Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
JAIRO VEGA URIBE,
Petitioner,
v. 	2:25-cv-01139-DHU-KRS
KRISTI NOEM, TODD LYONS,
MARY DE ANTA-YBARRA,
PAMELA BONDI, and DORA
CASTRO,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING HABEAS PETITION
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Jairo Vega Uribe’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). Doc. 1. Petitioner alleges that he has been unlawfully detained without
the opportunity for a bond hearing, in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
and his due process rights. Id. at ¶¶ 41-47. The Petition asks the Court to declare Petitioner’s
detention unlawful and to grant a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to provide Petitioner
an individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Having considered the parties’ briefs and the relevant and applicable law, the Court finds that the
Petition should be GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Jairo Vega Uribe is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States
without inspection in 2001, nearly twenty-five years ago. Doc. 1 at ¶ 32. Petitioner then moved to
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Mount Airy, Maryland, where he lives with his wife, two U.S. citizen children, and his elderly
mother-in-law, who is a lawful permanent resident. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 37.
On September 1, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) agents after being stopped while driving a work van with a coworker. Id. at ¶ 34. He was
served with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) on October 11, 2025, commencing removal proceedings
against him. See Doc. 8-1. Petitioner has remained in ICE custody since his arrest and is currently
detained at the Otero County Processing Center in Chaparral, New Mexico. Id. at ¶¶ 35-36.
On November 14, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In the
Petition, Mr. Vega Uribe contends that he should be subject to ICE’s general detention authority
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond hearing. Id. at 1. Instead, according to Petitioner,
under a new ICE policy and recent Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, Matter of
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), Petitioner was classified as an “applicant for
admission” subject to mandatory detention 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Id. at 1-2. Petitioner argues that he is
not an applicant for admission “seeking admission” or “an arriving alien” subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b). Id. at ¶ 40. Accordingly, Petitioner alleges he is entitled to a bond
hearing under § 1226(a), and that the Government’s denial of such a hearing deprives him of his
rights without due process of law. Id. at ¶¶ 42, 47. The Petition asks this Court to:
(1) Issue an Order to Show Cause, ordering Respondents to justify the basis of
Petitioner’s detention in fact and in law;
(2) Enjoin Petitioner’s transfer outside this judicial district pending this litigation;
(3) Declare that Petitioner is not an application for admission “seeking admission” or
an “arriving alien” subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b);
(4) Declare that Respondents’ actions violate Petitioner’s due process rights;
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(5) Declare that Respondents may properly detain Petitioner, if at all, only pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
(6) Order that Respondents conduct a bond hearing for Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) within 15 days;
(7) Grant the writ of habeas corpus and order Respondents to release Petitioner
forthwith, upon payment of the bond as ordered by the IJ; and
(8) Award Petitioner his costs of suit.
Id. at 13.
On December 23, 2025, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition, arguing that
Petitioner is appropriately classified under § 1225(b). Doc. 8 at 2. Respondents do not dispute the
facts laid out in the Petition regarding Mr. Vega Uribe’s approximate date of entry into the country.
See id. at 2; see also Doc. 8-1 at 1, 6.1 However, the Government asserts that § 1226 governs the
detention of noncitizens who lawfully entered the United States but who are no longer lawfully
present, id. at 8, whereas § 1225 applies to all noncitizens who enter the country without being
admitted, id. at 9. In the Government’s view, Matter of Hurtado, which affirmed this interpretation,
prevents an “‘incongruous result’ that rewards [noncitizens] who unlawfully enter the United
States without inspection and subsequently evade apprehension for a number of years.” Id. at 10
(citing Matter of Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec., at 228). Moreover, the Government argues that the plain
language of the INA mandates detention of all noncitizens present in the U.S. without having been
1 The NTA issued to Mr. Vega Uribe indicates that his date and location of entry into the United
States is unknown. Because the Government has not disputed Petitioner’s assertion that he entered
in 2001 or offered evidence suggesting otherwise, the Court has no reason to question this fact as
alleged by Petitioner.
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lawfully admitted, id. at 13, and that “past practice does not justify disregard of clear statutory
language[,]” id. at 14.
On January 6, 2026, Petitioner submitted a brief in opposition to Respondents’ Motion to
Dismiss. Doc. 9. In it, Petitioner argues that Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) is not
supported by the text of the statute, relevant case law, or longstanding agency practice. Id. at 3-15.
He reiterates that he should be detained under § 1226 and entitled to a bond hearing. Id. at 15-17.
Petitioner asks this Court to deny Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. Id. at 17.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Habeas relief is available when a person “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Petitioner seeks habeas relief,
arguing he is being unlawfully detained in violation of the INA, his Fifth Amendment due process
rights, and the Administrative Procedure Act.
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the Government from depriving any
person of liberty without due process of law. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause
protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (2001). The Due Process Clause’s
protections extend to all persons in the United States, including noncitizens, “whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Id. at 693.
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III.
DISCUSSION
This case is not the first of its kind in this Court. In fact, the Court has already considered
the statutory and constitutional issues raised by Petitioner in Requejo Roman v. Castro et al., 2:25-
cv-1076 (D.N.M. Jan. 12, 2026), and Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos et al., --F.Supp.3d--, 2025 WL
2676729 (D.N.M. 2025). The facts here are not materially different than those the Court analyzed
in Requejo Roman and Salazar, so the Court’s conclusion is the same.
Following its decisions in Requejo Roman and Salazar, as well as the decisions of virtually
all other federal courts who have analyzed this issue,2 the Court holds that noncitizens already
present in the United States who entered without inspection are subject to discretionary detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and are entitled to a bond hearing. Mr. Vega Uribe, who entered the country
without inspection over two decades ago and has resided here ever since, is properly detained
pursuant to § 1226 and therefore entitled to a bond hearing. The Government’s misclassification
of Petitioner under § 1225 and resultant denial of a bond hearing deprived him of his right to due
process. To ensure Petitioner’s due process rights are protected going forward, the factors laid out
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976), favor shifting the burden of proof to
the Government in any future bond hearing. For a detailed account of the Court’s reasoning
relevant to this decision, see Requejo Roman v. Castro et al..
2 In support of their Motion to Dismiss, Respondents cite to four recent district court opinions
adopting the Government’s interpretation of the INA’s detention provisions. See Doc. 8 at 12, 14
(citing Vargas Lopez v. Trump, --F.Supp.3d--, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); Chavez
v. Noem, --F.Supp.3d--, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025); Mejia Olalde v. Noem, 2025
WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); and Pena v. Hyde, 2025 WL 2108913 (D. Mass July 28,
2025). However, as of late 2025, this Court had counted decisions from over 70 district courts, and
one circuit court, rejecting the Government’s new interpretation of § 1225. Given the proliferation
of these cases in federal courts around the country, that number may be an undercount—and has
likely grown considerably since then.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, and articulated in greater detail in Requejo Roman v. Castro
et al., Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondents provide Petitioner an individualized
bond hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge (“IJ”) within 7 days of entry of this Order. If
Petitioner does not receive such a hearing on or before Friday, January 23, 2026, he shall be
immediately released. At the bond hearing, the government shall bear the burden of proving, by
clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is a flight risk and/or a danger to the community in
order to justify continued detention. The assigned IJ is hereby ordered not to deny bond based
solely on a lack of jurisdiction under the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of
Yajure Hurtado.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties submit a joint status report to the Court no
later than Monday, January 26, 2026, confirming whether a bond hearing was held and the result
of said hearing.
Should Petitioner wish to recover costs of suit and attorney’s fees, he may submit an
application for such costs and fees within 30 days of this Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
Respondents may respond to Petitioner’s application no later than 14 days after Petitioner’s
application is filed with this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
HONORABLE DAVID HERRERA URIAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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