USA v. Boustani et al

UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT
EASTERN DISTRJCT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERlCA,
-against-
MANUEL CHANG,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
18-CR-0681 (NGG) (CLP)
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.
Defendant Manuel Chang was once Mozambique's Minister of
Economy and Finance. (United States' Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for
Compassionate Release ("Gov'ts Opp'n") (Dkt. 844) at 1.) Now,
he is Inmate Number 10553-506 in Federal Correctional Institu-
tion, Danbury ("FCI Danbury''). (Final J. (Dkt. 824) at ECF p.l.)
He is scheduled to complete his sentence before the end of next
month, at which point he will be deported to Mozambique.
(Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Compassionate Release ("Def.'s
Reply") at 1.) Nonetheless, he seeks compassionate release so
that he may "return home to Mozambique ... before his expected
deportation." (Id.; see Def.'s Mot. for Compassionate Release
("Def.'s Mot.") at 4.) Because the court sees no "extraordinary
and compelling reasons" to warrant such a de minimis sentence
reduction, 	it 	DENIES 	Chang's 	motion. 	See 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(l)(A); U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.13(a)(l)(A).
I. 	BACKGROUND 1
On August 8, 2024, a jury found Manuel Chang guilty of conspir-
acy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money
laundering. (See Jury Verdict (Dkt. 732).) At Chang's January 17,
1 The court assumes familiarity with the relevant facts and procedural his-
tory of this case. For clarity, however, it briefly summarizes the context
leading to this order.
1
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2025 sentencing hearing, the court sentenced him to 102 months
imprisonment, with the understanding that the Bureau of Prisons
("BOP") would credit him for time served awaiting trial. (Sen-
tencing Tr. (Dkt. 801) at 62-64.) He began serving his sentence
that same day. (See Final J. at ECF p.1 (listing January 17, 2025
as the "Date of Imposition of Judgment'').)
Litigation continued, however, over the contents of the court's
written final judgment. On July 1, 2025, for example, Chang re-
quested that "the [c]ourt include specific language ... reflecting
that [it] sentenced [him] to a term of imprisonment on the belief
that he would receive full credit for all his time served." 2 (Def.'s
July 1, 2025 Ltr. to Court (Dkt. 820) at 1.) The court, however,
noted the next day in a memorandum that including such a state-
ment was "not appropriate" under Supreme Court and Second
Circuit precedent. (Mem. Dated 7/2/2025 (Dkt. 822) at 2-3 (cit-
ing United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992); Werber v.
United States, 149 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 1998)).) It then issued
its final judgment the same day. (See Final J. at ECF p.4.)
Forty days after the court issued its written final judgment, BOP
transferred Chang from Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC")
to FCI Danbury. (Gov'ts Opp'n at 2; Def.'s Mot. at 2.) It credited
Chang for time served awaiting trial and good behavior while
incarcerated. After Chang received those credits, his 102-month
sentence dwindled down to just over 14 months. Consequently,
his release date is set for March 26, 2026. (Def.'s Mot. at 2.)
2 Similarly, litigation continued over the amount of restitution Chang
would need to pay his victims. (See Sentencing Tr. (Dkt. 801) at 32.) The
court determined that amount in a May 16, 2025 order. (Mem. & Order
Dated 5/16/25 (Dkt. 803) at 20.). Out of an abundance of caution, the
listed the amount of restitution as ''TBD" in its final judgment. (Final J. at
ECF p.4.) In that judgment, the court instructed Chang to "comply with an
order of restitution to be determined if applicable after the various motions
for reconsideration on restitution have beeri decided by the court." (Id. at
ECFp.3.)
2
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To qualify for compassionate release, a defendant must establish
that he has satisfied three requirements. First, he must have "fully
exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the
[BOP] to bring a motion on [his] behalf," or 30 days must have
lapsed "from the receipt of such a request by the warden of [his]
facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582( c) (1) (A). Second,
he must demonstrate that "extraordinary and compelling rea-
sons" warrant a reduction in the term of imprisonment. Id. Third,
he must show that "the [applicable] factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.
§] 3553(a)" do not weigh against release. In analyzing these re-
quirements, a court must only grant a sentence reduction if doing
so would be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission." Id. Under those policy state-
ments, "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence
reduction include: (1) the defendant's medical circumstances;
(2) 	the defendant's age; 	(3) 	the defendant's family circum-
stances; 	(4) whether the defendant was a victim of abuse;
(S) other reasons which "are similar in gravity'' to the first four
reasons; and (6) a change in the law if the defendant received an
unusually long sentence and has served 10 years of that term of
imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.13(b).
III. DISCUSSION
Chang has failed to demonstrate that "extraordinary and compel-
ling reasons" warrant his release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(l)(A).
3
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Thus, he is ineligible for compassionate release. 3 See id. The court
now explains why.
Broadly, Chang states that three "extraordinary and compelling
reasons" merit his release. (Def.'s Mot. at 4 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c) (1) (A)).) 	The first is his "deterioration in physical
health because of the aging process." (Id.) He cites his "multiple
health issues, including stage 3 kidney disease, hypertension,
type 2 diabetes, and hyperlipidemia." (Id. at 5.) The second rea-
son 	Chang 	discusses 	is 	the 	"unanticipated 	and 	onerous
conditions of incarceration" that he faced at MDC after his Janu-
ary 2025 sentencing hearing. (Id. at 4.) Chang notes that the
court took into account the conditions at MDC "when granting
[him] a downward variance" for the 18 months that he spent
there prior to sentencing. (Id. at 6.) But he stresses that "the
[c]ourt was not aware, and therefore did not consider, that ...
[he] would spend an additional seven months at MDC after being
sentenced ... while waiting to be transported to FCI Danbury."
(Id. (citing United States v. Nunez, No. 23-CR-517 (AT), 2024 WL
4504493, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2024).) Chang contends that
these additional seven months at MDC were particularly difficult
for him because he had received surgery and could not follow his
doctor's post-operation instructions. Those instructions included
admonishments to "reduce his sodium intake, increase his intake
of water, fiber, fruits and vegetables, and exercise for 30 minutes
3 For this reason, the court need not address if Chang exhausted his ad-
ministrative remedies. See United States v. Henry, No. 13-CR-0091 (RRM),
2020 WL 3791849, at *4 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2020) (citing United States
v. Zehner, No. 19-CR-0485 (AT), 2020 WL 1892188, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
15, 2020)). Similarly, the court "need not consider" whether the counter-
vailing "§ 3553(a) factors" weigh against release. See United States v.
Woods, No. 18-CR-0033 (NGG), 2024 WL 3758817, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 12, 2024).
4
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a day." 4 (Id. at 7.) The third reason that Chang raises to support
his release is that BOP deprived him of "earned time credits" un-
der the First Step Act that should have "ma[de] his release date
on or about December 12, 2025, instead of March 26, 2026." (Id.
at 8, 10.)
The court disagrees with Chang. As the Government explains, he
has failed to meet his high burden to demonstrate "extraordinary
and compelling reasons" justifying his early release. (See Gov'ts
Opp'n at 5.) To start, BOP can readily manage each of Chang's
age-related conditions while he is incarcerated. Although he
might have had difficulty in MDC adhering to his doctor's instruc-
tions, he presents no evidence that the same is true at FCI
Danbury. (Gov'ts Opp'n at 7 n.8.) His "unfortunate but common
and non-serious age-related health conditions ... are being ap-
propriately managed and treated by the BOP" such that they do
not warrant his immediate release. See United States v. Garcia,
758 F. Supp. 3d 47, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2024).
So too when accounting for the additional seven months that
Chang spent in MDC after his sentencing hearing. Other than the
limitations on his diet and exercise, he "offers no specific evi-
dence 	establishing that he 	experienced extreme 	conditions"
during those seven months, "much less conditions that would be
'similar in gravity' to the criteria in U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.13(b)(l)-(4)."
(Gov'ts Opp'n at 7.) What is more, the delay in Chang's transfer
from MDC was largely of his own making. He continued fighting
the Government over the written final judgment's language and
4 Although Chang does not mention this himself, the Government notes in
response that he only remained in MDC for two months following his sur-
gery. (Gov'ts Opp'n at 7.)
5
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contents for nearly six months after he received his oral sen-
tence. 5 Not once during this period does Chang contend that he
sought immediate transfer to FCI Danbury. And forty days after
the court was finally able to enter its written final judgment, 6
BOP transferred Chang out of MDC. (Gov'ts Opp'n at 2; Def.'s
Mot. at 2.)
Third, Chang's arguments regarding his earned time credits are
not properly before this court. As he admits, he "currently has a
28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for habeas relief pending in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Connecticut," which is "the ap-
propriate motion and court for a prisoner to challenge his terms
of confinement." (Def.'s Mot. at 10 n.4.); see Chang v. Flowers,
No. 3:25-CV-1838 (VDO) (D. Conn. filed Oct. 30, 2025). Chang
is not the first defendant to concurrently seek compassionate re-
lease from this district so that he may be deported early. In United
States v. Perez Sanchez, the court explained that the district of
confinement "is better positioned to resolve the factual questions
that govern ... both" the defendant's parallel § 2241 petition and
his motion for compassionate release. No. 16-CR-661 (ARR),
2024 WL 3581234, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2024). So too here,
5 (See, e.g., Def.'s Ltr. Seeking Co-Defendant Andrew Pearse's Sealed Sen-
tencing Submissions 	(Dkt. 784); Letter Br. in Opp'n to Restitution
(Dkt. 787); Def.'s July 1, 2025 Ltr. to Court.) In the single instance where
the Government requested a one-week extension during these six months,
Chang consented. (See Gov'ts April 2, 2025 Ltr. to Court (Dkt. 792) .)
6 Lest Chang contend that the court itself was dilatory in entering its writ-
ten final judgment, it did so as expeditiously as was practicable. Indeed, it
entered judgment even though Chang's co-defendants had already sought
leave file motions for reconsideration of the May 16, 2025 restitution or-
der. (See Detelina Subeva's May 23, 2025 Ltr. to Court (Dkt. 805); Surjan
Singh's May 23, 2025 Ltr. to Court (Dkt. 806); Mot. to Continue by Andrew
Pearse (Dkt. 814).) The court accommodated the corresponding uncer-
tainty from the anticipated motions by listing Chang's restitution amount
as 'TBD" in its written final judgment (Final J. at ECF p.4.)
6
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given the "factual ambiguities" that the parties dispute. See id.;
(Def.'s Reply at 8-9).
Finally, Chang's argument that the Government does not "ade-
quately consider ... Chang's circumstances as a whole" fails to
persuade. (See Def.'s Reply at 6.) As an initial matter, Chang's
argument that his additional time in MDC was particularly oner-
ous is largely based on circumstances relating to his age. 7 (See
Def.'s Mot. at 4, 6.) Also, the Government discusses in detail ad-
ditional arguments that Chang raises regarding his rehabilitation.
(Gov'ts Mot. at 8.) Chang, however, concedes that his "rehabili-
tation efforts" can only support early release "in conjunction
with" the other "unique circumstances" of his case. (Def.'s Reply
at 9.) Moreover, other context surrounding this case counte-
nances against finding "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to
order Chang's immediate release. (See Def.'s Reply at 6; 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c) (1) (A).) He is currently scheduled to be released before
the end of next month. Then, he will be sent home to Mozam-
bique as he wishes. (Def.'s Mot. at 2.) Any order granting Chang's
motion would merely accelerate that process by a few weeks. He
has not alleged that FCI Danbury poses an imminent danger to
his health, and the District of Connecticut is currently considering
his § 2241 petition that he already completed his sentence due
to his First Step Act credits. See Flowers, No. 3:25-CV-1838. Thus,
the "circumstances as a whole" that Chang invokes further un-
dercut support for motion before this court. (See Def.'s Reply at
6.)
In sum, Chang has not demonstrated "extraordinary and compel-
ling reasons" that warrant his early release. 	See 	18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(l)(A); U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.13(b).
7 Again, that two of these additional seven months in MDC were after his
surgery. (See Gov'ts Opp'n at 7.)
7
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s/Nicholas G. Garaufis
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Chang's motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(l)(A).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	Brooklyn, New York
February ~ , 2026
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