Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ALFEO OROZCO AGUILAR,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-410-KG-LF
TODD LYONS, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Alfeo Orozco Aguilar’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Doc. 1, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 12. Following a hearing, the Court issued
a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) directing the Government to release Petitioner. See
Doc. 10. The TRO expires on March 26, 2026. The Court acknowledges that Petitioner has not
filed a reply—he may submit any objections to this Order. For the reasons below, the Court
grants the petition.
I. Background
Petitioner is a Guatemalan citizen who entered the United States in 2005 without
inspection. Doc. 5 at 3. He resides in Florida. Id. at 2. He is married and his wife suffers from
Type 1 diabetes and he has at least one citizen child. Id. at 3. In July 2025, ICE agents arrested
Petitioner when picking up his co-worker’s vehicle in Florida. Id. at 2. Petitioner is currently
detained at Torrance County Detention Center in New Mexico. Id. at 1.
Petitioner contends that his continued detention violates the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”) and the Due Process Clause. See id. at 4–5. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus
requiring the Government to release him unless it provides a bond hearing. Doc. 1 at 12. The
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Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) requiring the Government to release
Petitioner on February 26, 2026. Doc. 10.
II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical
confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is
available if a noncitizen is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
III. Analysis
For the reasons below, the Court concludes that (A) 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs Petitioner’s
detention, (B) Petitioner’s detention violates his right to due process, and (C) the proper remedy
is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof.
A. Section 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) establishes distinct detention regimes
depending on whether a noncitizen is “seeking admission” to the United States. See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89 (2018). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to “applicant[s] for
admission” who are “seeking admission” and “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” The “provision mandates detention and affords no bond hearing.” Pu Sacvin v. De
Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL 3187432, at *1 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). By contrast, § 1226(a)
authorizes the arrest and detention, “on a warrant issued by the Attorney General,” of noncitizens
“pending a decision on whether [they are] to be removed.” Noncitizens “detained under this
second detention regime are entitled to individualized bond hearings at the outset of detention.”
Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *1.
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Consistent with the overwhelming majority of district courts to consider the issue and this
Court’s prior findings, the Court finds that § 1226 governs here. See Barco Mercado v. Francis,
2025 WL 3295903, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.) (collecting 362 district-court opinions nationwide and
noting that challengers prevailed in at least 350 of them, in decisions by over 160 judges across
fifty courts); Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432 (Gonzales, J.); Danierov v. Noem, 2026 WL 45288,
at *2 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). Section 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as a
noncitizen “who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” In contrast,
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s detention mandate applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission” (emphasis
added). Noncitizens “seeking admission” are those who have not “effected an entry” into the
United States. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Noncitizens “who entered the
country years earlier” are not “seeking admission,” and therefore fall under § 1226 rather than
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3. The Court acknowledges the recent Fifth
Circuit decision holding that “[w]hile [noncitizens] remain applicants” for admission, “they
are...seeking admission.” Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330, at *5
(5th Cir.). However, the Tenth Circuit has not yet addressed this question.
Under this framework, § 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention. ICE arrested him decades
after initial entry into the United States and did not apprehend him at or near the border. Doc. 10
at 1. Accordingly, § 1225’s mandatory detention provision does not apply because Petitioner
effected an entry into the United States by living here for more than two decades. Pu Sacvin,
2025 WL 3187432, at *3.
B. Petitioner’s detention violates his right to due process.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: first, whether there exists “a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause,” and second, whether the procedures used to
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deprive that interest “accord with the Constitution.” Domingo v. Castro, 2025 WL 2941217, at
*3 (D.N.M.).
Here, Petitioner has a protected liberty interest. After residing in the United States,
noncitizens acquire “a protectable liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”
Danierov, 2026 WL 45288, at *2. Petitioner’s prior release allowed “him to do a wide range of
things,” including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other
enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
Petitioner was also entitled to procedural safeguards before he was detained. In determining
what process is due, courts consider (1) “the private interest” affected; (2) “the risk of erroneous
deprivation” through the procedures used and the probable value of additional safeguards; and
(3) “the Government’s interest,” including the fiscal and administrative burdens of additional
procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
To start, Petitioner’s private interest in remaining free from detention is substantial.
“Freedom from imprisonment...lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause
protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (2001).
There is also a significant risk of erroneous deprivation. Courts require “a material
change in circumstances as to whether the noncitizen poses a danger to the community or an
unreasonable risk of flight” before DHS revokes a noncitizen’s freedom. Danierov, 2026 WL
45288, at *2. No assessment was made as to whether any material facts had changed, creating a
substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of his liberty interest.
Finally, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without a hearing is limited
and the administrative burden of providing a bond hearing is minimal. See Danierov, 2026 WL
45288, at *2 (the “cost of providing a bond determination is not terribly burdensome”).
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C. The remedy is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof.
The proper habeas remedy is a prompt bond hearing at which the Government must
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the
community. Although “under normal circumstances, the burden” at a § 1226 hearing “is on the
noncitizen” to show that detention is unwarranted, Petitioner’s “unlawful detention in violation
of his constitutional rights shifts that burden to the Government.” Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432,
at *3. A noncitizen’s “strong private interest in being free from civil detention” outweighs the
Government’s “comparatively minimal burden to justify custody.” Id.
IV. Conclusion
The Court grants Mr. Orozco Aguilar’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1.
Because the Court already directed the Government to release Petitioner, it now enjoins the
Government from re-detaining him unless it provides an individualized bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge under § 1226(a).
The Government shall file a status report within ten business days of this Order
confirming that it has provided him with a bond hearing or, alternatively, that he remains at
liberty.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its
authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
Filing) accompanying this document.
Electronically filed documents can be found
on the Court’s PACER public access
system.
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