USA v. Chartier et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------X
JEFFREY CHARTIER,
Petitioner,
ORDER on Motions and
TO SHOW CAUSE
-against- 	17-CR-0372(JS)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
---------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: 	Jeffrey Chartier, Pro se
#75150-112
FCI Coleman Low
FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
Satellite Camp
P.O. Box 1027
Coleman, Florida 	33521
For Respondent : 	Whitman G.S. Knapp, Esq.
Kaitlin Farrell, Esq.
United States Attorney’s Office
Eastern District of New York
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 	11201
SEYBERT, District Judge:
The 	Court 	presumes 	the 	parties’ 	familiarity 	with 	the
facts of this case. 	See generally United States v. Chartier, No.
17-CR-0373, 	2021 	WL 	3795352 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	26, 	2021) 	(denying
co-defendants’ 	motions 	for 	acquittal 	or, 	alternatively, 	new
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trials1), aff’d, Nos. 22-3125 (L), 23-6080 (CON), 2024 WL 3617023
(2d 	Cir. 	Aug. 	1, 	2024) 	(summary 	order). 	For 	the 	reader’s
convenience, 	the 	Court 	states 	summarily 	that 	Petitioner 	Jeffrey
Chartier 	(“Petitioner”) 	was 	convicted 	of, 	inter 	alia, 	securities
fraud 	and 	conspiracy 	to 	commit 	securities 	fraud. 	See 	id. 	at 	*1.
On 	August 	1, 	2024, 	the 	Second 	Circuit 	affirmed 	Petitioner’s
conviction 	and 	this 	Court’s 	below-Guidelines 	sentence 	of 	120
months’ 	imprisonment. 	Id. 	at 	*10. 	Petitioner 	did 	not 	further
appeal 	his 	conviction 	or 	sentence 	to 	the 	Supreme 	Court. 	(See
Petition, ECF No. 1446, at 2.2)
Previously, 	on 	July 	28, 	2025, 	Petitioner 	sought 	an
extension 	of 	time 	to 	file 	a 	Section 	2255 	habeas 	petition
(hereafter, 	the 	“First 	Extension 	Motion”). 	(See 	ECF 	No. 	1443.)
Said 	First 	Extension 	Motion 	was 	not 	accompanied 	by 	a 	proposed
petition; nor was there any indication within the First Extension
Motion 	of 	the 	basis 	upon 	which 	Petitioner 	sought 	habeas 	relief.
(See 	id.) 	On 	July 	31, 	2025, 	pursuant 	to 	Green 	v. 	United 	States,
1 	More accurately, the Court granted, in part, Chartier’s motion
for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial
to the extent it vacated his conviction as to Count Sixteen of the
subject superseding indictment. 	See Chartier, 2021 WL 3795352, at
*1, *26-29. 	In all other respects, Chartier’s motion was denied.
See id. at *18, *52.
2 	The Petition is attached to Petitioner’s Second Extension Motion
(defined 	infra). 	(See 	ECF 	No. 	1446 	at 	ECF 	pp.6-29.) 	Herein,
unless otherwise indicated, the Court cites to the internal pages
of the Petition.
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260 	F.3d 	78, 	83 	(2d 	Cir. 	2001), 	and 	given 	the 	lack 	of 	any
accompanying 	petition, 	the 	Court 	dismissing 	the 	First 	Extension
Motion for lack of jurisdiction. 	(See July 31, 2025 Elec. ORDER.)
Now before the Court are three related motions filed by
Petitioner: 	(1) 	a 	motion 	for 	bond 	(hereafter, 	the 	“Bond 	Motion”)
(see 	ECF 	No. 	1444); 	(2) 	a 	combined 	motion 	seeking 	appointment 	of
counsel 	and 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	(hereafter, 	the 	“Appointment
Motion”) 	(see 	ECF 	No. 	1445); 	and 	(c) 	a 	second 	motion 	seeking 	an
extension 	of 	time 	to 	file 	a 	Section 	2255 	habeas 	petition, 	with
said petition (the “Petitioner”) attached thereto (hereafter, the
“Second Extension Motion”) (see ECF No. 1446). 	The Court addresses
the motions in reverse order.
1. 	The Second Extension Motion
A 	careful 	review 	of 	Petitioner’s 	Petition 	reveals 	he
does not need an extension of time since his filing is considered
timely. 	Pursuant to the Section 2255 habeas statute, the one-year
period of limitation to file a habeas petition “shall run from the
latest of”, among other measuring points and as is relevant here,
“the 	date 	on 	which 	the 	judgment 	of 	conviction 	becomes 	final.”
18 U.S.C. 	§ 	2255(f)(1). 	Petitioner 	believes 	his 	deadline 	for
filing 	his 	Petition 	was 	August 	1, 	2025, 	since 	that 	is 	one 	year
after the Second Circuit issued its order affirming his conviction.
(See Second Extension Motion ¶¶ 2-3.) 	Not so.
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“In Clay v. United States, . . . the Supreme Court held
that a conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court ‘affirms a
conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for
a 	writ 	of 	certiorari, 	or 	when 	the 	time 	for 	filing 	a 	certiorari
petition 	expires.’” 	Moshier 	v. 	United 	States, 	402 	F.3d 	116, 	118
(2d 	Cir. 	2005) 	(quoting 	Clay 	v. 	United 	States, 	537 	U.S. 	522, 	527
(2003)) (emphasis added); see also Sup. Ct. R. 13 (instructing, in
relevant 	part, 	“a 	petition 	for 	a 	writ 	of 	certiorari 	to 	review 	a
judgment in any case, civil or criminal, entered by. . . . United
States court of appeals . . . is timely when it is filed with the
Clerk of this Court within 90 days after entry of the judgment”).
Here, 	the 	time 	for 	having 	filed 	a 	certiorari 	petition 	expired 	on
October 30, 2025, i.e., 90 days after the Second Circuit’s August
1, 2024 entry of its judgment confirming Petitioner’s conviction.
In this instance, Petitioner’s Section 2255 Petition is
dated October 28, 2025; his supporting declaration also indicates
the 	Petition 	was 	placed 	in 	the 	FCI 	Coleman 	prison 	mail 	system 	on
that date. 	(See Petition Support Declaration, ECF No. 1446 at ECF
p.18.) 	Further, 	pursuant 	to 	his 	Certificate 	of 	Service,
Petitioner’s 	Second 	Extension 	Motion, 	Petition, 	and 	related
attachments 	were 	sent 	to 	the 	Court 	on 	October 	28, 	2025, 	although
the 	accompanying 	envelope 	indicates 	an 	October 	31, 	2025, 	mailing
date. 	(Compare 	Cert. 	of 	Serv., 	ECF 	No. 	1446, 	at 	ECF 	p.30, 	with
Mailing Envelope, ECF No. 1446, at ECF p.31.)
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As an incarcerated pro se litigant, Petitioner benefits
from the federal prison mailbox rule and its liberal application.
See generally Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The
Supreme 	Court 	held 	in 	Houston 	v. 	Lack, 	487 	U.S. 	266 	[ 	] 	(1988),
that 	a 	prisoner 	appearing 	pro 	se 	satisfies 	the 	time 	limit 	for
filing 	a 	notice 	of 	appeal 	if 	he 	delivers 	the 	notice 	to 	prison
officials 	within 	the 	time 	specified. 	This 	‘prison 	mailbox’ 	rule
is justified by the litigant’s dependence on the prison mail system
and 	lack 	of 	counsel 	to 	assure 	timely 	filing 	with 	the 	court.”
(citing 	Lack, 	487 	at 	270–71)); 	see 	also 	Adeline 	v. 	Stinson, 	206
F.3d 	249, 	251 	n.1 	(2d 	Cir. 	2000) 	(“When 	a 	prisoner 	is 	proceeding
pro se, . . . federal courts generally consider his . . . petition
for 	habeas 	corpus 	to 	have 	been 	filed 	as 	of 	the 	date 	it 	was 	given
to prison officials for forwarding to the court clerk.”); Hardy v.
Conway, 	162 	F. 	App’x 	61, 	63, 	2006 	WL 	93083, 	at 	*1 	(2d 	Cir. 	Jan.
12, 	2006) 	(summary 	order) 	(stating, 	“[t]he 	prison 	mailbox 	rule
provides that a pro se prisoner’s habeas petition is deemed filed
at the moment he gives it to prison officials”, and “in the absence
of contrary evidence, district courts in this circuit have tended
to assume that prisoners’ papers were given to prison officials on
the date of their signing” (collecting cases)). 	Therefore, because
his 	Petition 	is 	dated 	October 	28, 	2025 	and, 	importantly, 	the
accompanying 	Certificate 	of 	Service 	states 	Petitioner’s 	Petition
was served on October 28, 2025, applying the “prison mailbox” rule,
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the 	Court 	will 	treat 	the 	Petition 	as 	(just 	barely) 	timely.
Therefore, 	the 	Second 	Extension 	Motion 	is 	DENIED 	as 	moot.
Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules Governing
Section 2255 Proceedings, the Court will direct the Government to
respond to the Petition. 	(See infra, “CONCLUSION”.)
2. 	The Appointment Motion
Petitioner 	seeks 	appointment 	of 	counsel 	to 	“represent
him 	at 	the 	evidentiary 	hearing 	and 	all 	stages 	of 	his 	§ 	2255
motion.” 	(Appointment 	Motion); 	see 	also 	Brown 	v. 	New 	York, 	No.
22-CV-6371, 	2024 	WL 	422290, 	at 	*2 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Jan. 	23, 	2024)
(instructing a petitioner needs to explain the reason for seeking
appointment 	of 	counsel). 	However, 	Petitioner’s 	claimed 	need 	for
an evidentiary hearing at this juncture is anticipatory, at best.
Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules Governing Section
2255 Proceedings:
Determining Whether to Hold a Hearing. 	If the
motion is not dismissed, the judge must review
the 	answer, 	any 	transcripts 	and 	records 	of
prior proceedings, and any materials submitted
under 	Rule 	7 	to 	determine 	whether 	an
evidentiary hearing is warranted.
FED. R. G OVERNING § 2255 P ROCEEDINGS 8( A). 	In turn, Rule 7 states, in
relevant part:
(a) 	In 	General. 	If 	the 	motion 	is 	not
dismissed, the judge may direct the parties to
expand 	the 	record 	by 	submitting 	additional
materials 	relating 	to 	the 	motion. 	The 	judge
may 	require 	that 	these 	materials 	be
authenticated.
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(b) 	Types 	of 	Materials. 	The 	materials 	that
may be required include letters predating the
filing of the motion, documents, exhibits, and
answers under oath to written interrogatories
propounded by the judge. 	Affidavits also may
be 	submitted 	and 	considered 	as 	part 	of 	the
record.
FED. R. G OVERNING § 2255 P ROCEEDINGS 7 	(A) 	& (B). 	At 	a 	minimum, 	until
such 	time 	when 	the 	Court 	receives 	Respondent’s 	answer, 	it 	is
impossible 	to 	know 	whether 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	is 	warranted.
Moreover, given Petitioner’s claims of ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel, 	before 	requiring 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing, 	the 	Court 	will
first direct the submission of affidavits of counsel to expand the
record 	for 	the 	Court’s 	consideration. 	Until 	these 	additions 	are
made to the record, the Court’s ability to determine the necessity
of 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	is 	stymied. 	Given 	this 	procedural
posture, it is certainly too soon to decide whether appointment of
counsel is required. 	See F ED. R. GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 8( C).
In 	any 	event, 	“[t]here 	is 	no 	constitutional 	right 	to
counsel 	in 	post-conviction 	proceedings[.]” 	United 	States 	v.
Straza, 744 F. Supp. 3d 219, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (citing Clemente
v. Lee, 72 F.4th 466, 478 (2d Cir. 2023)). 	As Honorable Lorna G.
Schofield of the Southern District of New York recently succinctly
explained 	regarding 	a 	court’s 	discretion 	to 	appoint 	counsel 	to
represent a petitioner seeking Section 2255 habeas relief:
Section 	2255(g) 	expressly 	provides 	that
a 	district 	court 	“may 	appoint 	counsel,” 	and
that appointment of counsel is governed by 18
U.S.C. § 3006A. 	Section 3006A(a)(2) provides
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that 	representation 	may 	be 	provided 	“for 	any
financially 	eligible 	person” 	when 	“the
interests of justice so require.”
In determining whether the “interests of
justice” 	require 	the 	appointment 	of 	counsel
under 	Section 	3006A, 	district 	courts 	look 	to
Hodge 	v. 	Police 	Officers, 	802 	F.2d 	58, 	61-62
(2d 	Cir. 	1985), 	a 	Second 	Circuit 	case
articulating 	the 	factors 	that 	courts 	should
consider in determining whether to appoint an
attorney 	to 	represent 	an 	indigent 	civil
litigant. 	See, 	e.g., 	Vasquez 	v. 	McGuinness,
No. 	23[-CV-]7501, 	2024 	WL 	2883295, 	at 	*1
(S.D.N.Y. 	May 	22, 	2024) 	(applying 	Hodge
factors 	when 	considering 	a 	motion 	for 	the
appointment 	of 	counsel 	filed 	under 	Section
3006A); Brown v. New York, No. 22[-CV-]06371,
2024 WL 422290, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2024)
(same).
Davis 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	25-CV-1781, 	2025 	WL 	753541, 	at 	*1
(S.D.N.Y. 	Mar. 	10, 	2025). 	Judge 	Schofield 	further 	elucidated:
“Hodge dictates that ‘[i]n deciding whether to appoint counsel, .
. 	. 	the 	district 	judge 	should 	first 	determine 	whether 	the
indigent’s 	position 	seems 	likely 	to 	be 	of 	substance.’” 	Id.
(quoting Hodge).
Applying Hodge in the Davis case, Judge Schofield found
-- like here -- it was “too early in the proceedings to determine
whether Movant’s ‘position seems likely to be of substance’”, id.
at 	*2 	(quoting 	Hodge); 	therefore, 	she 	denied 	petitioner’s
appointment 	of 	counsel 	motion 	without 	prejudice 	to 	renew 	“[a]t 	a
later stage” in the Section 2255 proceedings, i.e., when the Court
would be better able to “determine that such appointment ‘would be
more 	likely 	to 	lead 	to 	a 	just 	determination.’” 	Id. 	at 	*2; 	see
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also, 	e.g., 	Brown, 	2024 	WL 	422290, 	at 	*2 	(denying 	motion 	for
appointment 	of 	counsel, 	inter 	alia, 	“[g]iven 	that 	this 	case 	is
still 	in 	the 	early 	stages 	of 	litigation, 	and 	Respondent 	has 	not
yet 	opposed 	the 	motion 	to 	vacate” 	such 	that 	court 	could 	not
ascertain 	whether 	petitioner’s 	claims 	were 	“likely 	to 	be 	of
substance” 	(citation 	omitted)). 	Therefore, 	in 	this 	instance,
given 	the 	nascent 	nature 	of 	Petitioner’s 	Section 	2255 	habeas
request, 	his 	Motion 	for 	Appointment 	of 	Counsel 	is 	DENIED 	in 	its
entirety and as wholly premature.
3. 	The Bond Motion
“[F]ederal 	courts 	have 	the 	authority 	to 	grant 	bail 	to
habeas 	petitioners,” 	Macaluso 	v. 	Keyser, 	No. 	18-CV-4830, 	2020 	WL
8455536, 	at 	*1 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Apr. 	17, 	2020), 	but 	that 	“power 	is 	a
limited one, to be exercised in special cases only.” 	Mapp v. Reno,
241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d. Cir. 2001). 	As former Chief Judge Roslynn
R. Mauskopf of this District explained:
A 	habeas 	petitioner’s 	bail 	request 	“must
demonstrate that ‘the habeas petition raise[s]
substantial 	claims 	and 	that 	extraordinary
circumstances exist[ ] that make the grant of
bail 	necessary 	to 	make 	the 	habeas 	remedy
effective.’” 	Grune v. Coughlin, 913 F.2d 41,
44 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Iuteri v. Nardoza,
662 	F.2d 	159, 	161 	(2d 	Cir. 	1981)). 	“[C]ourts
in 	this 	district 	have 	reasoned 	that 	‘there
must 	be 	a 	demonstrated 	likelihood 	that 	the
petition will prevail, based upon claims of a
substantial 	nature 	upon 	which 	the 	petitioner
has 	a 	high 	probability 	of 	success, 	and
demonstrating 	merits 	that 	are 	more 	than
slightly 	in 	petitioner’s 	favor, 	so 	that
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victory 	for 	petitioner 	can 	be 	predicted 	with
confidence.’” 	Muja 	v. 	United 	States, 	No.
10-CV-2770 	(NGG), 	2011 	WL 	1870290, 	at 	*1
(E.D.N.Y. 	May 	16, 	2011) 	(quoting 	Beras 	v.
United States, No. 05-CV-2678 (SWK), 2007 U.S.
Dist. 	LEXIS 	5273 	at 	*3, 	2007 	WL 	195352
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2007)).
Macaluso, 2020 WL 8455536, at *1.
Because the instance case is not a special one, it does
not 	warrant 	the 	granting 	of 	bond. 	Moreover, 	the 	Court 	finds 	it
does not have confidence there is a high probability Petitioner’s
substantive 	claims 	will 	succeed 	such 	that 	this 	Court 	will 	grant
habeas relief. 	Given this Court’s lack of confidence, Petitioner
fails to meet the demanding standard warranting granting the Bond
Motion. 	See 	Hayon 	v. 	Reardon, 	No. 	20-CV-4668, 	2021 	WL 	25365, 	at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2021) (“The standard for bail pending habeas
litigation 	is 	a 	difficult 	one 	to 	meet.”). 	Nor 	is 	the 	fact 	that,
as he claims, Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to
the 	community 	given 	his 	incarcerated 	enough 	to 	warrant
Petitioner’s release on bond. 	(See Bond Motion ¶¶ 1, 2); see also,
e.g., 	Moore 	v. 	Vann, 	No. 	20-CV-0012, 	2020 	WL 	2315694, 	at 	*1
(N.D.N.Y. May 11, 2020) (“The fact that petitioner is incarcerated
in 	alleged 	violation 	of 	his 	constitutional 	rights 	does 	not
constitute 	an 	extraordinary 	circumstance.”). 	And, 	the 	Court’s
having 	“previously 	allowed 	[Petitioner] 	to 	remain 	on 	bond 	after
conviction” 	(Bond 	Motion 	¶ 	4), 	does 	not 	change 	that 	calculus.
Finally, 	Petitioner 	has 	not 	explained, 	nor 	does 	this 	Court 	find,
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this 	case 	to 	be 	either 	unusual 	or 	presenting 	extraordinary 	or
exceptional 	circumstances 	making 	the 	grant 	of 	the 	Bond 	Motion
necessary to make the habeas remedy effective. 	See, e.g., Ward v.
Piccolo, No. 20-CV-1899, 2021 WL 3723067, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20,
2021) (finding, where petitioner had not established the existence
of extraordinary circumstances, release on bail pending ruling on
merits 	of 	habeas 	petition 	was 	not 	warranted); 	see 	also 	id. 	at 	*1
n.3 	(noting 	“[b]ecause 	of 	the 	two-pronged 	standard 	set 	forth 	in
Mapp, it [wa]s not necessary for the Court to reach the merits of
the underlying [p]etition . . . in order to rule on the motion for
bail”). 	Accordingly, Petitioner’s Bond Motion is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s:
(1) 	Bond Motion (ECF No. 1444) is DENIED;
(2) 	Appointment Motion (ECF No. 1445) is DENIED without prejudice
to renew at a later date; and
(3) 	Second Extension Motion (ECF No. 1446) is DENIED as moot; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
(4) 	in 	accordance 	with 	Rule 	5 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	Governing
Section 	2255 	Proceedings, 	by 	no 	later 	than 	March 	20, 	2026, 	the
Government 	is 	to 	SHOW 	CAUSE 	why 	Petitioner’s 	Petition 	should 	not
be granted;
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IT 	IS 	FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that, 	in 	conjunction 	with 	the
Government complying with this Court’s Order to Show Cause:
(5) 	having 	examined 	the 	Petition, 	Petitioner 	raises 	various
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 	claims 	and, 	in 	doing 	so, 	has
also 	waived 	his 	attorney-client 	privilege 	as 	to 	any 	information
and 	communications 	with 	counsel 	pertaining 	to 	his 	allegations 	in
the instant Petition;
(6) 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	7(a) 	& 	(b) 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	Governing
Section 	2255 	Proceedings, 	the 	Court 	has 	determined 	it 	is 	prudent
to 	require 	additional 	information 	from 	said 	counsel 	to 	rule 	upon
Petitioner’s ineffective-assistance claims;
(7) 	therefore, 	the 	Government 	is 	to 	submit 	affidavits 	from
counsel 	responding 	to 	Petitioner’s 	ineffective-assistance 	claims
and said counsel is/are ORDERED to timely and fully cooperate with
the Government in its obligation to submit the ordered affidavits;
and
(8) 	pursuant to Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules Governing Section
2255 	Proceedings, 	Petitioner 	shall 	have 	until 	April 	17, 	2026, 	to
file a reply admitting or denying the correctness of the averments
of 	counsel 	and 	otherwise 	addressing 	issues 	raised 	in 	the
Government’s response. 	PLAINTIFF IS ON NOTICE: 	If a timely reply
is not received, the Court will deem the record fully expanded and
will proceed to rule upon the Petition; and
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed
to 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Order 	upon 	(a) 	the 	above-named 	U.S.
Attorneys, via electronical service, and (b) Petitioner, via, U.S.
mail, at his address of record, including the notation “LEGAL MAIL”
on the mailing envelope.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: 	February 4, 2026
Central Islip, New York
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