Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
___________________________
JUAN LAMAS AGUILAR,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK
TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity as
Acting Attorney General of the United States,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, Field Office Director,
JAMIE RAYE CARNES, Warden of Torrance County Detention Center,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS UNDER THE EAJA
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Opposed Motion for Attorneys’
Fees and Costs Under the EAJA (Doc. 29). In accordance with the Court’s Memorandum Opinion
and Order granting habeas relief (Doc. 26), Petitioner seeks attorneys’ fees and costs under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Having reviewed the briefings, exhibits, and relevant law,
the Court finds that the Motion is well-taken because the Government has failed to meet its burden.
Petitioner’s motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
In July 2025, Petitioner Juan Lamas Aguilar, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers in New Mexico when he reported to his
parole officer for a misdemeanor offense. Doc. 29 at 2. Despite residing in the United States for
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 34 Filed 04/21/26 Page 1 of 8

2
more than 16 years, Petitioner was arrested and detained without a bond hearing because
Respondents1 classified his detention as mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) rather than
discretionary under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id.
In October 2025, Petitioner sought habeas relief, requesting that the Court release him from
custody or order a bond hearing. Id. at 3; Doc. 1 (Petition). Additionally, he requested that the
Court award attorneys’ fees and costs under the EAJA. Doc. 1 at 17. In November, Respondents
filed a motion to dismiss. Doc. 11.
On January 12, 2026, the Court granted the petition and dismissed the motion. Doc. 27
(Judgment). The Court declined to accept Respondents’ statutory interpretation of §§ 1225 and
1226 and found that § 1225(b)(2)(A) was limited to noncitizens “seeking admission”; § 1226(a)
governed the detention of noncitizens residing in the United States. Doc. 26 at 9 (Memorandum
Opinion and Order). Because Petitioner had been residing in the United States for more than a
decade and was not seeking admission at the time of his arrest, his detention was governed by the
discretionary detention procedures under § 1226(a). Id. at 12. Accordingly, Petitioner was entitled
to an individualized bond hearing. Id. The Court further determined that Petitioner may pursue
attorneys’ costs and fees under the EAJA. Id. at 13. Following the Court’s order, Respondents
conducted a bond hearing where an immigration judge denied Petitioner bond. Doc. 31 at 1.
On February 11, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant motion requesting attorneys’ fees and
costs pursuant to the EAJA because he meets the requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
1 The Court notes that the warden of Torrance County Correctional Facility, a private facility, was
also a respondent to the petition. Acting Warden Melissa Ortiz, see Doc. 13, did not join the
Government in objecting to the instant motion.
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 34 Filed 04/21/26 Page 2 of 8

3
LEGAL STANDARD
Under the EAJA, a fee award is required if (1) petitioner is a “prevailing party,” (2) the
government’s position was not “substantially justified,” and (3) there are no special circumstances
rendering an award of fees unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166,
1172 (10th Cir. 2007). The EAJA “unambiguously authorize[s] fees in habeas actions challenging
immigration detention.” Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025).
In a motion for EAJA fees and costs, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that they
are the prevailing party and eligible to receive an award. § 2412(d)(1)(B); Scarborough v. Principi,
541 U.S. 401, 414 (2004). The burden then shifts to the government to demonstrate that its position
was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. See Hackett, 475
F.3d at 1170; Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1991); Ericksson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 557 F.3d 79, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
Now that the Court has granted habeas relief, Petitioner seeks costs and attorneys’ fees
under the EAJA. Because Petitioner’s motion meets the EAJA’s requirements and the Government
does not carry its burden of showing that its position was substantially justified, the Court will
grant Petitioner’s motion.
I. Eligibility.
To receive an attorney fee under EAJA, an individual cannot have a net worth in excess of
$2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i). Petitioner states that he meets
the eligibility requirement, which the Government does not dispute. Accordingly, Petitioner
satisfies this requirement because he does not have a net worth above the statutory limit.
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 34 Filed 04/21/26 Page 3 of 8

4
II. Prevailing party.
The Government contends that Petitioner was not the prevailing party because (1) the Court
ordered a bond hearing rather than release and (2) Petitioner is still detained. Doc. 31 at 4–5.
Petitioner disagrees, stating that he is the prevailing party because the Court determined that he is
detained subject to the discretionary provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226, granted the petition, and
ordered a bond hearing. Doc. 32 at 2.
The Court agrees with Petitioner; he is a prevailing party. Petitioner sought release or a
bond hearing. The Court decided the merits of his petition and granted a specific relief requested
in his petition. See Iqbal v. Holder, 693 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2012). The resulting order and
judgment led to a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” See Buckhannon Bd.
& Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001); see also Al-
Maleki v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1200, 1205–06 (10th Cir. 2009). Although Petitioner was not released,
he received the process he was due by statute, and he was no longer subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225. Accordingly, Petitioner is a prevailing party under the EAJA.
III. Substantial justification.
Next, the parties disagree over whether the Government’s actions were substantially
justified. The EAJA first requires that a petitioner demonstrate that “the position of the United
States was not substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)–(B). Then, the government
justifies its position in any underlying proceedings and district court litigation. Hackett, 475 F.3d
at 1173–74. The government bears the burden of showing that its position was substantially
justified. Id. at 1172.
A position is substantially justified if it has “a reasonable basis in both law and fact.” Id.;
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). “[T]he government must establish three
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 34 Filed 04/21/26 Page 4 of 8

5
components to meet this test of reasonableness: a reasonable basis for the facts asserted; a
reasonable basis in law for the legal theory proposed; and support for the legal theory by the facts
alleged.” Harris v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 990 F.2d 519, 520–21 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Gatson v. Bowen,
854 F.2d 379, 380 (10th Cir. 1988)). The government’s position includes both the underlying action
and its litigation position. Al-Maleki, 558 F.3d at 1207; see also § 2412(d)(2)(D).
Petitioner asserts that the Government had no reasonable basis in law or fact for its position
that all noncitizens residing in the United States are subject to the mandatory detention
requirements of § 1225(b) or for its position to deny him a bond hearing. Doc. 29 at 7. To support
his position, Petitioner points to the longstanding interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, court
decisions invalidating the Government’s statutory interpretation of the provisions, and the facts of
his case. Id. at 7–8.
The Government only seeks to prove that there was a reasonable basis in law for the theory
it put forward. It asserts that its interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226 was substantially justified
because (1) the overwhelming nonbinding findings of district courts and the Seventh Circuit do
not amount to per se unsubstantial justification; (2) reasonable minds could differ as to the statutory
interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226 because some district courts and the Fifth Circuit have ruled in
the Government’s favor; and (3) substantial justification exists even though the Court rejected the
Government’s interpretation. Doc. 31 at 3–4.
The Government’s justification as to its legal position has some merit. An ultimately
incorrect position may be a substantially justified position. Madron v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 1255, 1257
(10th Cir. 2011) (citing Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1127). And if the law is “unclear or in flux,” it is more
likely that the Government’s position was substantially justified. Martinez v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 815 F.2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1987). But the available caselaw at the outset of and during
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 34 Filed 04/21/26 Page 5 of 8

6
litigation matters; a string of losses or wins can indicate whether the Government’s position was
substantially justified. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 569. And a split in nonbinding circuit authority does not
necessarily mean that reasonable minds differ. See id. (Supreme Court could not state that district
court abused its discretion in finding no substantial justification when a circuit court issued stays
and Supreme Court granted certiorari, while nine district courts and two circuit courts rejected the
government’s position).
Here, though, the Court finds that it does not need to reach the question of whether the
Government was substantially justified as to its legal position. The Government ignores its burden
to prove that the underlying action was substantially justified. See Harris, 990 F.2d at 520–21; see
also Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1174 (finding that government must justify both its position in underlying
agency proceedings and in subsequent court litigation). In its response, the Government does not
address Petitioner’s factual allegations whatsoever. For example, the Government does not
describe its justification for the change in agency practice. It does not argue that there was a
reasonable basis for arresting Petitioner while he was complying with an unrelated state
misdemeanor offense. And it does not justify the mandatory detention of Petitioner—who came to
the United States as a child and had resided here for well over a decade—and how the facts
reasonably supported its legal theory. Thus, by ignoring elements of the reasonableness test, the
Government has not justified its position.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the Government has
failed to meet its burden of showing substantial justification.
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 34 Filed 04/21/26 Page 6 of 8

7
IV. Special circumstances that would render a fee award unjust.
Finally, the Government argues that special circumstances are at issue because of the
Government’s “unique predicament” and the lack of “material change in the relationship between
the parties.” Doc. 31 at 5.
The Government argues that penalizing it with attorneys’ fees and costs, while it is bound
to Hurtado, would put the Government in an “impossible position” as it has “no authority to
overrule that decision directly.” Id. at 6. The Court rejects the Government’s attempt to cast the
individual respondents as anything less than the leaders of their respective agencies, departments,
and institutions. The Attorney General has broad authority to review de novo BIA decisions,
including Hurtado. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g), (h). Through this process, the Attorney General could
overturn this BIA precedent. Thus, the Attorney General is the final arbiter of the immigration
agency’s interpretation of a statute, including the statutes dealing with detention. Cf. Bamidele v.
INS, 99 F.3d 557, 563–64 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that attorney general overruled prior BIA
interpretation of immigration statute and that attorney general’s interpretation became one adopted
by INS). Therefore, the Government is not powerless to consider and overturn Hurtado until the
Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court weighs in.
Further, the Court is not persuaded by the Government’s assertion, without citing any
supporting authority, that Petitioner’s continued detention following his bond hearing warrants the
denial of attorneys’ fees and costs.
V. Reasonableness and evidentiary sufficiency.
The Government does not address the reasonableness or evidentiary sufficiency of
Petitioner’s requested award. See Doc. 31. The Court has carefully considered Petitioner’s motion
and calculation of expenses, fees, and costs incurred (Doc. 29-1) and finds that the requested
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 34 Filed 04/21/26 Page 7 of 8

8
$5,318.75 in attorneys’ fees and $ 144.14 in costs, totaling $5,462.89, is a reasonable award. See §
2412(d)(1)(C).
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Under the EAJA is hereby GRANTED for reasons described in this Memorandum Opinion and
Order. The fees will be paid to Petitioner but delivered to Petitioner’s attorneys. See Astrue v.
Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 595–98 (2010); Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1250–51 (10th Cir. 2007).
_____/S/_____________________________
KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-00996-KWR-KK Document 34 Filed 04/21/26 Page 8 of 8