Adelaide C Chambers

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Case 1-09-40201-dem Doci13_ Filed 02/13/09 Entered 02/13/09 17:47:48

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Inre: Case No. 1-09-40201-dem

ADELAIDE C. CHAMBERS, Chapter 13

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING APPLICATION
TO EXTEND THE AUTOMATIC STAY

In this Chapter 13 proceeding, Adelaide C. Chambers (the “debtor”’) has filed an
application for the issuance of an order extending the automatic stay pursuant to Section
362(c)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the”Application”’). For the reasons set forth below, the
Application is denied.

The facts underlying the A pplication are not in dispute. This is the debtor’ s
second petition in bankruptcy. On June 26, 2008, the debtor, proceeding pro se, filed a voluntary
petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Case No.: 1-08-44074-dem (the
“First Case’). On July 23, 2008, the debtor filed an application for the voluntary dismissal of the
First Case. On July 23, 2008, the Court entered an Order dismissing the First Case and on July
31, 2008 the First Case was closed. On January 14, 2009, the debtor, proceeding pro se, filed a
voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Case No.: 1-09-40201-
dem (the “Second Case”). On February 12, 2009, the debtor filed the Application, which, as
described above, seeks an Order extending the automatic stay of Section 362 of the Bankruptcy

Code.

Section 362(c)(3) governs the applicability of the automatic stay under the
circumstances presented in this case. 	Section 362(c)(3)(A) provides in pertinent part:
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), (f) and (h)
of the section --
(3) if a single ... case is filed by ... a debtor who is an individual
in a case under chapter ... 13, and if a single ... case of the debtor
was pending within the preceding 1-year period but was
dismissed [.].. --
(A) the stay under subsection (a) with respect to any act taken
with respect to a debt or property securing such debt ... shall
terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the
filing of the later case [.]
Thus, Section 362(c)(3)(A) provides that the automatic stay came into effect on the date of the
filing of the Second Case. However, Section 362(c)(3)(A) provides that this stay shall terminate
on the 30th day after the filing of the Second Case; here, that would mean that the automatic stay
must terminate on February 13, 2009, unless otherwise extended.
As noted above, on February 12, 2009, the debtor filed an application to extend
the automatic stay. Section 362(c)(3)(B ) allows the Court to extend the stay in particular cases
and provides in pertinent part:
(B) on the motion of a party in interest for continuation of the
automatic stay and upon notice and a hearing, the court may
extend the stay in particular cases as to any and all
creditors ... after notice and a hearing completed before the
expiration of the 30-day period only if the party in interest
demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in good faith
as to the creditors to be stayed.
The Application must be denied due to the debtor’s failure to provide
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Case 1-09-40201-dem Doc 13 Filed 02/13/09 Entered 02/13/09 17:47:48

appropriate notice to meet the statute’s requirement of “notice and a hearing.” 1 See In re Taylor,
334 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005). The debtor filed the Application on February 12, 2009.
The notice which the debtor provided is deficient both with regard to identifying the number and
identities of the creditors to be stayed and the length of time in advance of the hearing. The
Application failed to list the creditor(s) against whom extension of the automatic stay was
sought, and was filed on the 29th day of the 30 day period. 	No creditor has had the opportunity
to review the Application, evaluate its options and respond, either in support or opposition to the
Application, as it chose. Had the debtor filed the petition earlier, a hearing on the debtor’s
application could have been held and the Application determined prior to the expiration of the 30
day period. The debtor’s delay in seeking this relief in effect could result in an extension of the
automatic stay not based on the merits but solely because of the debtor’s calculated timing.
Moreover, hearing and deciding the Application in this 24-hour period would have denied due
process to all parties that would have been affected by the granting of the relief sought.
The Application is denied in all respects.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
February 13, 2009
S/Dennis E. Milton
DENNIS E. MILTON
United States Bankruptcy Judge
1 Section 102(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent part:
(1) “after notice and a hearing”, or a similar phrase –
(A) means after such notice as is appropriate in the particular
circumstances, and such opportunity for a hearing as is
appropriate in the particular circumstances [.]....
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Case 1-09-40201-dem Doc 13 Filed 02/13/09 Entered 02/13/09 17:47:48

To: 	Adelaide Chambers
Debtor Pro Se
186-47 Jordan Avenue
Jamaica, NY 11412
Michael J. Macco, Esq.
Chapter 13 Trustee
135 Pinelawn Road, Suite 120 South
Melville, New York 11747
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Case 1-09-40201-dem Doci13_ Filed 02/13/09 Entered 02/13/09 17:47:48