Hughes v. Rabauliman et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
JOSHUA LAWRENCE ROBERT
HUGHES,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANCISCO M. RABAULIMAN, in his
official capacity as Secretary of the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands Department of Community and
Cultural Affairs; and
MARGARITA TORRES-ALDAN, in her
official capacity as the Administrator of the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands Nutrition Assistance Program,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:26-cv-00015
SCREENING ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Joshua Lawrence Robert Hughes’s Application to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (the “Application,” ECF No. 1) and Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 2), both filed on July 15, 2026. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court grants Hughes’s Application and finds that his Complaint passes screening
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). As such, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Rule 4(c)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court authorizes the issuance of summons in this case and
service to be made in accordance with Rule 4(i)(1) and (2) of the Northern Mariana Islands Rules
of Procedure, as permitted by Rules 4(e) and (j) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, upon
Hughes’s providing mailing addresses for the Defendants.
F I L E D
Clerk
District Court
for the Northern Mariana Islands
By________________________
(Deputy Clerk)
AUG 05 2026
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I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Hughes’s Application is supported by his affidavit and financial information. Based on his
representations of his income and expenses, the Court finds the Application well taken and
therefore grants Hughes’s Application.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
As Hughes is proceeding without prepayment of costs or fees, the Court is “require[d]” to
screen his Complaint, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), and ascertain whether
it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). As to failure to state a claim, a complaint survives dismissal “only if,
taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194
(9th Cir. 1998) (noting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s “failure to state a claim” language “parallels
the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)” and applying standard of review for
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissals to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). A claim is
“plausible on its face” where there is sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required; however, a plaintiff must plead “more than
an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Id. (rejecting formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
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III. BACKGROUND
In his seven-page Complaint, Hughes names Francisco M. Rabauliman, the Secretary of
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Department of Community and
Cultural Affairs (DCCA), and Margarita Torres-Aldan, the Administrator of the CNMI Nutrition
Assistance Program (NAP), as defendants and alleges the following:
(1) Hughes, a forty-year-old resident of Saipan with limited financial resources, receives
Supplemental Security Income and has been receiving benefits under the NAP for
approximately the past six years. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 15, 16, ECF No. 2.)
(2) The NAP is funded through a block grant from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Food
and Nutrition Service, with administration of the NAP “governed, in part, by an annual
Memorandum of Understanding” between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the
DCCA. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.)
(3) Paragraph 17 of the MOU for fiscal year 2025 requires the DCCA “to establish a system
of Fair Hearings for appeals from any household aggrieved by any action of the CNMI in
operating” the NAP. (Id. ¶ 11.) In accordance with the requirements of the MOU, the
CNMI has promulgated administrative regulations governing the conduct of Fair Hearings
under the NAP. (Id. ¶ 12 (citing NMIAC § 55-30-270).)
(4) On June 10, 2025, Hughes submitted his annual renewal application for his NAP benefits.
(Id. ¶ 17.)
(5) On June 30, 2025, the NAP issued a notice allocating $41.00 per month in benefits to
Hughes. (Id. ¶ 20.) The notice also informed Hughes that he had the right to an “Agency
Conference or a Fair Hearing on his case,” which conference or hearing could be requested
by completing and submitting an attached form within ten days. (Id. ¶ 21.)
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(6) Hughes completed and submitted the attached form on July 3, 2025, requesting a “Fair
Hearing.” (Id. ¶ 22; see also id. ¶ 23 (alleging that NAP employee “Anica U.” received the
form the same day).) Hughes sought a “Fair Hearing” on the ground that the NAP
incorrectly calculated his monthly benefit amount under the applicable regulations, such
that the correct amount “should have been approximately $141 per month.” (Id. ¶ 24.)
(7) No “Fair Hearing” has been scheduled or held since Hughes submitted his request, nor has
the NAP acted on Hughes’s assertion about the miscalculation of his benefits,
notwithstanding the applicable regulations requiring the NAP Administrator to schedule,
conduct, and conclude a “Fair Hearing,” and issue a decision, within sixty days of receipt
of a request for a “Fair Hearing.” (Id. ¶¶ 25-31 (citing NMIAC § 55-30-270(e)).)
Hughes brings one cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both Defendants in their official
capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 7, 8.) Hughes alleges that he has a property interest in the NAP benefits for
which he is eligible that is protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution such that Defendants failure to provide him with a “Fair Hearing” after he
requested the same deprived him of procedural due process in violation of his federal constitutional
rights. (Id. ¶¶ 32-37.) Hughes seeks, inter alia, a declaration that Defendants’ conduct violates
the Due Process Clause, an injunction commanding Defendants to promptly provide him with a
“Fair Hearing” as required under the governing regulations, and fees and costs. (Id. at 6-7.)
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Screening
Hughes’s Complaint does not appear to be “frivolous or malicious,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), nor does it “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief,” id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Therefore, for screening purposes, the Court need only assess
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whether the Complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[.]” Id.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hughes must allege sufficient factual information
showing that “he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Marsh v. Cnty. of San
Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Hughes
alleges that his constitutional right to procedural due process was violated by Defendants’
continuing failure to afford him an opportunity to challenge the determination of his NAP benefits,
as otherwise required by CNMI law. “A section 1983 claim based on procedural due process . . .
has three elements: (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation
of the interest by the government; (3) lack of process.” Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d
898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993).
As to the first element, the Supreme Court has explained that “[f]ood-stamp benefits . . .
‘are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.’” Atkins v. Parker, 472
U.S. 115, 128 (1985) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970)); see also Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (explaining that legitimate claim of entitlement
to benefits depends on creation and scope of entitlement as “defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Here, as pleaded in Hughes’s Complaint and set forth in relevant provisions of the
Northern Mariana Islands Administrative Code, the CNMI issues NAP benefits pursuant to a
Memorandum of Understanding between the local and federal governments, with appropriate
benefits issued to those individuals or households who meet the eligibility requirements as
determined by the DCCA and NAP. Critically, the local governing regulations provide that NAP
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benefits are to be issued “to eligible households,” NMIAC § 55-30-401, in an amount determined
by a set formula, see id. § 55-30-245(e), with no provision for CNMI officials to make
discretionary grants or denials of NAP benefits. In other words, once Hughes meets the eligibility
criteria for NAP benefits, Hughes is entitled to the amount of NAP benefits as provided by CNMI
regulations. As such, Hughes’s allegations are sufficient to show that Plaintiff’s entitlement to
NAP benefits “are appropriately treated as a form of ‘property’ protected by the Due Process
Clause.” Atkins, 472 U.S. at 128; see also Nozzi v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 806 F.3d
1178, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[P]laintiffs have a protected property right in public benefits when
. . . a statute authorizes those benefits and the implementing regulations greatly restrict the
discretion of the people who administer those benefits.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
As to the second element, Plaintiff’s alleges that the NAP did not correctly calculate the
amount of benefits to which he was entitled in applying the formula set forth at NMIAC § 55-30-
245(e). (See Compl. ¶¶ 20, 24.) Defendants’ alleged wrongful reduction in Hughes’s NAP benefits
deprives him of his protected property interest in the NAP benefits to which he is entitled under
CNMI regulations. Cf. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (“For qualified recipients, welfare provides the
means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.”). Thus, Hughes’s Complaint
sets forth sufficient material facts to establish this element as well. See K.W. ex rel. D.W. v.
Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Having found that the Plaintiffs have a property
interest in their benefits, we must now examine whether providing a lower calculated budget to
participants deprives them of this property interest. We find that it likely does.”).
As to the third element, while “the mere violation of a regulation does not necessarily give
rise to a violation of the due process clause,” Tietjen v. U.S. Veteran’s Admin., 692 F. Supp. 1106,
1112 (D. Ariz. 1988) (discussing United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979)), here, Hughes
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effectively alleges that he was not afforded any opportunity whatsoever to challenge the reduction
in his NAP benefits. The Supreme Court has explained:
The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity
to be heard. The hearing must be at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner. . . . [T]hese principles require that a recipient
have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed
termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting
any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and
evidence orally.
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Hughes’s
allegations showing that Defendants failed to provide any hearing or decision on his challenge to
the calculation of his NAP benefits is sufficient to establish this element.
Therefore, Hughes’s Complaint plausibly states a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on
procedural due process.
B. Method of Service
As Hughes “is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915,” the Court
is required to “order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a
person specially appointed by the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
(“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases.”).
Hughes’s Complaint names the two Defendants—both natural persons—in their official capacity
as CNMI officials. In recognition that a suit against a state officer in their official capacity is
“tantamount to suing the state itself,” Alexander v. Brown, No. 9:23-cv-00274-JFW-SHK, 2024
WL 1218280, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2024) (quoting Gonzalez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, No. 1:20-
cv-01422-DAD-JLT, 2021 WL 3287717, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2021)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1216716 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2024), decisions interpreting
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing permissible methods of service of
process, have recognized that the rule is ambiguous as to whether a state official sued in their
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official capacity must be served in accordance with Rule 4(e) (service on individual within a
judicial district of the United States) or Rule 4(j) (service on foreign, state, or local government),
see Alexander, 2024 WL 1218280, at *9 (discussing Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir.
1982), and noting Jackson did not “concretely answer whether state officials sued in their official
capacities must be served pursuant to Rule 4(e) or (j)”); Echevarria-Gonzalez v. Gonzalez-Chapel,
849 F.2d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1988) (“There is no doubt that [former] Rule 4(d)(1) applies when a
state officer is sued in his individual capacity. However, [former] Rule 4(d)(1) nor [former] Rule
4(d)(6) addresses the situation when a particular officer of a state is sued in his official capacity.”).
The Court, however, need not “address whether a state official sued in their official capacity
must be served under Rule 4(e) or 4(j) because both provisions allow for service pursuant to state
law.” Alexander, 2024 WL 1218280, at *10. Rule 4(e)(1) permits service on an individual within
a judicial district of the United States by “following state law for serving a summons in an action
brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where
service is made[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Similarly, “[a] state . . . or any other state-created
governmental organization that is subject to suit must be served by . . . serving a copy of [the
summons and complaint] in the manner prescribed by that state’s law for serving a summons or
like process on such a defendant.” Id. 4(j)(2)(B). CNMI law provides that the “the issuance,
service and return of process shall be as prescribed in the rules of practice or procedure adopted
by the judiciary of the Commonwealth [Superior Court].” 7 CMC § 1205. Under Rule 4 of the
Northern Mariana Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, as duly adopted and promulgated by the CNMI
judiciary, specific provision is made for service on a CNMI officer or employee sued in their
official capacity:
(i) Serving the Commonwealth, and its Agencies, Corporations,
Officers, or Employees.
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(1) Commonwealth. To serve the Commonwealth, a party must:
(A) deliver a copy of the summons and the complaint to the
attorney general or to an assistant attorney general or clerical
employee of the office of the attorney general at the office of
the attorney general; or
(B) send a copy of the summons and the complaint by
registered or certified mail addressed to the attorney general.
(2) Agency; Officer or Employees Sued in an Official Capacity.
To serve an officer, agency or employee of the Commonwealth,
a party must serve the Commonwealth in the manner prescribed
by Rule 4(i)(1) and also send a copy of the summons and the
complaint by registered or certified mail to the officer or agency.
NMI R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)-(2). As such, first, the Court will authorize service of process on the CNMI
by having the U.S. Marshals Service deliver process to the CNMI Office of the Attorney General.
Second, the Court will authorize service of process on the two named Defendants by certified mail
addressed to each Defendant as officers within DCCA, with Hughes’s counsel’s address listed for
receiving return receipts. As Hughes did not provide a mailing address for any Defendant, the
Court will require Hughes to provide the Clerk’s Office with mailing addresses for each Defendant
forthwith. In addition, after the Clerk’s Office mails out process, Hughes must still file proof of
service on each Defendant in accordance with Rule 4(l) and (m) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Hughes’s Application to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 1) and finds that Hughes’s Complaint
(ECF No. 2) passes screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and therefore further proceedings thereon
is appropriate. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Rule 4(c)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure:
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(1) Hughes is directed to file forthwith a notice stating the mailing addresses for the two
Defendants as officers within the CNMI DCCA.
(2) Failure to file the notice within seven days of issuance of this order may result in
dismissal of the Complaint.
(3) Upon filing of the notice containing the mailing addresses for Defendants, the Clerk is
directed to issue three copies of summons, one addressed to the CNMI Attorney General
and one for each Defendant.
(4) Upon issuance of summons, the U.S. Marshals Service is directed to serve the summons
addressed to the CNMI Attorney General along with a copy of the Complaint (ECF No. 2)
by leaving the summons and Complaint with the CNMI Attorney General, a CNMI
Assistant Attorney General, or clerical employee at the CNMI Office of the Attorney
General at the CNMI Office of the Attorney General, located at the Juan A. Sablan
Memorial Building on Pagan Loop in Capitol Hill, Saipan, CNMI. The U.S. Marshals
Service shall file proof of service or attempted service.
(5) The Clerk is directed to mail the summons addressed to each Defendant with a copy of the
Complaint (ECF No. 2) by certified mail, return receipt requested, with Hughes’s counsel’s
address listed as the receiving address for any return receipt.
(6) Hughes must file proof of service on Defendants in accordance with Rule 4(l) and (m) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of August, 2026.
____________________________________
RAMONA V. MANGLONA
Chief Judge
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