Beck et al v. Mitchell et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
KIMBERLY BECK AND TRAVIS LORENTZ,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES OF CHARLES “GAGE”
LORENTZ, DECEASED
Plaintiffs,
vs. 	No. 2:20-CV-1280 MV/JHR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and
ROBERT JOHN MITCHELL, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A
NATIONAL PARK RANGER
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant John Robert Mitchell’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. 106]. This Motion asks the Court to dismiss Count I of the
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Count I alleges that Defendant
Mitchell violated Charles Lorentz’s rights under the Fourth Amendment when he used excessive
force against Mr. Lorentz, resulting in his death. See Doc. 1 at 10. Defendant Mitchell argues that
there is no remedy under this claim pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022).
Plaintiffs filed a Response [Doc. 122] in which they concede that there is no remedy under Bivens
and agree that the claim must be dismissed.
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move
for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is
governed by the same standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Leiser v. Moore,
903 F.3d 1137, 1139 (10th Cir. 2018) (“We review a district court’s grant of a motion for judgment
Case 2:20-cv-01280-MV-JHR Document 157 Filed 03/27/26 Page 1 of 4

2
on the pleadings de novo, using the same standard that applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”). Under
this standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Here,
Defendant Mitchell argues, and Plaintiffs agree, that under Bivens and Egbert, Plaintiffs have no
remedy against Defendant Mitchell for the Fourth Amendment violation and as a result, Claim I
must be dismissed. The Court agrees.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs may bring damages suits against state officials for
constitutional violations, yet there is no analogous statute for federal officials. In Bivens, the
Supreme Court “broke new ground by holding that a person claiming to be a victim of an unlawful
arrest and search could bring a Fourth Amendment claim for damages against the responsible
agents even though no federal statute authorized such a claim.” Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93,
99 (2020). The Court then extended Bivens to apply to two additional constitutional claims, namely
a former congressional staffer’s Fifth Amendment sex-discrimination claim, see Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979), and a federal prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical
care, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). The Supreme Court has been clear that “[t]hese
three cases—Bivens, Davis, and Carlson—represent the only instances in which the [Supreme]
Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself.” Ziglar v. Abbasi,
582 U.S. 120, 131 (2017). “[E]xpanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”
Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 121 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 661, 675 (2009)); see also Silva v.
United States, 45 F.4th 1134, 1140 (10th Cir. 2022) (expanding Bivens “is not just a disfavored
judicial activity, . . . it is an action that is impermissible in virtually all circumstances”). Indeed,
the Supreme Court has “declined 11 times to imply a similar cause of action for other alleged
constitutional violations.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 483.
Case 2:20-cv-01280-MV-JHR Document 157 Filed 03/27/26 Page 2 of 4

3
In the instant case, Plaintiffs’ Complaint asks the Court to devise a Bivens remedy in a new
context, namely a shooting by a park ranger. Where a plaintiff asks the Court to devise a Bivens
remedy, the Court must ask whether there are any “special factors” that provide “reason to pause
before applying Bivens in a new context or to a new class of defendants.” Hernandez, 589 U.S. at
102. One such special factor is the existence of alternative remedial structures. Egbert, 596 U.S.
at 493 (“If there are alternative remedial structures in place, that alone . . . is reason enough to limit
the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action.”). The existence of the Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which allows claims for certain intentional torts arising “out of the
acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. §
2680(h), provides an alternative remedy for Plaintiffs, who in fact have brought two FTCA claims
in their Complaint. Following the Supreme Court’s holding that expansion of Bivens is a
disfavored judicial activity, the existence of an alternative remedial structure militates in favor of
finding that the Court cannot extend Bivens to the new context presented here. Because the Court
cannot create a judicially fashioned remedy for Plaintiffs, the Complaint does not state a claim for
relief against Defendant Mitchell. Accordingly, the Court must grant his Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings under Rule 12(c), which, as noted above, is unopposed.
CONCLUSION
As there is no remedy available to Plaintiffs against Defendant Mitchell, the Court must
grant his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and dismiss Count I of the Complaint. Plaintiffs
have already voluntarily dismissed Count II of the Complaint. Doc. 14. There are therefore no
counts remaining against Defendant Mitchell. However, Defendants Mitchell and the United States
filed a joint Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 107]. The Court finds that Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment is moot with respect to the claims against Defendant Mitchell. The Court
Case 2:20-cv-01280-MV-JHR Document 157 Filed 03/27/26 Page 3 of 4

4
will address the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Counts III and IV of the
Complaint in a separate ruling. Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against
both Defendants Mitchell and the United States. Doc. 110. That Motion is also partially moot to
the extent that it relates to Defendant Mitchell’s liability.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Judgment on the pleadings [Doc.
106] is GRANTED, as follows: Claim I of the Complaint is dismissed, and Defendant Mitchell is
dismissed from this action.
ENTERED this 27th day of March 2026.
MARTHA VÁZQUEZ
Senior United States District Judge
Case 2:20-cv-01280-MV-JHR Document 157 Filed 03/27/26 Page 4 of 4