Lynch v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ROBERT P. LYNCH,
Plaintiff, 	MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against- 	23-cv-4800 (NRM) (LKE)
ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF
BROOKLYN, ST. RAPHAEL CATHOLIC
PARISH, GOOD SHEPHERD PARISH, and
FATHER JAMES K. CUNNINGHAM,
Defendants.
—————————————————————X
ROBERT P. LYNCH,
Plaintiff,
-against- 	23-cv-8687 (NRM) (LKE)
ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF
BROOKLYN, ST. RAPHAEL CATHOLIC
PARISH, and FATHER JAMES I. FROST,
Defendants.
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NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Robert P. Lynch invokes this Court’s diversity jurisdiction and brings
these two actions under New York tort law against the Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn
(the “Diocese”), St. Raphael Catholic Parish (“St. Raphael”), Good Shepherd Catholic
Parish (“Good Shepherd”) (collectively the “Parish Defendants”), Father James K.
Cunningham, and Father James I. Frost. These cases, which have been designated
related before the Court, involve allegations that Frost and Cunningham sexually
abused Lynch decades ago. Lynch also alleges that when he brought these allegations
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to a Church official whom he trusted, that official further traumatized Lynch by
arranging a pair of meetings where Lynch, alone and unsupported, was confronted
by Frost and Cunningham and was then forced to recount the details of his abuse in
their presence, before listening to Frost and Cunningham’s denials.
Plaintiff seeks to toll the statute of limitations on these claims under the New
York Adult Survivors Act (the “ASA”), N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-j, which established a one-
year window for adult survivors of sexual abuse to raise civil claims under New York
law that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. 	The Diocese and
the Parish Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaints. 	For the reasons
outlined below, these motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The two complaints contain many overlapping factual allegations. The below
facts are drawn from the two operative complaints, Second Amended Compl., No. 23-
CV-8687 (“Frost Compl.”), ECF No. 76; Second Amended Compl., No. 23-CV-4800
(“Cunningham Compl.”), ECF No. 95, and are assumed to be true for purposes of this
motion to dismiss. Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2021).
Lynch was born in New York and raised in an observant Catholic family. Frost
Compl. ¶ 38; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 45. 	Lynch’s family attended church at St.
Raphael every week, and both Lynch’s father and mother worked at St. Raphael at
one time or another. Frost Compl. ¶ 39; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 46. From first grade
to eighth grade, Lynch attended the St. Raphael Parish School. 	Frost Comp. ¶ 40;
Cunningham Compl. ¶ 47. In ninth grade, Lynch entered the Cathedral Preparatory
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School and Seminary (“Cathedral Prep”) with the belief that he would devote his
adult life to the Church. Frost Comp. ¶ 40; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 47.
When Lynch was fifteen years old, his father suffered a heart attack while
working at St. Raphael Parish and suddenly passed away. 	Frost Comp. ¶ 41;
Cunningham Compl. ¶ 48. The death of Lynch’s father left the family in dire financial
straits. 	Frost Comp. ¶ 41; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 48. 	When Lynch could no longer
afford tuition, the principal of Cathedral Prep, Bishop Catanello, allowed Lynch to
continue attending the school without paying tuition. Frost Comp. ¶ 42; Cunningham
Compl. ¶ 49. 	As a result, Lynch felt indebted to the school and the Church. 	He
became even more involved at St. Raphael and continued to consider becoming a
priest himself. Frost Comp. ¶ 43; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 50.
I. 	Abuse by Frost
While he was a student at Cathedral Prep, Lynch often served as an altar boy
during mass at St. Raphael and worked in the rectory for and with Frost. Frost Comp.
¶ 45. Lynch worked at St. Raphael after school and on weekends. Id. ¶ 46.
In or about 1992, when Lynch was sixteen years old, Frost began to sexually
abuse Lynch. Id. ¶ 47.1 	While Lynch was working alone at St. Raphael after school,
Frost repeatedly found him and proceeded to forcibly remove Lynch’s pants and
underwear, fondle Lynch’s penis, and rub his erect penis against Lynch. 	Id. ¶ 48.
1 Though the complaint contains allegations that Frost abused Lynch when he
was a child, Lynch does not in this case advance claims relating to this abuse. Lynch
has brought a separate action in New York State court under the New York Child
Victims Act, in which he raises claims relating to the abuse he experienced when he
was a child. Frost Compl. ¶ 27.
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Other times, Frost laid on top of Lynch and ground his erect penis on Lynch’s
buttocks. Id. These incidents occurred between 75 and 100 times over the course of
three years, from at least June 1994 until well into 1996. Id. ¶¶ 47–48. Lynch’s 18th
birthday occurred in January 1996. Id. ¶ 48. Lynch never consented to any of these
sexual acts and felt deeply humiliated, frightened, and helpless. Id. ¶ 49.
In and around 1984 (i.e., several years before Frost began abusing Lynch), a
series of priests were removed from duty at St. Mark’s Church in Sheepshead Bay,
New York. 	Id. ¶ 52. 	Frost was one of these priests. 	Id. ¶ 51. 	When Frost was
removed from his position at St. Mark’s, a Church representative made a written
notation that Frost’s removal was warranted because Frost was making “matters of
prudence and delicacy” that arose out of the abuse committed by his predecessors
“worse.” 	Id. ¶ 53. 	The Church officials who received this message responded by
transferring Frost to St. Raphael. Id.
The Diocese and St. Raphael also possessed and maintained personnel-file
records indicating that Frost had been the subject of reports documenting concerns
relating to inappropriate and sexualized conduct towards minors and vulnerable
parishioners in the years before he abused Lynch. 	Id. ¶ 54. 	The Diocese and St.
Raphael received and reviewed a professional assessment of Frost that documented
“compulsive sexual behavior” that began when Frost was thirteen years old, Frost’s
pattern of engaging in sexual innuendo with teenagers, and his past involvement in
sexualized and emotionally inappropriate relationships with minors and vulnerable
parishioners. 	Id. ¶ 55. 	The personnel file also includes records documenting that
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Frost was placed in formal therapy in 1986 after a “many-year emotional relationship
with an adolescent.” Id. ¶ 56. Professional evaluators identified this relationship as
sexually inappropriate and indicative of profound boundary failures. 	Id. 	This
treatment was arranged through clinicians approved by the Diocese and St. Raphael
and was known to Frost’s supervisors. Id. Documents in the personnel file also show
that Frost wrote to other priests in the Diocese during his treatment to express
appreciation for their continued support. Id. ¶ 57.
In 	1997, 	the 	Diocese 	and 	St. 	Raphael 	received 	a 	formal 	psychological
evaluation of Frost which concluded that he remained “vulnerable to return to his
past behavior,” including sexual misconduct, “especially when he is under stress.” Id.
¶ 58. 	This report also concluded that Frost should have “no unsupervised contact
with minors.” Id.
The report further stated that Frost’s psychological testing showed high
emotional dependency, difficulty managing interpersonal boundaries, tendencies to
intellectualize and suppress emotion, and a pattern of engaging in sexualized
behavior 	in 	“emotionally 	arousing 	situations,” 	including 	recent 	public 	sexual
misconduct. Id. ¶ 59.
The Diocese and St. Raphael continued to assign Frost to pastoral duties that
gave him unsupervised access to minors and vulnerable parish workers such as
Lynch, despite receiving explicit warnings about, and having prior knowledge of,
Frost’s history of sexual misconduct. 	Id. ¶ 60. 	Lynch alleges that the decision to
transfer Frost from St. Mark’s rather than discipline him was a part of a longstanding
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Diocese strategy of managing abusive clergy by quietly relocating them without
warning parishioners. Id. ¶ 62. Specifically, Lynch alleges that the Diocese pursued
this strategy in order to avoid disclosing the Diocese’s and St. Raphael’s knowledge
of sexual abuse by priests. 	Id. He further alleges that the Diocese and St. Raphael
failed to implement the 	basic safeguards 	recommended by 	the 	clinicians 	who
evaluated Frost, 	including 	the 	recommendation 	that 	Frost be 	prohibited from
unsupervised contact with minors. Id. ¶ 65. The Diocese and St. Raphael also failed
to maintain any policy or oversight to prevent a priest from being alone with a minor
or young adult or from engaging in sexual abuse. Id. ¶ 67.
Frost also abused other vulnerable parishioners besides Lynch. 	Id. ¶ 66.
These additional victims reported Frost’s sexual misconduct to the Diocese before
Frost ever met Lynch. Id. ¶ 68. Yet the Diocese and St. Raphael never notified law
enforcement of the allegations against Frost. 	Id. ¶ 69. 	Instead, Lynch asserts, the
Diocese attempted to hide, conceal, and cover up the abuse to avoid a scandal. 	Id.
¶ 72. 	Shortly after Lynch reported Frost’s abuse, in 1999, the Diocese again
transferred Frost to a different Parish — this time, from St. Raphael to “Corpus
Christi Parish.” Id. ¶ 75.
II. 	Abuse by Cunningham
After Lynch turned eighteen, he began living in the college seminary. During
this period, Father Cunningham developed what Lynch believed, at that time, was a
“normal” mentoring relationship with Lynch. Cunningham Compl. ¶ 73. In the fall
of 1996, Cunningham arranged to be alone with Lynch in Cunningham’s room at the
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Good Shepherd Parish in Brooklyn. 	Id. ¶ 74. 	During this encounter, Cunningham
attempted to rape Lynch. Id. After pretending to be wrestling, Cunningham pinned
Lynch to the bed, began kissing his neck, forcibly pulled down Lynch’s pants, and
began to fondle Lynch’s penis. Id. ¶ 75. Lynch struggled to free himself, eventually
kicking Cunningham and managing to flee. Id. ¶ 76.
III. 	Lynch 	Reports 	the 	Abuse 	and 	Is 	Forced 	to 	Confront 	Frost 	and
Cunningham
Following the abuse by Cunningham, Lynch reported the abuse by Frost and
Cunningham to Auxiliary Bishop Catanello, Lynch’s mentor and former principal at
Cathedral Prep. Cunningham Compl. ¶ 78; Frost Compl. ¶ 81.
In February 1997, shortly after contacting Auxiliary Bishop Catanello, Lynch
was summoned to the Diocese in Brooklyn. Cunningham Compl. ¶ 80; Frost Compl.
¶ 83. 	There, without warning, Lynch was led into a room where he was forced to
discuss his allegations in the presence of each of his alleged abusers: first Frost, and
then Cunningham. 	Cunningham Compl. ¶ 80; Frost Compl. ¶ 83. 	Lynch was
directed to recount in detail the sexual abuse he had experienced at the hands of each
priest, at which point he was then forced to listen to Frost’s and Cunningham’s false
denials. 	Cunningham Compl. ¶ 81; Frost Compl. ¶ 84. 	Lynch alleges that these
meetings were specifically orchestrated to intimidate him and deter him from
pursuing or reporting his allegations to anyone outside the Church, and that the
meetings left Lynch traumatized. Cunningham Compl. ¶ 82; Frost Compl. ¶ 85.
The Diocese and the Parish Defendants did not support Lynch in addressing
the trauma caused by Lynch and Cunningham’s sexual misconduct. 	Cunningham
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Compl. ¶ 83; Frost Compl. ¶ 86. 	Defendants refused to take any remedial action
against Frost and Cunningham. Cunningham Compl. ¶ 83; Frost Compl. ¶ 86. The
Diocese and the Parish Defendants never contacted law enforcement to report the
allegations. Cunningham Compl. ¶ 84; Frost Compl. ¶ 87. 	Nor did they take any
other protective measures to ensure the safety of Lynch or any other young people in
the Church. Cunningham Compl. ¶ 84; Frost Compl. ¶ 87.
Lynch also alleges that, shortly after he reported Frost and Cunningham, St.
Raphael and/or Frost fired his mother without cause from her job with the Parish,
which Defendants intended to serve both as retribution and a warning. Cunningham
Compl. ¶ 85; Frost Compl. ¶ 88.
Frost remained a priest until 2002, and Cunningham remains a priest to the
present day. 	Cunningham Compl. ¶ 83; Frost Compl. ¶ 86. 	The Diocese and the
Parish Defendants never contacted Lynch again after the February 1997 meetings
with his alleged abusers. Cunningham Compl. ¶ 96; Frost Compl. ¶ 97.
Lynch was deeply affected by the abuse and the subsequent confrontation with
his abusers at the Diocese. Cunningham Compl. ¶ 87; Frost Compl. ¶ 90. Lynch lost
his faith, stopped attending church, and gave up his aspiration of becoming a priest.
Cunningham Compl. ¶ 88; Frost Compl. ¶ 91. Lynch continues to struggle with self-
confidence and intimacy in his relationships and was unable for decades to discuss
with his wife the abuse he had experienced as a child and young man. Cunningham
Compl. ¶¶ 89–90; Frost Compl. ¶¶ 92–93. After Lynch saw Cunningham in May 2018
for the first time since the meetings at the Diocese, he began attending group
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counseling sessions for sexual abuse victims to better cope with the continued impact
of his earlier trauma. 	Cunningham Compl. ¶¶ 93–94. 	Lynch also suffers from
anxiety, depression, and feelings of betrayal. Cunningham Compl. ¶ 95; Frost Compl.
¶ 96.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Lynch initiated the instant suits during the expanded one-year statute of
limitations provided by the ASA. In one case (the “Cunningham case”), he named the
Diocese, St. Raphael, Good Shepherd, and Cunningham, Compl. No. 23-CV-4800,
ECF No. 1 (June 27, 2023), and in the other case (the “Frost case”), he named the
Diocese, St. Raphael, and Frost, Compl., No. 23-CV-8687, ECF No. 1 (Nov. 22, 2023).
The Cunningham case was assigned from its inception to this Court, Dkt. Entry dated
June 27, 2023, No. 23-CV-4800, and the Frost case was reassigned to this Court as
related, Ltr., No. 23-CV-8687, ECF No. 14; Dkt. Order dated Jan. 3, 2024. 	The
Cunningham case was stayed from September 5, 2023, until March 29, 2024, during
the pendency of a petition in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York that sought to fix venue for cases brought under the Child Victims Act in the
Southern District and consolidate those cases. See Dkt. Order dated Sep. 5, 2023, No.
23-CV-4800; Ltr. Mot., No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 32 (Nov. 8, 2023); Dkt. Order dated
Mar. 29, 2024, No. 23-CV-4800.
Cunningham 	and 	Frost 	individually 	answered 	the 	respective 	original
complaints, Answer, No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 36 (Cunningham answer); Answer,
No. 23-CV-8687, ECF No. 22 (Frost answer), and Lynch subsequently amended both
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complaints, First Amended Compl., No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 41; First Amended
Compl., No. 23-CV-8687, ECF No. 29. 	Cunningham and Frost again answered the
respective first amended complaints, Amended Answer, No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 45;
Amended Answer, No. 23-CV-8687, ECF No. 32, while the Diocese and the Parish
Defendants filed letters requesting pre-motion conferences on their anticipated
motions to dismiss, Ltr., No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 47; Ltr., No. 23-CV-4800, ECF
No. 48; Ltr., No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 49; Ltr., No. 23-CV-8687, ECF No. 34; Ltr.,
No. 23-CV-8687, ECF No. 35. 	Lynch responded to these pre-motion conference
letters. Ltr., No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 52; Ltr., No. 23-CV-8687, ECF No. 38. After
reviewing these submissions, the Court denied Defendants’ requests for pre-motion
conferences as unnecessary and directed the parties to brief the motions to dismiss.
Dkt. Order dated Dec. 4, 2024, No. 23-CV-4800; Dkt. Order dated Dec. 4, 2024, No.
23-CV-8687.
The fully bundled motions to dismiss were filed on June 24, 2025. 	Mot. to
Dismiss, No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 69; Mem. in Supp., No. 23-CV-4800 (“Diocese
Cunningham Mem.”), ECF No. 70; Mem. in Opp’n, No. 23-CV-4800 (“Pl. Cunningham
Mem.”), ECF No. 73;2 Reply in Supp., No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 82; Mot. to Dismiss,
No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 74; Mem. in Supp., No. 23-CV-4800 (“Parish Cunningham
2 The memoranda of law filed by Defendants on behalf of Lynch in opposition
to each of the three motions to dismiss in the Cunningham case appear to be identical.
Compare No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 73, with No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 76, and No.
23-CV-4800, ECF No. 80. Accordingly, in the interest of concision, references to the
“Pl. Cunningham Mem.” will cite to ECF No. 73 but refer to ECF No, 73, ECF No. 76,
and ECF No. 80.
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Mem.”), ECF No. 75;3 Mem. in Opp’n, No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 76; Reply in Supp.,
No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 77;4 Mot. to Dismiss, No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 78; Mem.
in Supp., No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 79; Mem. in Opp’n, No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 80;
Reply in Supp., No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 81; Mot. to Dismiss, No. 23-CV-8687, ECF
No. 53; Mem. in Supp., No. 23-CV-8687 (“Diocese Frost Mem.”), ECF No. 54; Mot. to
Dismiss, No. 23-CV-8687, ECF No. 57; Mem. in Supp., No. 23-CV-8687 (“St. Raphael
Frost Mem.”), ECF No. 58; Mem. in Opp’n, No. 23-CV-8687 (“Pl. Frost Mem.”), ECF
No. 59; Reply in Supp., No. 23-CV-8687 (“Diocese Frost Reply”), ECF No. 63; Reply
in Supp., No. 23-CV-8687 (“St. Raphael Frost Reply”), ECF No. 60.
In 	his 	opposition 	papers, 	Lynch 	requested 	leave 	to 	further 	amend 	his
complaint, which the Court granted while directing the Diocese and the Parish
Defendants to file letters to the docket addressing the new allegations in the second
amended complaints. 	Dkt. Order dated Nov. 10, 2025, No. 23-CV-4800; Dkt. Order
dated Nov. 10, 2025, No. 23-CV-8687. Lynch filed his second amended complaints on
November 24, 2025. Cunningham Compl.; Frost Compl. The Diocese and the Parish
Defendants 	subsequently 	submitted 	their 	letters 	adhering 	to 	the 	arguments
3 The Parish Defendants share common counsel, and the memoranda of law
filed by St. Raphael and Good Shepherd in the Cunningham case appear to be
identical. Compare No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 75, with No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 79.
Accordingly, in the interest of concision, references to the “Parish Cunningham
Mem.” will cite to ECF No. 75 but refer to both ECF No. 75 and ECF No. 79.
4 As with the Parish Defendants’ memoranda in chief, their respective reply
memoranda in the Cunningham case are identical. 	Compare No. 23-CV-4800,
ECF No. 77, with No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 81. 	Accordingly, in the interest of
concision, references to the “Parish Cunningham Reply” with cite to ECF No. 77 but
refer to both ECF No. 77 and ECF No. 81.
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advanced in their earlier motions to dismiss. Ltr., No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 97; Ltr.,
No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 98; Ltr., No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 99; Ltr., No. 23-CV-8687
(“Diocese Frost Ltr. Br.”), ECF No. 78; Ltr., No. 23-CV-8687 (“St. Raphael Frost Ltr.
Br.”), ECF No. 79. 	Cunningham has answered the second amended complaint,
Second Amended Answer, No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 101. Frost has yet to answer or
otherwise respond to the second amended complaint.
In the Cunningham case, Lynch now advances nine causes of action: (1) battery
against Cunningham; (2) assault against Cunningham; (3) false imprisonment
against Cunningham; (4) negligence against all Defendants; (5) negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision against the Diocese and the Parish Defendants; (6) gross
negligence against the Diocese and the Parish Defendants; (7) intentional infliction
of emotional distress against all Defendants; (8) negligent infliction of emotional
distress 	against 	all 	Defendants; 	and 	(9) 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty 	against 	all
Defendants. 	Cunningham 	Compl. 	¶¶ 103–96. 	The 	Diocese 	and 	the 	Parish
Defendants have moved to dismiss counts four through nine. 	Diocese Cunningham
Mem. at 7–9;5 Parish Cunningham Mem. at 9–10.
In the Frost case, Lynch again advances nine causes of action: (1) battery
against Frost; (2) assault against Frost; (3) false imprisonment against Frost;
(4) negligence against all Defendants; (5) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision
against the Diocese and St. Raphael; (6) gross negligence against the Diocese and St.
Raphael; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants;
5 All page references are to ECF pagination unless otherwise noted.
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(8) negligent infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants; and (9) breach of
fiduciary duty against all Defendants. Frost Compl. ¶¶ 103–99. The Diocese and St.
Raphael have also moved to dismiss counts four through nine. 	Diocese Frost Mem.
at 7–9; St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 7–9.
LEGAL STANDARD
Where, as here, a defendant has moved to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim, courts must evaluate whether the complaint pleads “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	On
the other hand, if “the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief,” the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 558. 	Courts at this stage “must construe [the complaint] liberally, accepting all
factual allegations therein as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff[’s] favor.” 	Sacerdote, 9 F.4th at 106–07. 	However, courts need not accept
legal conclusions and “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 663. 	Complaints that advance only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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DISCUSSION
As discussed supra, the Diocese and the Parish Defendants have moved to
dismiss only the causes of action that seek to hold them liable.6 	Accordingly, this
opinion does not address counts one through three in either of the second amended
complaints, since those causes of action seek to hold only Frost and Cunningham
liable, and neither Frost nor Cunningham has moved to dismiss these claims.
Because Lynch brings these cases pursuant to the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, Frost
Compl. ¶ 30; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 36, his claims are governed by New York
substantive law, Sarkees v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 15 F.4th 584, 588 (2d Cir.
2021) (“In a diversity of citizenship case, state law . . . applies to substantive issues,
and federal law applies to procedural issues.”).
I. 	Ordinary Negligence Claims
Under New York law, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of negligence
by showing that (1) a defendant owed him a duty; (2) the defendant breached that
duty; and (3) plaintiff suffered injuries proximately resulting from that breach. Coyla
v. United States, 954 F.3d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 2020). 	“Because a finding of negligence
must be based on the breach of a duty, a threshold question in tort cases is whether
the alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to the injured party.” 	Espinal v. Melville
Snow Contractors, Inc., 773 N.E.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 2002). 	A plaintiff must also
6 In its pre-motion conference letter in the Cunningham case, the Diocese
advanced the argument that the complaint does not comport with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8. 	Ltr. at 2–3, No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 47. 	However, the Diocese
has abandoned this argument in its motion papers, see Diocese Cunningham Mem.
at 19 n.7; Diocese Frost Mem. at 21 n.7, and accordingly the Court will not consider
it below.
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establish that his injuries were foreseeable. 	Aegis Ins. Servs. v. 7 World Trade Co.,
737 F.3d 166, 177 (2d Cir. 2013).
The dispute at this stage centers on whether the Diocese and the Parish
Defendants owed any duty to Lynch. In both the Frost and Cunningham cases, Lynch
advances the theory that these Defendants owed him a duty as landowners to protect
him from what they knew to be the dangerous proclivities of Frost and Cunningham.
Pl. Frost Mem. at 19–21; Pl. Cunningham Mem. at 17–19. In the Frost case, Lynch
advances the alternative theory that the Diocese and St. Raphael also owed him a
duty in loco parentis due to his enrollment at Cathedral Prep, a Diocesan school, at
the time of the alleged abuse. Pl. Frost Mem. at 21–22.7
7 Lynch also asserts, as another alternative theory in both cases, that the
Diocese and the Parish Defendants “owed [him] a duty to protect him from the
dangers arising out of [Frost’s and Cunningham’s] known propensit[ies] to commit
sexual assault.” Pl. Frost Mem. at 16; Pl. Cunningham Mem. at 14. This appears to
assert that these Defendants are liable under the respondeat superior theory of
vicarious liability. 	See, e.g., Riviello v. Waldron, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1280–81 (N.Y.
1979) (discussing respondeat superior liability under New York law). 	However, the
cases Lynch cites to establish this duty concerned state-law negligent supervision
claims, not claims for ordinary negligence. See Ehrens v. Lutheran Church, 385 F.3d
232, 235 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[The plaintiff] argues, as he did below, that the defendants
are liable for [individual defendant-employee’s] tortious conduct on a theory of
negligent retention or supervision.”); O’Rear v. Diaz, No. 24-CV-1669 (PAE), 2025 WL
283169, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2025) (“[The plaintiff] brings, against the corporate
defendants, claims of . . . negligent supervision under New York state law.”). Lynch
has cited no case, and the Court is not aware of any, where respondeat superior
liability attached to an employer for a claim related to a sexual assault perpetrated
by an employee. Courts in fact explicitly reject such theories because sexual assault
is not within any employee’s scope of employment. See N.X. v. Cabrini Medical Ctr.,
765 N.E.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. 2002) (finding a sexual assault perpetrated by a hospital
employee did not make the hospital employer liable under respondeat superior); In re
Roman Cath. Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 651 B.R. 146, 161 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. 2023)
(collecting cases). 	Accordingly, the Court will not consider arguments evoking
respondeat superior. 	However, the arguments adduced by Lynch on this point do
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The Parish Defendants argue that they cannot be liable for the negligence
causes of action in either case because, “to the extent the negligence claims rel[y]
upon a premises liability theory, that claim must [] fail for failure to plead foreseeable
harm.” 	St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 14 (citing A.M. v. Holy Resurrection Greek
Orthodox Church of Brookville, 135 N.Y.S.3d 823 (Mem) (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep’t
2021)); Parish Cunningham Mem. at 15 (same). 	The Parish Defendants do not
address Lynch’s in loco parentis theory.
For its part, the Diocese argues that it cannot be liable as a landowner because
“the Brooklyn Diocese is not the owner or operator of [either Parish church, where
the alleged abuse occurred].” Diocese Frost Mem. at 15; Diocese Cunningham Mem.
at 14; Diocese Frost Reply at 10–11; Diocese Cunningham Reply at 9–10. 	As to
Lynch’s in loco parentis theory, the Diocese contends that it cannot be liable because
the Diocese is not a school, Lynch was not a student at either Parish when the alleged
abuse occurred, and Lynch had turned 18 before the alleged abuse at issue in these
cases. 	Diocese Frost Mem. at 14–15; Diocese Cunningham Mem. at 13–14; Diocese
Frost Reply at 8–10; Diocese Cunningham Reply at 7–9.
The Court now considers each of these two theories of liability below, beginning
with in loco parentis.
weigh in both (1) the Court’s evaluation of Lynch’s negligent hiring and supervision
claims and (2) the issue of whether the Diocese and the Parish Defendants, as
putative landowners, were on notice of a hazard from which they had a duty to protect
Lynch as an invitee. The Court will discuss these arguments infra.
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a. 	Duty In Loco Parentis
“The concept of in loco parentis forms the basis of the duty owed by a school
district to students within its charge in the context of a negligent supervision claim.”
Guerriero v. Diocese of Brooklyn, No. 21-CV-4923 (MKB) (Guerriero I), 2024 WL
2826097 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2024) (citation modified) (quoting Doe v. Hauppauge
Union Free Sch. Dist., 184 N.Y.S.3d 150, 152 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2023)),
reconsideration denied, 2024 WL 2826101 (May 22, 2024). 	The New York Court of
Appeals has specifically noted “the general rule that a school’s duty of care does not
extend beyond school premises, and is limited to injury that occurred shortly after
school 	hours 	upon 	the 	student’s 	departure 	from 	the 	school.” 	Williams 	v.
Weatherstone, 15 N.E.3d 792, 801 (N.Y. 2014) (citation modified); cf. Doe 1 v. Bd. of
Educ. of Greenport Union Free Sch. Dist., 955 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d
Dep’t 2012) (modifying a trial court order to dismiss claims where “all of the improper
acts by [the school employee] took place off school premises and/or outside of school
hours, when the school defendants had no custody or control of the infant plaintiff
and no duty to monitor or supervise the conduct of [the school employee]”).
Here, Lynch has alleged that Frost abused him while he was working in the
St. Raphael rectory “after school and on the weekend,” and has specifically alleged
that Frost regularly abused him after finding him working alone “after school.” Frost
Compl. ¶¶ 45–48. As to Cunningham, Lynch alleges that the abuse occurred at Good
Shepherd, not at Cathedral Prep. 	Cunningham Compl. ¶ 74. 	Nowhere in either of
Lynch’s complaints does he allege abuse that occurred on school premises, during
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school hours, or shortly after the end of the school day while Lynch was leaving the
Cathedral Prep campus. For these reasons, Lynch has failed to show that Defendants
had a putative duty towards him under an in loco parentis theory. 	See Vernali v.
Harrison Cent. Sch. Dist., 857 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2008) (“A
school’s custodial duty ceases once the student has passed out of its orbit of authority
and the parent is perfectly free to reassume control over the child’s protection.
Generally, a school cannot be held liable for injuries that occur off school property
and beyond the orbit of its authority.” (citation omitted)); Hansen v. Bath & Tennis
Marina Corp., 900 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2010) (finding a school
was not liable for an injury that occurred during an off-campus meeting of a high
school rotary club). And because Lynch has failed to plead this element of an in loco
parentis duty arising from a school/student relationship, the Court does not reach any
of Defendants’ further arguments on this issue.
b. 	Duty as Landowner
Under New York law, “landowners and business proprietors have a duty to
maintain their properties in reasonably safe condition.” 	Di Ponzio v. Riordan, 679
N.E.2d 616, 618 (N.Y. 1997); Maheshwari v. City of New York, 810 N.E.2d 894, 897
(N.Y. 2004). 	“This duty may extend to controlling the conduct of third persons who
frequent or use the property, at least under some circumstances.” 	Marasligiller v.
City of New York, 217 F. App’x 55, 57 (2d Cir. 2007). A landowner has a duty to take
protective measures against misconduct by a third party only if “it is shown that he
either knows or has reason to know from past experience ‘that there is a likelihood of
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conduct on the part of third persons which is likely to endanger the safety of the
visitor.’” 	Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1980) (citation
modified) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344, cmt. f). 	If such notice is
established, a landowner has a duty to undertake “minimal precautions to protect the
public from reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third persons.” Polomie v. Golub
Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701 (N.Y. App. Div., 3d Dep’t 1996).
“[S]uch a duty arises by virtue of the party’s ownership and control of the
property, for the obvious reason that the person in possession of property ordinarily
is in the best position to discover and control its dangers.” 	Blatt v. N.Y.C. Hous.
Auth., 506 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 1986) (citation modified).
However, while “landlords and permittees have a common-law duty to minimize
foreseeable dangers on their property, including the criminal acts of third parties,
they are not the insurers of a visitor’s safety.” Maheshwari, 810 N.E.2d at 897. Thus,
landowners only have a duty to protect tenants and visitors from criminal conduct by
third parties when they have control over the premises and when the conduct is
foreseeable. See, e.g., Karim v. 89th Jamaica Realty Co., L.P., 7 N.Y.S.3d 488 (N.Y.
App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2015) (denying a landlord’s motion for summary judgment when
a tenant operating a store at a bus terminal sued the landlord after being assaulted
by a passerby in the waiting area when the landlord’s security guard was not
present).
The Diocese argues that it cannot be liable as a landowner because it does not
own either St. Raphael or Good Shepherd, the churches where the alleged abuse took
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place. Diocese Cunningham Mem. at 14; Diocese Frost Mem. at 15–16. The Diocese
asks the Court to take judicial notice of deeds and other documents purporting to
show that the Diocese is not the owner of either church. See generally Decl. of Randall
L. Morrison, Jr. dated Feb. 3, 2025, No. 23-CV-4800, ECF No. 71 (Good Shepherd
documents); Reply Decl. of Randall L. Morrison, Jr. dated June 24, 2025, No. 23-CV-
4800, ECF No. 83 (certified copies of same); Decl. of Randall L. Morrison, Jr. dated
Feb. 3, 2025, No. 23-CV-8687, ECF No. 55 (St. Raphael documents); Reply Decl. of
Randall L. Morrison, Jr. dated June 24, 2025, No. 23-CV-8687, ECF No. 63 (certified
copies of same). 	For their parts, the Parish Defendants assert that they cannot be
held liable as landowners because the complaints “fail[] to plausibly allege that [the
Parish Defendants] had prior notice of any dangerous condition on its property based
on 	[Frost’s 	and 	Cunningham’s] 	propensity 	to 	commit 	sexual 	abuse.” 	Parish
Cunningham Mem. at 9; St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 8.
Lynch contends that the Court should not take judicial notice of the deeds and
other documents and, even if it did take such notice, that the deeds are not dispositive
of the ownership question. 	Pl. Frost Mem. at 19–21; Pl. Cunningham Mem. at 17–
19. 	Lynch also contends that Defendants were aware of the danger Frost and
Cunningham posed. Pl. Frost Mem. at 20; Pl. Cunningham Mem. at 18.
As an initial matter, the Court declines to take judicial notice of the deeds and
other documents. 	“In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a
court 	is 	generally 	limited 	to 	the 	complaint 	and 	documents 	attached 	thereto.”
Neurological Surgery, P.C. v. Aetna Health Inc., 511 F. Supp. 3d 267, 278 (E.D.N.Y.
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2021). A court may consider documents that are the “proper subject of judicial notice.”
United States v. Strock, 982 F.3d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 2020). “If, however, there is a dispute
as to the relevance, authenticity, or accuracy of the documents relied upon, the
district court may not dismiss the complaint with those materials in mind.” Nicosia
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 231 (2d Cir. 2016). “The ‘no dispute’ requirement
has been interpreted strictly: even implicit, conclusory, contradictory, or implausible
objections to the authenticity or accuracy of a document render consideration
impermissible.” 	See Guerriero v. Diocese of Brooklyn, No. 21-CV-4923 (MKB)
(Guerriero II), 2024 WL 2826101, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2024) (citation modified).
Here, 	Lynch 	disputes 	both 	the 	relevance 	and 	the 	authenticity 	of 	the
documents. Pl. Frost Mem. at 20; Pl. Cunningham Mem. at 18. The Court also notes
that, even if the documents’ authenticity were not in dispute, formal ownership is not
dispositive as to whether the Diocese owed a duty as landowner to Lynch. See Klein
v. City & Cnty. Paving Corp., No. 16-CV-2264 (NRB), 2018 WL 4265885, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 5, 2018) (“Legal ownership is not dispositive: a landowner not in
possession and lacking control may not be liable, just as a tenant in possession and
control may be liable.”). Lynch claims that the alleged abuse occurred “on premises
owned 	and/or 	controlled 	by 	the 	Diocese 	and 	Parish.” 	Frost 	Compl. 	¶ 37;
Cunningham Compl. ¶ 31 (emphasis added). 	Control, rather than just formal
ownership, is at issue in this case. See Ritto v. Goldberg, 265 N.E.2d 772, 774 (N.Y.
1970) (“It has been held uniformly that control is the test which measures generally
the responsibility in tort of the owner of real property.”); Gronski v. County of Monroe,
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963 N.E.2d 1219, 1221–23 (N.Y. 2011) (summarizing case law and concluding that,
even when an agreement is in writing, a court should look “not only to the terms of
the agreement, but to the parties’ course of conduct — including, but not limited to,
the landowner’s ability to access the premises”). And the documents that the Diocese
relies upon do not determine whether it exercised such control here.
More relevant to that question is Lynch’s allegation that the Diocese “placed”
Frost in his position at St. Raphael, Frost Compl. ¶ 12, and affirmatively exercised
its power to transfer Frost between different parishes, id. ¶ 75 (“[I]n 1999, the Diocese
again transferred Frost, this time from Saint Raphael Parish to Corpus Christi
Parish.”). 	Lynch makes substantially the same allegations as to Cunningham. 	See
Cunningham 	Compl. 	¶ 18 	(“[T]he 	Diocese 	placed 	Cunningham 	into 	parish
assignments where he had unsupervised access to minors and young adults . . . .”);
id. ¶ 133 (“The Diocese and the Parishes gave Cunningham unfettered access to
minor children and young adults, including Mr. Lynch.”). These allegations permit a
reasonable inference that the Diocese affirmatively created dangerous conditions by
appointing Frost and Cunningham to positions in the Parishes where they had
unsupervised contact with minors, and thus may serve as a basis for liability for the
Diocese. 	See McNeish v. Lucky Mate Co., No. 15-CV-2924 (CBA) (PK), 2017 WL
6034121, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017) (“[E]ven absent a showing of continued
control, liability may attach to an out-of-possession owner who has affirmatively
created a dangerous condition or defect.” (citation modified)).
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The question of who owned or otherwise exerted control over the church
buildings where the alleged abuse occurred is a factual determination inappropriate
for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage. 	Accordingly, the Court does not take
notice of the deeds and related documents and denies the Diocese’s motion to dismiss
the negligence claims on the basis of its putative lack of ownership over the churches.
1. 	Notice of Frost’s Alleged Dangerous Propensities
The Court next turns to Lynch’s assertion that Defendants had actual notice
of Frost’s misconduct and his propensities for such misconduct prior to Frost’s abuse
of Lynch. Frost Compl. ¶ 50. That is a legal conclusion that the Court need not treat
as true for purposes of this motion to dismiss. 	See Murray v. Nazareth Reg’l High
Sch., No. 20-CV-1471 (RJD) (RML), 2022 WL 3139116, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2022)
(“Such conclusory statements . . . are insufficiently specific in alleging that the
Diocese had knowledge of [the alleged priest-abuser] propensities.”).
However, Lynch has alleged facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude
that Defendants had notice of Frost’s dangerous propensities. Specifically, Lynch has
alleged that (1) Frost was transferred from St. Mark’s Church because of his known
abuse of children there, Frost Compl. ¶ 53; (2) “the Diocese and [St. Raphael]
possessed and maintained internal personnel-file records documenting that, years
before abusing [Lynch], Frost had been the subject of reports and behavioral concerns
related to inappropriate, sexualized and boundary-violating conduct toward minors
and vulnerable parishioners, including but not limited to conduct reported during his
tenure at St. Mark’s Church,” id. ¶ 54; and (3) the Diocese and St. Raphael were
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aware of professional evaluations of Frost that concluded he engaged in sexually
inappropriate behavior and innuendo with minors and vulnerable parishioners, id.
¶¶ 55–57.
Lynch has plausibly alleged that the Diocese and St. Raphael were aware of
Frost’s dangerous propensities and that these Defendants breached their duty as
landowners to take reasonable steps to minimize the risk that Frost would abuse
Lynch. 	See Guerriero I, 2024 WL 2826097, at *8 (denying a motion to dismiss a
negligence claim based on a landowner’s duty when, inter alia, “[d]efendants knew or
should have known of [the priest-abuser’s] propensities . . . and [d]efendants had the
opportunity to control [the priest-abuser], as demonstrated by [d]efendants’ transfer
and eventual termination of [the priest-abuser]”). Because Lynch has also plausibly
alleged that he was injured by Defendants’ breach of their duty as landowners, Frost
Compl. ¶¶ 90–96, 143, Lynch has stated a claim for negligence. 	Accordingly, the
Diocese’s and St. Raphael’s motions to dismiss this claim in the Frost case are denied.
2. 	Notice of Cunningham’s Alleged Dangerous Propensities
Lynch’s 	allegation 	that 	Cunningham 	was 	“an 	individual 	with 	a 	known
propensity for sexual misconduct,” Cunningham Compl. ¶ 131, is also conclusory.
Unlike 	Lynch’s 	allegations 	against 	Frost, 	however, 	Lynch’s 	complaint 	in 	the
Cunningham case does not contain factual allegations that, if proven, would support
the conclusion that the Diocese and the Parish Defendants were on notice of
Cunningham’s alleged dangerous propensities.
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The only facts Lynch alleges as to such dangerous propensities relate to a 1990
psychological evaluation of Cunningham that was prepared in connection with his
admission to seminary and ordination. 	Id. ¶¶ 13–16. 	This evaluation concluded,
inter alia, that Cunningham displayed (1) emotional immaturity; (2) difficulty
forming healthy adult relationships; (3) constricted affect and inability to manage
close interpersonal dynamics; (4) fear of anger and tendency to withdraw under
stress; and (5) a pattern of avoiding intimacy and pushing people away when
confronted 	with 	interpersonal 	conflict. 	Id. 	¶ 13. 	Lynch 	contends 	that 	these
“psychological evaluations constituted actual notice that Cunningham possessed
traits . . . that are well-recognized risk indicators for boundary violations within
clergy-parishioner relationships, particularly with vulnerable adolescents and young
adults,” id. ¶ 16, and that “[t]he Diocese and the Parishes had actual knowledge of
Cunningham’s predispositions through the psychological evaluation,” id. ¶ 148.
The 	1990 	psychological 	report 	does 	not 	contain 	any 	references 	to
Cunningham’s potential or propensity to commit sexual abuse. The report’s finding
that 	Cunningham 	displayed 	a 	pattern 	of 	“avoiding 	intimacy” 	might 	even 	be
interpreted to suggest that he was not at risk of grooming young parishioners to
submit to sexual abuse. 	Cf. Karim, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 489 (“To establish that criminal
acts were foreseeable, the criminal conduct at issue must be shown to be reasonably
predictable based on the prior occurrence of the same or similar criminal activity at
a location sufficiently proximate to the subject location.”). 	Moreover, the complaint
does not explain why the psychological issues identified in the 1990 report were, as
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Lynch alleges, “inconsistent with safe pastoral ministry and required heightened
supervision,” Cunningham Compl. ¶ 148, or “well-recognized risk indicators for
boundary 	violations 	within 	clergy-parishioner 	relationships,” 	id. 	¶ 16. 	These
conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish that Cunningham’s subsequent
acts of sexual abuse were reasonably foreseeable. Cf. Murray, 2022 WL 3139116, at
*3 (“Yet plaintiff provides no basis to support the assertion that multiple transfers
are suspicious, says nothing of the explanation proffered for these transfers, and does
not clarify how many transfers is unusual.”). Accordingly, Lynch has not adequately
alleged facts from which it may be said that the Diocese and the Parish Defendants
knew about Cunningham’s propensity for sexual abuse, or that would otherwise
support a finding that his alleged abuse of Lynch was reasonably foreseeable.
Nor can Lynch’s allegations about the Diocese’s and the Parish Defendants’
general awareness of “an alarming number of incidents involving Priests abusing
minor boys and young adults” serve to make Cunningham’s alleged abuse of Lynch
foreseeable. 	“To be clear, including allegations . . . that [a diocese] knew about a
problem of sexual abuse within the [d]iocese alone is not a sufficient allegation that
the [d]iocese was on notice of a specific abuser’s propensity for abuse.” In re Roman
Cath. Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 651 B.R. at 174; see also Murray, 2022 WL 3139116,
at *4 (discounting as “vague group pleading” an allegation that defendants “fail[ed]
to properly investigate and report the known and tolerated pedophile activities of
their clergy”); Templeton v. Bishop of Charleston, No. 18-CV-2003 (DCN), 2021 WL
4129223 (D.S.C. Sep. 9, 2021) (holding that “knowledge of a general concern of
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pedophilia within the church is not the same as knowledge that [a specific priest] in
particular posed a danger to others,” despite evidence “suggesting that the Bishop
knew ‘there was a nest of pedophiles in the diocese’”).
The Cunningham complaint does not adequately allege that the Diocese and
the Parish Defendants had notice of Cunningham’s propensity to commit sexual
abuse. Accordingly, these Defendants’ motions to dismiss the negligence claim in the
Cunningham case are granted.
II. 	Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision Claims
“Under New York law, an employer can be held liable under theories of
negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision.” 	Ranta v. City of
New York, No. 14-CV-3794 (FB) (LB), 2024 WL 1332723, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28,
2024) (citation omitted). 	To state such a claim, “in addition to the negligence
elements of such a claim, a plaintiff must show: ‘(1) that the tort-feasor and the
defendant were in an employee-employer relationship; (2) that the employer knew or
should have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct which caused the
injury prior to the injury’s occurrence; and (3) that the tort was committed on the
employer’s premises or with the employer’s chattels.’” 	Rich v. Fox News Network,
LLC, 939 F.3d 112, 129 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Ehrens v. Lutheran Church, 385 F.3d
232, 235 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam)). 	Courts sometimes cast the third element as
requiring “a substantial nexus between [the employer’s] negligent supervision and
the harm [the plaintiff] suffered.” 	See, e.g., Waterbury v. N.Y. City Ballet, Inc., 168
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N.Y.S.3d 417, 425 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep’t 2022); id. at 423–26 (discussing this
element).
a. 	Alleged Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision of Frost
Defendants focus their briefing on the argument that the Diocese and St.
Raphael did not have sufficient notice of Frost’s alleged propensity to commit sexual
abuse to be held liable on this theory. Diocese Frost Mem. at 17–21; St. Raphael Frost
Mem. at 15–16; Diocese Frost Ltr. Br. at 2–4; St. Raphael Frost Ltr. Br. at 1–2.
Additionally, the Diocese “does not concede that it employed Frost at the time of the
alleged abuse” and asserts that Frost “worked for St. Raphael.” Diocese Frost Mem.
at 16. 	For his part, Lynch asserts that he has adequately pleaded notice of Frost’s
dangerous propensity, Pl. Frost Mem. at 12–15, and contends that “Frost was an
employee of both the Diocese (which was responsible for overseeing both Frost and
the Parish, and which assigned Frost to work at the Parish) and of the Parish, for
which Frost was directly employed,” id. at 16.
As to the first element of a negligent supervision claim, the complaint in the
Frost case alleges that the Diocese maintained significant control over Frost’s
employment, 	including 	appointing 	him 	to 	his 	position 	at 	St. 	Raphael,
notwithstanding any sole, formal employment relationship between Frost and St.
Raphael. Frost Compl. ¶¶ 6–9, 12. At the motion to dismiss stage, this is sufficient
to allege that the Diocese and St. Raphael were Frost’s joint employers. See Guerriero
I, 2024 WL 2826097, at *3 n.4 (“The Court . . . considers St. Bernadette and the
Diocese as joint employers for purposes of this motion.”); LaFrantz v. St. Mary’s
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Roman Cath. Church, No. 21-CV-4920 (NGG) (CLP), 2024 WL 216718, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2024) (“Drawing all reasonable inferences in [the p]laintiff’s favor,
the court . . . considers the Brooklyn Diocese and St. Mary’s as joint employers for
purposes of this motion.”); cf. Samide v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 754
N.Y.S.2d 164, 172 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Queens Cnty. 2003) (finding, under the New York
State Human Rights Law, that a diocese and a parish were joint employers of the
plaintiff because, inter alia, (1) the diocese was alleged to be “the governing body of
the [p]arish”; (2) the parish’s certificate of incorporation indicated that the diocese
possessed “ecclesiastical jurisdiction” over churches and societies within the county
where the parish was located; and (3) the plaintiff’s employment with the parish
school was subject to an employee handbook distributed by the diocese). Accordingly,
Lynch’s complaint has adequately alleged the first element of a negligent supervision
claim, that the Diocese and St. Raphael were in an employee-employer relationship
with Frost.
For substantially the same reasons outlined supra regarding the ordinary
negligence claim, Lynch has also sufficiently alleged that the Diocese and St. Raphael
had notice of Frost’s dangerous propensities. 	Frost Compl. ¶¶ 51, 53–57. 	These
allegations 	of 	earlier, 	specific 	conduct 	by 	Frost 	implicate 	conduct 	that 	is
fundamentally similar to the abuse Lynch allegedly experienced. See Doe v. Alsaud,
12 F. Supp. 3d 674, 680–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that an employer “is only liable
for negligent supervision or retention if it is aware of specific prior acts or allegations
against the employee” and “[t]he prior misconduct[] must be of the same kind that
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caused the injury; general, unrelated or lesser allegations of prior wrongdoing are
insufficient”).
Moreover, the alleged abuse occurred on St. Raphael property, specifically in
the rectory, while Lynch was working as an altar boy. 	Frost Compl. ¶¶ 53–57.
Whether the final element is framed as requiring that the injury occurred on the
property of the employer, with the chattels of the employer, or that the injury had a
nexus with Frost’s employment as a priest, the complaint has sufficiently alleged this
third element. 	In other words, Lynch has plausibly alleged that negligence on the
part of the Diocese and St. Raphael, Frost’s alleged joint employers, was the
proximate cause of his injury. 	See Waterbury, 168 N.Y.S.3d at 424 (noting that the
negligent supervision nexus requirement “means that the employer’s negligence
must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury”); cf. Roe v. Domestic & Foreign
Missionary Soc’y of the Protestant Episcopal Church, 155 N.Y.S.3d 418, 421–22 (N.Y.
App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2021) (finding no nexus where “the sexual assault occurred far
from the Church's premises, and there is no allegation in the complaint that the
plaintiff had any prior contact with the alleged attacker, any prior relationship with
any of the defendants, or even any knowledge, at the time of the sexual assault, that
the alleged attacker was employed by the defendants”).
Lynch has sufficiently pleaded a negligent hiring and supervision claim in the
Frost case. Accordingly, the Diocese’s and St. Raphael’s motions to dismiss this claim
in the Frost case are denied.
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b. 	Alleged 	Negligent 	Hiring, 	Retention, 	and 	Supervision 	of
Cunningham
In contrast, Lynch’s negligent supervision claim against the Diocese and the
Parish Defendants in the Cunningham case fails. As discussed supra, the complaint
does 	not 	adequately 	allege 	that 	the 	findings 	in 	Cunningham’s 	psychological
evaluation at the time of his ordination alerted Defendants to any dangerous
propensity to commit sexual abuse. The failure to sufficiently plead such facts means
that, in the Cunningham case, Lynch has failed to plead negligence on the part of the
Diocese and the Parish Defendants, which is a necessary element of a negligent
supervision claim. 	Rich, 939 F.3d at 129. 	This also means that the complaint does
not adequately plead the second element of a negligent supervision claim, which
requires Lynch to plead that the Diocese and the Parish Defendants had knowledge
of specific acts or allegations that were of a similar kind to the abuse Lynch allegedly
experienced 	at 	the 	hands 	of 	Cunningham. 	Doe, 	12 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	680–81.
Accordingly, the Diocese’s and the Parish Defendants’ motions to dismiss this claim
in the Cunningham case are granted.
III. 	Gross Negligence Claims
“Under New York law, a claim for gross negligence, like ordinary negligence,
requires breach of a legal duty.” 	Murray, 2022 WL 3139116, at *4 (citing Curley v.
AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Pasternack v. Lab’y Corp. of Am.,
892 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that a plaintiff must establish the
elements of ordinary negligence to prevail on a gross negligence claim (citing AT & T
v. City of New York, 83 F.3d 549, 556 (2d Cir.1996))). However, “gross negligence is
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a tort differing from ordinary negligence in kind rather than degree. Gross negligence
implies willful or intentional misconduct.” Mindspirit, LLC v. Evalueserve Ltd., No.
15-CV-6065 (PGG), 2016 WL 11707410, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2016) (citation
modified) (quoting Cauble v. Mabon Nugent & Co., 594 F. Supp. 985, 993 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)). “To constitute gross negligence, a party’s conduct must ‘smack of intentional
wrongdoing’ or ‘evince a reckless indifference to the rights of others.’” 	Ryan v. IM
Kapco, Inc., 930 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2011) (quoting Sommer
v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (N.Y. 1992)). Recklessness in this context
means “an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care,” such that “the
danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have
been aware of it.” 	AMW Materials Testing, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 584 F.3d 436,
454 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
The 	Diocese and the 	Parish Defendants 	argue 	that if 	Lynch’s 	ordinary
negligence claims fail, so too do his gross negligence claims. 	Diocese Frost Mem. at
21; St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 10–11; Diocese Cunningham Mem. at 19–20; Parish
Cunningham Mem. at 17. 	As to the gross negligence claim in the Frost case
specifically, the Diocese and St. Raphael contend that Lynch’s complaint fails to plead
non-conclusory facts demonstrating reckless conduct on their part. 	Diocese Frost
Mem. at 22; St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 17. 	The Diocese further contends that the
complaint does not plead facts establishing that it was on notice of a prior history of
inappropriate conduct by Frost, and that Lynch’s allegations are merely speculative.
Diocese Frost Mem. at 22.
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Lynch argues that his ordinary negligence claims succeed, which defeats this
aspect of Defendants’ challenge to his gross negligence claims. Pl. Frost Mem. at 23;
Pl. Cunningham Mem. at 20. As to Frost, Lynch further argues that the Diocese and
St. Raphael protected Frost by transferring him between assignments despite their
knowledge of his history of sexual abuse. 	Pl. Frost Mem. at 23–24. 	Lynch asserts
that by so doing, the Diocese and St. Raphael created a risk that Frost would abuse
vulnerable parishioners again. Id. at 24.
a. 	Gross Negligence as to Frost
As discussed supra, Lynch alleges that the Diocese and St. Raphael had
specific knowledge of Frost’s earlier acts of sexual abuse, and these Defendants were
informed that Frost had exhibited psychological indications of a proclivity for sexual
misconduct. 	Frost Compl. ¶¶ 51, 53–57. 	Lynch also alleges that Frost was not
punished for this earlier sexual misconduct and instead “was moved from parish to
parish to cover up, and hide from, claims of sexual abuse.” 	Id. ¶ 72. 	Lynch
characterizes 	this 	conduct 	as 	“the 	Diocese 	and 	[St. 	Raphael] 	conspir[ing] 	to
accommodate and conceal” Frost’s sexual abuse. 	Id. ¶ 73. 	In short, Lynch alleges
that the danger Frost posed was “known to the [D]efendant[s] or so obvious that the
defendant must have been aware of it.” 	AMW Materials Testing, 584 F.3d at 454
(citation omitted).
These allegations are sufficient to state a gross negligence claim against the
Diocese and St. Raphael in the Frost case. 	See Belcastro v. Roman Cath. Diocese of
Brooklyn, 184 N.Y.S.3d 367, 370 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2023) (holding that
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“allegations that the [defendants] knew of the sexual abuse, condoned it, covered it
up, and intentionally failed to prevent it were sufficient to allege a cause of action to
recover damages for gross negligence”). Accordingly, the Diocese’s and St. Raphael’s
motions to dismiss this claim in the Frost case are denied.
b. 	Gross Negligence as to Cunningham
As discussed supra, the complaint in the Cunningham case fails to plead
sufficient facts to support an ordinary negligence claim against the Diocese and the
Parish Defendants. For this reason, Lynch’s gross negligence claim, which requires,
inter alia, that he establish the elements of ordinary negligence, must fail. 	See
Pasternack, 892 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (“Where a claim for ordinary negligence fails, a
gross negligence claim necessarily fails.”). Accordingly, the Diocese’s and the Parish
Defendants’ motions to dismiss this claim in the Cunningham case are granted.
IV. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
Lynch raises intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in both the
Frost 	and 	Cunningham 	cases. 	Specifically, 	Lynch 	alleges 	that 	Frost 	and
Cunningham conspired with each other, the Diocese, and the Parish Defendants “to
conceal their sexual abuse and subject[] [Lynch] to a traumatizing confrontation with
his abusers.” Frost Compl. ¶ 176; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 174.
This claim principally relates to the February 1997 meetings between Lynch
and his alleged abusers, which occurred after Lynch had reported the alleged abuse
by Frost and Cunningham to Auxiliary Bishop Catanello. 	Frost Compl. ¶¶ 81–89;
Cunningham Compl. ¶¶ 78–86. 	Lynch alleges that these meetings “were designed
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and orchestrated to intimidate Mr. Lynch and prevent him from pursuing or officially
reporting his claims.” Frost Compl. ¶ 85; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 82.
Before addressing whether Lynch’s complaints plead the essential elements of
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court first considers the
Diocese’s and the Parish Defendants’ arguments that these claims are time-barred
because they are not subject to the revived statute of limitations in the Adult
Survivors Act. 	Diocese Frost Mem. at 22–25; St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 17–19;
Diocese 	Cunningham 	Mem. 	at 	20–23; 	Parish 	Cunningham 	Mem. 	at 	18–21.
Specifically, the Court must determine whether the acts and/or omissions of the
Diocese and the Parish Defendants fall under the ASA because the injuries these
Defendants allegedly caused Lynch — specifically, through the intentional infliction
of emotional distress in the wake of Lynch’s sexual abuse by Frost and Cunningham
— may fairly be deemed the “result of” these priests’ sexual misconduct, as that term
is used in the ASA. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-j.
a. 	Claims Encompassed by the Adult Survivors Act
The Diocese contends that “[t]he meeting[s] with Diocesan representatives in
February 1997 [] d[id] not involve any criminal conduct [unlawful under Article 130
of the New York Penal Law] and therefore do[] not fall under the suspension of statute
of limitations allowed by the ASA.” Diocese Cunningham Mem. at 21; see also Diocese
Frost Mem. at 23. The Diocese further argues that (1) the “February 1997 meeting[s]
w[ere] a distinct event from [Lynch’s] sexual abuse allegation”; (2) Lynch’s complaints
indicate he viewed the meetings as distinct from the underlying alleged abuse; and
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(3) “without a defined sexual violation occurring during the meeting[s], the ASA does
not 	revive 	the 	[intentional 	infliction 	of 	emotional 	distress] 	claim.” 	Diocese
Cunningham Mem. at 22–23; Diocese Frost Mem. at 24–25.
The Parish Defendants advance substantially similar arguments. They assert
that “the plain meaning of the ASA limits the revivable causes of actions is to [sic]
actions ‘constituting a sexual offense.’” 	St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 18–19 (citation
modified) (quoting Levin v. Sarah Lawrence Coll., 747 F. Supp. 3d 645 (S.D.N.Y.
2024)); Parish Cunningham Mem. at 19 (same). 	They further contend that “courts
uphold the plain reading of the ASA, affirming that the ‘conduct’ in question must
itself be a ‘sexual offense.’” 	St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 19 (citing cases); Parish
Cunningham Mem. at 20 (same). The Parish Defendants conclude that “the private
February 1997 meeting[s] could not form the predicate for an ASA claim because no
sexual criminal conduct took place at th[ose] meeting[s].” St. Raphael Frost Mem. at
19; Parish Cunningham Mem. at 20.
Lynch counters that his intentional infliction of emotional distress claims “are
not based on the [February 1997] forced confrontation alone” but instead “concern[]
the sexual assaults [Lynch] suffered because of the [Diocese’s and the Parish
Defendants’] intentional, reckless, and negligent acts.” 	Pl. Frost Mem. at 24; Pl.
Cunningham Mem. at 21. 	Lynch further argues that his intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims “are timely because they arise out of, and include,” the
abuse he alleged that he experienced from Frost and Cunningham. 	Pl. Frost Mem.
at 24; Pl. Cunningham Mem. at 21.
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This dispute requires the Court to consider the types of claims revived by the
ASA — and in particular, whether certain defendants who are alleged to have enabled
or facilitated sexual abuse by others may be covered by the Act.
In relevant part, the text of the ASA reads:
Notwithstanding 	any 	provision 	of 	law 	which 	imposes 	a 	period 	of
limitation to the contrary[,] . . . every civil claim or cause of action
brought against any party alleging intentional or negligent acts or
omissions by a person for physical, psychological, or other injury or
condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual
offense 	as defined 	in 	article one hundred 	thirty 	of 	the penal 	law
committed against such person who was eighteen years of age or
older . . . which is barred as of the effective date of this section because
the applicable period of limitation has expired[,] . . . is hereby revived,
and action thereon may be commenced not earlier than six months after,
and not later than one year and six months after the effective date of
this section.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-j (emphasis added).8
“The goal of a court interpreting a New York statute is ‘to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the Legislature.’” 	Levin v. Sarah Lawrence Coll., 747 F.
Supp. 3d 645, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting People v. Andujar, 88 N.E.3d 309, 313
(N.Y. 2017)). “As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the
8 The Court notes that the ASA contains very similar language to the earlier
Child Victims Act (the “CVA”), which revived claims for individuals who suffered
sexual abuse as children. See Carroll v. Trump, 650 F. Supp. 3d 213, 222 (S.D.N.Y.
2023) (“Just three years later – using almost precisely the same statutory language
[as the CVA] – [the New York Legislature] came to the same view and the same result
as to adult survivors, the ASA.”). 	Where statutes use similar language and have
similar purposes, courts should interpret such statutes similarly. 	Wasser v. N.Y.
State Off. of Vocational & Educ. Servs. for Individuals with Disabilities, 602 F.3d 476,
479 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per
curiam)). Accordingly, the Court will consider cases that interpreted the scope of the
CVA’s revival provision in interpreting the scope of the ASA’s substantially similar
provision. See Levin, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 661 (“[C]ourts have interpreted the ASA by
reference to the CVA.”).
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starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving
effect to the plain meaning thereof.” Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist.,
696 N.E.2d 978, 980 (N.Y. 1998).
The phrases “every civil claim or cause of action” and “any party,” which are
not meaningfully in dispute here, have been interpreted broadly by the courts. See,
e.g., Levin, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 662–63 (construing the ASA). 	The question here is
whether the emotional distress that Lynch alleges was inflicted by the Diocese and
the Parish Defendants qualifies as an injury caused “as a result of” Frost’s and
Cunningham’s sexual abuse of Lynch under the ASA. Answering this question also
requires the Court to consider the meaning of the phrase “intentional or negligent
acts or omissions” as used in the statute.
First, the Diocese and the Parish Defendants contend that the February 1997
meetings could only serve as a predicate to a revived ASA claim if sexual abuse
unlawful within the meaning of Article 130 of the Penal Law actually occurred at the
meetings. 	This argument is plainly foreclosed by the text of the ASA. 	The ASA
contemplates reviving claims predicated on either “intentional or negligent acts or
omissions.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-j (emphasis added). As the Levin Court noted, “[t]he
lowest grade of sexual offense under Article 130 is forcible touching,” which requires
intentionality on the part of the perpetrator; unlike the ASA, Article 130 does not
apply to negligent acts. 	747 F. Supp. 3d at 660. 	Similarly, the New York Court of
Appeals has stated that, for more serious offenses under Article 130, “intent is
implicitly an element of these crimes.” People v. Williams, 614 N.E.2d 730, 737 (N.Y.
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1993) (discussing the forcible compulsion element of rape, first degree and sodomy,
first degree).
Indeed, as the statutory language strongly indicates, and as a number of New
York state courts have found, it appears that Article 130 sex offenses cannot be
committed by negligence, accident, or omission. 	See N.Y. Penal Law § 130.00(3)
(“‘Sexual contact’ means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person
for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party.” (emphasis added)); In re
Joel H., 718 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep’t 2001) (noting that “intent to
obtain sexual gratification” is an “element” of crimes under Article 130 (citing N.Y.
Penal Law § 130.00(3))); People v. Farrell, 37 N.Y.S.3d 805, 807 (N.Y. App. Div., 4th
Dep’t 2016) (noting that “intent to engage in sexual contact” is “necessary” to
establish an “act of sexual contact” (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 130.00(3))); People v.
Guerra, 577 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 1991) (reversing a conviction
for three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree under Article 130 because “the
People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s intent was to
obtain sexual gratification”).9 That the ASA expressly revives certain claims arising
from negligent acts or omissions thus defeats the far narrower reading of the statute
offered by the Diocese and the Parish Defendants.
9 	The 	conclusion 	that 	offenses 	under 	Article 	130 	require 	some 	form 	of
intentionality is reinforced by decisions concerning sexual abuse in the context of civil
torts. See Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“It is thus legally
impossible to claim that the alleged perpetrator of deliberate sexual abuse injured
the plaintiff negligently.”).
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Moreover, to the extent that the plain text of the statute does not adequately
reveal the Legislature’s intent, the Court may look to extrinsic materials to aid its
construction. Carroll v. Trump, 650 F. Supp. 3d 213, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting 97
N.Y. Jur.2d, Statutes § 164 (2d ed. 2022)). 	Here, both the legislative memorandum
submitted with Assembly Bill 648A and the committee report produced with Senate
Bill 66, both of which became the ASA, contained the following paragraph, which
specifically contemplates revived claims against certain “enablers” — not only the
perpetrators — of sexual abuse:
This legislation, the Adult Survivors Act, would create a one-year
window for the revival of otherwise time-barred civil claims arising out
of sexual offenses committed against people who were 18 or older at the
time of the conduct. Those who have had justice denied them as a result
of New York’s formerly insufficient statutes of limitations should be
given the opportunity to seek civil redress against their abuser or their
abuser’s enablers in a court of law.
Carroll, 650 F. Supp. 3d at 220–21 (citation modified) (emphasis added).
Indeed, courts interpreting the CVA by reference to its legislative history have
noted that the statute’s reach was intended to cover both those who directly
perpetrate sexual abuse and those who serve as “enablers”:
The CVA is a legislative acknowledgment of the unique character of sex
crimes against children, which can have a multitude of effects upon
victims, including being justifiably delayed in otherwise timely taking
action 	against 	their 	abusers 	and/or 	those 	who 	facilitated 	their
abuse . . . . 	In enacting these reforms the legislature also recognized
that certain abusers—sometimes aided by institutional enablers and
facilitators—have been successful in covering up their heinous acts
against children.
S. H. v. Diocese of Brooklyn, 167 N.Y.S.3d 171, 186 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2022)
(citation modified) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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In light of the ASA’s legislative history and the persuasive construction of the
CVA, the ASA thus appears to contemplate extending liability to at least some third
parties who, through their actions or omissions, facilitated or allowed abuse to occur
and/or who have acted to cover up sexual abuse perpetrated by others — thereby
allowing the abuser to escape detection or punishment and potentially permitting the
abuse to continue.
The foregoing informs the Court’s interpretation of the phrase “injury or
condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as
defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law” contained within the ASA.
N.Y. 	C.P.L.R. 	§ 214-j 	(emphasis 	added). 	Courts 	have 	noted 	that 	“the 	ASA’s
limitations are injury-specific.” Levin, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 664. Accordingly, the Court
must evaluate how the complaint, on the one hand, connects the conduct of third
parties (here, the Parish and Diocese Defendants) to the alleged sexual abuse and, on
the other hand, connects the conduct of these third parties to the Plaintiff’s alleged
injury.
Both the Diocese and the Parish Defendants assert that “[t]he ASA revives
only those claims that seek relief from an injury caused by conduct that constitutes a
predicate sexual offense under Article 130 of the Penal Law.” Diocese Frost Mem. at
24 (emphasis added) (quoting Levin, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 664); Diocese Cunningham
Mem. at 22 (same); St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 19 (same); Parish Cunningham Mem.
at 20 (same). However, as discussed supra, this construction cannot mean that only
persons who directly perpetrate criminal sex offenses can be sued under the ASA’s
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revived statute of limitations. Such an interpretation would ignore the intent of the
Legislature to extend liability to certain third parties and read out of the statute the
provision that revives claims predicated on “negligent acts or omissions.”
The Diocese and the Parish Defendants, however, advance precisely this
construction. As the Diocese puts it, “the conduct in question must itself be a sexual
offense.” 	Diocese Frost Mem. at 24 (citation modified); Diocese Cunningham Mem.
at 22 (citation modified). They cite two cases decided in the Southern District of New
York, Levin, 747 F. Supp. 3d 645, and Reid v. McKelvey, No. 22-CV-10708 (JGLC)
(OTW), 2024 WL 4345585 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2024). 	Diocese Frost Mem. at 24;
Diocese Cunningham Mem. at 22; St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 19; Parish Cunningham
Mem. at 20. Both cases are distinguishable.
In Levin, the plaintiffs contended that a private college had been negligent in
running its academic programs, allegedly permitting an abuser to manipulate and
ultimately abuse the plaintiffs. 747 F. Supp. 3d at 664–65. Unlike the instant case,
Levin did not concern potential third-party liability for a claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Instead, in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims against the college,
the Levin Court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations against the college “[did] not
rest on allegations of fact that any [p]laintiff was the victim of a violation of Article
130.” 	Id. at 664–65. 	The court further observed that “even if [p]laintiffs did
adequately plead injuries suffered as a result of conduct that would constitute a
sexual offense as defined in Article 130, [p]laintiffs nonetheless do not allege that [the
college] proximately caused [p]laintiff’s injuries and therefore fail to allege that their
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state-law claims against [the college] arise from those injuries.” 	Id. at 668 (citation
modified); see also id. (“That is, the off-campus injuries [p]laintiffs allege do not give
rise to [p]laintiffs’ negligence claims against [the college] and therefore cannot
support application of the ASA.”); id. at 668–69 (conducting a proximate cause
analysis). Levin involved different factual allegations and different kinds of claims,
and Defendants’ reliance on that decision to argue that Lynch’s claims fall outside
the ASA’s scope is misplaced.
In Reid, the Court dismissed a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress against a publishing company arising from its publication of a book, written
by one of the plaintiff’s alleged abusers, which contained a description of a sexual
assault that had occurred sixteen years before the book’s publication (but in which
the author denied being present when Reid was assaulted by others). 	Reid v.
McKelvey, No. 22-CV-10708 (JGLC) (OTW), 2024 WL 4264896, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
14, 	2024), 	supplemented, 	2024 	WL 	4264855 	(Aug. 	23, 	2024), 	and 	report 	and
recommendation adopted in part and modified in part, 2024 WL 4345585 (S.D.N.Y.
Sep. 30, 2024). In a portion of the report and recommendation that was adopted by
the district court, the magistrate judge concluded that “the CVA does not apply to
[p]laintiff’s . . . intentional 	infliction 	of 	emotional 	distress 	claim[] 	against 	[the
publishing company] because . . . [intentional infliction of emotional distress] arising
out of the publication of a book do[es] not constitute a sexual offense under New York
criminal 	law.” 	Id. 	at 	*2. 	The 	district 	court, 	in 	adopting 	the 	report 	and
recommendation, held that Reid’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
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was 	not 	covered 	by 	the 	ASA, 	because 	“the 	injuries 	stemming 	from 	the
alleged . . . [intentional 	infliction 	of 	emotional 	distress] 	are 	distinct 	from 	those
injuries that were as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense
under Article 130.” Reid, 2024 WL 4345585, at *4 (citation omitted).
But again, Reid is distinguishable from Lynch’s case in several key respects.
First, the plaintiff did not appear to plead that the book’s publishers had anything to
do with the sexual assault or its immediate aftermath; as discussed supra, the book
simply contained an account of the alleged assault, in which one of the plaintiff’s
alleged assailants denied his own participation, but did not dispute that she may have
been victimized by others. That contrasts strongly with the allegations here: that the
Diocese and the Parish Defendants responded to Lynch’s reporting his abuse by
“order[ing] [] Lynch to attend [] meeting[s] and—without warning or support—
forc[ing] him to face Frost and Cunningham one after the next.” Frost Compl. ¶ 20;
Cunningham Compl. ¶ 26. Lynch also alleges that the purpose of the February 1997
meetings was “to intimidate [] Lynch and prevent him from pursuing or officially
reporting his claims.” 	Frost Compl. ¶ 85; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 82. 	Second, the
publication of the book in Reid occurred sixteen years after the alleged assault. Here,
Lynch asserts that the February 1997 meetings occurred “shortly after [Lynch]
contact[ed] Auxiliary Bishop Catanello” to report the abuse. 	Frost Compl. ¶ 83;
Cunningham Compl. ¶ 80. In short, Lynch alleges that the February 1997 meetings
were (1) an immediate and direct response by the Diocese and the Parish Defendants
to his reporting the abuse and (2) a deliberate attempt to intimidate him into silence.
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Notably, 	in 	Reid, 	the 	“[p]laintiff 	ha[d] 	failed 	to 	allege 	that 	[the 	publishing
company] . . . intended to cause [p]laintiff severe emotional distress.” 	Reid, 2024 WL
4264896, at *3. Put another way, the Reid plaintiff did not allege that the publishing
company’s publication of the book was in any way intended to facilitate, cover up, or
otherwise enable the perpetrator(s) of the alleged sexual assault. As such, Reid bears
little on the question of whether the claims against the Diocese and the Parish
defendants fall under the ambit of the Adult Survivors Act.
Defendants do not cite Bensky v. Indyke, 743 F. Supp. 3d 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2024),
which is far more relevant and persuasive. 	In Bensky, the court considered, inter
alia, an intentional infliction of emotion distress claim brought by a Jane Doe plaintiff
on behalf of a class of alleged victims against an accused abuser’s lawyer and
accountant; 	the 	complaint 	accused 	them 	of 	working 	to 	cover 	up 	the 	abuser’s
trafficking and sexual abuse. 	743 F. Supp. 3d at 598–99. This putative class claim
covered conduct from 1995 to 2019. 	Id. at 591. 	And while the decision does not
expressly hold that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was revived
by the ASA, the class complaint in that case did invoke the ASA to render timely its
otherwise time-barred claims. Compl., No. 24-CV-1204 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2024), ECF
No. 1.
The allegations in Bensky brought under the ASA’s expanded statute of
limitations included that the lawyer and the accountant (1) served as the abuser’s
moneymen as part of a complex sex trafficking operation; (2) kept the flow of hush
money funds “under the radar” by, among other conduct, providing false reasons for
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cash 	withdrawal; 	(3) personally 	approved 	and 	justified 	millions 	in 	dollars 	of
payments to keep victims quiet or available; (4) controlled the abuser’s business
affairs, which were intended to conceal the trafficking operation; and (5) did all this
with the knowledge that they were facilitating the trafficking operation. 743 F. Supp.
3d at 590–91. 	The Bensky Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Id. at 598–99.
The predicate conduct for the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
against the defendant-lawyer and defendant-accountant did not itself amount to a
sexual offense covered by Article 130 of New York’s Penal Law. 	Rather, the claims
arose from defendants’ role in concealing and facilitating their client’s sex trafficking
operation, which in turn encompassed conduct that violated Article 130. Id.
Lynch makes analogous allegations here. 	He alleges that the February 1997
meetings were designed to “intimidate” Lynch and “safeguard[] and protect[]” Frost
and Cunningham. 	Frost Compl. ¶¶ 84–85; Cunningham Compl. ¶¶ 81–82. 	Lynch
further alleges that the effort in his case to cover up abuse and deter victims from
reporting was part of a “known pattern” whereby “the Diocese and the Parishes did
their best to hide, conceal and cover up” scandalous abuse allegations. Frost Compl.
¶ 97; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 96. 	The Diocese and the Parish Defendants allegedly
accomplished this intimidation by ambushing Lynch with face-to-face, one-on-one
meetings with the same priests he had only recently accused of sexual abuse. 	Frost
Compl. ¶¶ 83–85; Cunningham Compl. ¶¶ 80–82.
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The Court concludes that Lynch has plausibly alleged that the injuries he
experienced because of the February 1997 meetings were suffered “as a result of”
sexual offenses within the meaning of Article 130. 	As pleaded, the February 1997
meetings were not separate, distinct events — they were a continuation of the alleged
abuse Lynch suffered, in that the meetings represented a deliberate attempt to cover
up abuse that constituted sexual offenses under Article 130. 	The complaint also
alleges that this was part of a pattern of conduct that facilitated and enabled sexual
abuse of minors and young adults in the Diocese, including by priests such as Frost
who were known to the Diocese and the Parish Defendants to be abusers. Assuming
the facts in Lynch’s complaint to be true, as the Court must for purposes of these
motions to dismiss, the “acts and omissions” of the Diocese and the Parish Defendants
fall within the ASA’s scope. 	There is a sufficient nexus between these Defendants’
alleged cover-up of the sexual abuse that Lynch had just reported to them and the
underlying 	abuse 	that 	Lynch 	alleged 	he 	endured 	at 	the 	hands 	of 	Frost 	and
Cunningham to establish that Lynch’s intentional infliction of emotion distress
claims are “tied to an alleged violation of New York criminal law.”10 Holloway v. Holy
See, 537 F. Supp. 3d 502, 505 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
10 The presence of Frost and Cunningham at the February 1997 meetings,
where Lynch alleges that he was forced to recount the abuse he experienced first in
Frost’s presence, and then separately in Cunningham’s, is a significant allegation
that ties these meetings directly to the abuse. The Court need not consider whether
different allegations (for example, that an institution covered up abuse allegations
without arranging for the accused abusers to personally confront the alleged victim)
would fall within the ASA’s revival provision.
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Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ASA serves to revive Lynch’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in both the Frost and Cunningham
cases, and each of these claims is timely.
b. 	Intentional 	Infliction 	of 	Emotion 	Distress 	Related 	to 	the
February 1997 Meetings
Having concluded that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in
the Frost and Cunningham cases are subject to the ASA’s extended statute of
limitations, the Court next evaluates whether Lynch adequately pled these claims.
Under New York law, the “tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has four
elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause severe emotional
distress, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury, and (4) severe
emotional distress.” Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1996).
The 	Diocese 	asserts 	that 	Lynch 	has 	insufficiently 	alleged 	extreme 	and
outrageous conduct, in that Lynch’s “sole factual allegation that he was called into
one meeting to confront his accused perpetrators does not rise to the level of conduct
so extreme and outrageous as to be utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Diocese
Frost Mem. at 25; Diocese Cunningham Mem. at 23–24. 	The Parish Defendants
similarly contend that “[t]he factual allegation that [Lynch] was called into a single
meeting, months after the sexual abuse ended and after [Lynch] reported the abuse,
to confront his accused perpetrators does not rise to the level of conduct so extreme
and outrageous as to be utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” St. Raphael Frost
Mem. at 20; Parish Cunningham Mem. at 20.
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The Court disagrees. “Covering up sexual abuse can, depending on the facts,
be ‘sufficiently outrageous.’” 	Bensky, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 599 (quoting Eskridge v.
Diocese of Brooklyn, 180 N.Y.S.3d 179, 181 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2022)). 	Lynch
alleges that the Diocese and the Parish Defendants sought to cover up Frost’s and
Cunningham’s abuse by calling Lynch into meetings at which he was forced to
recount the details of his abuse in front of both of his abusers, actions that Defendants
took for the purpose of intimidating him into silence about what he had endured.
This conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to survive a motion to dismiss.
In addition, Lynch’s claim is supported by his allegation about the actions that
Defendants took against his mother, a longtime Parish employee, after he reported
the abuse:
At the time of this meeting, Mr. Lynch’s mother was employed by St.
Raphael Parish. Shortly thereafter, St. Raphael Parish and/or Frost
fired Mr. Lynch’s mother without cause, as retribution and as a warning
to Mr. Lynch that the Roman Catholic Church, the Diocese, and the
Parish intended to protect his abusers and were prepared to destroy his
life, and the livelihoods of his loved ones, if he attempted to pursue
justice for the crimes and torts committed against him.
Frost Compl. ¶ 88; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 85. 	The entire course of conduct that
Lynch alleges the Diocese and the Parish Defendants engaged in — including
deliberate intimidation of Lynch and the retaliatory firing of his mother — for the
purpose of discouraging a sexual assault survivor from pursuing his allegations
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against two priests any further, is extreme and outrageous enough to sustain a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.11
The Court further finds that the complaints sufficiently allege the other
elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 	Accordingly, the
Diocese’s and the Parish Defendants’ motions to dismiss these claims in both the
Frost and the Cunningham cases are denied.
V. 	Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
Lynch advances claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress in both the
Frost and Cunningham cases. 	“[U]nder New York law, a plaintiff may establish a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in one of two ways: (1) the
‘bystander’ theory; or (2) the ‘direct duty theory.’” 	Doe ex rel. Doe v. E. Irondequoit
Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 16-CV-6594 (CJS), 2018 WL 2100605, at *26 (W.D.N.Y. May 7,
2018) (quoting Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Under the ‘bystander’ theory, a defendant’s conduct is negligent as
creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to a plaintiff and such
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about injuries to the plaintiff
in 	consequence 	of 	shock 	or 	fright 	resulting 	from 	his 	or 	her
contemporaneous 	observation 	of 	serious 	physical 	injury 	or 	death
inflicted by the defendant's conduct on a member of the plaintiff’s
immediate family in his or her presence.
11 The Court notes that the Parish Defendants contend that Lynch, “who
reported the abuse to bring it out into the open, cannot now complain that Diocesan
officials[] investigated the claims[ and] requested that he ‘recount in detail the sexual
abuse he had suffered[]’ and confront his alleged abusers.” 	St. Raphael Frost Mem.
at 19; Parish Cunningham Mem. at 20. 	This contention smacks of tactless victim
blaming. In any event, the characterization flies in the face of Lynch’s well-pleaded
facts, which the Court must accept as true, alleging that the Diocese and the Parish
Defendants “did not properly investigate the allegations.” 	Frost Compl. ¶ 97;
Cunningham Compl. ¶ 96.
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Under the “direct duty” theory, a plaintiff suffers emotional distress
caused by defendant's breach of a duty which unreasonably endangered
plaintiff's own physical safety.
Id. (citation modified).
On the one hand, to the extent these claims are based upon the same alleged
conduct that underpins Lynch’s negligence, negligent hiring, gross negligence, and
breach of fiduciary duty claims, these negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
are duplicative. See Demosthene v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-816 (SJ) (VMS), 2018
WL 10072931, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2018) (“[A] claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress can be asserted only as a last resort, and should be dismissed if
plaintiff can assert liability based on the same facts and circumstances under another
cause of action.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3992868 (Aug. 16,
2019), aff’d, 831 F. App’x 530 (2d Cir. 2020); D.J. by Comfort v. Corning-Painted Post
Area Sch. Dist., 722 F. Supp. 3d 148, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 2024) (“In similar cases, courts
have 	concluded 	that 	claims 	for 	negligent 	infliction 	of 	emotional 	distress 	are
duplicative of other negligence-based claims and dismissed the negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims.”), reconsideration denied, No. 22-CV-06567 (EAW), 2024
WL 5244392 (Dec. 30, 2024).
On the other hand, to the extent these claims are predicated upon intentional
acts relating to the meetings at the Diocese between Lynch and his alleged abusers,
they must also be dismissed, because intentional acts cannot form the basis of
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. 	Semencic v. County of Nassau,
No. 18-CV-5244 (SJF) (AKT), 2020 WL 435294, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2020)
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(“[D]eliberate or intentional actions do not create a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.”).
Accordingly, the Diocese’s and the Parish Defendants’ motions to dismiss these
claims in both the Frost and the Cunningham cases are granted.
VI. 	Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims
Finally, Lynch advances breach of fiduciary duty claims in both the Frost and
Cunningham cases. “To state a breach of fiduciary duty claim under New York law,
a plaintiff must plead: (i) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (ii) a knowing breach of
that duty; and (iii) damages resulting therefrom.” Spinelli v. Nat’l Football League,
903 F.3d 185, 207 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Such claims are contingent upon
the existence of a special relationship, “one founded upon trust or confidence reposed
by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another. It is said that the relationship
exists in all cases in which influence has been acquired and abused, in which
confidence has been reposed and betrayed.” 	LaFrantz, 2024 WL 216718, at *6
(quoting Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 1976)).
The “[t]wo essential elements of a fiduciary relationship are de facto control and
dominance.” G.T. v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 180 N.Y.S.3d 75, 76 (N.Y. App.
Div., 2d Dep’t 2022) (quoting Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead: The Rav Aron
Jofen Comm. Synagogue, 892 N.E.2d 375, 378 (N.Y. 2008)).
With respect to religious institutions specifically, New York courts have held
that, when “a parishioner plaintiff seeks to establish the existence of a fiduciary
relationship with an institutional church defendant, the plaintiff may not merely rely
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on the church’s status in general, but must come forward with facts demonstrating
that his or her relationship with the institution was somehow unique or distinct from
the institution’s relationship with other parishioners generally.” 	Doe v. Holy See
(State of Vatican City), 793 N.Y.S.2d 565, 568 (N.Y. App. Div., 3d Dep’t 2005).
However, religious institutions have been found liable for breach of fiduciary duty
when plaintiffs can articulate specific facts that placed them in a position of
heightened reliance on or control by the religious institution. See, e.g., Martinelli v.
Bridgeport Roman Cath. Diocesan Corp., 196 F. 3d 409, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1999)
(affirming a jury verdict of breach of fiduciary duty where the diocese (1) ran the
school the plaintiff attended; (2) knew that the plaintiff participated in group sessions
with a mentor priest who abused the plaintiff; and (3) had received reports that the
priest had earlier abused other victims).
The Parish Defendants argue that these claims fail because Lynch has not
pleaded particularized facts establishing a unique relationship between him and
these institutional Defendants and because of Lynch’s membership in the Parish
Defendants’ congregations. 	St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 20–22; Parish Cunningham
Mem. at 21–23. The Parish Defendants also argue that the fiduciary duty claims are
duplicative of Lynch’s negligence claims. 	St. Raphael Frost Mem. at 22; Parish
Cunningham Mem. at 23. 	The Diocese similarly contends that Lynch has not pled
the existence of a unique relationship that could establish the existence of a fiduciary
duty. Diocese Frost Mem. at 26–28; Diocese Cunningham Mem. at 24–26.
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Lynch responds that he did have a unique relationship with the Diocese and
the Parish Defendants because (1) a Diocese Bishop permitted him to continue
attending Cathedral Prep without paying tuition after the death of his father, and
(2) both Lynch and his mother were employed by the Diocese and/or St. Raphael
during the time of the alleged abuse. Pl. Frost Mem. at 22–23; Pl. Cunningham Mem.
at 19–20. 	Lynch also asserts that his breach of fiduciary duty claims are not
duplicative of his negligence claims because the federal rules permit pleading in the
alternative. 	Pl. 	Frost 	Mem. 	at 	26; 	Pl. 	Cunningham 	Mem. 	at 	23; 	see 	also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d).
It is well settled that “[b]ecause the existence of a fiduciary relationship is
generally a ‘fact-specific inquiry reserved for a jury[,] claims alleging the existence of
a fiduciary duty are usually not subject to dismissal in a 12(b)(6) motion.” Amusement
Indus., Inc. v. Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, P.C., No. 11-CV-4416 (LAK), 2013 WL
628533, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013) (citation modified) (quoting Dresses for Less,
Inc. v. CIT Grp./Com. Servs., Inc., No. 01-CV-2669 (WHP), 2002 WL 31164482, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2002)); see also Marmelstein, 892 N.E.2d at 378 (“Whether a
fiduciary relationship has been established is an inquiry that is ‘necessarily fact-
specific.’” (citation omitted)). If Lynch’s complaints allege facts that would, if credited
by a jury, permit the conclusion that he was treated differently and held in a position
of greater trust and dependency than the average parishioner, then resolving
whether these unique aspects of his relationship to Defendants amounted to a
fiduciary relationship is a question reserved for the jury.
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Here, Lynch argues that his relationship with the Diocese and the Parish
Defendants was different from the average parishioner in at least two ways. 	First,
he alleges that both he and his mother were employed by the Diocese and/or St.
Raphael. Frost Compl. ¶¶ 46, 88; Cunningham Compl. ¶¶ 53, 85. Lynch also alleges
the unexpected death of his father had left his family in “a dire financial condition,”
Frost Compl. ¶ 3; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 3, permitting the inference that Lynch’s and
his mother’s continued employment with the Diocese and St. Raphael was especially
important to family. 	Important as this employment may have been, however, it is
well established that an employment relationship alone does not establish a fiduciary
relationship. See Rather v. CBS Corp., 886 N.Y.S. 121, 125 (N.Y. App. Div, 1st Dep’t
2009); Daniels v. Am. Airlines, No. 19-CV-03110 (MKB), 2020 WL 9816000, at *25
(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 4, 2020).
Second, Lynch alleges that Auxiliary Bishop Catanello permitted him to attend
the Diocese’s Cathedral Prep school tuition free following the death of Lynch’s father.
Frost Compl. ¶ 3; Cunningham Compl. ¶ 3. 	This tuition waiver, if proven, would
suggest precisely the kind of unique or distinct relationship required to establish a
fiduciary relationship. 	In effect, Lynch has alleged the Diocese and the Parish
Defendants exerted unusual control over him because these Defendants could directly
influence both his family’s financial wellbeing and his own access to education.
The Court further notes that Auxiliary Bishop Catanello, who allegedly
approved Lynch’s tuition waiver, is the same official to whom Lynch allegedly
reported Frost’s and Cunningham’s abuse, and who may have arranged for the
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February 1997 meetings that were allegedly intended to intimidate and silence
Lynch. Frost Compl. ¶¶ 81, 83; Cunningham Compl. ¶¶ 78, 80. Lynch further alleges
that Catanello — a Diocesan official who allegedly personally extended an earlier
special dispensation to Lynch in the form of a tuition waiver — was personally
involved in attempts to cover up reported abuse by priests assigned to both St.
Raphael and Good Shepherd. 	At this stage in the litigation, these allegations
preclude the Court from finding, as a matter of law, that no fiduciary relationship
existed between Lynch on one side and either the Diocese, St. Raphael, and/or Good
Shepherd on the other.
Accordingly, the Diocese’s and the Parish Defendants’ motions to dismiss the
breach of fiduciary duty claims in both the Frost and Cunningham cases are denied.
CONCLUSION
The Court has considered the parties’ other arguments and finds them
unavailing. 	For the foregoing reasons, the various motions to dismiss before the
Court are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
For the claims in the Cunningham case, the Court has resolved the Diocese’s
and St. Raphael’s motions to dismiss as follows:
Ordinary Negligence 	GRANTED
Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision 	GRANTED
Gross Negligence 	GRANTED
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 	DENIED
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 	GRANTED
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 	DENIED
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For the claims in the Frost case, the Court has resolved the Diocese’s and the
Parish Defendants’ motions to dismiss as follows:
Ordinary Negligence 	DENIED
Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision 	DENIED
Gross Negligence 	DENIED
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 	DENIED
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 	GRANTED
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 	DENIED
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: March 5, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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