Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
—————————————————————X
GERMESE JAMES,
Plaintiff, 	MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against- 	23-cv-3688 (NRM)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
—————————————————————X
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
In 	this 	case, 	Plaintiff 	Germese 	James 	(“Plaintiff”) 	challenges 	the
Commissioner of Social Security’s February 25, 2022 decision to deny Plaintiff’s
March 2021 application for Social Security Disability benefits. 	Plaintiff and the
Commissioner have both moved for judgment on the pleadings. 	See Pl. Mot., ECF
No. 7; Comm’r Mot., ECF No. 11. For the reasons outlined below, Plaintiff’s motion
is denied, and the Commissioner’s motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for disability benefits with the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) in March 2021, claiming a period of disability beginning July 2020 due to
back, neck, and left shoulder injuries. 	AR 142–49,1 166. 	Following an automobile
accident in July 2020, AR 32, 166, Plaintiff underwent back surgery in February
2021, AR 238–42, and shoulder surgery in July 2021, AR 357–58. She had previously
worked as a mail carrier with the United States Postal Service (the “USPS”).
1 Citations to the Administrative Record (“AR”), which was filed as a single
document with the Court, ECF No. 5, are to the pagination applied by SSA prior to
transmitting the record, located in the bottom right-hand corner of each page.
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After her claim was originally denied, Plaintiff requested a hearing. 	AR 42–
77, 94–95. Plaintiff and her counsel appeared for a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) in February 2022. AR 24–41. Plaintiff requested a closed period
of disability from July 23, 2020 to November 2021. 	AR 28. 	In November 2021,
Plaintiff returned to light duty work with the USPS. AR 15.
In a decision issued on February 25, 2022, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not
disabled under the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act. 	AR 9–20. 	In
reaching this decision, the ALJ proceeded through the five-step analysis set forth in
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Id. The Appeals Council denied review on May 8, 2023, making
the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. 	AR 1–8 . 	Plaintiff
then timely filed this action.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Claimants who are denied disability insurance benefits by the SSA may seek
judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision,
district courts do not “decide de novo whether a claimant was disabled” or “answer in
the first instance the inquiries posed by the five-step analysis set out in the [SSA]
regulations.” 	Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
Instead, the Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s
decision is free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence. Shaw v. Chater,
221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000).
“Under 	the 	substantial-evidence 	standard, 	a 	court 	looks 	to 	an 	existing
administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support
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the agency’s factual determinations.” 	Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019)
(citation omitted). 	“[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the
threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” 	Id. at 103. 	“It means—and
means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.’” 	Id. (citation omitted). 	It is “more than a mere scintilla.”
Id. (citation omitted). In applying the substantial-evidence standard, the Court must
“defer[] to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up close.” 	Id. at 108. 	If
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings, they are conclusive and
must be upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 175–76 (2d
Cir. 2013). 	After completing its review, the district court may “enter, upon the
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing”
the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
DISCUSSION
The Court has reviewed the pleadings and the administrative record in light
of the applicable law. Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied, and
the Commissioner’s motion is granted.
The ALJ conducted the required five-step analysis in evaluating Plaintiff’s
disability claim. 	AR 15–20. 	At the conclusion of this analysis, the ALJ determined
that “considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, the claimant is capable of making a successful adjustment to
other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. A finding of
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‘not disabled’ is therefore appropriate under the framework of the above-cited rule.”
AR 20.
Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	the 	ALJ 	erred 	in 	several 	ways 	when 	assessing
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, or RFC. First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred
by rejecting certain conclusions of Plaintiff’s examining physician, Dr. Checo. Pl. Br.
at 12–15, ECF No. 7-1.2 Second, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in determining the
specifics of Plaintiff’s RFC. Id. at 15–16.
However, as explained below, the Commissioner (1) appropriately evaluated
and explicitly discussed the medical evidence, including the opinions of Dr. Checo,
and (2) applied the law correctly and made factual findings that are supported by
substantial evidence as to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.
I. 	The ALJ Appropriately Evaluated the Medical Evidence, Including
the Conclusions of Examining Physician Dr. Checo
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Checo’s “findings preclude sedentary work” because
Plaintiff “cannot meet the lift/carry requirements thereof.” 	Pl. Br. at 12. 	Plaintiff
specifically contends that, when the ALJ found that “Dr. Checo ‘overstate[d] the
claimant’s lifting/carrying limitations[,] [h]e offered no rationale, no proof from the
medical evidence, [and] no medical opinion supportive of his view.” Id. at 14. Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ improperly “rejected Dr. Checo’s opinions.” Id. at 13.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s disagreement with
the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Checo’s opinion appears to turn on a very slight
divergence between Dr. Checo’s opinion and the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can
2 Page references use ECF pagination unless otherwise noted.
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perform sedentary work. Dr. Checo concluded that Plaintiff can occasionally lift “less
than ten pounds.” AR 366. Sedentary work involves “lifting no more than ten pounds
at a time.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). Plaintiff’s contention that Plaintiff “cannot meet
the lift/carry requirements” of sedentary work thus means that this aspect of the
dispute turns on whether Plaintiff can occasionally lift ten pounds, or whether she
can only lift some unspecified amount that is less than ten pounds (for example, nine
pounds) throughout the day. 	The Court further notes that the two state agency
physicians 	who 	reviewed 	Plaintiff’s 	medical 	records 	concluded 	that 	her
lifting/carrying limitation was 20 pounds. AR 47, 61.
First, the Court agrees with the Commissioner, Def. Br. at 11, ECF No. 11-1,
that the ALJ did not reject Dr. Checo’s conclusions outright. The ALJ stated that he
was “persuaded by the [medical] opinions [in the record, including Dr. Checo’s] to the
extent that they generally reflect limitations in reaching and lifting/carrying.” 	AR
18. Plaintiff is incorrect that the ALJ was not permitted to find Dr. Checo’s opinion
persuasive in part and unpersuasive in part. As another court in this district recently
explained, “the argument that [an] ALJ could not consider some portions of [an]
opinion persuasive, while rejecting others, is without merit.” Carter v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 21-CV-7038 (SJB), 2023 WL 3997262, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 14, 2023) (citing
cases). There, as here, the ALJ relied on medical exams and plaintiff’s daily activities
to reject part of the medical opinion. 	Id.; see also Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578,
588 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming ALJ decision to credit some opinions while rejecting
other opinions of the same doctor).
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However, the ALJ noted a divergence between Dr. Checo’s opinion, which was
based on his examinations of Plaintiff, and the opinions of the two state agency
physicians, who did not examine Plaintiff. AR 18. The ALJ concluded that Dr. Checo
“overstates the claimant’s lifting/carrying limitations” yet also concluded that the
state agency physicians “understate the claimant’s lifting/carrying limitations.” 	Id.
Of course, the ALJ’s RFC need not “perfectly match” any specific medical opinion.
Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022). 	The ALJ is entitled instead to
“weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [i]s consistent with
the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013).
Here, the ALJ explicitly noted the inconsistency between Dr. Checo’s and the
state agency physicians’ evaluations of Plaintiff’s lifting/carrying limitation. AR 18.
The ALJ then concluded, in light of this inconsistency, that the record supported a
lifting/carrying limitation of “up to 10 pounds” — which was closer to Dr. Checo’s
opinion than the opinions of the state agency physicians. 	Id. 	The ALJ specifically
cited the fact that the record indicated no “gait abnormalities, the need for an
assistive 	device, 	or 	extremity 	strength/sensation 	deficits” 	and 	“the 	claimant’s
acknowledged activities of daily living, including her return to work [in a light work
position]” to support his finding that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work, which
includes lifting “up to 10 pounds,” as opposed to a lifting/carrying limitation of “less
than 10 pounds” as indicated by Dr. Checo. Id.
The Commissioner is also correct that, aside from Plaintiff’s self-reported
lifting limitation of 5 pounds, AR 193, the record does not support Dr. Checo’s more
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restrictive lifting/carrying limitation of less than 10 pounds, Def. Br. at 15. 	Dr.
Checo’s repeated instructions to Plaintiff direct her to refrain from “heavy lifting,”
AR 250, 253, 256, 274, 289, 301, 304, 338, 344, 350, 354, but do not make specific
mention of lifting strictly less than 10 pounds. Further, Dr. Checo provided Plaintiff
with a note for “light duty work.” 	AR 375; 20 CFR § 404.1567(a). 	The ALJ noted
that, based on Plaintiff’s description of the “light duty work” she performed at USPS,
this job fit into the Social Security exertional category of sedentary work. 	AR 15.
Based on the record before the ALJ, it appears Dr. Checo medically cleared Plaintiff
to return to a sedentary work position, notwithstanding his finding elsewhere that
Plaintiff could lift “less than 10 pounds.” AR 366.
While Plaintiff asserted at the hearing before the ALJ that, “soon after [her
shoulder] surgery,” her “doctor advised [her] not to carry mail or anything over a
certain amount of pounds in my arm,” AR 35, Plaintiff did not specify what weight
limitation was communicated to her by her doctor, id. 	Plaintiff also indicated that
her condition began to improve “two and a half months” after her surgery in July
2021. AR 34. Plaintiff now contends that her “total absence from work exceeded [the]
one year minimum requirement” for a finding of disability. 	Pl. Br. at 16. 	The ALJ
specifically addressed this history, however, and determined that, “[w]hile [Plaintiff]
may have been more limited during the periods of recovery after each of her surgical
procedures, there is no evidence that these limitations lasted the required 12-month
period.” AR 18. Moreover, when asked by her lawyer at the hearing before the ALJ
whether she was “capable of doing the light duty position that [she was by then
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performing],” she responded that she had “improved somewhat but [she] was still
unable to raise [her] arm to one past [her] shoulder” and that she “wasn’t able to raise
[her] arm properly.” 	AR 33. 	She made no mention of any difficulty with lifting or
carrying in the sedentary work position she was at that time performing with the
USPS.
The Court must evaluate whether the ALJ’s persuasiveness determination as
to Dr. Checo’s lifting/carrying opinion is supported by substantial evidence. 	The
SSA’s regulations explain that ALJs consider five main factors when evaluating the
persuasiveness of medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings: (1)
supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant, which includes the
length, 	purpose, 	and 	extent 	of 	the 	treatment 	relationship, 	the 	frequency 	of
examinations, and the examining relationship; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors
that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative finding.
20 CFR § 404.1520c(c). Of these factors, the regulations explain that supportability
and consistency are the most important. 20 CFR § 404.1520c(a).
The Second Circuit has explained that while the SSA makes the ultimate
finding of whether a claimant is disabled, “where the record includes the opinions of
treating physicians, ‘the [SSA] considers the data that [their opinions] provide [and
then] draws its own conclusions as to whether those data indicate disability.’” Schillo,
31 F.4th at 70 (quoting Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999)). 	When
evaluating medical source opinions, an ALJ is required to explicitly explain how he
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or she considered supportability and consistency, and may, but is not required to,
provide an explicit explanation of the other factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
In analyzing the supportability factor, “the ALJ must conduct an inquiry
confined to the medical source’s own records that focuses on how well a medical source
supported and explained their opinion.” 	Ayala v. Kijakazi, 620 F. Supp. 3d 6, 30
(S.D.N.Y. 	2022) 	(citation 	modified). 	“The 	more 	relevant 	the 	evidence 	and
explanations are, the more persuasive the medical opinion is.” 	Id. (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(1)).
In 	analyzing 	the 	consistency 	factor, 	“the 	ALJ 	must 	conduct 	an 	all-
encompassing inquiry focused on how well a medical source is supported, or not
supported, by the entire record.” Id. The more consistent the medical opinion being
analyzed is with the other sources, the more persuasive the medical opinion is. 	Id.
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)).
Here, the ALJ sufficiently analyzed both factors. As to supportability, the ALJ
determined that “Dr. Checo does 	not adequately address reaching issues and
overstates the claimant’s lifting/carrying limitations” and “providers [including Dr.
Checo] did not typically identify gait abnormalities, the need for an assistive device,
or extremity strength/sensation deficits.” 	AR 18. 	The ALJ specifically noted the
shortcomings in Dr. Checo’s reasoning and noted the evidence and findings in Dr.
Checo’s own records that did not support the “less than ten pounds” carrying/lifting
limitation. 	As to consistency, the ALJ compared Dr. Checo’s findings to Plaintiff’s
longitudinal treatment, noting that “the claimant’s acknowledged activities of daily
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living, including her return to work in November 2021, indicate that she retains the
ability to perform at least at sedentary physical exertion. While she may have been
more limited during the periods of recovery after each of her surgical procedures,
there is no evidence that these limitations lasted the required 12-month period.” AR
18.
Lastly, Plaintiff has not provided any authority supporting her position that
the ALJ was required to recontact Dr. Checo to address the parts of his opinion she
found unpersuasive. 	Pl. Br. at 13–14. 	The relevant regulations state that the SSA
shall recontact a consultative examiner if their report of a consultative examination
is “inadequate or incomplete.” 20 CFR § 404.1519p(b). In finding Dr. Checo’s opinion
unpersuasive in part, the ALJ did not find his opinion inadequate or incomplete.
Instead, 	as 	the 	Commissioner 	argues, 	if 	“inadequate” 	meant 	inconsistent 	or
unsupported, then an ALJ would have to recontact doctors every time they found any
aspect of their opinions unpersuasive; this outcome would conflict with the ALJ’s
authority to evaluate the persuasiveness of expert opinions and make that ultimate
determination. Def. Br. at 12–14.
In conclusion, the ALJ sufficiently explained, under the procedures and factors
mandated by the SSA’s regulations, why Plaintiff’s RFC varied from the medical
opinion of the treating physician Dr. Checo. Accordingly, this determination is
supported by substantial evidence.
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II. 	Substantial Evidence Supports the Exertional Limits Contained
in the RFC
Plaintiff argues that, in determining that Plaintiff possessed an RFC sufficient
to perform sedentary work with some additional limitation, “the ALJ’s approach to
the evidence – medical and other – is wanting.” 	Pl. Br. at 15. 	Plaintiff specifically
characterized the ALJ’s RFC findings as “elaborately-detailed” and “super-fine-
tune[d]” and argues that these findings “lack[] any foundation in the medical
evidence.” 	Id. at 15–16. 	Plaintiff further contends that “the ALJ offered no cogent
rationale” for the RFC findings. Id. at 15.
In response, the Commissioner argues that the RFC is administrative, not
medical in nature, and that its determination is within the province of the ALJ. Def.
Br. at 14. The Commissioner further argues that Plaintiff has not identified evidence
showing that she is more limited than the ALJ found her to be. Id. at 15.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained a sedentary work RFC with the
following additional limitations:
• 	Stand every 30 minutes for 5 minutes, not off task;
• 	Only occasionally reach overhead bilaterally;
• 	Only occasionally reach with left arm to shoulder level;
• 	Only occasionally stoop, crouch, or twist;
• 	Only occasionally rotate her head;
• 	Be off-task 10 percent of the day; and
• 	Be absent more than 1 day per month, but less than an average of 2 days
per month.
AR 16. Each of these limitations is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
As the Commissioner has noted, the postural and reaching limitations are
consistent with the opinion of Dr. Pradhan. 	Def. Br. at 15; AR 62–63. 	The sitting
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limitations are consistent with both the evaluation of Dr. Checo, AR 290, 367, and
Plaintiff’s own testimony that she “get[s] up and take[s] a break every now and then,”
AR 31. 	The off-task limitation is consistent with the opinion of Dr. Checo that
Plaintiff could sit for six or more hours and stand/walk for two hours during the
workday with normal breaks. 	AR 366–67. 	Finally, the absenteeism limitation is
consistent with Plaintiff’s testimony that, between her return to work in November
2021 and the hearing before the ALJ in February 2022, she had missed work only
because of a positive test for COVID-19; she did not testify to missing any days
because of her back or shoulder impairments. AR 32.
The Court has also considered Plaintiff’s other arguments and finds them to
be without merit. 	The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ “misstated the date of
Dr. Checo’s opinion,” Def. Br. at 14, but the Commissioner is correct that Plaintiff has
identified 	no 	harm 	or 	error 	arising 	from 	what 	she 	characterizes 	as 	a
“misapprehension” regarding this date, see Pl. Br. at 13. Finally, the Commissioner
is correct that a closed period of disability is not warranted because the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled during the alleged period because she could
perform a range of sedentary work. Def. Br. at 16. Specifically, the ALJ found that
“[w]hile [Plaintiff] may have been more limited during the periods of recovery after
each of her surgical procedures, there is no evidence that these limitations lasted the
required 12-month period.” AR 18.
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In conclusion, each element of the ALJ’s RFC determination, as well as the
determination as a whole, is supported by substantial evidence and is free of legal
error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is
denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion is granted.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: February 5, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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