Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
—————————————————————X
NICKELIA RODRIGUES,
Plaintiff, 	MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against- 	24-cv-79 (NRM)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
—————————————————————X
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
In 	this 	case, 	Plaintiff 	Nickelia 	Rodrigues 	(“Plaintiff”) 	challenges 	the
Commissioner of Social Security’s November 28, 2022 decision to deny Plaintiff’s
January 2021 application for Social Security Disability benefits. 	Plaintiff and the
Commissioner have both moved for judgment on the pleadings. 	See Pl. Mot., ECF
No. 8; Def. Mot., ECF No. 10. 	For the reasons outlined below, Plaintiff’s motion is
granted, the Commissioner’s motion is denied, and this case is remanded for further
proceedings.
The parties’ familiarity with the factual and procedural background of this case
is presumed. 	In relevant part, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who heard
Plaintiff’s case made the following determination as to Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”):
[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), except that she can occasionally push
and/or pull with the left arm. She can occasionally reach overhead with
both upper extremities. 	She cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds.
She can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. She can frequently,
but not constantly, handle and finger with the left hand. She can work
where there is no exposure to hazards such as dangerous moving
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machinery or unprotected heights. She can perform simple and routine
tasks (with limitations to concentration due to pain, not any established
severe mental impairment). 	She can engage in occupations with a
sit/stand option allowing a change of position briefly for 1-2 minutes
every 30 minutes, without leaving the workstation.
Administrative Record (“AR”) at 14, ECF No. 6.1 In reaching this determination, the
ALJ considered, inter alia, the medical opinions of Dr. Nickens, a state agency
medical consultant who examined Plaintiff, and Dr. Hecht, Plaintiff’s treating
physician. 	AR at 19–20. 	The ALJ found Dr. Nickens’s opinion persuasive and Dr.
Hecht’s opinion unpersuasive, because Dr. Hecht did not conduct a function-by-
function assessment of Plaintiff’s abilities and limitations and his opinion was not
entirely consistent with the medical record. AR at 20. The ALJ also noted the opinion
of Dr. Ochoa-Jimenez, a state examining psychiatrist, that Plaintiff had neither a
psychiatric diagnosis nor psychiatric functional limitations. Id. The ALJ found the
opinion of one non-examining state agency consultant, Dr. Wells, unpersuasive, and
noted that a second non-examining state agency consultant, Dr. Sinha, concluded
that, at the time of the review, there was insufficient evidence to evaluate Plaintiff’s
claim. 	AR at 19. 	Accordingly, the ALJ relied on Dr. Nickens’s and Dr. Ochoa-
Jimenez’s opinions in determining Plaintiff’s RFC.
Claimants who are denied disability insurance benefits by the Social Security
Administration (the “SSA”) may seek judicial review. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 	In
reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision, district courts do not “decide de novo
1 Citations to the AR, which was filed as a single document with the Court, are
to the pagination applied by Social Security Administration prior to transmitting the
record, located in the bottom right-hand corner of each page.
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whether a claimant was disabled” or “answer in the first instance the inquiries posed
by the five-step analysis set out in the [Social Security Administration] regulations.”
Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Instead, a court’s
review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is free of legal
error and supported by substantial evidence. Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d
Cir. 2000).
“Under 	the 	substantial-evidence 	standard, 	a 	court 	looks 	to 	the 	existing
administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support
the agency’s factual determinations.” 	Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019)
(citation omitted). 	“[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the
threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” 	Id. at 103. 	“It means—and
means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.’” 	Id. (citation omitted). 	It is “more than a mere scintilla.”
Id. (citation omitted). 	In applying the substantial-evidence standard, a court must
“defer[] to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up close.” 	Id. at 108. 	If
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings, they are conclusive and
must be upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 175–76 (2d
Cir. 2013). 	After completing its review, the district court may “enter, upon the
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing”
the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by not further developing the record as
to Plaintiff’s RFC. 	Pl. Br. at 12–15, ECF No. 8-1.2 	The Commissioner argues that
substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. 	Def. Br.
at 15–24, ECF No. 10-1.
After careful review of the parties’ submissions and the administrative record,
the Court concludes that the ALJ’s RFC determination as to a sit/stand option is not
supported by substantial evidence. 	“For an RFC to withstand judicial scrutiny,
substantial evidence must support the findings for each exertional and non-exertional
ability.” 	Carrube v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-0830 (FJS) (VEB), 2009 WL 6527504, at *7
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 2178499 (May
28, 2010). 	“Medical records alone cannot provide substantial evidence for an RFC
determination; rather, an ALJ’s RFC determination must be supported by a medical
opinion and that opinion must have been in the record at that time.” Hsieh v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-1793 (KAM), 2024 WL 230318, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2024)
(quoting Lebby v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec’y, No. 20-CV-4760 (PKC), 2022 WL 580983, at
*7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2022)). 	“The opinions of state agency physicians can be given
weight only insofar as they are supported by evidence in the case record.” Roberts v.
Astrue, No. 10-CV-0092 (DLI), 2011 WL 4056067, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 12, 2011)
(citation modified).
Here, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s decision not to rely upon Dr. Hecht’s
conclusory opinion that Plaintiff has “100% impairment” because Dr. Hecht did not
2 Page references use ECF pagination unless otherwise noted.
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make findings as to Plaintiff’s specific functional capacities. 	See AR at 16, 20
(discussing Dr. Hecht’s opinion). 	The ALJ discussed at length why Dr. Hecht’s
ultimate opinion was neither supportable by nor consistent with the other record
evidence. 	Id.; 	see 	also 	20 	CFR 	§ 404.1520c(a) 	(describing 	supportability 	and
consistency as “[t]he most important factors” for an ALJ to consider when evaluating
the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician).
The ALJ instead rested the RFC determination on the opinion of Dr. Nickens,
which the ALJ characterized as based upon a “complete” physical examination. AR
at 20. However, at the time of Plaintiff’s examination by Dr. Nickens, she was unable
to sit due to a recent surgical procedure to excise a lipoma in her gluteal area. AR at
17, 19. 	Dr. Nickens noted that Plaintiff was unable to lay supine or sit during the
examination because of this recent surgery, AR at 406, 408, and consequently
Plaintiff was unable to perform a straight leg raise during the examination, AR at
407. 	Accordingly, Dr. Nickens’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s ability to sit, and thus the
ALJ’s RFC determination that Plaintiff retained a light work functional capacity with
a sit/stand option of one-to-two minutes every thirty minutes, is not supported by
substantial evidence. This is especially true in light of the contrary ultimate opinion
of Dr. Hecht, AR at 412, and Plaintiff’s self-report at the hearing that she can only sit
comfortably for fifteen minutes, AR at 41.
It is true that, “where there are no obvious gaps in the administrative record,
and where the ALJ already possesses a complete medical history, the ALJ is under
no obligation to seek additional information in advance of rejecting a benefits claim.”
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Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999). Here, Dr. Nickens’s inability to
perform a full examination of Plaintiff’s ability to sit represents a substantial gap in
the record that the ALJ was obligated to fill before making a determination as to
Plaintiff’s RFC. 	The Court concludes, however, that the remaining elements of the
ALJ’s RFC determination are supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, and
the Commissioner’s cross-motion is denied. 	This case is remanded to the SSA to
further develop the record as to Plaintiff’s RFC as set forth above.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: February 23, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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