Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
YAOVI TINTIN DONOUVO,
Petitioner,
v. No. 1:26-cv-00192-KG-KK
PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Yaovi Tintin Donouvo’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Doc. 1, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 6. Because Mr. Donouvo’s challenge
presents a purely legal question, the Court declines to hold a hearing, see 28 U.S.C. § 2243, and
grants his petition for the reasons below.
I. Background
Mr. Donouvo, a native and citizen of Togo, entered the United States in 2022. Doc. 1 at
7. Upon entry, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained him, initiated removal
proceedings, and released him on his own recognizance. Id. In 2025, an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) denied “his application for relief.” Id. at 8. Mr. Donouvo’s appeal of that decision
remains pending. Id. For the past four years, Mr. Donouvo has remained compliant with all
conditions of release. Id. at 8. He has no criminal record and resides in Minnesota. Id. at 4, 8.
On January 20, 2026, ICE agents arrested Mr. Donouvo. Id. at 8. He remains detained at
the Torrence County Detention Facility in New Mexico. Id. Mr. Donouvo contends that his
detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 22–25. He further alleges that ICE agents violated his Fourth
Amendment rights in arresting him without a warrant. Id. at 26–28.
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II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical
confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is
available if a noncitizen is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687.
III. Analysis
For the reasons below, the Court finds that (A) 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs Mr. Donouvo’s
detention, (B) Mr. Donouvo’s detention violates his right to due process, and (C) the proper
remedy is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof.
A. Section 1226 governs Mr. Donouvo’s detention.
The INA establishes distinct detention regimes depending on whether a noncitizen is
“seeking admission” to the United States. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89
(2018). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to “applicant[s] for admission” who are “seeking
admission” and “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” The “provision
mandates detention and affords no bond hearing.” Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL
3187432, at *1 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). By contrast, § 1226(a) authorizes the arrest and
detention, “on a warrant issued by the Attorney General,” of noncitizens “pending a decision on
whether [they are] to be removed.” Noncitizens “detained under” § 1226(a) “are entitled to
individualized bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *1.
Consistent with the overwhelming majority of district courts to consider the issue and this
Court’s prior findings, the Court finds that § 1226 governs here. See Barco Mercado v. Francis,
2025 WL 3295903, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.) (collecting 362 district-court opinions nationwide and
noting that challengers prevailed in at least 350 of them, in decisions by over 160 judges across
fifty courts); Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432 (Gonzales, J.); Danierov v. Noem, 2026 WL 45288,
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at *2 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). Section 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as a
noncitizen “who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” In contrast,
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s detention mandate applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission” (emphasis
added). Noncitizens “seeking admission” are those who have not “effected an entry” into the
United States. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Noncitizens “who entered the
country years earlier” are not “seeking admission,” and therefore fall under § 1226 rather than
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3. The Court acknowledges the recent Fifth
Circuit decision holding that “[w]hile [noncitizens] remain applicants” for admission, “they
are...seeking admission.” Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330, at *5
(5th Cir.). However, the Tenth Circuit has not yet addressed this question.
Under this framework, § 1226 governs Mr. Donouvo’s detention. ICE arrested him four
years after his initial entry into the United States and did not apprehend him at or near the border.
Doc. 1 at 7–8. Accordingly, § 1225’s mandatory detention provision does not apply because Mr.
Donouvo effected an entry into the United States by living here for four years years. Pu Sacvin,
2025 WL 3187432, at *3.
B. Mr. Donouvo’s detention violates his right to due process.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: first, whether there exists “a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause,” and second, whether the procedures used to
deprive that interest “accord with the Constitution.” Domingo v. Castro, 2025 WL 2941217, at
*3 (D.N.M.). Here, Mr. Donouvo has a protected liberty interest. After the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) releases a noncitizen on their own recognizance, they acquire “a
protectable liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.” Danierov, 2026 WL 45288, at
*2. Mr. Donouvo’s prior release allowed “him to do a wide range of things,” including to live at
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home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of
normal life.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
Mr. Donouvo was also entitled to procedural safeguards before he was redetained. In
determining what process is due, courts consider (1) “the private interest” affected; (2) “the risk
of erroneous deprivation” through the procedures used and the probable value of additional
safeguards; and (3) “the Government’s interest,” including the fiscal and administrative burdens
of additional procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To start, Mr.
Donouvo’s private interest in remaining free from detention is substantial. “Freedom from
imprisonment...lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
There is also a significant risk of erroneous deprivation. Courts require “a material
change in circumstances as to whether the noncitizen poses a danger to the community or an
unreasonable risk of flight” before DHS revokes a noncitizen’s freedom. Danierov, 2026 WL
45288, at *2. Mr. Donouvo was redetained after four years without a bond hearing. Doc. 2 at 3.
No assessment was made as to whether any material facts had changed, creating a substantial
risk of erroneous deprivation of his liberty interest.
Finally, the Government’s interest in detaining Mr. Donouvo without a hearing is
limited. The Government has a legitimate interest in securing Mr. Donouvo’s appearance at
immigration proceedings. However, detention has been unnecessary to secure that interest to
this point. For the past four years, Mr. Donouvo has remained compliant with his conditions of
release. Doc. 1 at 8. Moreover, the administrative burden of providing a bond hearing is
minimal. See Danierov, 2026 WL 45288, at *2 (the “cost of providing a bond determination is
not terribly burdensome”).
C. The remedy is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof.
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The proper habeas remedy is a prompt bond hearing at which the Government must
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. Donouvo is a flight risk or danger to the
community. Although “under normal circumstances, the burden” at a § 1226 hearing “is on the
noncitizen” to show that detention is unwarranted, Mr. Donouvo’s “unlawful detention in
violation of his constitutional rights shifts that burden to the Government.” Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL
3187432, at *3. A noncitizen’s “strong private interest in being free from civil detention”
outweighs the Government’s “comparatively minimal burden to justify custody.” Id.
IV. Conclusion
The Court therefore grants Mr. Donouvo’s petition, Doc. 1. The Court orders that the
Government provide him with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) before an IJ within seven days of
this Order. At that hearing, the Government must justify Mr. Donouvo’s detention by clear and
convincing evidence. If the Government fails to provide a bond hearing within that timeframe, it
must release Mr. Donouvo.
The Court further orders the Government to file a status report within ten days of this
Order confirming that it has provided Mr. Donouvo with a bond hearing or released him.
IT IS SO ORDERED
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its
authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
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Electronically filed documents can be found
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