Miller v. Capital One Financial Corporation et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------X
ARIA C. MILLER,
Plaintiff, 	MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against- 	24-CV-2834 (NRM) (JAM)
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Defendant.
---------------------------------------------------------------X
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
Pro se plaintiff Aria Miller brought this consumer protection action under the
Fair Credit Billing Act (“FCBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1666, and the New York State General
Business Law (“NYGBL”). 	For reasons discussed below, Defendant Capital One
Financial Corporation’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and this action is dismissed
without prejudice. However, the Court grants Miller leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint within thirty days of the date of this Order, in the event that she is able
to plead additional facts showing that she timely provided Capital One with written
notice of the alleged billing error, as required by the FCBA.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Aria Miller holds a Capital One Platinum Credit Card issued by
Defendant Capital One Financial Corporation (“Capital One”), which she used to
purchase items from an online women’s clothing store (“Merchant”). Am. Compl. ¶ 9,
ECF No. 9.1 	According to her amended complaint, Miller returned the items after
1 All page number pincites are given to the page numbers generated by the
Electronic Case Filing System (“ECF”).
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they arrived later than expected and requested a refund from both the Merchant and
from Capital One. Id. at ¶¶ 10–12, 15. Capital One stated that it required additional
information to process the refund request. 	Id. at ¶¶ 19–20. 	However, Miller was
unable to upload documents through the secure email link Capital One provided, and
Capital One refused to accept supporting documents via any alternative methods. Id.
at ¶¶ 20–22. The Merchant was unable to refund Miller’s purchase because Capital
One declined to process her refund request. Id. at ¶¶ 16–17. She has not received a
refund from either the Merchant or Capital One, as of the filing of her amended
complaint. Id. at ¶ 25.
Miller originally filed this action on April 15, 2024, bringing claims under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. section 1601, as well as the FCBA and
NYGBL. 	See Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1 at 6. The Court dismissed her complaint with
leave 	to 	amend 	sua 	sponte 	on 	November 	1, 	2024, 	for lack 	of 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction. Mem. & Order, ECF No. 5. In the same order, the Court granted Miller
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Id. at 1.
On December 17, 2024, Miller filed her amended complaint, which was served
upon Capital One on April 21, 2025. See ECF No. 24. On July 28, 2025, Capital One
filed the bundled motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”) Rule 12(b)(6). See Notice Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Am. Compl. (“Mot.”), ECF No.
26; Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Am. Compl. (“Mem.”), ECF No. 26-1; Pl.’s Opp’n
Mot. Dismiss (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 25; Def.’s Reply Mem. Law Further Supp. Mot.
Dismiss Am. Compl. (“Reply”), ECF No. 28.
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In her opposition to Capital One’s motion to dismiss, Miller offers more details
concerning her billing dispute with the Merchant and Capital One.2 	She allegedly
purchased the items on July 3, 2023, and they did not arrive until July 20, 2023.
Opp’n at 7. On July 21, 2023, she communicated to the Merchant her desire to return
the purchased items, and on July 26, 2023, Capital One issued a temporary credit to
her account. Id.; Opp’n Ex. 6, ECF No. 25 at 35; Opp’n Ex. 2, ECF No. 25 at 66; Opp’n
Ex. 1, ECF No. 25 at 82. 	Miller also received letters from Capital One on July 26,
2023, notifying her of the credit and offering an update regarding her dispute with
the Merchant. See Opp’n Ex. 7, ECF No. 25 at 71, 73. On August 14, 2023, Capital
One informed her that it was reapplying the charge to her account and closing her
case. Opp’n Ex. 8, ECF No. 25 at 46. Miller claims to have disputed the charges with
Capital One via phone and email correspondence, within sixty days of August 14,
2023. Opp’n at 7.
Miller seeks a $399.80 refund (the disputed charge amount), a refund on any
interest resulting from the disputed charge, $100,000 in punitive damages, and fees
and costs. Am. Compl. at 3.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to
FRCP 12(b)(6), the Court must treat the allegations in the complaint as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 	See Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ.,
2 	Miller 	also 	specifies 	that 	she 	brings 	state 	law 	claims 	under 	NYGBL
section 349, after originally pleading violations of unspecified provisions in her
amended complaint. See Am. Compl. at 1, 3; Opp’n at 8–9.
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9 F.4th 95, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2021). 	Along with the complaint and documents it
incorporates by reference, the Court may consider “documents ‘integral’ to the
complaint and relied upon it, even if not attached or incorporated by reference.”
Weiss v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 762 F. Supp. 2d 560, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); see also
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002). Moreover, “[a]
court may consider papers a pro se Plaintiff submits in opposition to a motion to
dismiss so long as they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
Khater v. API Indus., Inc., No. 16-CV-6695 (CS), 2017 WL 6515531, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 19, 2017).
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it “contain[s] sufficient factual
matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). When filed by a pro se plaintiff, the complaint must be “liberally construed”
and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)). However, this leniency does not exempt pro se plaintiffs from complying
with 	relevant 	procedural 	rules 	and 	requirements 	of 	substantive 	law. 	See
Ezeiruaku v. Am. Express Co., No. 20-CV-4004 (LJL), 2020 WL 6135794, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2020).
DISCUSSION
I. 	The Fair Credit Billing Act
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Miller 	argues 	Capital 	One 	violated 	the 	FCBA 	by 	failing 	to 	reasonably
investigate billing errors in her credit card statement, despite being notified of her
refund request. 	See Am. Compl. at 3; Opp’n at 7–8. 	Capital One argues that the
complaint fails to state a claim under the FCBA because it does not allege 1) a billing
error, 2) that Plaintiff provided written notice under the statute, or 3) that Capital
One failed to comply with the statute’s procedural requirements. See Mem. at 12–13.
The FCBA was enacted in 1974 and amended the Truth in Lending Act
(“TILA”), 	15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 	et 	seq.; it is 	governed by Federal 	Reserve 	Board
regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 226.13. 	The FCBA provides consumers with a mechanism
for resolving disputed charges involving personal, “open-end credit” accounts (e.g.,
credit card accounts). 	See Abergel v. Santander Bank, No. 19-CV-6535 (CM), 2019
WL 4141668, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019). 	Within sixty days of receiving “a
statement of the [consumer’s] account” containing a “billing error,” the consumer
must provide the creditor with written notice “indicating the amount of the error and
the reasons supporting [the consumer’s] belief that it is an error.” Am. Express Co. v.
Koerner, 452 U.S. 233, 235–36 (1981). 	Within thirty days, the creditor must
acknowledge receipt of the notice; and within ninety days (or two complete billing
cycles), the creditor must conduct a “reasonable investigation” and either remedy the
error or explain in writing why it believes the original statement was correct. 	12
C.F.R. § 226.13(c), (f); see also Koerner, 452 U.S. at 236–37.
To state a claim under the FCBA, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence of a
billing error; (2) plaintiff’s timely notification of the billing error; and (3) failure of the
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card 	issuer 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	procedural 	requirements 	of 	Section 1666.”
Beaumont v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., No. 01-CV-3393 (DLC), 2002 WL 483431, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2002).
A. Billing Error
Capital One contends that Miller’s amended complaint fails to identify a billing
error, instead characterizing her allegations as claiming “she is entitled to a refund
for a purchase she made.”3 Mem. at 12. Miller states that she was notified of a billing
error on August 14, 2023, after the previously refunded transaction appeared on her
credit card statement. Opp’n at 5.
The FCBA offers various examples of what may constitute a “billing error”
under the statute, including “[a] reflection on a statement of goods or services not
accepted by the obligor or his designee or not delivered to the obligor or his designee
in accordance with the agreement made at the time of a transaction.” 	15 U.S.C.
§ 1666(b)(3); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(3). 	According to the commentary to the
FCBA’s regulations, goods that are “not accepted” or “not delivered as agreed” include
those that are delivered late or which the consumer refuses because they do not
comply with the contract. 	See 12 C.F.R. § 226, Supplement I, Subpart B, cmt.
13(a)(3)(1)(i). Furthermore, “[w]hether acceptance occurred is determined by state or
other applicable law.” Id. at cmt. 13(a)(3)(1)(ii).
3 In its reply, Capital One further argues Miller agreed to receive store
credit — and thus, conceded that she was not entitled to a refund — by agreeing to
accept store credit for her return. 	See Reply at 5. 	This mischaracterizes Miller’s
email correspondence with the Merchant, in which she repeatedly rejects the store
credit offer from the Merchant, and the Merchant eventually agrees to refund her
purchase. See Opp’n Ex. 6, ECF No. 25 at 11–16.
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Miller alleges that she refused clothing items because they were delivered
“later than expected,” Am. Compl. ¶ 10, but was charged for these items regardless.
She also states that she mailed the items back to the Merchant and that the Merchant
agreed to refund her purchase. 	Id. ¶¶ 15–16. 	While there was an ongoing dispute
between Miller and the Merchant — and ongoing communications with Capital One
regarding this dispute — the erroneous charges only appeared on her credit card
statement for the July 27, 2023 to August 26, 2023 period, after Capital One reapplied
the charges on August 14, 2023. See Opp’n Ex. 5, ECF No. 25 at 41; Opp’n Ex. 8, ECF
No. 25 at 46, 54. It was at this point that she received a statement reflecting charges
for goods “not accepted” and “not delivered as agreed.” 	See 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a); 12
C.F.R. § 226.13.
These allegations, taken together, are sufficient to constitute a billing error
under the FCBA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666(b)(3); 12 C.F.R. § 226, Supplement I, Subpart
B, cmt. 13(a)(3)(1)(i); see also N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-606 (acceptance defined in part by when
the buyer “after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller
that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of their non-
conformity”).
B. Written Notice
Less clear is whether Miller provided timely, written notice to Capital One
regarding the existence of a billing error. Miller alleges that she identified the billing
error on August 14, 2023, and that “Capital One was notified . . . within the 60-days.”
Opp’n at 5; see also id. at 7 (“The Plaintiff verbally and electronically notified the
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Defendant of the disputed transaction and the billing error within 60 days of the
transaction.”). She further alleges that she “contacted [Capital One] again” regarding
her dispute “via phone and additional email correspondence” after identifying the
billing error. Id. at 7.
Capital One argues that Miller’s amended complaint and her opposition to the
motion to dismiss fail to identify “(1) the specific date of the account statement where
Plaintiff first noticed the alleged error; (2) the specific date Plaintiff notified Capital
One of the alleged error; and (3) the means by which Plaintiff allegedly notified
Capital One of her dispute.” Reply at 6.
The FCBA requires a consumer to provide a “written notice” of a billing error
to the creditor within sixty days of the creditor “transmit[ing] . . . a statement of the
[consumer’s] account in connection with an extension of consumer credit.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1666(a); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(b) (notice must be received within sixty days
after the creditor transmits the first periodic statement reflecting the billing error).
If a creditor states that it accepts billing error notice electronically within its billing
rights statement, this may constitute written notice under the FCBA. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 226, Supplement I, Subpart B, cmt. 13(b).
Even construed liberally, with all inferences in her favor, the allegations in
Miller’s amended complaint and opposition to Capital One’s motion to dismiss are
insufficient to plead written notice under the FCBA. Capital One is incorrect to assert
that Miller failed to identify the account statement which contained the billing error.
See Opp’n Ex. 5, ECF No. 25 at 41. 	However, it rightly points out that — without
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more information about nature of Miller’s notice to Capital One — her amended
complaint fails to state an FCBA claim. See White v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 16-
CV-00176 (BR), 2017 WL 1131898, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 24, 2017) (“Without factual
detail as to the time, substance, and form of the notice, the court cannot infer that
plaintiff provided [defendant bank] with requisite written notice of a billing error.”);
Ezeiruaku, 2020 WL 6135794, at *3 (noting how certain allegations within plaintiff’s
complaint failed to state a claim because they failed to indicate whether Defendant
received written notice of a billing error).
Here, 	the 	amended 	complaint 	does 	not 	specify 	whether 	Miller’s 	email
correspondence to Capital One provided notice of the billing error or if it simply
discussed logistical issues, following her ostensible oral notice. 	See Am. Compl.
¶¶ 18–22 (discussing Plaintiff’s conversation with Defendant and her response to
Defendant’s email containing a secure link for document upload). 	The amended
complaint also does not state whether Miller provided “a signed and dated letter that
include[d her] case number, the merchant’s name, the date of the transaction, and
the disputed amount by 09/04/2023,” as Capital One instructed, or some equivalent
written notice that would satisfy the FCBA’s requirements. 	See Opp’n Ex. 8, ECF
No. 25 at 46. 	Without non-conclusory allegations of written notice, Capital One’s
obligations were not triggered, and Miller’s amended complaint fails to state a claim
under the FCBA.
C. Reasonable Investigation
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The Court need not address whether Capital One complied with the FCBA’s
procedural requirements, given the analysis above. However, it is worth mentioning
that — in characterizing Miller’s amended complaint as “aris[ing] solely out of [the]
decision to not issue her refund” — Capital One minimizes its obligations under the
statute. See Mem. at 12–13.
In conducting a “reasonable investigation,” a creditor “may not automatically
deny a claim based solely on the consumer’s failure or refusal to comply with a
particular request.” 	12 C.F.R. § 226, Supplement I, Subpart B, cmt. 13(f)(3).
Additionally, when investigating the alleged non-delivery of goods or services, the
creditor “shall not deny the assertion unless it conducts a reasonable investigation
and determines that the property or services were actually delivered, mailed, or sent
as agreed.” Id. at cmt. 13(f)(3)(ii) (emphasis added). In other words, proof of delivery
does not negate the existence of a billing error, if the buyer refused to accept the goods
or if the goods were not delivered in accordance with the contract. 	See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1666(b); see also Rigby v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 490 F. App’x 230, 236 (11th Cir.
2012) (noting how allegations of defendant “fail[ing] to follow-up when presented with
information that could have conclusively demonstrated non-delivery” support the
inference that the investigation was “not ‘reasonable’”).
In its August 14, 2023 letter, Capital One explained that it reapplied charges
to 	Miller’s 	account 	after 	the 	Merchant 	provided 	“[c]onfirmation 	showing 	no
cancellation per policy was received.” 	Opp’n Ex. 8, ECF No. 25 at 46. 	Miller also
alleged that she attempted to provide Capital One with information to support her
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refund request, and Capital One refused to accept this documentation via any
alternate method after Miller encountered technical difficulties. Am. Compl. ¶ 22.
Had Miller’s amended complaint offered sufficient facts to plead written notice,
she may have plausibly alleged that Capital One failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation. It does not appear that Capital One took any steps to investigate her
refund request after August 14, 2023. 	And not only did Capital One’s August 14,
2023 letter contain evidence of Miller’s non-acceptance, see Opp’n Ex. 8, ECF No. 25
at 	56, 	but 	it 	appears 	that 	Capital 	One 	ignored 	Miller’s 	efforts 	to 	provide
documentation to that effect. 	The standard under the FCBA is not whether a
particular merchant does or does not have a cancellation and return policy. 	It is
whether goods and services are delivered as agreed, and if not, whether the consumer
has been charged in error. If its duties were triggered under the FCBA, Miller may
have pled sufficient facts to demonstrate that Capital One’s investigation was
unreasonable under the circumstances.
D. Statute of Limitations
A final note regarding Capital One’s statute of limitations argument: Capital
One argues that Miller’s FCBA is time-barred because she was obligated to commence
her action within one year of opening her Platinum Credit Card account. See Mem.
at 13–14. It cites different opinions within the Second Circuit that state a TILA claim
must be brought within one year of entering into a loan agreement or receiving an
extension of a line of credit. 	Id. at 13 (citing Latouche v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.
Inc., 752 F. App’x 11, 12–13 (2d Cir. 2018); Maropakis v. Bank of New York Mellon
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Tr. Co., N.A., No. 13-CV-4744 (ERK) (VVP), 2015 WL 13742419, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May
4, 2015); Barnett v. Countrywide Bank, FSB, 60 F. Supp. 3d 379, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)).
These cases all involve closed-end credit transactions — specifically, mortgage loans
— that are distinguishable from the present action. See, e.g., Latouche, 752 F. App’x
at 13 (“It is well-settled law that in closed-end credit transactions, like a mortgage
loan, the date of the occurrence of violation is no later than the date the plaintiff
enters the loan agreement.” (citation modified) (emphasis added)); Maropakis, 2015
WL 13742419, at *4 (calculating the statute of limitations with respect to a mortgage
loan); Barnett, 60 F. Supp. at 392–93 (same).
The present case involves an open-end credit account, given that it concerns
credit card transactions. 	See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(j) (“The term ‘open end credit
plan’ . . . mean[s] a plan under which the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated
transactions, which prescribes the terms of such transactions, and which provides for
a finance charge which may be computed from time to time on the outstanding unpaid
balance.”); id. § 1666(d) (“[A] creditor operating an open end consumer credit plan
may not, prior to the sending of the written explanation or clarification required
under paragraph (B)(ii), restrict or close an account with respect to which the obligor
has indicated pursuant to subsection (a) that he believes such account to contain a
billing error solely because of the obligor’s failure to pay the amount indicated to be
in error.”); see also Koerner, 452 U.S. at 237 (“Every creditor under an ‘open end
consumer credit plan’ must disclose the protections available under [the FCBA] to the
obligor.”).
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As the Second Circuit has held, “[p]rivate actions based on violations of TILA
must be brought ‘within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation.’”
Latouche, 752 F. App’x at 12–13. At earliest, this would be the date of the disputed
transaction, if not after Miller saw evidence of a billing error. See, e.g., Iosilevich v.
Hofstra Univ., No. 20-CV-5085 (LDH), 2022 WL 4539679, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 28,
2022) (calculating the statute of limitations from the alleged date of the disputed
transaction); Douce v. Banco Popular N. Am., No. 05-CV-8979 (LAK), 2006 WL
2627966, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 12, 2006) (calculating the statute of limitations from
when 	the 	plaintiff 	was 	aware 	defendant 	had 	not 	met 	its 	FCBA 	procedural
obligations). In any event, the statute of limitations on Miller’s FCBA claim did not
begin to run when Miller opened her credit card account. 	Because the disputed
transaction occurred on July 3, 2023, and she alleges receiving notice of a billing error
on August 14, 2023, Miller’s action likely would have fallen within the statute of
limitations, had she stated an FCBA claim.
II. 	New York General Business Law
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
Miller asserts the Court’s diversity jurisdiction over her state law claims under
the NYGBL. 	See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–7. 	This requires the parties to be completely
diverse and the amount in controversy to exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Here, Miller’s NYGBL claim fails to meet or exceed the $75,000 statutory threshold.
NYGBL section 349 allows an injured plaintiff to recover actual damages.
N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 349. The Court has discretion to “increase the award of damages to
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an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages up to one thousand dollars”
if the Defendant’s violation was knowing and willful. 	Miller’s actual damages
(allegedly $399.80) — and any potential treble damages — fall well below the amount
in controversy threshold for federal diversity jurisdiction.
The New York Court of Appeals has permitted the recovery of punitive
damages under NYGBL section 349, despite the statute’s silence on the matter. See
Karlin v. IVF Am., 712 N.E.2d 662, 666 (N.Y. 1999). These count towards the amount
in controversy supporting diversity jurisdiction; however, “the Court is not obligated
to accept, on face value, a claimed amount of punitive damages, particularly where
there would be no diversity without such damages.” Cohen v. Narragansett Bay Ins.
Co., No. 14-CV-3623 (PKC), 2014 WL 4701167, at *3 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 23, 2014).
Here, Miller’s claim for punitive damages is 71.4 times greater than her actual
and potential treble damages combined. This exceeds the “single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages” ordinarily required for such an award to
comport with due process. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408, 425–26 (2003). Accordingly, it is not reasonably probable that Miller’s damages
will exceed the $75,000 threshold, and this Court likely does not have diversity
jurisdiction over her NYGBL claim. 	See Mem. & Order at 3 (“The party claiming
diversity jurisdiction ‘has the burden of proving that it appears to a reasonable
probability’ that the plaintiff actually could get damages greater than $75,000.”
(quoting Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Am. Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago,
93 F.3d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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B. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Where a federal district court otherwise has jurisdiction over the action, it may
choose to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . .”).
Here, however, Miller has failed to state a claim for relief under the FCBA and
has not shown any other independent basis for jurisdiction over her NYGBL claim.
Thus, in the interests of judicial economy, the Court does not reach that aspect of
Capital One’s motion that challenges whether Miller has stated a claim for relief
under the NYGBL; nor does the Court here decide whether, if she has met the
pleading requirements for her NYGBL claim, the Court should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over that claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Capital One’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED,
and this action is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to
FRCP 12(b)(6) and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to FRCP 12(h)(3).
If she wishes to file a second amended complaint with respect to her FCBA
claim, Miller shall do so within 30 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order.
The complaint must include sufficient facts to demonstrate that Miller (1) notified
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Capital One of a billing error “in writing” — containing “the amount of the billing
error and reasons for believing that it is an error” — and (2) did so “within sixty days”
of receiving an account “statement containing the alleged error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a).
If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order within the time allowed, the Court
shall direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and close the case. 	All further
proceedings shall be stayed for 30 days.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915(a)(3) that any appeal
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for
purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 269 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is requested to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff at the
address provided and note the mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: 	March 4, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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