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3:25-cv-01432Njd27 de fev. de 2026

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
L.G.,
Civil Action No. 25-01432 (ZNQ)
OPINION
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
QURAISHI, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff L.G.’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the
denial of her request for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II and/or Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. (ECF
No. 1; “Moving Br.,” ECF No. 5.) 	The Social Security Administration (“Defendant”) filed a
response brief. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff filed a reply brief. (ECF No. 8.)
The Court reaches its decision without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. 	After reviewing the parties’ submissions and the
Administrative Record (“AR,” ECF No. 4), the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ”) decision was based on substantial evidence and properly within the ALJ’s decision-
making authority. Accordingly, the decision to deny Plaintiff DIB and SSI will be AFFIRMED.
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I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her claim for DIB on February 17, 2022, and SSI on February 17, 2023,
alleging an onset date of disability on July 26, 2021. (AR at 233–46.) These claims were denied
initially and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 82, 108.) On March 20, 2024, the ALJ held a telephonic
hearing at which Plaintiff and Ms. Marian Marracco, an impartial vocational expert, testified. (Id.
at 34–81.) On April 9, 2024, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claims in a written decision, concluding
that Plaintiff was neither disabled under §§ 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act nor
disabled under § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (Id. at 7–26.) The Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision on January 14, 2025. (Id. at 1–6.) On
February 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant appeal. (ECF No. 1.)
B. 	THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ’s April 9, 2024 decision set forth the Social Security Administration’s five-step
sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled under the Social
Security Act. (AR at 11–21.) The ALJ first found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements
of the Social Security Act through December 21, 2024. (Id. at 12.) At step one of the evaluation,
the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has “not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 26,
2021, the alleged onset date,” because there was no evidence of earnings after that time. (Id.)
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of “insulin-dependent
diabetes, type I, history of right and left proximal humeral fractures, generalized anxiety disorder,
and status post right shoulder repair.” (Id. at 12–13.)
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
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Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Id. at 13–14.) Specifically, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s
diabetes was well-controlled, and Plaintiff does not have a documented need for a device to aid in
her mobility or an inability to use one or both upper extremities. (Id.) The ALJ further determined
that Plaintiff was mildly limited in understanding, remembering, applying information, and
interacting with others. (Id.) Plaintiff was determined to have no limitation in concentrating, and
a moderate limitation in adapting or managing herself. (Id.)
At step four, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s medical history, record evidence, and hearing
testimony to find that that Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity to perform light work”
except for climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffoldings, or otherwise being exposed to elevated places
and moving mechanical counterparts. (Id. at 15–19.) The ALJ particularly noted Plaintiff could
“occasionally reach overhead with the left, can frequently climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel,
crouch, crawl, and balance.” 	(Id. at 15) 	Additionally, the ALJ indicated Plaintiff “must avoid
concentrate[d] exposure to cold” and “can tolerate occasional changes in the routine work setting.”
(Id.)
At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “is unable to perform any past relevant work” as
a customer service representative or animal caretaker. (Id. at 20.) In making this finding, the ALJ
considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
and determined that Plaintiff “is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 	(Id. at 20–21.) 	The ALJ consequently
concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Id.)
II. 	SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction to review this appeal under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c).
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III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, a district court “shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of
the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001).
In reviewing applications for social security disability benefits, the district court has the
authority to conduct a plenary review of legal issues decided by the ALJ. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d
78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). To survive judicial review, the Commissioner’s decision must be supported
by substantial evidence. 	Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Morales v.
Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)). 	In other words, substantial evidence “may be somewhat less than a
preponderance of the evidence.” 	Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146, 1148 (3d Cir. 1971)
(quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)).
In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the court “may not weigh the evidence or
substitute [its] own conclusions for those of the fact-finder.” 	Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d
546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). Even if the court would have decided differently, it is bound by the ALJ’s
decision if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Fargnoli v. Halter, 247 F.3d
34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001). 	The court must “review the record as a whole to determine whether
substantial evidence supports a factual finding.” 	Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir.
2014) (citing Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999)). And “[s]ince
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it is apparent that the ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason,” courts
require “an explanation from the ALJ of the reason why probative evidence has been rejected” to
determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706–
07 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation modified).
B. 	APPLICABLE LAW
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the inability to “engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act further states,
an individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity
that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The 	Social 	Security 	Act 	establishes 	a 	five-step 	sequential 	evaluation 	process 	for
determining whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the statute. 	See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). “The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, and
the Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d
632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007)).
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the plaintiff is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not
disabled.
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At step two, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff has a “severe impairment” or
combination of impairments that “significantly limits [the plaintiff’s] physical or mental ability to
do basic work activities.” 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). 	If the plaintiff does not have a severe
impairment or combination of impairments, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not
disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step three.
At step three, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of
impairments “meets” or “medically equals” the severity of an impairment in the Listing of
Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If so,
then the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the impairment or combination of impairments has
lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. Otherwise, the ALJ
proceeds to step four.
At step four, the ALJ must determine the plaintiff’s RFC and analyze whether the plaintiff
can perform past relevant work. 	See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). 	Under C.F.R. § 404.1545, a
claimant's RFC is “the most [he or she] can do” despite limitations “that affect what [he or she]
can do in a work setting.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). If the plaintiff can perform past relevant
work, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not disabled. 	See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step.
At step five—the final step—the ALJ must decide whether the plaintiff, considering the
plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and work experience, can perform other jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). If the ALJ determines
that the plaintiff can do so, then the plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the plaintiff is presumed
to be disabled if the impairment or combination of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for
a continuous period of at least twelve months.
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
On appeal, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled.
(See generally Moving Br.) Plaintiff’s appeal is focused on the ALJ’s RFC analysis at step four.
(Id.) Plaintiff argues that, in determining that Plaintiff’s diabetes was controlled, the ALJ erred by
failing to consider all contrary evidence. (Id. at 22–28.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
ignored Plaintiff’s history of anxiety-induced hypoglycemia, discredited Dr. Dhiren Gandhi’s
(“Dr. Gandhi”) medical opinion as unpersuasive, and improperly relied on Plaintiff’s A1C levels.
(Id.) 	Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ’s RFC analysis did not consider any evidence of
Plaintiff’s social limitations. (Id. at 28–30.)
To begin, the Court will summarize the requirements for making an RFC determination, as
well as summarize the ALJ’s RFC assessment. As discussed, “[a] claimant’s RFC reflects ‘what
[the claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations,’ 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a), and the
controlling regulations are clear that the RFC finding is a determination expressly reserved to the
Commissioner rather than any medical source, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2),
404.1546(c), 416.946(c).” Morris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 19-13744, 2020 WL 2764803,
at *4 (D.N.J. May 28, 2020). 	An RFC determination requires the ALJ to consider a claimant’s
symptoms and the extent to which those symptoms are reasonably consistent with objective
medical or other evidence. 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). 	An ALJ additionally must consider all
statements about a claimant’s symptoms, but those statements must be corroborated by objective
medical evidence that, when considered with all the other evidence, it leads to the conclusion that
a claimant is disabled. 	Id. 	An ALJ must take into account all available evidence, including a
claimant’s medical history, laboratory findings, and statements about how the claimant is affected
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by his or her symptoms to then determine the extent to which the claimant’s functional limitations
affect his or her ability to work. Id.
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work subject to certain
limitations. (AR at 15.) In her narrative, the ALJ recounted Plaintiff’s history with Type 1 diabetes
and acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony that, as she grew older, her high anxiety caused low blood
sugar episodes. (Id.) Further, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff experiences hypoglycemic episodes
approximately twice per month, and that those episodes can be sporadic and severe enough to
cause seizures. (Id. at 16.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s worries or anxieties can contribute to
low blood sugar, especially when she was working or worried about her customers. (Id.) The ALJ
discussed Plaintiff’s mitigation efforts and stated that Plaintiff regularly takes two types of insulin
daily and checks her blood sugar multiple times a day. (Id.) When Plaintiff has a low blood sugar
flare-up, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff takes an injectable form of glucose. (Id.) The ALJ described
no other significant mobility issues but acknowledged that Plaintiff has some difficulties leaving
the house due to her anxiety. (Id.)
The ALJ outlined Plaintiff’s history of anxiety. (Id. at 17.) The ALJ reported that Plaintiff
had been managing her anxiety with her primary care physician for ten years without psychiatric
evaluation. (Id.) The ALJ stated that Plaintiff only recently began seeing a therapist with respect
to her anxiety and that taking anxiety medication helped manage her stress. 	(Id.) 	The ALJ
described the results of a psychological consultation exam and found that the examiner observed
Plaintiff’s verbose nature but also found that Plaintiff’s fund of knowledge was average, she was
well-oriented, and she could manage her own funds. (Id.) The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff
sought to increase the dosage of her anxiety medication, yet Plaintiff forgot to call the doctor to
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make such a request. 	(Id.) 	The ALJ observed that Plaintiff managed her anxiety with positive
self-talk and deep breathing, and Plaintiff reported a decrease in her anxiety in January 2023. (Id.)
While the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments could reasonably lead to the symptoms
she described, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s subjective testimony about the severity of her
symptoms was inconsistent in comparison to the medical evidence presented in the record. (Id. at
16, 17–18.) Notably, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s diabetes was under control based on a review
of Plaintiff’s objective medical records from 2018 to 2022, indicating normal A1C levels, as well
as Plaintiff’s daily efforts to monitor her blood sugar. (Id. at 18.) The ALJ further determined that
Plaintiff’s treatment regimen was conservative, despite her subjective complaints of repeated
hypoglycemic episodes and anxiety, because Plaintiff sought treatment for her diabetes from only
her primary care physician instead of an endocrinologist, and only recently started therapy for her
anxiety. 	(Id.) 	The ALJ further recognized that due to Plaintiff’s mental symptoms, she could
tolerate occasional changes in the routine work setting and would be off task only 5%, which was
not work-preclusive according to the vocational expert. (Id.)
The foregoing demonstrates that the ALJ fully considered Plaintiff’s subjective concerns
about her anxiety or stress contributing to frequent hypoglycemic episodes as required by 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). 	While Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by not explicitly referencing
contrary evidence, such as Plaintiff’s historical complaints of low blood sugar, the ALJ was not
required to do so. It is well-established that an ALJ “need not mention every piece of the evidence
within the record” so long as there is “a logical connection between the evidence considered and
the conclusion.” Beety-Monticelli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 F. App’x 743, 747 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). Here, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s subjective testimony about the frequency and
severity of her hypoglycemia and anxiety because Plaintiff’s A1C levels were objectively normal
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and Plaintiff’s treatment history was irregular and lacked consistency. 	Plaintiff’s extensive
citations to the record in an effort to demonstrate the frequency with which Plaintiff experiences
such episodes are an attempt to have this Court re-weigh the evidence presented before the ALJ.
The Court is not permitted to do that. Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d
Cir. 2011). The Court accordingly finds no reason to disturb the ALJ’s finding.
Similarly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s concern that the ALJ improperly disregarded Dr.
Gandhi’s assessment that Plaintiff’s anxiety and stress cause her low blood sugar episodes. “When
weighing medical opinions in Social Security matters, administrative law judges must consider a
range of factors, but all they must explain are the reasons for their decisions.” 	Zaborowski v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 638 (3d Cir. 2024) (emphases in original). The factors for
consideration are (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship of the medical source to the
claimant, including length of the treatment relationship, frequency of examinations, purpose of the
treatment relationship, and extent of the treatment relationship; (4) specialization; and (5) other
relevant factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c). Supportability and consistency are the most important
factors 	and 	must 	be 	considered. 	Zabrowski, 	115 	F.4th 	at 	638; 	see 	also 	20 	C.F.R. 	§
404.1520c(b)(2). 	Here, the ALJ explained that she found Dr. Gandhi’s assessment neither
persuasive nor supported by the record because he merely noted Plaintiff’s reports of low blood
sugar that conflict with the laboratory reports resulting in normal A1C levels. (AR at 19.) On the
contrary, the ALJ found the medical opinions from Dr. James Orsini and Dr. Mohammad Rizwan
persuasive because they considered Plaintiff’s complaints of uncontrolled blood sugars while also
evaluating Plaintiff’s A1C levels, and their findings were supported by and consistent with all
record evidence. (Id.) Accordingly, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision about how much weight to afford the opinion of each medical expert.
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Moreover, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that A1C is not a proper metric
by which to measure the stability of Plaintiff’s diabetes. 	The claimant “bears the burden of
establishing entitlement to disability benefits by producing competent evidence.” 	Alexander v.
Shalala, 927 F. Supp. 785, 792 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)). If the claimant
does not produce necessary evidence for purposes of establishing their disability, the ALJ is
entitled to make a decision based on the available evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1516, 416.916.
Plaintiff points to no other objective medical data in the record to discredit the ALJ’s findings. In
the absence of other objective evidence, the ALJ did not err and properly relied on Plaintiff’s A1C
levels to determine that Plaintiff’s diabetes is stable and explained her reasons for doing so.
Finally, the Court finds that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s social limitations. At
step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had mild mental impairments, mild social limitations
in interacting with others, no limitation in concentrating, and moderate limitations in adapting or
managing oneself. (AR at 14.) An “RFC assessment does not need to contain an in-depth analysis
on mental impairments when the ALJ finds earlier in [her] opinion that a claimant’s mental
impairments are no greater than mild.” Danielle G. v. King, Civ. No. 22-4721, 2025 WL 354448,
at *14 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2025) (quoting D.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 20-2484, 2021 WL
1851830, at *6 (D.N.J. May 10, 2021)). Having determined that Plaintiff’s social limitation was
mild, the ALJ did not need to incorporate that impairment into the RFC. She did so anyway. As
mentioned, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff’s anxiety and her ability to interact with others in the
RFC assessment. (AR 15–19.) The ALJ explained that Plaintiff demonstrated an adequate ability
to interact with her medical practitioners based on a review of the records and her testimony. (Id.
at 19.) 	Moreover, Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her ability to manage and care for herself
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contributed to the ALJ’s determination. (Id.) The ALJ’s determination was therefore reinforced
with adequate support in the record.
In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC analysis was supported by the record and the
ALJ comprehensively addressed Plaintiff’s hypoglycemia, anxiety, and social limitations.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will AFFIRM the ALJ’s decision to deny Plaintiff
DIB and SSI. An appropriate Order will follow.
Date: February 27, 2026
s/ Zahid N. Quraishi
ZAHID N. QURAISHI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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