) and Euro Building Group Inc. (“Euro Building”),
asking the Court to declare a set of policies Hiscox issued to CMNT void. Each of
these defendants has failed to appear. Hiscox moves for default judgment pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. Simultaneously, New York Marine and General
Insurance Company (“NYM”) moves to intervene as a defendant pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24.
The Honorable Pamela K. Chen has referred both the Motion for Default
Judgment and the Motion to Intervene to the undersigned. For the reasons that
follow, I recommend that the Motion for Default Judgment be DENIED and that the
Motion to Intervene be GRANTED.
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BACKGROUND
This action is, in its most basic form, an insurer’s request for this Court to
release it from a set of policies it issued. Plaintiff Hiscox seeks a declaration that
three policies it previously issued to defendant CMNT are rescinded and void ab initio
due 	to 	material 	misrepresentations 	CMNT 	allegedly 	made 	to 	Hiscox 	in 	its
applications for the policies, and therefore that Hiscox is released from any duty to
defend CMNT under the terms of those policies. However, this simple foundation sits
beneath layers of complexity which stem from a confluence of several parties
comprising various sides of multiple lawsuits. To understand the full mechanics of
the controversy, we start at the beginning.
CMNT first applied for an insurance policy with Hiscox in February 2022. In
its application, CMNT listed its primary business as “management consulting” and
answered “no” to the form question “[d]oes your business provide any construction
management or advice or general contracting services?” Memorandum of Law in
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (“Hiscox Mem.”), ECF No. 40-1, at
3 (cleaned up); see also Affidavit of Kate Rarick (“Rarick Aff.”), ECF No. 40-2, ¶ 20
(internal quotation marks omitted). In response to this application, Hiscox issued a
“business owner’s policy” to CMNT for the period of February 24, 2022 to February
24, 2023. Rarick Aff. ¶ 23. Hiscox renewed this policy twice, first for the period of
February 24, 2023 to February 24, 2024 and then for the period of February 24, 2024
to February 24, 2025. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. Hiscox canceled the policy on March 4, 2024,
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claiming to have discovered material misrepresentations by CMNT that rendered the
policy void. Hiscox Mem. at 2–5.
Hiscox asserts that it took this step after it became aware of lawsuits filed by
two men, Denis Moses Campos and Xavier Mariduena, who alleged that they had
been injured while performing work for defendants Ocean Realty and Euro Building,
which in turn filed third-party complaints against CMNT in both cases. Ocean Realty
and Euro Building alleged that any liability they incurred in the Campos and
Mariduena actions (together, the “underlying actions” or “underlying cases”) was due
to the “wrongful conduct, negligence, carelessness and/or breach of contract in the
performance of certain construction work” by CMNT. Hiscox Mem. at 4. Campos
alleged that he had been injured by a falling object on November 9, 2022, and filed
his action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Kings, on
November 28, 2022. Declaration of Laura B. Dowgin, Esq. (“Dowgin Decl.”), ECF No.
40-3, ¶¶ 3–4; Campos Action Complaint, ECF No. 40-8, ¶¶ 14–35. Mariduena alleged
that he had been injured on October 25, 2022, and filed his action, in the same court,
on September 22, 2023. Dowgin Decl. ¶¶ 5–6; Mariduena Action Complaint, ECF No.
40-10, ¶¶ 79–97. Letters containing notice of these actions were tendered to Hiscox
on March 8, 2023 and November 28, 2023, respectively. Campos Action Tender Letter,
ECF No. 39-5; Mariduena Action Tender Letter, ECF No. 39-6.
Hiscox filed the complaint in this action on December 3, 2024. ECF No. 1. The
complaint alleges that CMNT had misrepresented material facts by stating it did not
perform construction work in the policy application and asserted that Hiscox would
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not have issued the policies had CMNT “responded with the correct information.”
Id. ¶ 50. The complaint, which listed causes of action for declaratory relief (rescission)
and breach of contract, named CMNT as the sole “defendant.” Id. ¶ 12. It also named
Ocean 	Realty, 	Euro 	Building, 	Campos, 	and 	Mariduena, 	as 	well 	as 	20 	ABC
Corporations and 20 John Does, which the complaint defined as “parties that may
have lawsuits pending against CMNT that have not made any claim for coverage to
date, but may during the pendency of this suit,” as “nominal defendants.” Id. ¶¶ 14–
19. Hiscox served the complaint on CMNT on January 9, 2025, ECF No. 8, and on
both Euro Building and Ocean Realty on January 17, 2025. ECF Nos. 10, 11.
After the period for answering had elapsed as to each of the three named
company defendants, Hiscox moved for, and the Clerk of Court entered, certificates
of default against each of the three. ECF Nos. 18–23. Thereafter, Hiscox served the
complaint on Mariduena on March 13, 2025 and on Campos on April 11, 2025. ECF
Nos. 26, 27, 35. To date, Mariduena remains the only named party to have answered
in this case, filing a verified answer denying knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations in the complaint on March 13, 2025. ECF No. 29.
Hiscox moved for a certificate of default against Campos on May 19, 2025 and the
Clerk of Court entered that default on May 21, 2025. ECF Nos. 37–38.
While the initial stages of this case were underway, proposed-intervenor NYM,
which provides separate insurance policies to nominal defendants Ocean Realty and
Euro Building, was defending the underlying cases on their behalf. NYM’s review of
the situation which had yielded the underlying actions uncovered the Hiscox policies
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issued to CMNT, which, NYM alleges, covered Ocean Realty and Euro Building as
additional insureds. Memorandum of 	Law 	in Support of Proposed Intervenor-
Defendant’s Motion to Intervene (“NYM Mem.”), ECF No. 39-1, at 3–4. NYM argues
that it should have been named as a party in the first instance. Id. at 2.
On May 22, 2025, Judge Chen ordered Plaintiff to file a motion for default
judgment by July 22, 2025. May 22, 2025 Docket Entry. On July 15, 2025, one week
before that deadline, NYM filed its motion to intervene in this case, alleging that
Hiscox had already imposed substantial defense costs on it by refusing to undertake
its obligations under the duty to defend. Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 39; NYM Mem.
at 1–2. In signaling the position it intends to take should it be allowed to intervene,
NYM argues that Hiscox waived its ability to seek rescission of the policies both by
failing to issue written notice disclaiming liability to its insured “as soon as is
reasonably possible” under N.Y. Ins. Law § 3420(d)(2) and by retaining the policy
premiums paid by CMNT. NYM Mem. at 6–7. Hiscox filed its motion for default
judgment one week later, on July 22, 2025. ECF No. 40. Both motions, now fully
briefed, have been referred to me.
DISCUSSION
I conclude that the motion to intervene should be granted and that the motion
for default judgment should be denied. Because the relief sought by both motions is
dispositive, I address them by report and recommendation. Orrego v. Knipfing, No.
CV 20-3361, 2023 WL 2462777, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2023) (“[W]here motions are
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dispositive 	in 	nature 	the 	Court 	rules 	. . . 	in 	the 	form 	of 	Report 	and
Recommendation.”).
Legal Standards
Intervention
“Intervention 	is 	a procedural device 	that 	attempts 	to accommodate two
competing policies: efficiently administrating legal disputes by resolving all related
issues in one lawsuit, on the one hand, and keeping a single lawsuit from becoming
unnecessarily complex, unwieldy or prolonged, on the other hand.” United States v.
Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1994). Courts considering motions to
intervene “must be mindful that each intervention case is highly fact specific and
tends to resist comparison to prior cases.” United States v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
326 F.R.D. 411, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Pepsico, Inc., 314
F.R.D. 130, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate two forms of intervention:
intervention 	as 	of 	right 	under 	Rule 	24(a) 	and 	permissive 	intervention 	under
Rule 24(b).
The Second Circuit has established four requirements for intervention as of
right under Rule 24(a)(2).1 “Intervention as of right . . . is granted when an applicant:
(1) files a timely motion; (2) asserts an interest relating to the property or transaction
that is the subject of the action; (3) is so situated that without intervention the
1 Rule 24(a)(1) is not at issue here.
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disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to
protect its interest; and (4) has an interest not adequately represented by the other
parties.” 	Pitney Bowes, 25 F.3d at 70. “The intervention application will be denied
unless all four requirements are met.” Id.
Rule 24(b) provides another vehicle to intervene in a civil action. “On timely
motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who: . . . has a claim or defense
that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed R. Civ. P.
24(b)(1). Courts have “broad discretion” to grant or deny a motion for permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b), see AT & T Corp. v. Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560, 561
(2d Cir. 2005), and they have held that the rule is “to be liberally construed in favor
of intervention.” Delaware Tr. Co. v. Wilmington Tr., N.A., 534 B.R. 500, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Degrafinreid v. Ricks, 417 F.
Supp. 2d 403, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see Lipsett v. United States, 37 F.R.D. 549, 552
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). 	“The principal guide in deciding whether to grant permissive
intervention 	is 	‘whether 	the 	intervention 	will 	unduly 	delay 	or 	prejudice 	the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.’” Pitney Bowes, 25 F.3d at 73 (quoting
language now codified at Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3)).
Default Judgment
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth a two-step process
for entry of a default judgment. See Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95–96
(2d Cir. 1993). First, the Clerk of Court enters the default pursuant to Rule 55(a) by
recording a notation of the party’s default on the docket maintained by the Clerk. See
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id.; Fed R. Civ. P. 55(a) (providing that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is
shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default”). Second,
after the Clerk of Court enters a default against a party, if that party fails to appear
or otherwise move to set aside the default pursuant to Rule 55(c), the court may enter
a default judgment. See Fed R. Civ. P. 55(b).
The Second Circuit has cautioned that default judgment is an extreme remedy
that should be entered only as a last resort. See Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 277
(2d Cir. 1981). Although the Second Circuit has recognized the “push on a trial court
to dispose of cases that, in disregard of the rules, are not processed expeditiously [and]
. . . delay and clog its calendar,” it has held that district courts must balance that
interest with the responsibility to “[afford] litigants a reasonable chance to be heard.”
Enron Oil, 10 F.3d at 95–96. Thus, in light of the “oft-stated preference for resolving
disputes on the merits,” default judgments are “generally disfavored,” and “all doubts
must be resolved in favor of trial on the merits.” Id. at 95–96, 98.
Analysis
This case presents the unusual procedural history of a slew of defaults being
followed by an attempt to intervene in place of the defaulting parties. The proposed
intervenor, NYM, claims that it should have been named as a party in the first
instance. Given the oft-stated preferences within this Circuit in favor of intervention
(where warranted) and against resolving cases on the basis of default rather than the
merits of the case, I conclude that NYM should be permitted to intervene and Hiscox’s
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motion for default judgment should be denied in order to allow the adversarial process
to run its course.
NYM Has a Manifest Interest in Intervening.
In analyzing the three “interest” factors, which address why the movant seeks
to intervene rather than the timeliness of its motion,2 the Court notes that Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Mitlof, 193 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), offers on-point and persuasive
guidance. In that action, as in this one, one insurance company—Hartford—was
seeking to rescind a policy it had issued via a suit against the policy holders, while
another insurer for the policy holders—Reliance—sought to intervene as a defendant,
arguing that the Hartford policy should respond in the first instance based on the
language in that policy. Id. at 156–57. The Mitlof court, after finding that Hartford
had conceded the timeliness issue, concluded that all three other factors supported a
finding that Reliance was entitled to intervene as of right. Id. at 160. In considering
the intervenor’s interest, the Mitlof court found that Reliance’s role as an insurer for
the relevant defendants meant that it “clearly has an interest in the determination
of whether or not Hartford is obligated to defend and, if necessary, indemnify” those
parties. Id. The court then determined that, “as a practical matter, Reliance’s
interests will be impaired by a judgment in Hartford’s favor.” Id. at 162. And despite
Hartford’s objections that the existing defendants adequately represented Reliance’s
2 In addition to filing a timely motion, intervention as of right is granted when the movant:
“(2) asserts an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) is
so situated that without intervention the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair
or impede its ability to protect its interest; and (4) has an interest not adequately represented by the
other parties.” Pitney Bowes, 25 F.3d at 70.
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interests, the court found that the insureds had no interest in the determination of
the priority of coverage and thus that no existing party actually represented
Reliance’s interest. Id.
In this case, as in Mitlof, each of the interest-related factors seems to
straightforwardly favor allowing NYM to intervene in this case. NYM inarguably
“asserts an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
action” in alleging that Hiscox’s obligations directly affect its obligations to its
insureds under its own policies. Pitney Bowes, 25 F.3d at 70. This also necessarily
means that denying NYM the opportunity to intervene may indeed, “as a practical
matter, impair or impede its ability to protect its interest.” Id. And NYM’s interest is
not, by any definition, “adequately represented” by other parties in this case. Id. Most
of those other parties have failed to defend the action at all, and the sole defendant
who has appeared, Mariduena, has no reason to defend NYM’s interest in the matter.
NYM’s Motion to Intervene is Timely.
Both NYM and Hiscox devote most of their attention in the briefing on the
motion to intervene to whether or not NYM’s motion is timely. Upon consideration of
the governing law and all of the circumstances of the case, I find that NYM’s motion
is timely.
“A district court has broad discretion in assessing the timeliness of a motion to
intervene, which defies precise definition.” In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 225
F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The timeliness
of a motion to intervene defies precise definition in no small part because, despite the
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ordinary 	plain 	meaning 	of 	the 	term, 	“it 	certainly 	is 	not 	confined 	strictly 	to
chronology.” Pitney Bowes, 25 F.3d at 70. Rather, courts should consider: “(1) how
long the applicant had notice before it made the motion to intervene; (2) prejudice to
existing parties resulting from any delay; (3) prejudice to the applicant if the motion
is denied; and (4) any unusual circumstances militating for or against a finding of
timeliness.” Id. Timeliness is thus a holistic inquiry, and the court “should base its
determination upon all of the circumstances of the case.” United States v. Yonkers Bd.
of Educ., 801 F.2d 593, 595 (2d Cir. 1986).
Hiscox argues in its opposition to the motion to intervene that NYM’s motion
is untimely because NYM did not file its motion promptly after learning of this action:
Hiscox filed the complaint in this action on December 3, 2024 and NYM did
not seek to intervene until approximately seven months later . . . Even if
NYM Insured’s counsel did not inform NYM of this action . . . it still does
not explain the four month delay between March 11, 2025—when NYM
alleges that it became aware of this action—and July 15, 2025—when it
filed its motion to intervene.
Hiscox Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Intervene (“Hiscox Opp’n”), ECF No.
42, at 3–4.
The Court takes note that NYM declines to address this argument and gives
no reason for its monthslong delay in filing the instant motion in the relevant section
of its Reply. NYM Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene (“NYM
Reply”), ECF No. 43, at 5–6. Nonetheless, that delay (between four and seven months,
depending on when NYM actually became aware of this action) is not egregious either
in the broad scheme of federal litigation or the specific context of this case. As NYM
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points out, a court in this District has granted a motion to intervene as of right after
a delay of “approximately two years” when other factors weighed in favor of
intervention. United States v. Country Club Garden Owners Ass’n, Inc., 159 F.R.D.
400, 402–04 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). And a court in this Circuit has also found a motion to
intervene timely—after delays similar to the one here—even when filed after a
motion for default judgment had been filed. See UNI Storebrand Ins. Co., UK v. Star
Terminal Corp., No. 96-CV-9556, 1997 WL 391125, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1997).
(“Because SGE filed its motion approximately five months after the action began and
soon after learning of the motion for entry of a default judgment, and because none
of the other factors weigh against SGE, I find that SGE’s motion is timely.”) Moreover,
the state court cases underlying Hiscox’s claims in this action date back nearly three
years and Hiscox had notice of them for over a year before filing this action. NYM’s
delay is therefore not dispositive.
The next factor to consider, “whether the delay in moving for intervention has
prejudiced 	any 	of 	the 	existing 	parties,” 	is 	“the 	most 	significant 	criterion 	in
determining timeliness.” United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 530, 541–
42 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Hiscox argues that NYM’s delay prejudiced Hiscox and that
“intervention would require . . . litigating a number of collateral issues, including
whether NYM’s Insureds are entitled to additional insurance coverage under the
Hiscox Policies and priority of coverage . . . Thus, requiring Hiscox to dedicate time
and expense to litigate the ancillary issues at this stage would be prejudicial.” Hiscox
Opp’n at 4–5.
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Hiscox’s arguments lack force. The only actions Hiscox has had to take in this
case to date are requesting several certificates of default and (after the motion to
intervene) moving for default judgment. As NYM points out in its Reply, this case is
“truly at its outset. There has not even been any written discovery, depositions, or
even a discovery conference. There is no possibility of duplicating or prolonging events
that have not taken place.” NYM Reply at 6. Rather than prejudicing Hiscox, allowing
NYM to intervene would simply require Hiscox to actually litigate the merits of its
action. Moreover, “the argument of [an intervention] motion’s untimeliness carries
little force when one notes that discovery has yet to commence.” Citizens for an
Orderly Energy Pol’y, Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty., 101 F.R.D. 497, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). While
it is true that NYM’s intervention may ultimately require litigating the priority of
coverage, “[t]his question arises only in the event the Court finds that the [Hiscox
Policy] is not void,” in which case “deciding which policy is primary serves the purpose
of Rule 24 which is ‘to prevent a multiplicity of suits where common questions of law
or fact are involved.’” Mitlof, 193 F.R.D. at 161 (quoting Washington Elec. Co-op., Inc.
v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1990)).
On the other hand, there would be significant prejudice to NYM if the Court
denied its motion and allowed Hiscox to proceed in this action unopposed. As
discussed in further detail below, the Court would likely grant Hiscox’s motion for
default judgment in the absence of a counterparty, which would force NYM to
continue shouldering the allegedly substantial expense of defending the underlying
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cases and likely lead to the added expense of bringing a separate lawsuit against
Hiscox.
Finally, I find no unusual circumstances militating either for or against a
finding of timeliness.
Accordingly, upon consideration of all the circumstances, I determine that
NYM’s motion to intervene is timely. While NYM delayed in seeking to intervene,
that delay is reasonably attributable to a hope that CMNT (or another defendant now
in default) would appear and defend its coverage-priority interest. Hiscox, for its part,
delayed bringing this action; it was notified of the underlying actions as early as
March 2023 when it received the letter tendering notice of the Campos action, but it
did not file this case until December 2024. Most importantly, NYM would suffer
prejudice if not permitted to intervene, while Hiscox will not be unduly prejudiced by
having to litigate the merits of its action.
The Intervention Motion Should be Granted.
Accordingly, I recommend granting NYM’s motion to intervene as of right
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
In the alternative, and for substantially the same reasons, I recommend
granting permissive intervention to NYM under Rule 24(b). NYM’s claims and
defenses clearly have questions of both law and fact in common with the main action,
and intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original
parties’ rights.
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The Default Judgment Motion Should be Denied.
As discussed above, the Second Circuit has regularly repeated its “oft-stated
preference for resolving disputes on the merits” alongside its view that default
judgments are “generally disfavored.” Enron Oil, 10 F.3d at 95–96. Presented with
the option of allowing a case to be resolved on the basis of defaults, on the one hand,
and the option of allowing an interested party to intervene as a defendant and enable
the adversarial process to run as intended, the Court should choose the latter. This
is especially so in light of NYM’s claim that it should have been included as a party
in the first place. See NYM Mem. at 2.
Additionally, granting the motion for default judgment would postpone and
complicate the future of this dispute rather than resolve it. In circumstances
analogous to the present case, the Second Circuit recently declined to give preclusive
effect to an insurer’s default declaratory judgment as against a nonparty insurer
denied intervention. See 2939, LLC v. Cont’l Indem. Co., No. 23-7466, 2024 WL
4553900 (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2024). An insurer—Continental—had sued one of its
corporate policyholders—Bulson—in the Southern District of New York for breach of
contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment on the grounds that Bulson had failed to
disclose the employee (whose injury formed the basis of the underlying action) on its
payroll in violation of the terms of the policy. Id. at *1. After Bulson failed to appear
or defend, the district court granted Continental’s motion for default judgment and
declared that Continental did not owe any duty to defend or indemnify Bulson. Id.
Then several other interested parties who had been denied intervention prior to the
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default judgment—including another insurer—brought a separate action in the
Eastern District of New York against Continental for breach of contract, claiming
that Continental’s refusal to defend and indemnify Bulson violated the terms of its
policy. Id. at *1–2. The Second Circuit dismissed the E.D.N.Y. complaint as precluded
by the declaratory judgment Continental had obtained by default. Id. On appeal, the
Second Circuit reinstated the E.D.N.Y. action, determining that precluding the
appellants from litigating their claims based on the default declaration would raise
due process concerns. The Court of Appeals held that, under New York law, “issue
preclusion is generally not available where the judgment in the prior action was
obtained on default.” Id. at *2 (internal quotations omitted). In the same paragraph,
the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling applying claim preclusion to
the default judgment, noting that no New York court had reasoned that “a default
judgment against one party had preclusive effect against a different party” and that
at least two had ruled that they did not. Id. (emphasis in original)
Thus, even if this Court were to grant the declaratory relief Hiscox seeks, NYM
could still challenge Hiscox’s claim that it need not defend CMNT and Hiscox would
not be able to preclude NYM’s arguments. NYM states in its Memorandum that
allowing it to participate in this action would “avoid expensive, duplicative, [and]
piecemeal litigation,” all but promising to pursue such litigation if this Court denies
its motion to intervene. NYM Mem. at 15. In this context, denying intervention and
granting the default judgment would simply delay the collision between insurers,
splintering the litigation and thereby multiplying its cost and length. Such a result
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would run counter to the Court’s interest in “efficiently administrating legal disputes
by resolving all related issues in one lawsuit.” Pitney Bowes, 25 F.3d at 69.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that proposed intervenor-defendant
NYM’s motion to intervene be GRANTED and plaintiff Hiscox’s motion for default
judgment be DENIED.
OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within
fourteen (14) days. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s
order. Caidor v. Onondaga Cty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
February 12, 2026
__________________________________
Clay H. Kaminsky
United States Magistrate Judge
/s/ Clay H. Kaminsky
Case 1:24-cv-08322-PKC-CHK Document 44 Filed 02/12/26 Page 17 of 17 PageID #:
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