Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
__________________________
DARWIN VILLASINDA,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 26-cv-605-KWR-JHR
WARDEN, Otero County Processing Center, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Darwin Villasinda’s Amended Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(Doc. 4) (Amended Petition). 	Petitioner is
proceeding pro se and filed his Amended Petition pursuant to the Court’s Order Directing
Amendment (Doc. 3). 	Having reviewed the record, the Court determines that Petitioner is subject
to detention during the 90-day removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. 	The Court will therefore
dismiss the Amended Petition without prejudice to refiling, as set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner challenges his immigration custody at the Otero County Processing Center in
Chaparral, New Mexico. 	Petitioner states that on January 29, 2026, an Immigration Judge entered
an order of removal, and he did not file an appeal of the decision. 	(Doc. 4) at 2; see also
https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (reflecting a removal order was entered on January
29, 2026, and no appeal was received by the Board of Immigration Appeals). 	Petitioner contends
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he was detained without cause and his immigration hearing was conducted without adequate due
process. 	(Doc. 4) at 6. 	He seeks release from immigration custody. 	Id. at 7.
DISCUSSION
Habeas corpus review is available if a noncitizen is “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 	Courts conduct an initial review of pro se habeas petitions to
determine whether the claims raise a colorable request for relief. 	See Habeas Corpus Rules 1, 4.
“If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the moving party is not
entitled to relief in the district court, the Judge must dismiss the petition.” 	Habeas Corpus Rule
4(b). 	“If the petition is not dismissed, the Judge must order … an answer.” 	Id.
Where, as here, Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal, detention is governed by
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 and 8 U.S.C. § 1231. 	The Government is expected to secure a
noncitizen’s removal within 90 days after a removal order becomes final. 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
682; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). 	“During the 90-day removal period, … [the noncitizen] must
be held in custody.” 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683 (citing § 1231). 	After that, the Government may
continue detaining the noncitizen only for as long as is “reasonably necessary” to secure their
removal. 	Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). The Supreme Court determined that a six-month
detention period is presumptively reasonable. 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 	“After this 6-month
period, once the [petitioner] provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence
sufficient to rebut [th]e showing” that the custody is unconstitutional. 	Id. at 701.
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Petitioner’s removal order became final on March 2, 2026 – thirty days after it was issued.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(c) (“An order of removal made by the immigration judge at the conclusion
of proceedings under section 240 of the Act shall become final … [u]pon expiration of the time
allotted for an appeal if the respondent does not file an appeal within that time.”); 8 C.F.R. §
1240.15 (“An appeal shall be filed within 30 calendar days” of an order of removal being issued.).
Consequently, Petitioner is subject to detention during the 90-day statutory removal period. 	See
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the”
noncitizen). 	Even when the 90-day statutory removal period expires, Petitioner’s detention is
presumptively reasonable for another six months. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 	Petitioner
therefore cannot prevail on his claim for prolonged detention or obtain a release at this time.
Petitioner is also not entitled to a bond hearing. 	See Gregorio v. Warden, 2026 WL 810004, at
*2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2026) (“Petitioner is … not entitled to a bond hearing because during the
90-day removal period set forth in § 1231(a)(1)(A), his detention is mandatory.”); Johnson v.
Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 526 (2021) (“We conclude that § 1231, not § 1226, governs the
detention of aliens subject to … orders of removal, meaning those aliens are not entitled to a bond
hearing.”).
Because the Court cannot grant the requested relief at this time, the Amended Petition will
be dismissed without prejudice. 	Petitioner may refile his claims for prolonged detention after
expiration of the six-month period under Zadvydas or if the basis for the claims change. 	The
Court will also deny Petitioner’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 5) without prejudice
as moot.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner Darwin Villasinda’s pro se Amended
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 4) and Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis (Doc. 5) are DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling; and the Court will enter
a separate judgment closing the civil case.
____/S/ KEA W. RIGGS________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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