Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ALFREDO BECERRA-PAREDES,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 1:26-cv-0549 JB/DLM
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Alfredo Becerra-Paredes’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Becerra‑Paredes challenges the
legality of his continued detention, asserting that DHS is detaining him under the wrong statutory
provision in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and that his confinement
without any individualized custody determination violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. He also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
(TRO). (Doc. 2.) Having reviewed the record and relevant law, the undersigned recommends that
the Petition be GRANTED and the TRO be DENIED AS MOOT.1
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner Alfredo Becerra‑Paredes is a citizen and national of Mexico. (Docs. 1 at 8; 2 at
5; 9 at 2 (citing Doc. 9-1); 9-2 at 1.) He entered the United States without inspection in or about
2008 and has since lived in the interior. (See Docs. 1 at 6, 8; 9 at 2; 9-2 at 1.) Petitioner has no
criminal history. (See Docs. 1 at 8; 9-2 at 2.)
On or about January 9, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers
1 On February 25, 2026, Senior United States District Judge James O. Browning entered an Order of Reference
referring this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge “to conduct hearings, if warranted, including evidentiary
hearings, and to perform any legal analysis required to recommend to the Court an ultimate disposition of the case.”
(Doc. 5.)
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encountered and apprehended Petitioner as part of “Operation Metro Surge.” (See Docs. 1 at 6; 9
at 2 (citing Doc. 9-2).) Petitioner was subsequently served with a Notice to Appear charging him
as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as a noncitizen “present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled . . . .” (Docs. 1-1 at 2; 9-1 at 1.)
Since his arrest, Petition has remained continuously detained at the Cibola County
Correctional Center in Milan, New Mexico (Doc. 1 at 8–9; 1-1 at 2; 2 at 10; 9-1 at 1.) DHS records
reflect that Petitioner’s only known immigration history is a voluntary return issued by Border
Patrol on May 5, 2008. (Doc. 9-2 at 2.)
Petitioner asserts that he sought a custody redetermination hearing, but the Immigration
Judge declined jurisdiction based on DHS’s classification of him under § 1225(b). (See Doc. 1 at
12.) Respondents contend that Petitioner “did not proceed with the custody redetermination
hearing under § 1226,” citing “Exhibit D.” (Doc. 9 at 6.) There is no “Exhibit D” attached to the
response brief.
On February 24, 2026, Petitioner filed the present Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) He raises two claims: (1) that DHS is detaining him under the wrong
statutory provision in violation of the INA; and (2) that his continued detention without an
individualized custody determination violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
(See id. at 12–15.) Petitioner requests immediate release or, in the alternative, an order requiring
DHS to provide him a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days. (Id. at 15–16.)
Petitioner also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order seeking to prevent his
transfer outside the District and to require a prompt custody hearing. (See Doc. 2.) The Government
Respondents filed their response on March 10, 2026, arguing that Petitioner is properly detained
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under § 1225(b)(2)(A) as an “applicant for admission,” and that he failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.2 (See Doc. 9.) Petitioner did not file a Reply.
The matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
II. 	Legal Standard
Federal courts possess longstanding authority to review the legality of executive detention
through the writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 expressly authorizes courts to issue a writ of
habeas corpus when a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Tenth Circuit has recognized that “[c]hallenges to
immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388
F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
The fundamental purpose of a § 2241 habeas corpus proceeding is to allow a detainee to
challenge the legality of his custody and to secure release from unlawful detention. See
Palma‑Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). Because
Petitioner challenges the legality of his continued detention, his claim falls squarely within the
scope of § 2241.
No party has identified any factual dispute requiring an evidentiary hearing, and the issues
presented are purely legal and fully briefed. As such, the existing record is sufficient to resolve the
habeas petition.
2 Warden Respondents did not file a separate response. This is consistent with the standard practice in these § 2241
immigration‑detention cases, where wardens of private detention facilities either expressly join the federal
Respondents’ arguments or do not appear at all. Courts in this District have treated the federal Respondents’ position
as applying equally to the warden in such circumstances. See Duhan v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-0019 MIS/JFR, 2026 WL
266619, at *1 n.2 (D.N.M. Feb. 2, 2026) (citations omitted). The Government Respondents’ brief similarly states that
their arguments apply to the warden, notwithstanding a reference to the Torrance County Detention Facility rather
than Cibola County Correctional Center. (See Doc. 9 at 1 n.1.)
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III. 	Discussion
Petitioner argues that his continued detention is unlawful because DHS is detaining him
under the wrong statutory provision and because his prolonged confinement without any
individualized custody determination violates the Due Process Clause. (See Doc. 1 at 12–15.)
Respondents maintain that Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2) as an applicant for
admission and therefore subject to mandatory detention without bond. (See Doc. 9 at 1–2.)
For 	the 	reasons 	explained 	below, 	the 	undersigned 	concludes 	that 	§ 1226(a)—not
§ 1225(b)(2)—governs Petitioner’s custody. Because Petitioner has been detained for months
without any individualized custody review, his continued detention is unlawful under the INA and
the Fifth Amendment.
A. 	Detention Under § 1225 vs. § 1226
The detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal is governed by 8 U.S.C. §§
1225 and 1226. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–89 (2018). The statutory question
here is whether Petitioner—who entered the United States in or about 2008 and lived openly in the
interior since entry—is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2), a provision that applies only to
noncitizens “seeking admission,” or under § 1226(a), which governs the detention of noncitizens
already present in the United States and which provides for the possibility of a bond hearing. See
id. at 297, 303. For the reasons explained below, the undersigned concludes that § 1226—not
§ 1225—governs Petitioner’s detention.
Several courts in this District have recently examined the interaction between §§ 1225 and
1226 in cases involving noncitizens who entered unlawfully years before their later encounters
with immigration authorities. Respondents cite Singh v. Noem, No. 2:25‑cv‑1110 JB/KK, 2026
WL 146005 (D.N.M. Jan. 20, 2026), in support of their argument that § 1225(b)(2) applies to
Petitioner. (See Doc. 9 at 14–17.) Because Singh is the only decision from this District that
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Respondents invoke in their statutory analysis, and because it addresses the same statutory
provisions at issue here, the undersigned addresses it directly.
In Singh v. Noem, the court addressed the statutory basis for the federal government’s
detention of Singh, a noncitizen who entered the United States unlawfully in September 2023 and
was re-detained in September 2025 while traveling through a United States Border Patrol
checkpoint in New Mexico. Singh, 2026 WL 146005, at *35. The court explained that Singh was
never lawfully admitted or paroled into the United States, and therefore he is deemed an “applicant
for admission.” Id. at *14 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). Despite arguments that Singh’s
subsequent detention must fall under § 1226(a), entitling him to a bond hearing, the court
concluded that Singh’s detention was governed by § 1225(b)(2), which mandates detention and
does not require a bond hearing. See id. at *33.
The Singh court began by analyzing whether § 1225(b)(1), the expedited removal
provision, applies to Singh. Id. at *35. Although Singh had been present in the United States for
less than two years at the time of his re-detention and had not been admitted or paroled, the court
found 	that 	§ 1225(b)(1) 	did 	not 	apply 	because 	immigration 	officers 	charged 	him 	under
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), rather than the specific inadmissibility grounds, §§ 1182(a)(6)(C) or (a)(7),
required for expedited removal. Id. The court noted that DHS’s choice of inadmissibility ground
appeared intentional and that, regardless of Singh’s factual eligibility, the statutory prerequisites
for § 1225(b)(1) were not satisfied. Id.
Having determined that § 1225(b)(1) did not apply, the court turned to § 1225(b)(2), which
functions as a catchall provision for applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1). See id.
at *18, *34. The court emphasized that § 1225(b)(2) applies only to aliens who are both “applicants
for admission” and “seeking admission,” and it rejected the government’s argument that the two
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terms are synonymous. Id. at *35. The court also rejected the contention that “seeking admission”
applies only to arriving aliens at the border. Id. Instead, the court interpreted “seeking admission”
as an active process that can occur inside the United States when an alien who has not been
admitted seeks lawful status—“an alien must request admission into the United States.” Id.
Applying that interpretation, the court concluded that Singh was “seeking admission”
because he filed an asylum application after entering the United States unlawfully. Id. After
entering unlawfully on September 15, 2023—but before his second and operative detainment on
September 4, 2025—Singh submitted an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degreading
Treatment or Punishment. Id. at *36. The court further observed that Singh’s pending asylum
proceedings demonstrated that he had been found to have a credible fear of persecution, which
placed him squarely within the detention framework of § 1225(b). Id. The court relied on 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.3(c)(2), which provides that asylum applicants who have been found to have credible fear
“shall be detained” under § 1225(b). Id. The court thus concluded that Singh’s asylum application
did not shift him into § 1226(a) detention but instead reinforced that § 1225(b)(2) governed his
custody. Id.
The court also noted that immigration officers determined Singh was not “clearly and
beyond a doubt . . . entitled to be admitted,” a statutory requirement for detention under
§ 1225(b)(2). Id. at *35 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)). Singh admitted to unlawful entry, had a
pending removal case, and sought relief from removal; thus, the court concluded that he could not
meet the “clearly and beyond a doubt” standard. Id. Ultimately, the court held that Singh was
properly detained under § 1225(b)(2), not § 1226(a). Id. Because § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention
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without the possibility of a bond hearing, the court denied Singh’s request for release or a bond
hearing. Id. at *33.
To begin, Petitioner in this case, as in Singh, entered without inspection and was never
admitted or paroled. (See Doc. 1 at 6, 8, 11.) He is therefore an “applicant for admission” under
§ 1225(a)(1). See Singh, 2026 WL 146005, at *14 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)).
Second, § 1225(b)(1) does not apply here. Petitioner is currently detained based on his
January 2026 arrest. (Docs. 1 at 6, 10–11; 9 at 2; 9-2 at 1–2.) By that time, he had been in the
United States for almost two decades, placing him well outside the two‑year statutory window
during 	which 	DHS 	may 	designate 	certain 	noncitizens 	for 	expedited 	removal 	under
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Moreover, as in Singh, DHS charged
Petitioner under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), rather than charging him under § 1182(a)(6)(C) or §
1182(a)(7), the only inadmissibility grounds that trigger § 1225(b)(1). (See Doc. 9-1 at 1.) Thus,
the statutory prerequisites for § 1225(b)(1) are not met.
Third, because Petitioner has not taken any action that constitutes “seeking admission,”
§ 1225(b)(2) does not apply. As explained in Singh, “seeking admission” requires an active request
for lawful admission—“an alien must request admission into the United States.” Singh, 2026 WL
146005, at *35. Petitioner here has made no such request. Unlike in Singh, the record contains no
fact or allegation that Petitioner has filed an asylum application, a visa application, or any other
affirmative request for lawful admission. He is defending against removal, but he is not
affirmatively seeking admission. Respondents’ position—that all non‑admitted noncitizens are
“seeking admission”—is the precise interpretation Singh rejected. (See Doc. 9 at 14–17.) See also
Singh, 2026 WL 146005, at *35 (noting that “[t]his argument improperly equates the term
‘applicant for admission’ and ‘alien seeking admission’”).
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Petitioner notes that he intends to pursue Non-Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR)
Cancellation of Removal under INA § 240A(b). (See Doc. 1 at 8–9.) The record, however, contains
no evidence that he has filed an application for cancellation, and a stated intention to seek such
relief does not amount to “seeking admission.” Moreover, as Singh explains, “seeking admission”
requires an affirmative request for lawful entry or lawful status. See 2026 WL 146005, at *35.
Non‑LPR cancellation is the opposite: it is a defensive form of relief available only to noncitizens
already in removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (relief available only after DHS has
initiated removal proceedings, confirming its defensive nature).3 Thus, even if Petitioner
ultimately files for cancellation, that action would not transform him into an alien “seeking
admission” for purposes of § 1225(b)(2).
Because neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) applies, detention defaults to § 1226(a). This
is the statutory structure Singh adopts: § 1226(a) governs detention of noncitizens who are not
subject to either § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2). Id. at *33–36; see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287–
89 (explaining that §§ 1225(b) and 1226 create separate detention tracks and that § 1226(a) governs
when § 1225(b) does not apply).
Under the framework articulated in Singh, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a),
not § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner is therefore entitled to an individualized bond hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker.
Similarly, in Cortez‑Gonzalez v. Noem, where a noncitizen had lived in the United States
for nearly her entire life with no criminal history and was later arrested in the interior and charged
under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), the court rejected DHS’s attempt to classify her detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Cortez-Gonzalez v. Noem, 811 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1295–97 (D.N.M. 2025).
3 INA § 240A(b), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). See Velasco v. Holder, 736 F.3d 944, 945 (10th Cir. 2013) (“§ 240A
of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b”).
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The court explained that § 1225(b)(2) applies only when a noncitizen is both an “applicant for
admission” and “seeking admission,” and that long‑term residents who have taken no affirmative
steps to request lawful admission are not “seeking admission” within the meaning of the statute.
Id. at 1296–97. Because the statutory prerequisites for § 1225(b)(2) were not met, the court held
that detention defaulted to § 1226(a). Id. at 1297. The same reasoning applies here: Petitioner has
lived in the United States for years, was charged under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and has made no
affirmative request for admission. As in Cortez‑Gonzalez, DHS’s reliance on § 1225(b)(2) is
inconsistent with the statutory text, and § 1226(a) governs his detention.
B. 	Due Process Claim
Petitioner also argues that his continued detention without any individualized custody
determination violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (See Doc. 1 at 13–15.)
Because the undersigned concludes that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention, the Court must
also consider the due process that accompanies detention under that provision. Section 1226(a)
itself contemplates individualized custody determinations, and Respondents acknowledge that if
§ 1226(a) applies, “the appropriate relief would be a bond review . . . .” (Doc. 9 at 2.) This
concession aligns with the consistent holdings of courts in this District: when a noncitizen is
detained under § 1226(a), due process requires an individualized custody determination.
As a preliminary matter, the undersigned notes that “the Due Process Clause applies to all
‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (citations omitted).
Courts in this District have repeatedly applied these principles to hold that noncitizens
detained under § 1226(a) are entitled to an individualized bond hearing. In Cortez-Gonzalez, the
court concluded that because § 1226(a) controlled the petitioner’s detention, she was “entitled—
as a right—to an individualized bond hearing[,]” and that her continued detention without such
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review constituted “an ongoing violation of her right to due process.” 811 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1298
(D.N.M. 2025) (citing Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1240–41 (D.N.M.
2025)). Similarly, in Gonzalez Ramos v. Dedos, the court concluded that a noncitizen who had
lived in the United States for decades was not “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and
therefore that § 1226(a) controlled; because of that, the petitioner was “entitled to an individualized
bond hearing before an [Immigration Judge,]” at which the government bore the burden of
justifying continued detention. No. 1:25-cv-0975 MLG/KRS, 2025 WL 3653928, at * 4–5 (D.N.M.
Dec. 17, 2025) (citations omitted). And in Munoz Teran v. Bondi, the court again held that
§ 1226(a) governed the detention of a long‑term resident arrested in the interior, and ordered a
bond hearing because the petitioner had been detained “without an opportunity to post bond or
request a conditional release . . . .” No. 2:25-cv-1218 KWR/SCY, 2026 WL 161527, at *1, 6
(D.N.M. Jan. 21, 2026).
These decisions reflect a uniform principle: when § 1226(a) applies, due process requires
an individualized custody determination before the government may deprive a noncitizen of
physical liberty. See Velasquez Salazar, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1241 (citing Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft,
797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 784–85 (E.D. Mich. 2025)) (“[T]he due process owed to Petitioner is that
provided for in § 1226—namely, an individualized bond hearing before an IJ.”).
Petitioner has never received such a determination. ICE arrested him in the interior of the
United States and has detained him without any showing that he poses a danger or flight risk. The
government’s failure to make that threshold determination—and its continued detention of
Petitioner without a bond hearing—creates precisely the “risk of an erroneous deprivation” that
due process forbids. See Lopez‑Romero v. Lyons, No. 2:25-cv-1113 MIS/JHR, 2026 WL 92873,
at *6 (D.N.M. Jan. 13, 2026) (considering Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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Petitioner’s 	continued 	detention 	without 	any 	individualized 	custody 	determination
therefore violates the Due Process Clause.4
C. 	Disposition of the Habeas Petition
For the reasons explained above, Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and has
never received the individualized custody determination that the statute and the Due Process
Clause require. Habeas relief is therefore warranted. The undersigned recommends that the Court
order DHS to provide Petitioner with a prompt bond hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge.
Consistent with Castillo v. De Anda‑Ybarra, the undersigned does not recommend altering the
default burden of proof applicable at a § 1226(a) bond hearing. See No. 2:25‑cv‑1074 JB/JFR,
2026 WL 370497, at *41–42 (D.N.M. Feb. 10, 2026).
D. 	Disposition of Petitioner’s TRO
In his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Petitioner
seeks to prevent his transfer and to obtain a prompt bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator. (See
Doc. 2 at 1–2, 12.) Because the relief he seeks in the TRO is duplicative of the relief he seeks in
the Petition, granting the Petition will moot the TRO.
E. 	Administrative Exhaustion
In their March 10, 2026 Response, Respondents contend that Petitioner “fail[ed] to exhaust
[his] administrative remedies” by “not proc[eeding] with a custody redetermination hearing . . . .”
(See Doc. 9 at 6.) That argument is misplaced. Respondents cite “Exhibit D,” but no such exhibit
4 Petitioner includes a brief Administrative Procedure Act (APA) theory within Count II, asserting that DHS’s
continued detention without a bond hearing is “arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law.” (See Doc. 1 at
13–15.) He does not plead a standalone APA claim. Respondents address the APA theory as if it were an independent
cause of action. (See Doc. 9 at 7–8.) To the extent Petitioner seeks relief under the APA, courts in this District have
held that an individualized detention determination—such as DHS’s classification of a detainee under § 1225(b)(2) or
its refusal to provide a bond hearing—is not “final agency action” within the meaning of the APA. See Gamez Lira v.
De Anda‑Ybarra, No. 1:25-cv-0885 WJ/KK, 2025 WL 2581710, at *4 (D.N.M. June 6, 2025) (citing Hamilton v.
Gonzales, 485 F.3d 564, 569 (10th Cir. 2007); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)). Accordingly, the APA provides no independent
basis for relief.
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appears in the record.5 The only relevant attachment—Exhibit C—reflects a “master immigration
hearing” scheduled for March 31, 2026, more than three weeks after Respondents filed their
response. (See Doc. 9‑3.) Respondents cannot fault Petitioner for failing to attend a hearing that
had not yet occurred, and in any event a master calendar hearing is not a custody redetermination
hearing.
Moreover, exhaustion is not required where the agency has predetermined the outcome or
where the administrative process is incapable of providing the relief sought. Neither the INA nor
§ 2241 expressly imposes a statutory exhaustion requirement for noncitizens challenging the
legality of their detention. See Pu Sacvin v. De Anda‑Ybarra, No. 2:25-cv-1031 KG/JFR, 2025 WL
3187432, at 1–2 (D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2025) (explaining that § 2241 imposes no statutory exhaustion
requirement and that exhaustion is futile where IJs lack authority to grant a bond hearing).
Although the Tenth Circuit applies an exhaustion requirement in § 2241 cases, it recognizes a
“narrow exception” where exhaustion would be futile. See Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1203–
04 (10th Cir. 2010)).
To be sure, here, exhaustion is futile. Petitioner alleges—and Respondents do not dispute—
that he has never been afforded any opportunity to seek bond. (See Doc. 1 at 12.) ICE explicitly
informed him that he was “not eligible for bond[,]” and the custody determination section of the
I‑213 reflects that “[n]o bond was recommended . . . .” (See Doc. 9‑2 at 3.) Petitioner further alleges
that the Immigration Judge declined to conduct a custody redetermination hearing based solely on
DHS’s classification of him under § 1225(b). (See Doc. 1 at 12.) Respondents’ own briefing
confirms that they maintain noncitizens DHS has classified under § 1225(b)(2)(A) are subject to
mandatory detention and therefore not entitled to bond hearings under § 1226(a). (See Doc. 9 at
5 Respondents also devote several pages of their response to arguing that Petitioner cannot obtain habeas relief based
on an allegedly unlawful arrest. (See Doc. 9 at 10–14.) Petitioner raises no such claim.
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16–19.) Petitioner also alleges that immigration judges nationwide have been instructed to treat as
binding the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. &
N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), and to deny bond requests from individuals DHS has placed in
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 12.) Under that framework, any request by Petitioner for
a bond hearing would have been automatically denied for lack of jurisdiction.
Courts in this District have consistently held that Hurtado renders exhaustion futile in
precisely these circumstances. See, e.g., Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *2 (exhaustion futile
where IJ lacked jurisdiction under Hurtado); Francisco v. Dedos, No. 1:25-cv-1229 MIS/GJF,
2026 WL 145456, at *7–8 (D.N.M. Jan. 20, 2026), R&R adopted, 2026 WL 300319 (D.N.M. Feb.
4, 2026) (same). As these courts have recognized, requiring a petitioner to pursue a remedy the
agency has already declared unavailable would serve no purpose and would only delay judicial
review. Because the administrative process could not have provided Petitioner any avenue for
release, habeas review is both appropriate and necessary.
F. 	Effect of the Maldonado Bautista Declaratory Judgment
Petitioner also argues that, as a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado
Bautista v. Santacruz, he is entitled to release or a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (See
Doc. 1 at 2–7 (discussing Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-1873 SSS/BFM, 2025
WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025), reconsideration granted in part, Bautista v. Santacruz,
813 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2025), and amended and superseded on reconsideration, Bautista
v. Santacruz, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2025), judgment entered sub nom., Maldonado
Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-1873 SSS/BFM, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025)),
13.) The declaratory judgment in Maldonado Bautista held that class members are “detained under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and thus may not be denied consideration for release on bond under §
1225(b)(2)(A).” (See id. at 3 (citing Maldonado Bautista, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11).)
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So far, courts in this District have declined to treat Maldonado Bautista as controlling in
habeas cases brought by detainees confined in New Mexico. In Aguilar v. Bondi, the court held
that Maldonado Bautista “has no impact” on the habeas analysis because habeas jurisdiction lies
only in the district of confinement. See Aguilar v. Bondi, No. 1:25‑cv‑0996 KWR/KK, 2026 WL
84520, at *6 n.3 (D.N.M. Jan. 12, 2026) (citation omitted); see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S.
426, 443 (2004). In Garcia Sanchez v. Noem, the court expressly declined to engage Maldonado
Bautista because § 1226(a) independently governed the petitioner’s detention. See Garcia Sanchez
v. Noem, No. 1:25‑cv‑1219 KG/JFR, 2026 WL 266464, at *1 n.1 (D.N.M. Feb. 2, 2026). And in
Ramirez v. Noem, the court found Maldonado Bautista “persuasive” but not binding and resolved
the statutory question through an independent analysis of §§ 1225 and 1226. See Ramirez v. Noem,
--- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 2:26‑cv‑0063 SMD/GJF, 2026 WL 381869, at *6–7 (D.N.M. Feb. 11,
2026).
Consistent with these decisions, the Court should not treat Maldonado Bautista as binding
in this habeas action. The statutory question presented here—whether Petitioner’s detention is
governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a)—is resolved by the statutory text and the case law in
this District. Because § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention independent of Maldonado
Bautista, the Court need not reach the effect of the declaratory judgment.
G. 	EAJA Attorney Fees
Petitioner’s prayer for relief in habeas petition includes a request for “attorney’s fees and
costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412[.]” (Doc. 1 at
16.) The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) provides that:
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred
by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including
proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United
States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the
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position 	of 	the 	United 	States 	was 	substantially 	justified 	or 	that 	special
circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
The Tenth Circuit has confirmed that the EAJA “unambiguously authorize[s] fees in
habeas actions challenging immigration detention.” Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir.
2025).
At this stage, however, Petitioner’s request is premature. A party becomes eligible to seek
EAJA fees only after entry of a final judgment, and an EAJA motion does not ripen until the time
for appeal has expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G); see also Melkonyan v. Sullivan,
501 U.S. 89, 96 (1991). Because no final judgment has been entered, Petitioner is not yet a
prevailing party for EAJA purposes.
Even if the request were ripe, the undersigned would recommend denying EAJA fees
because the government’s position was substantially justified. “The test for substantial justification
is . . . ‘one of reasonableness in law and fact.’” Garcia‑Lopez, 2026 WL 524082, at *35 (quoting
Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007)). The government’s position is
substantially justified if it is “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Id.
(quoting Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1172.) A position may be substantially justified even if it is
ultimately incorrect. Id. (quoting Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1172). And substantial justification exists
where reasonable people could disagree about the appropriateness of the government’s action. Id.
(citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)).
Applying that standard, Judge Browning held that the government’s position was
substantially justified where the relevant legal question was unsettled, courts across the country
had reached conflicting conclusions, and at least one Court of Appeals had adopted the
government’s view. Id. at *36. The same is true here. The central statutory question—whether
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detention in these circumstances is governed by § 1225 or § 1226—remains unsettled, and courts
have reached conflicting conclusions. As the court in Garcia‑Lopez points out, several district
courts have adopted the government’s interpretation. See, e.g., Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 802 F.
Supp. 3d 1132 (D. Neb. 2025); Chavez v. Noem, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2025); Mejia
Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-0168 JMD, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025). And the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits have likewise embraced the government’s view. See Buenrostro-Mendez
v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). At the
same time, the Seventh Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. See Castanon‑Nava v. DHS,
161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025). Given this unsettled landscape, the government’s position had a
reasonable basis in law and fact.
Accordingly, even if Petitioner were eligible to seek EAJA fees at this stage, the
undersigned would recommend denying such fees because the government’s position was
substantially justified.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the following:
1. 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) should be GRANTED, because
Petitioner’s continued detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act and
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2. 	Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
(Doc. 2) should be DENIED AS MOOT in light of the full relief recommended
herein.
3. 	The 	Court 	should 	ORDER 	Respondents 	to 	provide 	Petitioner 	with 	an
individualized bond hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge within seven days
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of the Court’s order, and to file a status report within ten days confirming that the
hearing has occurred.
4. 	If no bond hearing is held within seven days, the Court should ORDER Petitioner’s
immediate release unless and until the Government demonstrates that continued
detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
5. 	The Court should retain jurisdiction to consider any future motion for attorney’s
fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
THE PARTIES ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT WITHIN 14 DAYS OF SERVICE of a
copy of these Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition they may file written objections
with the Clerk of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party must file any
objections with the Clerk of the District Court within the 14-day period if that party wants
to have appellate review of the proposed findings and recommended disposition. If no
objections are filed, no appellate review will be allowed.
_______________________________________
DAMIAN L. MARTINEZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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