Brathwaite v. The City of New York et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ANDREW BRATHWAITE, as administrator of the estate of
Richard Blake, deceased,
Plaintiff,
-against-
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, VICTOR BELIN, HARULTZ
DERISMA, and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
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ORDER
24 Civ. 3222 (NGG) (VMS)
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Vera M. Scanlon, Chief United States Magistrate Judge:
On behalf of his late brother, Richard Blake (“Mr. Blake”), who died while in custody at
the Otis Bantum Correctional Center at Riker’s Island (“OBCC”), Plaintiff Andrew Brathwaite
brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978). See Compl. ¶¶ 1-4, 42, ECF No. 1. Before the Court are two motions, which are
addressed together herein.
Plaintiff moves to compel Monell discovery, “Motion to Compel,” ECF No. 38, which
Defendants oppose, “Opp. to Compel,” ECF No. 39. Defendants move to bifurcate Monell
discovery, “Motion to Bifurcate,” ECF No. 48 (with Motion to Compel, the “Motions”), which
Plaintiff opposes, “Opp. to Bifurcate,” ECF No. 53. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions
are denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Blake, who suffered from hypertension, was provided
inadequate medical care following oral surgery, and that, on April 30, 2021, Mr. Blake suffered a
fatal cardiac arrest. See Compl. ¶¶ 41-124. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Victor Belin and
Harultz Derisma (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”), corrections officers on duty at the
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time of Mr. Blake’s death, witnessed Mr. Blake’s cardiac arrest but refused to get him medical
attention. See id. ¶¶ 85-121.
Plaintiff brings a deliberate indifference claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Individual Defendants and claims pursuant to Monell against the City of New York (the “City”).
See id. ¶¶ 180-94. Plaintiff’s Monell claims are based on the City’s alleged “widespread and
persistent practice” of insufficient staffing, training and supervision, including a general practice
to not provide CPR or first aid in a medical emergency. See id. ¶¶ 143-79.
On April 4, 2025, in denying Defendants’ first motion to bifurcate discovery, the Court
limited Monell discovery to “emergency care”: “policies and practices regarding emergency
medical care” and “inadequate staffing and supervision,” which are the “only Monell discovery
matters that may be relevant to Plaintiff’s claims based on Mr. Blake’s cardiac arrest.” “Order”
at 5, ECF No. 36. The Court, however, granted Plaintiff leave to request an expanded scope of
discovery based on the limited discovery permitted. See id. The Motion to Compel followed.
The Court also granted Defendants leave to renew their request to bifurcate discovery “if
new information is uncovered in discovery that merits bifurcation of the Monell claims.” Order
at 6. In light of the Court’s interest in resolving together questions raised in the Motions, after
Plaintiff filed the Motion to Compel, the Court set a deadline for the parties to brief any renewed
motion to bifurcate, stating that any renewed motion “must address, inter alia, any new
information uncovered in discovery that merits bifurcation of the Monell claims, any burdens
associated with Defendants’ response to Monell discovery, the approximate number of
responsive records to be disclosed, and any difficulties in accessing and producing those records,
including HIPPA and other confidentiality concerns.” 1/26/2026 Order. The Motion to Bifurcate
followed.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Compel
Plaintiff seeks to expand the scope of Monell discovery to include what the Court terms
“chronic cardiac care”: “inadequate medical treatment of incarcerated individuals with high-risk
cardiac conditions, including hypertension.” See Mot. to Compel at 3 (emphasis omitted). In
seeking to broaden Monell discovery to encompass chronic cardiac care, Plaintiff attempts to
bring in otherwise-time-barred events, namely, the allegedly deficient medical treatment Mr.
Blake received before his death on April 30, 2021.1
In support of his effort to broaden Monell discovery, Plaintiff makes two arguments.2
First, Plaintiff contends that “allegations concerning medical mistreatment before Mr. Blake’s
death are actionable and relevant because they caused Mr. Blake’s injury (i.e., the medical
emergency that killed him) within the statute of limitations period.” Mot. to Compel at 1.
Second, Plaintiff argues that the “continuing violation doctrine” should be applied here so as to
include the pre-April 30, 2021 medical treatment because “some acts in furtherance of the
policy” of deliberate indifference occurred in the statute-of-limitations period, namely the actions
1 The parties do not dispute that the statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff’s claims is three
years. See, e.g., Tr. 7/30/2024 Initial Conf. 5:4-7:6. ECF No. 25 (Plaintiff’s counsel
acknowledging that the end of the limitations period is April 30, 2021); Mot. to Compel at 6.
The Complaint was filed on April 30, 2024.
2 Plaintiff also contends that “precluding [him] from conducting discovery that is relevant to the
facts and claims pled in the complaint would have the practical effect of granting a motion to
dismiss, at least in part.” Mot. to Compel at 2. “Barring discovery concerning Defendants’ pre-
April 30, 2021 acts and omissions . . . would amount to at least a partial dismissal of Plaintiff’s
Monell claim under a Rule 12 motion that Defendants chose not to make . . . .” Id. Plaintiff does
not provide any legal support for this contention, and the Court finds none. Limiting the scope
of discovery to the timely allegations pleaded in the Complaint does not “dismiss” any of
Plaintiff’s claims. Rather, the Motion to Compel is an effort to indirectly amend the complaint
by a discovery motion.
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of the Individual Defendants in allegedly failing to provide emergency care to Mr. Blake on the
day of his death. See id. at 2.
1. Proximate Cause
Plaintiff argues that because the “medical mistreatment before Mr. Blake’s death . . .
caused [his] injury,” Plaintiff is entitled to Monell discovery related to time-barred events. See
Mot. to Compel at 1. Plaintiff is incorrect.
In support of his deliberate indifference Monell claim, Plaintiff alleges that the City has a
“persistent policy, custom, and practice of,” inter alia, “mismanaging staffing levels in DOC
correctional facilities,” “failing to adequately monitor or supervise housing areas or conduct
sufficient rounds to monitor the safety and security of the incarcerated individuals in custody,”
and “[f]ailing to train DOC and CHS agents and employees to provide CPR and first aid to
incarcerated people.” Compl. ¶¶ 187-89.
These allegations relate to emergency cardiac care, not preventative or chronic cardiac
care. Plaintiff’s post hac invocation of the allegedly deficient medical treatment that he contends
caused Mr. Blake’s death cannot amend his Monell claim, the basis of which, as stated in the
Complaint, is inadequate monitoring of incarcerated individuals so as to be aware that an inmate
is suffering a cardiac events and to provide CPR and first aid in cases of an emergency cardiac
event. See id. Accordingly, any “causation” of the injury related to allegedly inadequate
provision of chronic cardiac care does not provide a basis for an expanded scope of discovery
regarding such chronic cardiac care where it does not form the basis for Plaintiff’s Monell claim
regarding inadequate supervision and emergency response of correctional officers.3
3 The Court has not limited discovery as to Mr. Blake’s own medical history to events within the
statute of limitations.
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2. Continuing Violation Doctrine
A Section 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the
injury which is the basis of his action.” Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013).
Because § 1983 has no federal statute of limitations, courts borrow the “most analogous” state
statute of limitations, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980), as well as the
state’s tolling rules, unless such application would “defeat the goals” of § 1983, see Pearl v. City
of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks & citations omitted);
see also Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 641 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Although federal law determines
when a section 1983 claim accrues, state tolling rules determine whether the limitations period
has been tolled, unless state tolling rules would defeat the goals of section 1983.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In New York State, the statute of limitations for actions brought
pursuant to § 1983 is three years. See Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir.
2009).
“The continuing violation theory is an ‘exception to the normal knew-or-should-have-
known accrual date.’” Id. at 181 (quoting Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 248 (2d Cir.
1999)). “A claim that is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one
unlawful practice accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the defendant has
engaged in enough activity to make out an actionable claim.” Williams v. City of New York, No.
21 Civ. 3005 (ENV) (RML), 2025 WL 2782810, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2025) (internal
quotation omitted). “As a general matter, the continuing violation doctrine is heavily disfavored
in the Second Circuit[,] and courts have been loath to apply it absent a showing of compelling
circumstances.” Nadolecki v. New York State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., No. 09 Civ. 3888 (SJF)
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(ETB), 2011 WL 2446491, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted),
R&R adopted, 2011 WL 2437481 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2011).
Plaintiff contends that “Mr. Blake’s death resulted from an ongoing policy of deliberate
indifference . . . and ‘some acts’ in furtherance of the policy [occurred] within the statute of
limitations period . . . .” Mot. to Compel at 2. Plaintiff attempts to expand the scope of the
Monell-related discovery to include “[e]ach instance that DOC and CHS personnel failed to
provide adequate medical care for Mr. Blake’s hypertension—whether by mismanaging his
elevated blood pressure level, administering him contraindicating medications, denying
appropriate care after his loss of consciousness, or failing to promptly respond to his cardiac
emergency.” Opp. to Bifurcate at 19. The Court has not restricted Plaintiff’s discovery as to Mr.
Blake, but only as to Monell-related discovery.
The formulation of Plaintiff’s alleged Monell claim in the Complaint, however, does not
relate to any policy of “inadequate medical treatment” rendered by medical staff or DOC
officers’ prior to his cardiac arrest. Rather, as discussed above, Plaintiff alleges that DOC
officers failed to render emergency medical treatment or otherwise respond to Mr. Blake’s
medical cardiac emergency, which is distinct from any alleged prior conduct that may have left
Mr. Blake vulnerable to a fatal cardiac event. See Compl. ¶¶ 143-62. The Individual
Defendants’ “alleged refusals to call for a medical emergency and/or provide CPR/first aid on
April 30, 2021 [comprise] a discrete, unrelated act by unrelated individuals.” See Opp. to
Compel at 2-3. That is, the Individual Defendants were not medical providers participating in
any policy of medical mistreatment related to the oral surgery or post-operative care. Despite
Plaintiff’s contentions that this allegedly deficient medical treatment by others “constituted
‘another instance of the defendants’ continuing’ misconduct,” see Opp. to Bifurcate at 19
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(quoting Remigio v. Kelly, No. 04 Civ. 1877 (JGK) (MHD), 2005 WL 1950138, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 12, 2005)), Plaintiff’s Monell claim alleges inadequate supervision of incarcerated
individuals and inadequate response by corrections’ officers to these individuals’ medical
emergencies, not inadequate diagnostic, preventative, surgical or post-operative medical
treatment or medical management of similar chronic conditions. Accordingly, where the alleged
“misconduct” involved two different sets of actors and two different activities, application of the
continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable and does not support an expansive approach to
Monell discovery.4
As such, the Motion to Compel is denied.
B. Motion to Bifurcate
As discussed above, this Court previously denied without prejudice Defendants’ request
to bifurcate Monell discovery but granted Defendants leave to renew their request “if new
information is uncovered in discovery that merits bifurcation.” See Order at 6.
Defendants seek to bifurcate discovery because “nearly a year into discovery, it remains
unclear whether Plaintiff can establish the predicate constitutional violation [for his Monell
claim] at all.” “Defs. Mem. to Bifurcate” at 10, ECF No. 50. Defendants contend further that
bifurcation is warranted because “Plaintiff’s Monell-related interrogatories and document
requests could implicate millions of documents, including materials maintained by multiple City
and State agencies.” Id. at 12.
Plaintiff opposes for two reasons. First, Plaintiff argues that there is “‘significant
discovery overlap between the issues relating to Plaintiff’s individual deliberate indifference
4 Moreover, Plaintiff has not established any “compelling circumstance” to apply this doctrine,
the application of which, in this Circuit, is highly disfavored. See Williams, 2025 WL 2782810,
at *12.
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claims and his Monell claim.’” Opp. to Bifurcate at 5 (quoting Order at 3). Second, Plaintiff
contends that bifurcation would not lead to a more efficient resolution of his claims. See id.
It is “well-settled that that upon a showing of good cause a district court has considerable
discretion to stay discovery pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5874 (RPP), 2009 WL
2777076, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009). “In determining whether to stay discovery, a court
should weigh the breadth of discovery sought, the burden of responding to it, the prejudice that
would result to the party opposing the stay, and the strength of the pending motion forming the
basis of the request for stay.” Lopez v. Cty. of New York, No. 20 Civ. 2502 (LJL), 2021 WL
2739058, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2021) (internal quotation omitted). “The moving party bears
the burden of demonstrating good cause under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).” Roper v. City of New
York, No. 15 Civ. 8899 (PAE) (GWG), 2017 WL 462270, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2017).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s discovery requests “seek[] the wholesale production
of materials relating to every inmate death, regardless of factual similarity, relevance, or
connection to the underlying constitutional violation at issue here,” such that a responsive
production “would require a dedicated team of City employees working hundreds of hours to
collect, review, and produce materials.” Defs. Mem. to Bifurcate at 13. The crux of Defendants’
renewed motion to bifurcate is that Plaintiff’s requests for Monell discovery “ha[ve] necessitated
multiple meet[-]and[-]confers, and ha[ve] caused delays in moving discovery forward.” Id. at
14.
Plaintiff argues that “Defendants articulate no specific burden warranting bifurcation.”
Opp. to Bifurcate at 11. Even if “Defendants’ burden claims were valid,” Plaintiff contends
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further that the proper remedy is not bifurcation but rather motion practice regarding the scope of
discovery. See id. at 12-13.
The Court agrees. Apart from the parties’ opposing contentions regarding the scope of
Plaintiff’s discovery demands, see Defs. Mem. to Bifurcate at 10-14; Opp. to Bifurcate at 11-13,
Defendants do not provide any new support for their renewed request to bifurcate, see ECF No.
30 at 4-5. Defendants’ main argument—that Plaintiff’s discovery requests are overbroad and
have required multiple meet-and-confers—does not provide an adequate basis for bifurcation.
Moreover, the Court continues to have concerns regarding substantial discovery overlap
between Plaintiff’s claims and the lack of any significant efficiency in sequencing discovery as
proposed by Defendants. See Order at 3 (noting that Defendants failed to explain how
bifurcating discovery would be more efficient). As before, Defendants do not state any basis for
how any potential dispositive motion practice regarding the Individual Defendants would
conserve time or resources.
In light of Defendants’ having failed to meet their burden of demonstrating good cause to
bifurcate discovery, see Lopez, 2021 WL 2739058, at *1, the Motion to Bifurcate is denied.
C. Advancing Monell Discovery
The parties’ persistent disputes, see Defs. Mem. to Bifurcate at 10-14, Opp. to Bifurcate
at 11-15, appear to be inhibiting the expeditious completion of discovery. The extent of
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Defendants’ Monell production remains unclear,5 and the parties have not stated with specificity
their disagreements with respect to Plaintiff’s requests for production.6
It appears that Defendants have not produced any documents responsive to Plaintiff’s
request for documents regarding “employer disciplinary proceedings, lawsuits, inmate
grievances . . . and/or investigations . . . concerning the death of any individual in the custody of
[the Department of Corrections] involving an emergency medical response.” See Pl. Ltr. at 2,
ECF No. 53-5; Defs. Mem. to Bifurcate at 13. Although the Court agrees that information
regarding “inadequate medical treatment of incarcerated individuals with high-risk cardiac
conditions, including hypertension” is outside the scope of Monell discovery that the Court has
permitted, see Defs. Mem. to Bifurcate at 14, it is necessary for the parties to proceed with
Monell discovery expeditiously. As a starting point, within 30 days of this Order, Defendants
must produce all summary reports for the period April 30, 2020 through April 30, 2022,
concerning corrections officers’ responses to inmate deaths that involved an emergency medical
response at OBCC. This information falls within the “policies and practices” and “inadequate
5 Despite contending that Plaintiff’s request for “all disciplinary proceeding, lawsuits, inmate
grievances and investigations for every death in DOC custody involving an emergency response”
is “overly broad, sweeping, incident-based discovery,” Defendants do not state whether they
have produced any documents in response to this request. See Defs. Mem. to Bifurcate at 12.
Moreover, although “it is not entirely clear [to Defendants] what type of investigatory materials
Plaintiff is seeking,” Defendants do not state that they have produced any materials that are
responsive to this demand, such as “investigation reports.” See id. Pursuant to Rule 34,
Defendants were obligated to provide those materials to which they did not object with
specificity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) (providing that a party must respond to each request and
that the grounds for any objection must be stated with specificity and must state “whether any
responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection”).
6 In support of the Motion to Bifurcate, which was filed on February 6, 2026, Defendants
attached as exhibits the discovery requests that Plaintiff had propounded on March 19, 2025,
before the Order was issued limiting Monell discovery. See ECF Nos. 49-3, 49-4. Despite
implying that Plaintiff sought discovery in willful violation of the Order, Defendants
acknowledge that these requests have subsequently been modified pursuant to the parties’ meet-
and-confers. See Defs. Mem. to Bifurcate at 15.
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training and supervision” regarding the provision of emergency medical care. See Order at 5. In
addition, to the extent not already produced, Defendants must also produce all policies,
procedures and training materials related to the provision of emergency medical care to OBCC
inmates and responses to such conditions and events, for the period of April 30, 2020 to April 20,
2022. See Order.
After Plaintiff reviews this production, the parties are directed to file a joint letter, on or
before April 22, 2026, proposing a detailed schedule of any additional Monell discovery, which
must include deadlines, any deposition dates and a description of the particular types of
documents to be produced. It may be that after the forthcoming documents are reviewed, further
productions may be limited to acute cardiac or similar events or to events for which immediate
first aid was or should have been administered to OBCC inmates. Given the present lack of
clarity as to Plaintiff’s Monell claim and Defendants’ lack of detail as to the scope of the
anticipated production, the Court does not yet impose this limitation.
The Court understands that privacy concerns related to production of inmate medical
records counsel against production of individual inmates’ records at this juncture. Any
production of inmate-identifying material must be treated as highly confidential; Defendants
should endeavor to anonymize such material as is reasonably possible by the production
deadline. Accordingly, any production of inmate-specific documents beyond summary reports
will only be considered after review of summary reports and identification of the specific
incidents or inmates relevant to Plaintiff’s Monell claims. To the extent the Court determines
such records should be produced in a more complete form, if at all, they will likely need to be
anonymized.
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Given the parties’ attribution of discovery delays to the opposing side, see generally Pl.
Mem. to Bifurcate, Opp. to Bifurcate, counsel are reminded of their obligation to cooperate with
each other and to “read reasonably” all discovery requests, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 26.4.
Wholesale objection to discovery requests, without stating with specificity the objection,
particularly the extent of any alleged burden, are improper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Motion to Compel and the Motion to Bifurcate are denied. As
set forth above, the parties must file a joint discovery letter by April 22, 2026.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
March 5, 2026
Vera M. Scanlon
VERA M. SCANLON
United States Magistrate Judge
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