Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
LEONARDO JOBA PEREZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 1:26-cv-02012-KG-JFR
TODD W. BLANCHE, Attorney General
of the United States, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Robbenhaar’s Proposed Findings and
Recommended Disposition (“PFRD”), filed on September 1, 2026. Doc. 13. The PFRD notified
the parties of their ability to file objections within fourteen days, and that failure to do so waived
appellate review. Id. at 8. Petitioner, appearing pro se, filed timely objections on September 14,
2026 (“Petitioner’s Objections”). Doc. 15. The Government did not file any objections. Petitioner
has also filed a Supplemental Notice of Medical Records and Request for Expedited Release
(“Request for Expedited Release”). Doc. 14. That Motion is also before the Court.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3), the Court has conducted a de novo review of the record,
including all parts of the Magistrate Judge Robbenhaar’s PFRD to which Petitioner properly
objects. For the reasons below, the Court sustains Petitioner’s Objections to the PFRD and grants
the Petition. The Court denies Petitioner’s Request for Expedited Release.
I. Background
Petitioner Leonardo Joba Perez, a native citizen and national of Cuba, lawfully entered the
United States through Miami International Airport—a designated port of entry—on May 11, 2024,
pursuant to a prior grant of humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Doc. 6 at 1.
Petitioner’s term of parole was valid for one year and expired on June 12, 2025. Doc. 1 at 8; Doc. 6
Case 1:26-cv-02012-KG-JFR Document 16 Filed 10/09/26 Page 1 of 9

2
at 3. On January 31, 2026, Petitioner was arrested in St. Paul, Minnesota and served with a Notice
to Appear, alleging he was inadmissible because he did not possess a valid entry document under §
212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Doc. 6 at 3, 10, 16. Petitioner
remains in immigration custody and is currently detained at the Torrance County Detention Facility
in Estancia, New Mexico. Id. at 1, 3.
On June 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking immediate
release or, in the alternative, an individualized bond hearing. Id. at 4. The Court referred the matter
to Magistrate Judge Robbenhaar to recommend an ultimate disposition of the case. See Doc. 8. On
August 25, 2026, the Government filed a Status Report and attached a copy of the order of removal
(“Removal Order”) issued by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) on July 16, 2026. See Doc. 10. The
Removal Order indicated that Petitioner had reserved his right to appeal and that any appeal was
due on August 17, 23026. Id. at 6 (“Appeal Due: 8/17/2026”). In the Status Report, the
Government also stated the Removal Order “likely became [administratively] final on August 18,
2026,” but emphasized that it could not definitively determine the status of any appeal because the
system “can take approximately ten days to log appeals.” Id. at 1. On August 31, 2026, the
Government filed a Second Status Report, which stated that “[DHS] confirmed by email that an
appeal has not been filed[.]” Doc. 12 at 1. The Second Status Report also included a printout of
Petitioner’s immigration case in the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) Automated
Case Information System. Id. at 3–5.
Based on these facts, Magistrate Judge Robbenhaar proposed the following findings and
recommendations: (1) Petitioner’s Removal Order became administratively final on August 18,
2026; (2) Petitioner had been detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 for approximately two weeks since
the Removal Order became administratively final; (3) “Petitioner’s detention remains within the
ninety-day period of mandatory detention under § 1231(a)(2)(A), as well as the presumptively
Case 1:26-cv-02012-KG-JFR Document 16 Filed 10/09/26 Page 2 of 9

3
reasonable six-month period;” and (4) the Petition should be denied without prejudice. Doc. 15 at
7–8.
Petitioner filed timely objections to the PFRD on September 14, 2026.1 See Doc. 15 at 5–
21. Petitioner specifically objects to the finding that his order of removal became administratively
final on August 18, 2026. In support of this claim, Petitioner attached a copy of his Notice of
Appeal (Form EOIR-26), which is stamped received by the BIA on August 17, 2026. Id. at 12–25.
Although Petitioner concedes “this evidence was not before the Magistrate Judge at the time the
PFRD was entered on September 1, 2026,” he nonetheless asks this Court to consider it as “further
evidence” pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Id. at 5–6. The Government did not file any
objections.
II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical confinement[.]”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is available if a noncitizen is
“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.”
Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 687–88 (2001)).
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and its implementing regulations establish
distinct detention regimes. The detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings is governed
by two different INA provisions. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89 (2018). First, §
1225 governs noncitizens detained at a port of entry or shortly after entry, who are treated as
1 Petitioner’s filing is titled Notice of Filing Proof of Timely BIA Appeal in Response to the Court’s
Order for Second Status Report. Because this document contains specific objections to the PFRD,
see Doc. 15 at 5–21, the Court construes the filing as Petitioner’s Objections to the PFRD. See Hall
v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (“A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed
liberally[.]”).
Case 1:26-cv-02012-KG-JFR Document 16 Filed 10/09/26 Page 3 of 9

4
noncitizens “seeking admission into the country.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 140 (2020). With few exceptions, § 1225 “mandates detention and affords no bond
hearing.” Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. 2:25-cv-01031-KG-JFR, 2025 WL 3187432, at *1
(D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2025).
Second, § 1226(a) governs the detention of noncitizens who are “seeking admission” to the
United States. Under this statute, the detention of a noncitizen without a bond hearing violates their
right to due process under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Santillan
Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1237 (10th Cir. 2026) (holding that “noncitizens who entered the
United States and were thereafter detained in the interior of the country are usually subject to §
1226(a) (and thus eligible for bond), not § 1225(b)(2)(A)”).
Once a noncitizen is subject to final order of removal, their detention is governed by § 1231.
A removal order becomes administratively final upon the earlier of the noncitizen’s waiver of the
right to appeal, or the expiration of the time to appeal if no appeal is filed. 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a)-(c).
“[T]he Government ordinarily secures [a noncitizen]’s removal during” the 90 days after a removal
order becomes administratively final. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682; see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1).
During the 90-day “removal period,” the noncitizen is typically detained. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
682. After that, the Government may detain the noncitizen for as long as is “reasonably necessary”
to secure their removal. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
III. Analysis
The Court: (1) sustains Petitioner’s Objections to the PFRD; (2) concludes that § 1225(b)
governs Petitioner’s detention; and (3) orders the Government to provide Petitioner with an
individualized bond hearing.
Case 1:26-cv-02012-KG-JFR Document 16 Filed 10/09/26 Page 4 of 9

5
A. Petitioner’s Removal Order is not administratively final.
As a factual matter, the Court first finds that Petitioner’s Removal Order is not
administratively final. Here, the PFRD found that Petitioner’s Removal Order was administratively
final based on the Government’s understanding that “an appeal has not been filed[.]” Doc. 4 at 4;
see also Doc. 12 at 1. But the Notice of Appeal attached to Petitioner’s Objections—evidence that
was not before Magistrate Judge Robbenhaar at the time the PFRD was entered—compels a
different conclusion. See Doc. 15 at 12–25. This Notice of Appeal was also timely filed because it
is stamped as received by the BIA on August 17, 2026—the same day that Petitioner’s appeal was
due. Id. The Court therefore finds that Petitioner’s Removal Order is not administratively final and
further concludes that Petitioner’s detention is not governed by § 1231.
B. Petitioner is subject to detention under § 1225(b).
The Court next determines that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225(b). Parole does
not constitute an admission into the United States. See § 1182(d)(5)(A) (“[P]arole . . . shall not be
regarded as an admission of the [noncitizen] and . . . [after parole terminates] his case shall continue
to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United
States.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1.2. Thus, “[a]n alien detained under [§ 1225(b)] who is released from
detention pursuant to a grant of parole under [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)], and whose grant of parole is
subsequently terminated, is returned to custody under [§ 1225(b)] pending the completion of
removal proceedings.” Rincon v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 101, 109 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting Matter
of Q. Li, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 70 (BIA 2025)).
Here, Petitioner was paroled into the country for one year, until June 12, 2025. Doc. 1 at 8
(I-94); Doc. 15 at 22–29 (Removal Order stating that Petitioner was found inadmissible under
Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA). When his parole automatically terminated, Petitioner’s
Case 1:26-cv-02012-KG-JFR Document 16 Filed 10/09/26 Page 5 of 9

6
status therefore reverted to that of an applicant for admission and he became subject to the detention
provisions of § 1225(b).
C. The Due Process Clause Applies
Although Petitioner is subject to detention under § 1225(b), Petitioner also asserts that his
continued detention violates the Due Process Clause because he has acquired a protected liberty
interest. Doc. 1 at 3–4. The Court agrees. Courts analyze due process claims in two steps. First,
they evaluate whether a protected liberty interest exists, and second, whether the procedures used to
deprive that interest satisfy due process. Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1246, 1252 (D.N.M.
2025).
1. Petitioner has a cognizable liberty interest.
It is well-settled that the Due Process Clause grants protection to “all persons within the
territory of the United States.” Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies
at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
Protection under the Due Process Clause extends to noncitizens “whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Id. at 693. The Supreme Court has recognized that a
noncitizen physically present in the United States may acquire a cognizable liberty interest through
“substantial connections” here. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
(“[A]liens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United
States and developed substantial connections with this country.”); see also Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (holding that noncitizens have a “weighty” interest in their right “to stay and
live and work in this land of freedom” and to “rejoin . . . immediate family”).
Under these principles, Petitioner has established a protected liberty interest by residing in
the United States prior to his detention. See Doc. 1 at 2. His detention has severed those ties and
Case 1:26-cv-02012-KG-JFR Document 16 Filed 10/09/26 Page 6 of 9

7
deprived him of the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
718 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2. Under the Due Process Clause, a bond hearing is warranted.
Because the Due Process Clause affords Petitioner a protected liberty interest, the Court next
determines what process is due. In the immigration context, courts apply the framework established
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See, e.g., Landon, 459 U.S. at 34; Velasco Lopez v.
Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020); Hernandez v. Cremer, 913 F.2d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1990).
Under Mathews, the Court balances (1) “the private interest” affected; (2) “the risk of erroneous
deprivation” through the procedures used and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3)
“the Government’s interest,” including the fiscal and administrative burdens of additional
procedures. 424 U.S. at 335.
Turning to the first Mathews factor, the Court finds that Petitioner has a significant private
interest in remaining free from detention after living outside of physical custody. “Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at
the heart of the liberty that the [Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. As
mentioned above, Petitioner was free from physical custody before he was re-detained. His private
interest in freedom from arbitrary or unlawful physical custody is substantial.
The second Mathews factor also favors Petitioner. The risk of erroneous deprivation is high
because mandatory detention does not adequately protect his interest in freedom from arbitrary
physical restraint. Detention must “bear[ ] a reasonable relation to the purpose[s] for which the
individual was committed.” Id. at 690–91 (internal quotation marks omitted) (construing 8 U.S.C. §
1231 to avoid the constitutional concerns raised by indefinite detention). Yet § 1225(b) provides no
mechanism for determining whether detention is justified in light of Petitioner’s individual
circumstances. On the other hand, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under the statute.
Case 1:26-cv-02012-KG-JFR Document 16 Filed 10/09/26 Page 7 of 9

8
See Doc. 1 at 8; Doc. 15 at 22–29. Therefore, “the equities tip in favor of a bond hearing, rather
than release, where the Petitioner still bears the burden of showing why release on bond is
warranted in this case.” Mendibaev v. Lyons, No. 1:25-cv-01308-DHU-GBW, 2026 WL 917457, at
*7 (D.N.M. Apr. 4, 2026). This ensures Petitioner “is not erroneously deprived of his liberty
interest in release” while “recognizing that detention is mandated by the statute.” Id.
Finally, the third Mathews factor favors Petitioner. While the Government has a strong
interest in enforcing its immigration laws, its interest in detaining noncitizens absent an
individualized justification for doing so is low. Id. The Government previously determined that
Petitioner could pursue his immigration case while at liberty, and it has identified no material
change in circumstances that would justify a different conclusion today. The Court recognizes that
providing Petitioner a bond hearing necessarily entails an “administrative burden[].” See Mathews,
424 U.S. at 335. But “[c]ourts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is
relatively minimal.” Hilario M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det. Ctr., 2025 WL 1158841, at *9 (E.D.
Cal.) (citing cases). And because Petitioner’s removal proceedings will continue regardless of his
detention status, a bond hearing does not interfere with the Government’s “sovereign prerogative”
to decide which noncitizens to admit. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32. Nor does this Order affect the
Government’s authority to detain Petitioner after a final order of removal issues. See 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a). In sum, all three Mathews factors weigh in favor of Petitioner, and he is therefore entitled
to an individualized bond hearing.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court sustains Petitioner’s Objections to the PFRD, Doc. 13, and
grants the Petition, Doc. 1. The Court denies Petitioner’s Request for Expedited Release, Doc. 14.
The Court orders:
Case 1:26-cv-02012-KG-JFR Document 16 Filed 10/09/26 Page 8 of 9

9
1. Within fourteen (14) days of this Order, the Government shall provide Petitioner with an
individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge.
2. At the hearing, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that conditions of release would adequately address any risk of flight or danger to the
community.
3. If a bond hearing is not provided within fourteen (14) days, Petitioner shall be released
under the same conditions that governed his release immediately prior to detention.
4. Within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, the Government shall file a Status Report with
the Court to certify its compliance.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its authenticity,
please refer to the Digital File Stamp on the NEF
(Notice of Electronic Filing) accompanying this
document. Electronically filed documents can be
found on the Court’s PACER public access system.
Case 1:26-cv-02012-KG-JFR Document 16 Filed 10/09/26 Page 9 of 9