MAWALLA v. LAKEWOOD POLICE DEPT. et al

3:23-cv-01083Njd17 de fev. de 2026

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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NELSON MAWALLA,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 23-1083 (RE) GTQ)
Vv.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LAKEWOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT et
al.,

Defendants,

KIRSCH, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Lakewood Police Department, Lynn
Miller, and the Township of Lakewood Detective Department’s (collectively, “Defendants”)
Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Nelson Mawalla’s (‘Plaintiff’) Second Amended Complaint,
which Plaintiff filed as “Amend [sic] Complaint Pursuant [to the] Second, Seven [sic] and Fourteen
[sic] Amendments of [the] United States of America Constitution, “SAC,” ECF No. 54), pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), (“Mot.,” ECF No, 58). Plaintiff opposed.
(“Opp.,” ECF No. 59.) The Court has considered the parties’ submissions and resolves the matter
without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

L BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History
Before turning to the merits of Defendants’ Motion, the Court begins with an overview of

the extensive procedural history of this nearly three-year old action.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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On February 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed his initial handwritten, form Complaint, (Compl,
ECF No. 1), and accompanying application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C, §
1915, (@IFP,” ECF No. 1-6). The Complaint named as Defendants the Lakewood Police
Department, Lynn Miller, and the Township of Lakewood Detective Department. (Compl. at 1.)
Plaintiff alleged that as an “American citizen” he “has a right to own [a] gun if [he has] no criminal
record.” (/d. at 1-2.)! Plaintiff allezed—without specifying how—that his “[rJight[s] [as a] citizen
[were] violated” because of “[rlight #2,” presumably the Second Amendment. (fd. at 2-4.) Plaintiff
identified February 21, 2023 as the date giving rise to his claims. (/d@. at 3.)

On September 14, 2023, the Court denied Plaintiff's IFP application and dismissed his
Complaint without prejudice, (ECF No. 13.) This Court found that Plaintiff's IFP application did
not contain sufficient information for the Court to properly evaluate it, highlighting blank portions
and contradictory information contained in the application. (ECF No. 12 at 3-4.) In screening
Plaintiff's Complaint itself, the Court concluded that it failed to provide a “short and plain
statement” showing Plaintiffs entitlement to relief under Rule 8(a) and failed to state a “claim
upon which relief may be granted.” Ud. at 4—5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).) The Court
further noted that New Jersey’s firearm permit laws provide a process for applicants denied a
firearms permit to seek a hearing before the New Jersey Superior Court, see N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:58-3(d), but that same law does not create a cause of action, (fd. at 5). Additionally, the Court
noted that the Complaint lacked facts sufficient to put Defendants “on notice as to what
wrongdoing they are alleged to have committed.” Ud.) Because Plaintiff attempted to supplement

his Complaint six times after filing, (see ECF Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11), the Court directed Plaintiff to

' Because Plaintiff's initial Complaint lacks paragraph numbers, the Court cites to it by the complaint form’s
page numbers.

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include any additional allegations or claims he wished to be considered in any re-filed complaint,
(ECF No. 12 at 5 n.1),

The subsequent record over the next two years shows a pattern of procedurally deficient
and/or improper filings by Plaintiff. For example, in October 2023, Plaintiff filed separate motions
to seal, add additional defendants, reopen his case, and a renewed IFP application. (See ECF Nos.
14, 15, 16, 17, 18.) The Honorable Douglas E. Arpert, U.S.M.J. (ret.) denied both the motion to
seal and motion to add additional defendants as procedurally improper for a host of reasons,
including that Plaintiff had not yet filed an amended complaint, paid the filing fee, or been granted
Court leave to proceed under his renewed IFP. (ECF No. 20 at 1—2.) Following Judge Arpert’s
denial of these motions, Plaintiff—with his initial motion to reopen still pending—filed an
amended motion to reopen on February 9, 2024, (ECF No. 21), which he again amended four days
later, (ECF No. 22). Nearly six months later, on August 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a proposed First
Amended Complaint. “FAC,” ECF No. 24.)

Plaintiff's FAC named the same three Defendants as in his first Complaint and, though still
difficult to discern, clarified that his claims arose from Defendants’ alleged denial of a gun permit
despite Plaintiff's lack of a criminal record. (FAC at 2.)* Plaintiff alleged that this denial was due
to his “race, skin color and national origin,” (without, the Court notes, identifying his race, skin
color, or national origin which supposedly premised his claims of purported discrimination), and
asserted various violations of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as weil as

various violations of New Jersey law. (See generally, FAC at 1-4). After granting Plaintiff's

* Because the FAC lacks both page numbers and paragraph numbers, the Court cites to it by PDF page
number as it appears in ECF.

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motion to reopen, (ECF No, 25), the Court conditionally granted Plaintiff’s IFP application and
docketed Plaintiff's FAC, (ECF No. 26).

On December 3, 2024, Plaintiff requested an entry of default against Defendants, which
the Clerk entered on December 11, 2024.° (ECF Nos. 32, 34; see also Clerk’s Quality Control
Message, Dec. 4, 2024.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Default Judgment. (ECF No.
33.) On January 29, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to set aside the Clerk’s default pursuant to
Rule 55(c)}, (ECF No. 38), which the Court granted, (ECF No. 39), The Court directed Defendants
to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's FAC within 21 days. Ud. at 4.)

Six days later, on March 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend, (ECF No.
40), shortly followed by a motion to dismiss the FAC from Defendants, (ECF Nos. 42, 43).
Plaintiff initially opposed Defendants’ motion, (ECF No. 44), but, a month later, filed a motion to
stay “till [sic] Plaintiff's FBI history records file be corrected and updated by this Agent,” (ECF
No. 45 at 1), Almost a month later, before this Court had the opportunity to adjudicate Plaintiffs
motion to stay, Plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw his motion to stay. (ECF No. 48 at 1.) The
Court granted Plaintiff's motion to withdraw his motion to stay the following day. (ECF No. 50.)

On August 20, 2025, the Honorable Justin T. Quinn granted Plaintiff's unopposed motion
to amend and administratively terminated Defendants’ motion to dismiss pending Plaintiffs
amendment. (ECF No. 51.) Given Plaintiff's frequent filing and refiling, Judge Quinn granted
Plaintiff, “out of an abundance of caution,” the opportunity to “file a single amended complaint

containing all claims that he intends to assert in this action.” (/d. at 2.) In the event Plaintiff failed

3 In fact, Plaintiff requested the Clerk to enter default against Defendants three times. (See ECF Nos. 31,
35, 36.)

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to do so by September 10, 2025, the Court ordered that Plaintiff's August 2024 FAC would remain
his operative pleading. Ud.)

Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint by the Court-imposed deadline, In a further
effort to accommodate Plaintiff, Judge Quinn extended a final opportunity to him to file his Second
Amended Complaint by September 25, 2025. (ECF No. 53). On September 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed
his Second Amended Complaint. (SAC.)

B. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint

PlaintifPs SAC, which consists of three pages of unnumbered paragraphs, alleges federal
claims pursuant to the Second, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. (SAC at
1-2.) Plaintiff names the Lakewood Police Department, Lynn Miller, and the Detective
Department as Defendants without identifying or explaining, in any regard, what any of these
Defendants allegedly did or failed to do. (See generally id.) Instead, he alleges, in the most
conclusory fashion, that the “Defendants’—collectively—wronged him, without any
individualized allegations.

Unlike his FAC, Plaintiffs SAC does not make any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Compare FAC with SAC.) In his SAC, however, and without explaining the factual basis behind
his claims, Plaintiff quotes a portion of the Second Amendment and states that it “protects an
individual’s right to possess firearms, unconnected with service in a militia, for traditionally lawful
purposes, such as self-defense within the home,” (/d. at 1.) He argues that “Defendants are not
immune by US [sic] Second Amendment as clear[ly] stated in [the] US [sic] Constitution.” (SAC
at 1.) Notwithstanding repeated opportunities to amend his pleadings, this patent deficiency,
namely, Plaintiff's failure to identify in any regard how his purported rights under the Second

Amendment were denied, persists,

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Plaintiff further alleges that pursuant to the Seventh Amendment, he is “guarantee[d]|” the
right to a jury trial and “demand[s]” one in this case “where... discovery might get this complaint
[to] be resolved before trial.” (/d.) Relatedly, under the heading “28 USC App Fed R Civ P Rule
38: Jury Trial of Right,” Plaintiff states that “[pjursuant [to] Fed. R, Civ, P. Rule 28 (b)... faJny
party may demand a trial by jury." (Ud. at 2.) As to his Fourteenth Amendment claim, Plaintiff
broadly alleges that his civil rights have been “abused by [D]efendants,” and that Defendants’
“action[s] do not abide” by the Constitution. Ud. at 2.) He further alleges that Defendants have
exhibited an “abuse of power” by failing to timely respond to his Complaint and alleges that
Defendants denied his gun permit because they felt that they were “immune.” Ud.)

Further, Plaintiff includes a heading titled “Legal Duty of Care’—without explaining in
what context Defendants owed him a legal duty—and outlines various “ways to determine if the
Defendant owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff,” vaguely noting that a “legal duty” is “an element
of negligence.” (/d.) Finally, Plaintiff includes a “request[]” in his pleading that the Court “review
conduct of [D]efendants [according] to State and Federal Constitution on gun ownership,” and that
“li|f{necessary” the Court “shall question why defendants failed to denied [sic] or approve Plaintiff
gun ownership two applications while US Federal Gov entities include CBP, DHS, FBI cleared
Plaintiff background check.” Ud. at 3.) It is axiomatic that is not the proper function of the Court
to “question” putative Defendants in order to ensure compliance of a particular law.

On October 23, 2025, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, accompanied by a

twenty-one-paged brief, which chronicles, in some detail, the procedural labyrinth of this action,

‘ The Court is unaware of any provision of Title 28 of the United States Code matching Plaintiff's citation,
or what is being referred to as “App.” The Court has determined that Plaintiff is quoting Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 38(b) verbatim. The Court further concludes that Plaintiff's reference to Rule 28(b) was

_made in error, as Rule 38(b) provides the source of Plaintiff's quote regarding jury trials. Rule 28 outlines
persons before whom depositions may be taken. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 28.

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and sets forth a series of legal and factual bases warranting, yet again, dismissal. (See generally
Mot.) Plaintiff submitted a two-paragraph “Brief Letter” in opposition, which consists of less than
a single page—sans the caption-—~and fails to address any of Defendants’ arguments in its motion.”
(See generally Opp.) Instead, Plaintiff simply requests that “Defendant(s) . . . provide to this
[C]ourt a denial decision which shall state a very clear reason for being denied gun ownership,”
and under a heading titled “[C]onclusion,” simply reiterates, verbatim, the Second Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, with nothing more. (/d. at 1-2.) Defendants’ Motion is now ripe for decision.

WL. LEGAL STANDARD

A, Rule 8

Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pieader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Rule’s purpose is to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl, Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has advised that courts should
“be flexible when applying procedural rules” to and “interpreting [the] pleadings” of pro se
plaintiffs. Afala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). Indeed, this caution
is “driven by the understanding that implicit in the right of self-representation is an obligation on

the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent

° Plaintiffs failure to address Defendants’ arguments in his opposition leaves those arguments unrefuted
and any response from Plaintiff waived. See Dreibelbis v. Scholton, 274 F. App’x 183, 185 (Gd Cir, 2008)
(affirming district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on grounds raised in defendants’ motion but not
addressed in plaintiff's opposition despite “ample opportunity” to contest it (citing Confer v. Custom Eng'g
Co,, 952 F.2d 41, 44 (3d Cir, 1991) and Laborers’ Intern, Union of N. Ani, AFL-CIO y, Foster Wheeler
Energy, 26 F.3d 375, 398 Gd Cir. 1994))); Woodell v. Coach, No. 22-2222, 2022 WL 17486262, at *3
(D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2022} (“As Woodell does not address these arguments in his opposition brief, any arguments
in opposition are deemed waived.” (citing Leisure Pass N. Am. LLC v, Leisure Pass Grp., Ltd., No. 12-
3375, 2013 WL 4517841, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2013))).

7

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forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training,” Higgs v. Att'y Gen. of the
US., 655 F.3d 333, 339 Gd Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (cleaned up); see also Erickson y.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal! pleadings drafted by lawyers ... .” (citation omitted)).
However, a plaintiff's pro se status does not permit him to ignore the requirements of the
federal rules, especially, as here, both the District Court and the Magistrate Judge have repeatedly
indulged and accommodated Plaintiff, instructed him as to his previous complaints’ deficiencies,
and advised him to “supplement” additional allegations and claims into an amended complaint,
should he wish to do so. (See ECF No. 12 at 5 n.1 (advising Plaintiff to attach all information he
intended to have considered by the Court to any future filed pleading); see also ECF No. 51
(permitting Plaintiff “the opportunity to file a single amended complaint containing al! claims he
intends to assert in this action.” (emphasis added)).) “[A] litigant is not absolved from complying
with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because [he] proceeds pro se.” Thakar
v. Tan, 372 F. App’x 325, 328 Gd Cir. 2010). Even a pro se plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts
in [the] complaint]] to support a claim,” Mala, 704 F.3d at 245 (citation omitted), and Defendants
still require “fair notice” of the claims they will be expected to answer. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

B. Failure to State a Claim

For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain sufficient factual
matter to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” fad.

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the factual and

legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements

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of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, are inadequate to survive dismissal.
igbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)); Burtch v.
Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2011), Even if plausibly pled, a complaint
will not withstand a motion to dismiss if the facts alleged do not state “a legally copnizable cause
of action,” Turner vy, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co,, No, 14-7148, 2015 WL 12826480, at *2 (D.N.J.
Jan. 23, 2015). In short, “[a] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to
relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211
(citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008)).

Mere “conclusory allegations against defendants as a group” that “fail[] to allege the
personal involvement of any [d}Jefendant” are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, Galicki
v. New Jersey, No. 14-169, 2015 WL 3970297, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015). A plaintiff must
allege facts that “establish each individual [d]efendant’s liability for the misconduct alleged.” /d.
When a number of defendants are named in a complaint, a plaintiff cannot refer to all defendants
“who occupied different positions and presumably had distinct roles in the alleged misconduct”
without specifying “which [dJefendants engaged in what wrongful conduct.” Falat v. County of
Hunterdon, No. 12-6804, 2013 WL 1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013).

Hi DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's SAC again fails to meet the requirements of Rule 8. Plaintiff's SAC offers few
factual allegations and is largely comprised of quotations of various constitutional amendments,
paraphrased summaries of Plaintiff's personal understanding of what such amendments entail, and
a list of considerations he argues this Court should reference when determining whether
Defendants owed him a duty of care, (See generally SAC.) Even applying Rule 8 “flexibly” to

Plaintiff, the Court is unable to discern what relief, if any, Plaintiff believes he is entitled to. See

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Mala, 704 F.3d at 244; see also Swain v. City of Philadelphia, No. 23-3258, 2023 WL 8258781,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2023) (“[Plaintiff] does not include any facts in her Complaint, and so has
not adequately described the relevant who, what, where, when, and how that form the basis for her
claims.”).

The Court has previously dismissed Plaintiff's initial Complaint on Rule 8 grounds. (ECF
No, 12 at 4-5.) Furthermore, on at least two prior occasions, the undersigned and Judge Quinn
specifically brought to his attention the difficulty they had discerning Plaintiff's requested relief
due to the vague and limited information contained in his Complaint. (See id. at 5 (concluding that
_ the Court lacked “basic facts of Plaintiffs interaction with the Lakewood Police department —
such as when he applied, whom he spoke to, what was communicated, and their manner of
communication” to discern his allegations); see also ECF No. 51 at 1-2 (“At present, it is unclear
from Plaintiff's motion whether Plaintiff intends to abandon the state law claims previously
asserted and proceed solely with federal claims, or if he instead intends to add the new
constitutional claims to the existing pleading.”’).) Plaintiff's vague and conclusory legal
assertions—that Defendants are not “immune” from the Second Amendment, that Plaintiff is
“guarantee[d]” a jury trial, that Defendants “show[ed] abuse of power” for failing to respond to
his gun permit, and that Defendants owed him a convoluted legal duty to “not [make Plaintiff]
feel[] inferior or [like a] iow class citizen,” (SAC at 1—2)—are hardly sufficient to give Defendants’
“fair notice” of the claims are brought against them and the grounds upon which such claims rest,
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Fowder, 578 F.3d at 210-11. Despite multiple opportunities to amend,
correct, and consolidate his pleadings from the Court over the last three years, Plaintiff's SAC

again fails to adhere to Rule 8.

10

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Plaintiff's SAC also fails to allege specific wrongdoing against each individual Defendant,
instead grouping them together across all allegations. (See generally, SAC (referring only to
“Defendants” throughout).) As far as the Court can tell, Plaintiff only distinguishes between the
various Defendants a single time—in the case caption, Vd. at 1.) Under both Rules 12(b)(6) and
8(a)(2), a complaint must allege which Defendants engaged in what wrongful conduct with greater
specificity. See, e.g., Falat, 2013 WL 1163751, at *3; Sheeran y. Blyth Shipholding S.A., No. 14-
5482, 2015 WL 9048979, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2015) (dismissing pursuant to Rule 8 because the
“Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to separate out the liability for each defendant”); /ngris v. Borough of
Caldwell, No. 14-855, 2015 WL 3613499, at *5 (D.N.J. June 9, 2015) (“[T]o the extent Plaintiff
seeks to lump several defendants together without setting forth what each particular defendant is
alleged to have done, he has engaged in impermissibly vague group pleading.”); Shaw v. Hous.
Auth, of Camden, No. 11-4291, 2012 WL 3283402, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2012) (“Even under the
most liberal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must differentiate between
defendants,” (citation omitted)). Without specifying what each Defendant did, the Court is unable
to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, the court will dismiss all claims against Defendants because the Second
Amended Complaint contains no specific allegations of wrongdoing.®

Plaintiff's naked reference to “negligence” and factually unsupported references to a “legal
duty” are wholly insufficient to state a claim for negligence. Lackner v. United States, No. 22-
4951, 2025 WL 314965, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2025) (identifying the elements of a negligence

claim under New Jersey law as “(1) duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate cause; and

° The Court need not address any claims raised in Plaintiff's previous Complaints. Garrett v. Wexford
Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019) (“In general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading
and renders the original pleading a nullity. Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the
operative pleading.”) (cleaned up).

It

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(4) actual damages.”). Further, it is Plaintiffs burden to prove negligence. Taylor v, Fontenot, No.
05-1911, 2007 WL 9782881, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2007) (“The burden of proving negligence lies
with the plaintiff.”). As such, Plaintiff's invitation that this Court “determine if the Defendant
owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff’ is not the proper role of the Court? (See SAC at 2.)
Furthermore, per Plaintiffs own allegations, it appears that Defendants may not even have
reached a decision regarding his gun permit. (See SAC at 3.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims may
not yet be ripe. See Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454,
1462 (3d Civ. 1994) (finding that ripeness centers on whether an injury has occurred).® The Court
notes that there exists a statutory framework available to Plaintiff to appeal any gun permit denials
directly to the New Jersey Superior Court. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-3(d) (‘Any person
agerieved by the denial of a permit or identification card may request a hearing in the Superior
Court... .”). Of course, under certain circumstances, a plaintiff may have an actionable federal
claim arising from a state statute or the manner in which the statute is applied, which N.J. Stat.

Ann. § 2C:58-3 itself does not foreclose. However, at this juncture, it appears that “[t]he proper

’ Plaintiff may also not rely on his state-law negligence claim for jurisdiction in this Court following the
dismissal of his other federal claims. A claim for negligence under New Jersey law, particularly without
any allegations regarding an amount of damages or diversity of citizenship, is insufficient to confer any
form of subject matter jurisdiction. See Elmilligy vy. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 25-13497, 2025 WL 3268384,
af *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2025) (finding no federal question jurisdiction because negligence is a state-law tort
and the complaint failed to allege damages necessary to support diversity).

® While the issue is not before this Court, the Court notes that Plaintiff's claim might be barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, See Rooker v. Fid. Tr, Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldnian,
460 U.S. 462 (1983); see also Stephens v. Jerejian, No. 14-06688, 2023 WL 316344, at *2 (D.N.J, Jan. 17,
2023) (holding that Plaintiff's claims challenging a denial of his permits to purchase firearms was precluded
by Rooker-Feldman). Plaintiff cannot seek federal relief for previous losses in state court, fd. (“Rooker-
Feldman doctrine applies specifically to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.” (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp, v.
Saudi Basic Indus, Corp., 544 U.S, 280, 284 (2005))).

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course is for Plaintiff to re-apply for the permits so that he can demonstrate his fitness to purchase
the firearms.” Stephens y. Jerejian, No. 14-06688, 2023 WL 316344, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2023).

As to Plaintiffs Seventh Amendment claims, the Court notes that the Seventh
Amendment’s right to a trial by jury is not an independent vehicle, at least in this context, by which
Plaintiff can assert a freestanding cause of action. See Curtis v. Loether, 415. U.S. 189, 194 (1974)
(“The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury
trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for
damages in the ordinary courts of law.” (emphasis added)); see also Synesort Inc. v. Innovative
Routines Int'l, Ine., No. 04-3623, 2008 WL 11381901, at *7 (D.N.J. July 30, 2008) (“Courts have
consistently held that suits merely seeking injunctive relief, not monetary damages, are equitable
in nature and do not provide a right to jury trial.” (collecting cases)). By extension, Rule 38 does
not provide a cause of action either. See Mall Chevrolet, Ine. v. Gen, Motors LLC, No. 18-15077,
2021 WL 426193, at *18 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2021) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(a) provides
that ‘[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution-——or as
provided by a federal statute—is preserved to the parties inviolate.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
38(a))).

Additionally, Plaintiff's barebones allegations that Defendants did “not abide” by the
Constitution and that Defendants “abused” his civil rights are insufficient to state a claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Stackhouse v. City of East Orange, No. 07-5502, 2008 WL 4852680,
at *6 0.4 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2008) (noting that the plaintiff's “due process allegations are void of any
facts and cannot be construed as a cognizable claim,” where the plaintiff's complaint “failed to
specify the harm,” and concluding that the court could not “assume that the state procedures would

not afford him an adequate due process remedy” without particularized allegations).

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Finally, “[w]hile this Court is mindful of the Third Circuit’s teaching that a pro se civil
complaint, generally, should not be dismissed without allowing the litigant an opportunity to
amend, a dismissal with prejudice appears appropriate in the instant matter.” Jacobs v. A Robert
Depersia Agency, No. 09-0180, 2009 WL 799944, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2009) (internal citation
omitied) (citing Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2000)). The court need not grant Plaintiff
leave to amend if amendment would be “inequitable or futile.” See Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir, 2002) (citations omitted), Given Plaintiff's inability to satisfy
the pleading requirements of the federal rules across multiple complaints, spanning years, the
Court concludes that amendment would be futile and dismissal must be with prejudice. Jd; see
also Shaikh v. Germadnig, No. 23-2301, 2024 WL 2861845, at *4 (3d Cir. June 6, 2024) (per
curiam) (citing Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108) (finding that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion nor violate plaintiffs due process rights in denying plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint to better plead his claims).

Plaintiff has already had two chances to amend his complaint and has disregarded the
Court’s guidance on how to cure these procedural deficiencies, See Freeman v. TD Bank, No. 25-
1394, 2025 WL 3268455, at *2 Gd Cir. Nov. 24, 2025) (per curiam) (citing Mala, 704 F.3d at
244-45) (affirming the District Court’s denial of leave to amend where “the court clearly explained
why the original complaint was deficient and it need not have provided more advice,” and where
“nothing in [the parties’] filings suggests that they could amend their complaint to state any
colorable federal claim if given another chance.”).

Brown y. Cantineri, No. 14-6391, 2017 WL 481467, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017) (“Because
I have already given [plaintiff] one opportunity to amend, this dismissal is with prejudice.”);

Columbus LTACH Mgmt, LLC vy. Quantum LTACH Holdings, LLC, No. 16-6510, 2019 WL

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2281632, at *4 (D.N.J. May 29, 2019) (dismissing with prejudice because plaintiff had repeatedly

failed to correct the noted deficiencies in his pleading); cf Stephens v, Jerejian, 2015 WL 4749005,

at *3 (D.N.J. Aug, 6, 2015), aff'd per curiam, 655 F, App’x 64 (3d Cir. 2016) (dismissing both

facial and as-applied challenges to the New Jersey firearms regulation scheme with prejudice).

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's SAC with prejudice.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint is GRANTED. (ECF No. 58.) Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is hereby

DISMISSED with prejudice. (ECF No. 54.) The Clerk is di

La
ROBERT KiRSscH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: February 17, 2026

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