Channon v. Liberation Distribution LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
MATTHEW CHANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	No. 1:24-cv-01124-WJ-SCY
LIBERATION DISTRIBUTION, LLC; and
INSPERITY, INC., d/b/a ADMINISTAFF
COMPANIES, INC. GP LTD.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions Against
Plaintiff Matthew Channon [Doc. 99] and the Court’s Order Deferring Ruling on Motion for
Sanctions and Dismissal Warning [Doc. 101]. Under the authority granted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11,
37(b)(2)(A)(v), and 41(b), the Court grants the Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions and dismisses
this case with prejudice.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Matthew Channon filed his Complaint on November 4, 2024, 2024. [Doc. 1]. In
his Complaint, as well as in his First Amended Complaint, he sought damages from Defendants
for allegedly failing to provide reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff’s disabilities, failing to
provide Plaintiff required sick leave, and causing Plaintiff emotional distress and damages. [Doc.
1; Doc. 18]. The allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint placed his physical and medical condition at
issue in this case. Therefore, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s Local
Rules, Defendants were entitled to obtain discovery relevant to Plaintiff’s physical and medical
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condition, including being provided authorizations to obtain Plaintiff’s medical records. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b); D.N.M.LR-Civ. 26.3(d).
Plaintiff has failed to provide medical authorizations to Defendants throughout this
proceeding. Defendants first sought to have the Court resolve this dispute informally during a July
24, 2025, status conference before the assigned Magistrate Judge. [Doc. 62; Doc. 101 at 1-2]. At
the status conference, the Magistrate Judge advised Plaintiff of the requirements of D.N.M.LR-
Civ. 26.3(d). [Doc. 62]. At that time, Plaintiff agreed to provide the medical releases, but disagreed
with Defendants as to the scope of the releases. [Doc. 101 at 2; Doc. 70].
When no agreement could be reached, Defendants filed a formal Motion to Compel
Plaintiff to provide the signed authorizations from each health care treatment provider from July
2017 to the current date. [Doc. 75]. Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Compel. [Doc. 77]. Plaintiff
did not contend that his physical and mental conditions were not at issue, nor did he oppose
providing a list of medical providers whose records he might use to support his claims. [Doc. 77
at 3]. However, he did argue that the authorizations should be limited in scope to certain subject
matters, should be limited to three years rather than five years, and that the health care providers
should redact information pertaining to certain medical conditions the Plaintiff contends are not
relevant to the case. [Doc. 77 at 4].
The Court granted the Motion to compel, in part, concluding that Plaintiff cannot limit
discovery to only those records he intends to use to support his claims. [Doc. 96]. In its Order on
the Motion to compel, the Court held:
“A party is required under Local Rule 26.3(d) to disclose a list of
providers who treated the party in the five years preceding the date
of the occurrence to the present, if that party ‘may use’ information
from that provider in support of his claims or defenses. For each
provider listed, the party must execute a general authorization for
release of medical records in the format provided by Appendix A.
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with no restrictions or modifications to the template.”
[Doc. 96 at 7-8]. The Court ordered:
“Within 7 days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall
produce:
• 	a list of the name, address and phone number
of any healthcare provider, including without
limitation, any physicians, dentists, chiropractors,
mental health counselors, clinic and hospitals,
which have treated Plaintiff from July 2017 and
continuing through the current date, if Plaintiff
may use information from that provider in support
of his claims; and
• 	for each healthcare provider listed, a signed authorization
to release medical and mental health records form as set
forth in Appendix “A,” with no modifications or
restrictions not already contained in the form.
[Doc. 96 at 8]. Last, the Court expressly warned Plaintiff that “[f]ailure to follow this order may
result in sanctions, to include dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.” [Doc. 96 at 11]. The deadline for
Plaintiff to comply with the Order fell on December 23, 2025. Plaintiff did not respond or object
to the Order and did not move for an extension or stay of the obligation to provide medical
authorizations.
Defendants filed their Motion for Sanctions on January 14, 2026, notifying the Court that
Plaintiff had not complied with the deadline, and seeking extreme sanctions for Plaintiff’s failure
to provide the required medical authorizations. [Doc. 99]. Under D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7.4(a), Plaintiff
had 14 days to file a response in opposition to the Motion for Sanctions. Plaintiff did not file any
response, much less a timely response, to the Motion and, therefore was deemed to have consented
to granting of the Motion. 	D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7.1(b). 	The Court, however, gave Plaintiff yet one
more chance to comply. On January 30, 2026, the Magistrate Judge issued his Order Deferring
Ruling on Motion for Sanctions and Dismissal Warning. 	[Doc. 101]. 	In the Order, the Court
stated:
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“within 30 days of the date of this Order Plaintiff shall file
a certificate of compliance on the docket, indicating that he
has complied with the order and served the signed medical
authorizations on Defendants.”
[Doc. 101 at 6]. The Order concluded with a bolded warning:
“Failure to timely provide the authorizations and file
this certificate will result in dismissal of this case
with prejudice.”
[Doc. 101 at 6]. 	More than 30 days has now elapsed, and Plaintiff has not filed the required
certification or, for that matter, anything else in the Court record. 	Plaintiff’s repeated failures
evince a clear intent not to comply with the rules, not to comply with the Court’s orders, and, in
effect, not to prosecute this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Therefore, consistent with the rules,
the Court’s orders, and the Court’s warnings, the Court will grant the Defendants’ Motion for
Sanctions and will dismiss this case with prejudice.
Ehrenhaus Standards for Imposition of Extreme Dismissal Sanction
Although dismissal is an “extreme sanction” not “to be taken lightly,” it is a permissible
option, because “district court judges need to be able to control their courtrooms.” 	King v.
Fleming, 899 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2018). The Tenth Circuit reasoned that, “because dismissal
with prejudice defeats altogether a litigant’s right to access to the courts, it should be used as a
weapon of last, rather than first, resort.” Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir.
1992).1 Dismissal is “appropriate only when the aggravating factors like bad faith or willfulness
1 The Ehrenhaus case dealt with sanctions for misconduct under Rule 37 relative to the discovery
process, but the Tenth Circuit has recognized that the factors set forth in Ehrenhaus are also
appropriately considered for cases arising under Rule 11 or a court’s inherent power to sanction.
See King v. Fleming, 899 F.3d 1140, 1150 (10th Cir. 2018); Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337
(10th Cir. 1994); Jones v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 261, 264 (10th Cir. 1993) (using Ehrenhaus factors
to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice “for noncompliance with court orders.” 996 F.2d
261, 264 (10th Cir. 1993)).
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outweigh the judicial system’s strong predisposition to resolve cases on their merits.” Id. However,
“willful failure” can be “any intentional failure” and no wrongful intent need be shown. 	In re
Standard Metals Corp., 817 F.2d 625, 628 (10th Cir. 1987).
In determining what sanctions to impose, the Court should consider factors such as:
(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant;
(2) the amount of interference with the judicial process;
(3) the culpability of the litigant;
(4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action would be a
likely sanction for noncompliance; and
(5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions.
Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921. The first three factors aid the Court in deciding whether to apply any
sanction. King v. Fleming, 899 F.3d 1140, 1150, n.15 (10 th Cir. 2018). The last two inform on
whether dismissal or a lesser sanction is appropriate. Id., cited in Jaiyeola v. Garmin Int’l, Inc.,
No. 2:20-CV-02068-HLT, 2021 WL 2515023, at *13 (D. Kan. June 18, 2021). This list of factors
“is not exhaustive, nor are the factors necessarily equiponderant.” Atlas Res., Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 291 F.R.D. 638, 643 (D.N.M. 2013) (citing Archibeque v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa
Fe Railway Co., 70 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10 th Cir.1995).
Extreme Sanctions are warranted under the Ehrenhaus Factors
The Court concludes that the Ehrenhaus factors preponderate heavily in favor the extreme
sanction of dismissal in this case. 	The Plaintiff’s clear intent to restrict and limit discovery to
information that supports his claims, without allowing discovery of potential defensive evidence,
is contrary to and defeats the Court’s obligation to resolve disputes fairly and justly on the merits.
Plaintiff has been given multiple opportunities, which he has ignored, and has been repeatedly
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warned of the consequences. Therefore, as a last resort, the Court will impose the extreme sanction
of dismissal. Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 920.
1. 	The Degree of Actual Prejudice to Defendants.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be administered “to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. To that end, parties to a lawsuit
“may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense . . .information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be
discoverable.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 	Discovery of Plaintiff’s medical records and bills is
essential to defense of Plaintiff’s claims and damages. Plaintiff’s refusal to permit discovery of
that crucial information essentially blocks the ability to defend the case and is highly prejudicial
Defendants.
2. 	The Amount of Interference with the Judicial Process.
The Court has been dealing with Plaintiff’s refusal to provide medical authorizations for
more than seven months. 	Plaintiff’s intentional non-compliance with the Court’s directions to
produce the signed authorizations has necessitated two extensions of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)
scheduling order deadlines. [Doc. 71, 96]. The Plaintiff’s conduct has substantially interfered with
the judicial process in this case and is contrary to the goals of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
3. 	The Culpability of the Litigant.
Plaintiff elected to receive notice of electronic filings on the Court docket by e-mail [Doc.
4] and was granted permission to make electronic filings in the CM/ECF system. 	[Doc. 6].
Nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff has not received any notice by e-mail through the
CM/ECF system or that Plaintiff has had any problem with electronic filing of documents in the
CM/ECF system.
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Countless discussions and filings have been devoted to Plaintiff’s unwillingness to
provide discovery related to his medical information. 	Although initially agreeing to provide
discovery of medical information, Plaintiff has gone back on his word and not produced such
information. [Doc. 101 at 2]. In the end, Plaintiff has ignored Court warnings and orders and has
failed to provide requisite discovery. Plaintiff’s failure is neither accidental nor inadvertent but,
instead appears from the record to be intentional. Based on the record, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s failure is willful and intentional. 	In re Standard Metals Corp., 817 F.2d at 628.
Plaintiff’s willful refusal supports the appropriateness of dismissal in this case. Ehrenhaus, 965
F.2d at 920.
4. 	Warnings in Advance of Dismissal.
Plaintiff has been warned several times that failure to provide the required medical
authorizations could or would result in dismissal of this case. 	In the Court’s Order granting
Defendants’ Motion to compel the medical release forms, the Court stated: “[f]ailure to follow this
order may result in sanctions, to include dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.” [Doc. 96 at 11]. In even
stronger terms, the Court’s January 30, 2026, Order warned “[f]ailure to timely provide the
authorizations and file this certificate will result in dismissal of this case with prejudice.”
[Doc. 101 at 6].
Plaintiff has been warned in advance of this dismissal, Plaintiff has chosen to ignore the
warnings, and Plaintiff is well aware of the consequences of his decision to disregard the Court’s
orders.
5. 	The Efficacy of Lesser Sanctions.
The Court has considered options of lesser sanctions in this case. Based on the facts that
(1) medical authorizations enabling discovery of Plaintiff’s medical records and bills are essential
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to both the defense and the prosecution of this case and (2) that Plaintiff has chosen to ignore
warnings of sanctions, up to and including the dispositive sanction of dismissal, the Court
concludes that lesser sanctions would have no effect, whatsoever, on Plaintiff’s decision not to
provide the required discovery.
Attorney Fees and Costs
In their Motion for Sanctions, Defendants seek an award of attorney fees for bringing the
Motion to Compel and for bringing the Motion for Sanctions. 	[Doc. 99 at 4]. 	Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(5)(A) mandates an award of expenses, including attorney fees, when the Court grants a
motion to compel discovery. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants leave to file an application
for an award of fees and costs within 30 days of entry of judgment in accordance with the
provisions of D.N.M.LR-Civ. 54.5.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leve to file Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 50] is DENIED
as moot;
(2) all claims and causes of action that were or could have been brought in this case are
DISMISSED with prejudice and final judgment will be entered; and
(3) Defendants may file an application for an award of fees and costs consistent with
D.N.M.LR-Civ. 54.5 within thirty (30) days after entry of judgment.
/s/____________________________________
WILLIAM P. JOHNSON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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