Valentine v. Valentine

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
In re: 	WILLIAM CHARLES VALENTINE, 	No. 7-10-15009 JA
Debtor.
CHERYL VALENTINE,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Adversary No. 	10-1199 J
WILLIAM CHARLES VALENTINE,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court following a trial on the merits of this adversary
proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a particular debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). 	Plaintiff and Defendant appeared at the trial pro se. After
consideration of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that the debt at issue is a debt
owing to a former spouse that arises under a Final Decree entered by the Thirteenth Judicial
District Court as the result of dissolution of marriage proceedings between the parties.
Consequently the debt is non-dischargeable.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant William Charles Valentine filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code on October 1, 2010 as Case No. 7-10-15009 JA. 	Schedule F, entitled
Creditors Holding Unsecured Priority Claims, filed in Defendant’s bankruptcy case on October
1, 2010, lists Cheryl Valentine as an unsecured creditor with a claim in the amount of $55,000.
See Case No. 7-10-15009 JA, Docket No. 1.
Case 10-01199-j Doc 16 Filed 03/03/11 Entered 03/03/11 15:19:24 Page 1 of 5

2
On December 2, 2010, Plaintiff Cheryl Valentine commenced this adversary proceeding
by filing a “Complaint to Except from Discharge Domestic Support Obligations Owed by
Defendant William Charles Valentine to Plaintiff Cheryl Valentine Under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(5)/11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)” (“Dischargeability Complaint”). Attached to the Complaint is
a copy of the Final Decree of Dissolution of Marriage (“Final Decree”) entered on March 17,
2009 by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, County of Sandoval, State of New Mexico in
Case No. D 1329 DM 08-055, styled William Charles Valentine v. Cheryl Cottage Valentine
(“State Court Dissolution of Marriage Proceeding”). 	Defendant agrees that the Final Decree
was entered in the State Court Dissolution of Marriage Proceeding on March 17, 2009, and the
Court admitted the Final Decree into evidence at trial.
Among other things, the Final Decree determined the separate and community debts of
the parties, determined that each party was required to pay one-half of the community debt,
including the monthly mortgage payment on the first mortgage and second mortgage on certain
property located at 10 Crestwood Loop, Tijeras, New Mexico (“Property”), and determined
further that William Valentine was required to send to Cheryl Valentine one-half of the monthly
mortgage payments on the Property. The Final Decree also provided that “[n]either party should
pay spousal support to the other.” 	At trial, the Court also entered into evidence a Minute Order
entered in the State Court Dissolution of Marriage Proceeding on November 9, 2009. The debt
at issue in this adversary proceeding is the award in favor of Cheryl Valentine as reflected in the
Final Decree and the Minute Order, and any further orders entered in the State Court Dissolution
of Marriage Proceeding on the debt owing by Defendant to Plaintiff under the Final Decree.
DISCUSSION
Case 10-01199-j Doc 16 Filed 03/03/11 Entered 03/03/11 15:19:24 Page 2 of 5

3
Plaintiff requests the Court to declare the debt at issue in this adversary proceeding non-
dischargeable under either 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5); or, alternatively, under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).
Those sections provide:
A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt –
(5) for a domestic support obligation;
(15) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not of the kind
described in paragraph (15) that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or
separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of
a court of record, or a determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit.
11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5) and (15).
Sections 523(a)(5) and (a)(15) were amended as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”). 	After BAPCPA, the balancing test and the
debtor’s ability to pay were eliminated from 11 § 523(a)(15).1 Defendant’s evidence relating to
his ability to pay the debt is, therefore, not relevant to the determination of non-dischargeability
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). 	In addition, whether a debt is, in fact, a “domestic support
obligation” as defined under the Bankruptcy Code ,2 and, therefore non-dischargeable under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), or a debt arising from a divorce that does not fit within the definition of
1See In re Prensky, 416 B.R. 406, 409 (Bankr.D.N.J. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 2674039 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010)(stating
that BAPCPA “modified § 523(a)(15) to remove, among other things, the ‘ability to pay’ component, thereby no
longer conditioning the discharge of debts of the nature described in § 523(a)(15) upon the Debtor's ability to pay.”);
In re Gonzalez, 2010 WL 2650443, *4 (Bankr.D.Puerto Rico June 29, 2010)(stating that the amendments enacted as
part of BAPCPA “eliminated the affirmative defenses (exceptions) previously included in subparts (A) and (B) of
Section 523(a)(15), namely the undue burden defense (debtor's ability to pay) and the balancing test (whether a
debtor would gain more than his domestic relations creditors would lose were the debtor granted a discharge), which
if proven by the debtor, allowed the court to discharge a marital property settlement obligation.”)(citation omitted).
See also, In re Burkhalter, 389 B.R. 185, 188 (Bankr.D.Colo. 2008)(noting that after BAPCPA neither the undue
burden defense nor the balancing test apply as affirmative defenses to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)).
2A domestic support obligation includes an obligation owed to a former spouse that is “in the nature of alimony,
maintenance or support.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).
Case 10-01199-j Doc 16 Filed 03/03/11 Entered 03/03/11 15:19:24 Page 3 of 5

4
“domestic support obligation,” and, consequently non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(15), is immaterial because both types of debts are non-dischargeable in a Chapter 7 case.3
In this case, because it is uncontested that the debt at issue arises from the Final Decree
and the Minute Order entered in connection with the State Court Dissolution of Marriage
Proceeding, the debt necessarily is either a domestic support obligation because it is “in the
nature of alimony, nature, or support” (a determination the Bankruptcy Court can make
regardless of the determination by the State Court that “neither party shall pay spousal support to
the other”); or it is not a domestic support obligation, but is a post-marital debt to a former
spouse that arose during the course of a divorce proceeding. Consequently, the debt is non-
dischargeable. The Court need not, and, in fact, does not make a determination of whether the
debt is a “domestic support obligation” in order to reach its conclusion of non-dischargeability.
Defendant requests the Court to determine as part of this adversary proceeding whether
Plaintiff can enforce her judgment against his Veteran’s Disability Benefits and Social Security
Benefits. 	Defendant asserts that his Veteran’s Disability Benefits and Social Security Benefits
are exempt from attachment under applicable federal non-bankruptcy statutes. The Court
declines to consider this issue.
When the debt at issue has been reduced to judgment in the State Court Dissolution of
Marriage Proceeding, the province of this Court is to determine whether the debt at issue is
dischargeable.4 The issue of whether the Plaintiff can then enforce the state court judgment on
3 See In re Johnson, 397 B.R. 289, 295 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. 2008)(stating that “[i]n cases under Chapters 7, 11, and 12
of the Bankruptcy Code, the distinctions between DSOs, governed by Section 523(a)(5), and other types of post-
marital obligations, governed by Section 523(a)(15), are immaterial because both types of debts are
nondischargeable and must be paid in full.”)(citation omitted); In re Ginzl, 430 B.R. 702, (Bankr.M.D.Fla.
2010)(noting that “BAPCPA removed the balancing test from Section 523(a)(15) and made the distinction between
domestic support obligations and other obligations arising from a divorce immaterial in a dischargeability
analysis.”)(citing 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 523.23, at 523-124 (16th ed. 2009).
4See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and (2)(I)(providing that “[b]ankruptcy judges may hear and determine . . . all core
proceedings” which include “determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts.”).
Case 10-01199-j Doc 16 Filed 03/03/11 Entered 03/03/11 15:19:24 Page 4 of 5

5
the debt by attaching Defendant’s Veteran’s Administration Benefits or his Social Security
Benefits is an issue best decided by the state court. 5 As noted by the Bankruptcy Court of the
Western District of Tennessee, “[t]here is no federal law of domestic relations.”6 The Court,
therefore, finds that it should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over enforcement issues in the
interest of comity with the state court because those issues are better suited for resolution by the
state court that issued the Final Decree and the Minute Order.7 A judgment consistent with this
Memorandum Opinion will be entered.
_____________________________________
ROBERT H. JACOBVITZ
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Date entered on docket: 	March 3, 2011
COPY TO:
Cheryl Valentine 	William Charles Valentine
Plaintiff 	Defendant
PO Box 855 	2633 San Pablo NE
Cerillos, NM 87010 	Albuquerque, NM 87110
5Cf. Robbins v. Breckenridge (In re Robbins), 1997 WL 34726864, *10 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn. August 13, 1997)(after
finding that the obligations were non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) or 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), the
bankruptcy court concluded that the state court should determine remaining issues, such as enforcement, or
modification of the support obligations).
6 Id. at *10 (citing DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956)).
7Id. (reasoning that, “the federal bankruptcy court generally should not intrude into the States' traditional authority
over domestic relations” and concluding that the court should abstain, sua sponte in the interest of comity with the
state court)(citations omitted). See also,28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1)(discretionary abstention).
Case 10-01199-j Doc 16 Filed 03/03/11 Entered 03/03/11 15:19:24 Page 5 of 5