GENELIEN v. VERIZON WIRELESS et al

3:24-cv-06134Njd2 de mar. de 2026

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ANTONIO-MURLLER GENELIEN,
Civil Action No. 24-6134 (ZNQ) (TJB)
OPINION
Plaintiff,
v.
VERIZON WIRELESS, et al.,
Defendants.
QURAISHI, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Pro Se Plaintiff Antonio-Murller
Genelien’s (“Plaintiff”) application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 1-3.) For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s IFP application is DENIED, and the Complaint will be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks detailed factual allegations and meaningful background
information. As far as the Court can discern, Plaintiff tendered a “special deposit” to Defendant
Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) in an effort to satisfy and settle his account. 	Although Plaintiff
alleges that he tendered $497.97, the exhibits to his complaint suggest that he transmitted only a
$10 check. 	In any event, Verizon does not appear to have accepted the purported tender and
subsequently issued a notice of suspension to Plaintiff. Plaintiff also wrote a letter to Defendant
Hans Vestberg (“Mr. Vestberg”) regarding the “special deposit,” to which Mr. Vestberg did not
reply. Plaintiff now asserts two claims under 41 U.S.C. § 6503 and 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
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II. 	SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a plaintiff must file an affidavit
that states all income and assets, inability to pay the filing fee, the “nature of the action,” and the
“belief that the [plaintiff] is entitled to redress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); Glenn v. Hayman, Civ.
No. 07-112, 2007 WL 432974, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2007). “In making such an application, a
plaintiff must state the facts concerning his or her poverty with some degree of particularity,
definiteness or certainty.” Keefe v. NJ Dep't of Corr., Civ. No. 18-7597, 2018 WL 2994413, at *1
(D.N.J. June 14, 2018) (quoting Simon v. Mercer Cnty. Cmty. Coll., Civ. No. 10-5505, 2011 WL
551196, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2011)).
To guard against potential “abuse” of “cost-free access to the federal courts,” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e) empowers district courts to dismiss an IFP complaint if, among other things, the action is
frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to comply with the proper pleading standards. See Deutsch v.
United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995). Indeed, the Court must dismiss any claim, prior
to service, that fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Martin v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., Civ. No. 17-3129, 2017 WL 3783702, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2017) (“Federal law requires
this Court to screen Plaintiff's Complaint for sua sponte dismissal prior to service, and to dismiss
any claim if that claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).”).
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	IFP SCREENING
Plaintiff did not provide any information regarding his IFP application. 	Instead, in his
affidavit of support, he wrote “N/A” to every question, including questions about his source of
income and monthly expenses. 	These non-responses do not provide the Court with any
information, let alone “with some degree of particularity, definiteness or certainty,” to warrant
permitting Plaintiff to proceed IFP. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s IFP application.
B. 	SCREENING
Even if Plaintiff was entitled to proceed IFP, the Court will nevertheless dismiss his
Complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff’s first cause of action is brought under 41 U.S.C.
§ 6503. That section, however, simply does not apply here. 41 U.S.C. § 6503 applies “in case of
breach or violation of a representation or stipulation included in a contract under section 6502 of
this title.” 41 U.S.C. § 6503. “Section 6502, in turn, governs contracts made by an agency of the
United States for the manufacture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles, or equipment in an
amount exceeding $10,000.” Bello v. Capital One Bank, Civ. No. 20-1218, 2021 WL 3616156, at
*4 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2021). 	Even assuming Plaintiff alleged a contractual relationship between
him and Verizon or Mr. Vestberg (he has not), it is clear that neither Verizon nor Mr. Vestberg is
an agency of the United States. As Plaintiff cannot plead that Verizon or Mr. Vestberg are agencies
of the United Staes, this claim is futile. See id.
Plaintiff’s second cause of action is brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1109, which is likewise
inapplicable. 	That section “imposes liability on individual persons who breach their fiduciary
duties with respect to employee benefit plans.” Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers Local 1 of
PA/DE v. Penn Valley Tile, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 3d 487, 494 (E.D. Pa. 2016). “Recovery under this
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section, however, inures to the plan not an individual.” Hartman v. Wilkes-Barre Gen. Hosp., 237
F. Supp. 552, 557 (M.D. Pa. 2002). Insofar as Plaintiff’s allegations do not relate to an employee
benefit plan and are for an individual dispute, this claim will also be dismissed. Because Plaintiff’s
allegations are not related to an employee benefit plan, this claim is also futile.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s IFP Application and
DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE his Complaint. An appropriate Order will follow.
Date: March 2, 2026
s/ Zahid N. Quraishi
ZAHID N. QURAISHI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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