Baradji v. Delta Airlines

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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SAMBOU BARADJI,
Plaintiff,
-against-
DELTA AIRLINES,
Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
23-CV-2125(EK)(PK)
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Sambou Baradji has sued Delta Airlines, his former
employer, alleging that the airline discriminated against him
based on his race, national origin, and disability. 	Proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, he asserts claims under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. 	The Court dismissed a previous incarnation of
his complaint with leave to amend. 	For the reasons discussed
below, the complaint must now be dismissed with prejudice.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff alleges that Delta wrongfully terminated his
employment. 	See Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) 12, ECF No. 8.1 	In
his initial complaint, plaintiff alluded to an incident — not
described in detail — that took place in December 2019. 	Compl.
9, ECF No. 1. 	The complaint did not suggest that Delta took any
1 Page numbers refer to the ECF pagination, unless otherwise noted.
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adverse action immediately thereafter. 	Rather, Delta terminated
plaintiff in 2021, with COVID-19 serving as, in his words, “an
excuse.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff received an offer to return thereafter,
but management subsequently “advised” him that he could not be
re-hired due to this incident. 	Id.
The Court dismissed that complaint, as it “[did] not
reveal enough of what happened . . . to give rise to a plausible
inference that the defendant acted on the basis of an improper
motive.” 	Mem. & Order 5, ECF No. 5. 	Plaintiff had failed to
“supply a clear description of” the incident in question, or
allege enough relevant facts concerning his former colleagues
sufficient to allow any reasonable comparison. 	Id. at 6.
Plaintiff also had not alleged that he suffered from any
disability, and the Court explained that the ADA “permits claims
only for adverse employment action because of the plaintiff’s
disability or perceived disability.” 	Id. (citing Kinneary v.
City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2010)).
The Court granted plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint to cure these deficiencies. 	Id. at 7-8. 	Plaintiff
has since filed two amended complaints. 	ECF Nos. 6, 7. 	The
Court construed the second new filing as a motion for leave to
amend and granted it. 	See Docket Order dated Apr. 12, 2024.
II. 	Legal Standard
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A district court must dismiss an in forma pauperis
action that “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 	28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).3 	A claim is plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” 	Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57,
63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)). 	Although all allegations contained in the complaint
are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Pro se complaints are “held to less stringent
standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys, and the Court
will read a pro se complaint liberally and interpret it to raise
the strongest arguments it suggests. 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
2 The Court may still dismiss the SAC notwithstanding Delta’s service,
as Section 1915 permits sua sponte dismissal “at any time.” 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2); see, e.g., Zappin v. Cooper, No. 20-CV-2669, 2020 WL 4753036,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) (collecting cases).
3 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
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F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). 	Still, a pro se plaintiff is not
exempt from “compliance with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.” 	Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.
1983).
III. Discussion
As the Court previously explained, when relying on a
disparate-treatment theory, a “plaintiff must show she was
similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals
with whom she seeks to compare herself.” 	Graham v. Long Island
R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000). 	In making this
determination, the Court must judge “whether the conduct for
which the employer imposed discipline was of comparable
seriousness.” 	Id. at 40.
The Court cannot do so, as the events surrounding the
termination remain unclear. 	The complaint suggests, somewhat
nebulously, that Delta assigned the plaintiff responsibility for
an alleged “security breach” on a September 2018 Delta flight.
SAC 12-13. 	Plaintiff denies that such a breach occurred. 	Id.
at 13. 	The complaint provides little to no detail concerning
what plaintiff was accused of, and by whom. 	See Whittle v.
Cnty. of Sullivan, No. 16-CV-725, 2017 WL 5197154, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2017) (dismissing complaint in which plaintiff
provided “little detail about the insubordination charges” of
which he was accused, or about a memorandum he received and “how
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it related to his firing.”). 	The SAC then alleges: “They [the
director, general manager, and department manager] thought I was
the right man for the job, they offered me the position[.] 	[I]f
I accepted it they would move on from the September [2018]
incident. 	When I turned it down, they started targeting me.”
SAC 13. 	Plaintiff does not allege when or how he was targeted.
He goes on to allege that his November 2021 termination was
“based on the incident that happened in 2018.” 	Id. at 17.4 	But
such “bald assertions of discrimination — unsupported by any
meaningful comments [or] actions” do not suffice to allege a
Title VII claim. 	De La Pena v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 552 F.
App’x 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint now references
one individual by name and title, and alleges that she made
racially insensitive comments. 	SAC 23. 	But plaintiff does not
tell us this individual’s role (if any) in his termination. 	And
“stray remarks, even if made by a decision maker, do not
constitute sufficient evidence to make out a case of employment
discrimination.” 	Danzer v. Norden Systems, Inc., 151 F.3d 50,
56 (2d Cir. 1998).
4 Even here, the complaint is not clear as to when and how Delta
terminated plaintiff’s employment. 	The complaint alleges that “[b]efore”
this termination, plaintiff “was terminated on October 1st, 2020” because he
“didn’t secure a job.” 	SAC 17.
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Finally, as to the ADA claim, the SAC now alleges that
plaintiff suffered from high blood pressure at the time of the
September 2018 flight and that he got injured on the job. 	SAC
13, 24. 	Still, this is insufficient, as the amended complaint
does not contain “plausible support [for] a minimal inference of
discriminatory motivation.” 	Dooley v. JetBlue Airways Corp.,
636 F. App’x 16, 21 (2d Cir. 2015). 	Plaintiff does not allege
when he got injured on the job, or any connection between either
his high-blood pressure and an adverse employment action. 	He
has thus failed to plausibly allege that he suffered an adverse
employment action “because of” any disability. 	Kinneary, 601
F.3d at 155-56; see Tyson v. Dep’t of Energy & Env’t Prot., No.
21-CV-736, 2021 WL 4895898, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 20, 2021)
(“Because a disability discrimination claim requires facts to
show that disability was a reason for discrimination, it is not
enough for an employee to allege merely that the employer
engaged in adverse action against the employee during a time
period when the employee was disabled.”).
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed
with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see
Sprague v. Salisbury Bank & Tr. Co., 969 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir.
2020) (affirming dismissal with prejudice because of plaintiff’s
“[r]epeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
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previously allowed”). 	Delta’s motion for a more definite
statement, ECF No. 17, is denied as moot. 	The Clerk of Court is
respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to plaintiff,
note the mailing on the docket, and close this case. 	The Court
certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis
status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	January 27, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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