Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Argent Securities Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-M1, v. Nickle et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------------X
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,
As Trustee for Argent Securities Inc., Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-M1
Plaintiff,
-against-
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
24 CV 7889 (NCM)
(PCG)
DAVID NICKLE; NEW YORK CITY
HOUSING AUTHORITY; NEW YORK CITY
PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU; NEW YORK
CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD;
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT ADJUDICATION
BUREAU,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------------X
On November 13, 2024, plaintiff Deutsche Bank Trust Company, as Trustee for Argent
Securities Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-M1 (“Deutsche Bank” or
“plaintiff”) commenced this action against defendants David Nickle, the New York City Housing
Authority (“NYCHA”), the New York City Parking Violations Bureau (“NYCPVB”), the New
York City Environmental Control Board (“NYCECB”), and the New York City Transit
Adjudication Bureau (“NYCTAB”) (collectively, “defendants”) seeking to foreclose on a
mortgage encumbering the property located at 14 Cooper Street, Brooklyn, New York 11207 (the
“Subject Property”), pursuant to New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
(“RPAPL”), §1301 et seq.
Despite proper service, defendants failed to file an answer or otherwise respond to the
Complaint and thereafter, on February 20, 2025, the Clerk of Court entered a default in favor of
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plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 19). 1 On April 20, 2025, plaintiff moved for default judgment (Dkt. No. 20),
and the motion was then referred to United States Magistrate Judge Cheryl L. Pollak on April 24,
2025 (Docket Order dated April 24, 2025). On October 20, 2025, this Court issued an Order
giving the parties an opportunity to supplement the papers before the Court. (Dkt. No. 84). On
September 10, 2025, Plaintiff requested, and was granted, leave to file supplemental documents
in support of its motion for default judgment (Dkt. No 22; Electronic Order dated Sept. 16,
2025). Plaintiff supplemented its motion on October 3, 2025, and filed proof of service of the
documents (Dkt. Nos. 24, 25). To date, the Court has received nothing from defendants. The
case was reassigned and the motion was referred to the undersigned on January 15, 2026.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully recommends that (1) plaintiff’s
motions for default judgment and for judgment of foreclosure and sale be granted as to David
Nickle and NYCHA; (2) Joseph R. Vasile, Esq., be appointed as referee to effectuate the
foreclosure and auction and that he be paid $750 from the proceeds of the sale; (3) plaintiff be
awarded sums expended in the sale; (4) plaintiff be awarded damages in the amount of
$674,350.87 reflecting $594,297.25 in outstanding unpaid principal balance amount due under
the Mortgage and Note, $38,654.84 in deferred principal, $24,965.93 in past-due interest,
$271.38 in Late Charges, $7,698.99 in Escrow Balance, $1,160 in additional costs (less $412.52
in credits), $6,800 in attorney’s fees, and $915 in costs and disbursements, in addition to pre-
1 On November 20, 2024, defendant David Nickle was served with a copy of the summons and Complaint,
and the 1303 Notice – Help for Homeowners in Foreclosure, in compliance with RPAPL 1303, 1320. (Dkt. No.
8). According to the process server’s Affidavit, he served a copy of these documents on “John Doe” at 14 Cooper
Street, Brooklyn, who affirmed that this address was defendant’s “dwelling place/usual place of abode.” (Id.) A
process server also mailed copies of the documents to the same address by First Class Mail on November 25, 2024.
(Dkt. No. 8-1). The New York City Housing Authority and the New York City Transit Adjudication Bureau were
served on November 19, 2024, by personal service on authorized agents for each entity. (Dkt. Nos. 9, 10). The
New York City Parking Violations Bureau was served on November 21, 2024, by personal service on an authorized
agent for service. (Dkt. No. 11). Plaintiff also seeks to remove from the complaint John Doe Defendants #1 through
#12, who were originally thought to be tenants residing at the property, after concluding that “no tenants reside at
the property.” (Supplemental Declaration, Dkt. No. 24, Wherefore Clause).
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judgment and post-judgment interest. The Court respectfully recommends that plaintiff’s motion
for default judgment against NYCPVB, NYCTAB, and NYCECB be denied and the complaint
against them be dismissed without prejudice. Finally, the Court respectfully recommends that
the complaint against Defendants John Doe #1 through John Doe #12 be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Deutsche Bank alleges that it is “a citizen of the State of California.” (Compl. ¶
2).2 Defendant David Nickle, the mortgagor of the Subject Property, is alleged to be a citizen of
New York, residing at 14 Cooper Street, Brooklyn, New York 11207. (Id. ¶ 3). The remaining
defendants are alleged to be administrative tribunals of the City of New York, and necessary
parties having an interest in or liens upon the Subject Property that are subordinate to plaintiff’s
Mortgage. (Id. ¶¶ 4-7). Plaintiff alleges that on April 26, 2006, David Nickle and Linda Nickle3
executed and delivered a Note and Mortgage in the amount of $385,000 and interest to Argent
Mortgage company, LLC, secured by the Subject Property. (Id. ¶ 12). The mortgage was
recorded on May 11, 2006 in Kings County (CRF 2006000264547) (Compl. ¶ 12(a), Ex. D).
The Mortgage was assigned to Deutsche Bank on January 28, 2009, and recorded in Kings
County on February 24, 2009 (CRFN 2009000053528). 4 (Compl. ¶ 12(b), Ex. E). A
typographical error on the assignment of the mortgage was corrected on April 6, 2011, and the
correction of the assignment was recorded on June 23, 2011 (CRFN 2011000224231). The
mortgage was further assigned to Deutsche Bank on May 18, 2011 and recorded in Kings County
on June 23, 2011 (CRFN 2011000224232). (Compl. ¶ 12(b), Ex. E). The loan was modified
three times, most recently on or about September 30, 2020. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-15, Ex. F). Plaintiff
2 Citations to “Compl.” refer to plaintiff’s Complaint filed November 13, 2024. (Dkt. No. 1).
3 Plaintiff alleges that, on or about September 23, 2011, Linda Nickle died. (Compl. ¶ 18).
4 The Corporate Assignments of the Mortgage, assigning the mortgage to Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company, are attached to the Complaint at Exhibit E. (Dkt. No. 1-5).
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alleges that it is the owner and holder of the Note and Mortgage or has been delegated authority
to institute this foreclosure action by the owner and holder of the subject Note and Mortgage.
(Compl. ¶ 17).
According to the Complaint, defendant Nickle failed to make payments in accordance
with the terms of the Note and Mortgage by failing to make the payment due November 1, 2023,
as well as failing to make any subsequent payments. (Compl. ¶ 19). At the time of the
Complaint, plaintiff alleged that there was a principal balance owed on the Mortgage of
$632,952.09, along with interest. (Id. ¶ 25(a)). In addition, the Complaint alleges that plaintiff is
owed late charges and other fees and costs permitted by the Note, Mortgage, and Loan
Modification Agreements; attorney’s fees and other costs and disbursements; as well as any
additional fees that are due or may become due under the terms of the Note and Mortgage. (Id. ¶
25(b), (c)). Plaintiff alleges that it has complied with all of its contractual obligations, including
serving defendant 90-day notices to cure, and complying with all of the provisions of RPAPL §§
1304, 1306, and Sections 595a and 6-1 of the Banking Law. (Id. ¶ 22-23).
Plaintiff asserts that due to the default, defendant owes the unpaid principal amount due
under the Note, together with interest, late charges, and reasonable attorney’s fees and other fees
and costs permitted by the Note and the Mortgage. (Id., Wherefore Clause). Plaintiff also seeks
foreclosure and the sale of the Subject Property, and seeks payment out of the sale proceeds.
(Id.). The Complaint further seeks various conditions to be imposed should the action proceed to
a judgment of foreclosure and sale. (Id. ¶ 26).
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As a threshold issue, “[p]rior to entering a default judgment, the Court must ascertain that
subject matter jurisdiction exists over plaintiff’s claims.” Centra Devs. Ltd. v. Jewish Press Inc.,
No. 16 CV 6737, 2018 WL 1788148, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2018), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 16-CV-6737, 2018 WL 1445574 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2018). “Federal Courts
exercise subject matter jurisdiction where the Plaintiff has established that there is proper
diversity jurisdiction.” Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB v. Thomson, No. 18-CV-3107, 2019
WL 2603167, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2019). While the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint, Vera v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 946 F.3d 120, 135
(2d Cir. 2019), the “party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that
jurisdiction exists.” See Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation omitted). A federal bank “is a citizen of the State in which its main office, as set forth
in its articles of association, is located. See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 306–07
(2006). However, an allegation of citizenship is not a fact, but a legal conclusion, Kenshoo, Inc.
v. Aragon Advert., LLC, 586 F. Supp. 3d 177, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2022), and to establish the
citizenship of a national bank, “a plaintiff must plead facts about what state is listed in its articles
of association as its main office.” D’Aguilar v. U.S. Bank Trust NA, LSF9 Master Participation
Trust, No. 24-CV4498, 2024 WL 3850349, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2024) (citing OneWest Bank,
N.A. v. Melina, 827 F.3d 214, 219 (2d Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted)).
Here, plaintiff alleges that this Court has diversity jurisdiction because the parties are
citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Compl. ¶ 10 (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1332)). Plaintiff alleges that defendant David Nickle is a resident and citizen of
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New York. (Compl. ¶ 3). Defendants NYCHA, NYCPVB, NYCECB, and NYCTAB are New
York City agencies and citizens of New York. Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
(“DBNTC”), as Trustee for Argent Securities Inc., alleges in its complaint that it “is organized
under the laws of the United States. It is a citizen of the State of California.” (Id., ¶ 2). The
Complaint does not further elaborate on its citizenship or provide additional facts that support its
allegation. (Id.). Plaintiff’s complaint, as filed, thus failed to plead facts sufficient to ascertain
(1) plaintiff’s citizenship and (2) whether this Court has diversity jurisdiction.
In light of this deficiency in the complaint, plaintiff was granted leave to file
supplemental documents on September 16, 2025. (Electronic Order dated Sept. 16, 2025).
Plaintiff submitted DBNTC’s Articles of Association, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement
between Argent Securities, Ameriquest Mortgage Company, and DBNTC, an Amended proposed
Default Judgment and Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, an Amended Bill of Costs, an
Amended Statement of Damages, and a Certificate of Merit. (Dkt. No. 24). The Articles of
Association state that DBNTC’s main office “shall be in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los
Angeles, State of California.” (Dkt. No. 24-1, Articles of Association). This establishes that
DBNTC is a citizen of California.
But this does not end the Court’s inquiry into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction,
because DBNTC was only acting as trustee for Argent Securities Inc. The Supreme Court
“established that [] ‘citizens’ upon whose diversity a plaintiff grounds jurisdiction must be real
and substantial parties to the controversy.” Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460 (1980).
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a trustee is considered a real party to the controversy
“when he possesses certain customary powers to hold, manage, and dispose of assets for the
benefit of others.” Navarro Sav. Ass’n, 446 U.S. at 464; see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
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Konover Dev. Corp., 630 F. App'x 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2015). The trustee must be an “active trustee [
] whose control over the assets . . . is real and substantial.” Navarro Sav. Ass’n, 446 U.S. at 458.
Here, plaintiff’s complaint did not plead facts that allowed the Court to ascertain whether
DBNTC’s control of the assets is “real and substantial.” Id. However, plaintiff subsequently
filed the Pooling and Servicing Agreement between Depositor Argent Securities, Master Servicer
Ameriquest Mortgage Company, and Trustee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
(“Agreement”). (Dkt. No. 24-2). The Agreement defines “Trustee” as “Deutsche Bank National
Trust Company, a national banking association, or its successor in interest, or any successor
Trustee appointed as herein provided.” (Dkt. No. 24-2, § 1.01). Section 2.01 of the Agreement
discusses the “Conveyance of Mortgage Loans” and states that
the Depositor [Argent Securities], . . . does hereby transfer, assign, set over and
otherwise convey to the Trustee [DBNTC] without recourse for the benefit of the
Certificateholders all the right, title and interest of the Depositor, including any
security interest therein for the benefit of the Depositor, in and to the Mortgage
Loans identified on the Mortgage Loan Schedule, the rights of the Depositor
under the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, all other assets included or to be
included in REMIC I, payments made to the Trustee by the Swap Administrator
under the Swap Administration Agreement and the Swap Account.
(Id., § 2.01).
Under the Agreement, plaintiff DBNTC thus possesses the power to “hold, manage, and
dispose of [the Trust’s] assets,” and is therefore, a real party to the controversy. Navarro Sav.
Ass’n, 446 U.S. at 464. See also Wilmington Tr., Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. for Benefit of Registered
Holders of Benchmark 2018-B5 Mortg. Tr., Com. Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2018-B5 v. 115 Owner LLC, No. 20-CV-2157, 2021 WL 5086368, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2021)
(finding that plaintiff trustee was a real party where it held “in trust without recourse, for the
benefit of the Certificateholders ... all the right, title and interest ... in, to and under ... the
Mortgage Loans.”).
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Having established that DBNTC is the “real party to the controversy” and a citizen of
California, the Court finds that the complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties,
and that it has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a report and recommendation on plaintiff’s
motion for default judgment.
II. 	Default Judgment
After defendants failed to file an Answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint, plaintiff
obtained a default from the Clerk of Court (Dkt. No. 19) and filed the instant motion for default
judgment. (Dkt. No. 20).
A. Legal Standard
Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[w]hen a party against
whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that
failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Rule 55 sets
forth a two-step process for an entry of default judgment. See Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10
F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 1993). First, the Clerk of the Court automatically enters the default
pursuant to Rule 55(a) by notation of the party’s default on the Clerk’s record of the case. See id.
Second, after the Clerk of the Court enters a default against a party, if that party fails to appear or
otherwise moves to set aside the default pursuant to Rule 55(c), the court may enter default
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
When a defendant defaults, the defendant is deemed to have admitted every well-pleaded
allegation of the complaint, “except those relating to damages.” See Au Bon Pain Corp. v.
Artect, Inc., 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981); Wing v. E. River Chinese Rest., 884 F. Supp. 663, 669
(E.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Hernandez Gomez v. 4 Runners, Inc., 769 F. App’x 1, 2 (2d Cir. 2019)
(summary order). The Court, however, must review the allegations in the complaint to determine
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if the elements of each claim have been adequately pleaded prior to granting a request for default
judgment. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tapper, No. 14-CV-5410, 2015 WL 6869702, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 9, 2015).
In determining whether a default judgment should be entered, the Second
Circuit has cautioned that a default judgment is an extreme remedy that “must remain a weapon
of last, rather than first, resort.” Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 277 (2d Cir. 1981). While the
Second Circuit has recognized the “push on a trial court to dispose of cases that, in disregard of
the rules, are not processed expeditiously [and] . . . delay and clog its calendar,” it has held that
the district court must balance that interest with its responsibility to “afford[] litigants a
reasonable chance to be heard.” Enron Oil Corp., 10 F.3d at 95–96. Thus, in light of the “oft-
stated preference for resolving disputes on the merits,” default judgments are “generally
disfavored,” and doubts should be resolved in favor of the defaulting party. Id. Accordingly,
plaintiff is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right simply because the defendants
are in default. See Erwin DeMarino Trucking Co. v. Jackson, 838 F. Supp. 160, 162
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that courts must “supervise default judgments with extreme care to
avoid miscarriages of justice”).
The court has significant discretion and may consider a number of factors in deciding
whether to grant a default judgment. These factors include: (1) whether the grounds for default
are clearly established; (2) whether the claims were pleaded in the complaint, thereby placing the
defendant on notice; and (3) the amount of money potentially involved – the more money
involved, the less justification for entering the default judgment. See Hirsch v. Innovation Int’l,
Inc., No. 91 CIV. 4130, 1992 WL 316143, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1992); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c)
(stating “[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is
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demanded in the pleadings”); King v. STL Consulting LLC, No. 05 CV 2719, 2006 WL
3335115, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2006) (holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) is not violated in
awarding damages that accrued during the pendency of a litigation, so long as the complaint put
the defendant on notice that the plaintiff may seek such damages). Additionally, a court may
consider whether the facts alleged in the complaint state a valid cause of action, whether there
are unresolved questions regarding material issues of fact as to liability or damages, whether
plaintiff has been substantially prejudiced by the delay involved, and how harsh an effect a
default judgment might have on the defendant. See Au Bon Pain Corp., 653 F.2d at 65; 10A
W RIGHT & M ILLER’ S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2685 (4th ed. 2025) (discussing
factors).
B. Default Determination
In this case, it is beyond dispute that the defendant is in default since he has failed to file
an Answer to the Complaint, failed to oppose plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment, failed to
respond to this Court’s Order relating to the calculation of damages, and failed to challenge the
Court’s entry of a default. See Hirsch,1992 WL 316143, at *2 (holding that “[the defendant’s]
default is crystal clear – it does not even oppose this motion”). Based upon a review of the
allegations in the Complaint, which are undisputed at this time, and for the reasons stated herein,
the Court finds that plaintiff has alleged a basis for finding liability sufficient to warrant entry of
a default judgment against Defendant David Nickle and NYCHA. For the reasons stated below,
the Court respectfully recommends that the motion for default be denied as to the other city
agency defendants.
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C. Foreclosure Actions
Under New York law, a mortgage is “‘merely security for a debt or other obligation.’”
United States v. Freidus, 769 F. Supp. 1266, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting 77 N.Y. Jur. 2d
Mortgages § 2 at 374); see also Rivera v. Blum, 98 Misc. 2d 1002, 1008, 420 N.Y.S.2d 304, 308
(Sup. Ct. 1978) (noting that a mortgage is the security for a debt that represents a lien on the
mortgaged property). The “‘mortgagor is bound by the terms of his contract as made[,]’” and, in
the event of a default, cannot be relieved from the default unless waived by the mortgagee, or
where there is “‘estoppel, or bad faith, fraud, oppressive or unconscionable conduct’” on the part
of the mortgagee. Freidus, 769 F. Supp. at 1276 (quoting Nassau Tr. Co. v. Montrose Concrete
Prods. Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 175, 183, 436 N.E.2d 1265, 1269 (1982)).
Thus, in actions to foreclose upon a mortgage, the plaintiff must demonstrate three
elements: (1) the existence of the mortgage and mortgage note, (2) ownership of the mortgage,
and (3) the defendant’s default in payment on the loan. Campaign v. Barba, 23 A.D.3d 327, 327,
805 N.Y.S.2d 86, 86 (2005); see also Secretary of U. S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Robedee
ex rel. Suffolk Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 22-CV-00809, 2022 WL 18284844, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 5, 2002), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22CV0809, 2022 WL 17850116
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2022); Freidus, 769 F. Supp. at 1277 (holding that foreclosure actions require
“proof of the existence of an obligation secured by a mortgage, and a default on that obligation”).
Once the plaintiff submits the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of the default, it has
satisfied its prima facie entitlement to judgment, see Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Olasov, 16 A.D.3d 374,
374, 793 N.Y.S.2d 52, 52 (2005) (citing cases), and the burden shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate that there is a triable issue of fact with respect to the merits of the defenses and/or
counterclaims. Id.; see also Gustavia Home, LLC v. Rutty, 720 F. App’x 27, 28 (2d Cir. 2017)
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(summary order); U.S. Bank Tr. Nat’l Ass’n Tr. v. Butti, 16 A.D.3d 408, 408, 792 N.Y.S.2d 505,
506 (2005); Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. O’Kane, 308 A.D.2d 482, 482, 764 N.Y.S.2d 635,
635 (2003).
1. 	Foreclosure Against Borrower David Nickle Is Appropriate
In this case, plaintiff has alleged in the Complaint that it is the current holder of the Note
and Mortgage originally issued to Argent Mortgage Company, LLC. (“Argent”). (Compl. ¶ 2,
Ex. D). Although the Note and Mortgage were originally issued to Argent, the exhibits attached
to the Complaint demonstrate that the Note and Mortgage were assigned from Argent to plaintiff
Deutsche Bank on January 28, 2009 (recorded February 24, 2009) and again on May 18, 2011
(recorded June 23, 2011). (Id. ¶ 12; Ex. 1-3). Plaintiff has further alleged that the Mortgagor is
in default on its loan, and that plaintiff has complied with all relevant provisions of the RPAPL
and the New York Banking Law. (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 22-23).
In addition to the allegations in the Complaint, which have not been refuted, plaintiff has
submitted copies of the duly executed Note and Mortgage, the Assignment of Mortgage, and the
Affirmation of Indebtedness, executed Tayla Lopez, Contract Management Coordinator, attesting
to the authenticity of the documents and certifying compliance with the requirements of the
RPAPL. (See Affirmation of Indebtedness (Dkt. No. 20-12) (“Lopez Aff.”)). Plaintiff has also
provided a Statement of Damages, Bill of Costs, Declaration of Services Rendered, a proposed
Default Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, and Memorandum of Law in support of plaintiff’s
renewed motion for default judgment and judgment of foreclosure and sale. (See generally, Dkt.
Nos. 20 and 24).
The allegations in the Complaint, which establish the existence of the mortgage held by
plaintiff, along with the unpaid note, and evidence of the default, are sufficient to satisfy
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plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to judgment. While the law shifts the burden to defendants to
demonstrate that there is a triable issue of fact, here, the defendant has failed to appear to contest
the claims. Given the numerous opportunities afforded the defendant, and his lack of
participation in these proceedings, the Court finds no compelling reason to delay further and
respectfully recommends that the District Court grant plaintiff’s motion for default judgment of
foreclosure.
2. 	Liability of Subordinate Lienholders
In addition to David Nickle, plaintiff seeks default judgment against four New York City
agencies as defendants: the New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”), New York City
Parking Violations Bureau (“NYCPVB”), New York City Environmental Control Board
(“NYCECB”), and New York City Transit Adjudication Bureau (“NYCTAB”), each of whom is
alleged to hold a lien in the Subject Property subordinate to Plaintiff’s mortgage. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-
7). Under New York law, “[e]very person having any lien or incumbrance upon the real property
which is claimed to be subject and subordinate to the lien of the plaintiff” is a necessary party to
a mortgage foreclosure action. RPAPL § 1311(3). This includes entities that hold subordinate
liens and therefore only have a “nominal interest” in the property. E. Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Robinson, No. 13-CV-7308, 2016 WL 3365091, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2016) (“Courts regularly
enter default judgments in foreclosure actions against defendants with ‘nominal interests’ in the
relevant property, including parties holding subordinate liens or non-owner tenants.” (collecting
cases)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 13-CV-7308, 2016 WL 3102021 (E.D.N.Y.
June 2, 2016). “When a default judgment is entered against a defendant with a ‘nominal interest’
in a property, any such interest in the relevant property is terminated.” Robinson, 2016 WL
3365091, at *4 (citation omitted).
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RPAPL imposes a heightened pleading standard “where a state or city agency is named as
a defendant.” Thompson, 2020 WL 1242828, at *5 (citations omitted). In those instances, the
complaint “must allege ‘detailed facts showing the particular nature of the interest in or lien on
the real property and the reason for making the state or city agency a party-defendant.’” Id.
(alterations omitted) (quoting RPAPL §§ 202(1), 202-a(1)). “If the lien exists ‘by virtue of a
judgment,’ and the defendant is a state agency, the complaint must include ‘the name of the
court, date recorded, clerk’s office in which filed, and names of the parties against whom and in
whose favor the judgment was recorded.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting RPAPL § 202(2)).
“If the defendant is a city agency, the complaint must include that same information, as well as ‘a
brief description of the grounds for or the nature of such judgment.’” Id. (quoting RPAPL § 202-
a(2)). See also JXB 84 LLC v. Khalil, 15-CV-6251, 2017 WL 1184001, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
17, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1184141 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017)
(granting default judgment against a city agency where plaintiff included documentation
identifying the liens, and recommending that the motion for default judgment be denied and the
claim dismissed against a different city agency, where plaintiff failed to support its assertion that
the defendant may have an interest in or lien upon the subject property.).
Plaintiff alleges that NYCHA is a necessary party to this action “by virtue of the fact that
it is the holder of subordinate liens.” (Compl. ¶ 4). To support its allegation, Plaintiff annexed
the judgment docket and lien information to its complaint. (Compl., Ex. B, Dkt. No. 1-2). The
document lists “the name of the court, date recorded, clerk’s office in which filed, and names of
the parties,” which complies with RPAPL § 202-a’s heightened requirements. Thompson, 2020
WL 1242828, at *5 (quoting RPAPL §202-a(2)). (See Compl., Ex. B, Dkt. No. 1-2). Because
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Plaintiff has met the heightened pleading standard, the Court respectfully recommends that the
District Court grant Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment as to NYCHA.
As to NYCPVB, NYCECB, and NYCTAB, Plaintiff alleges that the three agencies are
necessary parties to the action “by virtue of lien(s) docketed in the County Clerk’s Office copies
of which are attached. To the extent that the judgments are not attached, named as a party
defendant because some docket books are missing from the county clerk’s office and they may
have an interest in the property being foreclosed.” (Compl. ¶¶ 5-7). Plaintiff has not provided
any documentation to support its allegations. As such, plaintiff has failed to comply with RPAPL
§202-a’s heightened standard as to these city defendants. The Court thus respectfully
recommends that the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be denied as to the NYCPVB,
NYCECB, and NYCTAB, and that the claims against them be dismissed without prejudice.
3. 	The John Doe Defendants Should Be Dismissed
Plaintiff’s complaint named twelve unidentified John Doe Defendants who may be
“tenants, occupants, persons or corporations” who have or claim an interest in or lien upon the
Subject Property. In its supplemental declaration (“Suppl. Decl.”), plaintiff seeks to remove
John Doe #1 through John Doe #12 (“John Doe Defendants”) as party defendants because “no
tenants reside at the property.” (Suppl. Decl., Dkt. No. 24, Wherefore Clause).
“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court–on
motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff–must dismiss the action without prejudice
against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(m); see also Gustavia Home, LLC v. Villatoro, 16-CV-2106, 2017 WL 3888606, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2017) (recommending dismissal of John Doe defendants under Rule 4(m) in
mortgage foreclosure action due to plaintiff's “failure to identify and serve these defendants
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within 120 days after the filing of the complaint”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017
WL 3887888 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017). None of the John Doe Defendants have been served and
the complaint was filed more than 450 days ago. Accordingly, the Court respectfully
recommends that the complaint against the John Doe defendants be dismissed.
III. 	Appointment of Referee, Payment of Referee, and Payment of Sums Expended in Sale
In its Amended Proposed Default Judgment and Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale filed
in conjunction with its supplemental documents, plaintiff requests that the Court designate a
referee, Joseph R. Vasile, Esq., to conduct a public auction and that the referee be paid $750 from
the proceeds of the auction. (See Am. Proposed J., Dkt. 24-3, at 3). In its complaint, plaintiff
also seeks “the expenses of such sale,” which it appears to further define in its Amended
proposed Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale as “advertising expenses and the expenses of said
sale as shown on the bills presented and certified by the said Referee to be correct.” (Compl. ¶
24; Am. Proposed J., Dkt. 24-3, at 4).
A court may appoint a referee to effectuate a foreclosure and compute the amount due to
the plaintiff under the Note and Mortgage when a defendant defaults and fails to answer the
complaint. See RPAPL § 1321(1); § 1351(1); see also Windward Bora, LLC v. Brown, No. 21-
CV-3147, 2022 WL 875100, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2022). “Courts routinely appoint referees
to effectuate the sale of foreclosed properties,” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. for RMAC Tr.,
Series 2016-CTT v. Christian, No. 19 CV 427, 2020 WL 3918566, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,
2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-CV-00427, 2020 WL 3893015 (E.D.N.Y.
July 10, 2020), and order that the referee be paid from the proceeds of the sale. See Windward
Bora, LLC v. Brown, 2022 WL 875100, at *6 (appointing Susan Ellen Rizos, Esq., pursuant to
proposed judgment that provides $750.00 fee); cf. Windward Bora LLC v. Valencia, 2022 WL
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872506, at *1 (appointing a different individual as referee in a foreclosure action for the fee of
$750.00). However, courts are generally not permitted to “award damages that exceed what the
plaintiff requested in its complaint.” Windward Bora v. Castiglione, No. 18 CV 1766, 2019 WL
2435670, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan 10, 2019) (citing Finkel v. Universal Elec. Corp., 970 F. Supp. 2d
108, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)). Nevertheless, courts have found that the phrase “expenses of such
sale” in a complaint “logically include[d]” the reimbursement of foreclosure and sale expenses
sought in a proposed judgment. Windward Bora LLC v. Baez, No. 19-CV-5698, 2020 WL
4261130, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020) (citing cases).
Having already determined that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of foreclosure, the
Court respectfully recommends the appointment of Joseph R. Vasile, Esq., as referee to
effectuate the foreclosure and auction of the Subject Property as one parcel, and that plaintiff be
awarded the expenses of the sale it seeks in its proposed Judgment. The Court further
respectfully recommends that Joseph R. Vasile, Esq., be paid $750.00, from the proceeds of the
sale.
IV. 	Default Damages
Plaintiff seeks entry of a judgment foreclosing on the loan and awarding plaintiff the
aggregate amount of $674,350.87. (Am. Statement of Damages, Dkt. 24-5). The requested
amount consists of $594,297.25 in unpaid principal, $38,654.84 in deferred principal, $24,965.93
in interest owed as of February 5, 2025 per the Lopez affidavit, $271.38 in accrued late charges,
$7,698.99 in Escrow Balance, $240 in property inspections, $85 in property appraisal/BPO, $835
in title search expenses, $915 in costs and disbursements, and $6,800 in attorney’s fees, less
$141.14 in borrower’s surplus funds and $271.38 in suspense balance. (Am. Statement of
Damages; Lopez Aff. ¶ 19).
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A. 	Legal Standard
When a default judgment is entered, the defendants are deemed to have admitted all well
pleaded allegations in the Complaint pertaining to liability. See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v.
E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993);
Montcalm Publ’g Corp. v. Ryan, 807 F. Supp. 975, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing United States v.
Di Mucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989)); Au Bon Pain Corp., 653 F.2d at 65. However,
the plaintiff must still prove damages in an evidentiary proceeding at which the defendants have
the opportunity to contest the claimed damages. See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc., 973 F.2d at
158. That said, while “the court must ensure that there is a basis for the damages specified in a
default judgment, it may, but need not, make the determination through a hearing.” Fustok v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 122 F.R.D. 151, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 873 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.
1989). Rather, “the court may rely on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence . . . to
evaluate the proposed sum.” Id. (holding that “it was not necessary for the District Court to hold
a hearing, as long as it ensured that there was a basis for the damages specified in a default
judgment”).
As previously mentioned, the court may appoint a referee to compute damages due to the
plaintiff under the Note and Mortgage. RPAPL § 1321(1); see Greystone Bank v. Skyline Woods
Realty, LLC, 817 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). However, RPAPL § 1321(1) does not
require a court to appoint a referee. See id. (“If the defendant fails to answer within the time
allowed or the right of the plaintiff is admitted by the answer, upon motion of the plaintiff, the
court shall ascertain and determine the amount due, or direct a referee to compute the amount
due to the plaintiff . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Windward Bora, LLC v. Brown, 2022 WL
875100, at *5 (computing amount due on the note without appointing a referee). This Court
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issued an Order directing the parties to submit papers in support of their damage calculations.
Plaintiff submitted evidence in support of its damage calculations, whereas the defendant did not
submit any papers. Since the defendant is in default, plaintiff’s evidence on damages is
undisputed.
B. 	Damages Calculation
1. 	Principal
According to the Affidavit of Talya Lopez, plaintiff is owed $594,297.25 in unpaid
principal and $38,654.84 in deferred principal on the mortgage as of February 5, 2025. (Lopez
Aff. ¶ 19). Plaintiff has attached the payment history and account summaries for the loan,
showing an unpaid balance of $632,952.09. (Id., Ex. P). Plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to
tender the installment which became due and owing on November 1, 2023, and failed to tender
all subsequent installments. (Lopez Aff., ¶ 10).
Having reviewed the plaintiff’s submissions in support of its motion for damages, the
Court respectfully recommends that plaintiff be awarded the unpaid and deferred principal
amount owed on the Mortgage, totaling $632,952.09.
2. 	Interest
Plaintiff seeks an award of unpaid interest due under the terms of the Loan in the amount
of $24,965.93 from October 1, 2023 until February 5, 2025, per diem pre-judgment interest from
February 6, 2025 until the date of entry of judgment, and post-judgment interest at the statutory
rate. (Lopez Aff., ¶ 19). The account statements plaintiff submitted state that the interest due on
the unpaid principal balance is $24,965.93. (Lopez Aff., Ex. P). Using the 30/360 method to
calculate mortgage interest, which assumes that every month has 30 days, and the year has 360
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days, the Court has independently confirmed this amount. Accordingly, the Court respectfully
recommends that plaintiff be awarded damages of past-due interest in the amount of $24,965.93.
Plaintiff is entitled to per diem pre-judgment interest in the amount of $50.885 per day
from February 6, 2025 until judgment is entered. See Windward Bora, LLC v. Brown, 2022 WL
875100, at *6 (awarding per diem, pre-judgment interest starting from August 13, 2021 where
plaintiff had calculated the amount of alleged interest due through August 12, 2021).
Finally, a plaintiff is also entitled to an award of post-judgment interest, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1961(a), on damage awards issued by a district court. See Schipani v. McLeod, 541
F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2008). Thus, the Court also respectfully recommends that plaintiff be
awarded post-judgment interest at the federal statutory rate from the date judgment is entered
until it is paid. See Windward Bora, LLC v. Brown, 2022 WL 875100, at *6 (awarding post-
judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) in granting motion for default judgment of
foreclosure and sale).
3. 	Late Charges and Escrow Balance
In addition to principal and interest, plaintiff seeks $271.38 in late charges. (Lopez Aff. ¶
19). The copy of the loan’s account summary, attached to the Lopez Affidavit, confirms this
amount. (Id., Ex. P). The Court thus respectfully recommends that plaintiff be awarded $271.38
in late charges.
Plaintiff also seeks $7,698.99 in “Escrow Balance.” (Id.). Plaintiff calculates this
amount by adding $9,813.39 in tax payments and $4,115.94 in insurance payments and
subtracting from this amount $6,230 in escrow payments/credits. (Id.). A breakdown of this
5 “Daily interest is calculated as follows: daily interest rate = (outstanding principal * interest rate per annum)/365
days.” CIT Bank, N.A. v. Seeram, No. 16 CV 2608 (RRM)(LB), 2017 WL 8220204, at *5 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15,
2017), adopted by, 2018 WL 1308003 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2018) (citation omitted). Here, the daily interest rate is
calculated as follows: ($594,297.25* .03125) / 365 = $50.88 per day.
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balance is included in Exhibit P to the Lopez affidavit. (Id.). Accordingly, the Court respectfully
recommends that plaintiff be awarded $7,698.99 in escrow balance.
4. 	Additional Costs and Credits
Plaintiff further seeks $1,160 in additional costs, which includes $240 for property
inspections, $85 for property appraisal/BPO, and $835 in title search expenses. Plaintiff has
submitted documentation sufficient to prove these expenses. (See Lopez Aff., Ex. P).
Plaintiff also seeks sums advanced by it “for taxes, assessments, water rates.” (Am.
Proposed J. at 4). As with the expenses for advertising of the sale, the Court finds that plaintiff’s
request of “the expenses of such sale” “logically includes” these costs and thus recommends that
plaintiff be awarded such fees. See Windward Bora LLC v. Baez, 2020 WL 4261130, at *6.
The Court notes that plaintiff subtracted $141.14 in Borrower’s Surplus Balance and
$271.38 in Suspense Balance from its Amended Statement of Damages, which the Court
recommends should be subtracted from the damages award. (See Am. Statement of Damages,
Dkt. No. 24-5).
5. 	Attorney Fees and Costs
Finally, plaintiff seeks to recover attorney’s fees totaling $6,800. (Statement of Damages,
Dkt. No. 24-5). In mortgage foreclosure actions, attorney’s fees may be recovered if they are
contractually authorized. Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Elmore-Hernandez, No. 18 CV 1840, 2019
WL 2779320, at *6–7 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CV-
1940, 2019 WL 2775620 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2019) (citing Vigo v. 501 Second St. Holding Corp.,
121 A.D.3d 778, 779, 994 N.Y.S.2d 354, 356 (2014)). Where such fees are contractually
authorized, they must still be “reasonable and warranted for the services actually rendered.”
Vigo, 121 A.D.3d at 779. As such, attorneys applying for court-ordered compensation must
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document the application with contemporaneous time records and “specify, for each attorney, the
date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.” Cruz v. Loc. Union No. 3 of Int’l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1160–61 (2d Cir.1994) (citation omitted). Attorney
affidavits which are “reconstructions of the contemporaneous records” are sufficient if they “set
forth all charges with the required specificity.” David v. Sullivan, 777 F. Supp. 212, 223
(E.D.N.Y.1991). The Court then calculates a reasonable fee award using the “lodestar” method,
by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent by counsel on the matter by a reasonable
hourly rate. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 546, 551–52 (2010); Millea v. Metro-North
R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n
v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008); Cowan v. Ernest Codelia, P.C., No. 98 CV
5548, 2001 WL 30501, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2001), aff’d, 50 F. App’x 36 (2d Cir. 2002).
Where the information provided is insufficient to allow the court to engage in a lodestar
comparison, the fee request will be denied. Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd. v. Jasper Grocery,
152 F.Supp.2d 438, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Counsel’s failure to offer more than the most general
estimate of time expended in this case therefore precludes any award of fees.”). Cf. CSC
Holdings, Inc. v. Khrisat, No. 04 CV 8592, 2005 WL 3030838, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2005)
(“The submitted contemporaneous time records sufficiently detail the attorney or paralegal who
performed the particular tasks noted, the date upon which the tasks were performed, and the
nature of the tasks performed. The Court is thus able to make an assessment of a reasonable
lodestar amount.”).
a. 	Reasonable Hourly Rate
The Court determines the “presumptively reasonable fee” for an attorney’s services by
looking to what a reasonable client would be willing to pay. See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens
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Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d at 183. To calculate this “presumptively
reasonable fee,” the court will first determine a reasonable hourly rate for the legal services
performed by looking at rates prevailing in the district in which the reviewing court sits.
Gesualdi v. Dove Mason Supply Co., Inc., No. 19 CV 17 1181, 2020 WL 1538746, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2020). In Arbor Hill, the Second Circuit adopted the following factors to
guide the Court’s inquiry as to what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate:
1) the time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 3)
the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; 4) the preclusion
of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) the attorney’s
customary hourly rate; 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) the time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; 8) the amount involved in
the case and the results obtained; 9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; 10) the “undesirability” of the case; 11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and 12) awards in similar cases.
Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n, 522 F.3d at 187 n.3 (citation omitted).
District Courts in the Second Circuit regularly apply the Second Circuit’s factors to determine
reasonable hourly rates. See Manzo v. Sovereign Motor Cars, Ltd., No. 08 CV 1229, 2010 WL
1930237, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 11, 2010); Adorno v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 685
F. Supp. 2d 507, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Cruz v. Henry Modell & Co., Inc., No. 05 CV 1450, 2008
WL 905351, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008). See also Lochren v. Cty. of Suffolk, 344 F. App’x
706, 709 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that district courts need not “recite and make separate findings as
to all twelve” factors in awarding fees). In this district, hourly rates of $450 to $650 for partners,
$300 to $450 for senior associates, $150 to $300 for junior associates, and $100 to $150 for
paralegals are reasonable. See Moore v. Rubin, 766 F. Supp. 3d 423, 428 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,
2025) (finding rates reasonable “[a]fter an extensive and well-documented discussion of the
impact of inflation on the cost of living”).
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The Note and Mortgage in the instant case establishes that plaintiff is entitled to
reasonable attorney fees in the event of default. (Note ¶ 6E, Dkt. No. 1-3; Mortgage ¶ 22, Dkt.
No. 1-4,). In support of plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees, plaintiff’s counsel has submitted a
“Declaration of Services Rendered” by Christina Bruderman, Esq. (“Bruderman Decl.”) (Dkt.
No. 20-14). Ms. Bruderman states that her firm was paid a flat fee of $6,800 (Bruderman Decl.
¶ 5). Mr. Bruderman further states that her average hourly rate for foreclosure matters is $330,
and that, if the work “were billed hourly, affirmant’s corresponding legal fee would meet or
exceed the flat rate of $6,800.” (Id., ¶ 6). 6 Ms. Bruderman has practiced law since 2002 and has
five years of experience handling foreclosure proceedings. (Id., ¶ 7). She further states that her
firm has “many decades worth of experience, and has an excellent reputation representing major
financial institutions in foreclosure and related litigation.” (Id.). The Court finds that Ms.
Bruderman’s rates are consistent with reasonable hourly rates in this district.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms. Bruderman’s average hourly rate of $330 is
reasonable.
b. 	Reasonable Number of Hours
Having determined the reasonable hourly rate, the court next determines the
reasonableness of the hours expended by counsel. See, e.g., Irving v. G. & G. Instrument Corp.,
19 CV 1597, 2020 WL 1536325 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2020); LaBarbera v. Empire State
Trucking, Inc., No. 07 CV 669, 2008 WL 746490, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007). When
attorneys request fees based on a flat rate, the documentation submitted must still allow the
Court to examine whether the fee is reasonable by calculating the presumptively reasonable fee
6 The Court notes that the 19.5 hours plaintiff’s counsel has already spent would amount to $6,435 at an hourly rate
of $330. Adding six hours that plaintiff has “estimated not yet performed,” would amount to a total of $8,415.
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using the lodestar method and comparing it to the flat fee amount. See Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Pamdh Enters., Inc., No. 13-CV-2255, 2014 WL 2781846 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 19, 2014). Attorneys
may not recover fees for “excessive, redundant, and otherwise unnecessary” hours. Bliven v.
Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434
(1983)); Gesualdi v. Dove Mason Supply Co., Inc., 2020 WL 1538746, at *6. See also, Jemine v.
Dennis, 901 F. Supp. 2d 365, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (reducing requested fees 10% because the
“quality and complexity of the submissions and calculations” did not reflect the hours
expended). See, e.g., Blue Castle (Cayman) Ltd. v. Astudillo, No. 23 CV 3851, 2024 WL
3813309, at * (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2024) (finding a total of 30.6 hours spent on a foreclosure
default judgment reasonable), report and recommendation adopted by, Electronic Order, dated
9/27/2024; US Alliance Fed. Credit Union v. M/V Kamara Fam., 691 F. Supp. 3d 646, 665
(E.D.N.Y. 2023) (finding a total of 26.8 hours spent on a maritime foreclosure default judgment
reasonable); E. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Evancie, No. 13-CV-00878, 2014 WL 1515643 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
18, 2014) (finding reasonable 17.5 hours spent in a default judgment and mortgage foreclosure
case, amounting to a total of $5,687.50 in attorney’s fees).
Here, counsel has submitted a list of 12 tasks Ms. Bruderman has undertaken or has
“estimated not yet performed,” amounting to an estimated 25.5 hours. (Bruderman Decl. ¶ 4).
Having reviewed the records, the Court finds that the hours plaintiff’s counsel expended are
reasonable and consistent with similar cases in this District. Accordingly, the Court respectfully
recommends that plaintiff be awarded $6,800 in attorney’s fees.
c. 	Costs and Disbursements
Plaintiff further requests costs and disbursements, including $405 for the complaint filing
fee, $475 for service of process, and $35 for the notice of pendency filing fee. (Bill of Costs,
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Dkt. No. 24-4; Am. Statement of Damages, Dkt. No. 24-5). The payment receipt for the
complaint filing fee submitted with the motion for default judgment appears to be for a case filed
in the Northern District of New York, and the tracking ID on the receipt (ANYNDC-6925954)
does not match the tracking ID of the instant case (ANYEDC-18488721). (Compare Bill of
Costs, Dkt. No. 20-13 with Dkt. No. 1). Nevertheless, the Court takes judicial notice of the
complaint filing fee which is reflected on the docket. See Douyon v. NY Med. Health Care, P.C.,
49 F. Supp. 3d 328, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), judgment entered sub nom. Douyon v. N.Y. Med.
Health Care, P.C., No. CV 10-3983, 2015 WL 5821499 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (taking
judicial notice of the filing fee reflected on the docket). Plaintiff submitted an itemized invoice
for $475 in process serving fees. Plaintiff also submitted an invoice in the amount of $35 from
ProVest for the notice of pendency, or lis pendens, fee. (Bill of Costs, Dkt 24-4; Am. Statement
of Damages, Dkt. 24-5). Accordingly, the Court recommends that plaintiff be awarded $915 in
costs and disbursements.
CONCLUSION
In summary, having reviewed plaintiff’s submissions in support of plaintiff’s motion for
default judgment and judgment of foreclosure, as well as plaintiff’s Proposed Judgment and
supplemental documents, the Court respectfully recommends that plaintiff’s default judgment
motion be granted as to Defendant David Nickle and the New York City Housing Authority. The
Court respectfully recommends that plaintiff be awarded (1) $674,350.87, comprised of:
Unpaid Principal 	$594,297.25
Deferred Principal 	$38,654.84
Past-due interest from 10/1/2023 through
2/5/2025
$24,965.93
Late Charges 	$271.38
Escrow Balance 	$7,698.99
Additional Costs (Property Inspection,
Property Valuation, Title Search)
$1,160
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Attorney’s Fees 	$6,800
Costs and Disbursements 	$915
Credits 	(-$412.52)
TOTAL 	$674,350.87
(2) per diem interest of $50.88, starting from February 6, 2025 until judgment is entered; and (3)
post-judgment interest at the statutory rate. The Court further respectfully recommends that the
foreclosure and sale of the Subject Property proceed as set forth in the Amended Proposed
Judgment, under the direction of Joseph R. Vasile, Esq., as referee. The Court further
respectfully recommends that the referee be paid $750.00 from the proceeds of the sale, and that
plaintiff be awarded from the sale any sums expended for taxes, assessments, water rates, and
any additional costs for the expenses of the sale and the advertising expenses as shown on the
bills presented to said referee and certified by him.
The Court respectfully recommends that plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against
NYCHA be granted.
The Court respectfully recommends that plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against
the New York City Parking Violation Bureau, the New York City Environmental Control Board,
and the New York City Traffic Adjudication Bureau be denied, and that claims against them be
dismissed without prejudice. And finally, the Court respectfully recommends that the complaint
against the John Doe Defendants be dismissed.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the
Court within fourteen (14) days. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (providing the method for computing time). Failure to file objections within
the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See, e.g., Caidor v.
Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008).
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The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Report and Recommendation to the parties
either electronically through the Electronic Case Filing (ECF) system or by mail.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 13, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
/s/ Peggy Cross-Goldenberg
PEGGY CROSS-GOLDENBERG
United States Magistrate Judge
Eastern District of New York
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