JOHNSON & JOHNSON TALCUM POWDER PRODUCTS MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
IN RE: JOHNSON & JOHNSON
TALCUM POWDER PRODUCTS
MARKETING, SALES
PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION
Case No. 3:16-md-2738 (MAS) (RLS)
MDL No. 2738
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. 	INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................1
II. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...................................... 2
A. 	The Talc MDL .......................................................................................2
B. 	The First Round of Rule 702 Motions .................................................. 3
C. 	Johnson & Johnson’s Bankruptcy Proceedings .................................... 4
D. 	The Current Round of Rule 702 Motions ............................................. 5
E. 	The Pending Daubert Motions .............................................................. 6
F. 	My Appointment and Duties as Special Master .................................... 8
III. 	OVERVIEW OF THE 2020 OPINION ........................................................... 9
A. 	Dr. Ghassan Saed.................................................................................10
B. 	Dr. William Longo............................................................................... 11
C. 	Drs. Anne McTiernan, Daniel Clarke-Pearson, and Arch Carson ...... 14
D. 	Dr. Gregory Diette ...............................................................................16
E. 	Dr. Cheryl Saenz..................................................................................18
F. 	Dr. Benjamin Neel ...............................................................................19
IV. 	LEGAL STANDARD ....................................................................................21
A. 	Federal Rule of Evidence 702 .............................................................21
B. 	2023 Amendment to Rule 702.............................................................22
1. 	The Amendments ......................................................................22
2. 	The Impact of the 2023 Amendment ........................................23
C. 	Daubert and its Progeny ......................................................................25
D. 	Admissibility Versus Weight ...............................................................30
E. 	Publication and Peer Review Status ....................................................34
V. 	GENERAL CAUSATION .............................................................................41
A. 	A Brief Primer Regarding Talc and Asbestos......................................42
B. 	Defendants’ General Causation Motions.............................................45
1. 	Scope of Review .......................................................................46
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Experts ......................................................................50
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3. 	The Bradford Hill Factors .........................................................55
4. 	Scientific Developments Since 2020 ........................................59
5. 	The Parties’ Bradford Hill Arguments ......................................68
i. 	Strength of the Association .............................................68
ii. 	Consistency .....................................................................92
iii. 	Biological Gradient (or Dose-Response
Relationship) ................................................................. 111
iv. 	Biological Plausibility ..................................................126
a. 	Ovarian Cancer Subtypes ...................................130
b. 	Migration ............................................................141
c. 	Inflammation, Oxidative Stress, and
Macrophage-Impairment ....................................179
(1) 	Talcum powder and chronic
inflammation, oxidative stress .................186
(2) 	Chronic inflammation and ovarian
cancer .......................................................212
(3) 	Macrophage-impairment and ovarian
cancer .......................................................234
v. 	The Remaining Bradford Hill Factors ..........................242
a. 	Specificity ...........................................................242
b. 	Coherence ...........................................................247
c. 	Analogy ..............................................................252
d. 	Experiment .........................................................255
e. 	Temporality ........................................................257
6. 	Asbestos ..................................................................................260
7. 	Heavy Metals and Fragrances .................................................279
i. 	Consideration of Defendants’ Arguments in the
2020 Opinion ................................................................280
ii. 	Summary of Plaintiffs’ Heavy Metals and
Fragrances Experts and Opinions .................................282
a. 	Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions .................283
b. 	Dr. Michael Crowley’s opinions ........................285
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c. 	Other experts ......................................................292
iii. 	Admissibility Analysis ..................................................304
a. 	Qualifications and Fit .........................................304
(1) 	Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s
qualifications and fit ................................306
(2) 	Dr. Crowley’s qualifications and fit ......... 309
(3) 	Other experts’ qualifications and fit......... 310
(a) 	Heavy metals .................................310
(b) 	Fragrances ......................................314
(c) 	Fit ...................................................315
b. 	Reliability ...........................................................315
(1) 	Heavy metals ............................................315
(a) 	Lack of connection to ovarian
cancer .............................................316
(b) 	Dose-response ................................325
(2) 	Dr. Crowley—fragrance chemicals.......... 328
(a) 	Lack of a link to ovarian cancer .... 329
(b) 	Dose-response ................................335
(c) 	Other experts’ opinions on
fragrance chemicals .......................337
C. 	Plaintiffs’ Motions to Exclude Defendants’ Rebuttal Experts’
Genetics-Related General Causation Opinions and Biological
Plausibility Opinions .........................................................................340
1. 	Defendants’ Experts ................................................................342
i. 	Drs. Saenz, Finan & Holcomb ......................................343
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................343
b. 	Relevant Opinions ..............................................346
ii. 	Dr. DiFeo ......................................................................350
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................350
b. 	Relevant Opinions ..............................................351
iii. 	Dr. Permuth ...................................................................353
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................353
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b. 	Relevant Opinions ..............................................354
iv. 	Dr. Boyd ........................................................................356
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................356
b. 	Relevant opinions ...............................................357
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Arguments ..............................................................363
i. 	Genetics-Related General Causation Opinions ............ 366
ii. 	Biological Plausibility Causation Opinions..................378
a. 	Constituents of Talcum Powder .........................378
b. 	Biological Plausibility Standard .........................388
iii. 	Dr. Boyd ........................................................................395
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................396
b. 	Reliability ...........................................................399
c. 	Fit........................................................................408
iv. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr.
Kornak ..........................................................................410
a. 	O’Brien 2024 ...................................................... 411
(1) 	The Sister Study .......................................412
(2) 	O’Brien 2024’s quantitative bias
analysis corrections ..................................413
(3) 	O’Brien 2024’s recall bias
adjustments...............................................416
(4) 	O’Brien 2024’s results .............................418
b. 	Dr. Kornak ..........................................................418
(1) 	Qualifications ...........................................418
(2) 	Methodology and opinions ......................419
(3) 	Reliability .................................................424
VI. 	CONTAMINATION AND TESTING MOTIONS......................................433
A. 	Asbestos.............................................................................................435
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’
Asbestos-Related Opinions .....................................................435
i. 	Drs. William Longo and Mark Rigler...........................435
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a. 	Qualifications .....................................................437
b. 	Methodology and Conclusions ...........................439
c. 	Analysis ..............................................................442
ii. 	Drs. Robert Cook and Mark Krekeler ..........................454
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................455
b. 	Dr. Robert Cook’s Methodology and
Conclusions ........................................................456
c. 	Dr. Mark Krekeler’s Methodology and
Conclusions ........................................................458
d. 	Drs. Robert Cook and Mark Krekeler’s
“Counsel-Generated Charts” ..............................460
e. 	The Adequacy of Drs. Robert Cook and
Mark Krekeler’s Factual Foundation .................463
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Geology Opinions of
Drs. Mary Poulton and Laura Webb .......................................473
i. 	Rule 702’s Qualification Requirement is Liberally
Construed ......................................................................474
ii. 	Dr. Mary Poulton’s Qualifications ................................475
iii. 	Dr. Laura Webb’s Qualifications ..................................478
iv. 	Analysis Regarding Dr. Mary Poulton .........................481
v. 	Analysis Regarding Dr. Laura Webb ............................488
B. 	Tissue Sample Motions .....................................................................495
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr.
Godleski ..................................................................................497
i. 	Qualifications ................................................................498
ii. 	Methodology and Opinions ..........................................500
iii. 	Reliability .....................................................................507
iv. 	Fit ..................................................................................538
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude The Opinions Of Dr. Juan
Felix And Dr. Teri Longacre ...................................................540
i. 	Qualifications ................................................................542
ii. 	Methodology and Opinions ..........................................545
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iii. 	Reliability .....................................................................548
VII. 	REGULATORY, MARKETING, AND CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE
OPINIONS ...................................................................................................551
A. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. David
Kessler, Laura Plunkett, William Sage, and George Newman..........551
1. 	Dr. Kessler ...............................................................................551
i. 	Qualifications ................................................................551
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Kessler’s Opinions .............................554
iii. 	Specific Exclusion Arguments and Legal Standards .... 556
a. 	Factual Narrative Challenge ...............................557
b. 	Legal Conclusions Challenge .............................560
c. 	State of Mind Challenge .....................................566
d. 	Ethical Opinion Challenge .................................569
iv. 	Reliability and Fit .........................................................574
v. 	Scope.............................................................................576
2. 	Dr. Plunkett .............................................................................579
i. 	Dr. Plunkett’s Qualifications.........................................579
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Plunkett’s Opinions............................582
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments................................585
iv. 	Reliability .....................................................................589
a. 	Risk-Assessment Methodology ..........................590
b. 	Regulatory-Based Methodology ........................596
v. 	Fit, Scope, and Specific Challenges .............................597
3. 	Dr. Sage ...................................................................................600
i. 	Dr. Sage’s Qualifications ..............................................600
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Sage’s Opinions .................................602
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments................................603
iv. 	Reliability and Scope ....................................................606
v. 	Fit ..................................................................................608
4. 	Dr. Newman ............................................................................610
i. 	Dr. Newman’s Qualifications .......................................610
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ii. 	Summary of Dr. Newman’s Opinions ..........................612
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments................................614
iv. 	Reliability .....................................................................617
v. 	Fit and Scope ................................................................621
5. 	Conclusion ..............................................................................623
B. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Dr. Kathleen Sutcliffe ........................623
1. 	Summary of Dr. Sutcliffe’s Opinions......................................624
2. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments ..........................................627
3. 	Dr. Sutcliffe’s Qualifications...................................................629
4. 	Reliability ................................................................................634
5. 	Fit and Scope...........................................................................637
VIII. CONCLUSION............................................................................................638
IX. 	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DECISION CHART ...................640
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SPECIAL MASTER, Hon. Freda L. Wolfson (ret.):
I. 	INTRODUCTION
This multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) consists of thousands of lawsuits filed
by 	individual 	consumers, 	represented 	by 	the 	Plaintiffs’ 	Steering 	Committee
(“Plaintiffs”), who claim that prolonged perineal use of Johnson & Johnson’s talcum
powder products causes ovarian cancer. As part of coordinated pretrial proceedings,
Plaintiffs and the moving defendants—Johnson & Johnson and LLT Management,
LLC, and now known as Red River Talc, LLC (“Defendants”)—have filed multiple
Daubert1 motions.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(a), the Court appointed me as
the Special Master for the limited purpose of addressing the parties’ Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 Daubert-related motions. As detailed below, the parties filed a total
of 17 motions challenging the admissibility of expert testimony. I have been tasked
with issuing a Report and Recommendation addressing whether the challenged
experts’ opinions satisfy Rule 702 and the related Daubert standard. Consistent with
my rigorous gatekeeping obligation, these recommendations address whether (1)
certain proffered experts are qualified to testify, (2) the proffered experts’ opinions
are based on a reliable methodology, and (3) the proffered experts’ testimony fits
within this case. My recommendations are based on the totality of materials
1 	Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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submitted, as well as arguments presented by the parties at an in-person hearing held
on November 25, 2025.
Specifically, I have considered the parties’ briefs, expert reports, deposition
transcripts, presentations during oral argument, and other supporting documents,
including the volume of studies upon which the experts relied in reaching their
conclusions. My reasonings and findings are set forth below, and my decisions are
summarized 	in 	a 	Chart 	attached 	at 	the 	conclusion 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation.2
II. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. 	The Talc MDL
Starting in October 2016, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(“JPML”) began transferring all federal actions involving talc-related ovarian cancer
to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey for coordinated pretrial
proceedings. (See ECF Nos. 1; 3; 9; 10; 14; 48; 61; 76; 77; 78; 80; 81.) The JPML
assigned this MDL to me in my then-role as a District Judge. I oversaw this MDL
until my retirement as Chief U.S. District Court Judge on February 1, 2023. Indeed,
I not only have institutional knowledge of this case, but I rendered various
substantive rulings in the MDL, including the Daubert opinion that is the subject of
2 	For purposes of this review, the terms ‘Report and Recommendation’ and ‘Opinion’ are
used interchangeably.
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the parties’ motions here. Following my retirement from the court, the JPML
assigned the MDL to Hon. Michael A. Shipp, U.S.D.J., who currently presides over
this litigation. (ECF No. 26591.) Since its inception, tens of thousands of cases have
been filed in the MDL. According to the JPML, as of January 5, 2026, this litigation
has over 67,000 actions now pending, with additional short form complaints filed on
a daily basis, making this the largest pending MDL in the United States by a
significant margin.
B. 	The First Round of Rule 702 Motions
After years of discovery in this MDL, in 2019, the parties proffered experts
on various scientific issues related to general causation and the testing of talcum
powder for asbestos and other contaminants. Each side moved to exclude the
testimony of certain of the other side’s experts. As discussed at length in Section III
of this Report and Recommendation, on April 27, 2020, I issued an Opinion and
Order denying Plaintiffs’ motions and granting in part, denying in part Defendants’
motions. See In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods. Mktg., Sales Pracs.
& Prods. Liab. Litig., 509 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.N.J. 2020) (“2020 Opinion”).
In short, while I limited certain conclusions drawn by Plaintiffs’ experts, I
declined to exclude their ultimate opinions that Defendants’ talcum powder products
contained trace amounts of asbestos and that, when applied to the perineum,
Defendants’ talc-based products may cause ovarian cancer in females. Prior to
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issuing my Opinion, I held a multi-day Daubert hearing at which five experts
testified 	on 	behalf 	of 	Plaintiffs 	(Drs. 	Ghassan 	Saed, 	William 	Longo, 	Anne
McTiernan, Daniel Clarke-Pearson, and Arch Carson) and three experts testified on
behalf of Defendants (Drs. Gregory Diette, Cheryl Saenz, and Benjamin Neel). Id.
at 128 & n.2. The parties selected these experts as representatives of each field of
science involved in this action. Id. at 128 n.2. After the issuance of my 2020 Opinion,
the parties proceeded to select bellwether trials.
C. 	Johnson & Johnson’s Bankruptcy Proceedings
However, starting in October 2021, Johnson & Johnson—by and through LTL
Management, LLC and later Red River Talc, LLC—attempted, on three separate
occasions, to use the bankruptcy court system to resolve all talc litigation. They were
unsuccessful. As a result of these bankruptcy proceedings, this MDL has been
subject to various stay orders over the years. Most recently, Red River Talc, LLC
filed suit in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in
September 2024, resulting in an automatic bankruptcy stay. However, on March 31,
2025, Hon. Christopher Lopez, U.S.B.J., entered a Memorandum Decision and
Order denying confirmation of Red River Talc LLC’s plan of reorganization and
dismissing its Chapter 11 case. (ECF No. 33426.) In April 2025, Defendants
declined to pursue an appeal of that decision, (id.), and thus, the stay terminated,
resuming this MDL.
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D. 	The Current Round of Rule 702 Motions
On March 27, 2024, after the second, but before the third, bankruptcy
proceeding, the Court entered the following Text Order allowing a full refiling of
the Rule 702 motions:
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ and
Defendants’ August 23, 2023 correspondences detailing a
disagreement as to the scope of Daubert motions. Upon
review of the parties’ contentions, the Court is persuaded
that the recent changes to Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
the emergence of new relevant science, and the language
of Chief Judge Wolfson’s previous Daubert Opinion make
a full refiling of Daubert motions appropriate.
(ECF No. 30260.) Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Court’s March 27, 2024 Text Order, which Defendants opposed. (ECF Nos. 31080;
32026; 32118.) The parties fundamentally disagreed (and perhaps still do) regarding
the purpose and scope of the renewed Rule 702 motions.
On April 30, 2024, the Court issued a Memorandum Order denying Plaintiffs’
motion for reconsideration and providing the parties “in more vivid detail how it
intends for [renewed] Daubert motions to proceed.” (ECF No. 32122 (the “April 30,
2024 Memorandum Order”) at 5.) The Court explained that, in holding that a full
refiling of the motions is appropriate, it intended “to open up all expert opinions to
Daubert challenges, even those previously considered by Chief Judge Wolfson.”
(Id.) However, the Court made clear that it did not intend to review de novo my prior
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findings or “to start Daubert motions over from scratch.” (Id. at 3.) To that end, the
Court provided the following guidance to the parties:
To ensure there is no room for confusion by the parties,
the Daubert procedure moving forward is as follows: if
Chief Judge Wolfson entered a decision on an issue and
either party wishes to challenge that decision, briefing on
the upcoming in limine motions should set forth Chief
Judge Wolfson’s previous decision and on what basis the
party contends that decision should be reconsidered. In
other words, the briefing should identify either: (1) that
Chief Judge Wolfson’s previous Opinion demonstrably
fails to adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023
amendments; or (2) new science is shown to directly
contradict or challenge Chief Judge Wolfson’s previous
findings. To the extent that the parties seek to file new
Daubert motions not previously considered by the Court,
the parties may file traditional Daubert motions without
restriction.
(Id. at 6.) On July 23, 2024, the parties filed their second round of Rule 702 motions
in accordance with the Court’s directive.
E. 	The Pending Daubert Motions
The parties have collectively filed a total of 17 Rule 702 motions, which
generally fall into four (sometimes overlapping) categories: (1) general causation;
(2) contamination and testing; (3) specific causation; and (4) corporate knowledge,
safety, regulatory compliance, and marketing. The parties seek to exclude, in whole
or in part, the testimony of at least 39 experts.
Specifically, Plaintiffs have filed the following nine motions:
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1. Motion to Exclude the Geology Opinions of Drs.
Mary Poulton and Laura Webb (ECF No. 32996);
2. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Kathleen
Sutcliffe (ECF No. 32998);
3. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. Michael
Finan, Cheryl Saenz, and Kevin Holcomb (ECF No.
32999);
4. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Jennifer
Permuth (ECF No. 33001);
5. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. Juan Felix
and Teri Longacre (ECF No. 33002);
6. Motion to Exclude the Asbestos Testing Opinions
of Matthew S. Sanchez, Ph.D., Ann G. Wylie, Ph.D.
and Shu-Chun Su, Ph.D. (ECF No. 33006);
7. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Analisa
DiFeo (ECF No. 33010);
8. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. John Kornak
(ECF No. 33011); and
9. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Defense Expert
Witness Dr. Jeff Boyd (ECF No. 33060).
In addition, Plaintiffs have filed (1) a Brief regarding the Rule 702 Standard,
(ECF No. 32994); and (2) a Response to the Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum
Order, (ECF Nos. 33009; 33109).
Defendants have filed the following eight motions:
1. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. David
Kessler, Laura Plunkett, William Sage and George
Newman (ECF No. 33000);
2. Motion to Exclude the Specific Causation Opinions
Offered by Dr. Judith Wolf (ECF No. 33003);
3. Motion 	to 	Exclude 	the 	Opinions 	of 	Dr. 	John
Godleski (ECF No. 33004);
4. Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinions
Regarding Alleged Heavy Metals and Fragrances in
Johnson’s Baby Powder and Shower to Shower
(ECF No. 33005);
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5. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Daniel
Clarke-Pearson (ECF No. 33007);
6. Motion to 	Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ General
Causation Opinions (ECF No. 33008);
7. Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Asbestos-
Related Opinions (ECF No. 33012); and
8. Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinions
Regarding Biological Plausibility/Mechanism (ECF
No. 33013).
After the bankruptcy stay terminated and this MDL resumed, the parties
urged, and the Court agreed, that the Rule 702 motions should be decided in an
expeditious manner so that the first bellwether trial can be conducted in Carter
Judkins v. Johnson & Johnson, et al., No. 3:19-cv-12430-MAS-RLS.
F. 	My Appointment and Duties as Special Master
On June 26, 2025, with the consent of the parties, the Court appointed me “as
a limited-purpose Special Master to address the Rule 702 Motions in this MDL.”
(ECF No. 39429 ¶ 1.) The Court explained that my appointment is both necessary
and appropriate because “there are numerous pending pretrial disputes ‘that cannot
be effectively and timely addressed’ by this Court,” and that my appointment “would
facilitate the prompt adjudication of these disputes and minimize delay in these
proceedings.” (Id. at 1, ¶ 1.)
As I previously advised the parties, the most efficient and orderly means of
resolving the pending Rule 702 motions is through a comprehensive Report and
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Recommendation, rather than deciding them piecemeal.3 In that regard, as directed
by the Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order, the purpose of filing the present
round of motions is not to seek a wholesale reconsideration of my prior Opinion.
Rather, my review of the motions is limited in two material respects: to the extent a
party challenges one of my prior rulings, reconsideration is warranted only if the
party establishes: (1) that my “previous Opinion demonstrably fails to adhere to Rule
702 as clarified by the 2023 amendments” with respect to the challenged ruling, or
(2) “new science is shown to directly contradict or challenge” my prior findings.
(ECF No. 32122 at 6.) Accordingly, I will confine this Report and Recommendation
to those circumstances expressly identified by the Court, including a full review of
new experts’ conclusions that were not previously addressed in my 2020 Opinion.
III. 	OVERVIEW OF THE 2020 OPINION
As mentioned above, I issued my Opinion and Order addressing the parties’
first round of Rule 702 motions on April 27, 2020. As to the scope of that Opinion,
I determined whether the parties’ eight representative experts were qualified to
testify in this MDL and whether their proffered testimony was admissible under the
prior iteration of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509
3 	As discussed more fully below, I am holding separate Daubert hearings with respect to Dr.
William Longo’s new PLM-chrysolite opinions and Plaintiffs’ experts on specific causation on a
schedule consistent with the availability of counsel and the experts. As a result, so as not to delay
the 	issuance 	of 	this 	Report 	and 	Recommendation, 	I 	will 	issue 	a 	separate 	Report 	and
Recommendation addressing those issues and experts.
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F. Supp. 3d at 128. Because my Opinion only addressed motions related to the
representative experts, I applied my reasoning “with equal force to the remainder of
the pending Daubert motions” and directed the parties “to confer and raise any issues
with respect to specific experts, e.g., qualifications, that are not covered by this
Opinion.” Id. at 129. I also recognized that the scientific landscape is not static, with
new studies being released addressing talc’s alleged carcinogenic properties. Id. at
129 n.6. Thus, I advised the parties that “I may amend my rulings at a later time” in
light of new and relevant studies. Id. Against that backdrop, I now provide an
overview of the parties’ then-filed Daubert motions, arguments, and my rulings.
A. 	Dr. Ghassan Saed
Dr. Ghassan Saed, who has not been proffered as an expert in this new round
of motion practice, was introduced by Plaintiffs as an expert in inflammation and
oxidative stress. Id. at 132. At Plaintiffs’ request, Dr. Saed and his laboratory
conducted an in vitro study to explore the role of talc in the carcinogenesis of ovarian
cancer. Id. at 133. After finding Dr. Saed qualified to testify as an expert, id. at 132
n.8, I discussed the design of Dr. Saed’s study and his methodologies, id. at 133–34.
Based on the results of his study, the relevant literature, and his experience, Dr. Saed
made several conclusions in his report, including that Johnson’s Baby Powder causes
cellular inflammation and oxidative stress, and that exposure to Johnson’s Baby
Powder can cause ovarian cancer. Id. at 134–35.
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Defendants sought to exclude Dr. Saed’s testimony by challenging the
admissibility of his opinions on multiple grounds. Id. at 135. I granted in part and
denied in part Defendants’ motion, id. at 129 n.3, upon consideration of the parties’
arguments and the reliability of Dr. Saed’s methodology and opinions, id. at 135–
47. First, I barred Dr. Saed from testifying “at any trial in this matter that his study
demonstrated a link between the use of talcum powder and ovarian cancer.” Id. at
140; see id. at 129 n.3. I found that “Dr. Saed’s opinion that talc causes ovarian
cancer is unsupported by the findings of his study” and that “Dr. Saed’s extrapolation
from inflammation to ovarian cancer is a step too far to constitute a reliable scientific
opinion.” Id. at 139; see id. at 135–40.
Nevertheless, I found Dr. Saed’s study “sufficiently reliable under Daubert to
show that the use of talc may cause inflammation and oxidative stress.” Id. at 140;
see id. at 140–47. Since there was a sufficient basis to support this opinion, I
concluded that the potential flaws highlighted by Defendants related to Dr. Saed’s
lab practices impacted the weight of his testimony, not admissibility. Id. at 146–47.
B. 	Dr. William Longo
Defendants moved to exclude the testimony of Dr. William Longo, who
Plaintiffs proffered as an expert in materials sciences. Id. at 147. I found Dr. Longo
“qualified to testify as an expert on the issue of whether the subject talc products
contain asbestos.” Id. At that time, Dr. Longo and his company, Materials Analytical
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Services, LLC (“MAS”), had tested 72 historical talc samples from the 1960s, 1970s,
1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s for the presence of asbestos using two different
methods: 	transmission 	electron 	microscopy 	(“TEM”) 	and 	polarized 	light
microscopy (“PLM”). Id. After performing these tests, Dr. Longo concluded that 50
out of 72 of the historical samples contained amphibole asbestos. Id. Dr. Longo
further opined that individuals who used Johnson & Johnson talcum powder
products “in the past, would have, more likely than not, been exposed to significant
airborne levels of both regulated amphibole asbestos and fibrous (asbestiform) talc.”
Id. (citation modified).
After carefully considering the parties’ arguments, Dr. Longo’s Daubert
hearing testimony, and the reliability of Dr. Longo’s TEM and PLM methodologies,
I granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion. Id. at 129 n.3; see id. at 147–
57. I found that Plaintiffs “met their burden of demonstrating that the doctor’s
testimony regarding the results of his TEM analysis is reliable for the purposes of
admission under 	Daubert.” 	Id. 	at 147–48. I addressed in detail Defendants’
arguments related to Dr. Longo’s application of the three-step TEM methodology,
including Defendants’ objections regarding Dr. Longo’s reliance on, and application
of, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) “counting rules” under the
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (“AHERA”) regulations. Id. at 148–54.
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I concluded that Defendants’ bases for exclusion did not render Dr. Longo’s TEM
analysis unreliable. Id. Rather, they were questions for a factfinder.
However, I held that Dr. Longo is not permitted to opine at trial as to his
findings of amphibole asbestos in Johnson & Johnson’s talcum powder products
based on his PLM analysis. Id. at 129 n.3, 148, 154–55. I determined that Dr. Longo
improperly, and unexplainedly, used the less sensitive International Organization for
Standardization (“ISO”) 22262-1 method to analyze the talc samples for the
presence of asbestos. Id. at 154–55. I found that Dr. Longo should have used ISO
22262-2 due to the ultra-trace amount of asbestos allegedly contained in the samples.
Id. I also took issue with the fact that “Dr. Longo changed his view regarding the
use of PLM to test cosmetic talc for asbestos solely for the purposes of this
litigation,” and that his PLM methodology “was replete with subjectivity and
reproducibility problems.” Id. at 155.
Furthermore, I barred Dr. Longo from testifying that females who used talcum
powder products in the past were exposed to asbestos. Id. at 129 n.3, 148, 156–57. I
found that Dr. Longo failed “to offer any scientific support for his opinion that the
use of Defendants’ talc products causes exposure, let alone significant exposure, to
asbestos.” Id. at 156–57. Critically, Dr. Longo failed to conduct an exposure
analysis, rendering his exposure-related opinion “too attenuated from his findings of
trace levels of asbestos in talc.” Id. at 157.
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Finally, I permitted Dr. Longo to opine “on the presence of ‘ultra-trace’
asbestos in Defendants’ talc products” because “the issue of whether there is
asbestos, and the amount of asbestos, in Defendants’ talc products are key issues in
this litigation.” Id. I also permitted other Plaintiffs’ experts in this litigation to rely
on Dr. Longo’s findings but limited their reliance solely to his finding that
Defendants’ talc products contain asbestos. Id.
C. 	Drs. Anne McTiernan, Daniel Clarke-Pearson, and Arch Carson
Defendants also sought to exclude Plaintiffs’ experts from opining on general
causation. I addressed three experts who “testified on behalf of Plaintiffs” at the
Daubert 	hearing “on the issue of general causation,” specifically “Dr. Anne
McTiernan, 	an 	epidemiologist; 	Dr. 	Daniel 	Clarke-Pearson, 	a 	gynecologic-
oncologist; and Dr. Arch Carson, a toxicologist.” Id. I found these individuals
qualified in their respective fields of expertise. Id. at 157–60.
In their reports, Drs. McTiernan, Clarke-Pearson, and Carson generally
opined that the use of Defendants’ talcum powder products in the genital perineal
area can cause ovarian cancer. Id. Each expert conducted a Bradford Hill analysis to
form their opinions. Id. The Bradford Hill factors are “(1) temporal relationship; (2)
strength of association; (3) dose-response relationship; (4) replication; (5) biological
plausibility; (6) consideration of alternative explanations; (7) cessation of exposure;
(8) specificity of the association; and (9) consistency with other knowledge.” Id. at
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160. 	In 	weighing 	these 	nine 	factors, 	these 	experts 	reviewed 	“the 	available
epidemiologic studies, which included 28 case control studies, 3 cohort studies, 3
meta-analyses, and 1 pooled analysis.” Id. at 161.
Defendants argued, as they do now, that the Bradford Hill analyses conducted
by Plaintiffs’ experts are unreliable and conclusion driven, thereby warranting
exclusion. Id. I disagreed, with one significant exception described below. After
finding 	that 	the 	Bradford 	Hill 	methodology 	itself 	is 	generally 	reliable 	for
determining a causal relationship, id., I evaluated whether Plaintiffs’ experts reliably
applied each Bradford Hill factor, see id. at 161–87. This analysis involved engaging
with the parties’ arguments, the law, and the science, including the epidemiologic
studies addressing the association between talc use and ovarian cancer. Id.
Ultimately, I found that Plaintiffs’ experts’ application of the Bradford Hill
methodology was reliable, “even if their conclusions in the context of some of these
factors demonstrate a relatively minimal causal relationship between talc use and
ovarian cancer.” Id. at 187. Specifically, I permitted Plaintiffs’ experts to testify at
trial that talcum powder can migrate up and through the female reproductive system
when applied to the perineum, and that once present in the ovaries, talcum powder
can cause chronic inflammation, which may lead to ovarian cancer. Id.; see id. at
172–76. However, I barred Plaintiffs’ experts from testifying “as to their theory that
ovarian cancer may be caused by the inhalation of talcum powder that travels
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through the lymphatic system to the ovaries.” Id. at 129 n.3; see id. at 176–77, 187.
I found that particular theory unreliable and not supported by the scientific evidence.
Id. at 176–77.
Finally, I recognized my important but limited role as gatekeeper under
Daubert. I acknowledged that “there does not appear to be scientific consensus on
the issue of the association between talc use and ovarian cancer.” Id. at 186. What
was (and still is) “clear from the general causation evidence relied on by the experts
on both sides in this matter, is that there is scientific evidence supporting each side’s
opinion.” Id. at 187. “At best, that the body of relevant scientific evidence is
inconclusive and may be open to different interpretations—does not mean one side’s
interpretation is more reliable than the other.” Id. Since Plaintiffs’ experts provided
a sufficiently reliable basis to support their general causation opinions, I determined
that “the question of whose experts are correct is a question for the jury” and that “it
would be erroneous for this Court to make those factual findings on a Daubert
motion.” Id.
D. 	Dr. Gregory Diette
Plaintiffs also filed motions to exclude various defense experts during the
initial round of motion practice. First, Plaintiffs sought to exclude the testimony of
Dr. Gregory Diette, an epidemiologist, who opined after conducting a Bradford Hill
analysis that the “relevant epidemiological evidence does not support a causal
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connection between perineal use of talcum powder products (whatever constituents
those products may contain in addition to talc) and ovarian cancer.” Id. at 188
(citation modified). The doctor focused on “the strength of association, consistency,
dose-response, 	and 	biological 	plausibility 	factors,” 	concluding 	they 	“did 	not
demonstrate a causal relationship.” Id.
While Plaintiffs implied “in their briefing that Dr. Diette is not qualified to
provide an epidemiological opinion as to the relationship between talc use and
ovarian cancer, because the primary focus of his research is pulmonary disease,” I
found that “Dr. Diette has extensive training and experience in epidemiology and,
further, 	that 	his 	medical 	training 	affords 	him 	the 	expertise 	to 	interpret
epidemiological studies.” Id.
Plaintiffs further claimed Dr. Diette failed to reliably apply the Bradford Hill
factors. Id. at 189. However, I found Dr. Diette’s opinions admissible because his
“testimony at the Daubert hearing and his expert report demonstrate that his opinions
reasonably flow from the epidemiological studies and that he followed a reliable
methodology in reaching his conclusions.” Id. at 190; see id. at 190–92.
Accordingly, I denied Plaintiffs’ motion because Dr. Diette’s opinions are
supported by good grounds. Id. at 192. While the parties fundamentally disagreed
“as to which experts’ opinion and interpretation is best,” it is not the Court’s role as
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gatekeeper under Daubert to determine which interpretation is best. “To do so would
usurp the role of the jury.” Id.
E. 	Dr. Cheryl Saenz
Plaintiffs also moved to exclude the opinions of Dr. Cheryl Saenz, a
gynecologic oncologist. Id. I found Dr. Saenz qualified to act as an expert, and after
finding her opinions admissible under Daubert, I denied Plaintiffs’ motion. Id. at
195; see id. at 192–95.
Dr. Saenz opined that “perineal application of talcum powder does not cause
ovarian cancer.” Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
forming her opinions, Dr. Saenz performed an extensive review of the epidemiologic
literature and relied on her experience as a gynecologic oncologist. Id. Dr. Saenz did
not conduct a full Bradford Hill analysis, choosing instead to focus on the strength
of association, consistency, coherence, dose-response, and biological plausibility
factors. Id.
Plaintiffs argued, in support of their motion, that Dr. Saenz improperly gave
greater weight to cohort studies over case-control studies, and that she “dismissed
statistically significant case-control studies simply because they had a relative risk
of less than 2.0” offering “ no epidemiologic authority for her dismissal of the case
control studies.” Id. at 193–94.
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I found that Dr. Saenz “provided ‘good grounds’ for her opinions with respect
to the weight she placed on the varying case-control and cohort studies.” Id. at 194.
Dr. Saenz explained that she placed more weight on cohort studies because they are
more scientifically credible than, and less prone to the biases of, case-control studies.
Id.
In addition, I concluded that “Dr. Saenz’s deliberate choice to not review”
several in vitro studies that Plaintiffs claim demonstrate their theory of biological
plausibility “does not render her opinion inadmissible.” Id. at 194–95. Dr. Saenz
reasonably “explained that because the studies referred to, but did not reveal, any
malignancy from talc, she did not view them as relevant on the question of biological
plausibility.” Id. at 195. Because experts are not required to review every single
study in the relevant body of literature, Plaintiffs’ line of attack was “better explored
on cross-examination.” Id. at 194–95.
F. 	Dr. Benjamin Neel
Finally, Plaintiffs sought to exclude the opinions of Dr. Benjamin Neel, a
cancer biologist, who proffered general causation opinions as well as a rebuttal to
Dr. Saed’s testimony regarding cellular inflammation. Id. at 195–96. Over Plaintiffs’
objection, I found Dr. Neel qualified “to render an opinion with respect to the
epidemiological studies under Daubert.” Id. at 197.
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Dr. Neel opined, after reviewing the epidemiologic literature and conducting
a Bradford Hill analysis, that “there is no evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claim that
perineal use of talcum powder can cause ovarian cancer.” Id. at 196. Next, Dr. Neel
opined that “Dr. Saed’s in vitro study was ‘flawed on multiple levels’ and that the
results of his study do not support his conclusion that Defendants’ products can
cause ovarian cancer.” Id. (citation omitted). He further opined that “[t]alc is not
genotoxic, does not cause mutations, does not cause inflammation in the female
genitourinary tract and has not been shown to cause ovarian cancer.” Id. at 195–96
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs argued that Dr. Neel’s opinion regarding biological plausibility is
unreliable because he did not consider the alleged components of talcum powder,
such as asbestos and heavy metals. Id. at 196–97. I disagreed, finding the alleged
contamination of talc irrelevant to Dr. Neel’s opinions because he was proffered to
rebut Dr. Saed’s methodology in his in vitro study, which made no findings as to
whether any component of talc is carcinogenic. Id. at 197. Plaintiffs further argued
that Dr. Neel’s Bradford Hill analysis is unreliable because he placed too much
weight on biological plausibility. Id. Again, I disagreed. Id. at 197–98. I found that
“Dr. Neel presented good grounds for his opinion that, where an association is weak
and inconsistent, biological plausibility may become more important in the overall
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Bradford Hill analysis.” Id. at 197. Accordingly, I denied Plaintiffs’ motion to
exclude Dr. Neel’s opinions. Id. at 198.
IV. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Federal Rule of Evidence 702
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. As
amended effective December 1, 2023, Rule 702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the
form 	of 	an 	opinion 	or 	otherwise 	if 	the 	proponent
demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not
that:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of
the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid.702 (emphasis added to reflect the changes from the prior rule).
Based on the Rule, the party offering expert testimony bears the burden of
establishing its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence, consistent with
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a). Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 & n.10; see Fed. R.
Evid.104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a
witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.”); Fed. R. Evid.702
advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“[T]he admissibility of all expert
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testimony is governed by the principles of Rule 104(a).”). “The preponderance
standard ensures that before admitting evidence, the court will have found it more
likely than not that the technical issues and policy concerns addressed by the Federal
Rules of Evidence have been afforded due consideration.” Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
B. 	2023 Amendment to Rule 702
1. 	The Amendments
First, and critically, Rule 702 was “amended to clarify and emphasize that
expert testimony may not be admitted unless the proponent demonstrates to the court
that it is more likely than not that the proffered testimony meets the admissibility
requirements set forth in the rule.” Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note to
2023 amendment (citing Fed. R. Evid.104(a)). The Advisory Committee explained
that, in the years leading up to the amendment, “many courts” had erroneously “held
that the critical questions of the sufficiency of an expert’s basis, and the application
of the expert’s methodology, are questions of weight and not admissibility.” Id.
Therefore, the amendment is meant to clarify that “the preponderance standard”
under Rule 104(a) “applies to the three reliability-based requirements added in
2000—requirements that many courts have incorrectly determined to be governed
by the more permissive Rule 104(b) standard.” Id.
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Before admitting expert testimony, a court must ensure that the party offering
the testimony has established—by a preponderance of the evidence—that the
testimony will assist the trier of fact and that it is “based on sufficient facts or data,”
“the product of reliable principles and methods,” and is “a reliable application of
those principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid.702(a)–(d).
Second, Rule 702(d) was “amended to emphasize that each expert opinion
must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded from a reliable application of
the expert’s basis and methodology.” Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note
to 2023 amendment. The Advisory Committee reiterated the importance of the
court’s gatekeeping role “because just as jurors may be unable, due to lack of
specialized knowledge, to evaluate meaningfully the reliability of scientific and
other methods underlying expert opinion, jurors may also lack the specialized
knowledge to determine whether the conclusions of an expert go beyond what the
expert’s basis and methodology may reliably support.” Id.
2. 	The Impact of the 2023 Amendment
The Advisory Committee made clear that the amendment to Rule 702 is
limited in nature, stating: “Nothing in the amendment imposes any new, specific
procedures. Rather, the amendment is simply intended to clarify that Rule 104(a)’s
requirement applies to expert opinions under Rule 702.” Id. The Committee further
explained that the Rule does not require “the court to nitpick an expert’s opinion in
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order to reach a perfect expression of what the basis and methodology can support.”
Id. Nor does the preponderance standard “require perfection.” Id. On the other hand,
Rule 702 “does not permit the expert to make claims that are unsupported by the
expert’s basis and methodology.” Id.
Since the amendments, courts have consistently concluded, and the parties do
not dispute, that the amendments “did not substantively change the relevant [Rule
702] standard.” EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC, 137 F.4th 1333, 1339 n.8 (Fed. Cir.
2025); see Le v. Zuffa, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-01045, 2024 WL 195994, at *5 n.5 (D.
Nev. Jan. 18, 2024) (“[The 2023] amendment codified what was already the
prevailing understanding of Rule 702’s requirements.”); Reflex Media, Inc. v.
SuccessfulMatch.com, 758 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (explaining that
the 2023 “amendment is not intended to be a ‘seachange’ in the performance of the
Court’s ‘gatekeeper’ function with respect to the admissibility of expert opinions”);
In re Valsartan, Losartan, & Irbesartan Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 19-md-02875, 2025
WL 1024048, at *9 n.15 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2025) (stating that “[t]he amendment does
not substantively alter Rule 702”); In re Acetaminophen—ASD-ADHD Products
Liab. Litig., 707 F. Supp. 3d 309, 335 n.27 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Nothing in the
amendment imposes any new, specific procedures.” (quoting Fed. R. Evid.702
advisory committee’s note to 2023 amendment)).4 Indeed, Judge Shipp, in his April
4 	In re Acetaminophen is currently on appeal in the Second Circuit.
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30, 2024 Memorandum Order here, likewise concluded that the 2023 amendment to
“Rule 702 did not change evidentiary standards, but clarified them.” (ECF No.
32122, at 4.) Consequently, cases interpreting Rule 702 that “predate the 2023
amendments remain fully applicable.” Reflex Media, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 3d at 1049.
C. 	Daubert and its Progeny
The 	U.S. 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	long 	recognized 	that, 	in 	determining
admissibility under Rule 702, courts serve “a gatekeeping role” to ensure “an
expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at
hand.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
147–48 (1999) (applying the gatekeeping role to all expert testimony, not just
scientific testimony). Similarly, in the Third Circuit, courts apply this “rigorous
gatekeeping function” to prevent the jury from hearing expert testimony that does
not have the proper indicia of reliability. Cohen v. Cohen, 125 F.4th 454, 460 (3d
Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
It is well settled that “Rule 702 contains three distinct substantive restrictions
on the admission of expert testimony: qualifications, reliability, and fit.” Id. (citation
modified); see Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404 (“Rule 702 embodies a trilogy of
restrictions on expert testimony . . . .”).
“First, the witness must be qualified to testify as an expert.” Calhoun v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2003). “Qualification
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requires that the witness possess specialized expertise.” Id. (citation modified). This
requirement is liberally construed, and courts have held that “a broad range of
knowledge, skills, and training qualify an expert as such.” Id. (citation modified).
“Second, 	the 	testimony 	must 	be 	reliable.” 	Id. 	“Daubert’s 	reliability
requirement ensures that an expert’s testimony is based on the methods and
procedures of science, not on subjective belief and unsupported speculation.” Cohen,
125 F.4th at 461 (citation modified). However, “admissibility does not hinge on
whether a particular scientific opinion has the best foundation, or even whether the
opinion is supported by the best methodology or unassailable research.” Id. at 462
(citation modified). “The court instead looks to whether the expert’s testimony is
supported by good grounds.” Id. (citation modified). “This inquiry applies to all
aspects of an expert’s testimony: the methodology, the facts underlying the expert’s
opinion, and the link between the facts and the conclusion.” Id. (citation modified).
To determine whether an expert’s testimony is supported by good grounds,
the court may consider any of these several factors:
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2)
whether the method has been subject to peer review; (3)
the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and
maintenance 	of 	standards 	controlling 	the 	technique’s
operation; (5) whether the method is generally accepted;
(6) the relationship of the technique to methods which
have been established to be reliable; (7) the qualifications
of the expert witness testifying based on the methodology;
and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has been
put.
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Id. (citation modified). These factors are not “a definitive checklist or test.” Daubert,
509 U.S. at 593. Rather, the court’s inquiry is “a flexible one” that focuses “on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 594–
95.
With that said, “conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from
one another” and a court is not required “to admit opinion evidence that is connected
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 146 (1997). “A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Id. As such, it is
appropriate for the court to “examine the expert’s conclusions in order to determine
whether they could reliably follow from the facts known to the expert and the
methodology used.” Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
Third, and finally, “the expert testimony must fit, meaning the expert’s
testimony must be relevant for the purposes of the case and must assist the trier of
fact.” Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 321 (citation modified). “Fit is not always obvious, and
scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other,
unrelated 	purposes.” 	Cohen, 	125 	F.4th 	at 	464 	(citation 	modified). 	The 	fit
requirement “goes primarily to relevance, so an expert’s testimony will be excluded
if it is not scientific knowledge for purposes of the case.” Id. (citation modified);
Hoefling v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co., LLC, 576 F. Supp. 3d 262, 279 (E.D. Pa.
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2021) (“Although they may be logically relevant in the evidentiary sense, they lack
a specific connection to general causation here. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.,
35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating the fit standard is ‘higher than bare
relevance’).” (citation omitted)).
Rule 702 equally applies to rebuttal experts. See Fed. R. Evid.702; Capri Sun
GmbH v. Am. Beverage Corp., 595 F. Supp. 3d 83, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“[R]ebuttal
experts must [still] meet Daubert’s threshold standards regarding the qualifications
of the expert, sufficiency of the data, reliability of the methodology, and relevance
of the testimony.” (alterations in original) (quoting In re Digital Music Antitrust
Litig., 321 F.R.D. 64, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-
8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 348 F. Supp. 3d 680, 696 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (noting that rebuttal
expert “testimony must still be based upon reliable science, as required by
Daubert.”); accord In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., No. 16-md-2724,
2024 WL 4980784, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2024); Cohen, 125 F.4th at 461 (“[T]he
proponent of [rebuttal expert] testimony must still be ‘offering a qualified expert
with good grounds to support his criticism.’” (quoting U.S. v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d
215, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)).
However, even so, parties offering rebuttal expert evidence often do not bear
the burden of proof, such as demonstrating causality. Accordingly, rebuttal experts
are generally not required to conduct a parallel analysis mirroring the methodology
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being critiqued. See Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 138 (“Rebuttal experts
thus ‘have a less demanding task because they have no burden to produce models or
methods of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiff[’s] expert[].’”
(alterations in original) (quoting In re Digital Music, 321 F.R.D. at 78)); U.S. Bank,
N.A. v. Glogowski L. Firm, PLLC, 339 F.R.D. 579, 581 (W.D. Wash. 2021)
(“Defendants, on the other hand, will often produce expert reports solely for the
purpose of contradicting 	or rebutting 	a plaintiff’s 	report 	because defendants
generally need not produce any evidence to prevail.”).
Instead, courts recognize that “the proper role of rebuttal experts [is] to
critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out potential flaws in the
plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct Mktg., Inc., 829
F. Supp. 2d 802, 835 (D. Minn. 2011); see Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d 530,
551 (D.N.J. 2004) (“Rebuttal evidence is properly admissible when it will ‘explain,
repel, counteract or disprove the evidence of the adverse party.’” (quoting Step-
Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 752 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991))); see also, e.g., Mahaska
Bottling Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (explaining that courts routinely permit defense
experts to testify “even if the expert primarily critiques the opposing expert’s
approach without offering an alternative approach”); In re Abilify (Aripiprazole)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1368 (stating that defense experts’ “opinions
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properly may be limited to criticizing the analysis and conclusions presented by
another party”); Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (“At bottom, a rebuttal
expert need not proffer a methodology or model, but only critique the opposing
expert’s.”); In re Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (“[D]efendants’ experts have a
less demanding task, since they have no burden to produce models or methods of
their own; they need only attack those of plaintiffs’ experts.”); Aviva Sports, Inc.,
829 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (“A number of other district courts have held that rebuttal
expert witnesses may criticize other experts’ theories and calculations without
offering alternatives.”) (collecting cases).
That said, it is the court that serves as the gatekeeper of expert evidence, not
a rebuttal expert. To the extent that a rebuttal expert usurps the court’s role in
determining the admissibility of expert evidence offered by the opposing party, those
opinions may be inadmissible. See T.N. Incorporation, Ltd. v. Fid. Nat’l Info. Servs.,
Inc., No. 18-cv-5552, 2021 WL 5980048, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2021) (“It is the
role of the trial court, not expert witnesses, to act as ‘gatekeepers’ to ensure the
relevance and reliability of all expert testimony.”).
D. 	Admissibility Versus Weight
While this issue will be addressed in greater detail in each relevant context for
the expert(s) being challenged, the governing principle is well established and
straightforward: “Determinations of admissibility, which fall within the gatekeeping
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role of the court, are separate from determinations of weight and credibility, which
are within the province of the jury in a jury case.” EcoFactor, Inc., 137 F.4th at 1339.
In practice, however, the boundary between the court’s gatekeeping role and the
factfinder’s function has often proven difficult to delineate, particularly where, as
here, Rule 702 challenges implicate highly technical and complex scientific issues.
Recognizing this difficulty, the Advisory Committee explained that certain
“challenges to expert testimony will raise matters of weight rather than admissibility
even under the Rule 104(a) standard.” Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note
to 	2023 	amendment. 	According 	to 	the 	Committee, 	and 	consistent 	with 	the
preponderance standard, “once the court has found it more likely than not that the
admissibility requirement has been met, any attack by the opponent will go only to
the weight of the evidence.” Id. For instance, if a court finds that an expert has a
sufficient basis to support an opinion, “the fact that the expert has not read every
single study that exists will raise a question of weight and not admissibility.” Id.
However, the Committee did not address the types of deficiencies that would render
an expert’s methods or results unreliable in the first instance.
In a law review article that predated the 2023 amendment, Hon. Thomas D.
Schroeder, who at the time was a Member of the United States Judicial Conference
Advisory 	Committee 	on 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Evidence 	and 	Chair 	of 	the
Subcommittee on Rule 702, addressed what he saw as “lingering confusion in the
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caselaw as to the proper standard for the trial court’s discharge of its gatekeeping
role for the admission of expert testimony.” Thomas D. Schroeder, Toward a More
Apparent Approach to Considering the Admission of Expert Testimony, 95 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 2039, 2040 (2020). As a result, Judge Schroeder proposed “several
suggestions for trial and appellate courts to consider for better decisionmaking in
discharging their duty to apply Rule 104(a)’s preponderance standard to the elements
of Rule 702.” Id.
Relevant 	here, 	one 	of 	Judge 	Schroeder’s 	suggestions 	provides 	helpful
guidance regarding the point at which a particular challenge to an expert’s method
or results crosses the line from a question of weight to one of admissibility:
[T]here will be challenges to the weight of an opinion’s
basis even under a proper Rule 104(a) analysis. This does
not automatically render the question one for a jury, as
some of the cases suggest. Rather, the trial judge, as
gatekeeper, must determine whether such challenges are
so significant that the factual basis for the opinion fails to
reach the preponderance standard or, instead, whether the
alleged defects are sufficiently minor, such that they do
not undermine the remaining basis. In the latter instance,
the alleged flaws do not impugn the reliability or validity
of the method or results. For example, an expert who
allegedly failed to include a handful of patients in a study
of over 100 patients, or an expert whose opinion is
supported by a dozen studies but is contrary to a study that
would not undermine her ultimate conclusion would likely
pass the Rule 104(a) bar. Of course, where there is a
legitimate question of fact on which the admissibility of
the expert opinion turns, Rule 104(a) does not allow the
trial court to make that call, and the jury must decide.
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Id. at 2061–62.
In distinguishing between “significant” and 	“minor” defects, the Sixth
Circuit’s recent decision in 	In re Onglyza, 93 F.4th 339 (6th Cir. 2024), is
instructive.5 	See 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Evidence—Expert 	Testimony—Judicial
Conference Amends Rule 702, 138 Harv. L. Rev. 899, 905 (2025) (“Drafters of the
amendments may be encouraged by the Sixth Circuit,” including its In re Onglyza
decision, “which has enthusiastically embraced the amendments to Rule 702.”).
In that MDL, the plaintiffs alleged that saxagliptin, a diabetes drug, caused
their heart failure. In re Onglyza, 93 F.4th at 342. The district court excluded Dr.
Parag 	Goyal, 	the 	plaintiffs’ 	sole 	general 	causation 	expert, 	finding 	that
methodological flaws rendered his testimony unreliable under Rule 702. Id. at 342,
344. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the
lower court had three valid reasons to find Dr. Goyal’s testimony unreliable. Id. at
348. First, his reliance on a single study “to the exclusion of all other studies
involving human data,” including four studies that found no association between
saxagliptin and heart failure, “was unreliable.” Id. at 345. “By ignoring all other
human studies” without adequate explanation, “Dr. Goyal failed to base his opinion
5 	The Sixth Circuit applied the “old” version of Rule 702 “because it was still in force at the
time of the district court’s decision (January 5, 2022).” In re Onglyza, 93 F.4th at 345 n.4.
Nevertheless, the court explained that “the district court’s reasoning aligns with the updated Rule
702, since it placed the burden of showing that Dr. Goyal was admissible on plaintiffs,” and that
its “decision here would be the same under either version of the Rule.” Id.
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on ‘sufficient facts or data.’” Id. at 346 (citing Fed. R. Evid.702(b)). Second, “Dr.
Goyal’s use of animal data was unreliable because he has no expertise in interpreting
animal studies.” Id. at 347. In addition to being unqualified and relying on studies
that did not diagnose the animals with heart failure, “Dr. Goyal admitted to ignoring
multiple peer-reviewed animal studies dispelling a causal link between saxagliptin
and heart failure.” Id. Finally, “Dr. Goyal did not reliably apply Bradford Hill” since
he “cherry-picked data to bolster his case” and “inconsistently applied several
Bradford Hill factors.” Id. In light of these significant defects, the plaintiffs failed to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Goyal satisfied Rule 702’s
admissibility requirements. Id. at 348.
E. 	Publication and Peer Review Status
While not dispositive, “publication in a peer reviewed journal is relevant ‘in
assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which
an opinion is premised.’” United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515, 520 (D.N.J.
2000) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594); accord In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613,
663–64 (3d Cir. 1999). As such, “[p]ublication in a peer-reviewed journal typically
satisfies” the consideration of whether “‘the theory and procedures have been
submitted 	to 	the 	scrutiny 	of 	the 	scientific 	community.’” 	United 	States 	v.
Gissantaner, 990 F.3d 457, 464 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Bonds, 12
F.3d 540, 559 (6th Cir. 1993)). This is so because peer review “‘conditions
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publication on a bona fide process’ of review by other scientists and experts in the
field.” Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1995)). Indeed, the peer review process for publication in a scientific journal is
far more rigorous than that of a student publication or a law journal. Gissantaner,
990 F.3d at 464–65 (“No offense to former, current, and future members of law
journals everywhere: But it is one thing to convince lawyers in training to publish a
piece; it is quite another to convince peers in a professional community to publish a
piece. That is why readership and citation are pivotal when it comes to legal
scholarship and why publication itself is noteworthy in scientific scholarship—and
ultimately why publication in a peer-reviewed journal alone typically satisfies this
Daubert inquiry.”); see id. (collecting cases). “[S]ubmission to the scrutiny of the
scientific community is a component of ‘good science,’ in part because it increases
the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.” Daubert, 509
U.S. at 593.
As such, expert testimony based on sound conclusions reasonably drawn from
peer-reviewed studies is typically considered reliable. Even “‘flaws in methodology’
uncovered by peer review do not necessarily equate to a lack of scientific validity,
since the methods may be based on scientific principles and the alleged flaws go
merely to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence and the testimony.”
Bonds, 12 F.3d at 559. Rather, “peer review and publication should be viewed as
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evidence that the theory and methodology are scientific knowledge capable of being
scrutinized and have in fact been scrutinized by the scientific community.” Id.
However, peer review and publication status of a study do not insulate it from
judicial scrutiny. Goodrich v. John Crane, Inc., No. 4:17-cv-00009, 2018 WL
4677773, at *23 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2018) (rejecting argument that study was
reliable simply because it “ha[d] been peer reviewed” and “published”). One such
instance where a court may exclude expert testimony based on a peer-reviewed study
is 	when 	the study’s methodology 	is 	so flawed, the court cannot 	ignore its
deficiencies. See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 737 F. Supp. 3d 898, 902–03,
908–09 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (excluding expert who relied on a peer-reviewed, published
meta-analysis because “simply intoning that a paper was peer-reviewed and that it
was (apparently) produced before the author was thinking about getting involved in
litigation isn’t enough to compensate for methodological problems as glaring as
those described here,” the flaws being that the hypothesis contemplated a dose-
response relationship even though at least one study showed no dose-response
relationship, diluting the results by mixing study types and data, using inconsistent
exposure measurements, and failure to adjust results for exposure to other potential
toxins), aff’d sub nom., Bulone v. Monsanto Co., No. 24-cv-4241, 2025 WL 2730843
(9th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025)); In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F. Supp.
3d 1075, 1164–65, 1171–73 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (criticizing experts’ reliance on two
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published, peer-reviewed studies in part because the court found, upon its own
“substantive review,” that both studies failed to control for confounding factors, and
“even if general acceptance of the methodologies used in these two studies was
established, acceptance in the scientific community and peer review are not
necessarily sufficient to establish the reliability of a scientific methodology”);
Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 666, 678 (D. Nev. 1996)
(excluding the testimony of an expert whose “study suffer[ed] from very serious
flaws” because the expert “took no steps to eliminate selection bias in the study
group, he failed to identify the background rate for the observed disorders in the
[relevant] community, he failed to control for potential recall bias, he simply ignored
the lack of reliable dosage data, he chose a tiny sample size, and he did not attempt
to eliminate so-called confounding factors which might have been responsible for
the incidence of neurological disorders in the subject group”); Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt
Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 974 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (citing with approval a case
where “the district court rejected a peer-reviewed article, but only after pointing out
that the reviewers were not in a position to identify certain flaws in the protocol used
in the study, were not given the results of trials showing different results and were
not given the comments of the FDA ‘concerning the inadequacies of the . . . results’”
(quoting Zeneca, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1999 WL 509471, at *29–30 (S.D.N.Y. July
19, 1999))).
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Moreover, 	articles 	published 	in 	peer-reviewed 	journals 	are not 	always
sufficient to support an expert’s opinion. See, e.g., In re Paraquat Prods. Liab. Litig.,
730 F. Supp. 3d 793, 849 (S.D. Ill. 2024) (explaining that, when considering the
“brevity and lack of scientific analysis” in an “opinion article” published in a peer-
reviewed journal, “the Court was and still is skeptical of its ability to independently
validate Dr. Wells’ general causation opinion”).6 Nor can an expert support his or
her opinion with one peer-reviewed article to the complete exclusion of other
relevant data. In re Onglyza, 93 F.4th at 343, 345–47 (affirming exclusion of an
expert who relied on one published human study and several animal studies because
the expert (1) without explanation, ignored other human studies, and (2) conceded
he was not qualified to interpret animal studies’ data as it applied in humans).
6 	When analyzing the peer-review status, a court may distinguish between “true peer review”
and pre-publication peer review or “editorial peer review.” “True peer review” is “the essence of
science” and is accomplished when “[o]ne investigator makes her methods and findings public, so
that others can attack or support her conclusion by following the same protocols while asking what
besides the stated principle could account for the documented results.” Valentine, 921 F. Supp. at
675. In contrast, “‘editorial peer review’ consists of the reference by a journal editor of an article
submitted for publication to two or more outside reviewers,” who “make confidential comments
on the article’s scientific accuracy, style, originality and importance, and make a recommendation
to the journal that the article be accepted or rejected.” Id. “Because the scope of editorial peer
review is necessarily narrower than true peer review, it is a serious error to conflate the two
processes, and, by extension, to assume that because an article is accepted for publication, even in
a prestigious scientific journal, that the science it contains is therefore valId.” Id. However, this is
not to suggest that articles subject to “editorial peer review” should per se fail under Daubert, or
that the distinction will necessarily arise in every case, particularly since peer review is not, on its
own, dispositive. Indeed, “expert testimony does not have to obtain general acceptance or be
subject to peer review to be admitted under Rule 702.” Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 406 (3d
Cir. 2003). And “[w]here there are other factors that demonstrate the reliability of the expert’s
methodology, an expert opinion should not be excluded simply because there is no literature on
point.” Id. For instance, “the particular application at issue may never previously have interested
any scientist,” leaving no opportunity for peer review. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 151.
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Critically, courts must bear in mind that the above-cited peer-review examples
represent the exception, not the rule. Indeed, peer review remains a “matter[] far
afield from the expertise of judges,” and as such, courts should exercise “great
caution in deciding more than” is necessary. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 599 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As such, it will apparently be the case
more often than not that the factfinder is permitted to hear the expert testimony, as
parties’ disputes or critiques regarding the testimony will go to its weight rather than
admissibility. Boncher v. 3M Co., No. 5:24-cv-01403, 2025 WL 511116, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 14, 2025) (“The Court notes Defendants’ objections to the limitations of the
design and implementation of [a seminal study], including its failure to avoid or
address potential confounding by other infection control measures instituted by the
hospital. However, these limitations and potential shortcomings in the research do
not make the study per se unreliable, as the strength of the study goes to its weight,
not admissibility.” (citation omitted)). “A test need not perfectly and identically
recreate real-world conditions 	to be reliable enough 	to 	clear 	Daubert’s low
admissibility bar: Daubert ‘does not require a paradigm of scientific inquiry as a
condition precedent to admitting expert testimony.’ Admissibility just requires good
grounds . . . .” VanDine v. Summit Treestands, LLC, 738 F. Supp. 3d 599, 613 (E.D.
Pa. 2024) (citation modified) (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 156
(3d Cir. 2000)). As the First Circuit summarized: “As long as an expert’s scientific
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testimony rests upon ‘good grounds, based on what is known,’ it should be tested by
the adversary process—competing expert testimony and active cross-examination—
rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its
complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.” Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of
Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 596).
In sum, when evaluating expert testimony under Rule 702, the court must
undertake its gatekeeping function with rigor, ensuring—by a preponderance of the
evidence—that the expert is qualified, that his or her opinion is grounded in
sufficient facts or data, that it flows from reliable principles and methods, and that
those methods have been reliably applied to the case-specific facts. This inquiry is
flexible, but it is not perfunctory; the court must examine both methodology and the
logical connection between underlying facts and the conclusions drawn, excluding
opinions that rest on speculation, cherry-picking, or analytical gaps too great to
overlook. At the same time, the Rule recognizes that not every flaw is fatal—once
the minimum reliability threshold is met, remaining criticisms generally speak to
weight, not admissibility, and become the province of the factfinder. Ultimately, the
court’s task is to admit only those opinions supported by “good grounds,” while
reserving unreliable or methodologically unsupported conclusions from reaching the
jury.
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V. 	GENERAL CAUSATION
The parties have filed five motions concerning general causation, which
addresses “whether an agent increases the incidence of disease in a group” as
compared to specific causation, which asks “whether the agent caused any given
individual’s disease.” Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 623, 627 (3d ed. 2011).7
In this MDL, each side has proffered multiple, distinguished experts who
opine on the question of whether exposure to Defendants’ talcum powder products—
including all alleged contaminants—is capable of causing ovarian cancer. I will first
address Defendants’ general causation motions, along with Defendants’ causation-
related arguments concerning asbestos, fibrous talc, heavy metals, and fragrances,
before turning to Plaintiffs’ general causation motions.
7 	As in my prior Opinion, I rely on the Reference Guide on Epidemiology for guidance on
issues of general causation. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 160 n.34. This guide is
part of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, a compilation of reference guides intended
“to provide the tools for judges to manage cases involving complex scientific and technical
evidence.” Fed. Judicial Ctr., Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence xv (3d ed. 2011). Relevant
here, epidemiology is the “study of the distribution and determinants of disease or other health-
related states and events in populations and the application of this study to control of health
problems.” Green at 623.
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A. 	A Brief Primer Regarding Talc and Asbestos8
Talc is a naturally occurring mineral that is mined from the Earth for
commercial purposes. In its pure mineral form, talc “is a hydrous magnesium
phyllosilicate 	mineral 	with 	a 	chemical 	composition 	of 	Mg3Si4O10(OH)2.”
(Interagency 	Working 	Grp. 	on 	Asbestos 	in 	Consumer 	Prods., 	White 	Paper:
IWGACP Scientific Opinions on Testing Methods for Asbestos in Cosmetic Products
Containing Talc 27 (Dec. 2021) (“IWGACP White Paper”).)9 Talc morphology is
typically described as platy or lamellar—that is, flat and plate-like. (Id. at 18 n.38;
see also Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer, World Health Org., Monographs on
the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, vol. 93: Carbon Black, Titanium
Dioxide, and Talc 277 (2010) (“IARC Monographs vol. 93”).) However, talc may
also exhibit a fibrous morphology. (IWGACP White Paper at 18; see also IARC
Monographs vol. 93 at 277.) And in some instances, talc may “form as true mineral
fibres that are asbestiform.” (IARC Monographs vol. 93 at 277.)
8 	This section is not intended to serve as a definitive scientific exposition of talc and asbestos.
Rather, the purpose of this general overview is to provide relevant background and context for the
parties’ arguments.
9 	In 2018, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) established an interagency
working 	group 	composed 	of 	subject-matter 	experts 	to 	develop, 	among 	other 	objectives,
standardized testing methodologies for detecting asbestos in cosmetic products manufactured with
talc as an ingredient. The working group published a white paper setting forth foundational
scientific 	principles, 	relevant 	background 	information 	regarding 	testing, 	and 	various
recommendations. In this section, I have referenced the working group’s white paper as well as
other neutral, third-party resources, such as IARC Monographs.
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Asbestiform means the “specific variety of a mineral or type of mineral
fibrosity, associated with a unique fibrous habit of crystal growth, in which the fibers
are long and thin and possess high tensile strength and flexibility.” (IWGACP White
Paper at 24.) Habit is defined as the “characteristic external shape of an individual
crystal or crystal group due to crystal growth.” (Id. at 26.) “A mineral may exhibit
multiple habits due to different conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure, geological
events) that were prevalent when crystal growth took place.” (Id.)
Because 	of 	its 	unique 	properties—“platyness, 	softness, 	hydrophobicity,
organophilicity and inertness”—talc is used in a wide variety of products “including
paint, polymers, paper, ceramics, animal feed, rubber, roofing, fertilizers, cosmetics
and pharmaceuticals.” (IARC Monographs vol. 93 at 289.) Relevant here, talc-based
personal care products have been used widely, either as baby powders or adult body
powders to absorb sweat and odors. It is undisputed that Defendants used talc
sourced from mines in Italy, the United States (specifically, Vermont) and China for
its Johnson’s Baby Powder and Shower to Shower products.
Asbestos is a generic term with “many definitions” that are “used in the
commercial, geological, and regulatory domains.” (IWGACP White Paper at 8–9;
see also Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer, World Health Org., Monographs on
the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, vol. 100C: Arsenic, Metals,
Fibres, and Dusts 221 (2012) (“IARC Monographs vol. 100C”).) The lack of
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consistent usage has contributed to uncertainty and confusion in both academic
literature and laboratory testing related to asbestos. (Id.) In commercial and
mineralogical contexts, asbestos describes a “group of fibrous silicate minerals that
occur in an asbestiform habit of growth in which the bulk mineral readily separates
into long, thin, strong fibers.” (IWGACP White Paper at 24.) Thus, asbestos does
not refer to a single mineral but rather encompasses a set of minerals with specific
characteristics. These minerals fall into two principal groups: serpentine and
amphibole.
Like 	talc, 	asbestos 	minerals 	are 	mined 	for 	their 	commercially 	useful
properties. Asbestos fibers possess high tensile strength, flexibility, excellent
thermal stability, adsorption capacity, and resistance to chemical, thermal, and
biological degradation. (IARC Monographs vol. 100C at 221.) These properties
make asbestos fibers “desirable for a wide range of industrial applications” such as
“roofing, thermal and electrical insulation, cement pipe and sheets, flooring, gaskets,
friction materials (e.g., brake pads and shoes), coatings and compounds, plastics,
textiles, paper, mastics, thread, fibre jointing, and millboard.” (Id.) “Since peaking
in the 1970s, there has been a general decline in world production and consumption
of asbestos” due to increased government regulations and outright bans. (Id. at 222.)
In the regulatory context, U.S. government agencies define asbestos as “the
following six minerals, which historically have been used in commerce: chrysotile
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(a member of the serpentine group) and five species of the amphibole mineral group,
specifically 	asbestiform 	riebeckite 	(also 	known 	as 	‘crocidolite’), 	asbestiform
grunerite-cummingtonite (also known as ‘amosite’), tremolite asbestos, actinolite
asbestos, and anthophyllite asbestos.” (IWGACP White Paper at 8.) Asbestos is
regulated by various agencies including the EPA, 40 C.F.R. § 763.83 and 40 C.F.R.
§ 61.141; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1001(b); and the Mine Safety and Health Administration, 30 C.F.R. §
56.5001(b)(1).
B. 	Defendants’ General Causation Motions
Defendants have filed two general causation motions: Motion to Exclude
Plaintiffs’ Experts’ General Causation Opinions, (ECF No. 33008), and Motion to
Exclude 	Plaintiffs’ 	Experts’ 	Opinions 	Regarding 	Biological
Plausibility/Mechanism, (ECF No. 33013). Plaintiffs strenuously oppose both
motions, which seek to preclude 14 of their experts from testifying regarding any
alleged causal link between Defendants’ talc-based products and ovarian cancer. The
thrust of Defendants’ motions is that Plaintiffs’ experts unreliably applied the
Bradford Hill criteria, which are traditionally employed to distinguish a causal
connection from a mere association, with Defendants devoting an entire motion to a
single factor—biological plausibility. There is no question that general causation is
among the most significant issues in this MDL, as reflected by the parties’
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submission of 285 pages of briefing and thousands of pages of supporting exhibits
related to these motions. Before I turn to the parties’ arguments, several preliminary
matters must be addressed to place Defendants’ motions in context.
1. 	Scope of Review
Defendants filed largely similar motions addressing general causation and
biological plausibility during the first round of motion practice. (See ECF No.
33008-2 (“Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br.”); ECF No. 33013-1 (“Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br.”); 	see also 	ECF No. 9736 (“Defs.’ 2019 General
Causation Br.”); ECF No. 9736-1 (“Defs.’ 2019 Biological Plausibility Br.”).)
As noted above, I ruled on the opinions of Plaintiffs’ representative general
causation experts—Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, and McTiernan. See In re Johnson
& Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 157–87. I then applied that reasoning “with equal
force to the remainder of the pending Daubert motions” and directed the parties to
raise any issues regarding specific experts not addressed in the Opinion “within 45
days of the date of the accompanying Order.” Id. at 129. All parties were aware of,
and agreed to, this representative-expert approach. Neither party raised any expert-
specific concerns 	within the 45-day period, nor did 	either side seek timely
reconsideration under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendants have renewed their motions challenging general causation and
biological plausibility. In these motions—as well as in their motions concerning
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asbestos, heavy metals, and fragrances—Defendants address Plaintiffs’ experts
collectively, asserting that the experts’ methodologies suffer from deficiencies
purportedly common to all. By way of illustration, Defendants’ heavy metals and
fragrances motion seeks to exclude the opinions of eighteen experts. Given the
number of experts and the complexity of the scientific issues presented, it is
understandable that Defendants elected to proceed through consolidated, issue-
specific motions rather than expert-specific challenges. This approach, however,
obscures important differences among the experts and makes it more difficult to
assess the reliability of any particular expert’s opinion. Although many experts
ultimately reach similar conclusions, they do not employ identical methodologies or
rely on the same exact body of materials. By presenting their challenges collectively,
Defendants effectively place upon the Special Master and the Court the burden of
disentangling a voluminous record to determine, expert by expert, whether the
proffered methodologies and conclusions satisfy the requirements of Rule 702 and
Daubert. In that connection, Defendants’ arguments frequently focus on one or a
few experts without clearly specifying whether or how those arguments apply to the
remaining experts, and they often rely on extensive record citations embedded in
footnotes rather than developed analysis. As a result, the Special Master and the
Court are left to infer the scope and substance of many of Defendants’ arguments.
Nonetheless, because Plaintiffs have likewise briefed these issues on a collective
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basis, this Report and Recommendation addresses the parties’ arguments in the same
manner, while at the same time, endeavoring to account for the distinct opinions and
methodologies of each expert at issue, resulting in this lengthy opinion.
Furthermore, under Judge Shipp’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order,
Defendants are not entitled to a wholesale reconsideration of my prior rulings, as I
have already addressed the vast majority of the issues raised in their general
causation motions. In an effort to comply with the limitations set forth in that Order,
Defendants have reframed their arguments, now asserting that my prior rulings failed
to adhere to Rule 702 as amended and that newly available scientific evidence
requires revisiting my findings. Their core contention, however, remains unchanged:
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions should be excluded “because the experts distort
epidemiology in a results-oriented manner,” “disregard longstanding concepts such
as statistical significance,” and do not meaningfully grapple with scientific evidence
undermining a causal relationship.10 (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 3.)
It is undisputed that “new science” has become available since my 2020
Opinion, with multiple relevant epidemiological studies having been published in
the intervening years. In light of these developments, I find it both necessary and
10 	For comparison, Defendants opened their prior general causation brief as follows:
“Plaintiffs’ experts’ general causation opinions are methodologically unsound and should be
excluded under Daubert because they misapply scientific principles, engage in unsupported leaps
of logic, and distort epidemiology in a results-oriented manner that transforms an important tool
for advancing public health into an unprincipled weapon for litigation.” (Defs.’ 2019 General
Causation Br. at 1.)
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appropriate to reexamine my prior general causation rulings, particularly given the
parties’ competing interpretations of the current scientific record. Plaintiffs assert
that “post-2020 developments” bolster the opinions of their general causation
experts. (ECF No. 33129 (“Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br.”) at 3.) Defendants, by
contrast, contend that “the most recent developments on which plaintiffs and their
experts hang their hats have confirmed that the relevant science has not established
a causal link.” (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 1.)
Thus, I will address the parties’ arguments as they relate to each of the
Bradford Hill factors below, focusing—as Plaintiffs correctly note—on “scientific
evidence that is truly new” and “the impact of any truly new law.” (Pls.’ General
Causation Opp. Br. at 6.) I will not disturb any prior Bradford Hill ruling unless, as
Defendants argue, I determine that I was less than faithful to the requirements of
Rule 702 with respect to a specific ruling.
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2. 	Plaintiffs’ Experts11,12
Defendants’ general causation motions seek to exclude the testimony of the
following Plaintiffs’ experts, all of whom—except for Dr. Bernard Harlow—
performed a Bradford Hill analysis to establish an alleged causal relationship
between the use of talcum powder products and ovarian cancer:
• 	Dr. Arch Carson: Dr. Carson is a physician specializing in medical toxicology
who holds an M.D. from Ohio State University College of Medicine and a
Ph.D. in toxicology from the Kettering Laboratory at the University of
Cincinnati, and has taught medical students, graduate students, and post-
graduate medical trainees at the University of Texas School of Public Health
in Houston since the 1990s. (ECF No. 33008-42 (“Carson Rep.”) at 1.)
• 	Dr. Daniel Clarke-Pearson: Dr. Clarke-Pearson, who holds a B.A. from
Harvard College and an M.D. from Case Western Reserve University School
of Medicine, is currently “a Professor in the Department of Obstetrics and
11 	Almost all expert reports and deposition transcripts appear multiple times in the record
under different exhibit numbers and ECF numbers. For ease of reference, and to avoid unnecessary
repetition, this Report and Recommendation identifies each report and transcript by a single
representative ECF number and refers to it consistently throughout, regardless of duplicative
filings elsewhere in the docket.
12 	I note that Drs. Carson, Kane, and Smith did not issue updated reports since the prior round
of motions in 2019. Defendants nonetheless continue to cite to these experts’ reports. (See, e.g.,
Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 65 n.161, 67.) Plaintiffs’ position is that because these experts
have not issued supplemental reports, that I need not reconsider those experts’ analyses. (Oral
Argument on 2024 Motions dated Nov. 25, 2025 (“Nov. 25, 2025 Tr.”) 111:9 to 113:9.) I agree.
Defendants’ general causation brief notes, for example, that Dr. Carson “failed to provide an
updated report or testimony to address any of the recent objective scientific literature that
undermines and discredits the methodology [he] utilized to reach his general causation opinions,”
and “[a]ccordingly, Dr. Carson’s opinions are outdated.” (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 27
n.73.) However, and notably, Defendants have not made any specific arguments as to why those
experts’ methodologies are unreliable based on any change in the legal landscape or how my
previous decision misapplied Rule 702 specifically as to those experts’ general causation analyses.
Instead, Defendants have a ripe opportunity for questioning on cross-examination, as to how, if at
all, new science post-dating Dr. Carson’s report affects his opinions. The same is true for Dr. Kane
and Dr. Smith. (See Nov. 25, 2025 Tr. 111:16–21.) Accordingly, on this record, I do not find a basis
on which to consider these three reports anew in the context of general causation.
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Gynecology and the Division of Gynecologic Oncology at the University of
North Carolina” and is “certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and
Gynecology as a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology as well as a
subspecialist 	in 	gynecologic 	oncology.” 	(ECF 	No. 	33008-15 	(“Clarke-
Pearson 3d Amend. Rep.”) at 2–3.)
• 	Dr. Michele Cote: Dr. Cote is a cancer epidemiologist specializing in female
cancers and health disparities who obtained a “Master of Public Health with a
concentration 	in 	Epidemiology 	from 	the 	University 	of 	Alabama,
Birmingham” and a Ph.D. in Epidemiologic Sciences from the University of
Michigan, and who is the Director of the Susan G. Komen Tissue Bank and
“a tenured Professor of Epidemiology at the Fairbanks School of Public
Health in the Department of Epidemiology at Indiana University.” (ECF No.
33008-16 (“Cote Amend. Rep.”) at 3–5.)
• 	Dr. Bernard Harlow: Dr. Harlow, who is a Professor of Epidemiology at the
Boston University School of Public Health, received a Ph.D. in Epidemiology
from the University of Washington and, over the past 35 years, “has focused
on epidemiologic research specifically in women’s cancers and other benign
gynecological disorders,” including coauthoring four published research
articles addressing talc use and ovarian cancer. (ECF No. 33008-10 (“Harlow
Rep.”) at 1–2.)13
• 	Dr. Sarah Kane: Dr. Kane is a gynecologic pathologist “certified by the
American Board of Pathology in Anatomic Pathology, Clinical Pathology,
and Cytopathology,” who received her M.D. from Ohio State University
College of Medicine, and completed a residency in Anatomic and Clinical
Pathology 	at 	Massachusetts 	General 	Hospital, 	as 	well 	as 	a 	two-year
gynecologic and cytology fellowship as the Robert E. Scully Fellow in
13 	I note that instead of analyzing the Bradford Hill factors, Dr. Harlow’s methodology
involves 	establishing 	a 	causal 	hypothesis 	and 	then 	identifying 	and 	rejecting 	non-causal
explanations of an association. During oral argument on November 25, 2025, defense counsel
explained that Defendants’ critique of Dr. Harlow’s methodology “is the same critique that we
have of folks who are employing a Bradford Hill methodology.” (Nov. 25, 2025 Tr. at 92:14–
93:12.) Accordingly, I will analyze Dr. Harlow’s methodology and opinions in connection with
Plaintiffs’ other general causation experts.
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Pathology at the same hospital, during which she studied the causes and
mechanisms of disease, including gynecologic cancer and disease. (ECF No.
33005-20 (“Kane Rep.”) at 2.)
• 	Dr. Anne McTiernan: Dr. McTiernan, who holds a Ph.D. in Epidemiology
from the University of Washington and an M.D. from New York Medical
College, is “a Full Professor at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center in Seattle,
Washington, Division of Public Health Sciences, Program in Epidemiology”
as well as “a Full Research Professor at the University of Washington School
of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology, and the University of
Washington School of Medicine, Department of Medicine, Division of
Geriatrics.” (ECF No. 33008-9 (“McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep.”) at 3–6.)
• 	Dr. Patricia Moorman: Dr. Moorman, who earned a Master of Science in
Public Health and a Ph.D. in Epidemiology from the University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill, is “an epidemiologist with more than 25 years of
experience in conducting research on women’s health issues including ovarian
cancer” and is “a tenured professor in the Department of Community and
Family Medicine, Duke University School of Medicine.” (ECF No. 33005-23
(“Moorman Rep.”) at 3.)
• 	Dr. Jack Siemiatycki: Dr. Siemiatycki obtained an M.Sc. in Mathematical
Statistics and a Ph.D. in Epidemiology and Medical Statistics from McGill
University in Canada, completed a post-doctoral fellowship with IARC,
taught epidemiology at McGill University and the University of Montreal, and
has devoted most of his “research career to investigating links between
environmental, occupational and lifestyle factors and various types of cancer”
including, relevant here, chairing the IARC Monograph panel tasked with
evaluating the carcinogenicity of talc.14 (ECF No. 33008-6 (“Siemiatycki 3d
Amend. Rep.”) at 3–6, 24–25; id., Ex. A at 3.)
14 	In 2010, IARC published Monographs Volume 93, which addresses talc and is cited by
both parties as an authoritative reference. In 2025, after the parties briefed the instant motions,
IARC issued a new Monographs—Volume 136—reexamining the potential carcinogenicity of talc.
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• 	Dr. Sonal Singh: Dr. Singh, who holds a medical degree and a Master of
Public Health, devotes most of his professional time to epidemiologic
research, has taught at Johns Hopkins University and the Wake Forest
University School of Medicine, and is currently an Associate Professor of
Family Medicine and Community Health at UMass Chan School of Medicine,
with 	joint 	appointments 	in 	the 	Division 	of 	Health 	Systems 	Science,
Department of Medicine, and the Department of Population and Quantitative
Health Sciences. (ECF No. 33008-50 (“Singh Rep.”) at 3–5; ECF No. 33008-
53 (“Singh Supp. Rep.”), Ex. A.)
• 	Dr. Ellen Blair Smith: Dr. Smith is a physician with an M.D. from the
University of North Carolina “who specializes in the treatment of women with
cancer (including ovarian cancer),” has treated hundreds of women with
epithelial ovarian cancer during her more than 28 years in private practice,
and pursued further education in Hospice and Palliative Care to enhance the
end-of-life care of her gynecologic oncology patients. (ECF No. 33008-51
(“Smith Rep.”) at 1; id., Ex. A at 1.)
• 	Dr. Rebecca Smith-Bindman: Dr. Smith-Bindman is a clinician-scientist who
earned an M.D. from the University of California, San Francisco, has
extensive expertise in epidemiology, biostatistics, and a range of research
study designs, and is presently “a professor of Epidemiology and Biostatistics,
Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reproductive Medicine, and Health Policy” at
her alma mater, as well as the Director of the Radiology Outcomes Research
Laboratory. (ECF No. 33008-8 (“Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep.”) at 4–6;
id., Ex. A at 1.)
• 	Dr. Judith Wolf: Dr. Wolf is a board-certified gynecologic oncologist and
physician with more than thirty years’ experience who specializes in the care
of 	women 	with 	cancer, 	attended 	medical 	school 	at 	Northeast 	Ohio
Universities 	College of Medicine, and completed her residency 	at 	the
University of Texas at San Antonio, as well as a fellowship at MD Anderson
Cancer Center, where she remained on faculty for more than twenty years as
a Professor in the Department of Gynecologic Oncology. (ECF No. 33008-7
(“Wolf 3d Amend. Rep.”) at 1–2.)
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(See Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 1 n.3; Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility
Br. at 1 n.2.)
In addition to the experts discussed above, Defendants’ biological plausibility
motion seeks to exclude two additional experts:
• 	Dr. Shawn Levy: Dr. Levy received his “Ph.D. in biochemistry and completed
a postdoctoral fellowship in genetics at Emory University,” has taught various
courses at Vanderbilt University Medical Center, the University of Alabama
at Birmingham, and the University of Alabama in Huntsville, and is currently
“the Chief Scientific Officer at Element Biosciences,” where he focuses “on
developing disruptive DNA sequencing technology on the AVITI platform.”
(ECF No. 33013-13 (“Levy 2d Amend. Rep.”) at 2–3.)
• 	Dr. Laura Plunkett: Dr. Plunkett is “a pharmacologist, toxicologist, United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory specialist and partner
in a consulting company known as BioPolicy Solutions, LLC” who “received
a B.S. degree in 1980 from the University of Georgia and a Ph.D. in
pharmacology from the University of Georgia, College of Pharmacy in 1984,”
and has “worked in both government and academic research” and has “taught
pharmacology and toxicology at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels.”
(ECF No. 33013-27 (“Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep.”) at 3–6.)
(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 1 n.2.)
Defendants do not dispute the qualifications of any of the experts at issue in
their general causation motions, nor do they challenge my prior ruling that Drs.
Carson, Clarke-Pearson, and McTiernan are qualified to testify as experts in this
MDL. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 157–60. I also find that Plaintiffs
have established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their general causation
experts possess specialized knowledge and expertise based on their academic
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backgrounds and professional experience, and that they satisfy Rule 702’s liberally
construed qualification requirement. See Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237,
244 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, and McTiernan
remain qualified as experts, as no new issues have been raised regarding their
expertise, and Drs. Cote, Harlow, Kane, Levy, Moorman, Plunkett, Siemiatycki,
Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf are likewise qualified to testify as experts
in their respective fields.
Having determined qualifications, I turn to the Bradford Hill factors.
3. 	The Bradford Hill Factors
In 1965, Sir Austin Bradford Hill published an article that provided guidance
on a fundamental question that had long plagued the field of medicine: when “an
association between two variables”—the exposure to an agent and the development
of a disease—is “perfectly clear-cut and beyond what we would care to attribute to
the play of chance,” “what aspects of that association should we especially consider
before deciding that the most likely interpretation of it is causation?” Austin
Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 Proc.
R. Soc’y Med. 295 (1965). To answer that question, Dr. Hill set forth nine factors—
which he referred to as “viewpoints”—to consider in determining whether an
association reflects a true causal relationship: (1) strength; (2) consistency; (3)
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specificity; (4) temporality; (5) biological gradient; (6) plausibility; (7) coherence;
(8) experiment; and (9) analogy.15 Id. at 295–99.
In the article, Dr. Hill discussed the limitations of his approach and cautioned
against mechanistically applying his “viewpoints” in making causal judgments,
stating:
Here then are nine different viewpoints from all of which
we should study association before we cry causation. What
I do not believe—and this has been suggested—is that we
can 	usefully 	lay 	down 	some 	hard-and-fast 	rules 	of
evidence that must be observed before we accept cause
and 	effect. 	None 	of 	my 	nine 	viewpoints 	can 	bring
indisputable evidence for or against the cause-and-effect
hypothesis and none can be required as a sine qua non.
What they can do, with greater or less strength, is to help
us to make up our minds on the fundamental question - is
there any other way of explaining the set of facts before
us, is there any other answer equally, or more, likely than
cause and effect?
Id. at 299.
The Reference Guide on Epidemiology sets forth a modern iteration of the
nine factors used to determine whether a cause-and-effect relationship exists: (1)
temporal relationship; (2) strength of the association; (3) dose-response relationship;
(4) replication of the findings; (5) biological plausibility (coherence with existing
knowledge); (6) consideration of alternative explanations; (7) cessation of exposure;
15 	The Bradford Hill factors are discussed in greater detail in connection with the parties’
arguments below.
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(8) specificity of the association; and (9) consistency with other knowledge. Green
at 599–600. “These guidelines reflect criteria proposed by the U.S. Surgeon General
in 1964 in assessing the relationship between smoking and lung cancer and expanded
upon by Sir Austin Bradford Hill in 1965 and are often referred to as the Hill criteria
or Hill factors.” Id. at 600.
Like Dr. Hill’s 1965 article, the Reference Guide makes clear that applying
these factors to demonstrate a causal link requires reasoned judgment:
There is no formula or algorithm that can be used to assess
whether a causal inference is appropriate based on these
guidelines. One or more factors may be absent even when
a true causal relationship exists. Similarly, the existence of
some factors does not ensure that a causal relationship
exists. 	Drawing 	causal 	inferences 	after 	finding 	an
association 	and 	considering 	these 	factors 	requires
judgment and searching analysis, based on biology, of
why a factor or factors may be absent despite a causal
relationship, and vice versa. Although the drawing of
causal inferences is informed by scientific expertise, it is
not a determination that is made by using an objective or
algorithmic methodology.
Id. Critically, “epidemiology cannot prove causation; rather, causation is a judgment
for epidemiologists and others interpreting the epidemiologic data.” Id. at 598.
I call attention to the different versions of the Bradford Hill criteria because
some of Plaintiffs’ experts apply Dr. Hill’s original factors, while others apply a
modern iteration of those factors. In addition, Defendants’ general causation brief
cites the original factors, while Plaintiffs’ opposition refers to the Reference Guide.
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Nevertheless, both formulations of the Bradford Hill criteria are widely
recognized as reliable methods for assessing causation. See In re Zoloft (Sertraline
Hydrochloride) Prods. Liab. Litig., 858 F.3d 787, 795–96 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding
that the original Bradford Hill factors are “generally reliable”); In re Deepwater
Horizon BELO Cases, 119 F.4th 937, 941 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing the Reference
Guide factors); see also In re Abbott Lab’ys, Preterm Infant Nutrition Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 3026, No. 22-md-00071, 2025 WL 1283927, at *5 & n.15 (N.D.
Ill. May 2, 2025) (noting that the Reference Guide “articulates the nine Hill factors
slightly differently” from the original formulation, but finding no “meaningful
difference between the two articulations of the Bradford Hill analysis”). For
purposes of this Report and Recommendation, and because neither party disputes
the inherent reliability of either version, I find both versions of the Bradford Hill
factors to be reliable in determining causal relationship between talc and ovarian
cancer.
Nevertheless, 	as 	stated 	in 	my 	prior 	Opinion, 	while 	the 	Bradford 	Hill
methodology itself may be the proper analytical framework, experts must reliably
apply the factors in forming their general causation opinions. See In re Johnson &
Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 161. This is the crux of Defendants’ position: Plaintiffs’
experts failed to reliably apply the factors. Indeed, the Third Circuit in In re Zoloft—
which remains one of the seminal cases on this topic—explained that “despite the
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fact that both the Bradford Hill and the weight of the evidence analyses are generally
reliable, the ‘techniques’ used to implement the analysis must be 1) reliable and 2)
reliably 	applied.” 	858 	F.3d 	at 	796. 	Because 	Bradford 	Hill 	is 	a 	flexible
methodology—meaning that experts “can theoretically assign the most weight to
only a few factors, or draw conclusions about one factor based on a particular
combination of evidence”—the way in which “an expert conducts such an analysis
must be reliable; all of the relevant evidence must be gathered, and the assessment
or weighing of that evidence must not be arbitrary, but must itself be based on
methods 	of 	science.” 	Id. 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted).
Accordingly, to reliably apply the methodology, an expert must explain, at a
minimum, “1) how conclusions are drawn for each Bradford Hill criterion and 2)
how the criteria are weighed relative to one another.” Id.
4. 	Scientific Developments Since 2020
Against that backdrop, I noted in my prior Opinion that Plaintiffs’ “general
causation experts conducted a review of the available epidemiologic studies, which
included 28 case-control studies, 3 cohort studies, 3 meta-analyses, and 1 pooled
analysis.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 161. After evaluating
Plaintiffs’ experts’ application of each Bradford Hill criterion—including the
epidemiologic studies they considered and the weight they assigned to each
criterion—I found their general causation opinions admissible under Rule 702 and
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Daubert, with one exception. See id. at 157–87 (excluding the experts’ inhalation
theory 	of 	biological 	plausibility). 	Since 	then, 	additional 	peer-reviewed
epidemiologic studies have been published, examining the alleged relationship
between genital powder use and ovarian cancer.
By way of brief background, “cohort studies measure and compare the
incidence of disease in the exposed and unexposed (‘control’) groups, while case-
control studies measure and compare the frequency of exposure in the group with
the disease (the ‘cases’) and the group without the disease (the ‘controls’).” Green
at 557. Simply put, cohort studies follow groups of individuals with and without
exposure to an agent, and then the groups are observed over time to determine
whether the exposed group is more likely to develop the disease. Id. at 621. Case-
control studies, on the other hand, start with people who already have the disease,
and then compare them to a group of individuals who do not, in order to identify
potential risk factors. Id. at 620. In addition, a meta-analysis is a “technique used to
combine the results of several studies to enhance the precision of the estimate of the
effect size and reduce the plausibility that the association found is due to random
sampling error.” Id. at 624. Finally, a pooled analysis combines individual-level data
from multiple studies and reanalyzes them together as if they were one large dataset.
In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 161.
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Epidemiologic studies typically report their results in terms of the odds ratio
(“OR”), relative risk (“RR”), or hazard ratio (“HR”), which are related but not the
same. As Defendants correctly observe, for purposes of evaluating general causation
in this MDL, “these are essentially interchangeable concepts that describe the
increase (or decrease) in risk between exposure and disease.” (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 8.) Dr. McTiernan provides a clear explanation of these measures
in her report:
The strength of a relationship between an exposure and the
occurrence of disease is commonly expressed in terms of
relative risk. In cohort studies, relative risk is the ratio of
risk (or incidence) of a disease among people with an
exposure to that among people without that exposure. In
cohort studies, the hazard ratio can be used, and is the
chance of an event occurring in one group (exposed)
divided by the chance of the event occurring in another
group (nonexposed). In case-control studies, the odds ratio
is used, which is the ratio of the odds of exposure among
cases to the odds of exposure among controls. Relative
risks, odds ratios, and hazard ratios above 1.0 indicate an
increased risk, while those below 1.0 imply a protective
effect. Therefore, a relative risk of 1.3 represents a 30%
increased risk.
(McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 13–14.) Importantly, a value of 1.0 for any of these
measures indicates “no association between exposure to the agent and disease.”
Green at 567.
Relatedly, an association refers to the “degree of statistical relationship
between two or more events or variables.” Id. at 619. “Events are said to be
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associated when they occur more or less frequently together than one would expect
by chance” or random error. Id. However, association “does not necessarily imply a
causal relationship.” Id. “Events are said not to have an association when the agent
(or independent variable) has no apparent effect on the incidence of a disease (the
dependent variable).” Id. “This corresponds to a relative risk of 1.0.” Id.
In 	an 	epidemiologic context, causation describes 	“an 	event, condition,
characteristic, or agent being a necessary element of a set of other events that can
produce an outcome, such as a disease.” Id. at 620. This does not require that the
agent be the only cause of disease. Id. For instance, “smoking is a necessary element
of a set of events that result in lung cancer, yet there are other sets of events (without
smoking) that cause lung cancer.” Id. As such, “a cause may be thought of as a
necessary link in at least one causal chain that results in an outcome of interest.” Id.
at 620–21.
One final foundational concept is important to understand before turning to
the discussion of the new epidemiologic studies. A confidence interval (“CI”)
“provides both the relative risk (or other risk measure) found in the study and a range
(interval) within which the risk likely would fall if the study were repeated numerous
times.” Green at 573. “Thus, if a confidence level of .95 is selected for a study, 95%
of similar studies would result in the true relative risk falling within the confidence
interval.” Id. at 621. “The width of the confidence interval provides an indication of
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the precision of the point estimate or relative risk found in the study; the narrower
the confidence interval, the greater the confidence in the relative risk estimate found
in the study.” Id. “Where the confidence interval contains a relative risk of 1.0, the
results of the study are not statistically significant”—meaning one cannot rule out
the possibility of no association based on the data. Id.
With these concepts in mind, I now turn to the epidemiologic studies
published since 2020 that address talc use and ovarian cancer:
• 	O’Brien et al. 202016 conducted a pooled prospective cohort analysis
to evaluate whether genital powder use is associated with ovarian
cancer. Data were pooled from four large, U.S.-based cohorts: Nurses’
Health Study, Nurses’ Health Study II, Sister Study, and Women’s
Health Initiative Observational Study. The pooled sample included
252,745 women (median baseline age 57), of whom 38% reported ever
using powder in the genital area, with 22% reporting frequent use
(≥1/week) and 10% reporting long-term use (≥20 years). During 11.2
years of median follow-up (3.8 million person-years), 2,168 ovarian
cancers occurred (58 per 100,000 person-years). Compared to never
use, the HR for ever use was 1.08 (95% CI, 0.99-1.17), with similarly
modest 	estimates 	for 	frequent 	and 	long-term 	use. 	The 	authors
concluded there was no statistically significant association between
genital powder use and ovarian cancer but noted that the study may
have been underpowered to identify a small increase in risk.
• 	Davis et al. 202117 conducted a pooled case-control analysis to evaluate
associations between genital powder use and ovarian cancer among
16 	Katie M. O’Brien et al., Association of Powder Use in the Genital Area With Risk of
Ovarian Cancer, 323 JAMA 49 (2020) (“O’Brien 2020”).
17 	Colette P. Davis et al., Genital Powder Use and Risk of Epithelial Ovarian Cancer in the
Ovarian Cancer in Women of African Ancestry Consortium, 30 Cancer Epidemiol. Biomarkers &
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African-American and white women. The study used data from five
studies 	in 	the 	Ovarian 	Cancer 	in 	Women 	of 	African 	Ancestry
Consortium. The analysis included 620 African-American cases and
1,146 controls, and 2,800 white cases and 6,735 controls who reported
genital powder use prior to 2014. Genital powder was defined as any
powder applied directly to the genital/perineal/rectal area or indirectly
via pads, tampons, or underwear. Exposure was 	categorized 	by
frequency (≤1/week, >1/week) and duration (<20 years, ≥20 years).
Ever genital powder use was reported by 35.8% of African-American
cases and 29.5% of white cases. Among all women combined, ever use
was associated with 32% higher odds of ovarian cancer (OR = 1.32;
95% 	CI 	= 	1.17–1.48). 	Stratified 	analyses 	showed 	a 	significant
association among White women (OR = 1.36; 95% CI = 1.19–1.57)
and a non-significant association among African-American women
(OR = 1.22; 95% CI = 0.97–1.53).
• 	Phung et al. 202218 conducted a pooled analysis of nine case-control
studies from the Ovarian Cancer Association Consortium to assess
whether ovarian cancer risk factors, including genital talcum powder
use, differ in women with and without endometriosis. In total, this
analysis included 8,500 cases and 13,592 controls for all risk factors;
however, 	there 	were 	fewer 	cases 	and 	controls 	included 	in 	the
estimation of the association between ovarian cancer and talc use
because one of the nine studies did not collect information on talc use.
Genital powder use was categorized based on the area of application
(genital or nongenital) and by ever versus never use. Genital talc use
was positively associated with risk for women with and without
endometriosis. Among women without endometriosis, ever use of
genital powder was associated with a modestly increased risk of
ovarian cancer (OR = 1.12; 95% CI = 1.01-1.25). Among women with
endometriosis, the association was stronger (OR = 1.38; 95% CI =
Prev. 1660 (2021) (“Davis 2021”). One of the coauthors, Dr. Moorman, is an expert for Plaintiffs
in this MDL.
18 	Minh Tung Phung et al., Effects of Risk Factors for Ovarian Cancer in Women With and
Without Endometriosis, 118 Fertil. & Steril. 960 (2022) (“Phung 2022”).
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1.04-1.84). The authors concluded that, although associations between
ovarian cancer and most risk factors were similar among women with
and without endometriosis, there was some suggestion of differences
by endometriosis status for risk factors such as body mass index,
menopausal hormone therapy use, and genital talcum powder use.
• 	Woolen et al. 202219 conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis
to evaluate the association between frequent perineal talcum powder
use and ovarian cancer. The authors noted that prior systemic reviews
focused on ever use—“a non-specific exposure that could dilute or
obscure a meaningful association as ever use would combine women
with low and high exposures to talcum powder.” The analysis involved
11 studies (10 case-control and one cohort—O’Brien 2020) and
included 66,876 patients and 6,542 ovarian cancer cases. Study
selection criteria included publication of primary data, reporting on
multiple times per week (≥ 2 times per week) perineal exposure to
talcum powder, including direct genital/perineal application or indirect
use via pads, underwear, or intravaginal devices. Across the studies,
frequent talc use was associated with a 47% higher risk of ovarian
cancer (adjusted pooled summary OR = 1.47; 95% CI = 1.31-1.65),
with no evidence of bias and low statistical heterogeneity. The authors
concluded 	that 	frequent 	use 	of 	perineal 	talcum 	powder 	use 	is
associated with increased risk of ovarian cancer.
• 	Chang 202420 conducted a prospective cohort analysis within the Sister
Study, a U.S. nationwide cohort of 50,884 women aged 35–74 who
had a sister with breast cancer but were themselves breast cancer-free
at 	enrollment. 	In 	this 	analysis, 	49,899 	participants 	reported 	the
frequency of use for 41 personal care products (“PCPs”), including
19 	Sean A. Woolen, Ann A. Lazar & Rebecca Smith-Bindman, Association Between the
Frequent Use of Perineal Talcum Powder Products and Ovarian Cancer: A Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 37 J. Gen. Intern. Med. 2526 (2022) (“Woolen 2022”). Dr. Smith-Bindman, a
coauthor of the study, is one of Plaintiffs’ experts in this MDL.
20 	Che-Jung Chang et al., Use of Personal Care Product Mixtures and Incident Hormone-
Sensitive Cancers in the Sister Study: A U.S.-Wide Prospective Cohort, 183 Env’t. Int’l 108298
(2024) (“Chang 2024”).
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genital 	talc 	use. 	The 	“study 	utilized 	a 	sophisticated 	mixtures
approach”—using beauty, hygiene, and skincare product groupings—
to examine the relationship between PCPs and the incidence of
hormone-sensitive cancers. Genital talc use was included within the
hygiene mixture analysis. Over an average of 11.6 years of follow-up,
the cohort experienced 4,226 breast cancer cases, 277 ovarian cancer
cases, and 403 uterine cancer cases. In adjusted models, the hygiene
mixture was positively associated with ovarian cancer risk (HR = 1.35;
95% CI = 1.00–1.83), the beauty mixture was positively associated
with postmenopausal breast cancer (HR = 1.08; 95% CI = 1.01–1.16),
and the skincare mixture was inversely associated with breast cancer
risk (HR = 0.91; 95% CI = 0.83–0.99). No significant associations
were observed for individual products—including genital talc use—
after correcting for multiple comparison. The authors concluded that
their findings from this multi-product, joint-effect approach contribute
to the growing body of evidence for associations between PCPs and
breast cancer and provide novel information on ovarian and uterine
cancer.
• 	O’Brien et al. 202421 reanalyzed the association between intimate care
products, primarily genital talc use, and ovarian cancer in the Sister
Study cohort using updated exposure data and quantitative bias
analysis. Genital talc use was initially reported at enrollment (2003–
2009), with additional exposure information collected in a follow-up
survey 	(2017–2019). 	Because 	many 	ovarian 	cancer 	cases 	were
diagnosed before the follow-up survey, the authors applied multiple
imputation 	and 	quantitative 	bias 	analysis 	to 	address 	differential
misclassification and missing data.22 In models adjusted for exposure
misclassification, genital talc use was positively associated with
21 	(ECF No. 33011-5, Katie M. O’Brien et al., Intimate Care Products and Incidence of
Hormone-Related Cancers: A Quantitative Bias Analysis, 42 J. Clin. Oncol. 2645 (2024)
(“O’Brien 2024).)
22 	Differential misclassification is a type of “bias that is due to the misclassification of
individuals or a variable of interest when the misclassification varies among study groups.” Green
at 622. “This type of bias occurs when, for example, it is incorrectly determined that individuals
in a study are unexposed to the agent being studied when in fact they are exposed.” Id.
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ovarian cancer (HRs ranging from 1.17 to 3.34). Under moderate
assumptions, ever use was associated with an approximately 40%
higher rate of ovarian cancer (HR = 1.40; 95% CI = 1.04–1.89),
compared to never use, with consistently increasing dose-response
patterns for both frequency and duration of use. No comparable
positive associations were observed between genital talc use and breast
or uterine cancer. The authors cautioned that the results do not
establish causality and do not implicate any specific cancer-inducing
agent. They reasoned that those reporting talc use could be recalling
products that contained talc, cornstarch, or a mixture, and women may
have used different products at different times. Some talc may have
also been contaminated with asbestos or other potentially harmful
chemicals. Chronic irritation of the ovaries or fallopian tubes from talc
or 	talc-like 	products 	could 	also 	potentially 	contribute 	to
carcinogenesis. In addition, the authors explained that their findings of
a positive association between genital talc use and ovarian cancer are
consistent with prior studies, noting that pooled or meta-analyses of
case-control studies have produced odds ratios of 1.2–1.4. Ultimately,
the authors concluded that their results support a positive association
between genital talc use and ovarian cancer incidence, but they do not
pinpoint 	a 	specific cause 	or 	mechanism. 	They 	also 	emphasized
remaining uncertainty about how much recall bias and missing data
may have inflated risk estimates.
As I explained in my prior Opinion, what is “clear from the general causation
evidence relied on by the experts on both sides in this matter, is that there is scientific
evidence supporting each side’s opinion.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp.
3d at 187. That remains true even in light of recent epidemiologic studies. Although
there is no clear scientific consensus as to whether a causal relationship exists
between genital talcum powder use and ovarian cancer, the available evidence is
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“open to different interpretations.” Id. As discussed above at length, the Bradford
Hill analysis requires the exercise of expert judgment in assessing causation. So long
as that analysis is reliably conducted and draws conclusions adequately supported
by sufficient facts or data, the resulting opinions more likely than not satisfy Rule
702’s reliability standard. Ultimately, if the analyses are reliable, the expert is
permitted to espouse his/her view before a jury.
5. 	The Parties’ Bradford Hill Arguments
In their motions, Defendants principally focus on four Bradford Hill factors:
strength of the association, consistency, biological gradient (or dose-response
relationship), and biological plausibility. They also briefly address the remaining
factors: specificity, coherence, analogy, experiment, and temporality. My discussion
will follow the parties’ arguments.
i. 	Strength of the Association
This Bradford Hill factor concerns the strength of the association between
exposure to an agent and disease—that is, the relative risk—which “is one of the
cornerstones for causal inferences.” Green at 602. “The higher the relative risk, the
greater the likelihood that the relationship is causal.” Id. A lower relative risk “can
reflect causality,” but such associations should be more closely scrutinized “because
there is a greater chance that they are the result of uncontrolled confounding or
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biases.”23 Id. However, Dr. Hill cautioned, “[w]e must not be too ready to dismiss a
cause-and-effect hypothesis merely on the grounds that the observed association
appears to be slight. There are many occasions in medicine when this is in truth so.”
Hill at 296.
As to this gating factor, Plaintiffs’ experts conclude that it supports a causal
relationship because the epidemiologic evidence reflects a positive association
between genital talc use and ovarian cancer, with reported relative risks ranging from
approximately 20% to 60% higher among users compared to non-users. (Carson
Rep. at 8–9, 10; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 13; Cote Amend. Rep. at 35–36;
Kane Rep. at 33–34; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 96–97; Moorman Rep. at 11–
29; Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 70–71; Singh Supp. Rep. at 19–20; Smith Rep.
at 19, 21; Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 32, 34–36; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at
18–19.) Indeed, as discussed above, in addition to studies that I previously reviewed
in my 2020 Opinion, there are subsequent studies that the experts relied upon to
further strengthen their opinions on the association between talc use and ovarian
cancer, which will be discussed, infra.
23 	“Confounding refers to a situation in which an association between an exposure and
outcome is all or partly the result of a factor that affects the outcome but is unaffected by the
exposure.” Green at 621. Bias refers to an “effect at any stage of investigation or inference tending
to produce results that depart systematically from the true values.” Id. at 620. Importantly, “[i]n
epidemiology, the term bias does not necessarily carry an imputation of prejudice or other
subjective factor, such as the experimenter’s desire for a particular outcome.” Id. “This differs
from conventional usage, in which bias refers to a partisan point of view.” Id.
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As I noted in my prior Opinion, and which remains true, Defendants “do not
suggest that the experts’ calculation of relative risk, based on the aggregate studies,
was not reliably reached.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 164. Instead,
they argue that the strength of the association cannot support the causal inference
drawn by Plaintiffs’ experts. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 36–37 (“Here,
the relative risk is much lower (approximately 1.3–1.6 in the meta-analyses on which
plaintiffs’ experts rely), weighing heavily against causation.”).) Defendants also
challenge 	the 	experts’ 	discussion 	of 	public-policy 	considerations 	and 	their
comparisons to other exposures with similar relative risks, such as secondhand
smoke and lung cancer, asserting that in those contexts other Bradford Hill factors
were uniquely compelling. (Id. at 37–40.)24 Finally, Defendants contend that the
epidemiologic studies relied on by Plaintiffs’ experts are affected by both recall bias
and confounding. (Id. at 40–47.)
24 	While public policy is indeed an important consideration for resolution of the ultimate issue
in this case, I do not address this argument in this Report and Recommendation for several reasons.
First, Plaintiffs’ experts’ passing comments on public policy do not inform the foundation for their
ultimate purpose in seeking to testify in this litigation, i.e., their scientific expertise on the general
causation issue. Second, Defendants introduce associations like secondhand smoke and lung
cancer as comparators to the agent-disease relationship here—not for the purpose of my evaluation
or analysis of the link between smoking and cancer. In their reports, Plaintiffs’ experts reference
these comparators to establish that a causal relationship can exist even if the strength of association
is moderate. Defendants take issue with these comparisons. I need not analyze the purported
comparators because, according to Hill, even moderately strong associations can support
causation, see Hill at 296, and because I find it more likely than not that the experts’ conclusions
regarding the strength of association are supported by good grounds, making analysis of
comparators unnecessary.
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Having reviewed the reports of Plaintiffs’ experts as amended and updated
since the prior motion practice,25 as well as the parties’ arguments and submissions,
I do not find that: (1) my prior ruling regarding the strength of association factor
demonstrably failed to adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023 amendments; or
(2) the epidemiologic studies published since 2020 cause me to change any of my
previous findings related to this factor. Indeed, there have been no seismic shifts in
the scientific landscape that would warrant reconsideration of my ruling here. In fact,
the majority of additional studies support the association between talc and ovarian
cancer, without any new studies concluding that no causal link exists. I therefore
find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Plaintiffs’ experts have applied
reliable methodologies to arrive at their opinions that the pre- and post-2020
epidemiologic studies, taken as a whole, demonstrate a positive, statistically
significant association between genital talc powder use and ovarian cancer.
Moreover, I thoroughly addressed and rejected Defendants’ substantially
similar arguments in my prior Opinion, finding that Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions
regarding this factor were admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert, and that their
“decisions to place significant weight on the strength of association factor” were
25 	Each proffered expert has issued updated reports since I decided the 2020 Daubert motions,
which address the post-2020 scientific landscape, except Drs. Carson, Kane, and Smith. I have
already discussed why I need not reconsider those experts’ analyses at this juncture. (See supra
Part III.)
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supported by good grounds. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 163; see
id. at 162–68. As Rule 702 requires, my analysis focused on “whether the experts
used a sound methodology in reaching their conclusion that the relative risk range
of 1.2 to 1.6 demonstrates a risk association between talc powder use and ovarian
cancer.” Id. at 164. I found that Plaintiffs’ experts reliably applied their methodology
in evaluating this Bradford Hill factor because they “examined, as they must, the
totality of the available epidemiological evidence on talc use and ovarian cancer, and
drew conclusions based on sound scientific reasoning.” Id. Consequently, and after
careful consideration, I determined that Defendants’ arguments regarding the
magnitude of the association, recall bias, and confounding went to the weight of the
evidence, 	and 	not 	its 	admissibility. 	Id. 	at 	162–68. 	Simply 	put, 	Defendants’
challenges reflected “their disagreement with the conclusions of the experts—not
the methodology employed in consideration of the studies.” Id. at 168.
While I find no reason to depart from my prior ruling on this factor, for the
parties’ and the Court’s benefit, I will fully address Defendants’ current arguments.
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions should be excluded because
they erroneously “all claim that a ‘strong’ association has been reported between talc
use and ovarian cancer.” (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 37.) I rejected this
argument in my prior Opinion, finding there is “no threshold, or a magical number,
of a relative risk that must be found in order to place significant weight on the
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strength of association factor.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 163.
Defendants now cite two recent cases—In re Acetaminophen and In re Viagra—in
support of the same proposition previously rejected: that risk ratios between 1.0 and
2.0 are too small or weak to support a causal inference. (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 37; see also Defs.’ 2019 General Causation Br. at 31–35.) However,
neither case holds that a relative risk below 2.0 is legally insufficient to support
causation; 	instead, both 	courts 	excluded 	the experts’ 	testimonies 	because of
methodological 	shortcomings, 	not 	because of the magnitude 	of the 	reported
associations. See In re Acetaminophen, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 346–48 (excluding
expert’s opinion for, inter alia, failing to “separately address” studies evaluating
disparate diagnoses, e.g., autism spectrum disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder, and other neurodevelopmental disorders, and failing to “explain how the
strength (or weakness) of association evidence for each of them has impacted his
overarching assessment”); In re Viagra (Sildenafil Citrate) & Cialis (Tadalafil)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 3d 781, 794–96 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (excluding
expert’s opinion because she was unable to specify grounds upon which she
perceived a strong association, instead testifying generally “that she found it in the
‘totality’ of the evidence”). Accordingly, Defendants cite no legal authority holding
that, as a matter of law, a relative risk in the range of 1.2 to 1.6 is facially insufficient
to support Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusion that this Bradford Hill factor is met.
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Furthermore, because Defendants’ challenge amounts to a debate over
whether the observed association should be characterized as weak, moderate, or
strong, (Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 74), in my view, this argument attacks
the experts’ conclusions on the ground that the observed association appears slight,
while disregarding the central reliability inquiry: whether the expert has reviewed
all relevant evidence and explained “(1) how conclusions are drawn for each
Bradford Hill criterion and (2) how the criteria are weighed relative to one another.”
In re Zoloft, 858 F.3d at 796. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ experts’ positive associations
derive directly from their independent reviews of the relevant studies—which were
all authored by practitioners with relevant expertise, peer-reviewed within their
fields, and published in scientific journals. (See, e.g., O’Brien 2020; O’Brien 2024;
Woolen 2022; Chang 2024; and Davis 2021.) As discussed in detail above, the more
recent studies are largely comprised of cohort and pooled analyses, rather than case
studies, analyzing hundreds of thousands of women’s health and hygiene patterns
across decades. (See supra Part V.B.4.)
For the majority of these studies, Defendants do not critique the researchers’
methodologies, but instead take issue with the experts’ characterizations of the
studies’ conclusions and outcomes, and purported failure to adequately account for
confounding factors and recall bias. (See Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 17–20
(disputing Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the findings of O’Brien 2020, Davis 2021, and
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Chang 2024).) They do, however, attack Woolen 2022, describing it as having been
“discredited” by the National Cancer Institute (“NCI”), on the basis that the NCI
later advised readers that Woolen 2022’s “results should be interpreted with care,”
because, in Defendants’ words, the study reflects a “post hoc analysis that used
subjective and inconsistent criteria to narrow the data it examined.” (Defs.’ General
Causation Br. at 20–21, 30.) Yet cautionary language advising the audience to
“interpret 	[a 	study’s 	results] 	with 	care” 	stops 	short 	of 	a 	methodological
condemnation that renders a study unreliable; measured academic consideration
does not equate to scientific repudiation. Nor do Defendants point to any other
support for the criticism that the study is insufficient such that Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions should be excluded for having cited and relied on this study.
As discussed above, Woolen 2022 was a meta-analysis that examined the
association between frequent perineal talc use and ovarian cancer using pooled data
from 11 studies. (Woolen 2022 at 2528.) The study found a “pooled adjusted odds
ratio of 1.47% (95% CI 1.31, 1.65),” for frequent use of perineal talcum powder. (Id.
at 2530.) As Woolen 2022 was “the first systematic review to focus on multiple
times per week users,” the authors also acknowledged the design’s limitations,
including variations across surveys that may have excluded certain frequent-use
patients “if the questionnaire did not explicitly capture” multiple-times-per-week
usage information, as well as potential variances in the definitions of talcum powder
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use by frequency and duration. (Id. at 2531–32.) While these constraints may
provide grounds for caution in interpretation, they do not rise to the level of
wholesale methodological unreliability by Plaintiffs’ experts’ that would justify
exclusion under Rule 702, particularly since this is but one of many studies that the
experts relied upon to reach their conclusions on strength of association.
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ experts acknowledge and account for those limitations
when explaining why, however, they do not discount the study’s conclusion in their
assessments. For example, Dr. McTiernan noted that despite its constraints, the study
is consistent with, and confirms, prior data by “add[ing] to the previously published
literature which shows a consistent elevated risk of ovarian cancer with genital
exposure to talcum powder product.” (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 81). She also
explained that although “[s]ome included studies were unable to differentiate
between perineal talcum powder product and cornstarch users,” “other research
shows only 1–2% of perineal powder users reported cornstarch.” (Id. (citing Daniel
W. Cramer et al., The Association Between Talc Use and Ovarian Cancer: A
Retrospective Case-Control Study in Two U.S. States, 27 Epidemiol. (3) 334–346
(2016) (“Cramer 2016”)); see also, e.g., Moorman Supp. Rep. at 4 (explaining that
the pooled OR was higher than the summary ORs from other published analyses
which was “to be expected given that other meta-analyses defined the exposure as
any use of talc whereas the exposure was defined as frequent use of talc in this meta-
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analysis”).) Accordingly, such limitations are more appropriately addressed through
cross-examination and competing expert testimony, which allow the factfinder to
evaluate the weight to be afforded to Woolen 2022 in the overall causation analysis.
See, e.g., Tree-Removal Rts. In re Land in Gordon Cnty., Ga., 283 F. Supp. 3d at
1346 (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard under Rule 702 to explain
that (1) “the gatekeeping function under Rule 702 is not intended to supplant the
adversary system or the role of the jury: vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof,” and (2) “in most
cases, objections to the inadequacies of a study are more appropriately considered
an objection going to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility”) (first
quoting Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014); and then
quoting Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2011)).
Defendants direct more pointed criticism at O’Brien 2024, asserting that the
study “imputed—i.e., made up” a substantial volume of missing exposure data when
evaluating retrospective talc-use information from Sister Study participants. (Defs.’
General Causation Br. at 21–22.) That characterization, however, obscures the actual
methodological detail underlying the study’s analysis. Confronted with incomplete
follow-up responses, the authors employed a multiple-imputation framework to
estimate exposure status and generate adjusted effect estimates. The study explained
that “[d]ata on intimate care product use were sometimes contradictory or missing,”
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from follow-up questionnaires in the Sister Study, specifically because, for example,
“those 	who 	died 	of 	their 	disease 	could 	not 	have 	completed 	the 	follow-up
questionnaire.” (O’Brien 2024 at 3, 14; see also Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at
30 (acknowledging that some “women [] were lost to the cohort before they could
answer the follow-up questions about lifetime use (for example, those who had
already died)”).) Therefore, the researchers “used quantitative bias analyses to
implement different approaches for imputing exposure in women who initially
reported never use but did not complete the follow-up questionnaire. These
comparisons were crucial for understanding potential biases, as women with incident
cancer were overrepresented in this undefined group.” (O’Brien 2024 at 3 (emphasis
added).) Using quantitative bias analysis, O’Brien 2024 “compared four possible
scenarios . . . : (1) no correction; (2) contradictory data correction; (3) contradictory
data 	correction 	plus 	categorizing 	missing 	or 	undefined 	as 	exposed; 	and 	(4)
contradictory data correction with multiple imputation of missing or undefined
data.” (Id. at 4.) Specifically, the researchers conducted ten iterations correcting for
conflicting responses and then summarized the results across 100 imputed data sets
to address confounding and uncertainty. (Id.) The study described in detail the steps
taken using “multiple imputation with chained equations (MICE; PROC MI, SAS
v9.4 [Cary, NC]) to generate covariate-informed probabilistic imputations of the
exposure status of participants who were undefined or missing,” resulting in an
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approach that they call “our best estimate of the true association in the absence of
recall or other unknown biases.” (Id.)
Several of Plaintiffs’ experts, such as Dr. Singh, (Singh Rep. at 1), cited to
what is known across the scientific literature as “Rubin’s Rule,” based on the 1987
publication by Donald B. Rubin that is often credited as codifying this methodology.
See, e.g., Romuladus E. Azuine et al., Prenatal Risk Factors and Perinatal and
Postnatal Outcomes Associated With Maternal Opioid Exposure in an Urban, Low-
Income Multiethnic U.S. Population, 2 JAMA Netw. (6) (2019); David C. Whiteman
et al., The Effect of Screening on Melanoma Incidence and Biopsy Rates, 187 Br. J.
Dermatol. 515 (2022). Scholars invoke this method when faced with a situation
where there is missing data that is not possible to obtain for a variety of unavoidable
reasons, ranging from material “missing completely at random” to “missingness
dependent on the unobserved values,” e.g., when a participant has died due to the
disease being studied. Peng Li, Elizabeth A. Stuart & David B. Allison, Multiple
Imputation: A Flexible Tool for Handling Missing Data, 314 J. Am. Med. Ass’n (18)
1966–67 (2015). Multiple imputation has been described in the peer-reviewed
literature as “the process of replacing missing data with 1 or more specific values,
to allow statistical analysis that includes all participants and not just those who do
not have any missing data.” Id. (emphasis added). While missing data can be
approximated by “estimat[ing] what each missing value might have been and replace
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it with a single value in the data set,” Rubin’s multiple imputation approach “better
handles missing data by estimating and replacing missing values many times.” Id.
This “reduces the change of false-positive or false-negative conclusions.” Id.
This accords with Plaintiffs’ experts’ characterizations of this process as
consistent with “well-established epidemiologic methods of multiple imputation that
have been in existence for decades,” and as a means of producing the most
informative estimate where recall bias and missing data are present. (Singh Rep. at
1 (citing Donald B. Rubin, Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys, Wiley
& Sons (1987)); ECF No. 33130-5, (“Harlow Supp. Rep.”) at 1; Cote Amend. Rep.
at 25; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 49 (explaining that multiple imputation does
not involve “making up data,” but instead fills in missing values based on observed
relationships within the dataset); Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 22 (“[T]he
authors used established techniques of multiple imputation to generate covariate-
informed probabilistic imputations of exposure status for participants with undefined
or missing values.”).) In her report, Dr. McTiernan described in detail, relying on
many of the same principles expounded upon above, how and why she agreed that
this methodology is sound. (See McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 50.)
Accordingly, I do not find Defendants’ characterization of O’Brien 2024 as
having “made up” data to be persuasive for purposes of assessing the reliability of
the methodology in the context of Rule 702. As I have described above, the study’s
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use of multiple imputation and quantitative bias analysis reflects well-established
statistical methodologies long accepted within the epidemiologic and broader
scientific communities for addressing missing data and recall bias—particularly in
longitudinal studies where loss to follow-up is unavoidable. Both the study’s authors
and Plaintiffs’ experts in detail describe the assumptions, limitations, and analytical
steps underlying this approach, and the methodology is grounded in peer-reviewed
principles dating back decades. Defendants’ objections therefore challenge the
inferences drawn from the imputed data and the weight to be accorded to those
results, not the reliability of the methods employed. Such criticisms are properly
explored through cross-examination and competing expert testimony, rather than
exclusion under Rule 702.
In sum, while Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusions, I find
that the experts have reviewed the epidemiologic evidence and articulated, in a
sufficiently reliable manner to satisfy the more likely than not standard, how they
evaluated the strength of association under the Bradford Hill framework and how
that factor fits within their overall causal assessment. For example, relying on both
pre- and post-2020 epidemiologic studies, Dr. Cote states that the “effect sizes seen
in most of the studies examining the association between the genital use of talcum
powder and ovarian cancer are around 1.25 in magnitude.” (Cote Amend. Rep. at
36.) Dr. McTiernan similarly concludes that pooled and meta-analyses show that
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“risk of ovarian cancer among ever users of talcum powder products is 22–31%
higher than in women who never used these products.” (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep.
at 96.) Dr. Siemiatycki opines that the “meta-RR estimate is 1.3,” meaning “the best
estimate from the epidemiologic literature is that women who regularly used talcum
powder products in the genital area had a 30% higher risk of ovarian cancer than
women who did not use such powders.” (Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 71.) He
asserts that such a “meta-RR could not have occurred by chance.” (Id.) Other experts
estimate that the risk among genital talc users may be as high as 50 to 60%,
particularly among frequent users. (Singh Supp. Rep. at 19–20; Smith Rep. at 19,
21; Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 32, 34–36.)
Next, Defendants claim that “the very small reported relative risk” between
talc use and ovarian cancer “is likely being driven by recall bias, thanks in part to
extensive lawyer 	advertising 	that 	has 	scared 	women.” 	(Defs.’ 	2024 	General
Causation Br. at 4.) Recall bias refers to the tendency of participants in case-control
studies who have been diagnosed “with disease (cases) . . . to recall past exposures
more readily than individuals with no disease (controls).” Green at 585. I addressed
Defendants’ recall bias arguments in my prior Opinion, including their concerns
about case-control studies and external influences such as media attention, which I
will not repeat here. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 164–68.
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Defendants now rely on three recent studies—Goodman 202426, O’Brien
202327, and Davis 2021—which they contend “conclusively demonstrate” that recall
bias explains the observed association between talc use and ovarian cancer. (Defs.’
2024 General Causation Br. at 40–43.) I disagree. None of these studies conclude
that recall bias actually occurred in the underlying epidemiologic literature. Rather,
they identify recall bias as a potential source of error and, in some instances, use
hypothetical or modelled scenarios to illustrate how differential misclassification
could influence risk estimates. Critically, none establish that the epidemiologic
evidence on which Plaintiffs’ experts rely is materially distorted by recall bias or
that such bias would nullify the positive associations consistently observed across
multiple studies. That is not to say that recall bias could not have affected the
underlying data. However, as discussed below, Plaintiffs’ experts have adequately
accounted for recall bias and other potential confounders in forming their opinions.
Defendants also challenge the experts’ reliance on O’Brien 2024, arguing,
inter alia, that Dr. McTiernan twisted the study’s findings by stating it “proved that
recall bias does not explain the relative risks seen for ovarian cancer with genital talc
exposure over decades of research around the world.” (Defs.’ 2024 General
26 	Julie E. Goodman et al., Quantitative Recall Bias Analysis of the Talc and Ovarian Cancer
Association, 7 Glob Epidemiol. (2024) (“Goodman 2024”).
27 	Katie M. O’Brien et al., Douching and Genital Talc Use: Patterns of Use and Reliability
of Self-reported Exposure, 34 Epidemiol. (3) 376–84 (2023) (“O’Brien 2023”).
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Causation Br. at 43; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 53.) As discussed above, O’Brien
2024 ran ten iterations across 100 imputed data sets to specifically “investigate[] the
potential impact of recall bias on the association between genital talc use and ovarian
cancer.” (O’Brien 2024 at 4.) The study’s authors described these quantitative bias
analyses as “a major strength,” of the study because “they provide a comprehensive
illustration of the possible impacts of missing data and recall bias under a variety of
scenarios.” (Id. at 14.) In that regard, while Defendants are correct in asserting that
O’Brien 2024 did not prove the lack of recall bias, and that Dr. McTiernan’s above
statement overstates this specific finding in O’Brien 2024, Defendants nonetheless
overlook the broader context of Dr. McTiernan’s and other experts’ discussions of
the study. (See infra, note 26.)
In her report, Dr. McTiernan began with a detailed analysis of O’Brien 2024.
(McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 48–54.) She set forth what she viewed as the study’s
strengths, when considered in the context of prior analyses and reasoning why the
potential for recall bias cannot adequately explain updated findings. I find that Dr.
McTiernan accurately described the study’s methods and findings and reasonably
interpreted its results and overall significance in light of her review of the Bradford
Hill analysis, with the possible exception of the above discussion of Dr. McTiernan’s
overstatement of the impact of recall bias. Specifically, she emphasized that the
study had a “more stable estimate of hazard ratios (relative risk)” and “more power
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to detect statistically significant associations,” because it was able to evaluate “more
cases accrued over a longer period of follow-up.” (Id. at 53.) O’Brien 2024 also
analyzed lifetime exposure, rather than the more limited period used in prior studies.
(Id.) Even with these more concentrated findings, the resulting HRs were consistent
with “genital talc exposure over decades of research around the world,” establishing
that recall bias alone cannot explain the ultimate conclusions.28 (Id.) Accordingly,
Dr. McTiernan’s discussion of O’Brien 2024 does not bespeak a lack of scientific
rigor, as Defendants contend.
Defendants 	also 	assert 	that 	Drs. 	Harlow 	and 	Cote 	distort 	the 	study’s
conclusions. (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 43 n.108.) I disagree. I find that these
experts 	have 	applied 	reliable 	methodologies 	and 	made 	adequately 	supported
extrapolations from O’Brien 2024 in arriving at their conclusions. For example, Dr.
Harlow addressed the potential for recall bias, noting that O’Brien 2024 applied a
recall bias correction to the reported risk ratio for “ever use” of perineal talc to arrive
at 1.40—a figure “similar to what many earlier studies have reported.” (Harlow
28 	I emphasize that despite Defendants’ selective quote from Dr. McTiernan that O’Brien
2024 “proved that recall bias does not explain the relative risks,” a closer read of her analysis
demonstrates that despite this phraseology in her summary of the study, her longer discussion and
analysis of the study appropriately accounted for how the study mitigated recall bias in its
methodology. In other words, I understand Dr. McTiernan’s comment in this regard to summarize
the high-level finding that based on the iterations of analysis O’Brien 2024 applied, the approach
resulted in the authors’ “best estimate of the true association in the absence of recall bias or other
unknown biases.” (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 50 (quoting O’Brien 2024 at 4).) Of course,
Defendants are free to use the expert’s words against her and probe this language on cross-
examination; however, I do not find this a sufficient ground to exclude her opinion on this point.
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Supp. Rep. at 4.) Indeed, the corrected estimate resulted in even more elevated
increased risk ratios for both “frequent use” and “long term use” subjects. (Id.)
Further, Dr. Harlow added that while “the authors [of the O’Brien 2024 study] state
that they cannot rule out the presence of unmeasured confounding,” any such
presence “would have had to occur before the first onset of talc exposure” and have
a “magnitude . . . sufficient to offset the observed talc and ovarian cancer association
present in this analysis.” (Id.) Based on this reasoning, Dr. Harlow concluded that
“unmeasured confounding is highly unlikely to have any impact on these findings.”
(Id.) Dr. Cote made similar assessments based on hypothetical over-estimations of
potential recall bias, explaining that even assuming “90% of women were reassigned
to never use” from either “infrequent or short term use,” the “analyses . . . showed
positive associations,” thus bolstering her conclusion that despite potential recall
bias, “there remained a positive association between genital talc use and ovarian
cancer.” (Cote Amend. Rep. at 25.)
None of these analyses rise to the level of Defendants’ claim that the “experts
are drawing conclusions that study authors were not willing to make.” (Defs.’
General Causation Br. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Instead, O’Brien
2024, in its own words, concluded that the study’s “findings support the hypothesis
that there is a positive association between genital talc use and ovarian cancer
incidence,” even though “there is still uncertainty as to how much recall bias and
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missing data could upwardly bias effect estimates.” (O’Brien 2024 at 14.) Moreover,
O’Brien 2024 assessed findings from nearly 50,000 women over the span of nearly
two decades, making it “one of the largest studies to collect data on intimate care
product use,” and therefore significantly powered to detect statistically significant
associations and account for potential recall bias. (Id. at 2, 14.) The experts’
explanations of same applied sound methodology to attempt to account for those
gaps that O’Brien 2024 identified; they accordingly arrived at the same finding of
“a positive association” between talc use and ovarian cancer. (Id.) Any further
challenges that Defendants have to the experts’ characterizations of the study on this
point are therefore a question of weight based on the scientists’ conclusions, rather
than their methodologies in reaching those conclusions.
Defendants next assert that Plaintiffs’ experts “fail to meaningfully address”
potential confounding in case-control studies. (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 44.)
Again, I disagree. Despite Defendants’ characterization that Dr. Harlow “ignore[d]”
the issue in his report, in addition to the recall bias analysis discussed above, Dr.
Harlow 	“[a]ddress[ed] 	skepticism 	related 	to 	this 	research,” 	explaining 	that
“[a]lthough case-control studies have long been disparaged as being backwards
versions of cohort studies . . . epidemiologists today understand case-control studies
to be conceptually identical to cohort studies, apart from an efficiency gain that
comes from sampling the denominators rather than conducting a complete census.”
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(Harlow Rep. at 17–18 (citing Kenneth J. Rothman, 	Six Persistent Research
Misconceptions, 29 J. Gen. Intern. Med. (7) 1060–1064 (2014).) As a general matter,
Dr. Harlow also concluded that “none of the non-causal explanations can account
adequately for the consistent positive association across so many studies,” when
considered in conjunction with the other Bradford Hill criteria such as consistency
and biological plausibility. (Id. at 20.)29
More specifically on the issue of confounders, Defendants fault Plaintiffs’
experts for giving little attention to douching as a potential confounder. (Defs.’
General Causation Br. at 45–47.) However, they do not meaningfully address that
recent data—including O’Brien 2024—reported that “[d]ouching was not strongly
associated with any of the examined outcomes,” ovarian cancer among them.
(O’Brien 2024 at 12; see also id. at 7, Table 2.) In fact, O’Brien 2024 only found “a
possible positive association between douching and ovarian cancer” for those
classified as “[f]requent douch[ers] and douch[ers] age 20–39 years.” (Id. at 13
(emphasis added).) In light of those findings, the absence of a detailed discussion of
29 	Defendants also claim that Dr. Clarke-Pearson “ignore[d]” confounding in case-control
studies in his report. (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 44.) But his report acknowledged that, in his
“opinion, meta-analysis studies are much stronger [than cohort and case-control studies] in that
they include larger numbers of patients resulting in greater statistical power.” (Clarke-Pearson 3d
Amend. Rep. at 9.) He therefore emphasized meta-analyses and pooled studies, rather than case-
control or cohort studies, to arrive at his conclusions. This directly tracks his opinions that I
previously considered. See In re J&J, 509 F. Supp. at 165–66. If Defendants seek to probe that
evaluation and the weight he affords certain types of studies over others, they may do so on cross-
examination, but his analyses and methodologies survive the preponderance of the evidence
standard.
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douching as a confounder in Plaintiffs’ expert reports is not entirely unexpected or
unreasonable.
Moreover, Defendants criticize Dr. Moorman’s treatment of two pre-2020
studies, Nicole L. Gonzalez, Douching, Talc Use, and Risk of Ovarian Cancer, 27
Epidemiol. 797 (2016) (“Gonzalez 2016”) and Iwona M. Gabriel, Douching, Talc
Use, and Risk for Ovarian Cancer and Conditions Related to Genital Tract
Inflammation, 28 Cancer Epidemiol. Biomarkers Prev (11), 1835 (2019) (“Gabriel
2019”).30 (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 45–47.) In her most recent report,
however, Dr. Moorman explained why she viewed Gonzalez 2016’s finding of a
relative risk below one as an outlier, noting that it is “only 1 of 3 studies out of the
27 studies included in the major meta-analyses” to report such a result and that its
estimate was based solely on talc use during the 12 months before enrollment, which
yielded a talc-use prevalence of just 14 percent. (ECF No. 33130-63 (“Moorman 2d
Supp. Rep.”) at 5.) She then evaluated more recent post-2020 literature in further
assessing the weight Gonzalez 2016 should be afforded. (Id. at 5–7.) Drawing on
30 	In her 2023 report, Dr. Moorman characterized Gabriel 2019 as finding that “[i]n contrast
to the talc findings, douching was not significantly associated with ovarian cancer (OR 0.98, 95%
CI 0.83–1.17 overall; OR 1.03, 95% CI 0.77–1.38 among talc users; and OR 0.94, 95% CI 0.76–
1.16 among those who never used talc).”) (ECF No. 33130-62 (“Moorman Supp. Rep.”) at 3.) And
indeed, the study itself concluded that “[d]ouching is not an independent risk factor for ovarian
cancer, but the combination of talc use and store-bought douches may modestly increase the risk.”
(Id. at 1.) I therefore do not find that Dr. Moorman’s conclusions are “unauthorized by the data she
cites.” (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Dr. Moorman does
not undertake further discussion of this study in her most recent report. (See generally ECF No.
33130-63, “Moorman 2d Supp. Rep.”)
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O’Brien 2024, Dr. Moorman observed that the reported associations for talc use were
generally stronger than those for douching, which, in her view, supports specificity
because one would expect recall errors to affect the two exposures similarly; if recall
bias alone explained the observed associations, comparable associations with
douching would be expected. (Id. at 9.) In light of these considerations, and given
the current scientific record, it is methodologically reasonable for experts to place
greater emphasis on factors and studies supported by more consistent or robust data.
More to the point, as Plaintiffs note, Defendants previously “made [these]
exact claim[s]” before me in the prior Daubert motions, upon which I found that the
expert reports were not lacking in their consideration of recall bias and confounding.
(Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 78 (citing In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F.
Supp. 3d at 166–68).) And the post-2020 “new science” only includes one case-
control study (Davis 2021), which was in fact founded upon data from the WHI
cohort study—minimizing concerns of recall bias because of the nature of the
prospective study. (See Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 32.) Finding the relevant
circumstances substantially unchanged on this issue, I find no reason to depart from
my prior assessment of the experts’ reasonable accounting for potential confounding
factors. I reiterate that to the extent Defendants observe that Plaintiffs’ experts have
not assessed the studies “for all potential confounders,” those questions are ripe for
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cross-examination at trial—particularly since Defendants only focused on douching
as their point of contention in their papers. (Id. at 45.)
To conclude, Plaintiffs’ experts generally gave this factor significant weight
in their Bradford Hill analyses. I do not find the experts’ conclusions regarding the
strength of association to be ipse dixit, but are instead based upon reliable study
results, having drawn adequately supported conclusions from the existing data, and
satisfying the more likely than not standard. To be clear, my determination that
Plaintiffs’ experts may opine on why they perceive a strength of association between
talc and ovarian cancer based on the available literature does not equate to a holding
that the factor is satisfied for purposes of establishing causation. That is ultimately a
question for the factfinder. See Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note to 2023
amendment (“The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits
standard of correctness.”). Accordingly, “Defendants’ argument with respect to
whether the association is ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ is one that goes to the weight of the
experts’ testimony, not the reliability.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at
163. 	I 	find, 	however, 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts 	have 	met 	their 	burden 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence under Rule 702 to demonstrate that they applied
reliable methodology and extrapolated conclusions adequately supported by the
literature on strength of association, such that their opinions are admissible for
inclusion at trial.
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ii. 	Consistency
This 	factor 	measures 	the 	consistency 	of 	the 	observed 	association 	and
examines whether the result has “been repeatedly observed by different persons, in
different places, circumstances and times.” Hill at 296. “Rarely, if ever, does a single
study 	persuasively 	demonstrate 	a 	cause-effect 	relationship.” 	Green 	at 	602.
Consistency in research findings “is an important factor in making a judgment about
causation.” 	Id. 	“Different 	studies 	that 	examine 	the 	same 	exposure-disease
relationship generally should yield similar results.” Id.
In my 2020 Opinion, I addressed Defendants’ arguments concerning this
factor and concluded that the experts’ methodologies were sufficiently reliable under
Daubert. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 168–172. At that time,
Defendants 	advanced 	two 	primary 	contentions. 	First, 	they 	argued 	that 	the
epidemiologic literature was not truly consistent because cohort and case-control
studies reached different outcomes, emphasizing that since no cohort study had
identified a statistically significant association between talc use and ovarian cancer,
consistency is lacking. Id. at 169. Second, Defendants contended that Plaintiffs’
experts did not adequately grapple with the cohort data, taking issue with the experts’
views on the cohort studies’ limited statistical power, the assertedly insufficient
duration of follow-up relative to ovarian cancer’s latency period, and the studies’
inability to ascertain each participant’s talc exposure with precision. Id. at 171–72.
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To assess consistency in light of Defendants’ arguments, I reviewed Dr.
McTiernan’s “consistency analysis in her expert report, explaining that 24 of the 28
case-control studies show relative risks greater than 1.1 for women who had any
perineal exposure to talcum powder products, compared with never users.” Id. at
169. I reasoned the expert found that over half of those studies were statistically
significant, while the others “had a sample size lower than that estimated to be
needed to have power to detect a statistically significant result.” Id. My opinion then
detailed Dr. McTiernan’s methodology in “consider[ing] statistical significance with
respect to both cohort and case control studies,” including evaluating the type of
analysis performed, “whether p-value or confidence interval.” Id. at 170–71. I cited
to leading epidemiologists’ corroboration of Dr. McTiernan’s approach, concluding
that “according to the experts, in the epidemiology context, inconsistent statistical
significance from one study to the next does not, in of itself, show inconsistency
under Bradford Hill.” Id. at 171.
Defendants reprise similar arguments here. In the first portion of their
argument, they claim that Plaintiffs’ experts improperly downplay O’Brien 2020’s
findings because they do not support their positions, i.e., that the study had “the
power to detect a statistically significant risk if it existed,” but did not so conclude.
(Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 52.) Specifically, they fault the experts for
stretching the O’Brien 2020 data to “attempt to show consistency” by relying on a
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subgroup analysis that found a “very small, but statistically significant, association
for women with a patent reproductive tract.” (Id.) Defendants also attack Plaintiffs’
experts’ reliance on O’Brien 2024, which according to Defendants, only yielded data
that supports Plaintiffs because the “authors imputed a number of ‘corrections’ and
‘assumptions’ into the Sister Study cohort data.” (Id. at 53–54.) They then advance,
as they did in 2020, their disagreement with Plaintiffs’ critiques around latency and
follow-up periods, emphasizing that Plaintiffs’ “concerns about imprecise exposure
data would apply to case-control studies as well.” (Id. at 54–58.) Defendants rely on
public health agencies, such as the NCI and FDA, purportedly recognizing that
studies do not show a consistent association between perineal talc use and ovarian
cancer. (Id. at 47 & n.120.)
Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ experts “improperly disregard
statistical significance” in order to “manufacture consistency.” (Id. at 58, 64.)
Defendants assert that courts have repeatedly rejected efforts by plaintiffs’ experts
to minimize the role of statistical significance. (Id. at 58–60 (citing In re Zantac, 644
F. Supp. 3d at 1222, 1237–38; In re Lipitor, 892 F.3d 624, 641–42 (4th Cir. 2018)).)
In their view, Plaintiffs’ consistency assessments rely primarily on point estimates
that trend toward increased risk, which Defendants characterize as “effectively
ignor[ing] statistical significance.” (Id. at 60.) Defendants also disagree with my
prior description of their position, stating that they “have never argued that statistical
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significance is a litmus test for consistency,” but they maintain that the concept
cannot be disregarded altogether. (Id. at 61–62.) Finally, Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs’ experts apply statistical significance inconsistently, highlighting, for
example, the experts’ attention to statistically significant subgroup findings in
O’Brien 2020, while giving less weight to the remainder of that study’s results. (Id.
at 62.)
Plaintiffs first respond that my 2020 Opinion found “there was adequate
evidence of consistency in 2020, even though the three cohort studies available at
the time did not clearly show an association that was statistically significant,” and
that the only thing that has changed is that now, “the scientific record is even stronger
and better described,” with “[n]othing in the new science rebut[ting the] existing
findings.” (Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 79, 82.) To illustrate this point, they
focus on Health Canada’s 2021 assessment, O’Brien’s follow-up commentary to her
2020 	study, 	and 	O’Brien 	2024—all 	finding 	consistency 	among 	the 	existing
epidemiological studies across decades.31 (Id. at 80–81.)
31 	Both parties rely on statements and findings by public health agencies—including the FDA,
Health Canada, and WHO—in support of their respective positions regarding the carcinogenicity
of Defendants’ talcum powder products. Although I addressed this issue briefly in my prior
Opinion, I pause here to clarify how such materials are considered in resolving the parties’ pending
motions. I am mindful of the role played by public health agencies in evaluating potential health
risks. Their mandate is to protect the public at large, often through precautionary risk assessment
intended to inform regulatory policy or public guidance. In carrying out that mandate, agencies
may reasonably err on the side of caution and may employ standards that differ in material respects
from those governing expert admissibility under Rule 702 and Daubert. Accordingly, I do not treat
agency findings as dispositive of the causation issues presented, nor do I assign greater or lesser
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In response to Defendants’ second argument, Plaintiffs assert that “the modern
trend is to take statistical significance into account without rigidly excluding all
studies that are not statistically significant,” citing scientific literature and case law
that supports their position. (Id. at 84–87.) Because “[n]othing in the science of
statistics has changed since 2020 to upend [my] findings,” they reason that there is
“all the more reason to reject J&J’s rehashed argument” based on the updated
literature. (Id. at 88.) If anything, Plaintiffs claim, now “the shoe is on the other
foot,” because Defendants are the ones who appear to “ignore the statistically
significant results of O’Brien 2020 and O’Brien 2024.” (Id. at 89–90.)
As a preliminary matter, I must address the correct standard for considering
statistical significance within the context of the Bradford Hill factors. The Reference
Guide explains that “significance testing only bears on whether the observed
magnitude [of an association between an agent and an outcome] arose as a result of
random chance, not on whether the null hypothesis [i.e., that there is no association]
is true.” Green at 577 n.81.32 In other words, a finding that a study’s results are
weight to the views of one agency over another or attempt to resolve differences among them. This
does not mean, however, that such materials are to be disregarded. Rather, they form part of the
broader scientific landscape and often reflect a reasoned and methodologically sound engagement
with the existing body of scientific evidence on which the parties’ experts also rely. In that context,
I note only that no public health agency has affirmatively concluded that there is no causal
connection between talc use and ovarian cancer.
32 	In mathematical terms, “epidemiologists use a convention that the p-value must fall below
some selected level known as alpha or significance level for the results of the study to be
statistically significant. Thus, an outcome is statistically significant when the observed p-value for
the study falls below the preselected significance level.” Green at 576–77. “The most common
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statistically significant indicates a degree of confidence that a real effect or
relationship exists within the population being studied. However, “[t]here is some
controversy among epidemiologists and biostatisticians about the appropriate role of
significance 	testing,” 	because 	“[e]pidemiologists 	have 	become 	increasingly
sophisticated in addressing the issue of random error . . . without the necessity of
rejecting all studies that are not statistically significant.” Id. at 579 (emphasis
added). Specifically, meta-analyses can “ameliorate concerns about random error.”
Id.
In line with those scientific principles, as I explained in my prior Opinion, the
Third 	Circuit has “declined 	to 	adopt 	a bright-line rule” regarding 	statistical
significance. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (citing In re Zoloft,
858 F.3d at 793; see also In re Lipitor, 892 F.3d at 642 (same). Instead, Zoloft
explained that “[a] causal connection may exist despite the lack of significant
findings, due to issues such as random misclassification or insufficient power,” and
at the same time, “[i]f a causal connection does not actually exist, significant findings
can still occur due to, inter alia, inability to control for a confounding effect or
detection bias.” 858 F.3d at 793; see also Green at 24 (“What role should statistical
significance play in assessing the value of a study? Epidemiological studies that are
significance level, or alpha, used in science is .05,” which means that “the probability is 5% of
observing an association at least as large as that found in the study when in truth there is no
association.” Id. at 577; see also, e.g., In re Lipitor, 892 F.3d at 634 (same).
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not conclusive but show some increased risk do not prove a lack of causation.”). Of
course, statistical significance can overlap with the strength of association factor
because it implicates level of risk and strength of causation; however, the parties
here have addressed this issue under the consistency factor because it 	also
necessarily involves whether the data studying the relationship between talc and
ovarian cancer is sufficiently consistent across the board.
Accordingly, I emphasize that this factor evaluates “consistency” across
differing 	studies 	not 	“statistical 	significance,” 	which 	means 	that 	statistical
significance is not the only data that I must consider related to this factor. In that
connection, despite Defendants claiming that they “have never argued that statistical
significance is a litmus test for consistency,” they nonetheless base their entire
argument in support of this factor on that exact measure. (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 63; see id. at 49–58 (focusing on Plaintiffs’ experts’ attacks on the
cohort studies pertaining to statistical significance); id. at 58 (subsection entitled,
“Plaintiffs’ Experts Improperly Disregard Statistical Significance In Reaching Their
Conclusions On Consistency”).) Even so, to the extent that statistical significance is
an aspect of consistency, as I noted in 2020 and I find no basis to depart from here,
“the causation experts considered statistical significance with respect to both cohort
and case control studies, and did so in a reliable fashion.” In re Johnson & Johnson,
509 F. Supp. 3d at 170.
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I will first review the relevant post-2020 studies. To begin, O’Brien 2020
evaluated whether genital powder use is associated with ovarian cancer by pooling
data from four large cohort studies covering over 250,000 women, but only 2,168
ovarian cancers developed in that population. (O’Brien 2020 at 49.) The authors
conducted approximately 11 years of follow-up reporting. (Id.) The study did not
find a statistically significant association on this measure but acknowledged that it
“may have been underpowered to identify a small increase in risk.” (Id.) The results
showed a “possible positive association among women with patent reproductive
tracts,” but “the association was not significantly different from that observed in
women with nonpatent reproductive tracts,” and the authors therefore clarified that
“this finding should be considered only exploratory and hypothesis generating.” (Id.
at 56.) However, in a follow-up Letter to the Editor, Dr. O’Brien agreed with
critiquing colleagues “that our results, particularly the analyses limited to women
with intact reproductive tracts, should not be discounted because of lack of statistical
significance,” and that as applied broadly to the study, they “never equated the lack
of statistical significance to evidence of no association.” (ECF No. 33130-38,
O’Brien et al., Letters to the Editor 323 JAMA 2095, 2096–97 (May 26, 2020).)
In a study published by the same lead author four years later, O’Brien 2024
used 	updated 	exposure 	data 	and 	quantitative 	bias 	analysis 	to 	reanalyze 	the
association between “intimate care products,” including genital talc, and ovarian
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cancer. (O’Brien 2024 at 1.) As has already been discussed at length, O’Brien 2024
“used quantitative bias analyses to implement different approaches for imputing
exposure” where follow-up data was lacking, by running and summarizing effect
estimates across 100 imputed data sets. (Id. at 4.) The authors “found evidence
supporting a positive association between ever genital talc use and incident ovarian
cancer,” collecting ORs across pooled and meta-analyses of case-control studies and
HRs from a pooled analysis of prospective cohort studies, as well as analyses of the
targeted age range (20–39 years)—“which is consistent with previous studies that
considered ages of use.” (Id. at 13.)
Indeed, since my 2020 Opinion, the experts now have a more robust record of
scientific evidence upon which to make their assessments, given the post-2020
cohort studies. Tellingly, Defendants’ prior attack on the consistency factor rested
in large part on, in their view, the absence of a statistically significant cohort study;
yet throughout their current moving brief, they do not seriously engage with O’Brien
2024, which updated findings for a cohort of nearly 50,000 women and found “a
positive association between use of intimate care products, including genital talc,
and ovarian cancer.” (Id. at 1.) The sum total of their discussion of O’Brien 2024 is
focused on condemning its usage of imputed data. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation
Br. at 53–54.) I have already explained, supra, why that argument is unavailing to
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entirely discount or reject the findings of O’Brien 2024 at this evidentiary stage. (See
supra Part V.C.2.iv.)
Plaintiffs’ experts, on the other hand, relied on post-2020 cohort study
literature to “confirm[] that the associations between perineal talcum powder product
use and ovarian cancer risk are present” for diverse groups, including across races
and endometriosis histories.33 (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 82–83; see also Smith-
Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 21–23 (explaining that O’Brien 2024 reported a
“significant increase in ovarian cancer risk for genital powder use, with effect
estimates that are in range with previous studies” and consistent with studies like
Woolen 2022 and the Nurses Health Study); Cote Amend. Rep. at 25 (noting the
33 	I acknowledge that the parties also rely on differing statements from public health agencies
in support of their positions on this factor. Defendants note that the NCI and FDA have
“recognized” inconsistency in the epidemiologic literature. (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 47.)
A closer review of the cited materials, however, shows that the NCI source is a PDQ webpage
“written and maintained by the PDQ Screening and Prevention Editorial Board, which is
editorially independent of NCI,” and therefore does not constitute an official NCI or NIH policy
statement. Ovarian, Fallopian Tube, and Primary Peritoneal Cancer Prevention (PDQ)–Health
Professional 	Version, 	National 	Cancer 	Institute 	(“NCI 	2024 	PDQ”),
https://www.cancer.gov/types/ovarian/hp/ovarian-prevention-pdq (last updated Apr. 9, 2025).
Defendants’ reliance on the FDA is grounded in a 2014 letter evaluating the body of evidence
available at that time. (See ECF No. 33008-4, “FDA 2014 Denial Letter.”) I do not view either
source as providing a basis to revisit my prior conclusions on this factor—particularly given that
the FDA letter was addressed in my 2020 Opinion and is now even more dated. In re Johnson &
Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 185–86. Plaintiffs, by contrast, cite Health Canada’s 2021 screening
assessment, which found “a high degree of consistency in the epidemiological studies across
several decades conducted in different parts of the world.” (Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 80
(quoting Health Canada, Screening Assessment: Talc, 1, 33 (Apr. 2021).) Although Health
Canada’s conclusions are similarly non-binding, that assessment considered more recent literature
and evaluated the Bradford Hill criteria in detail under international scientific standards. None of
the various agency statements, standing alone, is determinative of whether the challenged experts’
consistency analyses satisfy Rule 702. I address them here only to clarify the nature and limitations
of the sources upon which the parties rely.
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“consistency of the positive association between genital talc use and ovarian cancer,”
as well as the “strikingly similar estimates of association” derived from “decades of
studies in various populations and different investigators across the globe”); ECF
No. 33130-58 (“Singh 2d Supp. Rep.”) at 5 (observing that O’Brien 2024’s
confidence intervals findings overlap with “the entire body of evidence . . . from
case-control 	studies, 	cohort 	studies, 	pooled 	analysis 	of 	cohorts 	and 	meta-
analysis.”).)
The experts acknowledged the aspects of O’Brien 2020 that Defendants
emphasize—such as the absence of an overall statistically significant association—
but they also explained why, notwithstanding those findings, they continued to view
the consistency factor as satisfied. In doing so, they noted that the study’s authors
themselves observed that the analysis “may have been underpowered,” and they
articulated how that limitation informed their interpretation of the results. (O’Brien
2020 at 49; see, e.g., McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 19, 50, 75; Smith-Bindman 3d
Amend. Rep. at 30–31; Harlow Rep. at 13; Cote Amend. Rep. at 18–19; Singh Supp.
Rep. at 6–7, 10–12, 20; Moorman 2d Supp. Rep. at 17–18; Clarke-Pearson 3d
Amend. Rep. at 9; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 11.) Having reviewed each of these
reports, I cannot find that the experts unreasonably extrapolated or misinterpreted
O’Brien 2020 such that their opinions can be excluded on that basis. Moreover, the
findings and concordant analyses that Plaintiffs’ experts made based on the follow-
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up study, O’Brien 2024, provide more recent, updated data upon which the experts’
opinions on this factor were also based. I therefore find a sound methodological basis
upon which Plaintiffs’ experts may testify as to their interpretations of consistency
across the existing data, acknowledging that Defendants will have the opportunity
to question them as to how they interpret the literature to support their conclusions.
In response to Defendants’ second point, I do not find that Plaintiffs’ experts
“ignore” statistical significance in the literature writ large. (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 62.) The experts instead explained how they accounted for statistical
significance and why they afforded it certain weight. Indeed, as discussed above, the
case law and scientific treatises make clear that statistical significance is far from
the be-all end-all of consistency calculations. For example, Defendants fault Dr.
Moorman for “selectively rely[ing] on statistical significance” when it supports her
opinion, by citing to her analysis of O’Brien 2020’s subset of talc users with patent
reproductive tracts. (Id. at 63.) But, upon a further examination, Dr. Moorman
explained in detail not only why she focused her analysis on that cohort but also
surveyed other experts in the field who support that position—most notably, the
O’Brien 2020 authors’ own response that “agree[d] that the analyses limited to
women with intact reproductive tracts should not be discounted.” (O’Brien et al.,
Letters to the Editor 323 JAMA at 2096–97.) (emphasis added).) It is a well-
reasoned methodology that does not amount to “cherry-picking,” (Defs.’ 2024
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General Causation Br. at 63 (quoting In re Acetaminophen I, 707 F. Supp. 3d 309,
364 (S.D.N.Y. 2023))), but instead reflects how an expert examined and explained
the available data. Whether Dr. Moorman’s opinion should ultimately prevail is not
my determination here, so long 	as her conclusions proceed 	from a reliable
application of the methodology. I find that they do. Defendants are free to challenge
the doctor’s conclusions before a jury.
Highlighting additional examples, Dr. Siemiatycki reiterated that “the absence
of statistical significance is not tantamount to proof of the absence of an association.”
(Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 10 (citations omitted); see also Matrixx Initiatives,
Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 40–41 (2011) (“A lack of statistically significant
data does not mean that medical experts have no reliable basis for inferring a causal
link between a drug and adverse events. . . . [M]edical professionals and researchers
do not limit the data they consider to the results of randomized clinical trials or to
statistically significant evidence.”).) He further described how a study’s sample size
relates 	to 	its 	statistical 	power, 	depending 	on 	the 	type 	of 	study 	and 	its
characteristics—including 	observing 	that 	Sir 	Bradford 	Hill 	himself 	did 	not
“explicitly list[]” statistical significance as a factor due, in part, to the complications
with measuring that figure depending on RR and sample size. (Siemiatycki 3d
Amend. Rep. at 16–17, 20–21.) The doctor instead opined that “the single number
which reflects quite well the statistical strength of a study, be it case-control or
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cohort, is the number of exposed cases,” which he distilled by analyzing 34 studies’
exposed cases and RRs. (See id. at 84–86 (Table 2).) Based on that calculation, 31
results showed an RR of over 1.0, which “is clearly strong and in defiance of the null
hypothesis,” that there is no true association, which would result in “as many of the
RR estimates to be below 1.0 as to be above 1.0.” (Id. at 37.)
Dr. Smith-Bindman concurred that “it is more important to estimate the effect
size and the uncertainty surrounding the estimate (with a point estimate and
confidence interval) rather than using a significance level and p-value to determine
if there is/or is not a meaningful association,” because, for example, “[t]here is no
inherent or meaningful difference between a study with a p-value of 0.04 compared
with 0.06, and yet these are often wrongly considered reflective of significant and
non-significant results respectively.” (Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 16.)34 She
acknowledged that of the dozens she reviewed, “the sample size of some studies was
small and resulted in high statistical uncertainty,” which made “quantifying a precise
association between exposure and cancer . . . difficult.” (Id. at 18.) Specifically, she
acknowledged that the WHI study did “not demonstrate a statistically significant
association,” but that the study admitted limitations based on its “short period of
follow up and limited exposure information,” which “would tend to bias the results
34 	This accords with the quoted testimony from Dr. McTiernan in my 2020 Opinion on the
same issue. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 170–71.
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toward the null.” (Id. at 22–23.) I reiterate that I considered and dispensed with
Defendants’ challenges to those positions in my 2020 Opinion, concluding that this
is “a dispute over whether the experts are correct in discounting the causative results
of the cohort studies,” which “relate[s] to the weight of their testimony, not their
reliability.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 172. Because I find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the experts’ methodologies on the consistency
factor are reliable, and that their opinions reliably proceed therefrom, I recommend
that the Court not depart from that holding at this juncture.
Before leaving this factor, I must note that Defendants’ invocation of other
courts’ treatment of certain experts, is not only taken out of context, but also does
not have any bearing on those experts’ proffered opinions here regarding the
relationship between talcum powder and ovarian cancer. For example, Defendants
cite In re Lipitor, 892 F.3d at 641–42, where the Fourth Circuit affirmed excluding
Dr. Singh’s general causation opinion regarding Lipitor, stemming from his reliance
on non-statistically significant trends in the field. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation
Br. at 59–60.) But that example differs here, where Dr. Singh has explained the
methodology he used to support his opinions in relation to statistically significant
findings, and why he accounted for certain findings and studies over others. (See
generally Singh 2d Supp. Rep.) Similarly lacking, Defendants quote In re Zantac to
posit that the Southern District of Florida “excluded Drs. McTiernan and Moorman
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for ‘routinely . . . disregard[ing] the concept of statistical significance.’” (Defs.’ 2024
General Causation Br. at 59 (quoting 644 F. Supp. 3d at 1222; id. at 1237–38).) But
Defendants omit that court’s distinction drawn between Dr. McTiernan’s approach
in this very litigation and Zantac:
Before 	this 	MDL, 	Dr. 	McTiernan 	characterized
statistically insignificant data (under the conventional
definition) as statistically insignificant. In In re Johnson &
Johnson 	Talcum 	Powder 	Products 	Marketing, 	Sales
Practices & Products Litigation (In re Talc), another
MDL, 	Dr. 	McTiernan 	authored 	a 	77-page 	expert
report. 509 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	130. 	In 	that 	report, 	Dr.
McTiernan 	characterizes 	studies 	as 	either 	statistically
significant or statistically insignificant. McTiernan Dep.
Ex. 26 at 41 (“Among the 8 studies which were not
statistically significant . . . ”). Dr. McTiernan’s opinion
in that litigation was expressly based upon risk rates that
were statistically significant; she did not ground her
opinion on statistically insignificant data. Id. at 9 (“I base
this opinion on the statistically significant elevated risk
estimates . . . ”).
644 F. Supp. 3d at 1231–32 (citation modified). The court went on to find that Dr.
McTiernan’s methodology had evidently changed in relation to her testimony in
Zantac, 	where 	she, 	according 	to 	that 	court, 	“at 	some 	point 	[changed] 	her
understanding of the concept of statistical insignificance.” Id. at 1232. But whether
that was in fact the situation in Zantac is (1) of no moment here, where other courts
have noted the difference between her methodology here and in that unrelated case;
and (2) does not take into account my fulsome discussion of the proper role of
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statistical significance, as well as Dr. McTiernan’s exploration of that concept. (See
supra Part V.B.4.)
As to Dr. Moorman, the Zantac court in fact excluded her opinion despite
explaining that it “does not question the reliability of Dr. Moorman’s expert opinion
because she fails to adequately explain her methodology,” instead observing that in
contrast to Dr. McTiernan, “Dr. Moorman clearly explains what studies most
influence her opinion, and she explains why those studies influence her,” as well as
noting that she “relied upon statistically insignificant data with less frequency than
Dr. McTiernan.” Id. at 1243 & n.138. Rather, the court excluded Dr. Moorman
because, in that court’s view, “although the primary focus of a Daubert inquiry is an
expert’s methodology, this Court is permitted to consider the fact that the Plaintiffs’
experts’ general causation conclusions . . . are unique and isolated to this litigation,”
despite noting that the factor “weighs moderately in favor of exclusion.” Id. at 1254.
I reiterate that these cases are not analogous to these very experts’ methodologies
and approaches here—as the Zantac court itself distinguished them.
Again, nowhere do Defendants respond to these experts’ methodologies
finding 	O’Brien 2024 to be statistically 	significant, except 	to 	reiterate their
challenges to its imputed data.
In sum, Plaintiffs’ experts concluded that the Bradford Hill consistency
criterion is met because more than four decades of epidemiologic research reliably
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show an elevated risk of ovarian cancer associated with perineal talc use across
different study designs, populations, geographic regions, and time periods. (See
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 45–48; Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 72–73; Smith-
Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 28, 36; Harlow Rep. at 12–13, 20; Cote Amend. Rep.
at 36; Singh Supp. Rep. at 17–18; Moorman Rep. at 15–29; Clarke-Pearson 3d
Amend. Rep. at 13; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 7–9, 11–12.) Dr. Siemiatycki, for
example, explained that dozens of studies across decades “have produced an RR
greater than the null value of 1.0. If there [] were no association between talcum
powder use and ovarian cancer, we would expect to see as many RRs lower than 1.0
as higher than 1.0,” analogizing the pattern to “flipping a coin 30 times and getting
a heads 28 or 29 times.” (Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 72; see also Cote Amend.
Rep. at 36 (“In my opinion, having reviewed hundreds of epidemiologic studies and
publishing my own pooled and meta-analyses, the consistency of the effect sizes
seen across populations is strikingly consistent.”).)
The replication of the association between perineal talcum powder and
ovarian cancer across diverse settings, tumor subtypes, and decades of research
reflects the type of uniform, reproducible pattern that Bradford Hill identified as
evidence of a consistent relationship. As Plaintiffs’ experts explained, these studies
repeatedly produce positive associations, including statistically significant increased
risks in the majority of case-control studies and confirmed elevations in recent large
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pooled and meta-analytic analyses, even across variations in methodology, exposure
assessment, and demographic composition.
Indeed, as emphasized throughout this Report and Recommendation, my role
as a Rule 702 gatekeeper is to assess whether the experts have adequately considered
the existing literature and applied a reliable methodology in interpreting it to support
their opinions which must be based upon good grounds—not to determine whether
I ultimately agree with their purported conclusions. See Cohen, 125 F.4th at 461–62
(holding that Daubert’s standard “does not hinge on whether a particular scientific
opinion has the best foundation, or even whether the opinion is supported by the best
methodology or unassailable research,” but instead “looks to whether the expert’s
testimony is supported by good grounds,” including methodology, facts, and the
links between the facts and conclusion) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). With respect to the consistency factor, for the reasons stated above, I find
that Plaintiffs’ experts have done so. As in the prior round of motion practice, the
parties continue to debate the relative weight to assign particular studies or findings;
however, the briefs and expert reports reflect that Plaintiffs’ experts have, by a
preponderance of the evidence, reliably applied their methodologies to review and
interpret published, peer-reviewed research. In this respect, the parties’ disagreement
over the strengths and limitations of the post-2020 studies relates more to an
evidentiary dispute appropriate for the factfinder than to a methodological flaw or
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unsound conclusion requiring exclusion under Rule 702. I therefore find no basis to
exclude Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions on this factor, and conclude that the remaining
disputes are matters of weight for the jury, not admissibility.
iii. 	Biological Gradient (or Dose-Response Relationship)
Dose “refers to the intensity or magnitude of exposure to an agent multiplied
by the duration of exposure.” Green at 622. A dose-response relationship exists when
“a change in amount, intensity, or duration of exposure to an agent is associated with
a change—either an increase or a decrease—in risk of disease.” Id. “Generally,
higher exposures should increase the incidence (or severity) of disease.” Id. at 603.
However, this pattern is not universal. Some causal agents “do not exhibit a dose-
response relationship when, for example, there is a threshold phenomenon (i.e., an
exposure may not cause disease until the exposure exceeds a certain dose).” Id.
Accordingly, “a dose-response relationship is strong, but not essential, evidence that
the relationship between an agent and disease is causal.” Id.
In my 2020 Opinion, I summarized the parties’ dispute as centered on two
core issues: (1) the weight that the dose-response factor should be afforded in a
Bradford Hill analysis, including what type of data can establish a sufficiently strong
dose-response; and (2) whether Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions on the existence of a
dose-response relationship are “adequately supported by the studies on which they
rely.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 179. I noted that, in accordance
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with the above-mentioned epidemiological principles, “a strong dose-response is not
necessarily required for an expert to find a causal nexus.” Id. at 179 (citing Ferguson
v. Riverside Sch. Dist. No. 416, No. 00-cv-0097, 2002 WL 34355958, at *6 (E.D.
Wash. Feb. 5, 2002)).
My 	discussion 	of 	the 	parties’ 	dispute 	then 	centered 	largely 	on 	their
“competing interpretations” of the Terry 2013 pooled analysis study. Id. at 177 n.42,
180. Dr. McTiernan described the Terry 2013 methodology that divided study
participants into categories depending on their usage level of talcum powder
products, and found an increased relative risk based on level of use. Id. at 177–78.
In response, Defendants claimed that Terry 2013 actually “concluded that there was
no trend in risk with increasing talc use” because including non-users as a category
of subjects skewed the data to find a cumulative dose-response. 	Id. 	at 180.
Evaluating the parties’ arguments then, I found reasonable Dr. McTiernan’s opinion
that it is “appropriate to include non-users when you are looking at a dose-response
effect,” in the same way that a randomized trial would compare findings among users
of an agent to a placebo group. Id. I independently reviewed Terry 2013 and
explained that the study “did not wholly rule out a dose-response relationship, but
instead found the data to be inconsistent,” and therefore I concluded that despite the
parties’ “different interpretations of the Terry study,” this dispute boiled down to a
question of weight, rather than admissibility because “it is not the Court’s position
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as a gatekeeper to determine whose interpretation of the studies is correct,” so long
as there are good grounds to support the opinions. Id. at 180.
In their current motion, Defendants repeat many of the same arguments I
previously considered. They contend that the dose-response relationship factor
weighs against causation and that Plaintiffs improperly minimize it despite its central
importance in toxicology. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 65–67.) Instead,
they 	claim, 	the 	epidemiologic 	record 	does 	not 	evince 	a 	true 	dose-response
relationship between perineal talc exposure and ovarian cancer, but that “plaintiffs’
experts half-heartedly attempt to manufacture” one “by twisting the epidemiologic
data.” (Id. at 67.) Defendants explore the same pre-2020 studies they raised in the
prior round of motion practice to reiterate that none of the studies conclusively
determined that a dose-response relationship exists. (Id. at 67–69.) Lastly, they
repeat their prior objection to Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions regarding threshold
exposure. (Id. at 69–70.) In Defendants’ view, the absence of a dose-response
trend—together with methodological problems in the studies used by the experts—
means this Bradford Hill factor weighs against causation, and the experts’ efforts to
discount it are methodologically unreliable.
In response, Plaintiffs emphasize that Defendants’ arguments are “largely
recycled attacks” from the prior round of motion practice, and that in fact, the
evidence for a biological gradient has strengthened, particularly with post-2020
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cohort studies. (Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 90.) In their view, improved
prospective data (O’Brien 2024), the patent-tract subgroup in pooled cohorts
(O’Brien 2020), and meta-analytic results focused on heavier users, (Woolen 2022),
collectively 	demonstrate 	that 	ovarian 	cancer 	risk 	increases 	with 	greater 	talc
exposure, particularly with frequent and long-term use. (Id. at 91–92.)
As Plaintiffs correctly observe, Defendants’ briefing does not engage with any
of the post-2020 epidemiologic literature that was unavailable at the time of my 2020
Opinion, with the exception of O’Brien 2020. Instead, Defendants rely primarily on
earlier studies, a 2014 FDA letter, and a PDQ Screening and Prevention Editorial
Board 	webpage 	that 	expressly 	“does 	not 	provide 	formal 	guidelines 	or
recommendations for making health care decisions.” (Pls.’ General Causation Opp.
Br. at 90; see NCI, Ovarian, Fallopian Tube, and Primary Peritoneal Cancers
Prevention 	(PDQ) 	– 	Health 	Professional 	Version, 	available 	at
https://www.cancer.gov/types/ovarian/hp/ovarianprevention-pdq 	(“NCI 	PDQ”)).
Even so, Defendants—and the sources they cite—characterize the evidence as
“sorely lacking,” which is not equivalent to affirmative evidence demonstrating the
absence—let alone “inverse”—of a dose-response relationship, and reflects an
assessment based solely on pre-2020 science. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at
64, 69; see also NCI PDQ (“the data are inadequate” to establish a clear dose-
response relationship).) Defendants further argue that “imprecision” in exposure
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measurements 	is 	a 	“fundamental 	weakness” 	that 	weighs 	against 	any 	causal
inference, citing cases in which none of the underlying studies recorded actual
dosages. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 66–67 (quoting In re Acetaminophen
I, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 350).) But it is a considerable leap to suggest that a record
entirely devoid of dosage information is analogous to the presence of some degree
of imprecision in exposure assessment—an issue that arises with some frequency in
observational epidemiology and does not, standing alone, bar reliance on the
literature. Because I find the analogy inapposite to the evidence and methodologies
at issue here, I do not find Defendants’ argument on this point persuasive.35
Defendants claim that my prior Opinion “misread” certain case law, including
Ferguson, because general causation was not at issue in that matter. (Id. at 66.)
Ferguson grappled with the dose-response factor in assessing whether the expert’s
causative opinion between the presence of mold in school and injuries suffered by
students was sound under Rule 702. 2002 WL 34355958, at *1. The court explained
that dose-response is not essential if there is no threshold level for injury from
exposure to a harmful agent; rather, the court stated that “‘it makes little sense to
require a plaintiff to establish a dose/response relationship or threshold level in a
35 	Measuring talc exposure is not analogous to, for example, measuring the amount of
cigarettes a person smokes or the dose of medicine a person consumes. Measuring the amount of
talcum powder a person applies each time varies, and therefore does not lend itself to accurate
measurement. This “impression” in and of itself does not render plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions
unreliable, and is a matter for cross-examination.
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situation . . . where the dose/response relationship or threshold level will always vary
from individual to individual.’” Id. at *6 (quoting Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co., 243 F.3d 255, 263–64 (6th Cir. 2001)). The court went on to say, “‘[w]hile
precise information concerning the exposure necessary to cause specific harm to
humans and exact details pertaining to the plaintiff’s exposure are beneficial, such
evidence is not always available, or necessary, to demonstrate that a substance is
toxic to humans given substantial exposure,’” and therefore it does not need to
“‘invariably provide the basis for an expert’s opinion on causation.’” Id. (quoting
Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1999)). Indeed, in
Westberry, the Fourth Circuit admitted expert testimony that exposure to talc caused
sinus problems despite the inability to determine threshold level of exposure
necessary to cause the plaintiff’s injuries. 178 F.3d at 264. Consistent with that line
of cases, I explained that “a strong dose-response is not necessarily required for an
expert to find a causal nexus.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 179. In
any event, this case is not devoid of any evidence of dose-response which is further
explained, infra.
Defendants next argue that my prior determination—that “Terry did not
wholly rule out a dose-responsive relationship”—was insufficient to support my
conclusion that Plaintiffs met their burden under Rule 702 on this factor. (Defs.’
2024 General Causation Br. at 67–68.) They rely on In re Onglyza, for the principle
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that epidemiologic literature should not be interpreted as demonstrating a causal
relationship absent compelling evidence. 93 F.4th at 346. That decision, however, is
materially distinguishable from the circumstances presented here. In Onglyza, the
Sixth Circuit upheld the exclusion of an expert who “failed to engage with” multiple
large-scale studies involving approximately 175,000 users and dismissed them as
limited 	due 	to 	confounding 	without 	identifying 	any 	specific 	confounders 	or
explaining the methodological basis for discounting them. Id. at 345. Moreover, the
expert—not the court—asserted that studies “should be interpreted as cause-and-
effect” unless compelling evidence suggests otherwise. Id.
Nothing in Onglyza undermines the reasoning of my 2020 Opinion or the
positions advanced by Plaintiffs’ experts in this MDL. In 2020, I first cited
authoritative scientific sources to explain that a dose-response relationship “is
strong, but not essential, evidence” of causation, In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F.
Supp. 3d at 180 (quoting Green at 603), and then observed that Terry found “the data
inconsistent”—not that a dose-response relationship existed by default in the
absence of contrary findings, id. at 180. Nor does Onglyza suggest otherwise. There,
the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the district court excluded the expert because he
failed to explain how he inferred causation from a study that itself did not reach a
causal conclusion. 93 F.4th at 346. Here, by contrast, and as discussed below,
Plaintiffs’ experts articulate the methodological basis for their interpretations of the
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literature and explained how they reached their views on dose-response using the
available evidence.
Although the parties agree that the “new science” issued since 2020 provides
the impetus for the renewed motions, Defendants’ arguments on this factor primarily
challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ interpretations of pre-2020 literature that was already
addressed in my 2020 Daubert ruling. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 67–69;
In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 177–80.) Notably, Defendants do not
meaningfully 	engage 	with 	the 	post-2020 	scientific 	developments 	on 	which
Plaintiffs’ experts now rely. In this respect, Defendants have not identified how the
“new science is shown to directly contradict or challenge” my earlier findings. (Apr.
30, 2024 Memorandum Order (emphasis added).) Accordingly, I proceed to evaluate
Plaintiffs’ experts’ current opinions in light of the full evidentiary record, including
the post-2020 landscape, to address the Rule 702 standard.
As I previously discussed, O’Brien 2020 conducted a pooled prospective
cohort analysis based on four large cohort studies comprising over 250,000 women.
(See supra Part V.B.5.ii; O’Brien 2020 at 49.) The study found “no clear dose-
response trends for duration and frequency of powder use in the genital area in
relation to ovarian cancer risk,” despite noting that “the study was underpowered to
detect small changes in risk.” (O’Brien 2020 at 56.) O’Brien 2020 did detect “a
possible positive association among women with patent reproductive tracts,” a
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finding the authors considered to be “exploratory and hypothesis generating”
because “the association was not significantly different” from that among women
with nonpatent reproductive tracts. (Id.) The authors also “avoided” recall bias “by
excluding those with preexisting ovarian cancer.” (Id. at 57.) Additionally, the study
noted that “information on powder exposure is typically more limited in cohort
studies compared with case-control studies, particularly with respect to dose and
duration of use,” and suggested that “ongoing or future” studies collect such
information. (Id.)
Two years later, Woolen 2022 issued a meta-analysis to examine in depth the
association between frequent perineal talc use and ovarian cancer using pooled data
from eleven studies. (Woolen 2022 at 2528.) The study found a “pooled adjusted
odds ratio of 1.47% (95% CI 1.31, 1.65),” for frequent use of perineal talcum
powder. (Id. 	at 2530.) Although the meta-analysis could not model a single
continuous 	gradient 	across 	all 	studies 	due 	to 	differing 	exposure 	metrics, 	it
highlighted that studies using higher-frequency or higher-cumulative-use categories
(for example, daily use, > 30 times per month, or > 10,000 lifetime applications)
consistently showed elevated risks. (Id. at 2529.) The paper specifically noted
prospective cohort evidence demonstrating increased risk correlated to increasing
frequency, including a higher hazard in daily users, which the authors characterized
as supportive of a dose-response pattern. (Id. at 2531.) The authors acknowledged
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that by restricting inclusion to studies explicitly reporting frequent use, they
necessarily excluded some studies whose questionnaires did not capture higher-use
categories, as well as the fact that exposure definitions varied across studies. (Id. at
2531–32.)
The last major study that bears upon dose-response is O’Brien 2024. Those
researchers used updated exposure data and quantitative bias analysis to reanalyze
the association between “intimate care products,” including genital talc, and ovarian
cancer. (O’Brien 2024 at 1.) As has already been discussed at length, they “used
quantitative bias analyses to implement different approaches for imputing exposure”
wherein follow-up data was lacking, by running and summarizing effect estimates
across 100 imputed data sets. (Id. at 4.) The authors “found evidence supporting a
positive association between ever genital talc use and incident ovarian cancer,”
including specifically finding an approximately 40% higher rate of ovarian cancer
compared to never-users “with consistently increasing dose-response patterns for
both frequency and duration of use.” (Id. at 13.) Despite acknowledging limitations
such 	as 	“unmeasured 	confounding” 	and 	the 	potentially 	non-generalizable
demographics of the study participants, O’Brien 2024 announced that “higher rates
[were] seen for frequent and long-term users.” (Id. at 2.)
In broad strokes, Plaintiffs explain that Woolen 2022 specifically studied the
frequency of use of perineal talcum powder products in relation to ovarian cancer,
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and that O’Brien 2024 analyzed dose-response focusing on frequent and long-term
users, calculating increased risks of 82% and 100%, respectively. (See Pls.’ General
Causation Opp. Br. at 91–92.) Indeed, NIH’s issuance of a press release in June 2024
announcing O’Brien 2024’s findings is a strong indicator of the advent of “new
science” in this regard—science that Plaintiffs advocate supports their position,
because the study’s “key findings” include a “[p]ersistent positive association
between genital talc use and ovarian cancer, with the strongest associations observed
for frequent and long-term users and for use during the reproductive years.” (ECF
No. 33130-8, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, Genital Talc Use
May Be Linked to Increased Risk of Ovarian Cancer, NIEHS (June 2024) (“NIEHS
Press Release”) (emphasis added).) Defendants’ only response to this appears to be
that O’Brien 2024 cannot be trusted because of the imputed data discussed above. I
have already explained why I do not find that argument convincing. (See supra Part
V.B.5.iii.)
Based on the studies themselves and the experts’ interpretations of them, I do
not find that any of the post-2020 literature “directly contradicts or challenges” the
evidentiary record before me in 2020. (Apr. 30, 2024 Memorandum Order.) Rather,
the newer studies provide additional grounds upon which Plaintiffs’ experts may
reliably extrapolate that the dose-response factor is satisfied. For example, Dr. Singh
explained 	that 	O’Brien 	2024’s 	pooled 	data 	demonstrated 	“a 	consistent 	and
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statistically significant increased risk of ovarian cancer for both frequent genital talc
users (HR 1.99, 95% CI 1.43–2.78) and long-term genital talc users (HR 2.2, 95%
CI 1.52–3.19) compared to never users,” and that “sometime use of genital talc (HR
1.56, 95% CI 1.09–2.22) and use for one decade only (HR 1.48, 95% CI 1.06–2.06)
was also associated with a statistically significant increased risk.” (Singh 2d Supp.
Rep. at 1; O’Brien 2024 at 10 (Table 3).) He further calculated that the data showed
“[l]ong-term users of genital talc had a more than doubling in the risk of ovarian
cancer,” 	and 	concluded 	that 	the 	“strong 	monotonic 	dose-response 	effect,
accompanied by statistically significant positive tests for trend, and the large
magnitude of the dose-response, provides strong support” for this factor. (Singh 2d
Supp. Rep. at 6.)
Dr. McTiernan similarly stated in her supplemental report that “frequent use
of genital talcum powder products doubled risk of ovarian cancer,” and noted that
the statistical test for trend—a standard measure of dose-response—was “highly
significant at P < 0.001.” (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 51; see also O’Brien 2024
at 10 (Table 3).) She concluded that O’Brien 2024, which considered data on lifetime
patterns of talc use, “provided a more accurate picture of dose-response,” including
when accounting for recall bias, and “showed clearly that increased exposure to
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genital talc was associated with increased risk, which was statistically significant.”36
(Id. at 54.)
Dr. McTiernan also discussed Woolen 2022, emphasizing its value as the first
meta-analysis to focus on frequent use (rather than ever use), and noting that it
reported “strong data that women who used perineal talcum powder products two or
more times per week had a statistically significant 47% increased risk of developing
ovarian cancer.” (Id. at 81; Woolen 2022 at 2531.) She identified certain limitations,
such as the exclusion of studies that did not capture frequent-use patterns and
occasional inability to distinguish between talc and cornstarch products. (Woolen
2022 at 2531–32.) She ultimately considered the latter issue of minimal significance
because “other research shows only 1–2% of perineal powder users report using
cornstarch.” (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 81 (citing Cramer 2016).) The analyses
offered by Dr. Singh and Dr. McTiernan are grounded in the cited literature and
36 	Defendants again rely on Zantac, noting that the court there excluded Dr. McTiernan’s
opinion regarding the dose-response relationship. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 69.) In
Zantac, the court’s ruling rested in part on the conclusion that “no study concluded [that a dose-
response] relationship existed, with some even observing the inverse.” 644 F. Supp. 3d at 1240.
That factual premise, however, is not present here. Defendants quote this excerpt from Zantac to
suggest it applies here; yet none of the studies the parties cite found an inverse dose-response
relationship, nor do Defendants assert they do beyond simply quoting Zantac in this regard. (Defs.’
General Causation Br. at 69.) Instead, as discussed above, Defendants present an argument about
imprecision in the exposure data—an asserted methodological weakness that, in their view,
counsels against drawing causal inferences. (Id. at 66.) As already explained, methodological
imprecision is not equivalent to evidence of an inverse dose-response relationship. (See supra
V.B.5.i. & ii.) Accordingly, the reasons for excluding an expert’s testimony in another proceeding
do not control where, as here, the underlying record and factual circumstances are materially
different.
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generally align with other Plaintiffs’ experts who ascribed significant weight to this
factor. (See Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 44–55; Moorman 2d Supp. Rep. at 3–
11; Harlow Rep. at 8; see also Harlow Supp. Rep. at 3 (not using standard Bradford
Hill criteria but addressing the same factors in his analysis).)
Some experts, by contrast, explained why they did not ascribe substantial
weight to the dose-response factor in their Bradford Hill analyses. For example, Dr.
Smith-Bindman stated that, based on her review of the literature, “most studies of
talcum powder products and ovarian cancer show a dose response, with the caveat
that some studies do not, and several studies did not assess.” (Smith-Bindman 3d
Amend. Rep. at 37.) She noted that both O’Brien 2020 and O’Brien 2024
“confirm[ed] a dose response relationship 	where women 	with 	more lifetime
applications had higher risks as did women who reported long-term talc use or the
most applications,” but she assigned this factor less weight because not all
carcinogenic exposures necessarily demonstrate a linear dose-response pattern;
some, she explained, follow a threshold model. (Id.) She further stated that this
consideration is particularly relevant here because asbestos is understood to exhibit
a threshold dose-response, and thus, in her view, while the presence of a dose-
response relationship supports causation, the absence of such a pattern in any given
study would not alter her overall conclusion. (Id.; see also id. at 11–12.) This
reasoning is consistent with both pre- and post-2020 literature. (See, e.g., O’Brien
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2020 at 56; Woolen 2022 at 2531; O’Brien 2024 at 1–2, 13.) Certain other experts
similarly assigned moderate or limited weight to the factor while still recognizing
that many studies collecting frequency or duration data report evidence of dose
response. (See Cote Amend. Rep. at 37; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 13; Wolf
3d Amend. Rep. at 19.)
Defendants renew their objection to what they characterize as a “threshold”
theory, arguing that it is speculative because Plaintiffs’ experts cannot identify a
specific threshold dose. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 69–70.) But this
argument does not engage with any post-2020 scientific literature, nor does it
identify case law that interprets Rule 702 differently from my prior analysis. See In
re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 179–80. Moreover, courts applying the
amended Rule 702 have reiterated that the absence of a quantified exposure
threshold does not, by itself, render an expert’s causation opinion inadmissible. See,
e.g., Ruffin v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 137 F.4th 276, 282–83 (5th Cir. 2025) (dose-
response is “but one factor” and “does not require an expert to provide a specific,
quantitative exposure dose” so long as the expert reliably explains how the substance
is capable of causing the condition); Thompson v. Orkin, LLC, No. 20-cv-13085,
2025 WL 18639, at *14 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 2, 2025) (collecting cases recognizing that
precise exposure levels are not always necessary where other evidence supports
causation).
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For these reasons, I find that Plaintiffs’ experts have continued to apply well-
reasoned 	methodologies 	and 	to 	draw 	conclusions 	that 	are 	supported 	by 	the
literature—whether they afforded the dose-response factor significant, moderate, or
limited weight—based on their analyses of both pre- and post-2020 peer-reviewed
studies. Defendants’ critiques do not meaningfully address the more recent scientific
evidence that informs the experts’ current opinions. I reiterate that I do not opine, let
alone conclude, whether the existing data ultimately proves the existence of a dose-
response relationship between talc and ovarian cancer. While the studies support this
Bradford Hill factor, I also acknowledge that this factor does not share some of the
same force in the literature as do other factors. But I do find that, under Rule 702,
by a preponderance of the evidence, Plaintiffs’ experts have met the reliability
requirements with respect to this factor and may offer their opinions at trial.
Defendants 	remain 	free 	to 	challenge 	the 	strength 	or 	interpretation 	of 	those
conclusions, including their assertion that no dose-response relationship has been
conclusively 	demonstrated, 	through 	cross-examination 	and 	competing 	expert
testimony.
iv. 	Biological Plausibility
In his 1965 article, on the factor of biological plausibility, Sir Bradford Hill
advised: “It will be helpful if the causation we suspect is biologically plausible. But
this is a feature I am convinced we cannot demand. What is biologically plausible
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depends upon the biological knowledge of the day.” Hill at 298. Similarly, the
Reference Guide counsels that to demonstrate biological plausibility “depends upon
existing knowledge about the mechanisms by which the disease develops.” Green at
604. “When biological plausibility exists, it lends credence to an inference of
causality.” Id. “However, observations have been made in epidemiologic studies that
were not biologically plausible at the time but subsequently were shown to be
correct.” Id. Accordingly, these authorities caution that while biological plausibility
may support a causal inference, plausibility necessarily depends on the state of
scientific knowledge at the relevant time, and a limited or weak showing of
biological plausibility does not, standing alone, negate causation. See In re Viagra,
424 F. Supp. 3d at 791 (“In the abstract, there is no independent requirement that a
plaintiff establish it to be biologically plausible that exposure to a particular drug or
substance could cause the disease or condition at issue,” and therefore, “‘[b]iological
plausibility’ thus is only a subsidiary consideration in the larger question of general
causation.”); see also In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308 (“[A]n expert on
biological plausibility need not definitively prove the biological means by which a
drug acts in the body.”); In re Neurontin Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
612 F. Supp. 2d 116, 149 (D. Mass 2009) (finding that biological plausibility
supported expert’s opinion on causation despite the fact that there was “robust debate
in 	the 	scientific 	community” 	on 	the 	proposed 	mechanism); 	In 	re
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Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1247 (W.D.
Wash. 2003) (“The fact that the mechanism remains unclear does not call the
reliability of the opinion into question.”); Berg v. Johnson & Johnson, 940 F. Supp.
2d 983, 993 (D.S.D. 2013) (in permitting expert testimony that it was biologically
plausible for talcum powder to cause ovarian cancer, the court observed that “[a]t
times, mechanistic explanations are merely hypothesized—although hypotheses are
sometimes accepted in showing exposure can cause a disease” (citation and
quotations omitted)).
Here, Defendants advance a series of challenges to Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions on biological plausibility, contending that because those opinions rest on a
multi-step causal theory, Plaintiffs must reliably establish each component of that
theory under Rule 702. In particular, Defendants argue that the experts: (1)
improperly conflate distinct ovarian cancer subtypes with differing etiologies and
risk factors; (2) rely on insufficient evidence to demonstrate that externally applied
talc can migrate to the ovaries or fallopian tubes; (3) fail to establish that talc
exposure causes chronic inflammation and/or oxidative stress; (4) lack reliable
scientific support that such chronic inflammation can cause ovarian cancer; and (5)
improperly rely on in vitro studies to support theories involving oxidative stress or
macrophage impairment. (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 2–4, 9–48.)
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These arguments are framed against Defendants’ broader contention that my
prior rulings applied an unduly permissive interpretation of Rule 702 by treating
asserted gaps in biological plausibility as matters of weight rather than admissibility,
and that the 2023 amendments to Rule 702 require courts to resolve such issues at
the admissibility stage. Defendants also argue that I improperly shifted the burden
of proof by requiring them to disprove Plaintiffs’ theories, and that intervening
scientific developments undermine the experts’ opinions. Plaintiffs dispute each of
these assertions, maintaining that the correct Rule 702 standard was applied and that
Defendants 	identify 	no 	conclusive 	new 	scientific 	evidence 	warranting
reconsideration of the prior rulings.
To assess Defendants’ present motion within the framework set forth in the
Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order, it is necessary to revisit the earlier
Daubert rulings addressing biological plausibility. During the initial round of
Daubert motions, Defendants advanced materially similar challenges, including that
Plaintiffs’ experts improperly treated ovarian cancer as a single disease, failed to
establish a plausible migration pathway for talc, and lacked reliable evidence that
talc 	exposure 	could 	lead 	to 	chronic 	inflammation 	or 	carcinogenesis. 	Those
arguments were considered in detail and largely rejected, except for the inhalation-
and-lymphatic-transport theory, which I excluded. See In re Johnson & Johnson,
509 F. Supp. 3d at 175–76, 181–83.
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Defendants’ current motion reprises the same core thesis: that Plaintiffs’
biological plausibility opinions rest on a speculative, multi-step causal chain
unsupported by reliable evidence. Although Defendants now refine those objections
by 	reference 	to 	amendments 	in 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts’ 	reports, 	the 	selection 	of
bellwether Plaintiffs, recently published literature, and the amended text of Rule 702,
these refinements do not materially alter the substance of the challenge. Nor do they
demonstrate that my prior admissibility analysis fails to comport with Rule 702 as
amended. 	Importantly, 	Defendants 	identify 	no 	“new 	science” 	that 	directly
contradicts or undermines the evidentiary bases on which the prior rulings rested.
a. 	Ovarian Cancer Subtypes
Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs’ experts’ biological plausibility opinions
are 	unreliable 	because 	they 	treat 	“ovarian 	cancer” 	as 	a 	unitary 	disease,
notwithstanding heterogeneity in sites of origin, carcinogenic pathways, and risk
factors across ovarian cancer subtypes. (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 9–
12.) In Defendants’ view, any biological mechanism offered in support of general
causation must be subtype-specific, given that different subtypes arise in different
tissues and involve distinct etiologies. Defendants also emphasize that the selected
bellwether cases involve different ovarian cancer subtypes and contend that the
experts improperly rely on studies examining ovarian epithelial cells, which
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Defendants assert are not the cells of origin for high-grade serous carcinoma arising
in the fallopian tube fimbriae. (See id. at 12–14.)
Defendants contend that I did not adequately address this issue in 2020. My
prior Opinion found the experts’ opinions reliable as they relate to the evaluation of
epithelial ovarian cancer. I reasoned that the fact that Plaintiffs’ experts do not opine
on the biological mechanism for different epithelial ovarian cancer subtypes does
not call into question the reliability of their opinions. Then, as now, I examined the
reliability of the experts’ methodology and whether it is reliably applied to the facts
of this case.
As a general matter, ovarian cancer is an umbrella term encompassing several
distinct categories of malignancies, traditionally classified by cell type of origin,
including epithelial tumors, germ cell tumors, and sex cord–stromal tumors.
Epithelial 	ovarian 	cancer—the 	most 	common 	category—comprises 	multiple
histologic 	subtypes, 	such 	as 	serous, 	endometrioid, 	clear 	cell, 	and 	mucinous
carcinomas. (See, e.g., Brett M. Reid et al., Epidemiology of Ovarian Cancer: A
Review, 14 Cancer Biol. Med. (1), 9–32 (2017) (“Reid 2017”); see also Wolf 3d
Amend. Rep. at 3; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 20; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend.
Rep. at 4.) Importantly, as Defendants’ referenced literature suggests, “[m]ost
epidemiologic research . . . focuses on epithelial” ovarian cancer, since “more than
90% of malignant ovarian tumors are epithelial in origin.” (See Reid 2017 at 9
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(emphasis added).) It is, therefore, unsurprising that the studies underlying the
experts’ opinions principally examine the association between talcum powder use
and epithelial ovarian cancer.
At the outset, it bears repeating that a finding of biological plausibility
“depends upon existing knowledge about the mechanisms by which the disease
develops.” Green at 604. Accordingly, biological plausibility must be grounded in
“reliable scientific knowledge and reasoning,” not in scientific proof that has yet to
be developed. In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308. Based on that standard,
Defendants’ contention—that Plaintiffs’ experts either failed to account for, or that
the record lacks, epidemiologic studies stratified by epithelial ovarian cancer
subtype—does not render the experts’ methodologies unreliable. As the experts
explain, infra, and as the scientific literature reflects, epithelial ovarian cancer is a
heterogeneous disease in which certain subtypes—particularly high-grade serous
carcinoma—have been studied far more extensively than others. Where dispositive
data is limited or unavailable, it is scientifically appropriate for experts to rely on a
broader body of supportive epidemiologic, mechanistic, and pathological evidence
bearing on, for example, epithelial ovarian cancer generally. 	See, e.g., 	In re
Roundup, 390 F. Supp. 3d at 1126–27, 1129 (“[T]he Bradford Hill framework asks
experts to survey all the available evidence that might support or disprove causation.
A broad survey of the available evidence is neither unusual in expert testimony nor
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necessarily inappropriate.”); In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prod. Liab.
Litig. Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, MDL No. 2545, 2017 WL 1833173, at *9,
14 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2017) (“The Court agrees with plaintiffs that there is nothing
inherently unreliable about a method that relies on the totality of the evidence,
provided that the expert considers the evidence carefully and explains how the
weight of the various pieces of evidence led him to his conclusion.”). These experts’
opinions therefore rest on the application of existing scientific knowledge to the
question of biological plausibility, rather than on speculation or unsupported
extrapolation. The absence of definitive subtype-specific studies reflects the current
state of the science, not a methodological flaw, and does not preclude experts from
offering biologically plausible opinions grounded in the available evidence.
That said, several experts do in fact discuss different subtypes of epithelial
ovarian 	cancer 	in 	forming 	their 	biological 	plausibility 	opinions. 	(See, 	e.g.,
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 20 (providing overview of “different subtypes of
cancer of the ovary,” highlighting that only “epithelial ovarian cancer has been
studied in relation to use of talcum powder products,” and emphasizing importance
for “epidemiological studies of cancer . . . to identify . . . the type of cancer, stage of
cancer at diagnosis, and subtype of cancer”); Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 3
(“Talcum powder exposure is most clearly demonstrated to be associated with serous
cancer and other epithelial cancer subtypes (in particular, clear cell and endometrioid
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carcinoma), but because these other cancers are less common, and because fewer
studies 	have 	evaluated 	these 	cancers 	in 	sufficient 	numbers, 	quantifying 	the
associations 	is 	more 	difficult. 	In 	my 	opinion, 	this 	risk 	is 	likely 	overall 	in
approximately the same range as for serous cancer.”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 3
(“[Epithelial cancer] subtypes include serous, endometrioid, clear cell, mucinous,
undifferentiated or mixed. Of these, serous is by far the most common and accounts
for 70% of EOC. Epithelial ovarian cancers are those that are associated with talcum
powder products.”); see also, e.g., Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 22–25 (recognizing
bellwether Plaintiffs’ varied diagnoses).) Based on the available science, and the
underlying epidemiological studies upon which Plaintiffs’ experts rely in forming
their opinions, I find these discussions grounded in sound methodology.
Nevertheless, Defendants rely on Hoefling v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co.,
LLC in arguing that the experts’ failure to account for distinct subtypes of epithelial
ovarian cancer renders their methodologies unreliable. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 9–10 (citing Hoefling, 576 F. Supp. 3d 262).) Defendants’
argument is misplaced. In Hoefling, the district court excluded an expert’s general
causation opinion because the sources on which the expert relied did not support
causation for the specific anatomic site at issue—namely, the tonsil and oropharynx.
576 F. Supp. 3d at 272–75. The expert impermissibly extrapolated from evidence of
oral-cavity cancers without scientific justification and failed to meaningfully engage
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with the full body of relevant epidemiologic literature, among other methodological
deficiencies. See id.
By contrast, the sources relied on by Plaintiffs’ experts support the biological
plausibility theories concerning talcum powder use and epithelial ovarian cancer.
Plaintiffs’ experts do not derive subtype-specific conclusions from literature that
exceed the scope of the underlying studies. Rather, as discussed above and reflected
in their respective reports, the experts evaluate the association at the level of
epithelial ovarian cancer because both the relevant studies and the scientific
literature more broadly have focused predominantly on that category of disease,
rather than its sub-types. Nor do Plaintiffs’ experts disregard heterogeneity among
ovarian cancer subtypes. Instead, they accounted for the current state of the science,
which recognizes such heterogeneity. In that context, the experts’ reliance on
epithelial ovarian cancer as the relevant analytical frame is methodologically sound
and does not reflect the sort of unsupported extrapolation identified in Hoefling.
Defendants’ 	reliance 	on 	Siharath 	v. 	Sandoz 	Pharmaceuticals 	Corp. 	is
similarly misplaced. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 10 (citing
Siharath v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2001).)
In Siharath, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony and granted summary
judgment because every step of the proposed causal chain lacked independent
scientific support. Id. at 1370–71, 1373–74. After reviewing the full body of
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available 	medical 	evidence—including 	peer-reviewed 	epidemiologic 	studies,
learned treatises, case reports, and animal models—the court concluded that the
record did not demonstrate, or even meaningfully suggest, that Parlodel caused
hemorrhagic stroke. Id. at 1370–71. In short, the experts in Siharath advanced a
theory for which the scientific literature provided no reliable evidentiary foundation.
This case presents a materially different record. Here, Plaintiffs’ experts rely
on a substantial and evolving body of epidemiologic, mechanistic, and experimental
literature supporting the biological plausibility of an association between perineal
talc use and epithelial ovarian cancer, even if that literature does not resolve every
mechanistic question or permit exhaustive differentiation among all epithelial
subtypes. Unlike Siharath, this is not a case in which the scientific literature
uniformly contradicts—or fails to support—the proposed causal mechanism.
The distinction is further illustrated by the nature of the biological comparison
at issue. In Siharath, the court relied on a clear and well-established biological
dichotomy 	between 	ischemic 	strokes—caused 	by 	impaired 	blood 	flow—and
hemorrhagic strokes—caused by vascular rupture—and concluded that evidence
supporting one could not be reliably extrapolated to the other absent a scientific
foundation. Id. at 1355, 1371. Here, Defendants seek to analogize that dichotomy to
differences among epithelial ovarian cancer subtypes. But that analogy is not borne
out by the scientific literature on which Plaintiffs’ experts rely. Unlike the literature
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at issue in Siharath, the epidemiologic and mechanistic studies addressing talc use
and ovarian cancer are not framed in a manner that materially distinguishes among
epithelial subtypes or limits their findings to only certain subtypes. Rather, those
studies generally evaluate epithelial ovarian cancer as a category and do not identify
biological distinctions that would preclude the application of their findings across
epithelial subtypes. In that context, Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on this body of
literature does not involve the kind of unsupported extrapolation that concerned the
court in Siharath.
In short, Siharath involved a scientific record in which the asserted causal
relationship was unsupported at each analytical step. In contrast, Defendants’
arguments here challenge the scope and precision of the evidence supporting
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions, not the absence of such evidence. The analytical gaps
identified in 	Siharath 	were fatal under Rule 702 and 	Daubert; the asserted
limitations here instead present scientific disputes that should be explored through
cross-examination and the presentation of competing expert testimony, rather than
exclusion.
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ experts improperly rely on two in
vitro studies to bridge a subtype gap, because neither study is tied to the distinct sites
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of origin or biology to endometroid cancer or clear cell cancer.37 This argument is
distinct from Defendants’ challenge to the reliability of the experts’ macrophage-
inhibition theory, which is premised on Mandarino 2020 and Tania Emi et al.,
Transcriptomic 	and 	Epigenomic 	Effects 	of 	Insoluble 	Particles 	on 	J774
Macrophages, 16 Epigenetics (10), 1053–70 (2021) (“Emi 2021”), and which I will
separately address, infra.
One of the in vitro studies is Harper/Saed 2023, which exposed normal human
ovarian epithelial cells and fibroblasts to varying concentrations of talcum powder
or titanium dioxide for 72 hours, assessed anchorage-independent growth using a
cell-transformation assay, and performed immunohistochemical analyses. (See
generally Harper/Saed 2023.) The authors reported a dose-dependent increase in
transformed colonies in talc-exposed ovarian epithelial cells, with no such findings
in control samples. (See id.) Mandarino 2020 similarly examined the biological
effects 	of 	talc 	exposure 	by 	exposing 	mice 	macrophages—with 	and 	without
estradiol—to talc, measuring reactive oxygen species and gene-expression changes,
and co-culturing those macrophages with murine ovarian epithelial cells. (See
generally Mandarino 2020.) The authors reported increased oxidative stress and
37 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 13–14 (citing Angelo Mandarino et al., The
Effect of Talc Particles on Phagocytes in Co-Culture with Ovarian Cells, 180 Env’t Res. (2020)
(“Mandarino 2020”); Amy K. Harper et al., Talcum Powder Induces Malignant Transformation in
Normal Human Primary Ovarian Epithelial Cells, 75 Minerva Obstetrics & Gynecology (2)
(2023) (“Harper/Saed 2023”).)
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alterations in macrophage gene expression relevant to cancer development and
immunosurveillance. (See id.)
Defendants argue that Harper/Saed 2023 is of minimal relevance to high-
grade serous carcinoma because it examined ovarian epithelial cells in vitro rather
than fallopian tube fimbrial epithelium, from which high-grade serous carcinoma is
now understood to predominantly arise. Defendants raise a similar critique of
Mandarino 2020, asserting that it is not tied to any specific epithelial ovarian cancer
subtype or site of origin.
I do not find that Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on these studies renders their
opinions 	or 	methodologies 	unreliable 	under 	Rule 	702. 	Although 	Defendants
correctly observe that neither study evaluates every epithelial ovarian cancer subtype
nor is tethered to a specific anatomic site of origin, those limitations do not render
the studies irrelevant for purposes of biological plausibility. Plaintiffs’ experts do
not rely on these in vitro studies to advance subtype-specific causation opinions.
Rather, the studies are cited as part of a broader mechanistic body of evidence that
talc can induce cellular changes—such as oxidative stress, inflammation, and altered
immune function—consistent with carcinogenic processes. The experts explicitly
situate these findings alongside epidemiologic data, other in vitro and animal studies,
and regulatory assessments. In that context, Harper/Saed 2023 and Mandarino 2020
represent 	two 	recent 	contributions 	to 	a 	much 	larger 	evidentiary 	record, 	not
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standalone proof of biological plausibility, and certainly not standalone proof of
general causation. (See, e.g., Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 6 (“Recently,
Harper and Saed demonstrated that exposure to Johnson’s Baby Powder causes p53
mutations, 	cell 	proliferation 	and 	malignant 	transformation 	in 	normal 	ovarian
epithelial cells.”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“[Harper/Saed 2023] reported cell
proliferation, neoplastic transformation and p53 mutations when cells in culture
were 	exposed 	to 	Johnson’s 	Baby 	Powder.”); 	Levy 	2d 	Amend. 	Rep. 	at 	16
(“Mandarino and colleagues independently published separate work showing the
pro-oxidant effect of talc in a cell culture system.”); see also Plunkett 3d Amend.
Rep. at 46–47 (discussing Mandarino 2020).)
Indeed, multiple Plaintiffs’ experts cited Mandarino 2020 in conjunction with
numerous additional studies spanning several decades of research. For example, Dr.
Plunkett cites Mandarino 2020 and twenty-five other studies for support of the
proposition that scientific literature since the 1960s “has continued to accumulate
showing that . . . [cosmetic grade] talc has adverse effects in cells, tissues, animals
and humans.” (Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 27–28.) Dr. Wolf similarly cites
Mandarino 2020 and ten other studies for support of the proposition that “[t]alcum
powder causes inflammation/oxidative stress both in vitro and in vivo (in both animal
and human tissues).” (Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16.)
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In sum, Defendants have not shown that my prior ruling addressing Plaintiffs’
experts’ treatment of epithelial ovarian cancer subtypes “demonstrably fail[ed] to
adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023 amendments.” (April 30, 2024
Memorandum Order.) Rather, I find that Plaintiffs’ experts more likely than not
employ 	a 	sufficiently 	reliable 	methodology—grounded 	in 	experimentation,
interpretation, and application of a cumulative, multidisciplinary body of scientific
evidence—and that their use of the two in vitro studies for purposes of biological
plausibility does not warrant exclusion under Daubert.
b. 	Migration
Next, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ central premise that externally applied
perineal talc can reach the ovaries or fallopian tubes. (Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 14–27.) Defendants contend that the experts’ migration opinions
are 	inadmissible 	and 	advance 	three 	principal 	grounds 	for 	exclusion. 	First,
Defendants argue that the human experimental studies cited by Plaintiffs’ experts do
not involve the external application of talc to the perineum. (Id. at 15–19.) Second,
Defendants maintain that certain animal studies are inapposite and/or inconsistent.
(Id. 	at 	19–21.) 	Third, 	Defendants 	claim 	that 	reports 	identifying 	talc 	within
gynecologic or pelvic tissues do not establish that such talc originated from perineal
use. (Id. at 21–25.) Additionally, Defendants reiterate their position that the experts’
alternative migration theory—via inhalation and/or lymphatic transport—lacks
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sufficient evidentiary support.38 (Id. at 25–27.) Indeed, the bulk of Defendants’
challenge to the experts’ migration opinions generally rests on the fact that literature
“do[es] not directly support their theory that externally applied talc can migrate up
[or reach] the vagina to the ovaries.” (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 14–
15 (citing In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 174).)
Since the issuance of my 2020 Opinion, neither party has presented new
evidence establishing whether externally applied perineal talc does—or did—result
in talc being present in an individual’s ovaries. Indeed, I have already addressed
Defendants’ arguments raised here in my prior Opinion. Critically, as I stated then,
see In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 174–75, and elsewhere in this
Report 	and 	Recommendation, 	(see, 	infra, 	at 	Part 	V.C.2.ii.b), 	biological
plausibility—as 	its 	name 	suggests—does 	not 	require 	definitive 	proof 	of 	the
biological mechanism by which talc reaches ovaries. An expert need only “provide
reliable support that demonstrates that the mechanism is plausible.” In re Johnson
& Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 175; see also In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308
(“[A] biological plausibility opinion is admissible so long as it is derived from and
supported by reliable scientific knowledge and reasoning.” (collecting cases)).
38 	It appears that Plaintiffs are reasserting the inhalation theory, which I excluded previously.
(See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 30 (“[Plaintiffs’] experts’ opinions on
inhalation as a secondary mechanism are reliable and admissible.”); see also Kane Rep. at 4;
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 89; Moorman Rep. at 33; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 30; Wolf 3d
Amend. Rep. at 15, 19–20.) I will address this issue even though Plaintiffs have not, on these
motions, sought to formally reintroduce this theory of migration.
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Neither party has provided convincing arguments or case law to suggest that the
admissibility of a biological plausibility opinion is held to a different standard than
I applied in my prior Opinion.
On these bases, I find that both parties have failed to establish that: (1) my
prior Opinion “demonstrably fail[ed] to adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023
amendments” as it related to the admissibility of Plaintiffs’ experts’ migration
opinions, and (2) “new science . . . directly contradict[s] or challenge[s]” my
previous findings on the same. (See April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order.) I will
address the parties’ arguments in full.
In support of their first argument, Defendants contend that the design
differences of studies relied on by Plaintiffs’ experts create an analytical gap that
precludes extrapolation to external perineal use. Defendants highlight that those
studies39 involved particles deposited into the internal reproductive tract, not
externally on the perineum. Defendants also criticize the experts’ reliance on studies
that used non-talc tracers (e.g., carbon, albumin microspheres), often with subjects
positioned to facilitate upward transport, such as pelvis being elevated, prolonged
39 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 15–17 (citing G.E. Egli & Michael Newton,
The Transport of Carbon Particles in the Human Female Reproductive Tract, 12 Fertil. & Steril.
(2), 151–55 (1961) (“Egli & Newton 1961”); P.F. Venter & M. Iturralde, Migration of a Particulate
Radioactive Tracer from the Vagina to the Peritoneal Cavity and Ovaries, 55 S. Afr. Med. J. (23),
917–19 (1979) (“Venter & Iturralde 1979”); G. Kunz et al., The Uterine Peristaltic Pump. Normal
and Impeded Sperm Transport Within the Female Genital Tract, in The Fate of the Male Germ
Cell 267, 270 (Ivell & Holstein eds. 1997) (“Kunz 1997”).)
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supine positioning, and 	sometimes 	with use of oxytocin to 	promote uterine
contractions.40
Plaintiffs 	respond 	that 	Defendants’ 	criticisms 	go 	to 	the 	weight, 	not
admissibility, because biological plausibility does not require a study precisely
replicating real-world perineal use to be reliable. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 14–21.) In that regard, Plaintiffs emphasize that
regulatory authorities and medical sources recognize perineal use as a primary
exposure route and the plausibility of upward migration, citing the FDA, the IARC,
and Health Canada. (See id. at 15.) Plaintiffs also argue that ordinary behavior and
female anatomy make perineal-to-vaginal transfer plausible, as acknowledged by
some of Defendants’ experts. (See id. at 15–16.) In Plaintiffs’ view, studies that
begin with material in the vagina are probative of what occurs after perineal
application. (See id. at 15–17.) Plaintiffs suggest, as do their experts, that once in the
reproductive tract, documented physiological mechanisms—uterine peristalsis and
retrograde menstruation—drive transport to the uterus, fallopian tubes, and ovaries.
(See id. at 17–18.) Additionally, Plaintiffs cite multiple human tracer and particulate
studies showing upward migration within minutes to days, which I previously
deemed a reliable basis for expert migration opinions. (See id. at 18–21 (citing, e.g.,
40 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 18–19 (citing Egli & Newton 1961; Venter
& Iturralde 1979; A.C.E. Sjösten et al., Retrograde Migration of Glove Powder in the Human
Female Genital Tract, 19 Hum. Reprod. (4), 991–995 (2004) (“Sjösten 2004”).)
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Egli & Newton 1961; Venter & Iturralde 1979).) Finally, Plaintiffs contend the
studies’ use of particles other than talc is not fatal to their admissibility because the
particles are similar in size and morphology to talc and show the same upward
behavior. (See id. at 20–21.)
Taken together, Defendants’ critiques of individual studies do not establish
that Plaintiffs’ experts’ methodologies are unreliable; rather, the totality of the
evidence—principally 	human 	studies, 	supplemented 	by 	animal 	data, 	in 	vitro
experiments, 	and 	regulatory 	assessments—reliably 	supports 	the 	biological
plausibility, though not with certainty or definitively, that perineally applied talc
may migrate to the upper reproductive tract.
To begin, Defendants take issue with the experts’ reliance on three studies,
(see Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 16 & n.22),41 which I previously
considered in my prior Opinion, see In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at
173–74. Admittedly, they do not specifically involve the perineal application of talc
to research subjects. Rather, these studies generally sought to demonstrate that inert,
41 	Specifically, Defendants highlight that Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, Cote, McTiernan,
Plunkett, and Wolf rely on Egli & Newton 1961, (see Carson Rep. at 7; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend.
Rep. at 12; Cote Amend. Rep. at 13; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 88; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep.
at 31–32; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 14); that Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, McTiernan, and Wolf
rely on Venter & Iturralde 1979, (see Carson Rep. at 7; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 12;
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 88–89; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 14); and that Drs. Plunkett and
Wolf rely on Kunz 1997, (see Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 31, 38–39, 41; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at
14).
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sperm-sized particles placed in the vagina can rapidly and passively ascend through
the uterus into the fallopian tubes.
• 	In Egli & Newton 1961, clinicians “deposited” “[s]terile carbon particles”
“in the posterior fornix” of three women at or near the day of ovulation
and, after giving oxytocin, found particles in tubes within approximately
30 minutes in two cases. (See Egli & Newton 1961 at 152–54.)
• 	In 	Venter 	& 	Iturralde 	1979, 	doctors 	“deposited” 	“human 	albumin
microspheres” in the “posterior fornix” of 24 women “placed in the supine
position with the buttocks slightly elevated” and showed with imaging and
tissue counts that the microspheres moved up through the uterus into the
tubes and ovaries. (See Venter & Iturralde 1979 at 917–18.)
• 	In Kunz 1997, the authors tracked “[a]lbumin macrospheres” placed “at
the external os of the uterine cervix”42 and showed that, among other
things, uterine peristaltic contractions rapidly carry these sperm‑sized
particles from the cervix into the uterus. (See generally Kunz 1997.)
In sum, these studies all observed upward transport of the particles from their deposit
location, which all involved some measure of internal application.
Defendants similarly challenge several studies on which Plaintiffs’ experts
rely for their transport-via-retrograde menstruation theory.43, 44
42 	“External os” refers to the external opening of the cervical canal at the vaginal end of the
cervix, adjacent to the posterior vaginal fornix, or the cervix’s opening into the vagina. (See, e.g.,
Kunz 1997 at 268.)
43 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 16–17 (citing M.J. Blumenkrantz et al.,
Retrograde Menstruation in Women Undergoing Chronic Peritoneal Dialysis, 57 Obstet. &
Gynecol. 	(5), 	667–70 	(1981) 	(“Blumenkrantz 	1981”); 	Juoko 	Halme 	et 	al., 	Retrograde
Menstruation in Healthy Women and in Patients with Endometriosis, 64 Obstet. & Gynecol. (2),
151–54 (1984) (“Halme 1984”)).)
44 	Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ experts’ retrograde migration theory should have been
excluded because in my previous Opinion, I expressly stated that “migration has never been
demonstrated in circumstances analogous to perineal dusting.” (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 14–15 (citing In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 174).)
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• 	Blumenkrantz 1981 examined whether retrograde menstruation occurs
routinely by monitoring peritoneal fluid in 11 premenopausal women on
chronic peritoneal dialysis. (See Blumenkrantz 1981 at 667–68.) Peritoneal
blood was seen in 9 of 11 women and was otherwise rare in men or non-
menstruating women, leading the authors to conclude, among other things,
that retrograde flow into the peritoneal cavity is common. (See id. at 668–
70.)
• 	Halme 	1984 	prospectively 	assessed 	331 	pelvic 	fluid 	samples 	at
laparoscopy and classified its color by cycle timing. (See generally Halme
1984.) During perimenstrual phase, the authors observed that 90.4% of
sampled women with open fallopian tubes “had an appreciable amount of
red blood cells,” versus 15.4% of sampled women with occluded fallopian
tubes having the same or similar result. (See id. at 153.) The authors
concluded that retrograde menstruation through patent tubes is a common
physiologic event and that occlusion limits peritoneal blood. (See id. at
153–54.)
In short, these studies observed the upward movement of menstrual blood through
the fallopian tubes—a mechanism which was observed in nearly all investigated
women. (See generally id.)
With that context, Defendants’ migration challenge largely rests on the
absence of studies that begin with the external application of talc to the perineum
and then directly demonstrate talc’s presence in the ovaries or fallopian tubes. But
this framing misapprehends both the nature of biological plausibility analysis and
the way the scientific literature addressing reproductive tract transport is structured.
As I have previously explained, biological plausibility does not require definitive
proof of the precise mechanism by which an exposure reaches a target organ. Rather,
an expert must provide reliable scientific support demonstrating that the proposed
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mechanism is plausible in light of existing biological knowledge. See In re Johnson
& Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 175; In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308. That
standard has not changed under the 2023 amendments to Rule 702.
Viewed through that lens, the analogies employed by Plaintiffs’ experts are
scientifically apt. The human transport studies on which they principally rely—
including, among others, Egli & Newton 1961, Venter & Iturralde 1979, and Kunz
1997—were designed to examine whether inert, tiny particles placed at or near the
vaginal opening can move upward through the reproductive tract via normal
physiologic processes. Although those studies do not involve perineal dusting per
se, they directly address the critical biological question at issue: whether particles of
comparable size and morphology can ascend from the lower reproductive tract to the
uterus, fallopian tubes, and ovaries.
The studies uniformly demonstrate that upward transport occurs rapidly and
passively, driven by well-established physiologic mechanisms such as uterine
peristalsis. Importantly, the materials in these studies were placed at shallow, distal
locations within the reproductive tract—often in the posterior fornix or at the
cervical os—making them probative of what may occur once material enters the
vaginal canal, regardless of the precise initial mode of entry as opined by the experts.
In this context, the experts’ inference that perineally applied talc may enter the
vagina through ordinary hygiene practices and thereafter be subject to the same
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transport mechanisms is not speculative but grounded in known anatomy and
physiology reflected in the studies they cite.
The same is true of the experts’ reliance on studies documenting retrograde
menstruation. Blumenkrantz 1981 and Halme 1984 establish that retrograde flow of
menstrual material through patent fallopian tubes into the peritoneal cavity is a
physiologic occurrence. As Plaintiffs’ experts are well aware, these studies do not
purport to model talc exposure directly; rather, they demonstrate the existence of a
biologically plausible pathway by which particulate matter present in the lower
reproductive tract may reach the upper tract and surrounding tissues. The absence of
talc-specific tracing in these studies does not negate their relevance to biological
plausibility.
Defendants’ criticisms—that these studies involve internal placement, non-
talc tracers, or experimental conditions facilitating transport—do not render the
experts’ methodology unreliable. Such critiques speak to the degree of analogy, not
to whether the analogy itself is scientifically reasonable. As courts have recognized,
biological plausibility may be established through multiple lines of evidence, such
as transport physiology, analog particle studies, and known anatomic mechanisms,
particularly 	where 	ethical 	and 	practical 	constraints 	preclude 	direct 	human
experimentation. See Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 17–
19, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding a reliable inference of biological plausibility and
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reversing the district court’s “reasoning that because no one line of evidence
supported a reliable inference of causation, an inference of causation based on the
totality of the evidence was unreliable”); see also id. at 24–25 (recognizing that the
absence of dispositive epidemiological studies due to “difficulties of data collection
in the United States” is not fatal and citing cases); In re Roundup, 390 F. Supp. at
1129–30 (holding that Bradford Hill framework requires experts to survey all
available 	evidence 	and 	admitting 	mechanistic 	evidence 	supporting 	biological
plausibility despite absence of direct human data). Indeed, Plaintiffs’ experts explain
that prospective human studies involving perineal talc application, repeated tissue
sampling, or long-term cancer outcome measurement would be unethical and
infeasible. (See Singh Rep. at 7; Singh Supp. Rep. at 23; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep.
at 33; Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 33.) In that setting, reliance on analog
studies and mechanistic inference is not only accepted scientific practice but may be
the only method by which biological plausibility can reasonably be assessed.
Thus, the use in certain studies of non-talc tracers or migration-facilitating
conditions does not, standing alone, render Plaintiffs’ experts’ methodologies—or
their application to the facts here—unreliable. Plaintiffs’ experts cite tracer studies
not to establish talc-specific chemistry, but to illustrate a plausible migration
pathway governed principally by reproductive tract anatomy and particle transport
mechanics, rather than by the chemical composition of talc itself. (See, e.g., Wolf 3d
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Amend. Rep. at 13–15; Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 32–33.) To be clear,
Plaintiffs’ experts do not ignore the studies’ use of non-talc particles to demonstrate
migration. (See, e.g., Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 14; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at
88–89; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 12.) Rather, they use these studies, among
others, to reasonably extrapolate that talc applied to the perineum can migrate to the
upper reproductive tract. Under the governing 	standards, Plaintiffs 	need not
definitively 	prove 	biological 	plausibility. 	It 	is 	enough 	for 	these 	experts 	to
demonstrate that their biological plausibility opinions are reliably supported, even if
such support is not definitive proof of their opinions.
Consistent with that approach, Health Canada has recognized that the inert
particles used in several foundational migration studies—including, among others,
Egli & Newton 1961, De Boer 1972,45 Venter & Iturralde 1979, and Kunz 199646—
were “similar in size to talc.” (Health Canada Screening Assessment 2021.) Where,
as here, the proposed mechanism turns on particle size, form, and transport
dynamics, the use of inert particulates with comparable physical characteristics
provides a scientifically appropriate basis for demonstrating a plausible migration
pathway.
45 	C.H. De Boer et al., Transport of Particulate Matter Through the Human Female Genital
Tract, 28 J. Reprod. Fert. 295–97 (1972) (“De Boer 1972”).
46 	G. Kunz et al., The Dynamics of Rapid Sperm Transport Through the Female Genital Tract:
Evidence From Vaginal Sonography of Uterine Peristalsis and Hysterosalpingoscintigraphy, 11
Hum. Reprod. 627–32 (1996) (“Kunz 1996”).
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Lastly, Defendants criticize Drs. Cote’s and Plunkett’s reliance on De Boer
1972, a study that observed varying degrees of transportation of inert carbon
particles deposited in the uterine cavity, cervical canal, and vagina. Specifically, De
Boer 1972 found that inert India ink placed in the uterine cavity was often and
rapidly transported to the fallopian tubes in over half of cases; transport from the
cervix occurred in roughly a third of cases; and movement from the vagina into the
uterus was rare, i.e., twice in thirty-seven cases. (See generally De Boer 1972.)
Defendants stress as unsupportive De Boer 1972’s own data,47 which shows
frequent transit to the fallopian tubes when particles were placed in the uterus, but
almost never when placed in the vagina—highlighting that the study does not
support migration from the external perineum through the vagina. (See Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 17.) Defendants also claim that Dr. Cote ignored De
Boer 1972’s arguably unfavorable data, since Dr. Cote only referenced De Boer
1972’s findings concerning frequent movement from the uterus to the fallopian tubes
and not its observation of rare migration from the vagina to the uterus. (See id.; see
also Cote Amend. Rep. at 13 (summarizing De Boer 1972 as providing “evidence
[that] ink traveled to the fallopian tubes at least half of the time when placed in the
uterus”).)
47 	It is unclear whether Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on De Boer 1972 as
it relates to retrograde migration, or as it may relate to migration-via-perineal application.
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But Defendants mischaracterize Drs. Cotes’ and Plunkett’s reliance on this
study. They did not rely on or reference De Boer 1972 as sole or primary proof of
upward migration; instead, they relied on and referenced a large body of literature,
both predating and following the publication of De Boer 1972, that uses non-talc
substances sufficiently similar in size and morphology to talc to show the plausibility
of upward migration. (See Cote Amend. Rep. at 13 (citing, inter alia, De Boer 1972
and, inter alia, Egli & Newton 1961 and Venter & Iturralde 1979, as collectively
providing “[i]nsight as to how talc products and their components can migrate from
the perineum through the genital tract to the ovaries and fallopian tubes”); Plunkett
3d Amend. Rep. at 32–33 (summarizing De Boer 1972 and other migration-related
studies as “provid[ing] early notice of the ability of particles to move up the female
reproductive tract” (emphasis added)).) To be sure, the parties do not discuss or
challenge every study, experiment, or assessment that Plaintiffs’ experts rely on or
refer to in support of the plausibility of a migratory mechanism. While I have
reviewed this support, this Report and Recommendation does not endeavor to
discuss or otherwise consider every study relied on or referred to by each of Plaintiffs
experts that Defendants do not expressly challenge.48 For this same reason, the fact
48 	(See, e.g., Cote Amend. Rep. at 13–14 (citing, e.g., Carl G. Hartman, How Do Sperms Get
Into the Uterus?, 8 Fertil. & Steril. (5), 403–27 (1975); J.C. Phillips et al., Studies on the
Absorption and Disposition of 3H-Labelled Talc in the Rat, Mouse, and Guinea-Pig and Rabbit,
16 Food & Cosmet. Toxicol. (2) 161–63 (1978); Heather N. Lynch et al., Systematic Review of the
Association Between Talc and Female Reproductive Tract Cancers, Front. in Toxicol. (2023));
Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 31 (citing, e.g., Tim H. Parmley & J. Donald Woodruff, The Ovarian
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that Dr. Cote did not expressly discuss the infrequent transportation to the uterus of
inert carbon particles when they are placed in the vagina does not render her opinions
regarding migration unreliable.
Defendants’ criticisms of flaws or findings of a particular study—here, De
Boer 1972—do not undermine the ultimate conclusions that Plaintiffs’ experts draw
from them, given that they cite to a robust grouping of studies showcasing the
relative evolution of migratory evidence.49 Drs. Cote and Plunkett accurately
characterize De Boer 1972, and do not draw or enlarge opinions that the study’s
authors themselves fail to make. Moreover, De Boer 1972 did not produce evidence
disproving upward migration from the vagina to the uterus following application or
insertion of inert particles into the vagina, since it did not demonstrate that no
migration occurred. Defendants’ criticisms of Plaintiffs’ reliance on De Boer 1972
go to the weight owed to their migratory opinions, not to their admissibility.
Mesothelioma, 120 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. (2), 234–41 (1974); David L. Gardner et al., Potential
Delivery of Contraceptive Agents to the Female Reproductive Tract, Controlled Release of
Pesticides & Pharms. 99–109 (1981); M.G. McCalley et al., Radionuclide Hysterosalpingography
for Evaluation of Fallopian Tube Patency, 26 J. Nucl. Med. (8), 868–74 (1985); S. Kadanali,
Evaluation of Active and Passive Transport Mechanisms in Genital Tracts of IUD-Bearing Women
with Radionuclide Hysterosalpingoscintigraphy, 63 Contraception (1), 41–45 (2001); Stefan
Kissler 	et 	al., 	Uterine 	Contractility 	and 	Directed 	Sperm 	Transport 	Assessed 	by
Hysterosalpingoscintigraphy (HSSG) and Intrauterine Pressure (IUP) Measurement, 83 Acta
Obstetricia et Gynecologica Scandinavica (4), 369–74 (2004); I. Zervomanolakis et al., Physiology
of Upward Transport in the Human Female Genital Tract, 1101 Ann. of the New York Acad. of
Sci. (1), 1–20 (2007)).)
49 	See supra note 48; see also Egli & Newton 1961; Venter & Iturralde 1979; Kunz 1997;
Blumenkrantz 1981; Halme 1984.
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Next, in support of their argument related to animal studies, Defendants assert
that the experts’ biological plausibility opinions are unreliable because they rely on
animal studies that cannot be validly extrapolated to human perineal talc use. (See
Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 19–21.) To that end, they criticize certain
experts’ reliance on two studies that involved the application or insertion of talc in
rodent genital tracts.50 They fault these experts for “ignor[ing]” primate studies that
found no talc translocation to fallopian tubes or ovaries,51 and for inadequately
addressing 	at 	least 	one 	primate 	study 	that 	artificially 	maximized 	upward
transportation.52
Plaintiffs respond that their experts’ reliance on animal data is appropriate for
establishing biological plausibility, but, in any event, their experts ground their
migration and mechanism opinions on human-based evidence and use animal-based
studies only for supplemental support. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 21–23.) Plaintiffs further submit that courts routinely allow animal
50 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 19–20 (citing Nadi Keskin et al., Does Long-
Term Talc Exposure Have a Carcinogenic Effect on the Female Genital Systems of Rats? An
Experimental Pilot Study, 280 Arch. Gynecol. Obstet. (6), 925–31 (2009) (“Keskin 2009”)); W.J.
Henderson et al., The Demonstration of the Migration of Talc from the Vagina and Posterior Uterus
to the Ovary in the Rat, 40 Env’t Research (2), 247–50 (1986) (“Henderson 1986”).)
51 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 20 (citing Alfred P. Wehner et al., On Talc
Translocation from the Vagina to the Oviducts and Beyond, 24 Food Chem. Toxicol. (4) 329–38
(1986) (“Wehner 1986”).)
52 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 20–21 (citing Alfred P. Wehner et al., Do
Particles Translocate from the Vagina to the Oviducts and Beyond, 23 Food Chem. Toxicol. (3)
367–72 (1985) (“Wehner 1985”).)
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studies to inform biological plausibility, and the animal-based literature relied upon
by their experts does not undercut their opinions. (See id.)
As a general matter, the reliance on animal studies for purposes of establishing
general causation has two often-recognized disadvantages. “First, animal study
results must be extrapolated to another species—human beings—and differences in
absorption, metabolism, and other factors may result in interspecies variation in
responses.” Green at 346; see also Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d
434, 466 (W.D. Pa. 2003); In re Valsartan, 2025 WL 3141002, at *24–25. Second,
“the high doses customarily used in animal studies require consideration of the dose-
response relationship and whether a threshold no-effect dose exists.” Id. Therefore,
the admissibility of animal studies for proving causation in humans requires “good
grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans.” In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743.
Here, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on animal studies for
their biological plausibility opinions as they relate to their theories on the upward
migration of talc—not their general causation opinions. To be sure, animal studies
may be relied upon for demonstrating biological plausibility. See, e.g., In re 3M
Combat Arms Earplugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:19-md-2885, 2021 WL 4132269,
at *4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2021) (“Animal studies may support a biological
plausibility opinion so long as an expert explains how and why the animal data can
be reliably extrapolated to support conclusions about humans.” (citing In re Abilify,
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299 F. Supp. 3d at 1310)). Along these lines, there is an analytical difference
regarding the admissibility of biological plausibility opinions premised on, among
other things, animal studies, compared to the admissibility of general causation
opinions supported by the same. After all, biological plausibility “lends credence to
an inference of causality,” Green at 604, but is not itself dispositive of general
causation.
Defendants do not acknowledge that there is a distinction to be drawn when
assessing reliance on animal studies for general causation purposes as opposed to
for biological plausibility purposes. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at
19–20 (“[A]nimal studies are not admissible to prove human causation absent ‘good
grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans.’” (emphasis added) (quoting In re
Hum. Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., 582 F. Supp. 2d 644, 657 (D.N.J. 2008).) Following
a review of those Plaintiffs’ experts who rely on or discuss animal studies for support
of the biological plausibility of a migratory mechanism, I find that the experts have
sufficiently “explain[ed] how and why the animal data can be reliably extrapolated
to support conclusions about humans.” In re 3M Combat Arms Earplugs, 2021 WL
4132269, at *4. For example, Dr. Plunkett explained that rodent ovaries are
“completely covered by a bursal sac,” unlike human ovaries, which makes migration
to ovarian tissue via vaginal penetration more unlikely in rats and mice—thereby
limiting detection of ovarian translocation in those species compares with humans.
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(See Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 35–36, 43–45.) Dr. Cote contrasted species, noting
that 	animal 	evidence 	of 	translocation 	is 	inconsistent 	and 	“may 	be 	species-
dependent,” with rats showing ovarian talc after intrauterine or, with sufficient time,
intravaginal exposure, but rabbits and primates generally not showing translocation
in specific experiments. (See Cote Amend. Rep. at 13.) These experts, among others,
compare or acknowledge human and animal reproductive anatomy to explain why
migration observed—or not observed—in animals informs but does not control the
plausibility of particle migration in humans.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ experts make clear that their reliance on animal
studies is neither the only nor their primary basis for their migration-related
biological plausibility opinions. Instead, Plaintiffs’ experts rely on a totality-of-
evidence approach for determining biological plausibility, for which animal studies
provide other support. (See, e.g., McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 94 (“In my opinion,
these animal studies . . . . provide[] further evidence of a biologically plausible
mechanism supporting causation of ovarian cancer from the use of talcum powder
products.” (emphasis added)); Kane Rep. at 6 (“[A]nimal studies on exposure and
disease are performed to advance our understanding of the human response to the
same dose-adjusted exposure, and thus animal data is often relevant and important
in that it can provide important information that forms part of the total evidence
assessment.”).) Despite Defendants’ objections to certain experts’ use of a few select
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animal studies, those objections do not render the experts’ opinions unreliable just
because they are not dispositive, human-based evidence. See In re Testosterone
Replacement Therapy, WL 1833173, at *14.
Furthermore, several of Plaintiffs’ experts recognize that the applicability of
animal studies to humans is limited. (See, e.g., Carson Rep. at 7 (“There are a limited
number of animal studies suggesting that this transport does not occur. These are not
as compelling as the human evidence because of anatomical and physiological
differences between animals and humans in this regard, as well as the overwhelming
evidence in humans.” (citations omitted)); Cote Rep. at 13 (“[A]nimal studies do not
provide consistent evidence of translocation of talc—it may be species dependent.”);
id. at 37 (“Human studies were more convincing than animal studies, likely due to
the difficulties in replicating what is often a lifetime of use of talc in humans to
dosing and administration in animals (whose physiology may not closely align with
human female genital tract).”); Kane Rep. at 6 (“Human data is generally more
relevant than animal data when assessing causation in humans.”); McTiernan 3d
Amend. Rep. at 32 (“Given the differences between animals and humans in terms of
anatomy of the genital tract, the studies in humans are the most reliable in terms of
human health risk assessment and the toxicokinetics of talc applied externally to the
perineal area.”).)
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The experts’ discussion of contrary evidence further bolsters the reliability of
their methodologies and application. See In re Zoloft (Sertraline Hydrochloride)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 26 F. Supp. 3d 449, 461 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (finding expert’s
“fail[ure] 	to 	account 	adequately 	for 	contrary 	evidence 	. 	. 	. 	not 	reliable 	or
scientifically sound”); In re Mirena Ius Levonorgestrel-Related Prods. Liab. Litig.
(No. II) (“Mirena II”), 341 F. Supp. 3d 213, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Where an expert
ignores evidence that is highly relevant to his conclusion, contrary to his own stated
methodology, exclusion of the expert's testimony is warranted.”).
Turning to Defendants’ substantive challenges, Defendants criticize Drs.
McTiernan and Wolf’s reliance on Keskin 2009, and Drs. McTiernan and Plunkett’s
reliance on Henderson 1986, arguing that neither animal study reliably demonstrates
talc migration in the context of human perineal application. (See Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 19–20 & n.32, 34 (citing McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep.
at 90, 93; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 31, 35–36).)
Keskin 	2009 	assessed 	whether 	long-term 	perineal 	or 	intravaginal 	talc
exposure can be associated with potential carcinogenic effects on the female genital
organs of rats. (See generally Keskin 2009.) The authors assigned 28 rats to four
groups of seven: two control groups, one group receiving intravaginal talc, and one
group receiving perineal talc. (See generally id. at 925.) After undergoing talc
exposure for three months, the authors performed histopathologic evaluation of the
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vulva, vagina, uterus, fallopian tubes, ovaries, and peritoneum, and found consistent
foreign body reactions, inflammatory changes, and infections in talc-exposed
groups. (See id. at 925–26.)
Henderson 1986 sought to determine whether exogenous talc can migrate
from the lower female genital tract to the ovaries. (See Henderson 1986 at 247.) The
authors 	instilled 	talc 	suspensions 	into 	eight 	female 	rats 	intrauterinely 	and
intravaginally. The study confirmed the presence of talc particles after intrauterine
instillation and after four days of intravaginal exposure. (See id. at 248.) In other
words, the study showed that talc particles introduced into a rat vagina or uterus can
migrate to the ovary and localize in ovarian tissue within about four days. (See id.)
Defendants first argue that Keskin 2009 is not sufficiently supportive of
Plaintiffs’ migration theory because “talc was applied in enormous quantities not
analogous to human exposure.” (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 19.) But
Drs. McTiernan and Wolf cite Keskin 2009 for support of their theory that talc use
causes inflammation and/or oxidative stress, and not for support of talc’s migratory
potential. (See McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 90 (“Talc exposure has also been
linked to increased inflammation. It can induce granulomous and other inflammatory
responses 	in vivo.”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Talcum powder causes
inflammation/oxidative stress both in vitro and in vivo (in both animal and human
tissues).”).) Therefore, whether these experts appropriately extrapolated Keskin
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2009’s inflammation-and oxidative stress-related findings to humans will be detailed
in the appropriate section below.53
Moreover, 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts 	appropriately 	caveat 	Henderson 	1986’s
findings, noting that animal studies, generally, and Henderson 1986 specifically
cannot be solely relied upon for migratory or causal conclusions. (See, e.g.,
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 93–94 (assessing animal studies within “weight of
evidence” approach); Cote Amend. Rep. at 13 (discussing varied results in talc-
related animal studies and concluding that “animal studies do not provide consistent
evidence of translocation of talc—it may be species dependent.”).)
Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ experts failed to give due weight to, or
improperly ignored, Wehner 1986, which Defendants characterize as demonstrating
“no talc migration in monkeys.” (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 20.) In
Wehner 1986, the authors examined whether repeated vaginal depositions of talc in
primates would result in translocation to the uterus, oviducts, ovaries, or peritoneal
cavity. Over a 45-day period, six primates received more than thirty talc depositions
in the posterior vaginal fornix, after which the animals underwent peritoneal lavage
and tissue collection, with six untreated primates serving as controls. (See Wehner
53 	Even if Dr. McTiernan and Dr. Wolf relied on Keskin 2009 for support “of a mechanism of
action opinion rather than a general causation opinion,” it constitutes reliable methodology. See In
re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., 2010 WL 1489730, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2010). Indeed, Keskin
2009 offers evidence of a plausible pathway for talc to migrate from the perineum to the upper
reproductive tract, despite lacking an established dose-response scale that can be applied to
humans for purposes of causation.
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1986 at 329–30.) The authors detected talc in the vagina and cervix of treated
animals, but not in the uterus, oviducts, ovaries, or peritoneal lavage fluId. (See id.
at 329, 331–32.)
Contrary 	to 	Defendants’ 	assertion, 	Wehner 	1986 	was 	not 	ignored 	by
Plaintiffs’ experts. Several experts cited, discussed, or expressly analyzed the study.
(See Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 35–37; Singh Rep. at 57; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at
21; Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 21; Carson Rep. at 51.) Dr. Plunkett, in
particular, discussed Wehner 1986 at length, noting that it was the only animal study
at the time reporting no translocation of talc to the oviducts and contrasting it with
other animal and primate studies that did report migration. (See Plunkett 3d Amend.
Rep. at 35–37.) She further highlighted that the Wehner 1986 authors themselves
acknowledged potential explanations for their findings, including lower dosing, use
of different materials, and prolonged maintenance of the primates in a supine
position, as compared to other studies. (See Wehner 1986 at 337.) Dr. Singh
similarly 	observed 	that 	differences 	in 	timing, 	assessment 	techniques, 	and
interspecies considerations in Wehner 1986 preclude ruling out talc migration
altogether. (Singh Rep. at 57.) Both Drs. Plunkett and Singh also noted that the study
was industry funded, which they considered in assessing its weight. (Plunkett 3d
Amend. Rep. at 36; Singh Rep. at 57.)
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Rule 702 does not require that every expert address every study bearing on an
issue. The fact that only some of Plaintiffs’ experts discuss Wehner 1986 does not
render their migration-related biological plausibility opinions inadmissible. More to
the point, those experts who did consider Wehner 1986 reasonably assessed its
limitations, distinguished its unfavorable findings, and evaluated it in the context of
other 	animal 	studies, 	human 	evidence, 	and 	regulatory 	assessments. 	Any
disagreement with the weight those experts accorded the study is properly addressed
through cross-examination, not exclusion.54
Finally, in support of their third argument, Defendants contend that studies
identifying talc in human reproductive tissues do not necessarily or reliably support
migration from perineal use, pointing to five specific tissue-identification studies on
which several of Plaintiffs’ experts rely.55
54 	Though not discussed by Defendants, it is clear from my prior Opinion that, given my
recitation of Dr. Carson’s testimony, I considered the implication of Wehner 1986’s primate
observation and its finding that there was no measurable translocation of talc beyond the cervix.
See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 173. Defendants do not explain how my prior
consideration of Wehner 1986 was erroneous or whether such consideration undermined my
biological plausibility ruling under the amended Rule 702.
55 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 21–25 (citing W.J. Henderson et al., Talc and
Carcinoma of the Ovary and Cervix, 78 J. Obstet. Gynaecol. Br. Commonw. (3), 266–72 (1971)
(“Henderson 1971”); D.S. Heller et al., The Relationship Between Perineal Cosmetic Talc Usage
and Ovarian Talc Particle Burden, 174 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol (5), 1507–1510 (1996) (“Heller
1996”); Sandra A. McDonald et al., Migration of Talc from the Perineum to Multiple Pelvic Organ
Sites: Five Case Studies with Correlative Light and Scanning Electron Microscopy, 152 Am. J.
Clinical Pathology (5), 590–607 (2019) (“McDonald I 2019”); Sandra A. McDonald et al.,
Correlative Polarizing Light and Scanning Electron Microscopy for the Assessment of Talc in
Pelvic Lymph Nodes, 43 Ultrastruct. Pathol. (1), 13–27 (2019) (“McDonald II 2019”); Kurt E.
Johnson et al., Analytic Comparison of Talc in Commercially Available Baby Powder and in Pelvic
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More specifically, Defendants argue that: (i) Henderson 1971 did not report
users’ talc exposure, thereby precluding any inference regarding perineal use; (ii)
Heller 1996 detected talc in the ovaries of both reported users and non-users, with
particle counts unrelated to exposure history, which Defendants contend undermines
any association with perineal dusting; (iii) McDonald I 2019 and McDonald II 2019
are anecdotal case reports involving small samples, including findings of talc in
certain purportedly unexposed controls, with no reported blinding and an asserted
risk of contamination or bias—particularly given the involvement of several
Plaintiffs’ litigation experts as co-authors; and (iv) Johnson 2020 failed to reliably
establish that talc identified in resected pelvic tissue originated from patients’ use of
Johnson’s 	Baby 	Powder. (Defs.’ 2024 Biological 	Plausibility 	Br. at 	22–25.)
Defendants contend that these studies do not reliably support the biological
plausibility of perineal talc migration.
As with the experts’ reliance on animal studies, Defendants overstate the
import of these studies on Plaintiffs’ experts’ broader biological plausibility
opinions. The experts do not rely solely on these studies to establish the plausibility
of talc migration from the perineum to the ovaries or fallopian tubes. Instead, they
consider these studies with other migratory-focused studies, as discussed above, that
Tissues Resected from Ovarian Carcinoma Patients, 159 Gynecologic Oncology (2), 527–33
(2020) (“Johnson 2020”).)
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collectively support their biological plausibility theories. Significantly, in addition
to this body of literature, Plaintiffs’ experts also rely on regulatory assessments that
have acknowledged or endorsed migration as a plausible biological pathway. For
example, several of Plaintiffs’ experts expressly rely on statements from the FDA,
IARC and Health Canada to support their opinion that perineally applied talc can
migrate from the perineum through the genital tract and thus provide a biologically
plausible pathway to the ovaries. (See, e.g., Moorman Rep. at 33 (finding support of
migration from pathology studies and FDA’s 2014 response stating that “the
potential for particulates to migrate from the perineum and vagina to the peritoneal
cavity is indisputable”); Singh Supp. Rep. at 14 (relying on, inter alia, Health
Canada’s assessment to support migration as “mode of action”); McTiernan 3d
Amend. Rep. at 94 (considering Health Canada assessment and its determination
that “perineal application of talc results in migration to ovaries and fallopian
tubes”).)
Of particular note is Health Canada’s “mode of action” section in its recent
April 2021 Screening Assessment of talc, which expressly recognizes retrograde
particle movement as a biologically plausible pathway, noting that “[m]igration or
retrograde movement of talc particles from the vagina to the ovaries has been
identified as a plausible explanation of . . . talc particles in the upper reproductive
tract.” (See Health Canada Screen Assessment 2021 at 19 (citing Henderson 1986;
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Heller 1996; Daniel W. Cramer et al., Presence of Talc in Pelvic Lymph Nodes of a
Woman with Ovarian Cancer and Long-Term Genital Exposure to Cosmetic Talc,
110 Obstet. & Gynecol. (2), 498–501 (2007) (“Cramer 2007”).); see also id. at 34
(“Overall, the available animal and human studies described . . . clearly indicate that
particles, including talc, may transfer from the vagina to the fallopian tubes and
ovaries following perineal application.”).)56
Substantively, the experts’ reliance on the challenged studies does not
undermine the reliability of their biological plausibility opinions or the manner in
which those opinions were reached. Defendants’ critiques largely isolate individual
studies and fault them for acknowledged limitations. In that regard, they first
challenge the reliance of Drs. Clarke-Pearson, Cote, Kane, McTiernan, Singh, and
Smith on Henderson 1971—which reported talc particles embedded in ovarian and
cervical tumor tissue but did not identify the exposure source or trace an anatomic
route—by arguing it “does not plausibly show migration” because the study did not
report whether the tissue donors used perineal talc. (See generally Henderson 1971.)
Plaintiffs’ experts do not suggest otherwise. As reflected in their reports, the
experts characterize Henderson 1971 as providing indirect support for migration by
56 	I also note that Defendants strenuously object to my consideration of the Health Canada
Screening Assessment 2021, which they contend is unreliably based on a meta-analysis, is ripe
with bias, and fails to support the conclusions drawn therefrom. (See Nov. 25, 2025 Tr. at 48:25–
52:10.) But Defendants’ objections are not specific to migration. Moreover, as indicated, other
agencies than Health Canada have made similar conclusions regarding talc migration.
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demonstrating 	that 	talc 	can 	be 	present 	in 	upper 	genital 	tract 	tissues, 	while
recognizing that the study does not establish how the particles arrived there. (See,
e.g., Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend Rep. at 7, 12; Cote Amend. Rep. at 13; Smith Rep.
at 18.) Indeed, as observed by the experts, while Henderson 1971 does not purport
to prove migration, it nevertheless provides an early observational data point
consistent with the plausibility of transport, which the experts then evaluate
alongside later and more targeted studies. Used in this limited manner, the experts
did not unreasonably extrapolate Henderson 1971’s conclusion.
Defendants similarly object to the experts’ reliance on Heller 1996, arguing
that the study cannot support their opinions because it detected talc in ovarian tissue
from both reported perineal users and non-users and found talc particle counts to be
“completely unrelated” to reported exposure, thereby failing, in Defendants’ view,
to demonstrate migration or causation. (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at
22–23.) Plaintiffs’ experts, however, do not overstate the significance of Heller
1996’s findings.
Heller 1996 examined ovarian tissue from twenty-four women to assess
whether talc burden correlated with reported perineal talc use. (See generally Heller
1996.) The study detected talc in all ovaries examined, regardless of self-reported
use, and did not find a clear exposure–burden correlation. (See generally id.)
Plaintiffs’ experts acknowledge that Heller 1996 does not establish trace exposure
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source. Instead, they rely on the study for the narrower proposition that talc can be
found in ovarian tissue, and thus, can reach that anatomical site—an inference that
bears on plausibility of mode of migration. Several experts, including Dr. Plunkett,
expressly 	recognize 	the 	study’s 	limited 	findings, 	including 	the 	potential 	for
misclassification of exposure, while explaining why those limitations do not negate
the 	study’s 	relevance 	to 	the 	migration 	question. 	(Plunkett 	3d 	Amend. 	Rep.
(discussing limitations but opining that “the results showing higher overall particles
counts in women reporting perineal application of talc are nevertheless consistent
with the ability of talc particles to migrate up the female reproductive tract”); see
also Singh Rep. at 57 (acknowledging that in Heller 1996, the “talc particle counts
were unrelated to reported levels of perineal talc exposure,” which “reflects the
challenges in measuring exposure to talc”); Cote Amend. Rep. at 13 (recognizing
the authors’ suggestion that the results may be “due to widespread exposure to talc
during diapering”).)
More recent studies provide additional context and support.57 McDonald I
2019 identified talc particles in multiple pelvic tissues—including lymphatic sites—
of women with a reported history of perineal talc use. (See generally McDonald I
57 	By Defendants’ account, Drs. Cote, Clarke-Pearson, and Harlow reference or specifically
rely on McDonald I 2019, and Drs. Plunkett and Singh cite to or expressly rely on McDonald II
2019, in broad support of their biological plausibility opinions. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 22 n.42.) Similarly, Drs. Cote, Plunkett, and Singh reference Johnson 2020 for
the same or similar reasons. (See id.)
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2019.) Plaintiffs’ experts rely on this finding for the limited and appropriate purpose
of assessing the plausibility of a migration pathway. In their reasoned view, the
presence of talc across multiple pelvic locations, rather than in a single isolated site,
supports the inference that talc is capable of tissue transport and deposition within
the pelvic region. (See, e.g., Cote Amend. Rep. at 13; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend.
Rep. at 12; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 39–40.) The experts do not extrapolate from
these observations to draw definitive conclusions regarding exposure, dose, or
causation, nor do they treat the study as dispositive. Compare id., with McDonald I
2019 at 590, 603, 605; see also id. at 590, 605 (concluding that this study “offer[s]
new insight into the biologic potential of talc, its inflammatory potential, and its
migration via pelvic lymphatics from the perineum”).)
McDonald II 2019, which was expressly designed to address contamination
concerns raised in earlier literature, similarly detected talc in pelvic lymph nodes
under controlled conditions. (See generally McDonald II 2019.) Plaintiffs’ experts
cite this study to corroborate the biological feasibility of migration via pelvic or
lymphatic pathways, again stopping short of asserting proof. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d
Amend. Rep. at 39–40.) Used in this circumscribed manner, the experts’ reliance on
McDonald I and McDonald II reflects a reasoned and methodologically sound
application of the literature, not an unreasonable or unsupported extrapolation under
Rule 702.
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Likewise, Johnson 2020 compared talc particle size and morphology in
commercial talc products with particles identified in pelvic tissues from ovarian
cancer patients reporting perineal talc use. The study found that the dominant
particle class in consumer talc products closely matched the dominant class detected
in pelvic tissues. (See Johnson 2020 at 531–32.) The authors interpreted this
similarity as consistent with externally applied talc reaching pelvic sites. (See, e.g.,
id. at 523 (“In conclusion, our study lends support to the contention, also evidenced
by other literature reports, that externally-applied talc can migrate from the perineum
to other pelvic sites . . . .”).) In that regard, Plaintiffs’ experts rely on Johnson 2020
for precisely that limited inference—consistency in particle characteristics—not as
a standalone proof of exposure pathway.
While Defendants devote much of their argument in this context to attacking
the studies underlying Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions, I cannot find that Plaintiffs’
experts overstated or mischaracterized these studies’ conclusions. To the contrary,
the experts’ reports consistently and accurately describe what each study does—and
does not—demonstrate, and explain how each fits within a broader evidentiary
framework. (See, e.g., Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 7 (reporting Henderson
1971’s findings of “talc ha[ving] been identified deeply imbedded in ovarian cancer
tissue samples”), 12 (citing Henderson 1971, Heller 1996, Johnson 2020, and other
studies to support opinion that “the female reproductive tract is open and allows
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migration 	of 	potential 	pathogens 	into 	peritoneal 	cavity”); 	Cote 	Rep. 	at 	13
(“[Henderson 1971, Heller 1996, McDonald I 2019, Johnson 2020] suggest that
perineal use of talc can and does make its way into tissues in the reproductive tract,
including the ovaries and fallopian tubes.”); Kane Rep. at 14 (“[Henderson 1971,
Heller 1996, and other studies] have demonstrated the presence of talc in ovarian
tissue.”), 16 (“Henderson [1971] first observed talc particles embedded in both
ovarian tumors and normal ovaries.”); McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 88–89
(discussing studies that “have shown that talcum powder products can migrate to the
ovaries and fallopian tubes”); Singh Rep. at 18 (citing Henderson 1971, Heller 1996,
and other studies for the theory that “[t]alcum powder particles can migrate to the
fallopian tubes and ovaries”), 57 (citing Henderson 1971, Heller 1996, and other
studies for support that “[g]enital talc can migrate up the fallopian tubes and ovaries
and talc particles have been detected within the ovaries of women who report
perineal talc use”); Singh Supp. Rep. at 14–15 (summarizing McDonald I 2019 and
McDonald II 2019 as evidence of retrograde migration and citing Johnson 2020 for
“additional proof of retrograde migration of talc particles”); Plunkett 3d Amend.
Rep. at 31 (citing, inter alia, Heller 1996 as “demonstrating the presence of talc
particles in the ovaries of women who had reported use of talcum products in the
genital area”), 31 (finding the McDonald studies corroborate the FDA’s 2014
migratory plausibility conclusion), 37–38 (recognizing Heller 1996 as “a small piece
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of the overall evidence that supports the ability of talc to migrate from the vagina to
the ovaries”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 14 (citing Henderson 1971, Heller 1996, and
other studies for “conclud[ing] that [the presence of talc particles in the adnexa,
ovaries, and peritoneum] occurs as a result of migration of talc particles from the
vagina through the cervix, uterus, and fallopian tubes”); Smith Rep. at 16 (citing
Henderson 1971, among other studies, for support that “the female genital tract
functions as a conduit for foreign material to enter the peritoneal cavity”).
Far from treating any single study as conclusive, Plaintiffs’ experts expressly
acknowledge the limitations of the literature on which they rely, including contrary
findings, contamination concerns, species differences in animal models, and the
absence of direct human experimentation. They nevertheless explain—through
reasoned analysis—why the collective body of evidence supports the biological
plausibility 	of 	talc 	migration 	through 	the 	female 	reproductive 	tract. 	This
acknowledgment of limitations, coupled with an explanation of why the experts find
the supporting evidence more persuasive, reflects methodological rigor rather than
unreliability. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 37–38 (acknowledging criticism
of Heller 1996 “that women reporting no perineal use had talc detected in ovarian
tissue”); Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 12 (“I have reviewed the small body of
literature suggesting that migration of particles does not occur and do not think these
studies are compelling.”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 14–15 (“I have considered the
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limited evidence to the contrary and find it non-persuasive.”); Carson Rep. at 7
(“There are a limited number of animal studies suggesting that this transport does
not occur. These are not as compelling as the human evidence because of anatomical
and physiological differences between animals and humans in this regard, as well as
the overwhelming evidence in humans.”); see also Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 37
(discussing no evidence of translocation in Wehner 1986).)
From a Rule 702 standpoint, this approach is consistent with accepted
scientific practice. Plaintiffs’ experts do not present indirect or incomplete studies
as definitive proof.58 Instead, they synthesize multiple lines of evidence—including
human observational findings, tissue-identification studies, mechanistic research,
and anatomical considerations—to assess biological plausibility. In other words, the
experts’ conclusions drawn from the confluence of these studies are reasonable.
As before, Defendants ask that I disaggregate the literature and reject
plausibility unless each study independently establishes migration. Rule 702 does
not 	impose 	that 	requirement. 	Biological 	plausibility 	may 	be 	supported 	by
cumulative, indirect, and mechanistic evidence, so long as the expert explains how
that evidence is reasonably interpreted. See, e.g., In re PPA, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1241
(finding an expert’s opinion on biological plausibility reliable when supported by
58 	Nor have Defendants identified intervening “new science” that undermines the evidentiary
foundation upon which these opinions rest or demonstrates that the experts’ reasoning is unsound
under the amended Rule 702 standard.
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the “cumulative effect” of evidence, including reliance on “reports, textbooks and
treatises, and the clinical experience of several experts and other scientists” as well
as other evidence). Accordingly, I find, as I did previously, that Plaintiffs’ experts
have established by a preponderance of the evidence that their biological plausibility
opinions regarding talc migration are grounded in sufficient facts and data and reflect
a reliable application of scientific principles to the available evidence.
As 	to 	Plaintiffs’ 	inhalation-and-lymphatic 	transport 	migration 	theory,
Defendants assert that I correctly excluded this theory in my prior Opinion and urge
that I do so again. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 25–27.) Plaintiffs
respond by arguing that the reliability of their experts’ opinions on inhalation has
strengthened with the advent of additional evidence. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. 28–30.) I disagree with Plaintiffs and find that there
remains an insurmountable absence of data supporting this theory.59
Plaintiffs point to additional studies and regulatory assessments that they
contend 	support 	their 	expert’s 	opinions 	that 	talc 	can 	reach 	the 	ovaries 	via
inhalation.60 As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ experts appear to, again, rely upon
59 	Additionally, Plaintiffs do not argue that my prior exclusion of the inhalation theory
“demonstrably fail[ed] to adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023 amendments.” (See generally
Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br.; see also April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order.)
Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffs’ experts rely on studies previously considered, I see no basis to
revisit my prior decision excluding Plaintiffs’ theory on inhalation.
60 	(See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. 28–30 (citing, e.g., Health Canada
Screening Assessment 2021; Joan E. Steffen et al., Serous Ovarian Cancer Caused by Exposure
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studies that I considered or addressed in my prior Opinion. (See, e.g., Kane Rep. at
4, 14; Moorman Rep. at 33; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 89, 101; Wolf 3d Amend.
Rep. at 15; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 30.) But the new studies referenced by these
experts are insufficient to bridge the “analytical gap” between inhalation of talcum
powder and its potential migration to ovaries and/or fallopian tubes. See In re Hum.
Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
First, Plaintiffs point to the “extensive review of the scientific evidence on
inhalation of talc” contained within Health Canada Screening Assessment 2021,
which includes discussion of McDonald II 2019. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 28–30.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, however,
Health Canada Screening Assessment 2021 states, among other things, that “whether
inhalation of talc particles could result in ovarian exposure due to lymphatic transfer
of particles or whether responses may be immune-mediated has not been adequately
investigated for use in mode of action analysis.” (See Health Canada Screening
Assessment 2021 at 45.) Indeed, Plaintiffs’ reference to the identified health effects
following inhalation of “respirable talc particles” does not address or support the
migration of those talc particles via inhalation to ovaries or fallopian tubes. (See Pls.’
Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 28 (citing Health Canada
to Asbestos and Fibrous Talc in Cosmetic Talc Powders-A Case Series, 62 J. Occup. & Env’t Med.
(2), e65–e77 (2020) (“Steffen 2020”); McDonald II 2019 at 13–27.)
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Screening Assessment 2021 at 41); see also Health Canada Screening Assessment
2021 at 43 (“Based on the available data, ovarian cancer was identified as a critical
health effect for the perineal route of exposure to talc.”).) Similarly, Health Canada’s
assessment of McDonald II 2019 does not support migration via inhalation, because
McDonald II 2019 was a method-focused study observing talc entry into pelvic
tissues and regional nodes after perineal exposure. (See generally McDonald II
2019.)
Lastly, and as discussed in greater length with respect to the admissibility of
Dr. Godleski’s opinions and testimony, Steffen 2020 is not sufficiently supportive
of this inhalation theory. Steffen 2020 reports a litigation-linked case series of 10
women with serous ovarian cancer who used cosmetic talc. (See generally Steffen
2020.) The case series asserts that perineal use can produce “important inhalation
exposure to asbestos,” and characterizes inhalation as an “accepted route of
transmigration to the peritoneum and ovary.” (See id. at e69.) But standing alone,
Steffen 2020 does not offer sufficient scientific support or reasoning for a migration-
via-inhalation theory.
In sum, Plaintiffs’ renewed reliance on inhalation-and-lymphatic transport
does not cure the fundamental analytical deficiencies that led to exclusion of this
theory in my prior Opinion. The additional studies and regulatory materials cited by
Plaintiffs do not supply reliable data linking inhalation of cosmetic talc to deposition
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in the ovaries or fallopian tubes, nor do they meaningfully narrow the analytical gap
between pulmonary exposure and ovarian tissue presence. To the contrary, the
Health 	Canada 	Screening 	Assessment 	expressly 	acknowledges 	that 	ovarian
exposure via inhalation and lymphatic transfer has not been adequately investigated,
and it identifies ovarian cancer as a critical health effect associated with perineal—
not inhalation—exposure. The McDonald studies, including McDonald II 2019,
address migration following perineal exposure and do not support inhalation-based
transport. Steffen 2020, standing alone, offers a litigation-linked case series that
asserts—but 	does 	not 	scientifically 	substantiate—a 	migration 	pathway 	via
inhalation.
Accordingly, 	despite 	Plaintiffs’ 	characterization 	of 	the 	record 	as
“strengthened,” the evidentiary landscape remains materially unchanged. The
inhalation theory continues to rest on speculation rather than reliable scientific
evidence and fails to satisfy Rule 702’s requirement that expert opinions be
grounded in sufficient facts and data and the reliable application of scientific
principles. I therefore recommend the Court reaffirm my prior ruling excluding
Plaintiffs’ experts’ inhalation-and-lymphatic transport migration theory, and I
preclude Plaintiffs’ experts from testifying regarding this unsubstantiated theory.
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c. 	Inflammation, Oxidative Stress, and Macrophage-
Impairment
Lastly, Defendants move to exclude the experts’ biological plausibility
opinions on the ground that they have not identified a biologically plausible
mechanism by which perineal talc could cause ovarian cancer. (See, e.g., Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 27.)
Defendants take the same tack here as with migration, urging exclusion by
attacking the literature on which Plaintiffs’ experts rely. In broad terms, Defendants
first contend that the experts ignore the absence of histological evidence that talcum
powder causes chronic inflammation; that animal studies are non-analogous and
therefore uninformative; and that clinical uses of talc, i.e., pleurodesis, reflect
reactions unrelated to chronic inflammation and carcinogenesis. (See id. at 28–31.)
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on in vitro studies for
evidence of “subcellular markers of inflammation or oxidative stress” is unreliable
both in principle and in application—i.e., as a general scientific approach and as the
basis for the specific conclusions they draw. (See id. at 31–35.) Third, Defendants
attack “review articles,” among other studies on which Plaintiffs’ experts rely,
arguing 	they 	are 	methodologically 	weak 	and 	do 	not 	establish 	that 	chronic
inflammation 	causes 	ovarian 	cancer. 	(See 	id. 	at 	36–41.) 	Fourth, 	Defendants
challenge Plaintiffs’ experts reliance on Harper/Saed 2023 for the proposition that
talc exposure allegedly induces “malignant transformation” of normal human
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primary epithelial cells in vitro. (See id. at 41–45.) Finally, Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs’ macrophage-inhibition theory should be excluded because it rests only on
two in vitro mouse-cell studies that generate a hypothesis, thereby making the theory
impermissibly speculative and not plausible under the correct Rule 702 standard.
(See id. at 45–58.)
Plaintiffs oppose exclusion on these grounds by arguing that their experts
meet Rule 702’s reliability standard because biological plausibility requires a
credible, 	evidence-based 	mechanism—not 	definitive 	proof—and 	their 	experts
synthesize the totality of available evidence that talc can plausibly cause ovarian
cancer via chronic inflammation and related oxidative stress. (See Pls.’ Opp. to
Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 30–31.) Substantively, Plaintiffs point to
peer-reviewed literature linking chronic inflammation to carcinogenesis in ovarian
tissue and documenting pro-inflammatory and oxidative effects from talc and/or
asbestos exposure. (See id. at 31–43.) Plaintiffs emphasize that their experts’ reliance
on in vitro studies is appropriate—both as a general scientific approach and in
specific studies—to show that talc can trigger chronic inflammation and oxidative
stress. (See id. at 43–45.) Plaintiffs also summarize the literature linking chronic
inflammation to ovarian cancer, including Harper/Saed 2023, to correct what they
claim are Defendants’ misunderstandings and mischaracterizations of the studies
upon which their experts rely. (See id. at 45–52.) Additionally, Plaintiffs respond
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that opinions premised on certain macrophage studies are admissible under a totality
of evidence approach to demonstrate that talc can alter macrophage function, which
may in turn cause ovarian cancer. (See id. at 52–53.)
Once again, Defendants’ arguments largely rest on the premise that my prior
Opinion applied the wrong legal standard or otherwise departed from Rule 702 as
clarified in 2023. In relevant part, my prior Opinion evaluated the admissibility of
opinions regarding the association between talc use and inflammation and oxidative
stress, as well as the related association between inflammation and oxidative stress
and ovarian cancer. During the first round of Daubert motions, Plaintiffs offered Dr.
Saed as an expert in oxidative stress and ovarian cancer. See In re Johnson &
Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 130, 132. Ultimately, I permitted Dr. Saed to testify that
talcum powder exposure can induce cellular inflammation and oxidative stress based
on his in vitro work because his methods were testable, peer-reviewed, and involved
generally accepted techniques. See id. at 140. I excluded, however, Dr. Saed’s
extrapolation 	that 	such 	inflammation, 	which 	itself 	is 	represented 	as 	a 	pro-
carcinogenic process involving oxidative stress, causes ovarian cancer because his
in vitro study did not demonstrate malignant transformation, actual single nucleotide
polymorphisms mutations, or clinically relevant biomarkers. See id. at 135–140.
For Plaintiffs’ previously proffered experts’ Bradford Hill analyses, I allowed
testimony that talc can plausibly migrate through the female reproductive tract and
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that chronic inflammation and oxidative stress in ovarian tissue could contribute to
carcinogenesis. See id. at 172–75. I reviewed the current science as provided by the
parties, which largely consisted of peer-reviewed in vitro work and otherwise
accepted methods, and noted the absence of definitively contrary evidence. See id.
In permitting admission, I emphasized that biological plausibility requires a credible,
science-based mechanism rather than certainty or proof; opinions must be grounded
in reliable science rather than an expert’s say-so. See id. Consistent with these
boundaries, I permitted Defendants’ expert, Dr. Benjamin Neel, to rebut only Dr.
Saed’s admissible inflammation and oxidative stress opinions, reinforcing the
gatekeeping line between plausible cellular-level effects and unsupported causation
inferences. See id. at 195–98.
Now, and in view of my prior ruling, Defendants essentially contend that my
prior ruling cannot stand because a biological plausibility hypothesis based on
scientific research and reasoning is inadmissible if it is not definitively proven. (See
Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 27–28 (citing In re Acetaminophen, 707 F.
Supp. 3d at 350; In re Accutane Prods. Liability, 511 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1296 (M.D.
Fla. 2007)); see also id. at 7–8.) That is not the governing standard, and my prior
Opinion correctly declined to require definitive proof. See In re Johnson & Johnson,
509 F. Supp. 3d at 175.
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I start with Defendants’ reliance on In re Acetaminophen and In re Accutane,
which I find unpersuasive. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 27–28.) In
In re Acetaminophen, the district court excluded plaintiffs’ experts’ biological
plausibility opinions because their methodologies and evidence did not reliably
establish 	a 	mechanism 	by 	which 	prenatal 	acetaminophen 	exposure 	causes
neurodevelopmental disorders, including autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”) and/or
attention 	deficit/hyperactivity 	disorder 	(“ADHD”). 	707 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	309.
Specifically, the court excluded Dr. Baccarelli’s plausibility conclusions because the
physiological processes for ASD/ADHD were unknown at the time of writing and
because his theories were premised on the unreliable opinions of other experts. See
id. at 351. The court also excluded Dr. Cabrera’s mechanistic opinions because,
among other things, he failed to “identify a mechanism by which either ASD or
ADHD is created in utero.” Id. at 358–59. The court criticized Dr. Cabrera’s reliance
on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development’s “Adverse Outcome
Pathway 20,” which is built around mercury and oxidative stress leading to learning
and/or memory impairment, because it did not reliably map to acetaminophen or to
ASD or ADHD. Id. On the key-oxidative stress step, the court emphasized the
absence of replicated data and the misplaced reliance on inapposite human studies
and inconsistent behavioral animal evidence. See id. at 359–61. In other words, the
court 	excluded 	Dr. 	Cabrera’s 	biological 	plausibility 	opinion 	because 	his
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methodologies created an analytical gap and failed reliable application, not because
causation was not conclusively proven. In re Acetaminophen did not alter Rule 702
or impose any requirement of “definitive” mechanistic proof; rather, the court
applied the ordinary gatekeeping standard—which asks whether, more likely than
not, 	the 	opinion 	rests 	on 	sufficient 	facts, 	reliable 	principles, 	and 	a 	reliable
application.
In In re Accutane, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida
excluded plaintiffs’ expert’s biological plausibility opinion that Accutane disrupts
gastrointestinal mucosal integrity, which can initiate or amplify inflammatory
responses, and thus, induce or exacerbate inflammatory bowel syndrome (“IBS”).
511 F. Supp. 2d at 1295–96. In excluding plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion, the court
observed that the three proposed mechanisms were largely untested hypotheses
lacking general acceptance in the scientific community at the time—and, critically,
that plaintiffs’ expert expressly acknowledged these limitations. See id. at 1296–97.
The court’s statement that plaintiffs’ expert’s biological theory was “merely
plausible, not proven” does not impose a requirement of definitive proof; it reflects
the lack of reliable, scientifically validated support for any proposed mechanism or
epidemiologic evidence of increased incidence, and thus falls squarely within Rule
702’s reliability inquiry rather than a demand for correctness. See id. Accordingly,
In re Accutane does not alter the admissibility standard under amended Rule 702. It
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instead 	reaffirms 	that 	plausibility, 	absent 	reliable 	methodology 	and 	data, 	is
insufficient for admissibility—not that definitive proof is required. See id.
Here, Plaintiffs’ experts’ biological plausibility opinions do not suffer from
the same fatal flaws that led the courts in In re Acetaminophen and In re Accutane
to exclude biological plausibility and mechanistic opinions. As will be explained
below, 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts’ 	reliably 	employ 	methodologies 	that 	support 	their
respective opinions. Unlike in In re Acetaminophen, for example, Plaintiffs’ experts
here do not “cherry-pick[] isolated findings, ignor[e] inconsistent findings, and
disregard[] limitations expressed by” the studies’ authors. In re Acetaminophen, 707
F. Supp. 3d at 361.
Defendants also contend that, in admitting testimony regarding the biological
plausibility of talc leading to chronic inflammation, I impermissibly shifted the
burden of proof. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 5 (citing In re
Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 175 (“Defendants have not introduced any
evidence that this theory has been disproven as a matter of science, and therefore, I
have no basis to find that such a hypothesis is implausible so as to warrant exclusion
under a Daubert inquiry.”)).) Defendants misinterpret my prior ruling. The language
Defendants seize upon was used to underscore the absence of meaningful scientific
criticism or contrary evidence in the relevant literature that would call into question
the plausibility of Plaintiffs’ experts’ theory. In context, my prior observation that
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Defendants had not introduced evidence disproving the hypothesis did not serve as
the basis for admissibility. Instead, it reflected that Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions were
not contradicted by established scientific findings that would render their proposed
mechanism 	implausible. 	The 	admissibility 	determination 	rested 	on 	Plaintiffs’
affirmative showing—through reliable scientific literature, mechanistic reasoning,
and expert analysis—that perineal talc migration and resulting chronic inflammation
and/or oxidative stress constitute plausible biological mechanisms under Daubert
and Bradford Hill. Defendants’ argument ignores that context and mischaracterizes
the rationale for the prior ruling.
Against that backdrop, I will now turn to Defendants’ substantive arguments.
As follows, I will first address the parties’ arguments on the admissibility of expert
opinion and testimony concerning the association between talcum powder use and
chronic inflammation and oxidative stress; second, on the association between
inflammation and oxidative stress and the development of ovarian cancer; and
finally, on Plaintiffs’ macrophage-inhibition theory.
(1) 	Talcum powder and chronic inflammation, oxidative stress
I begin with Defendants’ objections to expert testimony concerning the
purported association between perineal talc use and chronic inflammation and
oxidative stress. Plaintiffs’ experts—including Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, Kane,
Levy, McTiernan, Moorman, Plunkett, Siemiatycki, Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman,
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Wolf, and Cote—opine that talc use is associated with chronic inflammation and
oxidative stress. In forming these opinions, Plaintiffs’ maintain that their experts rely
on various bodies of scientific literature,61 as well as their professional experience
and subject-matter knowledge.
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ experts, including Dr. Cote, ignore the
absence of histological evidence that talcum powder causes chronic inflammation.
(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 28–29.) For support, Defendants point
to Henderson 1971 and Heller 1996 as examples of studies that demonstrate that talc
does not induce inflammation. (See id.) As discussed within the context of Plaintiffs’
experts’ migration-related opinions, Henderson 1971 is a study that used extraction
and replication “to examine tissue from patients with ovarian and cervical tumours”
and that ultimately revealed talc particles embedded within ovarian and cervical
tumor tissues. Henderson 1971 did not assess or report inflammatory histopathology.
Heller 1996 was a pathoepidemiologic study that examined ovaries from women
with and without reported perineal talc use and explicitly looked for histologic
evidence of tissue reaction. Ultimately, the authors found no inflammatory response
associated with ovarian talc particles.
61 	It bears emphasis that Defendants challenge many of the same studies on which Plaintiffs’
experts rely to support both their migration opinions and their opinions that talc use is associated
with chronic inflammation as a causally relevant mechanism. Accordingly, in addressing
Defendants’ objections to the studies relied upon by Plaintiffs’ experts in support of their chronic-
inflammation theory, I incorporate by reference the earlier substantive discussion of those studies
to the extent relevant to the arguments presented here.
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Responding to Defendants’ contention, Plaintiffs point to a vast body of
largely 	unchallenged 	research 	and 	regulatory 	assessments 	relied 	upon 	and
referenced by their experts that show the plausible association between talc exposure
and chronic inflammation. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br.
at 31–30 & n.94–125.) As I have stressed, Plaintiffs’ experts anchor their biological
plausibility opinions in the totality of evidence, and not any one particular study.
(See, e.g., Singh Supp. Rep. at 22 (emphasizing that “body of evidence” strengthens
biological 	plausibility); 	Smith-Bindman 	3d 	Amend. 	Rep. 	at 	33–34, 	37–38
(addressing, 	inter 	alia, 	biological 	plausibility 	within 	“totality 	of 	evidence”
framework); Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 2, 13 (considering “extensive body
of literature in its totality” and “using the concepts outlined by Bradford Hill” in
forming causation-related opinions); Kane Rep. at 37–38 (detailing biologically
plausible mechanisms as part of integrated analysis).) As such, Defendants’ criticism
of one or two isolated studies does not undermine the remaining body of evidence
upon which the experts rely.
But even solely focusing on the substance of Henderson 1971 and Heller
1996, while these two older studies did not report that talc exposure causes chronic
ovarian inflammation, their findings do not undercut the reliability of Plaintiffs’
experts’ 	methodologies. 	Henderson 	1971 	did 	not 	discuss 	inflammation 	as 	a
mechanism or histologic finding. Therefore, Defendants’ contention that Henderson
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1971 did “not report that [talc] induced any inflammation” is misleading. (See Defs.’
2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 28 & n.53.) Defendants notably omit, however,
the authors’ conclusion that “[a]lthough it is impossible to incriminate talc as a
primary cause of carcinomatous changes within either the cervix or ovary on the
preliminary observations described [in the study], the possibility that talc may be
related 	to 	other 	predisposing 	factors 	should 	not 	be 	disregarded 	and 	further
investigations are obviously required.” (See Henderson 1971 at 271.)
Furthermore, while Heller 1996 found “no evidence of response to talc, such
as foreign body giant cell reactions or fibrosis in the tissue,” (Heller 1996 at 1508),
Plaintiffs rely on or reference other, more recent studies to assert the link between
talc use and inflammation, (see Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br.
at 31–30 & n.94–97, 99–103, 105–115, 117–125).62 Despite Heller 1996’s contrary
findings, the existence of conflicting evidence is not a sufficient basis to exclude an
expert’s opinion or anticipated testimony. See ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696
F.3d 254, 290 (3d Cir. 2012). Emphasis on a methodologically unchallenged, albeit
purportedly contrary, study in view of a larger body of evidence is fodder for cross-
examination and does not upend an expert’s opinion under the governing standard.
62 	See Woolen 2022; Paul K. Mills et al., Perineal Talc Exposure and Epithelial Ovarian
Cancer Risk on the Central Valley of California, 112 Int’l J. of Cancer (3), 458–64 (2009); Melissa
A. Merritt, Talcum Powder, Chronic Pelvis Inflammation and NSAIDs in Relation to Risk of
Epithelial Ovarian Cancer, 122 Int’l J. of Cancer (1), 170–76 (2008); see also Health Canada
Screening Assessment 2021.
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Defendants further fault Dr. Cote and other experts for purportedly lacking
knowledge of studies examining an association between talcum powder use and
chronic inflammation in humans. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 29
(citing, e.g., Cote Dep. at 217:6–14 (“I don’t know of a systematic study that has
examined [inflammation or granulomatous reaction in the reproductive tract or
gynecologic tissue of a woman who used talc and got ovarian cancer].”); ECF No.
33013-54 (“Harlow Dep.”) at 392:3–8 (“I don’t know of any studies [reporting talc
in the presence of inflammation in the ovary before ovarian cancer has been
diagnosed].”)).) That argument mischaracterizes both the testimony and the context
in which it was given. Neither Dr. Cote nor Dr. Harlow conceded a lack of familiarity
with relevant scientific literature. Rather, Dr. Cote testified that she was unaware of
any study specifically assessing inflammation in the reproductive tract or other
gynecologic tissues of women who used talc and later developed ovarian cancer.
(See Cote Dep. at 217:6–14.) Dr. Harlow similarly testified that he was not aware of
studies documenting talc in the presence of ovarian inflammation prior to an ovarian
cancer diagnosis. (See Harlow Dep. at 392:3–8.) Notably, neither Plaintiffs nor
Defendants identify the existence of any such studies. In other words, Defendants
do not point to overlooked or ignored literature; instead, they rely on testimony
acknowledging the absence of studies that would directly resolve the question. The
absence of dispositive human studies, however, does not require exclusion of an
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expert opinion, so long as other factors support the reliability of the methodology
employed. See In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 656–57 (recognizing that the
lack of studies either proving or disproving a causal hypothesis is not, standing
alone, fatal to admissibility).
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ experts rely on several animal
studies that they contend are unsupportive of their opinions regarding the association
between talc exposure and chronic inflammation. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 29–30.) They challenge the reliability of Plaintiffs’ experts’
methodologies on the basis that they improperly rely on Keskin 2009.63 First,
Defendants contend that Keskin 2009 does not demonstrate talc-induced neoplastic
change. 64 (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 29.) Second, Defendants
assert 	that 	certain 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts—such 	as 	Drs. 	McTiernan, 	Wolf, 	and
Moorman—ignored that limitation. (See id.) Both arguments are unavailing.
As discussed, Keskin 2009 provides experimental evidence that repeated
intravaginal or perineal talc exposure elicits a local inflammatory response in rat
genital tissue. (See Keskin 2009 at 925 (concluding that “[t]alc has unfavorable
63 	Defendants previously challenged Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on Keskin 2009, insofar as
it failed to demonstrate upward migration following perineal application.
64 	Interestingly, Defendants argued during the last round of Daubert motions that Plaintiffs’
experts improperly failed to consider Keskin 2009 in forming their coherence opinions—not that
their consideration of Keskin 2009 undermined their biological plausibility opinions. (See Defs.’
2024 General Causation Br. at 86.) I addressed this argument in my prior Opinion. See In re
Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 183.
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effects on the female genital system,” but that “this effect is in the form of foreign
body reaction and infection, rather than being neoplastic”).)65 Defendants do not
adequately explain how the authors’ observation that the study did not identify
neoplastic 	change undermines 	Plaintiffs’ experts’ 	methodologies 	or opinions.
Plaintiffs’ experts cite Keskin 2009 for the limited and appropriate purpose of
demonstrating talc’s capacity to induce inflammatory responses, not as proof of
tumorigenesis. (See McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 90 (“Talc exposure has also been
linked to increased inflammation. It can induce granulomas and other inflammatory
responses 	in vivo.”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Talcum powder causes
inflammation/oxidative stress both in vitro and in vivo (in both animal and human
tissue).”); Moorman Rep. at 34 (“Animal studies also confirm that talc causes
inflammation, as experiments in rats treated with intra-vaginal or perineal talc
showed inflammatory changes in the genital tract.”).) But even in the context of
neoplasm, contrary to Defendants’ interpretation, Keskin 2009 itself cautions against
drawing 	firm 	conclusions 	regarding 	neoplastic 	effects, 	expressly 	calling 	for
additional experimental and clinical studies and noting that prior research has
supported neoplastic effects, particularly in ovarian tissue. (See Keskin 2009 at 927.)
Defendants’ interpretation of the study’s 	limited findings therefore does not
65 	Neither the parties nor their experts clearly define what “neoplastic transformation” entails.
Defendants briefly equate it to “the development of tumor-like properties.” (See Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 44.)
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meaningfully call into question Plaintiffs’ experts’ use of the study for purposes of
assessing inflammation. Moreover, under Rule 702, any alleged failure to emphasize
a study’s limitations bears on weight, not admissibility. See In re Scrap Metal
Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Quiet Tech. DC–8, Inc. v.
Hurel–Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Defendants also challenge these experts’ reliance on experiments conducted
by the National Toxicology Program (“NTP”),66 which they contend are unreliable,
and consequently, lack relevance to the experts’ opinions. (See id. at 30.) I disagree
in part. NTP 1993 evaluated the chronic inhalation toxicology and carcinogenic
potential of non-asbestiform cosmetic-grade talc in mice and rats. (See generally
NTP 1993.) To do so, the authors exposed male and female rats and mice to
aerosolized, asbestos-free talc at target concentrations for a set period. (Id.) In rats,
chronic granulomatous inflammation was nearly universal in exposed groups. (See
id. at 7.) In mice, chronic active inflammation with macrophage accumulation was
similarly observed, though no evidence of carcinogenic activity was observed. (See
id.)
Several Plaintiffs’ experts cite the study—alongside other literature—for the
limited proposition that talc exposure can elicit inflammatory responses. (See, e.g.,
66 	National Toxicology Program, Toxicology and Carcinogenesis Studies of Talc (CAS No.
14807-96-6) in F344/N Rats and B6C3F1 Mice (Inhalation Studies), U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Serv., 421 (1993).
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Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Talcum powder causes inflammation/oxidative stress,
both in vitro and in vivo (in both animal and human tissues).” (citing, inter alia, NTP
1993); Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 6 (“Talcum powder is known to elicit an
inflammatory response in animals and humans.”) (citing, inter alia, NTP 1993);
Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Additional studies have also shown the effects of talc
on the immune responses.”) (citing, inter alia, NTP 1993).) This is an accurate
characterization of NTP 1993’s findings and is properly relied upon by Plaintiffs’
experts for the propositions that it asserts.
Other experts, including Dr. Plunkett, reference NTP 1993 more generally in
discussing talc toxicity and carcinogenic potential, while expressly acknowledging
its limitations and the reported absence of ovarian tumors, which they explain is
unsurprising given the inhalation exposure route and species-specific anatomical
differences. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 44–45.) Dr. McTiernan, however,
takes a different approach by extrapolating from NTP 1993 opinions that are too
attenuated and go beyond the bounds drawn by the authors themselves. Dr.
McTiernan asserts that NTP 1993 is “highly relevant to the role of talc in
carcinogenesis” because, among other things, it 	provides 	“important 	‘signal’
information of talc toxicity relevant to talc and ovarian cancer.” (See McTiernan 3d
Amend. Rep. at 93–94.) But Dr. McTiernan makes no mention of the experiments’
shortcomings as they relate to evidence of the association between talc and ovarian
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cancer risk: that NTP 1993’s primary tumor signals were confined to the lungs of
female 	rats; 	that 	NTP 	1993’s 	conclusions 	of 	carcinogenic 	activity 	relate 	to
respiratory tract outcomes under conditions of chronic inhalation, not genital or
peritoneal exposure; and that NTP 1993’s recitation of migratory studies found no
evidence of talc reaching the ovaries in relevant translocation testing. (See generally
NTP 1993.)
Simply put, NTP 1993 does not support the association between talc and
ovarian cancer risk because its design, findings, and ancillary data do not implicate
the ovary or perineal exposure in carcinogenesis. Therefore, to the extent that any
expert intends to use NTP 1993 to support the association between talcum powder
and ovarian carcinogenesis, they may not do so. To be clear, this is not to say that
NTP 1993 may not be relied upon to support the general proposition of an
association between talc use and inflammation or talc toxicity and carcinogenic
potential, or that such reliance by experts undermines the reliability of their
methodology or its application to this case.
Importantly, several Plaintiffs’ experts expressly address the criticisms that
have been leveled at NTP 1993, including challenges to its design and conclusions,
but explain why the study nonetheless provides relevant toxicological information
regarding talc-induced inflammation. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 43–45
(acknowledging that NTP 1993 “has been criticized and conclusions reached by the
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original authors have been questioned,” yet concludes “even with its limitations, the
study provides important information on talc toxicity that is relevant to assessing the
risks of cancer in humans”); Carson Rep. at 7 (“There are a limited number of animal
studies suggesting that this transport does not occur.” (citing NTP 1993).) That
acknowledgment and contextualization of the study’s limitations supports, rather
than undermines, the reliability of the experts’ methodologies. Plaintiffs’ experts
reasonably and adequately extrapolated NTP 1993’s conclusion to support their
opinion on inflammation.
In sum, I find that although NTP 1993 did not—and was not designed to—
evaluate ovarian carcinogenesis, it remains relevant to the broader question of talc
toxicity and inflammatory response. Under Rule 702, objections grounded in alleged
flaws or limitations of a study generally go to weight, not admissibility. See Karlo
v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 81–83 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The question
of whether a study’s results were properly calculated or interpreted ordinarily goes
to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility.”). Accordingly, I find that
Defendants’ criticisms of NTP 1993 do not warrant exclusion of the experts’
opinions that rely on it for the limited purposes outlined above.
Finally, it bears emphasizing that the experts who rely on or reference Keskin
2009 and NTP 1993 do so in conjunction with a broader body of evidence, including
other animal studies, epidemiologic studies, case reports, literature reviews, and in
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vitro research. Plaintiffs’ experts marshal this collective evidence to support their
view that talcum powder is consistently associated with chronic inflammatory
responses. 	Under 	the 	commonly 	employed 	totality-of-the-evidence 	approach,
Plaintiffs’ experts use animal studies as one component of their analysis, but do not
rely on them in isolation to support their biological plausibility opinions. (See, e.g.,
Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 55 (“The animal cancer data, when considered in
conjunction with the cellular data, indicate that talc is a carcinogen and there likely
is a dose-response threshold for tumor development in rodents. There are several
human studies that provide evidence of a dose-response relationship for talc
exposure and ovarian cancer in women.” (citations omitted)); Moorman Rep. at 9
(“Evidence from epidemiological investigations is combined with relevant studies
from other disciplines, including pathology, animal and mechanistic studies, to make
an assessment of the evidence for a causal association between genital exposure to
talcum powder and ovarian cancer.”).)
Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on pleurodesis is
misplaced because pleurodesis involves administering large amounts of talc to
intentionally invoke an acute inflammatory response that is not analogous to the
alleged chronic mechanism; other agents besides talc can cause the same effect; and
long-term data show no increased rates of cancer following pleurodesis. (See Defs.’
2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 30–31.) Despite similarly structured arguments
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elsewhere in Defendants’ motion, Defendants do not, however, argue against the
applicability 	of 	pleurodesis 	to 	biological 	plausibility 	of 	talc 	exposure 	and
inflammation based on anatomical differences between pulmonary tissue and
ovarian tissue. (See id.)
Plaintiffs’ experts’ references to pleurodesis do not undermine the reliability
of their methodologies or the application of their methodologies to this case. Dr.
Plunkett explained that while talc pleurodesis involves lung-related cells, it is
nonetheless a clinical procedure that intentionally uses talc to provoke an acute
inflammatory response albeit to scar and fuse pleural67 layers, thereby treating
pleural effusions. (See Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 52–53; see also Moorman Rep.
at 33–34 (“[T]alc pleurodesis [is] a treatment for malignant pleura effusions or
pneumothorax that involves instillation of talc into the pleural space.”).) However,
Dr. Plunkett emphasized that this pleurodesis inflammation is acute rather than
chronic, the latter of which she notes is typically the type of inflammation linked to
carcinogenesis, with no regard to origin of site. (Id. at 53.) Dr. Plunkett further noted
that the severity of inflammatory effects in pleurodesis depends on particle size,
citing data that small-particle talc, i.e., approximately 50% less than 10 μm, is
67 	The pleural space is the thin, fluid-filled gap between the two layers of the pleura
(membranes) that surround the lungs. (See Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 52–53; Moorman Rep. at
33–34.)
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associated with worse inflammatory outcomes and recalling that consumer talc
powders generally contain mostly small-particle talc, i.e., less than 10 μm. (Id.)
Likewise, Dr. McTiernan cites clinical and experimental work showing that
talc pleurodesis elicits both local and systemic inflammatory responses. (See
McTiernan 3d Rep. at 90–91.) Dr. McTiernan uses this data to support a mechanistic
pathway in which talc-induced inflammation promotes cellular proliferation and
other tumorigenic processes. (See id.) Along the same line, Dr. Moorman invokes
talc pleurodesis as evidence that talc causes inflammation and fibrosis. (See
Moorman 	Rep. 	at 	33–34.) 	The 	doctor 	explains 	that 	pleurodesis 	results 	in
inflammation and fibrotic adhesion of pleural layers, and, coupled with additional
evidence like pulmonary talcosis, talc exposure can drive inflammatory processes
that fit within recognized cancer biology frameworks involving inflammation. (See
id.) According to Dr. Moorman, talc pleurodesis is just one line in “several lines of
evidence” establishing that “talc can cause inflammation.” (Id.)
Furthermore, the experts cited to Elena Arellano-Orden et al., Small Particle-
Sized Talc Is Associated with Poor Outcome and Increased Inflammation in
Thoracoscopic Pleurodesis, 86 Respiration 201–09 (2013) (“Arellano-Orden 2013”)
to document the inflammatory biology of talc pleurodesis and particle-size gradient
in responses, which they used as a part of the mechanistic evidence that talc induces
inflammation in human tissue. By studying 227 consecutive malignant pleura
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effusion patients undergoing thoracoscopic talc pleurodesis and observing, among
other things, inflammatory responses with small-particle talc, Arellano‑Orden 2013
provided human clinical and mechanistic evidence that talc pleurodesis causes
pleural and systemic inflammatory response.
Having reviewed these opinions, I find that the experts’ discussion of
pleurodesis as evidence that talc can induce inflammation does not warrant exclusion
under Rule 702. At the outset, the experts’ reliance on pleurodesis-related literature
is sufficiently reliable because it is grounded in studies that Plaintiffs’ experts
accurately characterize. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 52 (citing Arellano-
Orden 2013); McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 90–91 (citing Arellano-Orden 2013).)
Notably, 	Defendants 	do 	not 	contend 	that 	these 	studies 	are 	misdescribed 	or
inaccurately reported.
Defendants’ argument that the pleurodesis studies demonstrate only acute,
rather than chronic, inflammation likewise misses the mark at this stage of the
analysis. Plaintiffs’ experts rely on pleurodesis-related studies to support the limited
proposition that talc can provoke a cellular inflammatory response, albeit in
pulmonary tissue. Whether that inflammatory response progresses to chronic
inflammation, and whether such inflammation can in turn contribute to ovarian
carcinogenesis, implicates subsequent steps in the causal chain that are addressed
elsewhere in this section. Importantly, Plaintiffs’ experts do not rely on pleurodesis
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studies alone to support those later steps, nor can they, but instead draw on additional
bodies of evidence to do so.
Next, Defendants 	challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ use of 	in 	vitro 	studies
generally 	because 	they 	purportedly 	fail 	to 	provide 	“good 	grounds” 	for
“extrapolating” from them. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 31–32.) I
disagree.
As a preliminary matter, “in vitro tests provide useful information about
metabolic processes at a cellular level, and may supplement existing animal and
human data.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (quoting Bourne ex
rel. Bourne v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 482, 496 (S.D.
W. Va. 2002)). While “in vitro evidence alone cannot serve as a basis for a general
causation opinion,” In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1310, it still can bolster
“predict[ions] of causation in humans” if consistent and supportive data exists from
human epidemiologic studies, 	In re Zoloft, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 464. Notably,
Defendants identify no portion of my prior Opinion that misstates or misapplies the
role of in vitro studies in supporting general causation or biological plausibility
opinions.
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Rather, Defendants point to several in vitro studies that they contend undercut
the 	experts’ 	opinions 	that 	talc 	causes 	chronic 	inflammation.68 	Specifically,
Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on Fletcher 2019 and Shukla 2009
to support the proposition that talc exposure causes oxidative stress, which in turn
increases the risk of ovarian cancer development. (See id. at 32–35 (citing Levy 2d
Amend. Rep. at 16; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 91; Singh Supp. Rep. at 15;
Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 14–15; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16).)
The authors of Fletcher 2019, which include Dr. Saed, aimed to determine
whether and how talcum powder can induce cellular and molecular changes that
would mechanistically support an association between genital talc use and increased
risk of epithelial ovarian cancer, by testing talc’s effects on oxidative stress
pathways, inflammatory markers, cell proliferation, apoptosis, and selected gene
variants in normal and ovarian cancer cell models. (See generally Fletcher 2019.)
Fletcher 2019 was built on a similar group of authors’ earlier work—a series of in
vitro and molecular studies from Dr. Saed’s laboratory. (See generally id.; see also
Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 48; Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 32.)
68 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 32–36 (citing Nicole M. Fletcher et al.,
Molecular Basis Supporting the Association of Talcum Powder Use with Increased Risk of Ovarian
Cancer, 26 Reprod. Sci. (12), 1603–1612 (2019) (“Fletcher 2019”); Arti Shukla et al., Alterations
in Gene Expression in Human Mesothelial Cells Correlate with Mineral Pathogenicity, 41 Am. J.
of Respiratory Cellular Molecular Biology (1), 114–23 (2009) (“Shukla 2009”)).)
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Notably, it does not appear that Fletcher 2019 is precisely the same study by
Dr. Saed that my prior Opinion previously examined. See In re Johnson & Johnson,
509 F. Supp. 3d at 133–47. However, Defendants lodge many of the same criticisms
against 	Fletcher 	2019 	as 	they 	did 	against 	Dr. 	Saed’s 	previously 	examined
experiments. 	Therefore, 	I 	infer 	methodological 	similarities 	between 	the 	two
experiments.
Fletcher 2019 used in vitro experiments exposing multiple human cell lines—
normal cells human macrophages, human primary normal ovarian epithelial cells,
immortalized human ovarian epithelial cells, immortalized human fallopian tube
secretory epithelial cells, and ovarian cancer cells—to Johnson & Johnson talcum
baby powder, at 5, 20, or 100 μg/mL doses for up to 72 hours to assess, among other
things, dose-response effects. (See Fletcher 2019 at 2.) Experiments were run in
triplicate under standard culture conditions per manufacturer protocols. (See id. at 2,
4–5.) The authors quantified, among other things, mRNA and protein/activity for
key 	antioxidant 	enzymes 	and 	pro-oxidant/inflammatory 	markers,
inflammation/tumor 	marker 	CA-125 	for 	inflammation, 	and 	assessed 	cell
proliferation and measured apoptosis. (See generally Fletcher 2019.) Fletcher 2019
reported that talc exposure drove a shift toward oxidative stress and inflammation
across normal ovarian, normal fallopian, and ovarian cancer cells. (See id. at 3–5.)
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As discussed below, Drs. Levy, McTiernan, Singh, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf
cite Fletcher 2019, among other studies, for the proposition that talc causes oxidative
stress. Defendants first challenge the credibility of Fletcher 2019’s reported data as
it relates to that conclusion. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 33–34.)
In doing so, Defendants largely repeat arguments that were previously raised and
addressed in my prior Opinion. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at
144–47 & n.21. For example, Defendants point to alleged irregularities in laboratory
records, 	asserting 	that 	“portions 	of 	the 	lab 	notebook 	are 	whited 	out 	with
contradictory information written over, and basic mathematical calculations (like
averages) are done incorrectly.” (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 33.)
Defendants also contend that the reported treatment time is inconsistent, noting that
“the treatment time is reported as 48 hours, which is consistent with Dr. Saed’s initial
and rejected manuscript, but inconsistent with [Fletcher (2019)], which claimed 72
hours of treatment.” (Id.) As Defendants acknowledge, however, I previously
considered these same criticisms and concluded that they “do not fundamentally
undermine the methodologies Dr. Saed utilized when conducting” the experiments.
See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 144–46. Here, as before,
Defendants do not identify how Dr. Saed’s experimental methodology fails to satisfy
Rule 702, either as it existed at the time of my prior ruling or as clarified by the 2023
amendments. At bottom, Defendants’ arguments amount to a renewed request for
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reconsideration of issues already decided. Consistent with my prior ruling, without
repeating those discussions, I again find no basis to conclude that the credibility
concerns 	raised 	by 	Defendants 	render Dr. 	Saed’s 	experimental 	methodology
unreliable. Rather, these criticisms bear on the weight to be afforded to the study and
the conclusions drawn from it, not on the admissibility of the opinions under Rule
702.
Defendants also make passing reference to potential bias concerns underlying
the propriety of Fletcher 2019. Fletcher 2019 disclosed that Dr. Saed served as a paid
consultant and expert witness in talcum powder litigation, though the article stated
that the authors received no financial support “for the research, authorship, and/or
publication of” the article. (See Fletcher 2019 at 9.) Defendants disagree, arguing
that the article “incorrectly states that ‘[t]he author(s) received no financial support’
for it.” (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at n.64.) On that statement alone,
without more particular information, I am unable to assess the potential impropriety
of Fletcher 2019 or confirm that the authors were otherwise financially influenced,
other than Defendants’ say-so. However, this is not to say Defendants may not fully
explore this issue further at trial. And in any event, it “is well-established that an
expert’s bias is not a proper basis to bar testimony under Daubert.” Cage v. City of
Chicago, 979 F. Supp. 2d 787, 827 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (collecting cases).
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Next, Defendants mount a merit-based challenge to Fletcher 2019 and the
opinions derived from it, contending that the study fails to use or establish any
physiologically relevant dose and rests on a mischaracterization of oxidative stress.
To begin, I note that Drs. Levy, McTiernan, Singh, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf cite
Fletcher 2019, among other studies, for the proposition that talc causes oxidative
stress. (See, e.g., Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Talcum powder exposure to normal
and epithelial ovarian cancer cells resulted in an increased pro-oxidant state as
evidenced by observing increased levels of CA-125, caspase-3, nitrate/nitrite, and
key redox enzymes.”); Singh Supp. Rep. at 15 (“Talc showed an increase in
inflammation as shown by a significant increase in CA-125 (P<0.05).”); Smith-
Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 14–15 (“Talc exposure also resulted in a significant
increase in inflammation as determined by increased tumor marker CA-125 (P <
.05).”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Talcum powder causes inflammation/oxidative
stress both in vitro and in vivo (in both animal and human tissues).”).) Several other
Plaintiffs’ experts articulate the association between talcum use, oxidative stress,
and the increased risk of ovarian cancer development, based on Fletcher 2019. (See,
e.g., McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 91 (“This study supports the role of talc in
inducing oxidative stress, providing a molecular basis for epidemiologic studies
demonstrating an increased risk of ovarian cancer with perineal talcum powder
product exposure.”); Singh Supp. Rep. at 15 (“Fletcher [2019] . . . demonstrated that
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talc induces changes in key redox enzymes and enhances the prooxidant state in
normal and EOC cells. This confirms the cellular effect of talc and provide a
molecular mechanism linking genital use to increased ovarian cancer risk through
oxidative stress and inflammation.” (citation omitted)); Smith-Bindman 3d Amend.
Rep. at 15 (“These findings confirm the cellular effect of talc and provide a
molecular mechanism to previous reports linking genital use to increased ovarian
cancer risk.”).)
Having reviewed these opinions, I do not find that Defendants’ substantive
challenges warrant exclusion of Plaintiffs’ experts or those of their opinions
grounded 	in 	Fletcher 	2019. 	My 	prior 	Opinion 	already 	rejected 	Defendants’
contention that Dr. Saed’s laboratory experiment, upon which Fletcher 2019 is
ostensibly based, is inapplicable because it did not use a “physiologically relevant
dose.” As explained at length, the absence of such a dose does not diminish the
study’s value, as the study did not purport to establish definitive causation. See In re
Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 143. Defendants offer nothing new to this
argument, and I do not find a basis to revisit that reasoning under Rule 702 as
amended or newly proffered evidence.
Defendants also contend that Fletcher 2019 did not, in fact, find oxidative
stress. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 34–35.) That argument rests
on an overly narrow characterization of the study’s findings. Fletcher 2019 reports
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mechanistic evidence demonstrating pro-inflammatory and pro-oxidant effects of
talc exposure across multiple human cell types. (See Fletcher 2019 at 1 (finding “that
talc induces significant changes in key redox enzymes and enhances the prooxidant
state in normal and [epithelial ovarian cancer] cells”).) Although Defendants argue
that the study reflects changes in indirect markers rather than direct measurement of
oxidative stress, Fletcher 2019 itself characterizes the observed redox alterations as
evidence of an induced pro-oxidant state. Disagreement over whether those findings
should be labeled “oxidative stress,” or overstate the strength of the inference drawn
from 	the 	reported 	biomarkers, 	goes 	to 	the 	interpretation 	and 	weight 	of 	the
evidence—not to whether Plaintiffs’ experts have mischaracterized the study or
relied on it in a methodologically unreliable manner under Rule 702. Rather, the
experts have reasonably extrapolated Fletcher 2019 for its intended purpose. See In
re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 744 (Plaintiffs’ experts “do not have to demonstrate to the judge
by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their experts are correct,
they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions
are reliable. . . . The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits
standard of correctness.”).
Similarly, the experts’ reliance on Shukla 2009 does not render their opinions
unreliable or inadmissible under Rule 702. Defendants argue that Shukla 2009 does
not support Plaintiffs’ experts’ inflammation theories because it observed significant
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gene-expression changes and greater toxicity in human mesothelial cells, not human
ovarian cells. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 35.)
Shukla 2009 investigated whether exposure to different mineral particles—
including asbestos and nonfibrous talc—induces inflammatory and oxidative-stress–
related molecular responses in human mesothelial cells and human ovarian surface
epithelial 	cells. 	Using 	surface-area-matched 	dosing 	and 	genome-wide 	gene-
expression profiling, the authors found that asbestos produced the most extensive
and 	robust 	transcriptional 	changes, particularly 	in 	mesothelial 	cells, strongly
activating genes associated with inflammation, oxidative stress, cytokine signaling,
and cellular stress responses. (Shukla 2009 at 118–19.) Importantly, nonfibrous talc
also induced measurable gene-expression changes at higher exposures, including
upregulation of inflammatory and oxidative-stress–related genes such as ATF3, IL-
8, PTGS2 (COX-2), and SOD2, demonstrating that talc is not biologically inert
under experimental conditions. (See id. at 118, 121.) As to the human ovarian surface
epithelial cells, which were tested under the same conditions, the authors observed
no meaningful change at the lower dose but observed mRNA levels increase at a
higher dose in two genes—NR4A2 and CXCL2 or MIP2—at eight hours and further
increase in expression of 16 genes at 24 hours. (See id. at 118.)
The authors concluded that mineral pathogenicity correlates with the ability
to trigger early inflammatory and oxidative molecular events, even in the absence of
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neoplastic transformation. 	(Id. 	at 	121–22.) 	Although 	talc’s 	effects 	were 	less
pronounced than those of asbestos, the study identified overlapping stress-response
and cytokine-regulatory pathways that are widely recognized as contributors to
chronic inflammation and carcinogenic processes. (Id. at 121.) Critically, the authors
emphasized that these findings reflect early mechanistic cellular responses, not proof
of cancer causation, and are therefore relevant to assessing biological plausibility
rather than establishing tumorigenesis. (Id. at 121–22.) As such, the study concludes
talc exposure can induce pro-inflammatory and pro-oxidant cellular states that may
be relevant to disease development when considered alongside other lines of
evidence.
Drs. Plunkett, McTiernan, and Clarke-Pearson, among others, cite and discuss
Shukla 2009 to support the mechanistic plausibility that talc can trigger biological
responses—particularly oxidative stress and inflammation—in cell types relevant to
this litigation. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 45–46; McTiernan 3d Amend.
Rep. at 92; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 6.) Dr. Clarke-Pearson, for example,
specifically found Shukla 2009 supportive of the association between talcum powder
and inflammation because it demonstrated that “non-fibrous (platy) talc caused
expression of genes in ovarian epithelial cells producing inflammatory cytokines.”
(See Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 6.) Dr. Plunkett similarly relied upon Shukla
2009 to illustrate, among other things, that asbestos elicits stronger adverse response
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than nonfibrous talc under the reported in vitro conditions. (See Plunkett 3d Amend.
Rep. at 45–46.) However, Dr. Plunkett noted that the study “did reveal statistically
significant increases in ATF3 and IL8 expression by asbestos and non-fibrous talc
at certain conditions,” and “that some of the genes affected [by asbestos and talc]
are involved in cellular processes that relate to oxidative stress and inflammation.”
(Id. at 46.)
Based on these opinions, I do not find that these experts’ conclusions exceed
those espoused in Shukla 2009, particularly since Shukla 2009 demonstrated adverse
cellular changes following talc and asbestos exposure.69 See In re Accutane, 511 F.
Supp. 2d at 1291 (“When an expert relies on the studies of others, he must not exceed
the limitations the authors themselves place on the study. That is, he must not draw
overreaching conclusions.”) (citing McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233,
1245–1247 (11th Cir. 2005)).
It 	also 	bears 	repeating 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts’ 	opinions 	regarding 	the
association between talc use and inflammation is supported by other animal studies,
in vitro studies, and clinical data, and not solely Shukla 2009 or Fletcher 2019. (See,
e.g., 	Arellano-Orden 	2013 	(showing 	post-talc 	increases 	in 	pro-inflammatory
69 	Plaintiffs’ experts also discuss and distinguish the study’s limitations. For example, Dr.
Plunkett addresses the lesser effects of talc exposure on ovarian cell gene expression by
commenting that the authors “failed to test talc with the same rigor that asbestos was tested in their
study, limiting the data collected on talc itself.” (See Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 46; see also id.
(“[H]owever, testing of only two doses of asbestos limit the conclusions that can be drawn about
differences between cells.”).)
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cytokines from talc pleurodesis patients); Britton Trabert et al., Pre-Diagnostic
Serum Levels of Inflammation Markers and Risk of Ovarian Cancer in the Prostate,
Lung, Colorectal and Ovarian Cancer (PLCO) Screening Trial, 135 Gynecologic
Oncology 	(2), 	297–304 	(2014) 	(“Trabert 	2014”) 	(linking 	higher 	systemic
inflammatory markers to increased ovarian cancer risk); see also Eduardo Henrique
Genofre, et al., Inflammation and Clinical Repercussions of Pleurodesis Induced
Intrapleural Talc Administration, 62 Clinics (San Paolo) (5), 627–34 (2007).)
(2) 	Chronic inflammation and ovarian cancer
Next, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ experts cannot reliably connect chronic
inflammation to ovarian carcinogenesis because their evidence is non-probative,
inconsistent, and/or misinterpreted. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at
36–41.) Defendants cite several different categories of studies and contend that the
experts 	ignored 	the 	underlying 	data, 	where 	applicable, 	and 	that 	the 	studies
themselves do not support Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions. (See id.) I disagree.
At the outset, I note again that Plaintiffs’ experts do not confine their
biological plausibility opinions to the challenged classes of studies. Rather, they
draw on a broader and more diverse evidentiary base. Even within the specific
categories Defendants target, Plaintiffs’ experts rely on multiple studies beyond
those singled out for criticism. And the very studies Defendants attack substantively
support the limited propositions for which Plaintiffs’ experts cite them.
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To start, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ experts improperly rely on so-
called “review articles” that synthesize existing literature rather than generate new
primary data, and that the experts therefore fail to independently analyze the
underlying studies. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 37 (citing Fran
Balkwill & Alberto Mantovani, Inflammation and Cancer: Back to Virchow?, 357
Lancet (9255), 539–545 (2001) (“Balkwill & Mantovani 2001”); Roberta B. Ness &
Carrie Cottreau, Possible Role of Ovarian Epithelial Inflammation in Ovarian
Cancer, 91 J. of the Nat’l Cancer Inst. (17), 1459–1467 (1999) (“Ness & Cottreau
1999”)).) That argument, however, warrants careful contextualization. Defendants
do not challenge Ness & Cottreau 1999 or Balkwill & Mantovani 2001 on the
substance of the scientific propositions for which they are cited. Instead, Defendants’
objection is directed solely to the fact that these publications are classified as “review
articles.” At its core, these so-called “review articles” are peer-reviewed, published,
and widely cited articles that discuss the works of other experts that have also been
peer-reviewed and published. As Daubert notes, “an expert is permitted wide
latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge
or observation.” 509 U.S. at 592.
Aside from the fact that these studies conducted reviews of other literature,
Plaintiffs’ experts rely on these sources for scientific propositions regarding the role
of inflammation in carcinogenesis. (See, e.g., Carson Rep. at 6; Clarke-Pearson 3d
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Amend. Rep. at 5; Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 11; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 15.) For
example, citing to the subject review articles, Dr. Wolf writes that “[i]nflammation
resulting from talcum powder use has been proposed as a potential mechanism for
the association with [epithelial cancers].” (Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 15 (citing, e.g.,
Ness & Cottreau 1999 and Balkwill & Mantovani 2001).) Dr. Singh opines that
“[i]nflammation has long been understood to be an important mechanism underlying
the development of ovarian cancer.” (Singh Rep. at 58 (citing Ness & Cottreau
1999); see also Kane Rep. at 10 (discussing Ness & Cottreau 1999 and its reporting
of inflammation of ovarian epithelium as a risk factor for ovarian cancer).) Dr.
Smith-Bindman 	also 	asserts 	that 	“[c]hronic 	inflammation, 	and 	even 	subtle,
subclinical inflammation, is associated with an increased risk of cancer.” (Smith-
Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 10 (citing, e.g., Balkwill & Mantovani 2001).)
Indeed, both Ness & Cottreau 1999 and Balkwill & Mantovani 2001
sufficiently support the scientific propositions for which they are used. Ness &
Cottreau 1999, entitled “Possible Role of Ovarian Epithelial Inflammation in
Ovarian Cancer,” synthesizes decades of epidemiologic and biological research to
advance 	the 	hypothesis 	that 	inflammation 	plays 	a 	central 	role 	in 	ovarian
carcinogenesis, while Balkwill & Mantovani 2001 revisits a hypothesis first
articulated in the nineteenth century by surveying extensive experimental and
clinical 	evidence 	linking 	inflammation 	to 	tumor 	initiation, 	promotion, 	and
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metastasis. Notably, this article documents that numerous chronic inflammatory
conditions are associated with increased cancer incidence and estimates that
approximately fifteen percent of cancers worldwide are attributable to chronic
infection and inflammation. (See generally Balkwill & Mantovani 2001.) Although
Defendants claim that Balkwill & Mantovani 2001 “is not focused on ovarian
cancer,” (see Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 37), the article expressly
identifies ovarian cancer as associated with inflammatory cofactors and details
ovarian-specific evidence. (See Balkwill & Mantovani 2001 at 539–40.)
Under 	Rule 	702, 	reliance 	on 	peer-reviewed 	synthesis 	literature 	to
contextualize and integrate primary findings is not methodologically improper,
particularly where, as here, the propositions drawn from those sources are well
supported by decades of scientific research and are not meaningfully disputed.
Plaintiffs’ experts accurately characterize these review articles, employ them for
limited and appropriate purposes, and situate them within a broader evidentiary
record that includes epidemiologic, mechanistic, and experimental studies—many
of which Defendants do not challenge. Accordingly, Defendants’ objection to the
experts’ use of these review articles does not undermine the reliability of their
methodologies or warrant exclusion.
Defendants next challenge “original research” that Plaintiffs’ experts relied
on 	to 	demonstrate 	an 	association 	between 	chronic 	inflammation 	and
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carcinogenicity.70 Defendants primarily highlight three studies— Buz’Zard 2007,
Trabert 2014, and Phung 2022—that they argue fail to provide a reliable basis for
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 37–40.)
Defendants contend that Buz’Zard 2007 undermines Plaintiffs’ experts’ causation
theories by showing decreases in indications of oxidative stress, cell proliferation,
and soft agar growth with talc exposure. (See id. at 37–38.) Defendants point out that
Trabert 2014 reports only weak biomarker associations that likely reflect chance
findings or reverse causation and do not withstand statistical correction. (See id. at
38–39.) Defendants go on to say that Phung 2022 does not support Plaintiffs’
experts’ inflammation-based mechanism because the study found no statistically
significant interaction between genital talc use and endometriosis. (See id. at 39–40.)
According to Defendants, these three studies fail to provide a reliable basis for
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions.
I will analyze each of the studies in turn within the context of the parties’
arguments. Buz’Zard 2007 tested whether talc exposure can induce pro-carcinogenic
changes in two human ovarian cell lines and whether Pycnogenol can mitigate those
changes. (See generally Buz’Zard 2007.) The authors exposed immortalized normal
70 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 37–39 (citing Amber R. Buz’Zard et al.,
Pycnogenol® Reduces Talc-Induced Neoplastic Transformation in Human Ovarian Cell Cultures,
21 Phytother. Res. 579–86 (2007) (“Buz’Zard 2007”); Trabert 2014; Minh Tung Phung et al.,
Effects of Risk Factors for Ovarian Cancer in Women With and Without Endometriosis, 118 Fertil.
& Steril. (5), 960–69 (2023) (“Phung 2022”)).)
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ovarian epithelial and immortalized normal ovarian granulosa cell lines to talc, or
pretreated with Pycnogenol and then talc, across different concentrations and timing
to assess cell viability, soft-agar growth as an in vitro transformation assay, and
reactive oxygen species generation. (See id.) The authors found that talc caused an
initial increase in cell viability of immortalized normal ovarian epithelial cells at 5
μg/mL at 24 hours, but a decrease at 200 μg/mL at 24 hours and 500 μg/mL at both
24 and 72 hours. (See id. at 580.) The authors also reported that talc caused an initial
increase in cell viability of immortalized normal ovarian granulosa at 5, 20, 50 and
100 μg/mL over 72 hours but decreased at 500 μg/mL over 24 hours. (See id. at 581.)
For soft-agar growth, the authors observed an increase in the number of transformed
colonies following talc exposure to immortalized normal ovarian epithelial cells at
5 and 20 μg/mL, and an increase in the same following talc exposure to immortalized
normal ovarian granulosa at 5, 20, and 100 μg/mL. (See id.) The authors noted an
“exception” to these results in 100 μg/mL talc treatment in immortalized normal
ovarian epithelial cells, which caused a significant reduction in the number of
transformed colonies. (See id.) Finally, the authors observed initial dose-dependent
decreases in reactive oxygen species in both cell lines but a subsequent rising at
different times under different doses. (See id. at 582.) Specifically, they observed
that talc caused an initial dose-dependent decrease at 24 hours for both human
ovarian cell lines, but an increase was observed at 20 μg/mL at 72 hours and 120
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hours, respectively, and 50 μg/mL at 120 hours, in immortalized normal ovarian
epithelial cells. (See id. at 582.) Similarly, the authors observed reactive oxygen
species increased at .5, 20, and 50 μg/mL at 72 hours and 120 hours, and at 5 and
100 μg/mL at 120 hours. (See id.)
In simpler terms, Buz’Zard 2007 demonstrates a positive correlation between
talc exposure to two human ovarian cell lines and increases in reactive oxygen
species generation over a longer period and greater dose. (See id. at 582.) 	The
authors opine, with scientific support, that reactive oxygen species “at high
concentrations or expressed in a chronic nature can damage cellular macromolecules
and contribute to neoplastic transformation and cell growth.” (Id. at 584.) Therefore,
the authors concluded, among other things, that talc may increase the likelihood of
ovarian cancer by causing abnormal reactive oxygen species—a by-product of
inflammation—and that Pycnogenol can blunt this effect in laboratory experiments.
(See Buz’Zard 2007 at 584, 586.) Furthermore, Buz’Zard 2007 shows a similarly
positive 	correlation 	between 	talc 	exposure 	and 	soft-agar 	growth 	and 	cell
proliferation, but only up to a certain point. (See id. at 581–82.)
Defendants contend that the paper does not reliably support Plaintiffs’
mechanism opinions because, among other things, in immortalized ovarian epithelial
cells, reactive oxygen species generally decreased with talc and cell proliferation
decreased at the highest dose. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 37–38
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(asserting that “almost every talc treatment in immortalized ovarian cells decreased
[reactive oxygen species] levels,” and noting that “[c]ell proliferation decreased at
the highest dose of talc treatment” (emphasis omitted).)71
First, Defendants selectively cite data from Buz’Zard 2007 for their argument
that the study does not support Plaintiffs’ position. Defendants emphasize that “talc
treatment in immortalized ovarian cells decreased” reactive oxygen species levels
but omit that this decrease was only observed at the lowest exposure amount of talc
and at the shortest exposure time. (Compare Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br.
at 38, with Buz’Zard 2007 at 582.) While Defendants focus on this early data point,
Plaintiffs 	focus 	on 	the time-course 	and 	overall 	pattern 	of the 	study, 	which
demonstrates a positive correlation between talc dose, time, and reactive oxygen
species generation. Similarly, Defendants highlight that cell proliferation “also
decreased at the highest dose of talc treatment” but fail to mention the increase in
cell viability observed at a lower dose. (Compare Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility
Br. at 38, with Buz’Zard 2007 at 582.)
Relatedly, Defendants ignore the practical significance of Buz’Zard 2007’s
findings of increased reactive oxygen species generation within the context of the
71 	Plaintiffs acknowledge this but argue that Defendants ignore findings that align with
Plaintiffs’ proposed mechanism; that the study shows time-dependent reactive oxygen species
increases in normal cells; and that the study reports increased anchorage-dependent growth in both
normal stromal and epithelial ovarian cells. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility
Br. at 46–47.)
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case. Plaintiffs here are long-term users of cosmetic talcum powder and not test tube
samples subject to mere hours of exposure. The purpose of Buz’Zard 2007,
according to the authors themselves, was to “investigate talc-induced carcinogenesis
and Pyc-induced chemoprevention.” (Buz’Zard 2007 at 579.) In doing so, the
authors found, among other things, that talc “increased proliferation, induced
neoplastic transformation and increased [reactive oxygen species] generation time-
dependently in the ovarian cells.” (Id.)
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ experts who rely on or refer to Buz’Zard 2007 do so
for the limited purpose of reiterating the study’s authors’ findings. Specifically,
Plaintiffs’ experts, including, without limitation, Drs. Levy, McTiernan, Plunkett,
and Cote, invoke Buz’Zard 2007 to support oxidative stress and transformation
mechanisms, and accurately characterize the study’s favorable results. (See Levy 2d
Amend. Rep. at 16 (“[Buz’Zard 2007] reported an increase in [reactive oxygen
species], increased cell proliferation, and neoplastic transformation (conversion into
cancerous cells) in human ovarian cells treated with talcum powder.”); McTiernan
3d Amend. Rep. at 91 (“Exposing human ovarian stroma; and epithelial cells to talc
resulted in increases reactive oxygen species (oxidative stress), cell proliferation and
neoplastic transformation of cells.”); Cote Amend. Rep. at 14 (“Buz’Zard [2007]
also noted in ovarian cancer cell lines that talc increased production of [reactive
oxygen 	species], 	which 	plays 	a 	role 	in 	the 	modulation 	of 	cell 	survival,
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differentiation, cell signaling, and inflammation-related factor production.”); see
also Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 27–28, 45, 55; Kane Rep. at 10.) These experts do
not extrapolate from the study opinions that the authors’ themselves fail to make. Of
course, Plaintiffs’ experts will have to explain certain of the inconsistent results
highlighted by Defendants, but at their core, Defendants’ challenges are against the
authors’ conclusions, which is an issue of weight and not admissibility.
For similar reasons, Defendants’ argument against Trabert 2014 and Phung
2022 do not undermine the reliability of Plaintiffs’ experts’ methodology or
opinions. Trabert 2014 measured 46 inflammation-related markers in stored blood
from women years before any cancer diagnosis and then asked who later developed
ovarian cancer. (See generally Trabert 2014.) The study found that women with
higher pre-diagnosis levels of markers had greater future ovarian cancer risk, with
two markers remaining associated even five or more years before diagnosis. (See id.)
Defendants argue that only three markers “showed association,” one of which had a
small sample size caution, and that applying stricter standards to account for false
positives would have likely nullified nominal findings, thus, providing for at most
slight evidence for inflammation as a causal pathway. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 38–39.) Again, Defendants narrowly interpret Trabert 2014’s
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findings, which strengthen the role of inflammation as a plausible mechanistic
pathway for ovarian cancer despite not involving a measurement of talc exposure.72
Phung 2022 conducted a pooled analysis of nine population-based case-
control studies in the Ovarian Cancer Association Consortium, using standardized
in-person or phone interviews and self-completed questionnaires to collect self-
reported endometriosis and risk factor data from 8,500 cases and 13,592 controls.
(See generally Phung 2022.) The study noted a p-for-interaction73 of 0.65, which
Defendants contend is indicative that the apparent difference in risk of endometriosis
was likely due to chance. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 39–40.) Yet
Phung 2022 concluded, among other things, that “[g]enital talc use was . . . positively
associated with risk for women with and without endometriosis, although its
magnitude seemed to be greater for women with than women without.” (Phung 2022
at 964; see also id. at 961 (same).) Plaintiffs’ experts rely on or refer to Phung 2022
for the proposition set forth by the authors of the study. (See, e.g., Cote Amend. Rep.
72 	Plaintiffs’ experts who reference Buz’Zard 2007 and Trabert 2014 do so not in isolation,
but in further support of their opinions regarding the association between chronic inflammation
and ovarian carcinogenicity. In other words, Plaintiffs’ experts do not rely solely on these studies
for support of the association. (See, e.g., Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 5–6; Kane Rep. at 10–
12; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 45, 50.) Thus, even if Buz’Zard 2007 and Trabert 2014 have little
value in supporting the experts’ biological plausibility opinions, Plaintiffs’ experts rely on other
reliable sources of support for the association between chronic inflammation and carcinogenicity,
as discussed herein.
73 	I take judicial notice that a “p-for-interaction” is an estimated measure used in comparing
three variables that quantifies whether an association between the exposure and outcome variables
is statistically different for different levels of the third variable measured. (See Jillian Cotter et al.,
How to Interact With Interactions: What Clinicians Should Know About Statistical Interactions,
13 Hospital Pediatrics (10), e319, e321 (Oct. 2023).)
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at 17; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 17.) Again, Defendants’ challenge is one to weight,
not admissibility, of the strength that Plaintiffs’ experts attribute to the study.
In sum, the experts’ reliance on these three studies does not warrant the
exclusion of their opinions that chronic inflammation may increase the likelihood of
ovarian cancer. Defendants’ challenges to them are essentially challenges to the
conclusions drawn by the authors’ of the respective studies and not attacks on the
studies’ respective methodologies or the methodologies of Plaintiffs’ experts. The
fact that parties or their experts disagree on how to interpret or apply an otherwise
peer-reviewed and published study does not render that study or the opinions
premised on that study inadmissible, see Karlo, 849 F.3d at 83 (explaining that
challenges to a study’s results or interpretation ordinarily goes to the weight of the
evidence and not the admissibility); Hemmings v. Tidyman’s, 285 F.3d 1174, 1188
(9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]n most cases, objections to the inadequacies of a study are more
appropriately considered an objection going to the weight of the evidence rather than
its admissibility.”); see also Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 01-5302, 2006
WL 3246605, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2006) (“[D]isagreements about the conclusions
to be drawn from a particular test affect the weight of a[n expert] report, not its
admissibility.”), so long as the conclusions drawn therefrom are reliable, supported,
and 	within 	the 	parameters 	drawn 	by 	the 	authors 	themselves, 	see 	In 	re
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Acetaminophen, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 353; In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1351;
McClain, 401 F.3d at 1247.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on anti-inflammatory
drug research is methodologically unreliable because the findings are mixed and
vary across drug classes and durations of use.74 Defendants also contend that the
experts “cherry-pick” favorable results while disregarding contrary data. (Defs.’
2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 40–41.) These arguments are unpersuasive.
Plaintiffs’ experts who reference anti-inflammatory drug research do so for the
limited and appropriate purpose of supporting the broader proposition that chronic
inflammation is implicated in ovarian carcinogenesis—not to establish a uniform or
definitive protective effect for any particular medication. (See, e.g., Wolf 3d Amend.
Rep. at 16.)
Despite 	Defendants’ 	assertions, 	the 	experts 	do 	not 	ignore 	conflicting
evidence. To the contrary, they expressly acknowledge that the literature concerning
anti-inflammatory drugs and cancer risk is mixed and, in some respects, inconsistent.
(See, e.g., Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16; Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 14 (“The earlier
74 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 40–41 (citing Britton Trabert et al., Analgesic
Use and Ovarian Cancer Risk: An Analysis in the Ovarian Cancer Cohort Consortium, 111 J. Nat’l
Cancer Inst. (2), 1–9 (2019) (“Trabert 2019”); Britton Trabert et al., Aspirin, Nonaspirin
Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drug, and Acetaminophen Use and Risk of Invasive Epithelial
Ovarian Cancer: A Pooled Analysis in the Ovarian Cancer Association Consortium, 106 J. Nat’l
Cancer Inst. (2), 1–11 (2014) (“Trabert 2014 II”); Lauren M. Hurwitz et al., Association of
Frequent Aspirin Use with Ovarian Cancer Risk According to Genetic Susceptibility, 6 JAMA
Netw. Open (2), 1–8 (2023) (“Hurwitz 2023”).)
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studies 	focusing 	on 	[nonsteroidal 	anti-inflammatory 	drugs] 	NSAIDs 	were
preliminary and results were somewhat inconsistent.”); Kane Rep. at 12 (recognizing
that 	while 	some 	studies 	suggest 	a 	protective 	effect, 	others 	do 	not).) 	This
acknowledgment 	of 	contradictory 	findings 	undermines, 	rather 	than 	supports,
Defendants’ claim of cherry-picking and reflects a balanced engagement with the
scientific record.
Moreover, the studies Defendants challenge are consistent with the experts’
limited use of this literature. Trabert 2014 II reported an association between regular
aspirin use and reduced ovarian cancer risk, while finding weaker or inconsistent
effects for non-aspirin NSAIDs and acetaminophen. Trabert 2019 similarly observed
a modest reduction in risk associated with daily aspirin use, alongside mixed
findings for long-term use of aspirin and other NSAIDs. More recently, Hurwitz
2023 associated frequent aspirin use with a modestly lower risk of several ovarian
cancer subtypes across varying levels of genetic risk. Taken together, these studies
support—among 	other 	studies 	relied 	upon—the 	experts’ 	conclusion 	that
inflammation plays a role in carcinogenesis, even if the magnitude and consistency
of risk modification vary by drug and usage pattern. Plaintiffs’ experts rely on this
body of literature in a circumscribed and appropriate manner, and their consideration
of mixed results does not render their methodologies unreliable under Rule 702.
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Fourth, Defendants’ seek to exclude those Plaintiffs’ experts who rely on
Harper/Saed 	2023. 	(See 	Defs.’ 	2024 	Biological 	Plausibility 	Br. 	at 	41–45.)
Defendants 	substantively 	challenge 	the 	study’s 	findings 	as 	flawed. 	(See 	id.)
Defendants 	further 	emphasize 	peer-reviewed 	criticisms 	of 	Harper/Saed 	2023
concerning the use of non-physiologic doses, non-tubal cells lines, flawed statistics,
and high seeding density. (See id.)
As discussed above, Harper/Saed 2023 describes an in vitro study that treated
human primary ovarian epithelial cells, ovarian epithelial cells, and primary
peritoneal fibroblast cells to talcum powder at 100 or 500 μg/mL for 72 hours, using
titanium dioxide as an inert particulate control. (See Harper/Saed 2023 at 150.) After
72 hours, the exposed cells were assessed with “a cell transformation assay,” and
transformation was confirmed by P53 and Ki-67 immunohistochemistry.75 (See id.
at 150, 154.) The authors reported a dose-dependent increase in transformed ovarian
epithelial cells for talcum powder, but no observed transformation in untreated
ovarian cells, titanium dioxide-treated ovarian cells, and talc-treated primary
fibroblasts. (See id.) Talc-treated ovarian cells showed a mutant-type p53 staining
pattern, and a rise in Ki-67 proliferation index, which the authors found consistent
75 	Dr. Smith-Bindman explains that “P53 gene codes for a protein that acts as a tumor
suppressor, which means that it regulates cell division by keeping cells from growing and dividing
too fast or in an uncontrolled way.” (Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 14.) Dr. Smith-Bindman
also describes Ki-67 as “a nuclear protein that is a market of active cell proliferation.” (Id.)
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with transformation. (See id. at 154.) From these results, the authors concluded that
“[e]xposure to talcum powder induces malignant transformation in ovarian epithelial
cells,” which they opine represents “a direct effect of talcum powder exposure that
is 	specific 	to 	normal 	ovarian 	cells 	and 	further 	supports 	previous 	studies
demonstrating an association between the genital use of talcum powder and an
increased risk of [ovarian cancer].” (See id. at 150, 154–56.)
Several of Plaintiffs’ experts accordingly refer to, or rely on, Harper/Saed
2023 	for 	the 	proposition 	that 	exposure 	to 	talcum 	powder 	causes 	malignant
transformation. (See, e.g., Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend Rep. at 6 (“Recently, Harper
and Saed also demonstrated that exposure to Johnson’s Baby Powder causes p53
mutations, 	cell 	proliferation 	and 	malignant 	transformation 	in 	normal 	ovarian
epithelial cells.”); McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 91 (“A recent study found that
talcum 	powder induced 	malignant 	transformation 	in 	normal 	primary 	ovarian
epithelial cells, in a dose-dependent manner.”); Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at
14 (describing Harper/Saed 2023 and its support with previous studies of talc
exposure inducing malignant transformation in normal human ovarian cells); Wolf
3d Amend. 	Rep. 	at 	16 	(“Harper 2023 	reported 	cell 	proliferation, 	neoplastic
transformation and p53 mutations when cells in culture were exposed to Johnson’s
Baby Powder”); see also Singh Supp. Rep. at 13.)
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At the outset, I acknowledge that Harper/Saed 2023 is not without substantive
criticism. But Defendants’ substantive challenges to Harper/Saed 2023 neither
render Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions unreliable nor the study itself inadmissible.
Substantively, Defendants claim that the study’s observation of malignant
transformation 	is 	incorrect, 	and 	that 	it 	is 	instead 	indicative 	of 	neoplastic
transformation. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 44–45.) They argue
that the study fails to report the dose of applied talc and only reports the
concentration of the solution. (See id. at 43 (citing Harper/Saed 2023 at 155).) They
also contend the authors selected cell models that are not the site of origin for a
common ovarian cancer subtype despite the availability of purportedly appropriate
cells. (See id. at 43–44.)
But at their core, Defendants’ substantive challenges are against the study’s
methodology and the authors’ conclusions, and not against Plaintiffs’ experts’
methodologies, conclusions, or the application of either to the facts of this case. This
is a fatal distinction, as the former improperly expands my limited role as gatekeeper
into a scientific factfinder. My role as Special Master under Daubert, as well as the
Court’s subsequent role under the same standard, is not to address or resolve
scientific disagreements. See Trs. of University of Pennsylvania v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
No. 15-cv-6133, 2022 WL 3973276, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2022) (“Although [a
study] may have flaws, ‘it is not the district court's role under Daubert to evaluate
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the correctness of facts underlying an expert’s testimony.’” (quoting i4i Ltd. P’ship
v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 856 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Defendants’ substantive
criticisms are more appropriate for cross-examination at trial, as they go toward the
weight of Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions premised on the study and not to the
admissibility of their opinions generally. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 83 (explaining that
challenges to a study’s results ordinarily goes to the weight of the evidence not the
admissibility).76
Second, Defendants highlight Harper/Saed 2023’s rejections from multiple
journals whose reviewers criticized it as substantively flawed in an attempt to further
discount the value of the study. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 41–
42.) As 	retold 	by 	Defendants 	and 	corroborated 	by 	the 	peer-reviewers’ own
correspondence with Dr. Saed, the study, as presented, did not meet publication
standards in the targeted journals. Across these journals, the consensus was that the
manuscript was premature and methodologically insufficient to support claims of
malignant transformation or human biological plausibility. Concerns in this regard
76 	For the avoidance of doubt, I find no evidence to suggest that the study’s methodology or
results cannot otherwise be trusted due to potential bias. Although Dr. Saed “has served as a paid
consultant and expert witness for the plaintiffs in the talcum powder litigation,” the “remaining
[six] authors have no potential conflicts of interest to report.” (Harper/Saed 2023 at 157.) 	The
study also concedes that a “portion of [Dr. Saed’s] time conducting this research was paid for by
the lawyers representing plaintiffs in the talcum powder litigation,” but that Dr. Saed “received no
financial support for the authorship or publication of” Harper/Saed 2023. (Id. (emphasis added).)
Dr. Saed’s research in this area spans years, and he is one of several authors who contributed to
the design, performance, and writing of this study. (See id. (noting authors’ contributions).)
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generally revolved around methodology, interpretation, relevance, and statistics. For
example, a reviewer from Gynecologic Oncology, a peer-reviewed medical journal,
primarily criticized on the study’s “reliance on a single commercial assay for
assessment of transformation that has not been established in the literature.” (See
ECF No. 033013-3 at SAED_SEPT222021_SUPPL_000069.) This reviewer called
the results “overinterpreted” due to, among other things, an insufficient correlation
to immunohistochemistry, questioned the clinical relevance “given the arbitrary dose
selection of talcum powder,” and faulted the study’s absence of statistical analysis
and insufficient particle characterization. (See id. at SAED_SEPT222021_SUPPL_
000069–70.) A different 	reviewer 	from 	PLOS 	One, 	a 	peer-reviewed 	journal
published by the Public Library of Science, wrote that the “authors’ conclusions
suggesting acute exposure of talc powder to ovary epithelial cells is associated with
ovarian cancer are outrageous and not supported by the manuscript’s data” “[b]ased
on the minimal amount of data provided in [the] manuscript.” (See ECF No. 033013-
3 at SAED_SEPT222021_SUPPL_000101.)
It is also worth noting that Dr. Jeff Boyd, a molecular geneticist and
gynecologic cancer researcher offered by Defendants to, among other things,
criticize Harper/Saed 2023, voiced credibility concerns surrounding the publication
of 	the 	article. 	(See 	generally 	ECF 	No. 	33060-5 	(“Boyd 	Rep.”).) 	Dr. 	Boyd
characterized Minerva Obstetrics & Gynecology, the English-language rebrand of
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the Italian journal Minerva Ginecologica that published Harper/Saed 2023, as an
extremely obscure journal and emphasized its low standing relative to leading outlets
in the field. (See Boyd Rep. at 14.)
Defendants’ emphasis on peer-review criticisms of Harper/Saed 2023 or on
the quality of Minerva Obstetrics & Gynecology does not render Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions 	regarding 	the 	association 	between 	talcum 	powder 	and 	cellular
inflammation and oxidative stress unreliable under Rule 702. I acknowledge that
prior to publication, Harper/Saed 2023 faced criticism during the peer-review
process and that the study is not without limitations. But, as discussed throughout
this Report and Recommendation, my gatekeeping role is to assess the reliability of
the experts’ methodologies in this case—not to adjudicate the merits, design, or
ultimate correctness of any individual peer-reviewed study.
To be sure, if a study on which experts rely was so fundamentally flawed as
to have no or little evidentiary value, reliance on that study could call into question
the reliability of the experts’ methodology overall. But “‘flaws in methodology’
uncovered by peer review do not necessarily equate to a lack of scientific validity,”
particularly where “the methods may be based on scientific principles and the
alleged flaws go merely to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence and the
testimony.” Bonds, 12 F.3d at 559. Harper/Saed 2023 is undisputedly a peer-
reviewed and published study and has therefore been subject to scientific scrutiny.
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Excluding expert testimony solely because an expert relies on or references a peer-
reviewed study that has drawn criticism would improperly elevate peer-review
disputes into dispositive admissibility barriers under Rule 702. Indeed, the converse
is also true: peer-review approval or general acceptance does not, standing alone,
establish methodological reliability. See In re Zantac, 644 F. Supp. 3d at 1172
(“[E]ven if general acceptance of the methodologies used in these two studies was
established, acceptance in the scientific community and peer review are not
necessarily sufficient to establish the reliability of a scientific methodology.”).
Accordingly, criticisms of Harper/Saed 2023 bear on the weight of the evidence and
the persuasiveness of the experts’ conclusions—not on the admissibility of their
opinions under Rule 702.
For further support, Defendants point to my prior ruling excluding then-expert
Dr. Saed’s opinion that talcum powder causes ovarian cancer, which I found to be
methodologically unreliable under Daubert. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility
Br. at 42–43 (citing In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 137).) In that ruling,
I also noted that reviewer feedback reinforced—but was not dispositive of—my
conclusion that Dr. Saed’s extrapolation from his in vitro work was unsupported and
that his methodology lacked sufficient reliability for presentation to a jury. In re
Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 137.
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The circumstances here are materially different. Plaintiffs do not now proffer
Dr. Saed as an expert witness. At the time of my prior ruling, Dr. Saed’s biological
plausibility and general causation opinions were premised largely, if not entirely, on
an in vitro study he conducted for purposes of the litigation. By contrast, Plaintiffs’
experts here do not premise their opinions on any single study, much less litigation-
generated 	research. 	Instead, 	they 	rely 	on 	a 	broad 	body 	of 	epidemiologic,
mechanistic, and biological literature, as well as case studies and review articles, to
support their opinions linking inflammation to cancer risk. Harper/Saed 2023 is cited
by Plaintiffs’ experts as one study among many, not as the exclusive or primary
foundation for their conclusions.
Finally, even if I were inclined to discount Harper/Saed 2023 and preclude
any discussion of the study, that preclusion would not justify excluding “any expert
who relies on the paper.” (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 42.) As noted
above, Plaintiffs’ experts cite Harper/Saed 2023 and other studies as evidence that
exposure and use of talcum powder may cause inflammation, oxidative stress, and
other biological mechanisms that prompt ovarian carcinogenesis. (See, e.g., Clarke-
Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 6; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 91; Smith-Bindman 3d
Amend. Rep. at 14; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16; Singh Supp. Rep. at 13.) Therefore,
the preclusion of Harper/Saed 2023, in light of Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance, would
not justify wholesale exclusion of Plaintiffs’ experts.
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Based on the foregoing, I find that Plaintiffs’ experts reasonably relied on
Harper/Saed 2023, together with other bodies of scientific evidence, and accurately
limited their extrapolation of that study’s conclusions in support of their opinions
regarding talc’s effects on cellular inflammation.
(3) 	Macrophage-impairment and ovarian cancer
Lastly, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ macrophage inhibition theory, which
purportedly is based on the results of two in vitro studies, i.e., Mandarino 2020 and
Emi 2021.77 Defendants generally contend that the data from these two studies does
not reliably support the theory that talc-induced inflammation or oxidative stress
impairs macrophage function in a manner relevant to ovarian carcinogenesis. (See
Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 4, 45–48.) Defendants maintain that
without a showing that talc can lead to malignant transformation of macrophages
(immune cells that can destroy cancer cells), discussion of any such impairment “is
irrelevant.” (Id. at 46.) Moreover, because the studies analyzed mice, Defendants
argue that the findings are even more limited than in vitro studies generally. (Id.)
They claim that Plaintiffs’ experts “entirely ignore” that the animal subjects were
treated with an “excessive” amount of estrogen—and that even under those “highly
77 	My prior Opinion did not consider this theory. I will therefore address it now. However, I
note that as with biological plausibility and other Bradford Hill factors, neither party squares their
arguments on Plaintiffs’ experts’ reports but instead largely debate the literature from which they
extrapolate their opinions. I will therefore briefly describe each study and refer to the few experts’
reports that discuss them.
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artificial conditions, the authors made no claims that any of the observed changes
were clinically significant.” (Id. at 46–47.) Defendants then conclude that despite
the studies “stopp[ing] well short of mechanistic conclusions,” the experts “exceed
the limitations the authors themselves placed on the stud[ies],” which demonstrates
their unreliability. (Id. at 47–48.)
Plaintiffs respond that Defendants’ argument on this point centers on two
isolated studies, even though the experts “do not rely on Mandarino [2020] or Emi
[2021] in isolation as a basis for a new theory of biological plausibility.” (Pls.’ Opp.
to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 52.) Plaintiffs emphasize that both
studies tested the effect of talc combined with estrogen “on reducing the anti-tumor
abilities of macrophages.” (Id. at 52–53.) They quote Emi 2021’s finding that in vitro
“exposure to . . . talc particles alone, and especially to a combination of talc with
oestrogen leads to substantial genome-wide gene expression changes,” while
Mandarino 2020 determined that “talc alone and especially in combination with
[estrogen] produced changes in gene expression [] may promote pro-tumorigenic
environment 	and 	less 	efficient 	surveillance 	(tumoricidal) 	activity 	of 	the
macrophages.” (Id. at 53 (quoting Emi 2021 at 1064 & Mandarino 2020 at 6).) They
cite Dr. Smith Bindman’s opinion that these “noted changes in expression of
macrophage genes are pertinent to cancer development.” (Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 53.)
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I will first summarize the two studies, both of which applied in vitro models
to test whether talc alters macrophage function in ways that could promote ovarian
cancer development, particularly in an estrogen-rich milieu. Mandarino 2020
exposed mouse macrophage lines to asbestos-free talc with or without estradiol, then
co-cultured these macrophages with murine ovarian surface epithelial cancer cells
for 72 hours. (See Mandarino 2020 at 3–6.) The researchers observed a range of
outcomes for the estradiol and talc combination treated cells, including (1) reactive
oxygen species generation and upregulation of gene clusters for the phagocytes,78
leading the authors to conclude that the combination “produced changes in gene
expression that may promote pro-tumorigenic environment and less efficient
surveillance (tumoricidal) activity of the macrophages”; and (2) a “microscopic
observation” that talc-treated MOSEC cells “appeared more fragile than any
controls,” i.e., that the combination of talc and estradiol “affected the macrophages
to permit higher MOSEC-GFP survival.” (Id. at 5–7.) As “the first study linking the
macrophage, talc particles and estrogen in a potential mechanism to explain the
effect of talc” on ovarian cancer, the authors emphasized that their “focus . . . was to
demonstrate whether talc is inert when phagocytized in high-estrogen milieu,”
78 	Phagocytosis 	is 	“the 	engulfing 	and 	usually 	the 	destruction 	of 	particulate 	matter
by phagocytes (e.g. macrophage cells) that serves as an important bodily defense mechanism
against infection by microorganisms and against occlusion of mucous surfaces or tissues by foreign
particles 	and 	tissue 	debris.” 	Phagocytosis, 	Merriam‑Webster.com 	Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/phagocytosis (last visited Jan. 10, 2026).
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concluding that “it is not inert”; they admittedly “did not investigate carcinogenic
properties of talc per se.” (Id. at 7, 9–10.) Additionally, the authors noted that one
limitation of the study was that it applied an estradiol dosage that was “likely at the
higher 	end 	of 	concentration 	ranges,” 	despite 	justifying 	same 	with 	the 	high
concentration within ovarian tissue that “may be an indication of why talc use is
associated with ovarian cancer rather than at other sites.” (Id. at 9.)
One year later, Emi 2021 profiled transcriptomic and epigenomic changes in
mice macrophages following 24-hour exposure to talc or the control substance
titanium dioxide, with or without estradiol. (See Emi 2021 at 1054.) The authors
tested some of the same cells with some of the same types of substances and formulas
as in Mandarino 2020. (Id.) The results showed that all of the talc combined with
estrogen samples “were most dissimilar with vehicle control samples,” while
samples consisting only of talc were similar to the talc-estrogen combination
samples. The authors concluded that “talc alone, and especially talc with oestrogen,
has induced the most changes in the dataset compared to vehicle control.” (Id. at
1055 (internal parentheticals omitted).) The authors also found that “approximately
10 times more genes were significantly different after talc and oestrogen exposure
vs. titanium dioxide and oestrogen when either was compared to the vehicle control.”
(Id. at 1056–57 (internal parentheticals omitted).) Their other methods of testing
produced similar results and assessments. (See id. 	at 1057–64.) The authors
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discussed the biological mechanism by which talc can enter the genital tract and that
“talc 	association 	was 	more 	apparent 	in 	premenopausal 	women 	and 	those
postmenopausal women who were taking oestrogen replacement therapy suggesting
higher oestrogen may fuel the pathogenesis.” (Id. 	at 1065.) After a lengthy
discussion of their epigenomic analysis, they emphasized that their study was “the
first to show that a single short-term exposure of microphages in vitro to particles
can be linked to epigenome-wide DNA methylation changes”—despite noting that
several of the effects were detected by both the talc and non-talc samples. (Id. at
1068.) They concluded that their findings and further hypotheses based on the talc
and titanium dioxide results “merits further testing.” (Id.)
As Defendants note, only a handful of Plaintiffs’ experts considered these
studies in their reports and depositions. (See generally Smith-Bindman 3d Amend.
Rep.; Smith-Bindman Dep.; Levy 2d Amend. Rep.; Singh Supp. Rep.; Plunkett 2021
Dep.) Although I do not find that the experts mischaracterized the two challenged
studies per se, I am not satisfied that the evidence they have provided meets the more
likely than not standard that Rule 702 demands.
The only expert that Plaintiffs cite in their response to Defendants’ argument
on this point is Dr. Smith-Bindman. In her report, the doctor accurately described
both Mandarino 2020 and Emi 2021. (See Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 14.)
However, after quoting Mandarino 2020’s methods and conclusions at length, she
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cursorily stated that based on the study, the finding that exposure to talc in a high-
estrogen environment can compromise macrophage function, “could apply in vivo
to exposure to talc.” (Id.) She not only provided no further explanation for why or
how she reaches that conclusion, but no citations to scientific literature supporting
this opinion. Based on Mandarino’s own conclusion that “further studies [are
needed] to elucidate [the observed mouse-based] mechanism,” (Mandarino 2020 at
1), I cannot find that Dr. Smith-Bindman applied a reliable methodology or
sufficiently sound basis in extrapolating the data in reaching her opinion on this
issue. See, e.g., Heller, 167 F.3d at 153 (The court “must examine the expert’s
conclusions in order to determine whether they could reliably follow from the facts
known to the expert and the methodology used.”). The same is true of Dr. Smith-
Bindman’s passing comment that Emi 2021’s discussion and analysis “provides
evidence of the impact of these particles for initiating cellular changes that would
lead to cancer.” (Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 14.) As to Emi 2021, she did
not even mention that the study was limited to mice—not human subjects—nor did
she link the study to ovarian cancer specifically. (Id.) This so-called analysis misses
the mark and fails to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard under Rule
702 to admit this portion of her opinion.
The other experts that Defendants cite in footnotes similarly fail to adequately
engage with the studies’ actual data and conclusions in arriving at their perfunctory
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statements on this potential biological mechanism. (See, e.g., Levy 2d Amend. Rep.
at 16 (neglecting to mention that the challenged studies were only conducted on
mice, then summarizing Mandarino’s study by saying it “show[ed] the pro-oxidant
effect of talc in a cell culture system,” the effects of which “were not observed” with
the control substances, adding that Emi 2021 made “[s]upporting observations”);
Singh Supp. Rep. at 22 (citing Emi for the proposition that studies have shown
talcum powder can induce malignant transformation “in normal human ovarian cell
lines,” 	without 	providing 	any 	explanation 	for 	such 	extrapolation 	from 	mice
subjects).) Indeed, Mandarino 2020 clearly stated that this was the first study of its
kind and that its “focus . . . was to demonstrate whether talc is inert when
phagocytized in high-estrogen milieu,” but it “did not investigate carcinogenic
properties of talc per se.” (Mandarino 2020 at 7, 9–10.) Emi 2021 also concluded
that their findings and further hypotheses based on the talc and titanium dioxide
results “merit[] further testing.” (Emi 2021 at 1068.) Where the Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions are based on a sum total of two animal studies in the last five years, which
both attested to needing further experimentation and evaluation to confirm whether
their hypotheses can be supported in humans, I do not find that they have sufficiently
met their burden under Rule 702 in this regard. See Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 266 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen an expert opinion is
based on data, a methodology, or studies that are simply inadequate to support the
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conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule 702 mandate the exclusion of that unreliable
opinion testimony.”).
For the avoidance of any doubt, I emphasize that my recommendation on this
sub-issue does not mean that I find an absence of biologically plausible mechanisms
connecting talcum powder to ovarian cancer. I simply find that the data upon which
the experts seek to rely in forming their opinions that talc-induced inflammation and
oxidative 	stress 	impairs 	macrophage 	function 	in 	a 	manner 	relevant 	to 	the
development of ovarian cancer is inadequate to support the conclusions they purport
to draw. My limited recommendation on this point determines only that, under my
charge under Rule 702, “there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data
and the opinion proffered” to support admission of these testimonies. Joiner, 522
U.S. at 146. I therefore find that Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions on the microphage
inhibition theory should be excluded as they only rely on the two studies Defendants
have challenged in their motion.
For the detailed reasons stated above, I recommend that the Court grant in part
and deny in part Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinions
Regarding 	Biological 	Plausibility/Mechanism. 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts’ 	opinions
regarding the plausibility of upward migration, as well as the association between
talcum powder and inflammation and oxidative stress, and association between
chronic inflammation and oxidative stress and ovarian carcinogenesis, are largely
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admissible by a preponderance of the evidence. As noted, I recommend that the
Court exclude Plaintiffs’ experts’ migration-via-inhalation theory and macrophage-
inhibition theory, as they respectively fail to satisfy the preponderance standard
under Rule 702 as amended. As for all of Plaintiffs’ experts and their respective
opinions, Defendants may, of course, cross-examine these experts to show that
particular studies are unreliable or that the experts have improperly derived opinions
from them.
v. 	The Remaining Bradford Hill Factors
I turn next to the remaining Bradford Hill factors—specificity, coherence,
analogy, experiment, and temporality.79
a. 	Specificity
“An association exhibits specificity if the exposure is associated only with a
single disease or type of disease.” Green at 605. While most agents do not cause a
wide variety of effects, id. at 605–06, Dr. Hill advised against overemphasizing the
importance of specificity because an agent may cause more than one disease, Hill at
297. This is especially true for agents that “are not in fact single agents but consist
of numerous harmful agents.” Green at 606. For example, cigarette manufacturers
79 	It bears noting that, notwithstanding Judge Shipp’s guidance, much of Defendants’
argument regarding the remaining Bradford Hill factors effectively seeks reconsideration of prior
rulings, which I will highlight, infra. Indeed, Defendants’ contentions rest largely on disagreement
with my earlier conclusions, and on these motions, such disagreement does not provide a proper
basis for revisiting those determinations, except to evaluate whether my prior 702 rulings comport
with Amended Rule 702.
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“long claimed that because cigarettes have been linked to lung cancer, emphysema,
bladder cancer, heart disease, pancreatic cancer, and other conditions, there is no
specificity and the relationships are not causal.” Id. As such, “whereas evidence of
specificity may strengthen the case for causation, lack of specificity does not
necessarily undermine it where there is a good biological explanation for its
absence.” Id.
In my 2020 Opinion, I explained that at the time, “[e]ach of Plaintiffs’ experts
found this factor to weigh in support of causation, but did not place significant
weight on the factor.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 180. For
example, Dr. Clarke-Pearson noted that the epidemiologic studies appear to be
specifically linking talc use to ovarian cancer, as opposed to other types of cancer;
Dr. Carson reasoned that compared to the typical incidence rate of ovarian cancer in
the general population of women, the research shows that the disease “occurs more
often in women who use talcum powder for hygienic purposes on a regular basis.”
Id. at 181. Defendants’ opposition then was based on “the undisputed fact that
ovarian cancer is not a single disease,” because there exist subtypes with different
risk factors and origins. Id. I concluded that the experts’ opinions rested on “good
grounds and considered scientific evidence” to find a specific association to ovarian
cancer, with a focus on epithelial ovarian cancer. Id. Despite there being “various
subtypes,” I found that 	Defendants 	failed 	to 	“sufficiently demonstrate[] that
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Plaintiffs’ findings are unreliable,” and further, that their disagreements with the
experts’ conclusions “is fodder for cross-examination and not exclusion under
Daubert.” Id.
Defendants present the same argument here, contending that “[t]he proposed
association in this litigation is highly unspecific because ovarian cancer is not a
single distinct disease; rather there are many different subtypes”; they suggest that
this is why “many of plaintiffs’ experts place little weight on the specificity factor.”
(Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 72–73.) They take particular issue with my
prior focus on epithelial and serous ovarian cancer because only two of the six
bellwether plaintiffs have that subtype. (Id. at 73–74.) And, they challenge certain
experts’ position that O’Brien 2024 supports a finding of specificity based on the
study’s conclusion that uterine and breast cancer were not associated with talc use,
claiming those outcomes are irrelevant to the question at hand.
Before addressing these points, I reiterate that Defendants advanced a
materially similar argument in the prior round of briefing. At that time, I concluded
that Defendants had “not sufficiently demonstrated” that the existence of ovarian
cancer subtypes rendered the experts’ methodologies unreliable. In re Johnson &
Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 181. Defendants have not identified any new evidence,
nor any change in the application of Rule 702, that would warrant departing from
that conclusion here.
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In any event, Defendants’ argument is founded on a generalized claim about
cancer subtypes, focusing on selective portions of the experts’ opinions. For
example, they critique Dr. Siemiatycki for ascribing less weight to this factor,
reasoning that he chose to do so post-hoc because the factor does not support his
position. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 73.) However, he in fact opined that
he de-emphasized this factor because in the sixty years since Bradford Hill
announced these criteria, it has become even more widely understood “that some
agents can indeed provoke multiple different pathologies.” (Siemiatycki 3d Amend.
Rep. at 74.) This accords with the Reference Manual excerpt cited above, as well as
Sir Bradford Hill’s own warning that “[w]e must not . . . over-emphasize the
importance of the characteristic,” because “multi-causation is generally more likely
than single causation.” Hill at 297.
Similarly, Dr. Siemiatycki explained that O’Brien 2024 is relevant not
because it reflects a process-of-elimination analysis, but because it bears on whether
the observed association between talc use and ovarian cancer is specific rather than
the product of a generalized reporting bias. (Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 54–55.)
O’Brien 2024 found no association between talc use and either uterine or breast
cancer. (O’Brien 2024 at 13.) While that absence may, in a limited sense, be viewed
as consistent with the Bradford Hill concept of specificity, Dr. Siemiatycki placed
greater emphasis on the implications of those findings for evaluating recall bias.
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(Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 55.) Relying on the accompanying editorial by
Harris 2024, he explained that uterine cancer—like ovarian cancer—is a malignancy
of the reproductive system and relies on similar self-reported exposure histories. (Id.
(citing Harris et al., Epidemiologic Methods to Advance Our Understanding of
Ovarian Cancer Risk, 42 J. Clin. Oncol. (22) 2619 (May 15, 2024).) If ovarian
cancer cases were systematically over-reporting talc exposure, one would reasonably
expect a comparable association to appear among uterine cancer cases as well. (Id.)
The absence of such an association therefore weighs against recall bias as a
nonspecific explanation and supports the inference that the talc–ovarian cancer
association is disease-specific. (Id. at 54–55.)
This reasoning does not rest on the mere absence of associations with other
cancers, but on a comparative assessment of how potential reporting biases would
be expected to manifest across related outcomes. Other experts applied similar logic
in their analyses. (See, e.g., McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 54; Cote Amend. Rep. at
36; Moorman 2d Supp. Rep. at 9 (also addressing analogous considerations with
respect 	to 	douching).) 	I 	find 	no 	basis 	to 	conclude 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts’
methodologies 	regarding 	specificity 	are 	unreliable 	or 	unreliably 	applied;
specifically, I find that their methodologies evince extrapolations that are adequately
supported by the existing data. To the extent Defendants dispute the experts’
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ultimate conclusions, which are supported by their analyses, those disagreements
may be explored through cross-examination at trial.
b. 	Coherence
The coherence factor ensures that the observed association does “not seriously
conflict with the generally known facts of the natural history and biology of the
disease.” Hill at 298.
In my prior Opinion, I summarized Defendants’ three arguments on this
factor: (1) there exist subtypes of ovarian cancer and “the notion that talc would
cause all of them is incoherent”; (2) no animal studies have shown that talc causes
ovarian cancer; and (3) the experts failed to account for studies investigating talc
powder in conjunction with diaphragms or condoms that show no increased risk of
ovarian cancer. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 182. Plaintiffs
responded then that observational studies “are long enough to account for the
development of ovarian cancer,” and that the existing biologic evidence was
consistent with the mechanics of the disease. Id. When evaluating the parties’
arguments, I noted that to assess coherence, the experts “examined generally known
facts regarding inflammation and cancer, and opined that these facts are coherent
with their theory that talc, which may contain carcinogens, can inflame epithelial
cells resulting in cancer.” Id. at 182–83. As with the specificity factor, I did not find
the fact that different types of ovarian cancer exist, to “undermine the experts’
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opinion on this factor.” Id. at 183. I explained why I found Defendants’ arguments
to “merely show disagreement with the conclusion on coherence drawn by the
causation 	experts,” 	rather 	than 	with 	their 	methodology, 	because 	the 	experts
considered the same studies that Defendants raised, but rather “interpreted [them]
differently.” Id. (emphasis added). “Importantly,” I concluded, “Defendants do not
dispute the known fact about the link of cellular inflammation to cancers in general,
which is the basic premise of the experts’ opinion on coherence,” but instead
challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ interpretations based on the data, which goes to weight
rather than admissibility. Id. (internal citation omitted).
On this motion, Defendants first argue that population-level trends undermine
Plaintiffs’ theory of coherence, pointing to declining ovarian cancer incidence rates
between 1990 and 2019, including periods during which talcum powder products
remained on the market. In their view, this trend renders it “incoherent to suggest
that talc causes cancer.” (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 76.) They also note
that perineal talc use has been reported as more prevalent among African-American
women, while ovarian cancer incidence rates in that population are comparatively
lower—an observation they contend is inconsistent with talc being a causal factor.
(Id. at 76–77.) Relatedly, Defendants emphasize testimony from Dr. Clarke-Pearson
acknowledging that talc is not “‘the only cause of ovarian cancer,’” which they argue
further undermines Plaintiffs’ theory. (Id. (quoting ECF No. 33118-9 (“Clarke-
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Pearson Dep.”) at 134:3–136:9).) Finally, Defendants assert that although several of
Plaintiffs’ experts assign “considerable weight” to the coherence factor, those
experts do not adequately reconcile their opinions with the epidemiologic and
demographic data Defendants highlight. (Id. at 77.) According to Defendants, the
experts instead conflate coherence with biological plausibility, relying on what
Defendants characterize as untested and speculative hypotheses regarding the
mechanisms by which talc could cause ovarian cancer. (Id. at 77–78.)80
I begin by noting, as Dr. Hill himself emphasized, that coherence requires
only that the proposed causal association “not seriously conflict with the generally
known facts of the natural history and biology of the disease.” Hill at 298. Based on
my review of the record, Plaintiffs’ experts have applied that standard in a
methodologically sound manner.
Dr. 	Singh, 	for 	example, 	explained 	that 	recent 	epidemiologic 	studies
demonstrate an 	increased 	risk of ovarian 	cancer among women 	with patent
80 	Defendants also take issue with my prior reasoning that “whether a plaintiff’s ovarian
cancer is caused by genetic mutations or use of talc[] is a question of specific causation.” (Defs.’
2024 General Causation Br. at 75 n.178.) They say that the absence of evidence tying talc to genetic
mutations “underscores the incoherence between the proffered theory of general causation and
what is known about ovarian cancer.” (Id.) But Defendants’ argument here is misplaced because
Plaintiffs’ theory rests on the claim that talc (along with its constituents) directly cause cancer—
separate and apart from any possibility that genetic mutations can independently cause ovarian
cancer. I therefore reiterate that Defendants’ argument does not undermine Plaintiffs’ experts’
general causation opinions. For further explanation of Plaintiffs’ theory regarding inflammation
causing cell damage, as opposed to ovarian cancer stemming from genetic mutations, I refer to my
prior discussion on the biological plausibility factor. (See supra Part V.C.2.iv.)
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reproductive tracts, consistent with earlier findings, as well as a higher risk among
women with endometriosis, an inflammatory condition. (Singh Rep. at 22–23.) He
concluded that these observations are coherent with an association between talc use
and ovarian cancer because inflammation is a biologically recognized mechanism
relevant to carcinogenesis in this context, and he therefore accorded this factor
significant weight. (Id.; see also Singh Supp. Rep. at 6 (explaining that O’Brien
2024’s finding that ovarian cancer risk was highest among women in their twenties
and thirties is coherent with known disease biology and patterns of genital talc use).)
(See supra Part V.C.2.iv.)
Dr. McTiernan likewise recognized that increased inflammation has been
associated with ovarian cancer risk and that talc and other components of talcum
powder products elicit inflammatory responses in tissues where talc has been
detected, including the ovary. (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 101.) At the same
time, she explained that broader population-level trends—such as changes over time
in oral contraceptive use, hysterectomy and tubal ligation rates, and obesity
prevalence—complicate efforts to isolate temporal coherence, and she therefore
assigned this factor comparatively less weight. (Id. at 32–33; see also Siemiatycki
3d Amend. Rep. at 22–23 (drawing similar comparisons in other disease contexts).)
Other 	experts 	treat 	coherence 	as 	closely 	overlapping 	with 	biological
plausibility, 	as 	Defendants 	themselves 	acknowledge. 	(Defs.’ 	2024 	General
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Causation Br. at 77–78; see, e.g., Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 38; Cote
Amend. Rep. at 38; Moorman Rep. at 37–38.) Indeed, some formulations of the
Bradford Hill framework describe biological plausibility as coherence with existing
scientific knowledge. Green at 600. It is therefore appropriate to consider these
factors in tandem, and as such, I incorporate my discussion of biological plausibility,
supra Part V.C.2.iv, into my analysis of coherence.
Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, coherence does not require talc to be the
sole cause of ovarian cancer. The inquiry is whether the proposed association
seriously 	conflicts 	with 	established 	biological 	understanding—not 	whether
alternative 	causal 	pathways 	exist. 	Accordingly, 	Dr. 	Clarke-Pearson’s
acknowledgment that talc is not the only cause of ovarian cancer does not support a
finding of incoherence. The same is true of Defendants’ reliance on declining
ovarian cancer incidence rates during periods when talcum powder products
remained on the market. While such trends may be an appropriate subject for cross-
examination, they do not, standing alone, render the experts’ coherence analyses
methodologically unreliable. As the Rule 702 gatekeeper, I may not substitute
population-level observations selectively emphasized by one party for the experts’
scientific analyses; that task belongs to the factfinder.
Finally, I do not find any methodological infirmity in the fact that different
experts assign differing weight to the coherence factor. So long as those differences
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are supported by empirically grounded reasoning, the relative emphasis placed on
this criterion is a matter for the jury to assess. Indeed, as the Rule 702 advisory
committee notes explain, the experts’ varied evaluations of the same body of data
may assist the factfinder by framing competing interpretations at trial. Regardless of
the weight that each Plaintiffs’ expert ascribed to this factor in their individualized
analyses, 	my 	role 	is 	to 	determine 	whether 	they 	faithfully 	applied 	reliable
methodologies to arrive at their conclusions that this factor is satisfied. I find that
they did. To the extent Defendants wish to question any experts on how and why
their colleagues weighted this factor differently, that is appropriate fodder for cross-
examination.
c. 	Analogy
Dr. Hill in his 1965 article provides little guidance with respect to this factor,
simply stating: “In some circumstances it would be fair to judge by analogy.” Hill at
299. Courts have interpreted this factor to mean that “causal inference is supported
where 	relationships 	similar 	to 	the 	putative 	causal 	relationships 	have 	been
substantiated.” In re Acetaminophen, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 337.
In my prior Opinion, I noted that the proffered experts compared the
relationship between talc and ovarian cancer to that between asbestos and the
development of ovarian and lung cancer. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d
at 184. I also noted that the experts did not weigh this factor heavily. Id. Nonetheless,
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I explained that “[t]here is no dispute that asbestos is carcinogenic” and therefore “it
is not unreliable for the experts to opine that because asbestos has been found in talc,
it 	can 	similarly 	cause 	ovarian 	cancer.” 	Id. 	Defendants 	found 	this 	analogy
“inappropriate,” because the asbestos mineral most associated with ovarian cancer
(i.e., crocidolite) has not been found in talc powder products. Id. at 184–85.
However, I “reiterate[d] that crocidolite is in the same family as the types of asbestos
(anthophyllite and tremolite) that were found in talc—amphibole asbestos”—all of
which are regulated. Id. at 185. I emphasized that the purpose of this factor is to
“compare the causal association at issue to other similarly known causative
relationships,” not to “prove causation.” Id. I therefore explained that the comparison
the experts made between asbestos and talc was “based on these minerals’ tendency
to 	cause 	inflammation, 	which 	could 	lead 	to 	carcinogenesis,” 	and 	that 	this
comparison was more likely than not reliable under Rule 702. Id.
Defendants incorporate by reference their Motion to Exclude Asbestos-
Related Opinions to challenge the experts’ assertions that “asbestos—at least at
levels below heavy occupational exposure—causes ovarian cancer,” to form their
argument that my prior Opinion should not be followed. (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 78.) They rehash their argument that asbestos and talc are “distinct
minerals 	with 	distinct 	chemical 	structures 	and 	morphology,” 	challenging 	the
experts’ “conclusory opinions” which, they say, “fail to . . . suggest what particular
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qualities of asbestos that make it dangerous are ostensibly shared by talc.” (Id. at
79.)
In this portion of their argument, Defendants do not cite to any new law aside
from a parenthetical about a case I have already addressed, In re Acetaminophen,
nor to any “new science” since my prior Opinion. Indeed, their argument squares on
the same claims I previously considered—albeit without any new reasoning upon
which I must depart from my decision. I have already explained my finding that the
“particular qualities of asbestos” that Plaintiffs’ experts invoke in support of their
analogy here, (id.), relate to their “tendency to cause inflammation, which could lead
to carcinogenesis,” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 185. (See, e.g.,
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 33, 102 (linking increased inflammation with
carcinogenesis, analogizing to talc causing an inflammatory response in the ovaries);
Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 75 (same, acknowledging that this is “a more tenuous
aspect” than the prior factors); Cote Amend. Rep. at 38 (same, affording this “a low
factor in assessment of causality”); Moorman Rep. at 38 (same); Wolf Rep. at 20
(same).) Finally, to the extent Defendants’ arguments here overlap with their
Asbestos-Related Motion, I incorporate by reference my discussion of that issue
here. (See infra Part VI.A.1.)
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d. 	Experiment
Dr. Hill explained that, in limited circumstances, it may be “possible to appeal
to experimental, or semi-experimental, evidence.” Hill at 298. By way of example,
he noted that where an association has been observed, a reduction in exposure
followed by a corresponding decrease in disease incidence may support a causal
inference. Id. Such evidence, where available, may therefore inform the causation
analysis.
In my prior Opinion, I addressed Defendants’ contention that there was “no
reliable support” for Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions under this factor, while recognizing
that the experts “generally did not afford this factor great weight because of the
ethical implications” associated with conducting a randomized trial on talc exposure
and ovarian cancer. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 184. I further noted
that the experts nonetheless referenced in vitro and animal studies in support of their
opinions, and concluded that Defendants’ objections—that contrary experimental
studies 	undermined 	causation—presented 	issues 	of 	weight 	for 	the 	jury, 	not
admissibility. Id.
Defendants now observe that some experts conclude this factor is not
satisfied, while others do not address it at all. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at
80.) They again argue that Plaintiffs’ experts selectively rely on certain experimental
data while disregarding other studies. (Id.) As before, however, Defendants identify
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no intervening scientific developments or changes in governing law that would
warrant revisiting my prior analysis of this factor. Moreover, Hill himself cautioned
that experimental evidence is only “[o]ccasionally” available in observational
settings. Hill at 298. Consistent with that understanding, the Reference Manual does
not include this factor in its articulation of the Bradford Hill considerations. See
Green at 600–06. Where Plaintiffs’ experts did engage with this factor, they
explained that a randomized trial would be unethical because genital talcum powder
use may pose a risk of harm. (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 101–02; see also Singh
Supp. Rep. at 23; Cote Amend. Rep. at 38.) That explanation is consistent with
accepted scientific practice and does not reflect a methodological deficiency.
Because this is not a motion for wholesale reconsideration, and Defendants
have not identified any basis under Judge Shipp’s Order requiring a renewed finding,
I decline to revisit this issue. To the extent the parties dispute how particular
experimental or semi-experimental studies should be weighed, those disagreements
concern evidentiary weight and are properly presented to the jury. My role as the
Rule 702 gatekeeper is limited to determining whether the experts have reliably
applied their methodologies, and whether their resulting opinions more likely than
not are supported by those methodologies, which I find they have done here.
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e. 	Temporality
This factor poses a straightforward—though not always simple—question:
“which is the cart and which the horse?” Hill at 297. As the Reference Guide
explains, “[a] temporal, or chronological, relationship must exist for causation to
exist.” Green at 601. Put differently, “[i]f an exposure causes disease, the exposure
must occur before the disease develops”; if the exposure occurs after disease
development, it cannot be causal. Id.
In my prior Opinion, I noted that Plaintiffs’ experts assigned significant
weight to temporality based on evidence indicating that talc exposure generally
precedes the onset of ovarian cancer. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at
181. Defendants responded that this chronology was “unremarkable,” given that talc
use often begins in early adulthood while ovarian cancer is typically diagnosed later
in life. Id. I concluded that “[b]oth positions are true,” and that the proper weight to
assign this factor was a matter for the factfinder, as Defendants’ objection reflected
scientific disagreement rather than a methodological flaw. Id.
Defendants now reprise that argument, asserting that the experts’ assignment
of “high weight” to the temporality factor is inappropriate. (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 80–81.) They further argue that the inquiry should focus on disease
development rather than diagnosis and contend that, given ovarian cancer’s long
latency period, disease onset may precede talc exposure in some women. (Id. at 81–
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82.) In support, they cite testimony acknowledging the difficulty of pinpointing
temporality where latency periods are extended. (Id.)
As with several other Bradford Hill factors, Defendants do not identify any
intervening scientific developments or changes in governing law that would call for
reconsideration of my prior ruling. Instead, their argument focuses primarily on the
degree 	of 	weight 	certain 	experts 	assign 	to 	temporality, 	rather 	than 	on 	any
unreliability in the methodologies used to evaluate it. (Id. at 80–82.) For example,
Defendants 	criticize 	Dr. 	Smith-Bindman 	for 	describing 	temporality 	as 	an
“important” consideration, but do not identify any methodological deficiency in her
analysis. (Id. at 80 n.194.) In fact, Dr. Smith-Bindman expressly addressed the
concern of reverse causality—where behavior is influenced by disease-related
symptoms—and explained why it does not meaningfully affect the epidemiologic
studies at issue. Specifically, she noted that most case-control studies asked
participants to report only past, not current, talc use, and that cohort studies
necessarily assessed exposure among women who had not yet been diagnosed with
ovarian cancer. (Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 37; see also Moorman Rep. at
29.)
It may be true, as Defendants argue, that such data cannot conclusively
establish that talc exposure preceded the earliest biological development of ovarian
cancer rather than its diagnosis. But that limitation is inherent in the study of diseases
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with long and uncertain latency periods and does not render the experts’ analyses
methodologically unsound. As several experts acknowledged, temporality can be
difficult 	to 	determine 	with 	precision 	in 	this 	context, 	yet 	the 	available 	data
consistently 	indicate 	that 	reported 	talc 	exposure 	preceded 	disease 	onset 	as
understood in epidemiologic practice. (See, e.g., Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 21,
103 (Table 13); McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 60–61.) Notably, O’Brien 2024
attempted to address latency concerns by collecting data on talc use beginning at
very young ages, including ages 10 to 13. (O’Brien 2024 at 3–4.)
In the context of my gatekeeping role, it is not within my purview to determine
whether 	the 	temporal 	relationship 	between 	talc 	and 	ovarian 	cancer 	indeed
demonstrates that the former causes the latter. Instead, my role is simply to assess
whether the Plaintiffs’ experts have reliably described, analyzed, and extrapolated
from the relevant data to opine as they propose to testify at trial. I find that they have.
On the temporality factor, Plaintiffs’ experts have again satisfied their burden, by a
preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence, 	to 	offer 	opinions 	grounded 	in 	reliable
methodologies; drawing conclusions that are adequately supported by the data and
consistent with existing scientific knowledge; while appropriately accounting for the
limitations inherent in latency-based disease research. I see no basis to depart from
my prior conclusion that the remaining disputes concerning temporality concern the
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Those issues are properly
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reserved for the factfinder, particularly where Defendants have not presented any
new evidence that “directly contradict[s] or challenge[s]” my 2020 findings on this
factor. (Apr. 30, 2024 Memorandum Order at 5.)
For these reasons, I recommend that the Court find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Plaintiffs’ experts have reliably applied the Bradford Hill framework
in assessing general causation. The experts reviewed the relevant scientific literature,
addressed 	limitations 	and 	sources 	of 	uncertainty, 	and 	articulated 	reasoned
explanations for how they weighed each factor in reaching their conclusions. To the
extent Defendants challenge the experts’ conclusions or the relative weight assigned
to particular Bradford Hill factors, those arguments reflect disputes over evidentiary
weight rather than methodological reliability. Such disagreements are fodder for
cross-examination and competing expert testimony, but not for exclusion under Rule
702.
6. 	Asbestos
In addition to their General Causation motion papers, Defendants also move
to 	exclude 	the 	opinions 	of 	sixteen 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts 	who, 	according 	to
Defendants, “piggyback off of Drs. Longo and Rigler’s testing and opine that the
alleged asbestos in cosmetic talc causes ovarian cancer.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83.)
In my prior Opinion, I considered this issue within the scope of the “analogy” factor
under the Bradford Hill analysis. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 184–
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85. I explained that “[t]here is no dispute that asbestos is carcinogenic,” and that
IARC has classified the types of asbestos that had been found in talc (anthophyllite
and tremolite) with the type that Defendants argue the literature shows can cause
ovarian cancer (crocidolite). Id. As discussed below, Defendants raise similar
arguments in the context of their Motion to Exclude Asbestos-Related Opinions.
(See Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 88–93.) Therefore, due to the importance of this issue
and for the parties’ and the Court’s benefit, I will provide a fulsome review of the
evidence and arguments in this Report and Recommendation. Accordingly, this
portion of the Report and Recommendation applies as well to the three experts who
have not issued new reports since the prior round of motion practice—Drs. Carson,
Kane, and Smith. (See Carson Rep.; Kane Rep.; Smith Rep.) I further note that, in
support of their asbestos-related motion, Defendants attach the reports of the
remaining thirteen challenged experts that predate the 2024 supplemental reports
many of those experts later issued addressing general causation and the Bradford
Hill factors. (See Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83 n.212.) Plaintiffs do not attach the
experts’ 2024 supplemental reports to their Opposition. Accordingly, for purposes
of this portion of the Report and Recommendation, I limit my analysis to the expert
reports submitted by Defendants in support of the asbestos motion.81
81 	Defendants also challenge Dr. Godleski’s case-specific expert reports for the Newsome and
Gallardo Plaintiffs, which I do not address here. (See Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83 n.212.)
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The sum total of what Defendants seek to exclude is the Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions that asbestos can cause ovarian cancer. Specifically, Defendants argue that
I should exclude such opinions because (1) the studies that the experts rely on to
demonstrate an association with ovarian cancer are “confounded by peritoneal
mesothelioma diagnoses,” (2) the literature “does not support an association between
asbestos and ovarian cancer at the levels described by Dr. Longo and Dr. Rigler,”
and (3) the studies the experts rely on involve a different type of asbestos
(crocidolite) than that detected in talc (chrysotile and non-crocidolite amphibole
types). (Id. at 88–93.) In support of their mesothelioma confounding claim, they
reason that Reid 201182 and Slomovitz 202183 explained that “until very recently
peritoneal 	mesothelioma 	was 	often 	misdiagnosed 	as 	ovarian 	cancer,” 	which,
according to Defendants, “rais[es] a significant likelihood that the ovarian cancer
cases associated with occupational asbestos exposure in prior studies were actually
cases of mesothelioma.” (Id. at 88–89 (internal quotation marks omitted).)
Next, Defendants emphasize that most of the studies Plaintiffs’ experts cite
examined “high levels of occupational exposure to the most potent forms of
asbestos,” which are “not remotely comparable” to the low levels of asbestos Drs.
82 	Allison Reid et al., Does Exposure to Asbestos Cause Ovarian Cancer? A Systematic
Literature Review and Meta-Analysis, 20 Cancer Epidemiol. Biomarkers & Prev. (7), 1287 (2011)
(ECF No. 33016-34 (“Reid 2011”)).
83 	Brian Slomovitz et al., Asbestos and Ovarian Cancer: Examining the Historical Evidence,
31 Int’l J Gynecol. Cancer (1), 122 (2021) (ECF No. 33017-7 (“Slomovitz 2021”)).
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Longo and Rigler detected in Defendants’ talcum powder products—arguing that
“[c]ourts routinely reject” those types of analogies. (Id. at 89 & n.229 (collecting
cases), 90.) They add that the studies of “non-occupational environmental exposure
to asbestos have not found a statistically significant association” to ovarian cancer.
(Id. at 90–91 (emphasis omitted).) Finally, they assert that the studies Plaintiffs’
experts invoke “primarily involve exposure to large amounts of crocidolite asbestos,
which is not alleged to be a contaminant of talc.” (Id. at 91.)
Plaintiffs respond that major regulatory and health bodies—including IARC,
the NCI, the EPA, and the multi-agency IWGACP—recognize asbestos as a human
carcinogen 	that 	causes 	ovarian 	cancer 	without 	confining 	that 	conclusion 	to
occupational settings, and that IARC’s 2012 evaluation (reaffirmed in 2024) applies
to all six asbestos fiber types and expressly encompasses talc containing asbestiform
fibers.84 (Pls.’ Asbestos Br. at 76–77, 87–90.) Plaintiffs quote extensively from
84 	Defendants also move to exclude certain Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions on the ground that
elongated non-asbestiform talc fibers—which Defendants label “fibrous talc”—cannot cause
cancer. (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 97–102.) The record, however, does not support Defendants’
characterization of Plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony. The terminology used by the parties and experts
warrants clarification. Defendants use the term “fibrous talc” to refer to talc fibers that are non-
asbestiform and, in their view, distinct from asbestos. Plaintiffs’ experts, by contrast, use the term
“fibrous talc” to denote talc that occurs in an asbestiform habit—that is, asbestiform talc. As
reflected in the scientific literature, “fibrous talc” is not a term of art with a single meaning and
may be used to describe talc that occurs either in an asbestiform or non-asbestiform habit. This
distinction is critical to understanding the scope of the opinions at issue. Relying on IARC’s
classifications, Plaintiffs’ experts opined that exposure to asbestos and to asbestiform talc can
cause ovarian cancer. (See, e.g., Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br. at 77 (citing IARC 2012’s conclusion that
exposure to asbestos of six fiber types and to asbestiform talc causes ovarian cancer); see also,
e.g., McTiernan Rep. at 10; Wolf Rep. at 76.) A review of the expert reports and deposition
testimony demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ experts consistently confined their opinions to asbestiform
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IARC Monographs vol. 100C to demonstrate that the agency “considered all
published 	occupational 	exposure 	studies 	and 	non-occupational 	environmental
studies” to arrive at its conclusion that “‘a causal association . . . was clearly
established.’” (Id. at 78–79 (quoting IARC 2012 at 256).) Plaintiffs reason that the
sources their experts cite “considered the genital application of talcum powder as a
primary route of asbestos exposure for the general population,” referring specifically
to “dermal contact (i.e. through perineal application of talcum powders),” and did
not limit their findings to only heavy occupational exposure, although “they clearly
could have done so” if that was the authors’ intention. (Id. at 79 (quoting IARC 2012
at 232).) They further add that the FDA, NCI, and EPA also do not “limit their
conclusions . . . to occupational exposure,” again, despite recognizing that the
majority of the relevant data studied that type of exposure. (Id. at 80–82.)
Plaintiffs also dispute Defendants’ contention that “the amount of exposure is
negligible” in the bellwether cases, reiterating that those individual plaintiffs “used
and applied Johnsons Baby Powder and/or Shower to Shower in their genital area
daily for decades.” (Id. at 83–84.) Rejecting Defendants’ mesothelioma confounder
argument, they add that IARC considered and largely discounted misdiagnosis as an
talc and did not define “fibrous talc” as elongated, non-asbestiform talc fibers. (See, e.g.,
McTiernan Rep. at 10 (“Talc fibers grown in an asbestiform habit are often referred to as ‘fibrous
talc.’”); Plunkett Rep. ¶ 101 (noting that fibrous talc contains “asbestiform fibers”).) Because these
experts’ opinions are limited to asbestiform talc and those opinions reliably flow from IARC’s
similar treatment of asbestos and talc grown in an asbestiform habit, Defendants’ argument is
premised in part on a terminological mismatch rather than a substantive disagreement.
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explanation, and that more recent meta-analyses (e.g., Kim 202385; Turati 202386)
report statistically significant associations and conclude that misclassification
cannot explain the excess risk. (Id. at 84–87.)
I begin 	by 	reviewing the scientific literature that 	the parties 	interpret
differently, focusing on the studies to which they devote substantive discussion. In
doing 	so, 	I 	note 	that 	the 	parties’ 	dispute 	centers 	primarily 	on 	competing
interpretations of what those studies examined and what conclusions may properly
be drawn from them. Defendants do not meaningfully challenge—indeed, largely do
not address—the methodologies employed by Plaintiffs’ experts, which is the core
inquiry in my gatekeeping role under Rule 702. Instead, Defendants contend that the
scientific literature, properly understood, supports their position. Absent a showing
of methodological deficiencies—such as the improper derivation of conclusions
from the cited studies—that would render Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions unreliable or
insufficient 	to 	satisfy 	the 	preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence 	standard, 	such
disagreements concerning interpretation and evidentiary weight are matters for the
jury, not grounds for exclusion.
The summaries of the relevant studies are as follows:
85 	Seo Young Kim et al., 15 Asbestos Exposure and Ovarian Cancer: A Meta-analysis (1)
Saf. Health Work (2023) (ECF No. 33132-12 Ex. 91) (“Kim 2023”).
86 	Federica Turati et al. Occupational Asbestos Exposure and Ovarian Cancer: Updated
Systematic Review, 73 Occup. Med. (Lond) (9), 532–40 (2023) (ECF No. 33132-12 Ex. 92)
(“Turati 2023”)).
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• 	Reid 2011: This meta-analysis reviewed fourteen cohort and two case-
control studies between 1950 to 2008. (Reid 2011 at 1287.) Inclusive of all
studies, the analysis revealed that the effect size was 1.75 (95% CI, 1.45–
2.10), meaning that a review of all studies “showed a 75% excess risk of
ovarian cancer in women who had been exposed to asbestos.” (Id. at 1287,
1291.) This was attenuated to 1.29 (95% CI, 0.97–1.73) in studies with
confirmed ovarian cancer cases. (Id. at 1287.) Statistically significant
excess mortality or incidence of ovarian cancer was reported in four out of
14 of the cohort studies. (Id. at 1291.) The authors noted that when “[t]aken
without further analysis, women thought to have ovarian cancer had an
increased rate in the meta-analysis if reporting having been exposed to
asbestos, compared with reference populations,” but cautioned that the
result “may have occurred because of disease misclassification,” i.e.,
peritoneal mesothelioma—despite noting that misclassification between
those two diseases could shift numbers either upward or downward. (Id. at
1291, 1293.) The authors also cautioned that there was a “small number of
cases” because “[m]uch fewer women than men have been exposed to
asbestos, particularly in more heavily exposed occupational settings,”
while in domestic exposure, “levels have generally been relatively low so
that risks and hence numbers of cases have also been few.” (Id.) The study
concluded that the actual cases of ovarian cancer were low in an absolute
sense but proportionate in the context of cases in the general reference
population. (Id. at 1288.) The study did not limit its findings to the
occupational 	context, 	but 	rather 	considered 	data 	deriving 	from
environmental exposure as well. (Id. at 1287–88, 1294.)
• 	Camargo 201187: This meta-analysis pooled data from 20 distinct cohorts
of women with documented occupational asbestos exposure in literature
through March 2010. (Camargo 2011 at 1211.) The analysis found an
overall standardized mortality ratio (“SMR”) of 1.77 (95% CI, 1.37–2.28),
leading the authors to conclude that their “study supports the IARC
conclusion that exposure to asbestos is associated with increased risk of
ovarian 	cancer”—a 	conclusion 	they 	asserted 	generally 	across 	both
occupational and non-occupational exposure. (Id. at 1211, 1216.) The
pooled SMRs were also “larger for cohorts exposed predominantly to
crocidolite (SMR = 2.18; 95% CI, 1.40–3.37) or mixed asbestos (SMR =
2.00; 95% CI, 1.41–2.84) than for cohorts exposed to chrysotile (SMR =
87 	Camargo et al., Occupational Exposure to Asbestos and Ovarian Cancer: A Meta-Analysis,
119 Env’t Health Perspectives 1211 (2011) (ECF No. 33017-6 Ex. 100) (“Camargo 2011”).
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1.40; 95% CI, 1.40–3.37).” (Id. at 1214.) The authors noted that “[a] major
concern in interpreting our findings is that until recently it has been very
difficult to distinguish pathologically between peritoneal mesothelioma
and ovarian cancer,” but that they “did not observe a difference in pooled
SMRs between studies with and without pathologic confirmation” of the
disease. (Id. at 1216.) However, the “power of this test was limited because
there were only two studies with pathologic confirmation.” (Id. (internal
citation omitted).) Another limitation was an “inability to account for
nonoccupational risk factors for ovarian cancer other than age,” but that
when “restricted to highly exposed women [the findings are] compatible
with an underlying dose-response effect.” (Id.)
• 	Kim 2023: This study conducted a meta-analysis of occupational and
environmental studies, covering literature through July 2022. (ECF No.
33131 (“Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br.”), Ex. 91 at 1–2.) For data collected after
the 2012 IARC Monograph publication, the results yielded an SMR of 2.04
(95% CI, 1.03–4.05); for the combined analysis of studies before and after
2012, the SMR was 1.72 (95% CI, 1.43–2.06). (Id. at 1.) The authors noted
that crocidolite “is considered the most carcinogenic,” but that the studies
included exposure to chrysotile and amosite, as well as asbestos in “mixed
form.” (Id. at 3.) As do other studies, the authors noted the potential for
misdiagnosis as peritoneal mesothelioma, (id. 	at 2), as well as the
“differentiation between occupational and nonoccupational exposure,” (id.
at 6–7), but when only accounting for occupational exposure cases, “the
overall direction of the effect estimate did not fundamentally alter our
conclusions but rather increased the effect size slightly,” (id. at 6–7).
The IARC 2012 Monograph was published with the objective “to prepare,
with the help of international Working Groups of experts . . . critical reviews and
evaluations of evidence on the carcinogenicity of a wide range of human exposures.”
(IARC 2012 at 12.) “The Monographs are used by national and international
authorities to make risk assessments, formulate decisions concerning preventative
measures, 	provide 	effective 	cancer 	control 	programmes 	and 	decide 	among
alternative options for public health decisions.” (Id. at 13.) These evaluations are
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“scientific, qualitative judgements on the evidence for or against carcinogenicity
provided by the available data.” (Id.) The Working Group “reviews all pertinent
epidemiological studies and cancer bioassays in experimental animals,” and “reports
that have been published or accepted for publication in the openly available scientific
literature.” (Id. at 13–14.)
As relevant here, the IARC 2012 Monograph noted that “published literature
examining the association between asbestos exposure and cancer of the ovaries is
relatively sparse, because the workforce occupationally exposed to asbestos . . . has
been predominantly male.” (Id. at 253.) Despite these limitations, the Working
Group reviewed and synthesized 11 cohort studies in 13 populations—ten analyzing
occupational exposure and three focusing on community-based or residential
exposure. (Id. at 254–59.)88 The Monograph explained that its “conclusions . . . about
asbestos and its carcinogenic risks apply to these six types of fibers [serpentine
mineral chrysotile, actinolite, amosite, anthophyllite, crocidolite, and tremolite]
wherever they are found, and that includes talc containing asbestiform fibers”; in
other words, the Monograph did not limit its findings to crocidolite or any other
particular type of fiber. (Id. at 219.) Having reviewed the data, the Working Group
found “a causal association between exposure to asbestos and cancer of the ovary,
88 	These include many of the same studies the above meta-analyses reviewed, including those
referenced directly in the parties’ briefs, e.g., Acheson 1982, Ferrante 2007, Reid 2008, and Reid
2009.
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based on five strongly positive cohort mortality studies of women with heavy
occupational exposure to asbestos (Acheson et al., 1982; Wignall & Fox, 1982;
Germani et al., 1999; Berry et al., 2000; Magnani et al., 2008),” adding that “[t]he
conclusion received additional support from studies showing that women and girls
with environmental, but not occupational exposure to asbestos (Ferrante et al. 2007;
Reid et al. 2008, 2009) had positive though non-significant increases in both ovarian
cancer incidence and mortality.” (Id. at 256.) The Monograph also concluded that
while exposure can happen in occupational settings, “[c]onsumer products (e.g.,
cosmetics, pharmaceuticals) are the primary sources of exposure to talc for the
general population. Inhalation and dermal contact (i.e. through perineal application
of talcum powders) are the primary routes of exposure.” (Id. at 232 (emphasis
added).)
As 	of 	2024, 	IARC 	classifies 	asbestos 	as 	a 	Group 	1 	carcinogen, 	i.e.
“carcinogenic to humans,” and talc as Group 2A, i.e., a “probable carcinogen.” (ECF
No. 33132-11, 	IARC Monographs Evaluate the Carcinogenicity of Talc and
Acrylonitrile, IARC Monographs vol. 136, Questions & Answers (Q&A), at 5 (July
5, 2024).) IARC explained these classifications as supported by the fact that there is
“sufficient evidence that asbestos causes . . . cancers of the . . . ovary in humans,”
and “contamination of talc with asbestos remains a major concern and may lead to
exposure of workers and the general population,” because as the Working Group
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noted, “contamination of talc products with asbestos has been documented and []
industry standards used to assess talc in cosmetic and pharmaceutical products have
often not been sufficiently sensitive to rule out contamination with asbestos.” (Id.)89
Plaintiffs also rely on similar conclusions reached by the NCI, EPA, and
IWGACP (which includes representatives from the FDA, National Institutes for
Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”), National Institute of Health (“NIH”),
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (“NIEHS”), OSHA, EPA,
Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”), National Institute of Standards
and Technology (“NIST”), and United States Geological Survey (“USGS”)). (See
Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br. at 80–82, 87–88.) They emphasize, for example, that the
IWGACP arrived at the same conclusion that “[e]xposure to asbestos may also lead
to diseases . . . including cancers of the . . . ovaries” in their analyses of cosmetic
talc products—without limiting their findings along fiber-specific or exposure type
grounds. (IWGACP White Paper at 9; see also ECF No. 33132-11, Ex. 84, Final
Rule Regulating Use of and Limiting Exposure to Chrysotile Asbestos (March 28,
89 	Defendants, however, interpret IARC 2024’s conclusions differently. Echoing their
argument writ large, they claim that IARC’s analyses were “based on five studies involving heavy
occupational exposure predominantly to crocidolite asbestos.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 92.) They
therefore do not consider IARC 2024 to support Plaintiffs’ position in this litigation. However, as
discussed above, IARC did not confine its findings to those contexts. Also, during the November
25, 2025 Oral Argument, Defendants invoked the IARC 2025 Monographs in the context of being
“entirely consistent with what the agency put out in 2024”—that is, in their view, finding
“inadequate evidence of an association [between talc and] ovarian cancer”—despite agreeing that
the 2025 documents are not part of the record in this matter. (Nov. 25, 2025 Tr. 10:11 to 13:4.)
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2024) (noting that “[m]any authorities have established causal associations between
asbestos exposures and . . . cancer of the ovary”).)
Having summarized the relevant literature and publications, I next reviewed
the expert reports that Defendants seek to exclude to determine whether the opinions
regarding the potential for asbestos in talc to cause ovarian cancer are grounded in
the application of reliable methodologies. At the outset, I reiterate that neither party
meaningfully tailors its arguments to the methodologies employed by individual
experts. Instead, the parties focus on competing interpretations of what the existing
data demonstrate. Defendants do not challenge the experts’ methodologies in general
terms; rather, they argue for a particular interpretation of the science—namely, that
only crocidolite asbestos, at high doses and through occupational exposure, bears a
causal relationship to ovarian cancer—and criticize Plaintiffs’ experts for reaching
a broader conclusion that exposure to asbestos, in any form and at any level, has the
potential to cause ovarian cancer.
The starting point of my review, however, is an assessment of the experts’
methodologies under Rule 702, including whether their interpretations of the studies
on which they rely are adequately supported. In that regard, I refer to certain expert
reports as illustrative examples of the methodologies employed. To be clear, the
portions of Plaintiffs’ experts’ reports that Defendants seek to exclude here are
distinct from the Bradford Hill analyses addressing the carcinogenic properties of
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talcum powder itself, discussed supra. (See supra Part V.5.) Instead, the challenged
asbestos-related opinions are offered in the causation context to support the
proposition that asbestos is one component of talc that may cause ovarian cancer.
Defendants move to preclude Plaintiffs’ experts from testifying that asbestos can
cause ovarian cancer at all. Thus, the dispute is not whether Plaintiffs’ experts may
opine as to a particular fiber type, exposure level, or dose, but whether asbestos
possesses carcinogenic qualities capable of causing ovarian cancer.
With this in mind, I find that Plaintiffs’ experts undertook a faithful review of
the scientific literature discussed above—including its respective strengths and
limitations—to 	assess 	whether, 	in 	their 	professional 	judgment, 	a 	sufficient
foundation exists to support their opinions that asbestos contained in talc can cause
ovarian cancer. For example, Dr. Smith cited evidence from medical literature that
talcum powder contains asbestos, which accords with Dr. Longo’s and Defendants’
own testing revealing the same result. (Smith Rep. at 18.) She explained that
“[a]sbestos is well known to be one of the most potent human carcinogens,”
including causing ovarian cancer specifically. (Id.) Dr. Smith discussed that the
IARC 2012 Monograph determined that “all forms of asbestos” are carcinogenic,
finding a “causal association” between ovarian cancer and asbestos. (Id.) She cited
Camargo 2011’s finding of an SMR of 1.77 for risk of ovarian cancer mortality,
which “corroborate[d] the finding of the IARC Working Group.” (Id.) Dr. Smith
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acknowledged Defendants’ argument that distinguishing diagnoses of peritoneal
mesothelioma and ovarian cancer “can be difficult,” but cited several studies in
support of her opinion that “[e]ven with such discrimination, asbestos increases
ovarian cancer risk.” (Id. at 19.)
Dr. Kane took a similar methodological approach in arriving at her proffered
opinion. (See Kane Rep. at 29–33.) The doctor reported seeing “evidence that talcum
powder products manufactured by Johnson & Johnson . . . contained and continue
to contain asbestos,” and explained that asbestos has “been identified as [a] known
carcinogen[] by IARC,” adding that NIOSH has determined that there is “no safe
level of asbestos exposure for any type of asbestos fiber.” (Id. at 29 (internal
quotation marks omitted).) After discussing the different asbestos types and how
they may induce inflammation, she noted that despite asbestos’ widely accepted
causative relationship with mesothelioma, “[t]he relationship between asbestos
exposure and ovarian cancer had been less studied.” (Id.) However, she noted, IARC
has “concluded that there is sufficient evidence to show that asbestos exposure can
cause ovarian cancer.” (Id.) Dr. Kane then reviewed the limited literature from the
1960s through the 1980s, which found higher than expected death rates from ovarian
cancer in connection with asbestos exposure—albeit a connection manifested in
small absolute numbers. (Id. at 30.) As part of her report, she also discussed, where
available, 1960s through 2000s studies’ Standardized Incidence Ratio (“SIR”), the
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types of asbestos involved (whether known, unknown, or a mixture of types), and
the magnitude of exposure (i.e., occupational or environmental). (Id. at 30–32.) She
then reviewed the two 2011 meta-analyses, Reid 2011 and Camargo 2011, which
both found evidence of a link between ovarian cancer and asbestos—the latter a
stronger association than the former. (Id. at 33.) Based on her review of this body of
literature, she opined with “a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that asbestos
exposure can cause ovarian cancer,” and that “to the extent that talcum powder
products contain even small amounts of asbestos, the evidence of causation is even
more compelling.” (Id.)
Furthermore, Dr. Smith-Bindman considered the properties of asbestos and
the research of their presence in talc—specifically in Defendants’ products. (See
ECF No. 33016-30 (“Bindman 2d Amend. Rep.”) at 11–12.) She then discussed the
scientific 	findings 	and 	public 	pronouncements 	regarding 	asbestos 	being 	a
carcinogen. (Id. at 12.) She reviewed similar studies to those discussed above to
support IARC’s conclusion that “there is sufficient evidence that asbestos is
carcinogenic in humans (Group 1) and that asbestos causes cancer of the ovary.”
(Id.) She added that “IARC explicitly stated that the findings . . . applied to all forms
of asbestos.” (Id.)
Having summarized these experts’ methodologies, I further note that the
remaining experts employ materially similar approaches—namely, a review of the
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pertinent scientific literature followed by a reasoned synthesis of that evidence—to
reach their respective opinions regarding the association between asbestos exposure
and ovarian cancer. Where, as here, Plaintiffs’ experts seek to testify only that
asbestos contained in talc powder possesses carcinogenic properties capable of
causing ovarian cancer, that methodological consistency supports the reliability of
their opinions under Rule 702. The challenges that Defendants raise here go to the
weight of the testimony and should be reserved for cross-examination, rather than
exclusion.
Against this methodological backdrop, Plaintiffs further point to the policies
and statements of relevant regulatory agencies mentioned supra, which are largely
consonant with the opinions offered by Plaintiffs’ experts. At the outset, I emphasize
that those agency determinations are not themselves the subject of my Rule 702
inquiry, nor do I assess whether the agencies’ conclusions were reached in a manner
that would satisfy the evidentiary standards governing expert admissibility. My
review remains confined to the reliability of the experts’ own methodologies and
analytical processes.
That 	said, 	in 	evaluating 	whether 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts 	employed 	reliable
methods, it is not insignificant that the analytical approaches they adopted mirror
those employed by regulatory bodies charged with assessing the causal relationship
between asbestos exposure and ovarian cancer. Those agencies relied on the same
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general body of scientific literature disputed here and reached conclusions that
substantially align with those of Plaintiffs’ experts. This provides additional support
for the reasonableness of the experts’ methods and their extrapolations from the
available data. In particular, notwithstanding Defendants’ substantive criticisms
regarding asserted limitations in the underlying studies, regulatory agencies have
concluded that the existing evidence is relevant to cosmetic talc products and have
not confined their guidance or warnings to occupational exposures or to particular
asbestos fiber types, such as crocidolite. Viewed in that context, there is adequate
support and basis for Plaintiffs’ experts—having conducted their own independent
review of the literature—to have applied comparable analytical frameworks in
reaching their respective conclusions.
I emphasize that, in reaching the above conclusion, I do not make any
determination as to whether Plaintiffs’ experts are ultimately correct on the merits.
My role at this stage is limited to assessing whether the challenged opinions are more
likely than not grounded in the application of reliable methodologies and are
sufficiently supported to be presented to a jury under Rule 702. Yet, Defendants’
entire argument in this context bears on criticisms of Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusions
drawn from the studies cited by the experts. But whether the experts’ conclusions
are persuasive in light of the full evidentiary record is a matter for the jury to resolve.
I find that Plaintiffs’ experts have not mischaracterized the methods or findings of
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the studies on which they rely. The experts opined at a general level—that asbestos
can cause ovarian cancer—based on a comprehensive review of the relevant
scientific literature. Even if Defendants dispute whether particular agencies or
researchers properly interpreted asbestos exposure data under specific conditions,
Plaintiffs’ experts have not misstated those studies or their results. Rather, they
accurately presented the data and conclusions as part of a broader analytical
framework supporting their opinions.
Nevertheless, Defendants’ substantive critiques of the evidence are not
without force. As they emphasize repeatedly, much of the epidemiological literature
addressing asbestos and ovarian cancer focuses on occupational exposure, and even
within that body of research, data specific to women are limited—an observation
that takes on added significance when contrasted with the ultra-trace levels of
asbestos identified by Drs. Longo and Rigler, ranging from 0.0092% to 0.0000033%.
(Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 90.) These considerations, however, bear on the weight of
the experts’ opinions, not on the reliability of the methodologies they employ in
order to simply opine that asbestos, as a component of talcum powder within
Defendants’ products, can cause cancer.
For that reason, I decline to rely on the non-binding authority Defendants cite
to 	argue 	that 	such 	differences 	compel 	exclusion. 	Those 	cases 	are 	readily
distinguishable. In Boyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 14-286, 2016 WL 705233 (W.D.
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Wis. Feb. 19, 2016), the court addressed whether workers’ alleged asbestos-related
injuries stemmed from occupational or non-occupational exposure in the context of
workers’ compensation exclusivity. The dispositive issue there was the need to
distinguish among different exposure pathways—such as workplace exposure
versus exposure from living or attending school near a facility. Id. at *19. No such
dispute exists here, where all parties agree that the alleged exposure pathway is
cosmetic talc through perineal application.
The remaining cases Defendants invoke are similarly inapposite. Cerna v.
South Florida Bioavailability Clinic, Inc., 815 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
applied the Frye standard rather than Daubert. Sutera v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc.,
986 F. Supp. 655, 662 (D. Mass. 1997) excluded expert testimony where the
plaintiffs had produced no peer-reviewed epidemiological studies demonstrating an
association between the agent and the disease. And Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
439 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. 2014) concerned whether the plaintiffs satisfied Texas
substantive causation standards—not whether any of the exerts’ opinions were the
product of reliable methodology under Rule 702.
As with all expert testimony, Defendants remain free to rigorously challenge
the experts’ assumptions, reasoning, and conclusions through cross-examination and
the presentation of contrary evidence. At this time, I recommend that the Court
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permit these experts to opine on the causative effect of the types of asbestos that Drs.
Longo and Rigler detected in Defendants’ products and ovarian cancer.
7. 	Heavy Metals and Fragrances
Defendants move to exclude Plaintiffs’ experts from testifying that certain
heavy metals and fragrance chemicals found in Defendants’ products contribute to
the ovarian carcinogenicity of Defendants’ talc products. Defendants’ central
contention is that the experts have not established and cannot establish, through
scientific evidence, a causal link between exposure to the heavy metals or fragrance
chemicals allegedly present in Defendants’ talc products and ovarian cancer.
With respect to heavy metals, Defendants generally argue that Plaintiffs’
mineralogy experts, Drs. Robert B. Cook, Ph.D., and Mark Krekeler, Ph.D., “were
primarily asked to opine on mining processes” but they nevertheless “seek to testify
that the heavy metals at issue are human carcinogens” despite having “zero expertise
in biology or medicine.” (ECF No. 33005-2 (“Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances
Br.”) at 8.) They further argue that twelve other Plaintiffs’ causation “experts each
devote a few sentences buried in their otherwise lengthy reports to the purported
opinion that heavy metals are present in [Defendants’ talc products] and that these
substances cause ovarian cancer.” (Id. at 8–9.) Defendants also contend that these
experts’ heavy metal opinions are unreliable and should be excluded. (Id. at 15–26.)
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As to fragrance chemicals, Defendants argue that several of Plaintiffs’
causation experts impermissibly “parrot” the opinions of Plaintiffs’ fragrance
chemicals expert, Dr. Michael Crowley, Ph.D., that the fragrances added to
Defendants’ products contribute to their alleged carcinogenicity. (Id. at 6, 14–15.)
Defendants claim that thirteen of Plaintiffs’ “experts who have no expertise on this
topic and did not undertake their own, independent analysis blindly adopt Dr.
Crowley’s conclusion.” (Id. at 14.) Defendants posit that Dr. Crowley’s opinions,
and those advanced by all experts who simply mechanically repeat Dr. Crowley’s
opinions, “do not pass muster under Rule 702 or Daubert.” (Id. at 27.)
i. 	Consideration 	of 	Defendants’ 	Arguments 	in 	the 	2020
Opinion
Before addressing the substantive aspects of Defendants’ motion, I must first
address the permissible scope, under Judge Shipp’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum
Order, of Defendants’ challenges.
I addressed the issue of heavy metal contamination in my prior Opinion,
specifically as it related to the biological plausibility factor of the Bradford Hill
analysis. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 172 & n.39. My analysis
discussed the opinions of Dr. Arch Carson as a representative causation expert. See
id. at 172 & n.39. I observed that “Plaintiffs’ general causation experts present two
theories of biological plausibility, both of which are premised on their understanding
that talc contains asbestos and other heavy metals.” Id. at 172. In a corresponding
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footnote, I addressed Defendants’ argument that “Dr. Carson’s testimony—that the
heavy metals contained in talc, i.e., cobalt, chromium, and nickel, may also cause
ovarian cancer—is unreliable, because these metals have not been proven to be
specifically carcinogenic to the ovary.” Id. at n.39.
I permitted Dr. Carson “to testify that it is plausible that, as carcinogens, these
heavy metals may cause ovarian cancer with respect to his Bradford Hill analysis
only.” Id. Dr. Carson explained during the Daubert hearing that “while there are no
studies linking these specific metals to ovarian cancer, they have been identified by
the IARC as carcinogens, and these metals have been linked to specific types of
cancer.” Id. Relying on IARC’s recognition that identification of a carcinogen’s
target organ or tissue does not preclude the possibility that it may cause cancer at
other sites, Dr. Carson “opined that similar to asbestos, the carcinogenic heavy
metals found in talc may plausibly cause other types of cancer, such as ovarian
cancer.” Id. “To the extent Defendants take issue with that opinion,” I stated, “they
may cross-examine Dr. Carson on that basis.” Id.
Defendants argue that their motion addressing heavy metals is appropriate,
under Judge Shipp’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order, because my ruling related
to Dr. Carson “was not a fulsome Daubert analysis” and “did not address any other
experts’ opinions” on the topic of heavy metals. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and
Fragrances Br. at 2.) Defendants have filed a motion to exclude that encompasses all
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experts who opine on the subject of heavy metals and fragrance chemicals. In
addition, Plaintiffs do not object to my consideration of Defendants’ heavy metals
arguments. Based upon Defendants’ arguments, and because my prior ruling was
confined to Dr. Carson’s opinion and did not consider the opinions of other experts
concerning heavy metals, including Drs. Cook and Krekeler, I believe revisiting my
prior analysis is appropriate. Therefore, I will consider the parties’ heavy metal
arguments (including those arguments that relate to Dr. Carson’s opinion) without
limitation. Likewise, because my prior decision did not analyze the admissibility of
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions regarding fragrance chemicals, I will consider the
parties’ arguments on this matter without limitation.
ii. 	Summary 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	Heavy 	Metals 	and 	Fragrances
Experts and Opinions
I begin my analysis of Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’
Opinions Regarding Alleged Heavy Metals and Fragrances by discussing the
relevant experts’ qualifications and summarizing the opinions that concern heavy
metals and/or fragrances. I start by discussing the qualifications and opinions of Drs.
Cook and Krekeler that Plaintiffs seek to offer at trial, followed by the qualifications
and opinions of Dr. Crowley. I then discuss the opinions of other Plaintiffs’ experts
that rely on the opinions of Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and Crowley.
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a. 	Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions
Both Dr. Cook and Dr. Krekeler offer opinions regarding the presence of
heavy metals—such as nickel, chromium, and cobalt—in the mines used by
Defendants and in their talcum powder products.
Dr. Cook holds an E.M. degree in Mining Engineering from the Colorado
School of Mines, and an M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in geology from the University of
Georgia. (ECF No. 33005-5 (“Cook Rep.”) at 2.) He later entered academia, serving
as a professor and, ultimately, as head of the geology department at Auburn
University. (Id.) He has consulted with the United Nations, NASA, the Department
of Defense, and the Department of Justice, and is a registered geologist in Alabama,
Georgia, and Florida. (Id.) He has authored the state mineralogies for Alabama and
Georgia, describing all minerals known to occur in each state, including deposits
containing talc, asbestos, and heavy metals, and has published approximately 100
research papers concerning geology and related subjects. (Id.) His non-academic
experience includes exploration and consulting for mining companies, specifically
concerning the exploration for and mineralogy of talc deposits independent from his
work on this litigation. (Id.)
Dr. Krekeler holds a Ph.D. in Geotechnical Engineering and Earth Science
from the University of Illinois at Chicago and is a tenured Associate Professor in the
Department of Geology and Environmental Earth Science at Miami University in
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Oxford, Ohio. (ECF No. 33005-4 (“Krekeler Rep.”) at 1.) His academic and research
work 	centers 	on 	mineral 	properties 	and 	mineral-based 	geotechnologies, 	with
particular 	emphasis 	on 	metals 	and 	industrial 	minerals 	occurring 	in 	igneous,
sedimentary, and metamorphic systems, among others. (Id.) As reflected in his
curriculum vitae, Dr. Krekeler has authored or co-authored multiple publications on
mining-related topics. (Id.; see also id., Ex. A.) Beyond his scholarship, Dr. Krekeler
has consulted for mining companies on mineral sampling procedures and techniques
and has provided detailed analyses of ore minerals and waste materials. (Id. at 1.)
He also teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in mineralogy, geochemistry,
ore geology, and analytical techniques. (Id.)
Turning to both experts’ opinions, Dr. Cook explained in his report that “talc
deposits can contain asbestos, asbestiform minerals, or minerals containing elevated
levels of heavy metals and arsenic, making their ores potentially unsafe.” (Cook Rep.
at 4 (footnote omitted).) He opined that the Vermont talc deposits used by
Defendants in their talcum powder products “contained high levels of heavy metals
including nickel and chromium, known carcinogens, and cobalt which has been
classified as a possible human carcinogen.” (Id. at 42; see also id. at 4, 37.) Dr. Cook
reached these conclusions after examining, among other things, the mineralogy of
the Vermont talc deposit, Defendants’ testing, and IARC’s 2012 Monographs. (Id.
at 3–4, 11–13, 30–37, 43.) He further opined, based on Defendants’ internal testing,
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that nickel, chromium, and cobalt were present in Defendants’ “finished talc
products in amounts above Johnson & Johnson’s . . . specified limits.” (Id. at 36.)
Dr. Krekeler similarly reported that “talc often is associated with or contains
arsenic, and heavy metals such as cadmium, cobalt, chromium, lead, and nickel.”
(Krekeler Rep. at 31; see also id. at 6–7.) He also reported that “IARC has classified
chromium (Cr) and nickel (Ni) as human carcinogens, and cobalt (Co) as a Group
2B carcinogen, or a possible carcinogen to humans.” (Id. at 6.) Dr. Krekeler opined,
after reviewing various documents and test results related to heavy metals, that there
is sufficient evidence to conclude that the talc mined in Vermont for Defendants’
talcum powder products contained excess amounts of nickel, chromium, and cobalt.
(Id. at 34–39.) Dr. Krekeler further opined that the presence of these heavy metals
at such elevated levels is consistent with the geology of the Vermont talc deposits.
(Id. at 35, 37, 39.)
b. 	Dr. Michael Crowley’s opinions
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Crowley as an expert in chemistry and pharmaceutical
science. (ECF No. 33005-17 (“Crowley Dep.”) at 30:12-19.) Dr. Crowley holds a
Ph.D. in molecular pharmaceutics from the University of Texas. (ECF No. 33005-
14 (“Crowley Rep.”) at 206.) He is the President of Theridian Technologies, LLC, a
pharmaceutical consulting group, and co-founder of Oticara, Inc., a specialty
pharmaceutical company. (Id.) He has consulted for more than fifty companies,
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primarily in the pharmaceutical industry, regarding “proof of concept, formulation
and 	product 	development, drug 	delivery 	and 	clinical 	development, including
generation of FDA regulatory submissions.” (Id. at 15.) He has developed over fifty
formulations that have been tested in human clinical studies and has authored or co-
authored over fifteen clinical study protocols. (Id.) He has also authored or co-
authored over thirty published articles and abstracts and four book chapters. (Id. at
16.) Further, he has served as a reviewer for peer-reviewed journals and is an
inventor on five U.S. patents, as well as multiple foreign patents and pending
applications. (Id.)
Regarding Dr. Crowley’s opinions, the doctor was tasked to evaluate “the
fragrance components of Johnson and Johnson’s talcum powder products and the
question of whether these substances contribute to the development of ovarian
cancer.”90 (Crowley Rep. at 12.) According to Dr. Crowley, “Johnson’s Baby
Powder contains a mixture of 141 fragrance chemicals, some of which are extracts
that are themselves a mixture of chemicals,” and “the Shower to Shower product
contains a fragrance mixture comprising 53 fragrances, some of which are mixtures
themselves.” (Id.) Dr. Crowley opines, after accounting for fragrance chemicals
90 	Dr. Crowley testified in his deposition that some of the substances he reviewed would not
technically be classified as fragrances. (See, e.g., Crowley Dep. at 199:16–20, 342:12–343:3.) For
simplicity, this Report and Recommendation collectively refers to all substances that were the
subject of Dr. Crowley’s analysis as “fragrance chemicals.”
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present in both products, “there are at least 175 fragrance chemicals between the two
products.” (Id.)
In his report, Dr. Crowley answered two questions: (1) “Are the fragrance
chemicals in compliance with governmental and industry standards?” and (2) “Can
the 	fragrance 	chemicals 	in 	the 	talcum 	powder 	products 	contribute 	to 	the
inflammatory properties, toxicity, and potential carcinogenicity of the products?”
(Id.) To answer these questions, Dr. Crowley “conducted an independent review of
the regulatory standards, safety, toxicological, medical, pharmacological and other
scientific literature concerning the fragrance chemicals present in Johnson’s Baby
Powder and Shower to Shower talcum products.” (Id.)
During his deposition, Dr. Crowley stated that he “tried to examine the totality
of the evidence for each and every chemical and collate. . . in a meaningful way to
examine their properties and to answer the questions that were posed to [him].”
(Crowley Dep. at 111:10–15.) Specifically, Dr. Crowley testified as follows
regarding his methodology:
Q. 	What methodology did you use in reaching
your opinions in this case?
A. 	I was given the list of fragrance chemicals. I
set about identifying them. The names of the chemicals
were in the Thomas Dydek report. That often started by
just plugging that into Google or PubChem to see what I
could find.
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After doing that, I would then try to identify a CAS
[Chemical Abstracts Service] number so I could cross-
reference it into various databases and gather the physical
and chemical properties, as well as the safety profile, in
vitro or in vivo studies, and any published or known
pharmacological properties.
I would then go to IFRA [International Fragrance
Association] 	and 	CIR 	[Cosmetic 	Ingredient 	Review]
websites and look at their - the information they had on it,
the FDA [U.S. Food and Drug Administration] website, in
particular the Inactive Ingredient Database.
I looked in some of the journals, specifically Food
and Chemical Toxicology, to see what the studies were. I
looked at the EFSA website, the European Food Safety
Authorities, you know, all the different places that I’ve
identified in my report and gathered as much information
as I could on it.
Once Appendix A and Appendix B [to the report]
were built, then I started classifying them. How many of
them are considered - are classified as irritants? Which
ones are allergens? Which ones are eye irritants? And so
forth.
I also looked at, you know, the RTECS database,
the Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, and
so forth.
(Id. at 109:5–110:16.)
After conducting his review of the fragrance chemicals, and based on his
“education, training, and experience in the fields of molecular pharmaceutics,
chemistry 	and 	drug delivery,” Dr. Crowley concluded that certain 	fragrance
chemicals used by Defendants in their talcum powder products are not in compliance
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with governmental and industry standards. (Crowley Rep. at 65.) Additionally, Dr.
Crowley opined that “the fragrance chemicals in the Johnson & Johnson talcum
powder products contribute to the inflammatory properties, toxicity, and potential
carcinogenicity of these products.” (Crowley Rep. at 66; see also Crowley Dep. at
199:22–200:12 (opining that “perineal application of the talc products is associated
with a higher risk of cancer . . . and fragrance chemicals . . . contribute to that”).) In
summary, he based this opinion on the following:
• 	Only 1 of the 141 fragrance chemicals in the Baby
Powder product have been investigated for safety in the
vagina in a product approved by the FDA.
• 	Only 2 of the 53 chemicals in Shower to Shower have
been investigated for safety in the vagina in a product
approved by the FDA.
• 	Several fragrance chemicals are irritants, sensitizers,
and 	allergens 	that 	can 	cause 	inflammation 	and
oxidative stress.
• 	In vitro and in vivo studies have demonstrated that
several fragrance chemicals have biological activity,
including 	reproductive 	and 	developmental 	effects.
These studies have been published in peer reviewed
scientific journals.
• 	Four 	chemicals 	in 	Johnson 	and 	Johnson’s 	Baby
Powder 	product 	have 	been 	identified 	by 	the
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
as potential carcinogens: styrene, coumarin, eugenal
and d-limone.
• 	Styrene 	has 	been 	recognized 	as 	a 	carcinogen 	by
multiple governmental regulatory bodies.
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• 	The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency considers
p-cresol, 	also 	known 	as 	4-methylphenol, 	to 	be
“possibly carcinogenic.”
• 	p-Cresol was co-carcinogenic and promoted tumors on
mouse skin.
• 	Three 	fragrance 	chemicals 	added 	to 	Johnson 	and
Johnson’s Shower to Shower are included in the IARC
monographs as possible carcinogens: benzophenone,
eugenol and coumarin.
• 	Benzophenone was recently removed from use in foods
by FDA due to histiocytic sarcoma observed in ovaries
and uterus, higher incidences of kidney tumors and
leukemia in animal studies, and in vivo estrogenic
activity.
• 	Musk ketone is suspected of being a carcinogen, and
has been classified as a Category 3 carcinogen by the
Scientific Committee on Health and Environmental
Risks (SCHER)
• 	Methyl Hydrogenated Rosinate is present in Baby
Powder and Shower to Shower. Methyl Hydrogenated
Rosinate is a film former and used to adhere the
fragrance chemicals to the talcum powder.
• 	The safety margins of the 175 fragrance chemicals
were determined for foods (oral administration) or
cosmetics (topical application to the skin).
• 	Only 3 fragrance chemicals are present in an approved
drug product administered to the vagina according to
the FDA IID.
(Crowley Rep. at 65–66.)
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Dr. Crowley clarified, however, that he did not opine that fragrance chemicals
alone can cause or increase the risk of ovarian cancer or other cancers. (Crowley
Dep. at 105:19–106:14.) He was not asked to consider epidemiological evidence
supporting the notion that fragrance chemicals can cause ovarian cancer. (Id. at
199:2–21.) Nor did he independently research individual chemicals found in
Defendants’ product; his task was to review the “totality of the evidence” concerning
the chemicals. (Id. at 126:13–127:11.) He also was unaware of any scientific
publication that links the fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products to human
ovarian cancer. (Id. at 114:9–115:7.)
Dr. Crowley also clarified that he was not asked to, and did not perform, a risk
assessment, exposure assessment, or dose-response analysis in this matter with
respect to any substance. (Id. at 123:5–8, 124:21–125:5.) Importantly, he testified
that he would have been unable to conduct a risk assessment, exposure assessment,
or dose-response analysis because he did not have the exact composition of fragrance
chemicals in Defendants’ products. (See id. at 200:13–202:6, 204:15–22.) According
to Dr. Crowley, the absence of that data also prevented him from opining that
Defendants’ products violated certain regulatory standards as he could not measure
the concentration of a chemical in the product against any regulatory threshold. (See
id. at 328:15–331:2.)
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c. 	Other experts
Several of Plaintiff’s experts refer and/or rely on the analyses of Drs. Cook,
Krekeler, and/or Crowley. These experts include Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, Cote,
Kane, Levy, McTiernan, Moorman, Plunkett, Siemiatycki, Sage, Singh, Smith,
Smith-Bindman, Wolf, and Zelikoff. I discuss each of these experts and their
reference to the analyses of Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and/or Crowley.91
Dr. Carson: Citing the deposition and an exhibit thereto of Julie Pier,92 the
corporate representative of Imerys Talc America, a talc mining company that
supplied Defendants, Dr. Carson noted that Defendants’ talcum powder products
contain nickel and chromium (which are classified as known carcinogens by IARC)
and cobalt (which is classified as a possible carcinogen by IARC). (See Carson Rep.
at 5–6.) At his deposition, Dr. Carson agreed that IARC has not classified nickel,
chromium, and cobalt as carcinogenic to the ovaries. (ECF No. 33005-12 (“Carson
Dep.”) at 300:20–24.)
91 	Defendants seek to exclude the opinions of the following experts with respect to heavy
metals: Drs. Clarke-Pearson, Cote, Kane, Levy, McTiernan, Moorman, Siemiatycki, Sage, Singh,
Smith, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 9 n.24.) Although
Defendants do not specifically seek to exclude Dr. Carson’s opinion on heavy metals, because I
am reviewing the issue of heavy metals without limitation, my analysis applies to his opinion as
well. Defendants seek to exclude the opinions of the following experts with respect to fragrances:
Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, Cote, Kane, Levy, Moorman, Plunkett, Sage, Singh, Smith, Smith-
Bindman, Zelikoff, Wolf, and McTiernan. (Id. at 14 n.42.) The qualifications of these experts are
discussed elsewhere in this Report and Recommendation.
92 	No party appears to have offered the relevant deposition testimony or deposition exhibit
from Ms. Pier’s deposition as an exhibit. It appears that Ms. Pier testified that certain heavy metals
were present in the talc supplied to Defendants by Imerys Talc America.
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Dr. Carson noted that talc contains fragrance chemicals, “some of which have
been shown to produce cancer in laboratory animals.” (Carson Rep. at 6.) He
acknowledged that these fragrance chemicals are “likely to be present in very small
or trace quantities, and likely present a lower level of risk than the major
components, by mass,” but he nonetheless opines that “any additional risks are added
as part of a total risk profile.” (Id.) He has reviewed the report of Dr. Crowley and
concurred that certain fragrance chemicals “may contribute to the inflammatory
properties, toxicity, and potential carcinogenicity of [Defendants’] products.” (Id.
(citing Crowley Rep.).) At his deposition, Dr. Carson admitted that he has never
published on or researched fragrance chemicals. (Carson Dep. at 63:6–18.) He also
admitted that he does not “have the specific formulation or quantities of [the
fragrance chemicals]” in Defendants’ products. (Id. at 73:15–20; see also id. at
175:13–176:9.) He also agreed that “[t]here is no information available to do a dose-
response estimate for the fragrances” in Defendants’ products. (Id. at 174:3–10.) He
could not say what quantity of fragrance chemicals reach the ovaries, but maintains
that the chemicals do reach the ovaries. (Id. at 177:12–19.)
Dr. Clarke-Pearson: Citing the deposition of Ms. Pier, Dr. Clarke-Pearson
noted that talcum powder contains carcinogens including “heavy metals such as
nickel, chromium and cobalt.” (ECF No. 33005-18 (“Clarke-Pearson Rep.”) at 7–8.)
Citing Dr. Crowley’s report, Dr. Clarke-Pearson further noted that talcum powder
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contains “inflammatory agents, toxins, and carcinogens contained in the fragrance
chemicals in talcum powder.” (Id.) In discussing the plausibility factor of his
Bradford Hill analysis, Dr. Clarke-Pearson noted that talc includes numerous
constituents such as . . . heavy metals and/or chemicals contained in fragrances added
to talcum powder, [both] of which cause an inflammatory reaction leading to
carcinogenesis.” (Id. at 13.) At his deposition, Dr. Clarke-Pearson clarified that he
was not opining that any individual component of talcum powder, such as heavy
metals or fragrance chemicals, independently causes ovarian cancer, but rather that
talcum powder as a whole causes ovarian cancer. (See ECF No. 33005-43 (“Clarke-
Pearson Dep.”) at 288:11–23.) He further acknowledged that he was unaware of
scientific evidence causally linking the heavy metals and fragrance chemicals
identified in Defendants’ products to ovarian cancer and would defer to IARC as to
the carcinogenicity of those substances. (Id. at 290:19–292:10.) Dr. Clarke-Pearson
further acknowledged that his overall causation opinions in this matter do “[n]ot
necessarily” depend on carcinogenic metals or fragrances. (Id. at 291:16–21.)
Dr. Cote: Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr. Cote opined that talc contains
heavy metals “known to be carcinogenic.” (ECF No. 33005-19 (“Cote Rep.”) at 11.)
She further noted that Defendants’ products contain “fragrance chemicals that have
been identified as carcinogenic or inflammatory agents.” (Id. (citing Crowley Rep.).)
In her opinion, heavy metals “can induce an inflammatory response” once they are
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“present in the fallopian tubes and/or ovaries.” (Id. at 37.) At her deposition, Dr.
Cote acknowledged that she did not search for, and is not aware of, any studies
supporting the theory that trace amounts of heavy metals or fragrances cause ovarian
cancer. (ECF No. 33005-33 (“Cote Dep.”) at 142:24–143:4, 146:25.) Dr. Cote
further acknowledged that heavy metals and fragrances are not “necessary” to her
causation opinion that talcum powder and all its constituents in its entirety can cause
ovarian cancer. (Id. at 147:7–17.)
Dr. Kane: Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr. Kane noted that talc contains
heavy metals such as nickel and chromium, which are known carcinogens, and
cobalt, which has been identified as a possible carcinogen by IARC, and that those
metals provide “additional evidence of biological plausibility for talcum powder
products to cause ovarian cancer.” (Kane Rep. at 5, 29, 36.) She also noted that the
alleged presence of the fragrance chemicals (according to Dr. Crowley’s report) in
Defendants’ products “provides additional evidence of biological plausibility for
causation regarding talc and ovarian cancer.” (Id. at 5, 36.) At her deposition, Dr.
Kane acknowledged that she has not specifically analyzed the biological plausibility
of heavy metals or fragrances as ovarian-cancer-causing agents but considered both
together along with other components of talcum powder in her analysis. (See ECF
No. 33005-39 (“Kane Dep.”) at 133:12–136:1.)
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Dr. Levy: Dr. Levy also noted that talc may contain nickel, chromium, and
cobalt, which have carcinogenic properties based on IARC’s classification of them.
(ECF No. 33005-21 (“Levy Rep.”) at 18–20.) According to Dr. Levy, this “supports
the conclusion that talcum powder causes chronic inflammation.” (Id. at 19.) He also
agreed with Dr. Crowley that certain fragrance chemicals added to Defendants’
products 	“contribute 	to 	the 	inflammatory 	properties, 	toxicity, 	and 	potential
carcinogenicity of the products,” and the presence of those chemicals “provides
additional evidence of biological plausibility for talcum powder and ovarian cancer.”
(Id.) At his deposition, Dr. Levy explained that his opinion concerned “the totality
of talc and its components,” and that he had not “performed an analysis to
specifically break apart the relative contributions of any components that may or
may not be present in talc.” (ECF No. 33005-36 (“Levy Dep.”) at 118:9–18; see also
id. at 127:10–24.) He conceded that he did not “specifically look at heavy metals”
in his analysis. (Id. at 155:24–156:12.)
Dr. McTiernan: Dr. McTiernan noted that IARC concluded that “chromium
and nickel are Group 1 human carcinogens” and cobalt is a “possible carcinogen.”
(ECF No. 33005-22 (“McTiernan Rep.”) at 87–88.) Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr.
McTiernan noted that all three metals have been found in Defendants’ products. (Id.)
She concluded that the presence of heavy metals and fragrance chemicals “have been
shown to induce cancer” through “inflammatory response which mediates oxidative
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stress, release of cytokines and resulting genotoxicity which can induce malignant
transformation.” (Id. at 101.) At her deposition, Dr. McTiernan testified that she does
not have “evidence one way or the other” as to whether Defendants’ products contain
any chromium, nickel, and cobalt, and did not address that question. (ECF No.
33005-31 (“McTiernan Dep.”) at 270:20–272:10.)
Dr. Moorman: Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr. Moorman noted that talcum
powder contains chromium and nickel, which are established carcinogens, and
cobalt which is considered a possible carcinogen based on IARC’s findings.
(Moorman Rep. at 35.) She also reviewed and agreed with Dr. Crowley’s report, and
thus concluded that the presence of heavy metals and fragrance chemicals “provide
further evidence that exposure to talc products could result in cancer[.]” (Id. at 35.)
At her deposition, Dr. Moorman acknowledged that she had not independently
reviewed scientific evidence that heavy metals in cosmetic talc powders cause
ovarian cancer to reach her opinion. (ECF No. 33005-40 (“Moorman Dep.”) at
120:16–121:6.) She also admitted that she did not consider any evidence beyond an
IARC 	monograph 	in 	determining 	that 	nickel, 	chromium, 	and 	cobalt 	were
carcinogenic. (Id. at 122:12–123:6.)
Dr. Plunkett: Citing Dr. Crowley’s report, Dr. Plunkett noted that several of
the fragrance chemicals used in Defendants’ product “have been associated with
potential carcinogenic activity.” (Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶ 36.) Citing Ms. Pier’s
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deposition and other documents produced by Defendants, Dr. Plunkett also noted
that Defendants’ product contains heavy metals “known to be carcinogenic in
animals and/or humans.” (Id. ¶ 37.) At her deposition, Dr. Plunkett acknowledged
that she has not “attempted to define an independent risk” for chromium, nickel, and
cobalt individually, or for fragrances. (ECF No. 33005-13 (“Plunkett 2021 Dep.”) at
271:24–272:8; see also id. at 274:5–275:25.) In her view, because those metals share
a similar mechanism to talc, she factored them into her risk assessment for talc
overall. (See id. at 272:9–273:6.) She testified that when faced with the presence of
multiple . . . carcinogens with similar mechanisms of action, you would assume in
[your] risk assessment that those risks could be additive.” (Id. at 275:9–25.)
Dr. Sage: Dr. Sage opined that “[t]alcum powder products contain or may
contain ingredients that pose health hazards to consumers.” (ECF No. 33005-24
(“Sage Rep.”) at 5.) Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr. Sage noted that these
ingredients include chromium and nickel (both known carcinogens), and cobalt (a
possible carcinogen). He also adopted Dr. Crowley’s opinion that the talc products
contain fragrance chemicals that are “potential and known carcinogens, toxins, and
allergens.” (Id. at 6.) Dr. Sage further opined that certain of these ingredients “could
be considered adulterants in talcum powder products.” (Id. at 7.) At his deposition,
however, Dr. Sage clarified that he is “not offering an opinion as a scientific expert
as to whether . . . talcum powder exposure causes ovarian cancer” or an opinion “on
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the causal connection between any one of the[] particular ingredients [found in
talcum powder] and any particular health injury.” (ECF No. 33005-35 (“Sage Dep.”)
at 292:14–20.) Dr. Sage further acknowledged that he did not independently
investigate any scientific evidence linking heavy metals to a risk of ovarian cancer.
(See id. at 293:10–21.)
Dr. 	Siemiatycki: 	Dr. 	Siemiatycki 	noted 	that 	talcum 	powder 	products
generally contain “carcinogens, namely nickel and chromium.”93 (Siemiatycki 3d
Amend. Rep. at 27.) But he conceded that the “extent of the contamination of talcum
powder products by these metals, during the entire period of commercial production
of talcum powder products over the past several decades” is unknown. (Id.) He
further conceded that how exposures to the metals in the products “measure up to
the exposure levels to these metals that may cause cancer” is also unknown. (Id.) In
opining that there is a biologically plausible mechanism through which talc can
cause ovarian cancer, Dr. Siemiatycki opined that “there is also evidence that
commercially-distributed 	talc 	powder 	contained 	some 	heavy 	metals 	that 	are
themselves carcinogenic.” (Id. at 73–74.) At his deposition, Dr. Siemiatycki clarified
that, in his opinions on talcum powder, he was not relying on observations that
93 	Dr. Siemiatycki does not identify his basis for noting that Defendants’ products contain
potentially carcinogenic heavy metals, but he includes in the references section of his report the
Deposition of Julie Pier, the same source that most Plaintiffs’ causation experts cite in support of
their opinions that Defendants’ products contain heavy metals. (Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep., Ex.
B, at 7.)
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Defendants’ products contain heavy metal. (See ECF No. 33005-38 (“Siemiatycki
Dep.”) at 55:20–56:7.)
Dr. Singh: In connection with his opinion on biological plausibility, Dr. Singh
noted that “talcum products contain fibrous talc, heavy metals and fragrance
ingredients which are known or suspected carcinogens” based on Ms. Pier’s
deposition. (Singh Rep. at 60.) He opined that “the presence of these known or
suspected carcinogens provides a plausible biologic explanation for the increased
risk seen in the epidemiologic studies.” (Id.) At his deposition, Dr. Singh indicated
that he has not analyzed how much, if any, heavy metal exposure (from talcum
powder) reaches a woman’s ovaries. (ECF No. 33005-42 (“Singh Dep.”) at 184:9–
13.) He also clarified that he is not specifically opining that heavy metals and
fragrance chemicals are causally associated with ovarian cancer. (Id. at 185:15–19,
298:20–300:11.) Nor was he aware of epidemiological evidence supporting the
theory that exposure to trace amounts of chromium, nickel, and cobalt can cause
ovarian cancer. (Id. at 298:20–300:11.)
Dr. Smith: Dr. Smith opined that the heavy metals allegedly in Defendants’
products “likely contribute to the carcinogenicity of talcum powder products by the
inflammatory mechanism” that she elaborated on in her report and is discussed
elsewhere in this Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 33005-27 (“Smith Rep.”)
at 19.) She also agreed with Dr. Crowley’s opinion that certain fragrance chemicals
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“likely contribute to the inflammatory properties, toxicity and/or carcinogenicity” of
Defendants’ products. (Id. at 19.) At her deposition, Dr. Smith admitted that she did
not 	conduct 	a “comprehensive review” of the evidence supporting 	a causal
connection between heavy metals and fragrance chemicals with ovarian cancer. (See
ECF No. 33005-34 (“Smith Dep.”) at 61:3–62:3.)
Dr. Smith-Bindman: Dr. Smith-Bindman opined that carcinogenic heavy
metals such as nickel, chromium, and cobalt “can cause ovarian cancer through an
inflammatory mechanism.” (ECF No. 33005-28 (“Smith-Bindman Rep.”) at 15.)
She also agrees with Dr. Crowley’s opinion that certain fragrance chemicals “may
contribute to the inflammatory response, toxicity, and potential carcinogenicity of
[Defendants’] talcum powder products.” (Id.) At her deposition, Dr. Smith-Bindman
stated that talcum powder contains trace amounts of heavy metals and contains
fragrance chemicals, but she acknowledged that she has only high-level estimates of
the concentration of heavy metals and chemicals in Defendants’ products and
interpreting those concentrations is not part of her expertise. (See ECF No. 33005-
37 (“Smith-Bindman Dep.”) at 138:7–139:21.)
Dr. Wolf: Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr. Wolf noted that “talcum powder
products have been shown to contain nickel, chromium, and cobalt” and that the
“inflammatory mechanism for carcinogenesis for these metals is similar to that
described for asbestos, fibrous talc, and platy talc.” (ECF No. 33005-29 (“Wolf
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Rep.”) at 12.) She also opined that many of the fragrance chemicals identified by Dr.
Crowley “are known to be irritants, toxins, and carcinogens,” and some “have been
shown to be harmful to the reproductive organs and function.” (Id.) Dr. Wolf
suggested that the “chemicals would be expected to accompany the talcum powder
as it migrates or is transported through the genital tract to the fallopian tubes and
ovaries” and “[a]t least some of these chemicals would also be expected to be
absorbed through the vaginal mucosa.” (Id.) Dr. Wolf opined that the chemicals
“likely contribute to the inflammatory properties, toxicity, and carcinogenicity of
these talcum powder products.” (Id.)
At her deposition, Dr. Wolf agreed that she did not individually evaluate the
data for heavy metals and/or fragrances to assess their causal relationship to ovarian
cancer. (See ECF No. 33005-30 (“Wolf Dep.”) at 399:22–402:12.) She also agreed
that the inflammatory response caused by foreign substances can—but does not
always—cause ovarian cancer. (Id. at 407:5–14.) Dr. Wolf acknowledged that she
was not fully aware of the roles chromium, cobalt, and nickel played in the human
body as potential nutrients. (See id. at 432:17–435:12.) And Dr. Wolf admitted that
the IARC monographs on which she relies do not indicate that chromium, cobalt,
and nickel are carcinogenic to the ovaries. (See id. at 430:15–432:3, 434:7–10.)
Dr. Zelikoff: Citing IARC’s classifications, Dr. Zelikoff noted that nickel and
chromium are known carcinogens and cobalt is a possible or probable carcinogen
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depending on whether it is accompanied by tungsten chloride. (ECF No. 33005-6
(“Zelikoff Rep.”) at 8-10.) She explained that the “exact mechanisms of nickel-
induced carcinogenesis are not known, but likely involve genetic and epigenetic
routes” and aggravation “through the generation of DNA-damaging reactive oxygen
species (ROS) and the inhibition of DNA repair.” (Id. at 8.) She also noted that
animal studies have found “nickel compounds induce tumors at virtually all sites of
application.” (Id. at 9.)
Dr. Zelikoff noted that chromium comes in different forms, including trivalent
and 	hexavalent 	chromium. 	(Id.) 	She 	explained 	that 	hexavalent 	chromium 	is
considered carcinogenic by IARC and has been “shown to cause direct DNA damage
. . . , mutation, genomic instability, aneuploidy, . . . cell transformation,” and “can
cause damage leading to dysfunctional DNA replication, aberrant cell cycle, DNA
strand breaks, dysfunctional DNA repair and DNA-protein crosslinks and directly
causing 	genotoxicity.” 	(Id.) 	Separately, 	Dr. 	Zelikoff 	opined 	that 	chromium
compounds “can activate transcription factors involved in inflammation and tumor
growth” by “cellular integrity and functions.” (Id. at 9–10.)
Dr. 	Zelikoff 	explained 	that 	cobalt 	can 	cause 	genotoxicity 	through 	2
mechanisms: “(1) DNA breakage induced by cobalt metal and especially hard metal
particles, and (2) inhibition of DNA repair by cobalt (II) ions.” (Id. at 10.) Both
mechanisms “contribute to the carcinogenic potential of cobalt compounds.” (Id.)
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With respect to fragrances, Dr. Zelikoff agreed with Dr. Crowley’s conclusion
that certain fragrance chemicals “likely contribute to the inflammatory properties,
toxicity, and carcinogenicity of these talcum powder products.” (Id. at 12.) At her
deposition, Dr. Zelikoff conceded that she did not opine on a specific causal
connection between heavy metals and ovarian cancer. (ECF No. 33005-11 (“Zelikoff
Dep.”) at 281:1–282:1.) She also conceded that she has no information to suggest a
threshold level for which heavy metals increase a woman’s risk for ovarian cancer.
(Id. at 282:2–286:4.)
iii. 	Admissibility Analysis
Defendants challenge the admissibility of certain experts that opine on
whether the heavy metals and fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products cause or
contribute to the causation of ovarian cancer. I address these challenges below in my
independent analysis of the qualifications, reliability, and fit of each expert’s opinion
as it concerns heavy metals and/or fragrances.
a. 	Qualifications and Fit
Defendants challenge certain experts’ qualifications. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals
and Fragrances Br. at 7–15.) Their arguments first address the qualifications of Drs.
Cook and Krekeler to opine that the heavy metals found in talc are carcinogenic. (Id.
at 8–9.) Defendants further challenge the qualifications of other experts who rely on
the opinions of Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and Crowley. (Id. at 8–15.) I follow the same
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sequence below, addressing Defendants’ challenge to Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s
qualifications, and also address Dr. Crowley’s qualifications, before turning to
Defendants’ qualifications arguments regarding the experts who rely on Dr. Cook’s
and Dr. Krekeler’s opinions. In addition, although Defendants do not challenge the
fit of any of the expert opinions discussed above, I must independently assess it.
As noted above, the qualifications element of Rule 702 “requires that the
witness 	possess 	specialized 	expertise.” 	Calhoun, 	350 	F.3d 	at 	321. 	But 	that
requirement is “liberally” construed. Id. (quoting In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741; see
also Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244 (“[I]t is an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony
simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best
qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the specialization that the
court considers most appropriate.” (quoting Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80
F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996))); Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802,
809 (3d Cir. 1997), as amended (Dec. 12, 1997) (“If the expert meets [Rule 702’s]
liberal minimum qualifications, then the level of the expert’s expertise goes to
credibility and weight, not admissibility.”). Even so, “[a]n expert may be generally
qualified but may lack qualifications to testify outside his area of expertise.”
Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 322. Experts “are permitted to rely on materials used by other
experts in developing their own opinions” but may not “simply ‘parrot’ ideas of
other 	experts.” 	In 	re 	Suboxone 	(Buprenorphine 	Hydrochloride 	& 	Naloxone)
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Antitrust Litig., 13-MD-2445, 2020 WL 6887885, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2020)
(citation omitted).
(1) 	Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s qualifications and fit
Defendants argue that Drs. Cook and Krekeler are unqualified to testify that
the heavy metals allegedly in Defendants’ products are carcinogenic because neither
has the necessary expertise to opine on carcinogenicity.94 (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and
Fragrances Br. at 8 (“Although [Drs. Cook and Krekeler] also seek to testify that the
heavy metals at issue are human carcinogens, they have zero expertise in biology or
medicine and expressly disclaimed having the requisite credentials to weigh in on
these specialized topics.”).) Plaintiffs respond that “Drs. Krekeler and Cook do not
provide medical or epidemiological testimony.” (ECF No. 33120 (“Pls.’ Heavy
Metals and Fragrances Opp. Br.”) at 9.) To Plaintiffs’ point, Drs. Cook and Krekeler
disclaim any opinion that heavy metals cause cancer. Despite such a disclaimer, they
nevertheless suggest that certain heavy metals are carcinogenic, citing academic
and/or regulatory sources in support. (See Krekeler Rep. at 6; Cook Rep. at 27–28,
30, 32; ECF No. 33005-9 (“Krekeler Dep.”) at 25:6–22; ECF No. 33005-10 (“Cook
Dep.”) at 17:3–10, 96:20–22.) For example, Dr. Krekeler cited IARC’s classification
94 	Defendants do not appear to challenge Dr. Cook’s or Dr. Krekeler’s qualifications to opine
on the contents of Defendants’ commercial products (aside from the alleged presence of asbestos)
and instead focus on opinions that heavy metals potentially in their products are carcinogens. (See
Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 8.) As further discussed infra, I independently find that
Drs. Cook and Krekeler are qualified to opine to the mineralogic and geologic contents of talc used
by Defendants based on their credentials and experience.
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of chromium, nickel and cobalt as carcinogens in support of his view that they are
carcinogenic. (Krekeler Rep. at 6; see also id. at 33–34, 36–37.) He further explained
that “[a]cademic and research literature have long-recognized many toxic metals
commonly found in talc as known or possible carcinogens, including: Chromium
(Cr), nickel (Ni), cobalt (Co), arsenic (As).” (Id.) Dr. Cook similarly cited IARC
sources in support of the conclusion that arsenic, nickel, chromium, and cobalt are
carcinogens. (Cook Rep. at 27–28, 30, 32.)
I find that Drs. Cook and Krekeler are qualified to identify certain heavy
metals as carcinogens based on their experience in geology and mineralogy under
Rule 702’s liberal standard for qualifications. Notably, and as further discussed
infra, neither expert opines that the heavy metals they discuss cause ovarian cancer.
While identifying a mineral as a carcinogen certainly involves the life-sciences
disciplines, such identification does not unreasonably fall outside of Dr. Cook’s and
Dr. Krekeler’s expertise, which admittedly involves the characterization of minerals
and the evaluation of their “geology,” “mineralogy,” and “geochemistry.” (Krekeler
Dep. at 24:8–24; see Cook Rep. at 6–7 (citing a variety of articles and sources
characterizing certain heavy metals as toxic or carcinogenic from geologic and
industrial publications).) Accordingly, I find both experts’ background and expertise
in identifying and characterizing such minerals to meet Rule 702’s liberal standard
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for expert qualifications. Therefore, I find Drs. Cook and Krekeler qualified to
identify certain heavy metals as carcinogens.
With respect to fit, I note that neither Dr. Cook nor Dr. Krekeler opine that the
heavy metals they discuss cause ovarian cancer. They stop short at identifying the
metals as carcinogens, in contrast from Plaintiffs’ other experts, who affirmatively
opine that heavy metals and/or fragrance chemicals may cause ovarian cancer. As I
conclude infra, those experts do not use reliable methods in reaching their opinions
that heavy metals and/or fragrance chemicals may cause ovarian cancer. Given that
conclusion, I find that Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s opinions generally identifying
certain heavy metals as carcinogenic do not meet Daubert’s fit criterion because they
“lack[] a ‘valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry,’” which is whether the
metals, as constituents of talc, can cause ovarian cancer. Hoefling, 576 F. Supp. 3d
at 278–79 (excluding an expert’s opinion because the expert could only discuss a
substance’s general carcinogenicity, not its tendency to cause the specific cancer the
plaintiff contracted) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591–92); accord Allen v. Pa.
Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he fact that [a chemical] has
been classified as a carcinogen . . . is not probative of the question whether [the
plaintiff’s] cancer was caused by [the chemical].”). Given the lack of fit, allowing
Drs. Cook and Krekeler to testify at trial regarding the heavy metals’ general
carcinogenicity, without reference to ovarian cancer, will likely confuse the issues
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and mislead the jury. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court grant this aspect of
Defendants’ motion and exclude Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s opinions that certain
heavy metals are carcinogenic.
(2) 	Dr. Crowley’s qualifications and fit
Defendants do not appear to challenge Dr. Crowley’s qualifications to opine
on 	the 	contents 	of 	their 	products 	or 	the 	characterization 	of 	those 	contents.
Nonetheless, I independently find that Dr. Crowley is qualified to opine as to the
contents and characterization of Defendants’ products based on his credentials and
his experience as chemist and consultant in the pharmaceutical industry. His work
in 	analyzing 	the 	contents 	of 	potential 	pharmaceutical 	products 	and 	making
recommendations to companies manufacturing those products concerning their risk
mirrors the analysis supporting his opinion. That said, I note that Dr. Crowley
professes no experience as a medical doctor or with cancer but opines that certain
substances are carcinogenic. (Crowley Dep. at 62:10–63:1.) Nor does he have
expertise in cancer. (Id. at 213:21–214:4.) There does not appear to be any dispute
that Dr. Crowley’s opinion that fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products
contribute to the causation meets the fit Daubert criterion. I independently find that
Dr. Crowley’s opinion fits because it concerns the principal causation issue raised
in this case: whether Defendants’ products cause ovarian cancer.
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(3) 	Other experts’ qualifications and fit
Defendants next challenge the qualifications of other experts who rely in part
on the opinions of Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and Crowley. With respect to heavy metals,
Defendants argue that twelve95 of Plaintiffs’ medical experts are unqualified to opine
that heavy metals are present in Defendants’ products or that these substances cause
ovarian cancer. (Id. at 8–13.) Defendants similarly argue that thirteen96 of Plaintiffs’
experts are unqualified to opine that fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products
cause ovarian cancer. (Id. at 14–15.) I first discuss Defendants’ challenges to
experts’ qualifications to opine on heavy metals and then discuss challenges to their
qualifications to opine on fragrances.
(a) 	Heavy metals
Defendants argue that the medical experts relying on Dr. Cook’s and Dr.
Krekeler’s analyses “lack independent knowledge and expertise in this area and
performed no expert analysis of their own on this subject.” (Id. at 9.) They further
argue 	that 	in 	light 	of 	those 	experts’ 	lack 	of 	qualifications, 	their 	opinions
impermissibly parrot the opinions of other experts. (Id. at 13.)
95 	These 	experts 	are 	Drs. 	Clarke-Pearson, 	Cote, 	Kane, 	Levy, 	McTiernan, 	Moorman,
Siemiatycki, Sage, Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances
Br. at 9 n.24.)
96 	These experts are Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, Cote, Kane, Levy, McTiernan, Moorman,
Plunkett, Sage, Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman, Wolf, and Zelikoff. (Id. at 14 n.42.)
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I agree with Defendants that the causation experts are not qualified to
independently opine on whether Defendants’ products contain heavy metals. As
Plaintiffs point out, they are epidemiologists, geneticists, toxicologists, pathologists,
or other related medical professionals—not mineralogists or mining experts. (See id.
at 8.)
Drs. Cook and Krekeler are mineralogists and, as discussed above, are
qualified to opine on the presence and characterization of heavy metals in the talc
products at issue. Accordingly, to the extent other experts rely on Drs. Cook’s and
Krekeler’s analyses for the proposition that Defendants’ products contain heavy
metals, such reliance is permissible. See Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s
notes to 2000 Amendments (“The term ‘data’ is intended to encompass the reliable
opinions of other experts.”); Fed. R. Evid.703; Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. NL Indus.,
Inc., No. 09-cv-4117, 2017 WL 3568401, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2017) (“In forming
an 	opinion, 	experts 	may 	rely 	on 	other 	experts’ 	opinions,” 	but 	may 	not
“unblinking[ly] rel[y] on those experts’ opinions.”) (alterations in original) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting In re TMI, 193 F.3d at 716); Comm’r of Dep’t of Plan.
Nat. Res. v. Century Aluminum Co., et al., No. 05-cv-62, 2013 WL 4534742, at *4
(D.V.I. Aug. 26, 2013). If there are any weaknesses in Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s
analyses, those are matters of weight. Whether those weaknesses in turn weaken or
impact the analyses of experts who rely on Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s analyses
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is similarly a matter of weight. See In re Suboxone, 2020 WL 6887885, at *5
(“Experts ‘may use a mix of objective data and subjective analysis from another
expert to . . . create an admissible report,’ and the testifying expert’s knowledge
regarding the underlying facts ‘go[es] to the weight accorded to [that expert’s] report
and testimony, rather than its admissibility.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
I.B.E.W. Loc. Union 380 Pension Fund v. Buck Consultants, No. 03-cv-4932, 2008
WL 2265269, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2008)). Accordingly, I conclude that the
causation experts’ lack of qualifications to opine as to the mineral contents of
Defendants’ products is not a basis for outright exclusion. These experts may not
independently opine on the composition of the talc products at issue. They may,
however, rely on the opinions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler regarding the presence of
heavy metals in those products as a factual predicate in rendering their own opinions
on carcinogenicity.
As to the characterization of heavy metals as carcinogenic, I conclude that
most of Plaintiffs’ causation experts are qualified. As noted above, they are experts
in the life-sciences who are qualified to determine whether certain substances cause
cancer. They reviewed literature that they are qualified to review and made a
scientific judgment based on their review. (See, e.g., Clarke-Pearson Rep. at 8; Levy
Rep. at 18–20; McTiernan Rep. at 88; Moorman Rep at 25; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep.
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¶ 37; Singh Rep. at 60; Smith-Bindman Rep. at 15; Wolf Rep. at 13; Zelikoff Rep.
at 8–10.)
The one exception is Dr. Sage. As discussed infra, Dr. Sage’s opinions
concern Defendants’ compliance with various regulations and he does not purport
to offer causation opinions and did not undertake a causation analysis. (Sage Dep. at
118:15–122:3.) Nor does he have the qualifications to do so. Aside from a brief
period working as a physician, Dr. Sage has worked as a corporate lawyer and law
professor. (Sage Rep. ¶¶ 1–9.). Despite that, like Drs. Cook and Krekeler, Dr. Sage
still ventures into offering causation opinion testimony by referring to certain
substances present in Defendants’ products as carcinogens or carcinogenic. (See
Sage Rep. at 5.) Although Dr. Sage has experience with regulations that pertain to
public health, neither he nor Plaintiffs explain why that experience qualifies him to
offer scientific opinions on the carcinogenicity of heavy metals or fragrance
chemicals. Accordingly, I do not find Dr. Sage not qualified to opine as to
causation.97
Finally, Defendants’ arguments that the experts identified above failed to
properly analyze a causal association between heavy metals and ovarian cancer
concern whether the experts’ opinions are reliable, not whether the experts are
qualified to make such an opinion. I therefore consider those arguments below.
97 	I fully discuss Dr. Sage’s opinions and Defendants’ challenges to them infra.
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(b) 	Fragrances
Defendants’ fragrance chemicals challenge concerning Plaintiffs’ causation
experts is premised on their argument that the experts improperly “parrot” Dr.
Crowley’s opinions (i.e., the experts simply incorporate Dr. Crowley’s opinions
without 	any 	independent 	analysis 	or 	validation). 	(Defs.’ 	Heavy 	Metals 	and
Fragrances Br. at 14–15.) However, issues of improper parroting are issues of
methodology, not qualification. See In re TMI, 193 F.3d at 716 (noting that an
expert’s “failure to assess the validity of the opinions of the experts he relied upon
. . . demonstrates that the methodology he used to formulate his opinion was flawed
under Daubert as it was not calculated to produce reliable results.” (emphasis
added)). I therefore consider Defendants’ arguments when assessing the reliability
of Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions on fragrances.
As noted above, where an expert simply serves as the mouthpiece of another,
the expert’s opinions may be inadmissible as the product of unreliable methods. See
In 	re TMI, 193 	F.3d 	at 	715–16. I therefore discuss 	Defendants’ arguments
concerning Plaintiffs’ causation experts below. It does not otherwise appear that
Defendants challenge any of Plaintiffs’ experts’ qualifications to opine on a causal
connection 	between 	ovarian 	cancer 	and 	fragrance 	chemicals. 	Based 	on 	my
independent review, I find all of these experts qualified to opine on whether
fragrance 	chemicals 	are 	carcinogenic 	under 	Rule 	702’s 	liberal 	standard 	for
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qualification for the same reasons that I find them qualified to opine that certain
heavy metals are carcinogenic.
(c) 	Fit
As for the other experts’ fit, as the absence of any challenge to fit suggests,
those experts’ opinions readily fit the issues raised in this litigation. Each opinion
concerns whether heavy metals and/or fragrance chemicals can cause ovarian
cancer, which as noted above, is the central issue in this multidistrict litigation.
Accordingly, I find that each expert satisfies the fit element.
b. 	Reliability
Defendants make several reliability challenges. They challenge Plaintiffs’
experts’ opinions that heavy metals cause ovarian cancer as unreliable. (Defs.’
Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 15–26.) Defendants further challenge Dr.
Crowley’s opinion that fragrance chemicals contribute to the development of ovarian
cancer as the product of unreliable methods. (Id. at 26–43.) As noted above,
Defendants also challenge the opinions of any Plaintiffs’ experts who rely on Dr.
Crowley’s opinion as improper parroting. (Id. at 14–15.)
(1) 	Heavy metals
Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions that heavy metal exposure
can cause ovarian cancer as unreliable on two grounds: (1) the experts cite no
evidence linking heavy metal exposure to ovarian cancer and (2) the experts cite no
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evidence supporting a dose-response relationship between heavy metal exposure and
ovarian cancer. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 15-26.) I address each
of these arguments in turn.
(a) 	Lack of connection to ovarian cancer
With respect to a causal association between heavy metal exposure and
ovarian cancer, Defendants argue that although the experts cite evidence that heavy
metals can be carcinogenic in general, no expert cites evidence showing a specific
link between heavy metal exposure and ovarian cancer. (Id. at 16–21.) Defendants
argue that the experts must present scientific evidence connecting heavy metals to
ovarian cancer—the specific cancer at issue in this litigation—and the lack of
reference to any literature on this issue is fatal. (Id. at 19–20.) Defendants further
argue that these experts’ identification of a biologically plausible mechanism by
which heavy metals cause ovarian cancer is also unreliable. (Id.) They incorporate
their arguments as to the biological plausibility factor in the Bradford Hill analysis
that 	inflammation 	is 	an 	untested 	hypothesis. 	(Id.) 	But 	even 	assuming 	that
inflammation satisfies the biological plausibility factor, Defendants further argue
that there is no evidence that heavy metals cause inflammation in the ovaries.98 (Id.)
98 	As I have already addressed Defendants’ biological plausibility arguments regarding talc,
see supra Part V.B.1, and recommended that the Court admit that portion of Plaintiffs’ experts’
causation opinions, in this section, I only address Defendants’ arguments concerning the lack of
evidence that heavy metals cause inflammation in the ovaries.
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Plaintiffs respond that a specific link between heavy metals and ovarian
cancer is unnecessary because their experts opine that Defendants’ talc products “as
a whole” cause ovarian cancer, and heavy metals are just one constituent. (Pls.’
Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 13–14, 17.) Plaintiffs emphasize evidence that
the heavy metals at issue are carcinogenic in humans. (See id. at 14–16 (citing reports
from IARC, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (“ATSDR”),
and the NTP.)) Plaintiffs also argue that the presence of a biologically plausible
mechanism through which talcum powder (and the heavy metals it may contain)
causes inflammation, and ultimately carcinogenesis, supports their experts’ opinions
that heavy metals contribute to ovarian cancer. (See id. at 13–14.)
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, when analyzing the reliability of general
causation opinions in similar product liability cases, courts across the nation
typically require experts to cite evidence linking the product to the specific medical
condition at issue. See, e.g., Hoefling, 576 F. Supp. 3d at 274; Ruffin v. BP Expl. &
Prod., Inc., 137 F.4th 276, 285 (5th Cir. 2025) (noting, in excluding general
causation expert, that “[w]hile [the expert’s] testimony does link benzo(a)pyrene to
cancer, his connection of it to prostate cancer, [the plaintiff’s] condition, is
lacking.”); see also In re Paulsboro Derailment Cases, 746 Fed. App’x 94, 99 (3d
Cir. 2018) (affirming exclusion of expert where she “admitted during her deposition
that there ‘is no literature’ showing a link between short-term exposure to vinyl
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chloride and [liver] cancer”); In re Roundup, 737 F. Supp. 3d at 905 (“But saying
there is a ‘compelling link’ or an ‘association’ isn’t the same as saying that Roundup
is capable of causing [non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, a type of cancer] in humans—
which is what a plaintiff’s general causation evidence must enable the jury to
conclude.”).
The lack of literature supporting a connection between heavy metal exposure
and ovarian cancer militates in favor of exclusion of the challenged experts’ heavy
metals causation opinions. Although an expert’s opinion “should not be excluded
simply because there is no literature on point,” there must be “other factors that
demonstrate the reliability of the expert’s methodology” to warrant admission.
Schneider, 320 F.3d at 406; see also Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d
1227, 1237 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Causation can be proved even when we don’t know
precisely how the damage occurred, if there is sufficiently compelling proof that the
agent must have caused the damage somehow.”). Here, the only other theory that
Plaintiffs’ experts offer is that the heavy metals at issue may cause inflammation,
which can contribute to ovarian carcinogenicity. (See, e.g., Smith-Bindman Rep. at
15; Smith Rep. at 19; Levy Rep. at 18; Zelikoff Rep. at 12–13.)
Courts have consistently recognized that the existence of a biologically
plausible mechanism, standing alone, does not compensate for the absence of data
supporting general causation. Hoefling, 576 F. Supp. at 274; accord In re Abilify,
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299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308 (“Although biological plausibility, without more, cannot
establish general causation; its existence ‘lends credence to an inference of causality’
drawn from other, more substantial evidence.”); In re Viagra, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 791
(“Biological plausibility thus is only a subsidiary consideration in the larger question
of general causation.”).
Applied here, these cases stand for the principle that even where evidence
suggests a substance is generally carcinogenic or is associated with one type of
cancer, an expert may not, consistent with Daubert, extrapolate from that evidence
to opine that the substance causes a different cancer in the absence of supporting
data. The presence of a biologically plausible mechanism does not cure that
evidentiary gap. An opinion resting solely on such an extrapolation amounts to an
untested hypothesis and does not satisfy Rule 702’s reliability requirements.
Hoefling is particularly instructive. There, the plaintiff’s general causation
expert relied on authorities’ (including IARC) conclusions that smokeless tobacco
caused oral cancer and other oral conditions. 576 F. Supp. 3d at 272.99 The plaintiff,
99 	The Hoefling court’s summary of the basis of the plaintiff’s general causation expert’s
opinion was as follows: (1) [IARC] concluded “[s]mokeless tobacco causes cancers of the oral
cavity”; (2) the U.S. Surgeon General determined smokeless tobacco “can cause cancer and a
number of non-cancerous oral conditions and can lead to nicotine addiction and dependence”; (3)
the American Academy of Otolaryngology (“AAO”) and CDC determined “smokeless tobacco
products contain cancer causing chemicals,” the most harmful of which include tobacco-specific
nitrosamines (“TSNAs”); and (4) every “major public health organization,” such as the WHO,
American Cancer Society and National Cancer Institute, has identified smokeless tobacco as a
“cause of oral cancer.” Id.
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however, contracted tonsil cancer, and the court noted that “IARC did not conclude
smokeless tobacco causes tonsil or oropharyngeal cancer.” Id.; Culliver v. BP Expl.
& Prod., Inc., No. 21-cv-4942, 2024 WL 1478659, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2024)
(“IARC’s designation of benzo[a]pyrene as a carcinogen, generally, is not sufficient
to show it can cause prostate cancer.” (citing Allen, 102 F.3d at 196–97)). The
Hoefling court therefore found that the general causation expert’s analysis was
unreliable because his sources did not justify his view that the defendants’ products
caused tonsil cancer. 576 F. Supp. at 272.
The Hoefling court also rejected the expert’s reliance on a biologically
plausible mechanism as a sufficient basis to opine that smokeless tobacco can cause
tonsil cancer. See id. at 274. The expert’s belief in the mechanism did “not account
for the absence of data to support general causation.” Id.; see also id. at 279 (noting,
with respect to a different general causation expert, that, “like his colleagues, he
ultimately could not move past biological plausibility and identify data to support
general causation”). The court emphasized the expert’s acknowledgment of the “lack
of 	epidemiological 	research 	establishing 	the 	necessary 	causal 	link 	between
smokeless tobacco and tonsil cancer.” Id. However, the court did not reject the
expert’s testimony solely due to the absence of literature or epidemiological
evidence establishing a causal connection between smokeless tobacco and tonsil
cancer. See id. at 275 (“When an expert’s causation opinion is ‘equivocal or
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inconsistent with’ epidemiological research, the expert must ‘thoroughly analyze’
its ‘strengths and weaknesses.’” (quoting In re Zoloft, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 475)). The
court also pointed out that the expert offered no additional support for his opinion
other than a biologically plausible mechanism and the general carcinogenic nature
of smokeless tobacco, and therefore, failed to meet the reliability prong of Daubert.
See id. That the expert made “‘speculative leaps’ in claiming that a causal link exists
simply because it is biologically plausible” demonstrated that his analysis was
unreliable. Id.
Beyond its speculative nature, the Hoefling court also found that the expert’s
opinion was not the product of a reliable scientific methodology. See id. As the
expert had no evidence to shore up his opinion, it was not falsifiable or testable,
which also rendered the opinion unreliable under Daubert. See id. (“But it is
‘impossible to test a hypothesis’ produced by a subjective methodology because only
its ‘creator’ can ‘test[] or falsify[]’ it.” (alterations in original) (quoting In re TMI,
193 F.3d at 703 n.144.)) In sum, the Hoefling court excluded the expert’s opinion
because it was speculative and unscientific. See id. (concluding that the expert’s
opinion that smokeless tobacco “can cause tonsil cancer is not reliable because it is
nothing more than an ‘untested hypothesis’” and because “it is ‘mere subjective
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belief” propped up by biological plausibility rather than an ‘objective inference[]
from the relevant scientific evidence’” (citations omitted)).100
Here, on the subject of heavy metals, Plaintiffs’ experts offer substantially
similar opinions in scope as to those excluded in Hoefling. Each expert relies on a
similar body of literature that heavy metals are generally carcinogenic. (See Clarke-
Pearson Rep. at 7–8 (citing IARC classifications of chromium, cobalt, and nickel);
Carson Rep. at 6–7 (same); Kane Rep. at 5 (same); Levy Rep. at 18–19 (same);
McTiernan Rep. at 85 (same); Moorman Rep. at 7 (same); Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep.
at 26 (citing IARC classifications and NTP classification of chromium and cobalt);
Sage Rep. at 2, 6 (citing IARC classifications); Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 27,
115 (same); Singh Rep. at 14 (citing academic article on mineral characterization of
talcum powder); Smith Rep. at 19 (citing IARC classifications); Smith-Bindman
Rep. at 4 (same); Wolf Rep. at 13 (same); Zelikoff Rep. at 8–10 (same).) Like the
experts in Hoefling, some of Plaintiffs’ causation experts point to the biologically
plausible mechanism as evidence through which heavy metals could cause ovarian
cancer. (See, e.g., Carson Dep. at 171:16–21; Carson Rep. at 8–10; Levy Rep. at 16,
19; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 50–51; Plunkett 2021 Dep. at 268:7–13.)
100 	The Hoefling court excluded the opinions of two other general causation experts with
similar opinions for same reasons. See id. at 276–80.
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Like the Hoefling court, I conclude that the presence of a biologically
plausible mechanism cannot compensate for the lack of data or evidence connecting
heavy metal exposure to ovarian cancer.101 Without such data, Plaintiffs’ experts
have presented only a hypothesis that heavy metal exposure causes ovarian cancer,
albeit such substances are purportedly contained in talc. That is not a reliable method
under Daubert. Additionally, the experts’ analyses do not appear to have considered
a wider body of literature on the subject of heavy metal exposure causing ovarian
cancer through the mechanism they suggest or otherwise. As Defendants point out,
some experts say that consideration of heavy metal exposure is not necessary to their
opinions on the causative effect of talc on ovarian cancer. (See Siemiatycki Dep. at
55:16–56:7; Levy Dep. at 127:5–128:6; Kane Dep. at 133:23–135:2; Moorman Dep.
at 119:10–123:12; Clarke-Pearson Dep. at 291:16–18; Plunkett 2021 Dep. at
271:15–274:16.) Others acknowledge that they have not specifically investigated the
causal connection between heavy metal exposure and ovarian cancer, are unaware
of any evidence that a connection exists, and/or unaware if anyone has investigated
such a connection. (See Clarke-Pearson Dep. at 289:22–291:18; Carson Dep. at
299:18–300:5; Wolf Dep. at 431:23–432:7, 434:7-10; Cote: Dep. at 111:13–21,
101 	It bears emphasis that, with respect to talc, as distinguished from its component parts,
Plaintiffs’ experts do not rely on biological plausibility in isolation. Rather, they conduct a
Bradford Hill analysis that encompasses not only a biologically plausible mechanism by which
talc may cause ovarian cancer, but also a substantial body of epidemiologic, mechanistic, and
observational evidence supporting an association—and, in their view, a causal link—between talc
exposure and ovarian cancer.
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142:24–143:4; Smith Dep. at 61:9–14; Sage Dep. at 293:10–294:2; Singh Dep. at
184:9–13, 298:24–300:6.) These analytical gaps highlight the hypothetical nature of
these experts’ opinions on heavy metal. While future research may substantiate the
causal connection on which Plaintiffs’ experts seek to opine in this litigation, without
such research, I cannot find, on this record, that the experts’ opinions are reliable.
Finally, I am unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument that evidence connecting
heavy metals to ovarian cancer is unnecessary because the experts opine on talcum
powder “as a whole.” (Pls.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 14.) Plaintiffs cite
no legal authority for the proposition that when the Defendants’ product is a mixture
of substances, it is unnecessary to demonstrate evidence of a causal connection for
any potentially harmful constituent substance, when Plaintiffs themselves have
chosen to opine that the constituent substances cause the cancer at issue. Moreover,
Plaintiffs’ experts concede that they cannot establish the relative contribution of
heavy metals and the other substances in Defendants’ talc products to the causation
of ovarian cancer. Nor have Plaintiffs’ experts explained that heavy metals and other
substances act in concert to cause ovarian cancer. This is in contrast with one
substance, asbestos, where Plaintiffs have proffered sufficient evidence causally
associating asbestos with ovarian cancer. But Plaintiffs have failed to do the same
for heavy metals. For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the experts’ opinions
concerning heavy metals should be excluded in their entirety.
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(b) 	Dose-response
Defendants further challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ heavy metals opinions
because the experts fail to identify a concentration at which heavy metals may cause
cancer. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 21–26.) They argue that the
failure to identify a threshold above which heavy metals are toxic is independently
fatal to the reliability of Plaintiffs’ experts’ causation opinions. (Id.)
Plaintiffs respond that the lack of a dose-response relationship does not
necessarily undermine the reliability of their experts’ opinions, pointing out that
neither Bradford Hill nor qualitative risk assessments require consideration of a
dose-response relationship. (Id. at 24–25.) They also reprise their arguments that the
presence of a biologically plausible mechanism through which talc (as well as the
heavy metals) can cause ovarian cancer overcomes the absence of a dose-response
relationship. (Id. at 24–28.) While I have already recommended that the experts’
heavy metal opinions be excluded, to be complete, I will address this argument as
well.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, courts generally require some evidence of a
dose-response relationship or evidence compensating for the lack of a dose-response
relationship. 	See 	Pinares 	v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., 19-cv-14831, 2023 	WL
2661521, at *3 (11th Cir. Mar. 28, 2023) (“[W]e have never required an expert to
‘give precise numbers about a dose-response relationship,’ . . . we do require an
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expert 	to 	lay 	a 	‘reliable 	groundwork 	for 	determining 	the 	dose-response
relationship.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Williams v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,
889 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2018))); Sutherland v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., No.
04-cv-0129, 2006 WL 6617000, at *11 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2006) (“If an expert offers
no evidence related to the dose-response relationship, there is an unsurmountable
methodology problem.”); Hartle v. FirstEnergy Generation Corp., No. 08-cv-1019,
2014 WL 868913, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2014) (citing McClain, 401 F.3d at 1241
n.6).
This requirement is evident from my 2020 Opinion, which Plaintiffs cite in
support of their argument that no evidence of dose-response is required. (See Pls.’
Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 24 (citing In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F.
Supp. 3d at 179).) As I concluded in the 2020 Opinion, “a strong dose-response is
not necessarily required for an expert to find a causal nexus.” 509 F. Supp. 3d at 17
(emphasis added). Although Plaintiffs and Defendants disputed the strength of the
dose-response relationship concerning talc and ovarian cancer both now and in 2020,
Plaintiffs’ experts provided some evidence of dose-response. See id. (“Even so, the
causation experts have pinpointed studies that demonstrate evidence of dose-
response, i.e., meta-analyses, and adequately explained why the studies, themselves,
are reliable.”). As discussed supra Part V.B.5.iii, the experts’ reference to a body of
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evidence concerning a connection, and dose response, between talc and ovarian
cancer is sufficient under Daubert.
Unlike with talc and asbestos, however, Plaintiffs appear to concede that they
have provided no evidence of a dose-response relationship between heavy metals
and ovarian cancer. (See Pls.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 24–35.) Their
experts similarly appear to concede that there is no evidence of such a relationship.
(See, e.g., Zelikoff Dep. at 282:10–24; Carson Dep. at 169:17–23, 175:6–176:10;
Plunkett 2021 Dep. at 263:24–264:1; Clarke-Pearson Dep. at 292:6–10.)
Turning to Plaintiffs’ arguments in opposition, I first am unpersuaded that the
presence of a biologically plausible mechanism obviates the need to consider a dose-
response relationship. As noted above, Plaintiffs have provided evidence of a dose-
response relationship between both asbestos and talc with ovarian cancer, as well as
a biologically plausible mechanism. Here, they do not have the requisite evidence of
a dose-response relationship with heavy metals.
For similar reasons, I am also unpersuaded that the experts’ use of qualitative
risk assessment and a Bradford Hill analysis on talcum powder generally obviates
the need for a dose-response relationship to establish the reliability of their experts’
opinions concerning heavy metals. I have recommended, based on the fulsome
discussion supra Part V.B.5.iii, that Plaintiffs’ experts may testify that under their
qualitative risk assessments and attendant Bradford Hill analyses of talcum powder
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there is a causative relationship, including a dose-response relationship between talc
and 	ovarian 	cancer—without 	evaluating 	the individual 	constituent 	substances
(except for asbestos) that are included in Defendants’ products, such as heavy
metals. But Plaintiffs seek to offer expert opinions that those heavy metals are
carcinogenic and can contribute to the causation of ovarian cancer. For that scientific
proposition, Plaintiffs must provide a sufficiently reliable analysis under Rule 702
and Daubert, whether it takes the form of qualitative risk assessment, a Bradford
Hill analysis, or some other reliable methodology. Cf. In re Denture Cream Products
Liab. Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 n.28 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“[T]he lack of any
analytic epidemiological studies does weaken Plaintiffs’ experts’ assertion of
causation.”).
Because Plaintiffs’ experts failed to substantiate their opinions on heavy
metal, I recommend that the Court grant Defendants’ motion to exclude Plaintiffs’
causation experts’ opinions that heavy metals contribute to the toxicity and/or
carcinogenicity of Defendants’ products.
(2) 	Dr. Crowley—fragrance chemicals
Defendants challenge the reliability of Dr. Crowley’s opinions. Like their
heavy metals challenge, Defendants argue that Dr. Crowley’s method is unreliable
because (1) he fails to cite evidence linking fragrance chemical exposure to ovarian
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cancers, and (2) and fails to analyze dosage. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances
Br. at 27–43.)
In response, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Crowley does not offer a medical
causation opinion. According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Crowley instead opines on whether
the “chemical properties of J&J’s fragrance chemicals met regulatory standards, and
whether they can contribute to the inflammatory properties, toxicity, and potential
carcinogenicity of the Talcum Powder Products as a whole.” (Pls.’ Heavy Metals
and Fragrances Br. at 32.) As for reliability, Plaintiffs offer similar responses to those
that they offered with respect to heavy metals. Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Crowley’s
methods are reliable based on his past experience as a chemist and in the
pharmaceutical field and were reliably applied here because he followed the methods
he uses in the industry. (Id. at 32–42.) They further respond that there is sufficient
evidence indicating a relationship between certain fragrance chemicals and ovarian
cancer. (Id. at 42–47.) Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that it was unnecessary for Dr.
Crowley to conduct a dose-response assessment. (Id. at 47–52.)
(a) 	Lack of a link to ovarian cancer
At the outset, I disagree with Plaintiffs that Dr. Crowley does not offer an
opinion that concerns medical causation. Even under Plaintiffs’ own formulation,
Dr. Crowley’s opinion that fragrance chemicals “contribute to the inflammatory
properties, toxicity, and potential carcinogenicity” is an opinion suggesting that
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certain 	substances 	in 	Defendants’ 	products 	may 	cause 	cancer. 	(Id. 	at 	32.)
Characterizing 	his 	opinion 	as 	one 	of 	causation 	or 	one 	of 	“contribution 	to
carcinogenicity” is a distinction without difference because the functional import of
the opinion is the same: Dr. Crowley opines that the fragrance chemicals can cause
(or contribute to) ovarian cancer. (Crowley Dep. at 327:14–328:13 (“Q. You’re not
expressing an opinion as to whether or not the chemical substances that you identify
in this section of your report, [Section] 4.8, either cause or contribute to ovarian
cancer. Correct? [objection omitted] A. Actually, I am . . . I’ve stated fairly clearly,
I feel, that, you know, you’ve got a whole bunch of irritants, . . . sensitizers, . . .
allergens, . . . where that talc particle goes, those fragrance chemicals go with it. . . .
[M]any of them – demonstrated biological activity in animal and in vitro cell models
that demonstrates toxicity and carcinogenicity. . . . I think they can absolutely
contribute to the carcinogenicity of the product in total.”).) This conclusion frames
the rest of the analysis of Dr. Crowley’s opinions. As Dr. Crowley seeks to offer
testimony on causation, he is subject to the same standards that I have applied above
to Plaintiffs’ causation experts with respect to talc, asbestos, and heavy metals.
In that regard, on the issue of a scientific link, Dr. Crowley concedes that there
is no evidence of such a connection between the fragrance chemicals and human
ovarian cancer. (See Crowley Dep. at 114:9–15, 199:16–19 (“I am not aware of an
epidemiological study substantiating the causation of ovarian cancer from the so-
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called fragrance chemicals.”), 234:5–20, 252:12–17, 261:18–24, 264:15–23, 271:5–
19.) Dr. Crowley cites several sources that identify certain fragrance chemicals as
generally carcinogenic and cause specific cancers that are not ovarian cancer. (See,
e.g., Crowley Rep. at 12 (citing classifications of chemicals by IARC, NTP, the
EPA); Crowley Dep. at 249:15–252:17; 256:11–257:21; 262:1–8, 264:15–265:24,
276:22–277:3.) 	Dr. 	Crowley 	also 	relies 	on 	animal 	studies, primarily 	studies
involving animal ovary cells to support his opinion.102 (See, e.g., Crowley Rep. at
21, 23–25; Crowley Dep. at 115:14–119:8, 217:12–218:5, 221:20–222:2; see also
Pls.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 43–44 (identifying animal studies Dr.
Crowley relies upon).)
To reiterate, “[g]enerally, courts are ‘reluctant to allow expert testimony based
upon animal studies to prove causation in humans unless there are good grounds to
extrapolate data and results from animals to humans.’” In re Valsartan, 2025 WL
3141002, at *24 (quoting In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 670); see also Leake
v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560, n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“Animal studies
102 	Plaintiffs argue in opposition that certain studies on fragrance chemicals and ovaries would
be unethical. But as Defendants point out, this does not relieve Plaintiffs of their burden to
demonstrate that their expert opinion testimony is reliable. See De Los Santos v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. 21-01208, 2024 WL 3700205, at *23 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 7, 2024) (“Regardless of any
sympathy this Court may have for Plaintiff’s asserted inability to produce such reliable scientific
evidence as controlled experiments firmly establishing the effects of benzene on humans, which
would be unethical, ‘courts may only admit the state of science as it is.’ Thus, this Court does not
today hold that benzene cannot or did not cause Plaintiff’s alleged injuries; only that he has failed
to prove it with reliable evidence.” (quoting Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202
(11th Cir. 2002)).
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may also provide sufficient scientific basis for an expert’s general causation opinion,
provided there are ‘good grounds to extrapolate [the findings] from animals to
humans[.]’”) (alterations in original) (quoting Fabrizi v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., No.
01-cv-289, 2004 WL 1202984, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Jun. 2, 2004)); In re Paraquat, 730
F. Supp. 3d at 808. The level of support for extrapolation required will vary with the
circumstances of the study, but sufficiently reliable extrapolation generally involves
accounting for metabolic and physiological differences between the animals studied
and humans, as well as differences in dosage. See In re Valsartan, 2025 WL
3141002, at *24; Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
Here, Dr. Crowley does not appear to offer any grounds, much less good
grounds, for extrapolating from the animal studies he cites to humans. Indeed, Dr.
Crowley admits that there “is no animal model for ovarian cancer,” which would
logically require that Dr. Crowley offer a strong basis for extrapolating animal data
to humans. (Crowley Dep. at 278:18–279:8); see In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d
at 657 (“[T]here must be good grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans, just
as the methodology of the studies must constitute good grounds to reach conclusions
about the animals themselves. Thus, the requirement of reliability, or ‘good
grounds,’ extends to each step in an expert’s analysis all the way through the step
that connects the work of the expert to the particular case.” (quoting In re Paoli, 35
F.3d at 742–43)).
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Plaintiffs suggest that the fact that Dr. Crowley relied on studies assessing
hamster ovaries is sufficient to extrapolate the hamster study. (See Pls.’ Heavy
Metals and Fragrances Br. at 43–44 (“Dr. Crowley identifies the studies in his report,
and he also listed the fragrance chemicals in Baby Powder that have specifically
been linked to ovarian abnormalities in animal studies at his deposition: [citing
examples].”).) But the identity of the target organ alone is not sufficient. Dr. Crowley
does not discuss whether there are meaningful differences between hamster ovaries
and human ovaries that may impact extrapolating data. Nor does Dr. Crowley
purport to identify any general differences or similarities between humans and
hamsters that would permit the extrapolation of hamster studies to humans. See In
re Valsartan, 2025 WL 3141002, at *25 (“[R]ats typically have much shorter
lifespans than humans, meaning that the timelines of disease in rodents and humans
differ 	considerably.”). 	At 	one 	point, 	Dr. 	Crowley 	notes 	that 	the 	routes 	of
administration (i.e., whether the chemical was administered orally, vaginally, or
through a different route) of the chemical in a study impacts its extrapolation, but he
does not explain how he can effectively extrapolate from a study using oral
administration to the vaginal administration of fragrance chemicals in humans. (See
Crowley Dep. at 269:8–14.)
In 	addition, 	Dr. 	Crowley 	also 	fails 	to 	provide 	a 	reliable 	method 	for
extrapolating the dosages of fragrance chemicals used in the animal studies he cites.
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For example, Dr. Crowley cites to one study concerning eugenol that caused
“endometrial stromal polyps” in the reproductive systems of rats and explains the
dosage used in the study. (See Crowley Dep. at 271:20–273:7.) But he fails to explain
how that dosage can be extrapolated to humans. (See id.) In another example, Dr.
Crowley relies on a 2006 NTP animal study of benzophenone that observed certain
tumors in rats, including in the rats’ ovaries. (Crowley Dep. at 277:17–280:13.) But,
as 	Defendants 	contend, 	the 	rats 	in 	the 	NTP 	were 	given 	different 	doses 	of
benzophenone, and only certain doses resulted in tumors. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and
Fragrances Br. at 34.) Dr. Crowley does not account for this variation in dose in his
analysis.
Moreover, Dr. Crowley 	only 	offers animal studies to support a causal
connection between certain fragrance chemicals and human ovarian cancer. While
other Plaintiffs’ experts have relied on animal studies, as is discussed elsewhere in
this Report and Recommendation, in those instances, the experts relied on other
forms of evidence as well, such as epidemiological studies. Here, Dr. Crowley offers
only animal studies in support of his opinion and he does not reliably extrapolate
from them or provide a reliable basis to extrapolate from them. Given these failures,
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I recommend that the Court exclude his opinions that fragrance chemicals contribute
to the toxicity and carcinogenicity of Defendants’ products.103
(b) 	Dose-response
As to Dr. Crowley’s alleged failure to consider a dose-response relationship,
I reiterate that the case law generally requires some, but not necessarily strong,
evidence of a dose-response relationship. I am not persuaded that Dr. Crowley has
advanced sufficient evidence concerning dosage to make his opinions reliable.
Plaintiffs argue that they were not given sufficient information for Dr.
Crowley to consider dosage. (Pls.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 47–48.)
However, Plaintiffs do not specify that they sought the information that they now
claim Defendants failed to provide. Neither party clarifies whether Plaintiffs sought
or moved to compel more specific information concerning the concentrations of
various fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products. (See id. at 40–42.) However,
Plaintiffs carry the burden to demonstrate that Dr. Crowley’s opinions are based on
sufficient facts and data under Rule 702. Barring any issues of improper withholding
of relevant discovery information (which does not appear to be the case here, and,
103 	Although I exclude Dr. Crowley’s causation opinion (i.e., fragrance chemicals in talc
contribute to talc’s toxicity) as the product of an unreliable methodology, that exclusion does not
extend to, or undermine, his identification of the fragrance chemicals present in Defendants’ talc
products.
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in any event, is not an issue before me), if Dr. Crowley does not have sufficient facts
and data to support one of his opinions, it is inadmissible.
Nonetheless, 	Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	no 	consideration 	of 	dose-response
concerning the fragrance chemicals is required for the same reasons that it was not
required for heavy metals. (See id. at 48–52.) Plaintiffs first note that consideration
of dose-response is unnecessary when conducting a qualitative risk assessment. (See
id. at 48–49.) Yet Dr. Crowley admits that he did not conduct a risk assessment. (See
Crowley Dep. at 200:13–202:6, 204:15–22.) Nor has any other expert conducted a
qualitative risk assessment specifically focused on fragrance chemicals. Plaintiffs
also raise the presence of a biologically plausible mechanism by which the fragrance
chemical can cause ovarian cancer as support for the reliability of Dr. Crowley’s
opinions. But as I concluded above with respect to heavy metals, the presence of a
biologically plausible mechanism and the general carcinogenicity of the fragrance
chemicals 	alone 	is 	insufficiently 	reliable 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	some 	additional
supporting evidence, such as a more specific connection to ovarian cancer or a dose-
response relationship. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court exclude Dr.
Crowley’s opinions that fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products contribute to
those products’ toxicity or carcinogenicity.
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(c) 	Other experts’ opinions on fragrance chemicals
As noted above, I construe Defendants’ argument that certain experts merely
“parrot” Dr. Crowley’s opinions as a challenge to the reliability of those experts’
methodologies. 	Simply 	adopting 	or 	repeating 	another 	expert’s 	conclusions—
particularly where, as here, the underlying opinion is itself unreliable—does not
constitute a reliable method under Rule 702. See In re TMI, 193 F.3d at 716.
Accordingly, to the extent any expert’s opinion on the toxicity of fragrance
chemicals in Defendants’ talc products rests solely on uncritical acceptance of Dr.
Crowley’s conclusions, such testimony is subject to exclusion.
Indeed, with one exception discussed below, each expert who offers opinions
regarding fragrance chemicals indicates that he or she reviewed Dr. Crowley’s report
and concurs with its conclusions, or merely cites that report while providing little to
no independent analysis addressing any causal association between fragrance
chemicals and ovarian cancer. (See Carson Rep. at 6 (citing Crowley Rep.); Clarke-
Pearson Rep. at 8 (same); Cote Rep. at 11–12; Kane Rep. at 5 (same); Levy Rep. at
19 (same); McTiernan Rep. at 88 (same); Moorman Rep. at 35; Sage Rep. at 6–7
(same); Singh Rep. at 60 (same); Smith Rep. at 21–22 (concluding that fragrances
contribute to talc’s carcinogenicity without citation or analysis); Smith-Bindman
Rep. at 15 (citing Crowley Rep.); Wolf Rep. at 12–13 (same); Zelikoff Rep. at 12
(same); see also Sage Dep. at 290:6–291:3; Cote Dep. at 110:22–112:2, 144:24–
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147:6; Wolf Dep. at 171:15–174:11; McTiernan Dep. at 272:11–273:16; Smith Dep.
at 61:15–62:3, 331:3–22; Levy Dep. at 122:22–128:6; Kane Dep. at 130:25–131:7.)
Because these experts appear to have accepted Dr. Crowley’s conclusions
wholesale, without undertaking any independent analysis or validation, I conclude
that they impermissibly parrot his opinions in violation of Rule 702. Accordingly, I
recommend that the Court exclude their opinions concerning whether fragrance
chemicals contribute to the toxicity or carcinogenicity of Defendants’ products. See
In re TMI, 193 F.3d at 716 (noting that failure to assess the validity of another
expert’s work warrants exclusion).104
The only exception appears to be Dr. Plunkett, who explains that she did not
rely on Dr. Crowley’s report but reviewed it after completing an independent
analysis. (ECF No. 33005-13 (“Plunkett 2018 Dep.”) at 336:5–339:14; see also
Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶¶ 35–36.) Accordingly, I do not conclude that Dr. Plunkett
improperly parrots Dr. Crowley’s opinions. However, I do otherwise conclude that
104 	As I have not excluded Dr. Crowley’s opinions concerning the contents of Defendants’
products, Dr. Crowley’s work may serve as a factual predicate establishing the presence of specific
fragrance chemicals in the products at issue. Had Plaintiffs’ causation experts then employed
reliable, independent methodologies to assess whether those identified fragrance chemicals cause
ovarian cancer, their opinions could be admissible notwithstanding the exclusion of Dr. Crowley’s
causation conclusions. That is, reliance on Dr. Crowley for the limited purpose of identifying
which fragrance chemicals are present in the talc products is permissible. However, Plaintiffs’
causation experts stopped there, and did not conduct an independent analysis of whether fragrance
chemicals cause ovarian cancer. Instead, they adopted Dr. Crowley’s carcinogenicity conclusions
wholesale, without validation or separate methodological support. Because their opinions merely
echo Dr. Crowley’s excluded causation opinions—rather than applying independent scientific
reasoning to the identified chemicals—they must likewise be excluded under Rule 702.
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Dr. Plunkett’s opinions suffer from the same methodological problems discussed
above with respect to Dr. Crowley’s opinions. Dr. Plunkett similarly has no evidence
to connect any fragrance chemicals specifically to ovarian cancer, (see id. at 275:9–
25), and is similarly unable to determine the relative contribution of any fragrance
chemical to the overall risk of Defendants’ products, (see Plunkett 2018 Dep. at
167:24–171:15). As such, I recommend excluding Dr. Plunket’s causation opinion
of fragrance chemicals in talc.
To summarize my recommendations with respect to Defendants’ motions
concerning heavy metals and fragrance chemicals, I recommend that the Court (i)
exclude the opinions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler insofar as either expert opines that
a substance is carcinogenic for a lack of fit, (ii) exclude Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions105 that heavy metals cause or contribute to the causation of ovarian cancer
because those experts did not use reliable methods in causally connecting heavy
metals to ovarian cancer, (iii) exclude the causation opinion of Dr. Crowley related
to fragrance chemicals as he similarly did not use reliable methods in causally
connecting those chemicals to ovarian cancer, and (iv) exclude Plaintiffs’ experts’
105 	As noted above, the relevant Plaintiffs’ causation experts are Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson,
Cote, Kane, Levy, McTiernan, Moorman, Siemiatycki, Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf.
As noted above, my recommendation excluding Plaintiffs’ experts’ heavy metals opinions applies
to Dr. Carson’s opinions notwithstanding the reference to Dr. Carson in the 2020 Opinion.
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opinions106 that fragrance chemicals cause or contribute to the causation of ovarian
cancer because, inter alia, those opinions impermissibly parrot Dr. Crowley’s
excluded opinions or are not the product of reliable opinions.107
C. 	Plaintiffs’ 	Motions 	to 	Exclude 	Defendants’ 	Rebuttal 	Experts’
Genetics-Related 	General 	Causation 	Opinions 	and 	Biological
Plausibility Opinions108
Plaintiffs move to exclude portions of the opinions offered by three of
Defendants’ designated gynecologic oncologists—Dr. Cheryl Saenz, Dr. Kevin
Holcomb, and Dr. Michael Finan. (See generally ECF No. 32999-1 (“Pls.’ Finan,
Saenz & Holcomb Br.”).) Plaintiffs also move to exclude portions of the opinions
offered by Dr. Analisa DiFeo, an ovarian cancer researcher, (see ECF No. 33010-1
(“Pls.’ DiFeo Br.”)), Dr. Jennifer Permuth, a molecular epidemiologist, (see ECF
106 	As noted above, the relevant Plaintiffs’ causation experts are Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson,
Cote, Kane, Levy, McTiernan, Moorman, Plunkett, Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman, Wolf, and
Zelikoff.
107 	I do not find that Plaintiffs’ experts’ failure to reliably link heavy metals or fragrance
chemicals to ovarian cancer undermines the admissibility of their opinions that Defendants’ talc
products, considered as a whole, cause ovarian cancer. As explained throughout this section and
elsewhere in this Report and Recommendation, both Plaintiffs and Defendants have consistently
framed the causation inquiry at the product level—examining the carcinogenicity of cosmetic talc
as a whole and its effects on ovarian tissue. Indeed, Defendants’ own experts expressly adopt that
same approach, evaluating talc in its entirety without parsing causation by individual constituents.
(See, e.g., ECF No. 32999-5 (“Saenz Rep.”) at 58; ECF No. 32999-7 (“Finan Rep.”) at 4; ECF No.
32999-6 (“Holcomb Rep.”) at 3.)
108 	As explained above, I will issue a separate Report and Recommendation addressing the
portions of Plaintiffs’ motions seeking to exclude certain of Defendants’ experts’ specific causation
opinions. Therefore, my decisions resolving Plaintiffs’ motions to exclude the opinions and
testimony of Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, Permuth, DiFeo, and Boyd, will not substantively
address these experts’ specific causation opinions or Plaintiffs’ arguments to exclude them. Rather,
I will focus on the opinions of these experts on general causation.
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No. 33001-1 (“Pls.’ Permuth Br.”)), and Dr. Jeff Boyd, a molecular geneticist and
gynecologic cancer researcher, (see ECF No. 33060-1 (“Pls.’ Boyd Br.”)).
As an overview, Plaintiffs challenge: (i) those portions of Defendants’
experts’ 	opinions 	suggesting 	that 	unidentified 	genetic 	mutations, 	yet-to-be-
discovered genetic mutations, and/or genetic variants of uncertain significance
(“VUS”) 	may 	explain 	Plaintiffs’ 	ovarian 	cancers—or 	ovarian 	cancer 	more
generally—on the grounds that such opinions are speculative and insufficiently
supported;109 (ii) certain experts’ biological plausibility opinions as lacking scientific
reliability and posing a risk of confusing or misleading the jury; and (iii) what
Plaintiffs characterize as the application of an incorrect standard for assessing
biological plausibility, which they contend warrants exclusion of related opinions.
Plaintiffs further move to exclude Dr. Boyd’s critique of mechanistic and in vitro
studies, along with any associated biological plausibility conclusions, arguing that
his opinions are not supported by his qualifications, are methodologically unreliable,
and are not relevant to issues the jury must decide.
Given 	the 	substantial 	overlap 	between 	Plaintiffs’ 	arguments 	for, 	and
Defendants’ arguments against, the partial exclusion of Dr. Saenz, Dr. Holcomb, Dr.
Finan, Dr. DiFeo, Dr. Permuth, and Dr. Boyd, I will address common issues in
109 	It is important to note that Plaintiffs are not seeking to exclude the experts’ opinions on
genetic testing as a general matter; rather, Plaintiffs only seek to preclude opinions regarding
unidentified genetic mutations, yet-to-be-discovered genetic mutations, and/or VUS.
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tandem and recommend rulings accordingly based on my assessment of the Parties’
positions. Although Plaintiffs do not contest most of these experts’ qualifications or
opinions, it is necessary to contextualize my forthcoming recommendations in this
section. Therefore, I will first provide an overview of Defendants’ challenged
experts, the scope of their engagement as Defendants’ experts, and their general
causation and biological plausibility opinions. Next, I will evaluate Plaintiffs’
arguments as they apply to Defendants’ experts’ pertinent methodologies and
opinions.
My prior Opinion addressed only Dr. Cheryl Saenz and did not address the
remainder of Defendants’ experts challenged here. See In re Johnson & Johnson,
509 F. Supp. 3d at 192–95. As discussed below, however, my prior Opinion
addressed certain arguments Plaintiffs now raise, which were largely presented
during the first round of motion practice. These arguments will be addressed in turn,
in accordance with the Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order.
1. 	Defendants’ Experts
Defendants offer Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, Finan, DiFeo, Permuth, and Boyd as
rebuttal experts to certain of Plaintiffs’ proffered experts. Each has submitted one or
several expert reports that purport to challenge, among other things, Plaintiffs’
experts’ general causation opinions that perineal use of cosmetic talcum powder
causes ovarian cancer. Many of these experts also offer affirmative opinions based
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on, among other things, their review of epidemiological and mechanistic literature,
their professional experiences, and their independent review of certain Plaintiffs’
experts’ methodologies and opinions.
In 	resolving 	Plaintiffs’ 	motions 	to 	exclude, 	I 	will 	first 	address 	the
qualifications of Defendants’ experts and consider their general causation and
biological plausibility opinions.
i. 	Drs. Saenz, Finan & Holcomb
a. 	Qualifications
Dr. Cheryl C. Saenz is a board-certified gynecologic oncologist with decades
of clinical and academic experience. (See Saenz Rep. at 1–2; see generally id., Ex.
A.) Dr. Saenz earned a B.A. in Biopsychology from Cornell University in 1985,
obtained her M.D. from the University of California, Irvine, in 1991, and completed
residency in Reproductive Medicine at the University of California Medical Center
in San Diego, California, in 1995. (See id. at 2.) During residency, Dr. Saenz was
awarded a Galloway Fellowship at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, and
shortly thereafter became a Fellow in Gynecologic Oncology at Memorial Sloan
Kettering Cancer Center. (Id.)
Dr. Saenz currently serves as a Clinical Professor in the Department of
Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reproductive Sciences at the University of California,
San Diego, where she has served as an attending physician since 1998. (Id. at 1–2 &
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Ex. A.) In her academic and clinical roles, Dr. Saenz has directed multidisciplinary
treatment planning for gynecologic malignancies for over two decades, served as
Chair of the Cancer Committee at the Moores Cancer Center at the University of
California, San Diego, for twelve years, and is the Medical Director of the Strauss
Family Center for the Early Detection of Ovarian Cancer. (Id. at 2–3 & Ex. A.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Dr. Saenz is qualified to act as an expert in gynecologic
oncology.
Dr. Kevin Holcomb is a board-certified gynecologic oncologist who received
his medical degree from New York Medical College, completed residency in
Obstetrics and Gynecology at The New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, and
undertook an American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology-approved fellowship
in Gynecologic Oncology at Downstate Medical Center/Kings County Hospital.
(See Holcomb Rep. at 1.) Following faculty service as an Assistant Professor at
Downstate Medical Center/Kings County Hospital, Dr. Holcomb became Director
of Gynecologic Oncology at Beth Israel Medical Center, and in 2006 returned to
Weill Cornell Medicine/New York‑Presbyterian, where he has served as Director of
Gynecologic Oncology, Vice‑Chairman of Gynecology, Director of Minimally
Invasive Surgery, and Associate Professor and Associate Dean of Admissions at the
Weill-Cornell Medical College. (Id.)
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Clinically, 	Dr. 	Holcomb 	maintains 	a 	high‑volume practice, performing
roughly 200 surgeries annually and managing chemotherapy, immunotherapy, and
targeted therapy for ovarian‑cancer patients. (Id.) Dr. Holcomb describes his clinical
responsibilities to include, among other things, “the identification of genetic,
reproductive, and environmental risk factors.” (Id.) Academically, Dr. Holcomb has
authored 	or 	co‑authored 	more 	than 	90 	peer‑reviewed 	publications, 	leads
multi‑institutional prospective trials, and reviews for leading journals. (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Dr. Holcomb is qualified to act as an expert in
gynecologic oncology.
Dr. Michael A. Finan is a board-certified obstetrician-gynecologist and
gynecologic oncologist with more than three decades of clinical practice. (See Finan
Rep. at 2.) Dr. Finan earned his undergraduate degree from the University of New
Orleans and his medical degree from Louisiana State University Health Sciences
Center in Shreveport, Louisiana. (Id.) Dr. Finan completed his Obstetrics and
Gynecology residency at the University of South Florida in Tampa and at the Tampa
General Hospital, where he received multiple teaching awards and was elected to
the Alpha Omega Alpha Honor Medical Society. (Id. at 2–3.) Dr. Finan was
thereafter accepted into a fellowship in Gynecologic Oncology at the University of
South Florida, with clinical training at the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Tampa
General Hospital. (Id. at 3.)
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Dr. Finan subsequently joined the Ochser Clinic in New Orleans as a
Gynecologic Oncologist, where he maintained a high-volume surgical and clinical
practice, 	directed 	resident 	research, 	and 	later 	served 	as 	the 	Obstetrics 	and
Gynecologic Residency Program Director. (Id.) Dr. Finan joined the University of
South Alabama as a Professor of Gynecologic Oncology in 2005 and the University
of South Alabama Mitchell Cancer Institute in 2007. (Id.) From 2014 to 2018, he
served as Cancer Center Director of the Mitchell Cancer Institute, overseeing
strategic, research, and faculty development initiatives. (Id. at 4–5.) Since 2020, Dr.
Finan has served as Chief of Cancer Services and Chief of Women’s Services for
the Singing River Health System in Mississippi, where he continues an active
clinical gynecologic oncology practice and leads systemwide cancer services,
clinical research oversight, and cancer risk assessment programs that include
“genetic testing and a more intense screening.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiffs do not dispute
that Dr. Finan is qualified to act as an expert in gynecologic oncology.
b. 	Relevant Opinions
Drs. Saenz, Finan, and Holcomb each offer nearly the same five general
causation opinions: (1) established factors—apart from talc—are known to increase
or decrease ovarian cancer risk; (2) the epidemiology does not show that genital talc
use is a risk factor; (3) talc cannot migrate from the perineum to the fallopian tubes
or ovaries; (4) talc does not cause ovarian cancer by inducing inflammation; and (5)
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there is no evidence talc causes malignant transformation of epithelial cells. (See
generally Saenz Rep.; Holcomb Rep.; Finan Rep.)
Drs. Saenz, Finan, and Holcomb also all assert in their respective discussions
of established risk factors that an individual’s genetic predisposition may cause or
contribute to the development of ovarian cancer. As previewed above, Plaintiffs
move to exclude a narrow aspect of these discussions as they generally relate to the
development of ovarian cancer: that presently unidentified genetic mutations, yet-
to-be-discovered genetic mutations, and/or VUS may cause the development of
ovarian cancers.
Dr. Saenz submits a general expert report that evaluates whether genital use
of cosmetic talc causes ovarian cancer and concludes that it does not, based on a
critique of the epidemiology and biological plausibility evidence. (See generally
Saenz Rep.)110
Across all of Dr. Saenz’s reports, Dr. Saenz critiques the expert opinions of
Dr. Judith Wolf and Dr. Daniel Clarke-Pearson on general and specific causation.
(See, e.g., Saenz Rep. at 10, 15, 45, 51; Saenz Converse Rep. at 4–5 (Dr. Clarke-
Pearson); Saenz Judkins Rep. at 5–6 (Dr. Wolf); Saenz Newsome Rep. at 5–6 (Dr.
110 	Dr. Saenz also submits reports containing case-specific opinions regarding Plaintiff
Converse, (see ECF No. 32999-8 (“Saenz Converse Rep.”)), Plaintiff Judkins, (see ECF No.
32999-9 (“Saenz Judkins Rep.”)), Plaintiff Newsome, (see ECF No. 32999-10 (“Saenz Newsome
Rep.”)), and Plaintiff Rausa, (see ECF No. 32999-11 (“Saenz Rausa Rep.”)).
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Clarke-Pearson); Saenz Rausa Rep. at 6–7 (Dr. Clarke-Pearson).) Dr. Saenz also
challenges Dr. Saed’s methodology and conclusions, (see, e.g., Saenz Rep. at 51–
52), and addresses Dr. Godleski’s pathology opinions as to specific Plaintiffs, (see,
e.g., Saenz Converse Rep. at 7–8; Saenz Judkins Rep. at 5–6; Saenz Newsome Rep.
at 5, 7).
Generally, 	Dr. 	Saenz 	opines, 	among 	other 	things, 	that 	hereditary
predisposition 	is 	a 	well-established 	driver 	of 	epithelial 	ovarian 	cancer, 	with
approximately 	70% 	of 	inherited 	cases 	stemming 	from 	BRCA1 	and 	BRCA2
mutations. (See Saenz Rep. at 5–6; see also id. at 13 (“The most influential of [well-
established factors that have been associated with a woman having an increased risk
of developing ovarian cancer] are mutations in genes that can be inherited and
increase the risk of developing ovarian cancer to as high as 50–60% over the course
of a woman’s lifetime.”).) Dr. Saenz emphasizes that genetic testing previously only
tested for BRCA1 and BRCA2; that modern genetic testing examines over 25 genes;
and that “new genes are being identified and added to testing panels every year.”
(See Saenz Rep. at 3, 5–6.)
Dr. Holcomb “was asked to review the relevant scientific literature to furnish
an opinion as to whether perineal use of talcum powder can cause ovarian cancer as
a general matter, and, specifically, whether it caused [Plaintiff] Anna Gallardo to
develop ovarian cancer.” (Holcomb Rep. at 3.) Dr. Holcomb submits a single expert
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report, wherein he critiques Dr. Wolf’s general causation opinions, (see, e.g., id. at
3), Dr. Wolf’s specific causation opinions of Plaintiff Gallardo, (see id. at 3, 29–34),
and Dr. Saed’s methodology and conclusions, (see id. at 26).
Like other defense experts, Dr. Holcomb generally opines, among other
things, that genetic mutations found in the BRCA1 and/or BRCA2 tumor suppressor
genes are major causes of hereditary ovarian cancer. (See id. at 5–6.) But the
“number of genes potentially associated with an increased risk of ovarian cancer is
continually expanding.” (Id. at 6.)
Dr. Finan “was asked to render an opinion as to whether talcum powder can
cause or contribute to the development of ovarian cancer in general, and specifically,
whether it did so with regards to Linda Bondurant.” (See Finan Rep. at 2.) Dr. Finan
also submits a single expert report, wherein he rebuts Dr. Wolf’s general causation
opinions, (see, e.g., id. at 12–13, 45, 50, 55, 61, 64), her specific causation analysis
of Plaintiff Bondurant, (see, e.g., id. at 63–67), and Dr. Saed’s in vitro methodology
and “malignant transformation” claims, (see, e.g., id. at 62).
Dr. Finan asserts, among other things, that approximately 30% of women with
serous ovarian cancer have a known pathogenic germline mutation, the majority of
which 	are 	attributable 	to 	alterations 	in 	BRCA1 	or 	BRCA2. 	(Id. 	at 	7.) 	But
“[a]dditional genetic mutations continue to be identified, with more than 2 dozen
reported mutations related to ovarian cancer having been identified to date.” (Id.)
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According to Dr. Finan, genetic testing is continually evolving, so a negative result
does not exclude a hereditary cause. (Id. at 7–8; see also id. at 64 (“[G]enetic testing
is a dynamic field with new genetic variants found to be associated with ovarian
cancer on a regular basis.”).) Dr. Finan also posits that VUS “are commonly found
to be associated with diseases as further testing is refined over time” and that
“genetic testing is constantly being developed, expanded, and updated.” (Id. at 7.)
ii. 	Dr. DiFeo
a. 	Qualifications
Dr. Analisa DiFeo is an ovarian cancer researcher with more than two decades
of experience in ovarian cancer genetics and biology research. (See ECF No. 33010-
5 (“DiFeo Rep.”) at 2.) Dr. DiFeo earned a B.S. in Biochemistry from the State
University of New York at Binghamton and a Ph.D. in Cancer Genetics from the
Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, followed by postdoctoral training in
Genetics and Genomic Sciences at Mount Sinai. (See id. at 3; see also id., Ex. A at
1.) In 2012, Dr. DiFeo joined Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
as an Assistant Professor in the Division of General Medical Sciences (Oncology),
later holding a joint appointment in Genetics and Genome Sciences, and was named
the Norma C. and Albert I. Geller Designated Professor in Ovarian Cancer Research.
(See id.) While at Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine, Dr. DiFeo
founded and led a research laboratory. (See id. at 3.)
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Recruited in 2018 to the University of Michigan Medical School, Dr. DiFeo
served as a tenured Associate Professor in the Departments of Pathology and
Obstetrics & Gynecology and, as of May 2024, is a tenured Professor in both
departments. (See id. at 3; see also id., Ex. A at 1.) Dr. DiFeo directs the Michigan
Ovarian Cancer Science and Innovation Consortium and co-leads the institution’s
gynecologic 	cancer 	tumor 	repository, 	which 	supports 	extensive 	collaborative
research. (Id. at 2.) Dr. DiFeo’s work focuses on ovarian cancer genetics and
biology, chemotherapy resistance, tumor initiation, and development of patient-
relevant models, resulting in more than 70 peer‑reviewed publications, multiple
federal and foundation awards, and editorial service for several leading journals.
(See id. at 3–5; see also generally id., Ex. A.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that Dr. DiFeo
is qualified to act as an expert in her proffered area of expertise.
b. 	Relevant Opinions
In her expert report, Dr. DiFeo provide[d] “an overview of cancer, what is
known about ovarian cancer, the origins of ovarian cancer, modeling malignant
transformation, bioassays to assess neoplastic transformation, and an overview on
inflammation.” (Id. at 6.). Dr. DiFeo also opined “on the hypothesized role of talc in
ovarian cancer development and discuss[es] numerous concerns with the data
presented” relied upon by Plaintiffs’ experts and “why the results of their research
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do not constitute scientifically sound evidence that cosmetic talc use can cause
ovarian cancer.” (Id.)
Dr. DiFeo largely concurred with Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, and Finan. She
agreed that scientific evidence does not support a causal link between perineal use
of cosmetic talc and ovarian cancer. (See generally DiFeo Rep.) Dr. DiFeo asserted
that epidemiology does not show an increased risk and that there is no evidence of
meaningful transformation, (see, e.g., id. at 27–31), adding further that cosmetic
talc—regardless of its exact constituents or alleged contaminants—does not cause
or contribute to ovarian cancer, (see, e.g., id. at 6). But unlike Drs. Saenz, Holcomb,
and Finan, Dr. DiFeo did not separately opine on known risk factors or migration.
Rather, Dr. DiFeo concluded that cosmetic talc has not been shown to migrate by
way of reliable study, (see, e.g., id. at 28–29), to trigger chronic inflammation
preceding cancer development, (see, e.g., id. at 16–17), or to induce malignant
transformation, (see, e.g., id. at 17–22, 29–50).
To be sure, Dr. DiFeo explained that genetics is an established risk factor for
ovarian cancer. Dr. DiFeo opined, among other things, that while known hereditary
mutations account for a significant share of ovarian cancer causes—“approximately
24% of ovarian cancer[s] diagnosed have at least one predisposing germline
mutation,” with BRCA1 and BRCA2 being the most common at approximately
“18% of the germline mutations”—the genetic picture is incomplete and evolving.
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(See id. at 13.) Even within known pathways, which include at least 16 genes, Dr.
DiFeo asserted that “there are mutations that remain unknown, have an unclear
impact on cancer progression, or cannot be detected by current tests.” (Id.) In Dr.
DiFeo’s view, although certain genes are recognized to predispose individuals to
ovarian cancer, the “exact mutation in those genes”—classified as VUS—may not
be clear. (Id. at 13.) Moreover, beyond new variants in known genes, “new genes
continue to be identified.” (Id. at 13–14.)
iii. 	Dr. Permuth
a. 	Qualifications
Dr. Jennifer Blythe Permuth is a molecular epidemiologist and tenure-track
Associate Professor in the Department of Cancer Epidemiology at the H. Lee Moffitt
Cancer Center and Research Institute in Tampa, Florida, where she also serves as
Vice Chair of Research in Gastrointestinal Oncology. (See ECF No. 33001-5
(“Permuth Rep.”) at 4.) Dr. Permuth holds a B.S. in Biology from the University of
South Florida, an M.S. in Molecular, Cellular, and Developmental Biology and
Genetics with a specialization in Genetic Counseling from the University of
Minnesota, and a doctorate in Epidemiology from the University of South Florida
College of Public Health. (See id.) Beyond her graduate training in genetics, Dr.
Permuth practiced as a genetic counselor, providing counseling and education to
hundreds of women newly diagnosed with ovarian, fallopian tube, and primary
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peritoneal cancers about hereditary risk, testing options, and implications for family
members. (See id.)
Dr. Permuth has a grant-funded research portfolio and has authored more than
100 peer‑reviewed publications, reviews, and book chapters spanning genetics,
epidemiology, molecular biology, and gynecologic and gastrointestinal oncology.
(See id.) Dr. Permuth also serves as a peer reviewer for leading scientific journals
and as a grant reviewer for the National Cancer Institute. (See id.) Plaintiffs do not
dispute that Dr. Permuth is qualified to act as an expert in her proffered area of
expertise.
b. 	Relevant Opinions
In her expert report, Dr. Permuth addressed “causes of and risk factors for
ovarian cancer” and challenged “the fundamental bases of [P]laintiffs’ experts’
hypotheses and contentions regarding talc as a causal agent.” (See id. at 4.)
Throughout her report, Dr. Permuth also provided “commentary” “on the reports
submitted by Plaintiffs’ epidemiology experts,” including, without limitation, Dr.
McTiernan, Dr. Moorman, Dr. Singh, Dr. Smith-Bindman, Dr. Siemiatycki, Dr.
Cote, Dr. Harlow, and Dr. Levy, and specifically addressed specific causation
opinions for Plaintiffs Bondurant, Converse, Judkins, and Newsome. (See, e.g., id.
at 135–47.)
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Like Dr. DiFeo, Dr. Permuth largely shared the conclusions of Drs. Saenz,
Finan, and Holcomb, identifying known risk and protective factors, (see, e.g., id. at
9–52), concluding that the epidemiology did not demonstrate a causal talc-ovarian
cancer relationship, (see, e.g., id. at 53–115), and opining that there is a lack of
evidence 	of 	talc 	carcinogenicity, 	(see, 	e.g., 	id. 	at 	149). 	Instead 	of 	directly
commenting on migration, Dr. Permuth appears to broadly emphasize the failure of
literature to demonstrate migration as a biologically plausible mechanism. (See, e.g.,
id. at 53, 69, 111–12.)
Dr. Permuth opined that genetics and family history are the strongest risk
factors 	for ovarian cancer, with 	first-degree relatives 	of affected 	individuals
experiencing a three- to seven-fold increased risk and women with a prior breast
cancer diagnosis having approximately a 70% increase in risk. (See id. at 9–10.) Dr.
Permuth explained that up to 20% of ovarian cancers arise from “rare, high-penetrant
mutations in genes”—most notably in BRCA1 and BRCA. (See id.) Dr. Permuth
conceded 	that 	although 	BRCA1 	and 	BRCA2 	gene 	mutations 	are 	relatively
uncommon in the general population, they are more prevalent in certain groups such
as those of Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry. (See id. at 10.) Beyond BRCA1 and BRCA2,
Dr. Permuth identifies pathogenetic variants across approximately 20 additional
genes. (See id.)
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iv. 	Dr. Boyd
a. 	Qualifications
Dr. Jeff Boyd is a molecular geneticist and gynecologic cancer researcher with
more than three decades of leadership in oncology research and academic medicine.
(See Boyd Rep. at 2.) Dr. Boyd holds a B.S. from Duke University and an M.S. and
Ph.D. in Toxicology and Biochemistry from North Carolina State University. (Id.)
Dr. Boyd completed postdoctoral training at the Lineberger Comprehensive Cancer
Center of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. (See id.) Subsequently,
Dr. Boyd served as a section head of Gynecologic Pathobiology at the National
Institutes of Health’s National Institute of Environmental Health Science, an
Associate Professor in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Division of
Gynecologic Oncology, and the Department of Genetics, at the University of
Pennsylvania. (See id.)
From 1997 to 2006, Dr. Boyd directed the Gynecologic and Breast Research
Laboratory in Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center’s Department of Surgery,
and the Diagnostic Molecular Genetics Laboratory in Memorial Sloan Kettering
Cancer Center’s Department of Medicine. (Id.) Dr. Boyd later held senior research
and academic leadership roles at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, the
Anderson Cancer Institute at the Memorial University Medical Center, and the
Mercer University School of Medicine. (Id.)
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Dr. Boyd now serves as Director of the Institute of Cancer Research at the
Feinstein Institutes (Northwell Health), and Vice President, Chief Scientific Officer,
and Director of the Northwell Health Cancer Institute’s Center for Genomic
Medicine, 	with 	professorships 	at 	the 	Zucker 	School 	of 	Medicine 	at
Hofstra/Northwell’s Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology and Department of
Pathology and Laboratory Medicine and the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory. (Id.)
Dr. Boyd has received over $25 million in peer‑reviewed funding and has authored
or co-authored over 200 publications “on the molecular and genetic bases of
gynecologic or breast cancers.” (Id. at 2–3.) Discussed in greater detail below,
Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd is not qualified to “opine on the design and
methodologies of in vitro studies.” (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 19–20.)
b. 	Relevant opinions
Within the scope of his engagement in this matter, Dr. Boyd was asked to
review: (1) two poster presentations by Dr. Saed and the associated 2023 publication
by Dr. Saed and colleagues, (see Boyd Rep. at 2–16); (2) two mechanistic studies on
which Plaintiffs’ experts rely, involving rodent macrophages and talcum powder, led
by Dr. Angelo Mardino in 2020 and Dr. Tania Emi in 2021, respectively, (see id. at
2, 16–20); and (3) selected opinions of Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Levy concerning
genetics and ovarian cancer, (see id. at 2, 22–26).
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Dr. Boyd concluded that Plaintiffs’ mechanistic theory that perineal talc
causes ovarian carcinogenesis is speculative and lacked support from scientific
evidence. In his view, the in vitro studies Plaintiffs’ experts relied upon are
methodologically unsound and do not establish a plausible biological mechanism for
human carcinogenesis at real-world exposures to cosmetic talcum powder.
With respect to Dr. Saed’s work, Dr. Boyd first criticized a poster presented
by Dr. Saed and his co-authors that claimed talc “induces malignant transformation”
in normal ovarian epithelial cells, thereby implying a direct causal mechanism. See
generally Amy K. Harper et al., Talcum Powder Induces Malignant Transformation
of Human Primary Normal Ovarian Epithelial Cells But Not Human Primary
Normal Peritoneal Fibroblasts, 159 Gynecol. Oncol. (1), 140 (2020) (“Harper/Saed
2020 Poster”).111 Notwithstanding Dr. Boyd’s concerns with the publication of the
Harper/Saed 2020 Poster, (see Boyd Rep. at 4–5),112 Dr. Boyd concludes that the
111 	Plaintiffs did not attach the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster to its moving papers. Through
independent research, I located it as an abstract published in a 2020 issue of Gynecologic
Oncology.
112 	Dr. Boyd provides a critical overview of the publication process underlying Harper/Saed
2020 Poster’s dissemination. Dr. Boyd explains that the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster appeared only
in a supplemental issue of Gynecologic Oncology because it had been accepted for poster
presentation at the Society of Oncology 2020 Annual Meeting on Women’s Cancer, which was
later canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (See Boyd Rep. at 4–5.) Dr. Boyd emphasizes that
poster acceptance is not equivalent to peer-reviewed publication: 842 abstracts were submitted to
the Society of Oncology 2020 Annual Meeting, and 743 (88%) abstracts were accepted for
presentation. (See id.) Dr. Boyd also notes that the corresponding manuscript—reiterating the same
research and conclusions—was repeatedly rejected by journals, including Gynecologic Oncology
in 2021 even after additional testing, underscoring that the work did not meet publication standards
and likely would have been rejected in its 2020 form. (See id.)
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study’s “objective” misstates prior findings and overreaches, (see id. at 5–6). Dr.
Boyd further finds the study’s dosing and assay methods woefully deficient. (See id.
at 6–8.) For example, Dr. Boyd claims that the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster omits
essential parameters such as cell numbers, volume, and plate surface area, which
make the actual dose per cell unknowable. (See id. at 6.) Dr. Boyd concludes the
“commercial cell transformation assay kit” was used beyond its validated purpose,
and 	that 	asserting 	“malignant 	transformation” 	after 	a 	72-hour 	exposure 	is
biologically implausible. (See id. at 7.) Finally, Dr. Boyd states that the purported
results of the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster are unreliable because it wrongly treats
colony growth as proof of cancer, claims a dose-response without valid counting,
and reports 11% and 20% increases over zero, which makes no mathematical sense.
(See id. at 8–9.)
Dr. Boyd next criticizes a subsequent poster presented by Dr. Saed and his co-
authors that claims to supplement Harper/Saed 2020 by performing the same
experiments and assaying with cell transformation assay and added p53 and Ki‑67
immunohistochemistry (“Harper/Saed 2021 Poster”). (See Boyd Rep. at 10–14 &
n.41.113) According to Dr. Boyd, the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster was presented at the
113 	Plaintiffs did not attach the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster to its moving papers. Dr. Boyd cites
the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster as “Saed GM, Harper AK, Morris R, Talcum Powder Induces a
Malignant Transformation in Normal Ovarian Epithelial Cells,” but the citation does not contain
sufficiently precise information to permit location or review.
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68th Annual Meeting of the Society for Reproductive Investigation on July 8, 2021.
(Id. at 10.) Dr. Boyd concludes, among other things, that the Harper/Saed 2021
Poster improperly claims to “confirm” malignant transformation that was never
established in the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster; that its reliance on certain published
studies is misplaced because they fail to support the opinions drawn therefrom; and
that 	its 	methods 	still 	use 	unrealistic, 	poorly-described 	doses 	and 	the 	same
commercial assay that cannot prove malignancy. (See id. at 10–12.) Consequently,
Dr. Boyd claims that the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster’s results are misinterpretations of
the presented date. (See id. at 12–13.) Therefore, Dr. Boyd fundamentally disagrees
with the study’s conclusion, finding the continued claim of malignant transformation
and a causal mechanism unsupported—a view he notes was shared by peer reviewers
who called the work premature and unreliable. (See id. at 13–14.)
Like the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster, Dr. Boyd underscores the publication
issues surrounding the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster as illustrative of its inherent
unreliability. 	According 	to 	Dr. 	Boyd, 	Dr. 	Saed 	submitted 	a 	slightly 	altered
manuscript of the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster to Gynecologic Oncology on January 4,
2021 (the “Harper/Saed 2021 Manuscript”). (See Boyd Rep. at 10 n.41 & 13–14.)
Gynecologic Oncology subsequently rejected the manuscript, as did two other
scientific journals. (See id. at 13–14.) Dr. Boyd explains that he was unsurprised that
Gynecologic Oncology rejected the 2021 poster’s manuscript for “several major
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issues,” 	“questionable” 	clinical 	relevance, 	and 	interpretive 	difficulties 	with
potentially premature data. (See id.) Shortly thereafter, an Italian medical journal
called 	Minerva 	Obstetrics 	and 	Gynecology 	accepted 	the 	Harper/Saed 	2021
Manuscript for publication. (See id. at 14 (citing Amy K. Harper et al., Talcum
Powder Induces Malignant Transformation in Normal Human Primary Ovarian
Epithelial Cells, 75 Minerva Obstetrics & Gynecology (2) (2023) (“Harper/Saed
2023 Article”)); see also discussion at supra Part V.B.2.iv.e.).
Dr. Boyd notes that the Harper/Saed 2023 Article used softer language than
its 	previous 	iterations 	but 	is 	otherwise 	an 	insufficient 	repackaging 	of 	the
Harper/Saed 2020 Poster and the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster. (See Boyd Rep. at 14–
15.) Like its previous iterations, Dr. Boyd claims that the Harper/Saed 2023 Article
uses “no new experiments or methodological updates” and therefore perpetuates its
same core flaws. (Id. at 15–16.)
Regarding two macrophage-based mechanistic studies relied on by Plaintiffs’
experts, Dr. Boyd finds them minimally informative to ovarian carcinogenesis
because, among other things, they “do not attempt to demonstrate the effects of talc
on normal human ovarian cells and are of minimal relevance to the biological
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plausibility questions raised in this litigation. (Id. at 16; see also id. at 17–20 (citing
Mandarino 2020114 & Emi 2021115).
Dr. Boyd criticizes Mandarino 2020 because “it has nothing to do with
transformation (malignant or not) of normal ovarian cells.” (See Boyd Rep. at 17.)
He further criticizes Emi 2021 for using a mouse macrophage cell line as opposed
to human ovarian cells and testing only a single high dose, among suffering from
other flaws. (See id. at 19–20.) Dr. Boyd also faults Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on
Emi 2021, which he describes as “an extension of Mandarino” 2020, because the
study offers only a “hypothesis that merits further testing” and not evidence of
biological plausibility. (See id. at 18–19.)116
On Dr. Levy’s genetics-related causation opinions, Dr. Boyd critiques what
he 	identifies 	as 	misinterpretations 	or 	overstatements—such 	as 	implying 	that
carcinogenic exposure increases the penetrance of inherited risk alleles (e.g.,
BRCA1 and BRCA2) without evidentiary support, conflating post-initiation tumor
114 	Plaintiffs do not attach Mandarino 2020 to their moving papers. Defendants attach it to
their opposition. (See ECF No. 33111-34.)
115 	Plaintiffs do not attach Emi 2021 to their moving papers. Defendants attach it to their
opposition. (See ECF No. 33111-35.)
116 	Because I recommend that the Court not permit Plaintiffs’ experts to offer their
macrophage-inhibition theory, which is largely premised on Mandarino 2020 and Emi 2021, see
supra Part V.B.5.iv.c.3, there is no basis for Dr. Boyd to offer a rebuttal opinion against Plaintiffs’
experts’ use of these studies for this now-impermissible purpose. This is not to say, however, that
Dr. Boyd is precluded from criticizing Mandarino 2020 or Emi 2021 for any other purpose. Thus,
to the extent that Plaintiffs’ experts rely on these studies for a purpose other than for support of
their macrophage-impairment theory, then Dr. Boyd may rebut those opinions based on these two
studies.
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behavior with carcinogenesis, and relying on Dr. Saed’s oxidative stress claims
despite serious methodological flaws. (See id. at 22–25.) Dr. Boyd underscores that
most somatic mutations arise stochastically with DNA replication and that Plaintiffs’
mechanistic bridge from talc to initiated ovarian cancer remains unsubstantiated.
(See id.) Dr. Boyd also criticizes, among other things, Dr. Levy’s reliance on certain
studies that he posits do not support the propositions for which they are used. (See
id.)
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Arguments
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to clarify the scope of Plaintiffs’
motions to exclude genetics-related opinions. Plaintiffs state that they seek to
exclude 	all 	genetics-related 	opinions 	except 	for 	the 	observation 	that 	certain
bellwether Plaintiffs “have no known genetic mutations that are associated with
ovarian cancer.” (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 8; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 8;
Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 5.) In substance, however, Plaintiffs’ motions focus on challenging
the specific causation opinions offered by Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, Finan, and Permuth
as applied to particular bellwether Plaintiffs. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br.
at 5–6; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 4–6.) Plaintiffs do not meaningfully address, or expressly
seek exclusion of, these experts’ genetics-related general causation opinions. Those
opinions mirror, in substance, Dr. DiFeo’s conclusion that deleterious genetic
mutations can play a causal role in the development of ovarian cancer. Unlike Drs.
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Saenz, Holcomb, Finan, and Permuth, Dr. DiFeo offers only general genetics-related
causation opinions and does not opine on specific causation for any bellwether
Plaintiff.117
In light of Plaintiffs’ arguments, and to ensure a clear and consistent resolution
of the admissibility issues presented, I address the genetics-related general causation
opinions of Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, Finan, and Permuth together with those of Dr.
DiFeo. As clarified above, see supra note 1, this Report and Recommendation does
not address the portions of Plaintiffs’ motions seeking to exclude Defendants’
specific causation opinions.
Turning to the merits of their arguments, with respect to Drs. Finan, Saenz,
Holcomb, Permuth, and DiFeo, Plaintiffs first contend that the experts’ genetics-
related general causation opinions are unreliable because they rest on inadmissible
speculation about alternative causes—here, unidentified or yet-to-be-discovered
genetic mutations and/or VUS. Plaintiffs reason that admitting such speculative
opinions risks confusing or misleading a jury.
Second, with respect to Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, DiFeo, Permuth, and
Boyd, Plaintiffs contend that the experts’ biological plausibility opinions are
117 	Indeed, Defendants have expressly stated that Dr. DiFeo does not seek to opine on specific
causation. (See generally DiFeo Rep.; see also ECF No. 33111 (“Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth,
DiFeo & Boyd Brs.”) at 46 (“Section IV of plaintiffs’ motion against Dr. DiFeo is moot because
Dr. DiFeo is not offering case-specific opinions.”).)
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unreliable because they apply a flawed methodology that disregards the actual
constituents of talcum powder. Plaintiffs also argue that the opinions do not fit the
facts of this case, because they apply an improperly heightened “proof” standard
rather than the accepted “plausibility” standard.
Third, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Boyd’s critiques of peer-reviewed studies
rest on subjective belief rather than a reliable methodology. In that regard, Plaintiffs
maintain that his testimony will not assist the trier of fact and risks confusing or
misleading a jury by inviting re-evaluation of research and methods already vetted
through the peer-review process. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd is not
qualified to opine on in vitro study design or methods.
Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ motions, arguing that the genetics-related
general causation opinions are admissible as proper rebuttal that offer the jury
alternative causes. Moreover, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are impermissibly
rehashing arguments already rejected by the Court, and that both science and law
require evaluating general causation based on the talcum powder product as sold—
not its isolated constituents—consistent with how the literature and analogous case
law frame the issue. Finally, Defendants maintain that contrary to Plaintiffs’
contention, Defendants’ experts did not impose an improperly heightened biological
plausibility standard.
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As to Plaintiffs’ specific challenges to Dr. Boyd, Defendants contend his
opinions are proper defense-side critiques grounded in his extensive research and
peer-review experience. In that connection, Defendants insist that peer review does
not immunize published studies from expert criticism, and more to the point, Dr.
Boyd’s testimony will assist the trier of fact by explaining why certain mechanistic
claims 	are 	unreliable. 	Lastly, 	Defendants 	maintain 	that 	Dr. 	Boyd 	is 	amply
qualified—as a long-time cancer researcher, professor, and reviewer/editor—to
opine on the design and methodology of in vitro studies.
i. 	Genetics-Related General Causation Opinions
Plaintiffs argue that the experts’ genetics-related general causation opinions,
which suggest that “imaginary” genetic mutations may cause ovarian cancer, are
inadmissible because they are unreliably speculative, unsupported by current
science, and risk misleading or confusing the jury. (See Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 3–7; see
also Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 5–10; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 4–10.) Across
their motions to exclude, Plaintiffs argue that these experts should only be permitted
to opine that the “science and testing [regarding genetics] to date demonstrate that
Plaintiffs have no known genetic mutations that are associated with ovarian cancer.”
(See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 8; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 8; Pls.’ DiFeo Br.
at 5.)
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Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ efforts to exclude these opinions by arguing that
their experts’ discussions of unidentified genetic mutations, yet-to-be-discovered
genetic mutations, or VUS are proper rebuttal opinions, sufficiently supported by
scientific and medical bases, and do not risk jury confusion because their opinions
are framed as possibility, not inevitability. I agree with Defendants.
First, Plaintiffs appear to have misapplied the burden of proof. They cite
several cases for the proposition that an expert’s opinions must be based on existing
scientific validity and not speculation. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 7;
Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 7; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 4.) But the cases that Plaintiffs rely on do
not directly deal with a defense expert offered to rebut a plaintiff’s expert. See, e.g.,
Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, 82 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 1996) (affirming the
exclusion of plaintiff’s expert’s affirmative opinions); Hoefling, 576 F. Supp. 3d at
275–76 	(excluding 	plaintiff’s 	expert’s 	affirmative 	opinions); 	Henricksen 	v.
ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1168–69 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (same); In
re Bausch & Lomb Contacts Lens Solution Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 515,
520 (D.S.C. 2010) (holding plaintiff expert’s opinion regarding future causation as
insufficiently speculative to overcome summary judgment).
As discussed throughout this Report and Recommendation, “the proper role
of rebuttal experts [is] to critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out
potential flaws in the plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp.
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2d at 835; see also Mahaska Bottling Co., Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 3d 745,
759 (S.D. Iowa 2019) (explaining that courts routinely permit defense experts to
testify “even if the expert primarily critiques the opposing expert’s approach without
offering an alternative approach”). Indeed, “a rebuttal expert need not proffer a
methodology or model, but only critique the opposing expert’s.” Capri Sun GmbH,
595 F. Supp. 3d at 140.
Importantly, Plaintiffs concede that Defendants’ experts at issue here do not
purport to establish causation through unidentified genetic mutations, yet-to-be-
discovered genetic mutations, or VUS. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 5
(“Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, and Finan all theorize that unknown genetic mutations . . .
may have caused Plaintiffs’ ovarian cancers.” (emphasis added)); Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at
3 (“Dr. DiFeo theorizes that unknown genetic mutations . . . may cause ovarian
cancer.” (emphasis added)); Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 4 (“Dr. Permuth theorizes that
unknown genetic mutations . . . may have caused Plaintiffs’ ovarian cancers.”
(emphasis added)).) Put another way, none of these experts have opined or testified
that an alternative cause is the actual cause of ovarian cancer.
Courts routinely admit the opinions and testimony of defense experts who
offer potentially alternative causes for injury or product defect despite not having
conducted their own differential diagnoses. See, e.g., In re 3M Combat Arms
Earplug Prods. Liab. Litig., Case No. 3:19md2885, 2022 WL 823474, at *4 (N.D.
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Fla. Mar. 19, 2022) (“The fact that Dr. Chatham’s opinions on AIHL are not
definitive diagnoses does not compel their exclusion. A defense expert ‘may offer
evidence of potential alternative causes of [an] injury without needing to prove those
alternative-cause theories with certainty or probability.’” (citation omitted)); see also
In re Mentor Corp. ObTape Transobturator Sling Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:07-cv-
00088, 2010 WL 1782272, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2010) (admitting four experts
who “opine that Plaintiffs’ experts did not adequately identify and rule out
alternative causes for Plaintiffs’ injuries” despite not having done a differential
diagnosis 	themselves, 	but 	precluding 	them 	from 	testifying 	that 	“alternative
causes . . . actually caused Plaintiffs’ injuries”); In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair
Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-cv-00931, 2017 WL 6396852, at *2 (S.D. W. Va.
Dec. 13, 2017) (“Defendants, however, need not conduct a differential diagnosis to
identify the specific cause of an injury because they do not bear the burden of
proving causation. Indeed, a defendant’s specific causation expert’s testimony
should not be excluded because it fails to identify the specific cause of a plaintiff’s
injury. In lieu of conducting traditional differential diagnoses, defendants may
instead provide expert testimony suggesting alternative causes for the plaintiff’s
injury in order to rebut the plaintiff’s specific causation testimony.” (citations
omitted)). Moreover, the “alternative causes suggested by a defendant normally
affect the weight that the jury should give the expert’s testimony and not the
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admissibility of that testimony.” Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 202
(4th Cir. 2001).
Still, the admissibility of a defense expert’s opinions must nonetheless satisfy
Rule 702’s admissibility requirements. See Fed. R. Evid.702; In re E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 348 F. Supp. 3d 680, 696 (S.D. Ohio 2016)
(“The defendant’s expert need not give an alternate causal factor within a reasonable
degree of medical certainty. But, the testimony must still be based upon reliable
science, as required by Daubert.”).
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ experts offer unreliable opinions lacking
scientific support because VUS have no proven effect on, or causal link to, ovarian
cancer generally. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 8–9; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at
5–6; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 8–9.) They also argue that the evolving state of genetics
does not justify allowing unsupported speculation to reach the jury, and that opinions
premised on unidentified or unvalidated mutations are too speculative to be
admissible. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 7–8; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 4–5;
Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 7–8.)
Defendants respond that their experts’ opinions show that there are scientific
bases to posit alternative, genetic causes of ovarian cancer generally. (See Defs.’
Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 3–10, 18–23.) Additionally, Defendants
contend that the opinions are grounded in their experts’ clinical experience, reflect
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the current state of the relevant science, are supported by clinical evidence that
predates their involvement, and align with views expressed by certain of Plaintiffs’
own experts. (See id. at 12–16.)
After carefully reviewing the motion papers, the expert reports, and the sworn
testimony of Defendants’ contested experts, I conclude that the general causation
opinions of Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, DiFeo, and Permuth regarding unidentified
or yet‑to‑be‑discovered genetic mutations, as well as VUS, are products of reliable
methods and therefore admissible.
First, these experts all base their genetics-related causal opinions on their
professional 	qualifications 	and 	experiences. 	To 	be 	sure, 	the 	unchallenged
qualifications of Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, Permuth, and DiFeo bolster the
reliability of the methodology underlying their opinions. See Schneider, 320 F.3d at
406–07.
Dr. Finan has decades of clinical experience, and his role in, among other
responsibilities, the Cancer Risk Assessment program for the Singing River Health
System grounds his opinions on family-history-based genetic testing, mutation
identification, and ovarian cancer development. (See, e.g., Finan Rep. at 4; see also
id. at 2, 63 (basing causation opinions on, inter alia, “education, training, and 30
years of medical practice,” as well as a review of peer-reviewed scientific literature
and “relevant statements of national and international organizations”).)
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Dr. Saenz similarly has decades of clinical and academic experience directing
multidisciplinary treatment plans for gynecologic malignancies. (See Saenz Rep. at
1; see also id. at 3 (basing general causation opinions on, inter alia, “education,
experience and expertise,” as well as review of “peer-reviewed published scientific
literature”).)
Dr. Holcomb likewise has decades of experience in clinical and academic
settings, with clinical responsibilities including, among other things, assessing
cancer risk in patients and their families by identifying genetic risk factors. (See
Holcomb Rep. at 1–2; see also id. at 3, 29, 35–46 (relying on, inter alia, his
“education, [his] experience as a gynecologic oncologist and [his] review of the
peer-reviewed published scientific literature” for causation opinions).)
Dr. DiFeo holds a Ph.D in Cancer Genetics from Mount Sinai School of
Medicine, has over two decades of research experience in ovarian cancer genetics,
and leads a translational laboratory that, among other things, detects and analyzes
genetic drivers responsible for the development and progression of ovarian cancer.
(See DiFeo Rep. at 2; see also id. at 2 (basing general causation opinions on
“education, training and expertise as a cancer biologist” and “review of the relevant
literature”).)
Dr. Permuth is, among other things, a former genetics counselor who has
personally counseled hundreds of women with ovarian and related cancers, serves
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in national ovarian cancer research consortia, and has authored over 100 peer-
reviewed publications on genetics, risk factors, and molecular epidemiology. (See
Permuth Rep. at 4; see also, e.g., id. at 53–54 (basing general causation opinions on
“educational background, training, and experience,” as well as a “review of
epidemiologic studies, lab-based molecular and toxicology studies, and other
relevant studies”).)
The Third Circuit has recognized that an expert opinion not explicitly
supported by peer-reviewed published scientific or medical literature can still be
reliable and admissible when the expert has extensive clinical experience. See
Schneider, 320 F.3d at 406; Heller, 167 F.3d at 155. Here, Defendants’ experts not
only rely on their own clinical experience, but also relevant literature in forming
their opinions. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not attempt to distinguish or denounce any
specific scientific or medical study relied on by Defendants’ experts’ genetics-
related causation opinions.
It 	is 	with 	this 	backdrop—educational 	experience, 	clinical 	experience,
Plaintiffs’ medical records, and an extensive review of scientific and medical
literature—that Defendants’ experts assert their genetics-related general causation
opinions. These experts generally agree that while a significant subset of ovarian
cancer is hereditary, the genetic landscape is continuously evolving: BRCA1 and
BRCA2 account for most known mutation-driven cases, but many additional genes
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are implicated as testing panels continue to advance. These experts also agree that
the 	potentially 	deleterious 	effects 	of 	new 	mutations—discussed 	herein 	as
unidentified genetic mutations, yet-to-be-discovered genetic mutations, or VUS—
will be discovered as genetic testing and research advance.
As discussed above, Plaintiffs do not appear to directly challenge the genetics-
related general causation opinions of Dr. Finan, Dr. Saenz, Dr. Holcomb, and Dr.
Permuth 	as 	substantively 	incorrect, 	other 	than 	to 	suggest 	that 	they 	are 	too
speculative. (See, e.g., Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 9–10; Pls.’ Permuth Br.
at 9–10.)
Notably, as Defendants rightly point out, (see Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth,
DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 14–15), several of Plaintiffs’ own experts concede at least
some of Defendants’ experts’ opinions that Plaintiffs now seek to exclude, (see
Clarke-Pearson Dep. at 584:13–15 (“[T]here are factors that we don’t know today
that cause mutations that in aggregate result in cancer.”); see also id. at 453:1–4
(“[Q.] . . . [Y]ou are not of the view that scientists completely understand what causes
ovarian cancer, right? A. Yes.”); id. at 473:15–19 (“In addition to the talc and in
addition to the possible ovarian cancer, there are other factors that we don’t know
about.”); Wolf Dep. at 401:24–402:3 (“Certainly there can always be unknown as
yet hypothetical things that at sometime in the future could be associated with an
increased risk of ovarian cancer or some other type of cancer.”).)
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At its core, this litigation focuses on the general and specific cause of ovarian
cancer; specifically, whether the perineal application of cosmetic talcum powder
causes ovarian cancer generally, and caused ovarian cancer to develop in the
gynecologic tissue of the bellwether Plaintiffs. Putting aside admissibility concerns
regarding specific causation opinions, which will be addressed in a separate Report
and Recommendation, Defendants are entitled to proffer experts to opine on or rebut
opinions regarding the potential causes of ovarian cancer, so long as those opinions
are “based on the methods and procedures of science rather than on subjective belief
or unsupported speculation.” In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 (citation modified). Here,
these genetics-related general causation opinions are supported by sufficiently “good
grounds,” in that they are supported by experts’ educational experience, clinical
experience, medical records, and 	extensive review of scientific and 	medical
literature. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 81 (“‘The test of admissibility is not whether a
particular scientific opinion has the best foundation, or even whether the opinion is
supported by the best methodology or unassailable research.’ Instead, the court looks
to whether the expert’s testimony is supported by ‘good grounds.’” (quoting In re
TMI, 193 F.3d at 665) (citation omitted)).
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that admitting Defendants’ experts’ genetics-related
causal opinions risk confusing or misleading the jury because they are framed in
terms of inevitability, not possibility. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 9–
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10; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 9–10; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 6–7.) Plaintiffs appear to rely on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 403 for this argument. (See Pls.’ Saenz & Holcomb
Br. at 1; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 1; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 1.) Pursuant to that Rule, courts
may exclude evidence that risks “confusing the issues[] [or] misleading the jury.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 403; see also Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 756 n.13 (3d Cir.
2000) (“Permitting . . . a witness to offer an opinion unsupported by a sufficient
factual foundation would significantly increase the risk of misleading the jury and
confusing the issues, the very dangers against which Rule 403 defends.”).
First, 	and 	as 	discussed 	above, 	Defendants’ 	experts 	do 	not 	argue 	that
unidentified genetic mutations, yet-to-be-discovered genetic mutations, or VUS
cause the development of ovarian cancer generally. In other words, these opinions
are appropriately expressed in terms of possibility, not probability or inevitability.
Moreover, the Court can cabin the opinions of these experts to ensure these defense
experts do not overstate their conclusions and testify within the guardrails of
expressing opinions on possible causes. Indeed, Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, DiFeo,
and Permuth identify alternative causes for the development of ovarian cancer
generally and, in doing so, rebut the corresponding opinions offered by Plaintiffs’
experts. Defendants’ experts do not exaggerate their educational backgrounds or
clinical experience, nor do they mischaracterize the scientific and medical literature
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on which they rely. As I mentioned above, Plaintiffs’ own expert express similar
views.
Second, I find that the probative value of these experts’ genetics-related
general causation opinions substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect. Plaintiffs’
challenges to Defendants’ experts’ general causation opinions, which I find reflect a
reliable application of their methodology, go toward the weight of their opinions.
Given that they are otherwise admissible, the opinions of Defendants’ experts’
genetics-related general causation opinions will aid the jury in understanding the
complex scientific landscape underlying this case and help them determine the
ultimate resolution.
Given 	the 	foregoing, 	I 	find 	that 	Defendants 	have 	established 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence the admissibility of the genetics-related general
causation conclusions of Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, Finan, DiFeo, and Permuth. Again,
at this stage, I am not deciding the admissibility of these experts’ genetics-related
specific causation opinions. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court deny the
portions of Plaintiffs’ motions premised on the inadmissibility of genetics-related
general 	causation 	opinions, 	but 	limit 	their 	opinions 	on 	unidentified 	genetic
mutations, yet-to-be-discovered genetic mutations, and/or VUS to being possible,
not inevitable, causes.
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ii. 	Biological Plausibility Causation Opinions
Plaintiffs next argue that the experts’ biological plausibility opinions must be
excluded because they are supported by an unreliable methodology, i.e., ignore the
constituents of talcum powder. Plaintiffs also argue that the opinions must be
excluded because they do not fit the facts of this case and risk misleading or
confusing 	a 	jury 	by 	applying 	an 	improperly 	heightened 	standard 	of 	proof.
Defendants oppose by contending that Plaintiffs’ argument violates the Court’s April
30, 2024, Memorandum Order, and that its experts properly assess general causation
of talcum powder as sold rather than its isolated constituents.
a. 	Constituents of Talcum Powder
Plaintiffs argue that the experts fail to consider all individual constituents of
talcum powder—namely, fibrous talc, platy talc, asbestos, heavy metals, fragrances,
and/or other constituents—in forming their biological plausibility opinions.118 More
specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ experts’ “cherry-pick” scientific and
118 	To be precise, Plaintiffs advance slightly different arguments for excluding the opinions of
Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, Permuth, DiFeo, and Boyd. Unlike Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, and
DiFeo, Drs. Permuth and Boyd expressly opine that asbestos is carcinogenic. (See Pls.’ Permuth
Br. at 11–12; Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 13.) Plaintiffs fault Drs. Permuth and Boyd for failing to research
the impact that asbestos-containing talc—and other constituents potentially present in talc—may
have on cancer development. (See id.) By contrast, Plaintiffs fault Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb,
and DiFeo for failing to consider the carcinogenic properties of asbestos at all, or to evaluate the
effects of individual talc constituents, including asbestos. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & .) For purposes
of resolving Plaintiffs’ motions, however, this distinction is immaterial. Across all six experts,
Plaintiffs’ central contention is the same: that a biological plausibility analysis which does not
account for the potential carcinogenic effects of individual constituents of cosmetic talc is
methodologically unreliable under Rule 702.
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medical literature that focuses on talc rather than, for example, asbestos-containing
talcum powder.
Defendants oppose by first arguing that Plaintiffs are rehashing an argument
that the Court rejected in direct contravention of this Court’s April 30, 2024,
Memorandum Order. (See Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 25–
27; Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 18–19.)
Defendants correctly observe that I addressed this argument in the context of
Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the opinions of Defendants’ expert, Dr. Benjamin Neel.
See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 195–98. Then, Plaintiffs argued
that Dr. Neel’s opinion regarding biological plausibility was unreliable because he
did not consider the individual constituents of talcum powder, such as asbestos and
heavy metals. Id. at 196–97. I disagreed by finding that the composition of talc was
irrelevant to Dr. Neel’s rebuttal of Dr. Saed’s in vitro methodology, which itself did
not evaluate the carcinogenicity of the individual constituents of talcum powder such
that Dr. Neel’s lack of analysis of asbestos or other constituents did not undermine
the reliability of his opinions. See id. Because my prior Opinion only addressed
motions related to representative experts, I applied my reasoning “with equal force
to the remainder of the pending Daubert motions,” to the extent such reasoning could
be applied to other motions. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 128–
29.
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Here, reprising their former argument, Plaintiffs contend that Drs. Finan,
Saenz, Holcomb, Permuth, DiFeo, and Boyd employed a flawed methodology by
ignoring the constituents of talc when opining about biological plausibility. (See
Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 11–15; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 10–14; Pls.’ DiFeo
Br. at 7–12.) In response to Plaintiffs’ challenge, Defendants maintain that the proper
scientific and legal framing of their experts’ biological plausibility assessments is
that of the product consumers actually use—talcum powder—rather than its separate
constituents. (See Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 27–33; Defs.’
Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 20–26.) Defendants contend that the
scientific and medical literature that both sides rely on—epidemiology, in vitro, and
other mechanistic studies—generally evaluates talcum powder in its commercial
form and not as asbestos, fibrous talc, platy talc, heavy metals, or fragrance
chemicals in isolation. (See Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 27–
28; Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 20–22.) Defendants stress
that, as a result, their experts’ opinions are responses to Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions,
which 	often 	evaluate 	talcum 	powder 	without 	consideration 	of 	its 	individual
constituents. (See Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 29–31; Defs.’
Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 22–24.)
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I agree with Defendants.119 As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ framing of the issue
is misleading. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ experts “ignore” individual
constituents 	of 	cosmetic 	talcum 	powder, 	including 	asbestos, 	and 	employ 	an
unreliable methodology that “impermissibly cherry-picks” by focusing solely on
talc. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 14–15; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 10–12; Pls.’
Permuth Br. at 12–13; Pls.’ Boyd Dr. at 13–14.) The record does not support that
characterization. Defendants’ experts do not disregard the individual components of
talcum powder. Rather, they deliberately evaluate talcum powder as a finished
consumer product, based on their view that the central causation question in this case
is whether perineal use of cosmetic talcum powder—considered as a whole—causes
ovarian cancer. (See, e.g., Saenz Rep. at 58 (“My opinion does not change regardless
of the composition of the talcum powder because the published, peer-reviewed
literature does not support the increased risk of developing ovarian cancer with
perineal application of talc.”); Finan Rep. at 4 (“The application of talcum powder,
regardless of its constituents, to the female perineum does not cause or contribute to
the development of ovarian cancer); Holcomb Rep. at 3 (“I was asked to review the
119 	In further support of their argument, Defendants cite analogous case law to maintain that
general causation opinions must be framed around the product used, not the isolated constituents
of said product. (See Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 31–33 (citing In re Zantac,
644 F. Supp. 3d at1075; Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1156 (E.D. Wash.
2009); Burst v. Shell Oil Co., No. 14-cv-109, 2015 WL 3755953, at *9 (E.D. La. June 16, 2015),
aff’d, 650 F. App’x 170 (5th Cir. 2016)); Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 24–
26 (citing In re Zantac, 644 F. Supp. 3d at 1075; Henricksen, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1156; Burst, No.
2015 WL 3755953, at *9). These cases are in accord with my analysis.
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relevant scientific literature to furnish an opinion as to whether perineal use of
talcum powder can cause ovarian cancer as a general matter . . . .”), ECF No. 32999-
14 (“Holcomb Dep.”) at 40:16–19 (“[M]y opinion is whatever is in that [Johnson &
Johnson] bottle that has been subjected to decades of testing does not increase the
risk of ovarian cancer.”); ECF No. 33001-6 (“Permuth Dep.”) at 42:11–13 (“I looked
at . . . the bulk of epi[demiological] literature, which considered talc as a substance
or as a whole.”); DiFeo Rep. at 6 (“I conclude that cosmetic talc, regardless of its
exact constituents or alleged contaminants, does not cause or contribute to the
development of ovarian cancer.”).)
In this context, phrases such as “regardless of the composition” or “regardless
of its constituents” reflect inclusivity, not exclusion. That is, Defendants’ experts
consider talcum powder inclusive of whatever constituents it may contain, rather
than isolating talc to the exclusion of other components. Accordingly, their
biological plausibility analyses or critiques do not “impermissibly cherry-pick”
evidence, but instead rest on a product-level assessment consistent with their
articulated methodological approach.
Even if Defendants’ experts could be criticized for “cherry‑picking” by
evaluating talc or talc-focused literature without considering talc’s potentially
carcinogenic 	constituents, 	they 	are 	not 	required 	to 	analyze 	each 	purported
component of talcum powder to address biological plausibility for several reasons.
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As I have referenced when addressing Defendants’ motion to preclude, the experts
are not required to review every medical or scientific study available about the topic
on which they are opining. See, e.g., In re C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2187, 2018 WL 4220616, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 5, 2018)
(observing that “nothing in Daubert requires an expert to consider every single
article on a topic in order to be admitted as an expert”); see also In re Testosterone
Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig. Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, MDL
No. 2545, 2018 WL 4030585, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2018).
In that regard, Defendants’ experts often express their opinions as critiques of
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions and underlying methodologies. For example, Dr. Saenz
devotes a substantial portion of her reports to rebutting the opinions of Dr. Wolf, Dr.
Clarke-Pearson, Dr. Saed, and Dr. Godleski. (See, e.g., Saenz Rep. at 10, 15, 45, 51–
52; Saenz Converse Rep. at 4–5 (Dr. Clarke-Pearson), 7–8 (Dr. Godleski); Saenz
Judkins Rep. at 5–6 (Dr. Wolf & Dr. Godleski); Saenz Newsome Rep. at 5–7 (Dr.
Clarke-Pearson & Dr. Godleski); Saenz Rausa Rep. at 6–7 (Dr. Clarke-Pearson).)
Dr. Finan and Dr. Holcomb respectively rebut Dr. Wolf’s causal opinions and Dr.
Saed’s methodology and conclusions. (See Finan Rep. at 12–13, 45, 50, 55, 61, 63–
67; Holcomb Rep. at 3, 26, 29–34.) Dr. Permuth provides “commentary” on reports
submitted by Plaintiffs’ epidemiological experts, including, among others, Dr. Cote
and Dr. Levy. (See Permuth Rep. at 135–47.) Dr. DiFeo “discuss[es] numerous
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concerns with the data presented by” some of the scientific and medical studies relied
on by Plaintiffs. (See DiFeo Rep. at 53–115.) And Dr. Boyd criticizes Dr. Saed’s
methodologies and opinions drawn therefrom, as well as other Plaintiffs’ experts’
reliance on the work of Dr. Saed. (See Boyd Rep. at 2–16.)
Most of Plaintiffs’ experts, at one point or another, opine only as to talc or
talcum 	powder—not 	its 	individual 	constituents—when 	assessing 	biological
plausibility.120 For example, Dr. Wolf testified that her opinion on whether perineal
application of talcum powder causes ovarian cancer does not depend on the presence
of asbestos because she evaluated cosmetic talcum powder “as a whole.” (Wolf Dep.
at 110:16–111:9.) Dr. Clarke-Pearson similarly testified that while he cannot identify
which specific component of talcum powder caused Plaintiff Converse’s ovarian
cancer, he maintains that talcum powder causes ovarian cancer regardless of the
precise constituents. (See Clarke-Pearson Dep. at 293:4–22.) In conducting a review
of the epidemiological research on talc and ovarian cancer, Dr. Michele Cote looked
to “talc as a whole,” or “whatever was in the bottles or containers of talc that the
women were using,” and not its individual components. (See ECF No. 33118-10
(“Cote Dep.”) at 112:17–113:2; see also, e.g., Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 2
120 	Indeed, as discussed supra, in recommending exclusion of Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions
regarding the carcinogenic effects of heavy metals and fragrance chemicals, I made clear that those
experts may nonetheless opine on the causal relationship between cosmetic talc—as a product,
inclusive of its constituents—and ovarian cancer. That conclusion reflects the fact that much of the
epidemiologic literature on which the experts rely evaluates talc exposure without distinguishing
among talc’s individual constituents, including asbestos.
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(“[T]here are biologically plausible mechanism to explain how powdering with talc-
based powders can contribute to the development of ovarian cancer.”), 74 (“[T]here
are credible biologically plausible mechanisms by which talcum powder products
can reach the upper genital tract causing an inflammatory response . . . .”).)121
Therefore, as rebuttal to Plaintiffs’ experts, Defendants must necessarily be entitled
to address these experts’ talc-based opinions regarding biological plausibility.
To be sure, some of Plaintiffs’ experts do opine on talcum powder as inclusive
of its individual constituents, and/or its individual constituents separately. (See, e.g.,
Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 18–20; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 3 (“When I refer to
talc or talcum products in this report, I am referring to commercially available talcum
powder products and all constituent elements contained within.”), 89 (“In my
opinion it is biologically plausible that talcum powder products can reach the ovaries
121 	Additionally, Dr. Godleski’s methodology sought to identify talc and other potentially
deleterious particulates in the gynecologic and pelvic tissue of certain bellwether Plaintiffs to
determine their contribution to the development of ovarian cancer. (See generally Godleski
Gallardo Rep.; Godleski Converse Rep.; Godleski Rausa Rep.; Godleski Judkins Rep.; Godleski
Rausa Rep.)
But Dr. Godleski did not attempt to identify other potentially deleterious materials outside of talc
and asbestos. (See generally id.) Defendants contend that Dr. Godleski’s failure to identify every
foreign particle observed within each tissue sample undermines his causation conclusion. (See
Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 17–18.) In response, Plaintiffs argue, among other things, that this argument
“targets the weight of the evidence offered” and not its admissibility. (See Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br.
at 17–18.) Although Defendants challenge Dr. Godleski’s failure to consider all birefringent
material in his causal conclusions, Plaintiffs here challenge these experts’ failure to consider
individual constituents of talcum powder as it may relate to their biological plausibility opinions.
While the arguments Plaintiffs advance differ in some respects across these motions and in their
opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr. Godleski, the similarities are nonetheless sufficient
to diminish their credibility.
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via migration from the perineum and via inhalation into the lungs, blood stream, and
lymphatic system.”).) A defense expert, however, is not required to address and/or
rebut every assertion contained within every plaintiff’s expert’s opinion. See, e.g.,
Quidel Corp. v. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc., No. 16-cv-3059, 2019 WL
4727939, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2019) (“Indeed, there is no requirement that a
rebuttal expert read the opening expert report cover to cover, and then write a rebuttal
report outlining each and every criticism of the opening expert’s opinions.” (citation
modified)); see also Wherevertv, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:18-
cv-529, 2022 WL 4017049, at *3 & n.3 (M.D. Fl. Sept. 4, 2022).
Moreover, defense experts attack the epidemiologic, in vitro, and mechanistic
studies on which Plaintiffs’ experts rely. Many of these scientific and medical
studies assess talcum powder as a whole—rather than its individual constituents—
when evaluating biological plausibility. For example, several of Plaintiffs’ experts
rely on Dr. Saed’s research. (See, e.g., Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 15–16; Wolf 3d
Amend. Rep. at 16 (citing Harper/Saed 2023 Article); Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend.
Rep. at 5–6 (citing Dr. Saed’s 2019 study and the Harper/Saed 2023 Article).) Much
of the research makes no effort to differentiate between talc and the individual
constituents of talcum powder.
Finally, an expert is not required to review every single study within a relevant
body of literature. See Johnson v. Vane Line Bunkering, 01-cv-5819, 2003 WL
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23162433, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2003) (noting, in rejecting a Daubert challenge
for alleged failure to meet the reliability requirement, that “the Third Circuit does
not require that an expert review every medical report available to him or her and
does not require that a physician make citations to publications to support his
medical 	conclusions”); 	In 	re 	Testosterone 	Replacement 	Therapy, 	2018 	WL
4030585, at *6 (“The fact that [plaintiff’s expert] does not discuss every study . . .
view[ed] as relevant, or that he may have overlooked a study, does not mean that he
unreliably applies his methodology.”). It is clear, however, that “[w]here an expert
ignores evidence that is highly relevant to [her] conclusion, contrary to [her] own
stated methodology, exclusion of the expert’s testimony is warranted.” In re Mirena
II, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 241.
This is not the case here. Although Defendants’ experts do not cite every
relevant study in the universe of available literature, the admissibility inquiry focuses
on the reliability of their methods. Here, the record demonstrates that their opinions
rest 	on 	a 	reliable 	body 	of 	peer‑reviewed 	evidence, 	educational 	background,
professional 	experience, 	and 	reasoned 	application 	of 	established 	scientific
principles. In this context, the omission of some studies goes to the weight of an
opinion, not admissibility. See, e.g., Luppino v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Civil
Action No. 09-5582, 2015 WL 12819051, at *6 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015) (“[T]he
absence of a study conducted by an expert is relevant to the weight, not the
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admissibility, of his or her conclusion.” (citation omitted)). Of course, Plaintiffs may
cross-examine defense experts’ on the sources they rely upon in forming their
biological 	opinions. 	After 	all, 	“‘vigorous 	cross-examination, 	presentation 	of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence . . . .”’ Heller,
167 F.3d at 152 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
b. 	Biological Plausibility Standard
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ experts’ biological plausibility opinions
must be excluded on the ground that the experts improperly apply a heightened
standard of proof—rather than a plausibility analysis—thereby rendering their
opinions irrelevant, confusing, or misleading. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs
mischaracterize their experts’ testimony, and that the experts properly apply
biological plausibility principles under Bradford Hill by requiring more than
untested hypotheses to support a causal inference. I agree with Defendants.
At the outset, as I have discussed at length, Plaintiffs are correct that biological
plausibility does not require a proven biological mechanism, or even overwhelming
evidence of biological mechanism. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 19–
22; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 14–17; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 16–19.) Indeed, even if the
scientific community has not reached consensus on the biological mechanism, that
does not mean the pathway proposed by an expert is not accepted as “plausible.” See
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In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 645 F. Supp. 2d 164, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Still,
although biological plausibility need not require proof certain, any biologically
plausible opinion must be “derived from and supported by reliable scientific
knowledge and reasoning.” In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308.
Here, contrary to Plaintiffs’ framing, Defendants’ experts do not impose a
requirement of scientific certainty or definitive proof. Rather, they offer general
causation opinions regarding perineal talcum powder use and ovarian cancer and, in
doing so, critique Plaintiffs’ experts’ proposed biological mechanisms on the ground
that those mechanisms lack adequate support in the scientific and medical literature.
Their opinions are thus directed at the sufficiency and reliability of the evidentiary
foundation for Plaintiffs’ theories, not at demanding proof beyond what biological
plausibility requires.
Plaintiffs’ criticism of Dr. Saenz is illustrative. Plaintiffs contend that Dr.
Saenz misapplied biological plausibility by insisting on “proof” that talc migrates
from the perineal area to the ovaries or that such migration causes inflammation.
(See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 16–17 (citing Saenz Rep. at 17–18; ECF
No. 32999-16 (“Saenz Dep.”) at 285:23–286:1; ECF No. 32999-17 (“Saenz Dep.
II”) at 325:14–17.) I disagree. A closer examination of Dr. Saenz’s report and
deposition testimony does not support that characterization. Dr. Saenz does not
require definitive proof of migration or inflammation; rather, in her role as a rebuttal
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expert, she explains that Plaintiffs’ biological plausibility theory is not supported by
the existing epidemiologic and medical literature. She reaches that conclusion based
on her review of the literature and her professional experience. (See Saenz Rep. at
17–18.) To preclude Dr. Saenz—or similarly situated defense experts—from
offering 	such 	rebuttal 	opinions 	would 	improperly 	deprive 	the 	factfinder 	of
competing expert views concerning the relevance, sufficiency, and interpretation of
the scientific evidence. Rule 702 does not require exclusion merely because an
expert concludes that the literature fails to support an opposing party’s theory of
biological plausibility.
I reach the same conclusion with respect to Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning
Drs. Holcomb and Finan. Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Holcomb misapplies the
biological plausibility standard regarding talc migration from perineal use and the
role of inflammation in ovarian carcinogenesis because he testified that he has not
seen literature “proving” either theory.(See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 17–
18 (citing ECF No. 32999-14 (“Holcomb Dep.”) at 108:10–19; 131:14–22, 392:22–
393:4, 421:15–423:20).) That argument mischaracterizes his testimony.
Dr. Holcomb makes clear that he does not require definitive proof to accept a
theory of biological plausibility. Rather, he explains that Plaintiffs’ proposed
mechanisms are not supported by the existing scientific or medical literature. (See
Holcomb 	Dep. 	at 	131:14–22 	(“I 	don’t 	believe 	that 	the 	theory 	of 	chronic
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inflammation, to the degree that it’s been studied, supports the concept that . . .
chronic inflammation from talc . . . causes mutations [or] causes malignant
transformation.”), 422:20–23 (“I have not seen where chronic inflammatory states
have been shown to cause malignant transformation of cancer cells.”).) His use of
the term “convince[],” read in context, reflects his assessment of the sufficiency of
the supporting evidence—not an insistence on scientific certainty. (See id. at
108:15–19 (“I’m not convinced of that based on the literature.” (emphasis added).)
Indeed, Dr. Holcomb testified that biological plausibility requires “an explanation
that at least is possible,” (id. at 104:17–22), and that he disagrees with Plaintiffs’
experts’ plausibility theories because he finds that the relevant literature does not
adequately support their hypotheses. (See id. at 105:6–107:20.)
Plaintiffs argue Dr. Finan improperly applied the biological plausibility
standard for talc migration and malignant transformation by relying on the absence
of “precise” studies. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 18 (citing Finan
Expert Report at 5, 54; ECF No. 32999-15 (“Finan Carl Dep.”) at 60, 68:8–13,
169:12–170:8).) Dr. Finan’s opinion on the absence of “studies that demonstrate that
talcum powder as a dusting to the female perineum can migrate upwards through the
female genital tract and reach the fallopian tubes or ovaries” is not indicative of an
improperly heightened biological plausibility standard. (Finan Carl Dep. at 68:8–13;
see also id. at 69:10–16 (explaining that “much” of the research into biological
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plausibility of inflammation involves “advanced ovarian cancer,” which Dr. Finan
opines causes the inflammation), 60:5–8 (cautioning against taking his expert
report’s introductory bullet points out of context because they are meant to
summarize his expert report).) Like Dr. Saenz and Dr. Holcomb, Dr. Finan is
commenting on the lack of evidence supporting certain theories of biological
plausibility. This is not the same as requiring evidence that proves Plaintiffs’
experts’ theories. Accordingly, Dr. Finan applies the correct Bradford Hill standard
that biological plausibility must rest on some evidentiary support.
Plaintiffs largely repeat this line of argument against Drs. Permuth and DiFeo.
I remain unconvinced. In short, Plaintiffs argue Dr. Permuth misapplied the
biological plausibility standard for perineal-to-ovarian talc migration, citing her
testimony that she found no evidence “prov[ing] that hypothesis.” (See Pls. Permuth
Br. at 14–15 (citing ECF No. 33001-6 (“Permuth Dep.” at 176:16–177:7).) Again, a
broader review of Dr. Permuth’s testimony shows that this challenged statement is
criticizing a specific study for not supporting the upward migration of talc from the
perineum to the ovaries. (Compare Permuth Rep. at 113, 121–22, with Permuth Dep.
at 176:16–177:7.) This is admissible rebuttal opinion.
Plaintiffs also argue that Dr. DiFeo misapplies biological plausibility with
respect to talc migration, talc-induced malignant transformation, and the role of
inflammation in ovarian cancer. (See Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 12–16 (citing Permuth Rep.
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at 6, 16–17, 28, 29, 50; ECF No. 33001-6 (“DiFeo Dep.”) at 52:25–53:4, 72:20–21,
74:1–19, 93:8–14, 169:1–15:22, 221).) In support, Plaintiffs point to portions of Dr.
DiFeo’s report and deposition testimony in which she concludes that certain studies
do not support the biological mechanisms they purport to establish, or do not support
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions. (See id.)
That characterization misconstrues Dr. DiFeo’s analysis. In those instances,
Dr. DiFeo does not conclude that a biological mechanism is impossible simply
because it has not been conclusively proven. Rather, she opines that the cited studies
do not, in her view, support the specific mechanistic conclusions that Plaintiffs’
experts draw from them. For example, Plaintiffs challenge Dr. DiFeo’s statement
that certain studies “do not conclusively show that talc can migrate to the fallopian
tubes or ovaries” because they “were conducted under artificial conditions that do
not mimic the use or perineal application of cosmetic talc.” (See DiFeo Rep. at 28.)
In that context, Dr. DiFeo is not imposing a requirement of conclusive proof; she is
critiquing the studies for failing to substantiate the conclusions they claim to
support.122 (See id.; see also id. at 6, 50.) Elsewhere, Dr. DiFeo similarly notes gaps
or limitations in the evidence underlying Plaintiffs’ biological plausibility theories.
(See, e.g., id. at 16–17, 29.) Identifying an absence or insufficiency of supporting
122 	Moreover, Dr. DiFeo previously testified that something “doesn’t have to be conclusive to
be plausible, but to strengthen the . . . plausibility of it, you want to conclusively confirm that it
has a biological effect.” (DiFeo Dep. at 169:18–22.)
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evidence, however, is not the same as demanding definitive proof. Rather, it reflects
a permissible expert assessment of whether the cited literature adequately supports
the proposed biological mechanisms.
Moreover, Plaintiffs cite to no legal authority for the proposition that a defense
expert may not opine on the existence or absence of relevant scientific or medical
studies. Plaintiffs similarly cite to no legal authority for the proposition that a defense
expert may not base his or her general causation opinions on, among other things,
the existence or absence of relevant studies. And again, “the proper role of rebuttal
experts [is] to critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out potential
flaws in the plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
An otherwise qualified expert may attack an opposing expert’s methodology by
criticizing the methodology, i.e., scientific and medical studies, on which they rely.
See, e.g., id. at 834 (“A number of other district courts have held that rebuttal expert
witnesses may criticize other experts’ theories and calculations without offering
alternatives.” (collecting cases); see also In re Proton-Pump Inhibitor Prods. Liab.
Litig., 	2:17-MD-2789, 	2022 	WL 	18999830, 	at 	*29 	(D.N.J. 	July 	5, 	2022)
(“[C]riticisms of an expert’s explanations for reliance on, or rejection of, particular
studies, 	are 	appropriately 	addressed 	through 	cross-examination, 	not 	through
wholesale exclusion of the expert testimony.”).
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It also bears repeating that Plaintiffs do not challenge most of these experts’
general causation rebuttal opinions on Daubert grounds. Plaintiffs do not appear to
contend that these experts failed to employ reliable methodologies in reaching their
respective conclusions. A central component of each expert’s methodology is a
review of the relevant scientific and medical literature. As explained throughout this
Report and Recommendation, Defendants’ experts often reach conclusions that
differ from those of Plaintiffs’ experts regarding the applicability, reliability, or
significance of the same body of literature. That divergence, however, does not
render the opinions inadmissible. The fact “[t]hat two different experts reach
opposing conclusions from the same information does not render their opinions
inadmissible,” 	so 	long 	as 	they 	still 	meet 	Daubert’s 	threshold 	requirements
concerning qualifications, reliability, and relevance. Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co.,
208 F.3d 581, 589 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp. 3d at
139 (applying to rebuttal experts).
I find that the biological plausibility opinions of Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb,
Permuth, and DiFeo apply the correct standard. They are relevant and do not pose a
risk of confusing or misleading the jury.
iii. 	Dr. Boyd
As previewed above, Plaintiffs move to exclude Dr. Boyd on three grounds
independent from their efforts to exclude other defense experts set forth in this
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section. Plaintiffs first contend that Dr. Boyd is unqualified to opine on the design
and methodologies of certain in vitro studies. Next, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd’s
challenges to various peer-reviewed studies are speculative and lack a reliable
methodology. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Boyd’s testimony will not assist the
trier of fact.
Defendants respond that Dr. Boyd is well qualified to opine on in vitro study
design and methodology, that his opinions are proper, helpful methodological
critiques grounded in his expertise and peer‑review experience, and that his
testimony is relevant because peer review does not immunize the challenged studies.
a. 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Boyd is unqualified to opine on in vitro study
design 	and 	methodology 	because 	he 	lacks 	experience 	conducting 	in 	vitro
experiments or lab-based research of his own. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 19–20.)
Plaintiffs highlight that Dr. Boyd has not conducted hands-on basic laboratory
research 	in 	decades 	and 	has 	not, 	in 	a 	professional 	capacity, 	researched 	or
experimented with genital talcum powder usage and its association with the
development of ovarian cancer. (See id.)
Defendants argue in response that Dr. Boyd’s decades of laboratory-centered
cancer genetics experience, his active role in collaborative lab research programs,
and his longstanding service as a reviewer and journal editor qualify him to assess,
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among other things, in vitro design and ovarian cancer studies. (See Defs.’ Opp. to
Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 43–46.)
Defendants 	have 	the 	better 	argument. 	As 	an 	initial 	matter, 	Plaintiffs
mischaracterize Dr. Boyd’s relevant experience. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 19–20 (citing
ECF No. 33060-6 (“Boyd Dep.”) at 49:23–50:16).) Without citation, Plaintiffs assert
that “Dr. Boyd does not do lab-based research and does not do in vitro studies.” (See
Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 19.) Dr. Boyd’s testimony makes clear, however, that while he does
not “own [a] personal research laboratory at this time in [his] career,” he nonetheless
conducts laboratory research, participates in collaborative laboratory research
programs, and has an active laboratory-based research program. (See Boyd Dep. at
49:21–50:9; see also id. at 134:10–12 (“I don’t have an active research laboratory
any longer, although I have a clinical laboratory . . . .).)
Plaintiffs also argue that Dr. Boyd’s failure to conduct talc-specific research
and talc-specific experimentation makes him unqualified to opine on the objectives,
design, and methodology of talc-specific studies. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 19–20.) That
argument misses the mark. Rule 702 does not require Dr. Boyd to propose a
competing methodology or replicate the challenged analyses as a precondition to
offering methodological critiques of talc-specific study objectives, designs, or
methods. See, e.g., Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 138. The “proper role of
rebuttal experts [is] to critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out
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potential flaws in the plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp.
2d at 835 (emphasis added).
Finally, it is worth reiterating that an expert’s qualifications must still meet
the Daubert qualification standards regardless of whether the expert’s opinions are
offered in rebuttal. The Daubert standard for qualification is liberally construed.
Defendants need not put on the “best qualified” expert to offer a rebuttal opinion.
See In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 655 (quoting Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244).
Rather, Dr. Boyd possesses the requisite specialized expertise to allow him to opine
on the design and methodology of proffered studies conducted or relied on by
Plaintiffs’ experts. Dr. Boyd is, among other things, a credentialed gynecologic
cancer researcher who has held senior research and academic leadership positions in
some of the world’s leading cancer research institutions. (See Boyd Rep. at 1–2; see
also ECF No. 33111-2 (“Boyd CV”).) Dr. Boyd has led or worked in numerous
esteemed cancer research laboratories. (See Boyd CV at 1–4.) Dr. Boyd has authored
or co-authored over 200 peer-reviewed publications “on the molecular and genetic
bases of gynecologic or breast cancers,” and has served in several editorial positions
for reputable medical journals. (See, e.g., Boyd Rep. at 2; see also Boyd CV at 7
(naming editorial positions on Molecular and Cellular Differentiation, Molecular
Carcinogenesis, Gynecologic Oncology, Journal of Clinical Oncology, American
Journal of Pathology, and Anticancer Research).) The fact that Dr. Boyd has not
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personally replicated Dr. Saed’s experiments does not disqualify him from opining
on the design or methodology of these studies. Therefore, I find that Dr. Boyd to be
qualified to offer the opinions challenged by Plaintiffs.
b. 	Reliability
Plaintiffs seek to exclude Dr. Boyd’s opinions regarding the Harper/Saed
2020 Poster, the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster, the Harper/Saed 2023 Article, Mandarino
2020, Emi 2021,123 and certain of Dr. Levy’s opinions on the ground that Dr. Boyd
employed an unreliable methodology. In support, Plaintiffs point to portions of Dr.
Boyd’s deposition testimony in which he purportedly admitted that he conducted no
independent research. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 4–5.) That characterization is not
supported by the cited testimony. The excerpts reflect that, at the time of his
deposition, Dr. Boyd could not recall specific aspects of the research he conducted
in 	connection 	with his 	literature review—not that he failed 	to 	conduct any
independent analysis. Elsewhere in his deposition testimony and supplemental
expert report, Dr. Boyd describes the steps he undertook in forming his opinions,
including reviewing the relevant literature and drawing on his decades of experience
in cancer research. (See, e.g., Boyd Dep. at 49:16–20, 139:13–19.)
123 	I note that these studies are no longer at issue with respect to Plaintiffs’ experts’
macrophage-inhibition theory.
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In any event, Plaintiffs’ criticism misses the mark. Dr. Boyd offers rebuttal
opinions critiquing Plaintiffs’ experts’ studies 	and their interpretation of the
scientific literature. He was not required to conduct original experimental research
to do so. His methodology—reviewing the literature, evaluating the cited studies,
and applying his expertise to assess their reliability and relevance—is a standard and
permissible approach for rebuttal testimony under Rule 702.
Plaintiffs next emphasize the absence of support underlying Dr. Boyd’s
opinions regarding Dr. Saed’s dosing, use of a cell transformation assay kit, and use
of ovarian surface epithelial ovarian cells rather than fallopian tubes cells.124 (See
Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 5–9.) As a general matter, Plaintiffs appear to misunderstand Dr.
Boyd’s role as a rebuttal expert. A rebuttal expert need not conduct his or her own
experimental study or parallel analysis to attack an opposing experts’ methodology
or model. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (“[D]efendants’ experts
have a less demanding task, since they have no burden to produce models or methods
124 	In this context, Plaintiffs’ brief cites to Dr. Boyd’s criticisms of methodology described in
the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster, (see Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 5–9), which Dr. Boyd alleges is repeated across
Dr. Saed’s subsequent studies, including Harper/Saed 2023. In short, this study sought to
“demonstrate whether exposure to talcum powder induces malignant transformation in human
primary normal ovarian epithelial cells and human primary normal peritoneal fibroblasts.” (See
Harper/Saed 2020 Poster.) The study exposed human primary normal ovarian epithelial cells and
peritoneal fibroblasts in triplicate to Johnson & Johnson talcum baby powder at two exposure
concentrations, 100 μg/mL and 500 μg/mL, for 72 hours. (See id.) The cells were then assessed
using a cell transformation assay in accordance with manufacturer protocols. (See id.) Following
assessment, the authors observed the formation of colonies in ovarian epithelial cells that indicated
cell malignant transformation increasing by approximately 11% at 100 μg/mL and 20% at 500
μg/mL, while fibroblasts and titanium dioxide controls showed no detectable transformation at
either dose. (See id.)
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of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiffs’ experts.”). It is sufficient for
the rebuttal expert to ground his critique in his expertise and a review of the materials
on which the opposing expert relied. Accordingly, Dr. Boyd does not, and need not,
offer affirmative opinions. Dr. Boyd may instead criticize Dr. Saed’s methodology
and highlight flaws in his studies’ design. So long as Dr. Boyd’s opinions otherwise
satisfy Daubert’s threshold standards regarding qualifications, reliability, and fit, he
may “critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out potential flaws in the
plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
More specifically, as to Dr. Boyd’s opinions on Dr. Saed’s dosing, Plaintiffs
argue that he failed to conduct independent research that comparable dosing appears
in other peer‑reviewed studies, and that even Defendants’ experts endorsed the
appropriateness of Dr. Saed’s dosing. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 6–7.) However, as
explained below, I find that Dr. Boyd offers proper rebuttal opinions challenging the
methodology and conclusions underlying Dr. Saed’s dose-related opinions. To be
sure, Dr. Boyd does not suggest a proper dosage, other than to explain that in his
view, Dr. Saed’s dosage used in a 2019 study was “extraordinarily high.” Boyd Dep.
at 96:9–11; see also Boyd Rep. at 6 (“Dr. Saed’s 2019 study treated cells with very
high, non-physiologic doses of talcum powder, making it untenable to extrapolate
those experiments to perineal talcum powder application by women.”). Dr. Boyd
goes further to criticize Dr. Saed’s failure to follow accepted scientific methodology
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by not “begin[ning] with the lowest dose possible [and] working up to the point
where a biological effect is observed.” (Boyd Dep. at 97:8–20.) Dr. Boyd then
criticized Dr. Saed’s apparent omission from the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster of dosage
information because of the poster’s claimed reliance on the 2019 study for dosing.
(See Boyd Rep. at 6, 8.)
In forming his opinions that Dr. Saed used an improper dose of talcum
powder, 	Dr. 	Boyd 	relied 	on 	his 	“understanding 	of 	[Dr. 	Saed’s] 	scientific
methodology, [and his] review of laboratory notebooks and previous work [of Dr.
Saed].” (Boyd Dep. at 93:1–15.) Dr. Boyd also relied on the opinions of other peer
reviewers who came to the same conclusion. (See, e.g., Boyd Rep. at 6 & n.16, n.17,
n.18, n.19; Boyd Dep. at 94:2–9.) These bases are sufficient to support Dr. Boyd’s
rebuttal testimony as reliable. Plaintiffs’ references to comparable dosing or
purported testimony about proper dosage do not, standing alone, call into question
the reliability of Dr. Boyd’s methodology. Rather, these are scientific disputes that
go to the weight of Dr. Boyd’s testimony, not its admissibility.
Plaintiffs next argue that Dr. Boyd’s opinions regarding Dr. Saed’s use of a
specific cell transformation assay kit should be excluded because Dr. Boyd lacks
experience with that particular kit as well as commercial assay kits generally and
cannot say whether this kit or commercial assay kits generally are used in the
scientific community. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 7–9.) For further support, Plaintiffs
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point to Dr. Boyd’s deposition testimony, wherein he admitted to not understanding
how the term “cell transformation” was used in the kit’s product guide and was
unaware of whether any existing commercial assay kit tested for “malignant
transformation.” (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 8 (citing Boyd Dep. at 115:19–116:4, 120:2–
11, 122:25–123:5).)
I agree with Plaintiffs and recommend that the Court exclude Dr. Boyd’s
opinions 	and 	testimony 	regarding 	Dr. 	Saed’s 	use 	of 	the 	commercial 	cell
transformation assay kit, “ab235698,” manufactured by Abcam. Dr. Boyd may still,
however, opine on malignant cell transformation and whether he believes it can be
observed within 72 hours following exposure as a general, scientific principle. And
to be clear, this recommendation does not extend to limiting any other portion of Dr.
Boyd’s opinions or testimony challenged by Plaintiffs, as I find they are sufficiently
reliable, by way of both underlying methodology and application to this case.
Dr. Boyd specifically opines that Dr. Saed misused the commercial cell
transformation assay kit that he employed as a part of the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster
by claiming that it demonstrated malignant transformation—a purpose for which the
assay is not validated—and that asserting malignant transformation after only 72
hours is scientifically incoherent and biologically implausible. (See Boyd Rep. at 7.)
In forming his opinion, Dr. Boyd reviewed the assay kit’s product guide,
which states that the kit is intended to measure “cell transformation in mammalian
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adherent 	or 	suspension 	cells 	in 	response 	to 	stimuli 	that 	inhibit 	or 	induce
transformation.” (See Boyd Rep. at 7 n.20; see also Boyd Dep. at 113:11–12 (“I’m
referencing this kit based on what I’ve read from the pamphlet provided.”).) Based
solely on his review and that description, Dr. Boyd opines that the kit does not
support conclusions regarding malignant transformation, as distinct from the more
limited phenomenon of cell transformation as marketed. (See Boyd Rep. at 7.) But
this review, which reflects the methodology underlying Dr. Boyd’s opinions on Dr.
Saed’s use of the commercial cell‑transformation assay kit at issue, is not sufficiently
reliable. Dr. Boyd concedes to having never used the particular assay kit that he is
now challenging. (See Boyd Dep. at 111:15–23.) Dr. Boyd also admitted that he has
never used a commercial cell transformation assay kit of any kind. (See id. at 112:2–
5.) Instead, Dr. Boyd explains that he “produced [his] own reagents” instead of using
a cell transformation assay kit, though he admits that he has not done so for over 25
years. (See id. at 112:4–13.) In sum, Dr. Boyd admits to having neither familiarity
with the cell transformation assay kit used by Dr. Saed, nor commercial cell
transformation assay kits generally. And although he admits to using a cell
transformation assay kit earlier in his career, it was a product of his own creation
used over 25 years ago. Therefore, his criticisms of Dr. Saed’s use of the commercial
cell 	transformation 	assay kit, “ab235698,” manufactured by 	Abcam, are not
supported by a reliable methodology.
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Plaintiffs also cite portions of Dr. Boyd’s deposition in which he testified that
he did not understand how the term “cell transformation” was used in the kit’s
product guide. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 8 (citing Boyd Dep. at 115:19–116:4, 120:2–
11, 	122:25–123:5).) 	Dr. 	Boyd 	also 	criticizes 	the 	kit’s 	language 	as 	an
oversimplification of the carcinogenic process. (See Boyd Dep. at 113:18–114:13.)
For the same reasons as outlined above, Dr. Boyd’s methodology underlying his kit-
specific opinions is without sufficient support and therefore unreliable.
However, Dr. Boyd has demonstrated that his opinions regarding cell
transformation as they relate to the broader carcinogenic process are supported by
his reliance on “several decades of experience in how cells are transformed into
malignant cells.” (Boyd Dep. at 138:8–13.) Thus, he should be permitted to testify
about cell transformation and his 72-hour exposure opinions, but not as they relate
to his criticisms of Dr. Saed’s use of commercial cell transformation assay kit,
“ab235698,” manufactured by Abcam.
Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd’s critique of Dr. Saed’s use of ovarian
surface epithelial ovarian cells rather than fallopian tube cells lacks support because
Dr. Boyd has never personally experimented with fallopian tube cells, cites no
studies using such cells, and did not consider in vitro testing of them. (See Pls.’ Boyd
Br. at 8–9 (citing Boyd Dep. at 134:4–12, 136:22–25, 137:4–13).)
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According to Dr. Boyd, “the great majority of high-grade serous ovarian
cancers, which are the majority of ovarian cancer type, occurs in the fallopian tube,
in which case the use of some normal type of fallopian tube cell would have been
more appropriate.” (Boyd Dep. at 133:22–134:3.) Dr. Boyd cites other peer
reviewers who were critical of Dr. Saed’s studies. (See Boyd Rep. at 6 (“I also agree
with later peer reviewers that Dr. Saed’s decision to use ovarian surface epithelial
cells rather than fallopian tube cells significantly marginalizes his study given that
scientists now agree that most high-grade serous ovarian cancers originate in the
fallopian tubes.”).) Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot credibly argue that Dr. Boyd’s
criticisms lack support, since he supported this opinion not only based on his own
experience, but on other peer-reviewed conclusions.125
Additionally, Plaintiffs mischaracterize Dr. Boyd’s testimony as it relates to
his reliance or lack thereof on studies where fallopian tube cells are used in ovarian
cancer research. When asked whether he could recall “any studies where fallopian
tubes were used,” Dr. Boyd responded that he was unable to “from memory.” (See
Boyd Dep. at 136:22–137:2.) Dr. Boyd similarly could not recall whether he
considered “in vitro testing using fallopian tube cells.” (See Boyd Dep. at 137:4–
13.) But, even if Dr. Boyd did not personally test, research, or consider use of
125 	Plaintiffs spend much time arguing about the significance of the peer review process, (see
Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 17–19), but lose sight of Dr. Boyd’s reliance on peer-reviews of Dr. Saed’s posters.
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fallopian tube cells when studying high-grade serous ovarian cancer, Dr. Boyd may
nevertheless opine “that scientists now agree that most high-grade serous ovarian
cancers originate in the fallopian tubes,” (Boyd Rep. at 6; see also Boyd Dep. at
136:4–8), because, as discussed, the methodology on which he relies in forming such
an opinion is reliable.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd’s criticisms of Dr. Levy’s talc,
inflammation and ovarian cancer opinions are unreliable and should be excluded
because Dr. Boyd ignored several peer‑reviewed studies that Dr. Levy considered.
(See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 9–10.) Defendants rightly point out that Plaintiffs fail to
explain the significance of these studies to Dr. Boyd’s opinions. (See Defs.’ Opp. to
Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 38.) Plaintiffs do not address the substance of
the studies that Dr. Boyd purportedly ignored, and do not argue how these studies
undermine the reliability of Dr. Boyd’s methodology or opinions. While exclusion
of an expert’s opinions is warranted where “an expert ignores evidence that his
highly relevant to his conclusion, contrary to his own stated methodology,” Plaintiffs
fail to explain how these studies are relevant to Dr. Boyd’s opinions. See In re
Mirena II, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 241.126 The absence of explicit citations to every study
Dr. Levy cites does not, by itself, render Dr. Boyd’s methodology unreliable under
126 	In any event, “a proper rebuttal expert's opinion is not required to be based on the same
data as the expert opinion that it is offered to rebut.” Better Holdco, Inc. v. Beeline Loans, Inc.,
666 F. Supp. 3d 328, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (citation omitted) (collecting cases).
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Daubert. Moreover, most of Dr. Boyd’s critiques of Dr. Levy’s opinions rest on Dr.
Levy’s misreadings of specific studies or on unsupported assertions, (see, e.g., Boyd
Rep. at 22–25), not on affirmative analyses susceptible to challenge by overlooked
literature.
Accordingly, I find Dr. Boyd’s methodology sufficiently reliable under
Daubert, and therefore, I recommend the Court to admit Dr. Boyd as a rebuttal expert
subject to the constraint I detailed above.
c. 	Fit
Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd’s post hoc critiques of published studies will not
assist the jury and instead risk confusion or unfair prejudice. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at
17–19.) Defendants respond that peer review does not insulate scientific studies from
scrutiny in litigation, and that Plaintiffs’ position is particularly inconsistent given
that Plaintiffs’ own experts criticize peer-reviewed cohort literature. (See Defs.’ Opp.
to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 39.) Defendants further note that Plaintiffs’
acknowledgment 	that 	peer 	reviewers 	are 	“typically 	experts” 	underscores 	the
relevance of Dr. Boyd’s testimony, particularly where multiple expert reviewers at
reputable journals criticized and rejected Dr. Saed’s work. (See id. at 41.)
I agree with Defendants. Plaintiffs cite no authority—and I am aware of
none—holding that peer-reviewed or published literature is categorically immune
from critique by rebuttal experts. Adopting such a rule would improperly confer a
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presumption of reliability on all published research, regardless of its methodology
or the rigor of the review process. As discussed above, Dr. Boyd’s critique of
Plaintiffs’ experts’ methodologies and the studies on which they rely goes to weight,
not admissibility.
Under Daubert, courts may evaluate relevance by assessing whether a theory
or method has been peer reviewed or published. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
“Although it is not dispositive of admissibility, publication in a peer reviewed
journal is relevant ‘in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or
methodology on which an opinion is premised.’” Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 520
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). It follows that a defense expert offered in
rebuttal may properly scrutinize and critique the methodology and conclusions of
peer-reviewed studies relied upon by an opposing expert. Such testimony is relevant
and may assist the trier of fact in evaluating complex scientific evidence.
Here, Dr. Boyd does not opine on the admissibility of Plaintiffs’ expert
evidence or usurp the Court’s gatekeeping function. Rather, he critiques the
methodologies underlying Dr. Saed’s research and related studies cited by Plaintiffs’
experts. Specifically, Dr. Boyd opines that the Harper/Saed 2020 and 2021 posters
and 	the 	Harper/Saed 	2023 	article 	suffer 	from 	experimental 	and 	interpretive
deficiencies; that Mandarino 2020 and Emi 2021 do not meaningfully advance the
relevant mechanistic inquiry; and that Dr. Levy’s genetics-related causation opinions
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overstate the data on which they rely. These critiques address scientific design and
interpretation, not admissibility.
Accordingly, I recommend that the Court grant in part and deny in part
Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Boyd.
iv. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Kornak
Plaintiffs move to exclude the opinions of Dr. John Kornak, Ph.D. Defendants
offer Dr. Kornak’s testimony to rebut the PSC’s experts’ opinions to the extent that
those opinions are based on O’Brien 2024. Several of Plaintiffs’ experts rely on
O’Brien 2024, as is discussed elsewhere in this Report and Recommendation.
Generally, O’Brien 2024, which concludes that genital talc use is associated
with an increased risk of ovarian cancer, uses statistical methods to compensate for
missing data points in the underlying dataset, which came from the Sister Study, a
cohort study exploring the relationship between various risk factors and cancer. (See
O’Brien 2024 at 13.) Dr. Kornak primarily criticizes the imputation methods
employed by the authors of O’Brien 2024. (See ECF No. 33011-9 (“Kornak Rep.”).)
Plaintiffs move to exclude Dr. Kornak on primarily two bases. (See generally
ECF No. 33011-1 (“Pls.’ Kornak Br.”).) First, they argue that the methodology used
in O’Brien 2024 deserves great deference such that Dr. Kornak’s opinion critiquing
that methodology should be excluded. (Id. at 21-22.) Second, they maintain that Dr.
Kornak’s critique of O’Brien 2024’s methodology is unreliable because the doctor
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hastily prepared his report and did not review key materials cited by the study. (Id.
at 23-24.)
Defendants 	argue in opposition 	that 	the soundness of O’Brien 	2024’s
methodology is not a legal basis on which a court can exclude Dr. Kornak’s
criticism, and Plaintiffs’ other criticisms of Dr. Kornak are factually baseless. (See
ECF No. 33107 (“Defs.’ Kornak Br.”) at 13–23.)
As set forth above, Dr. Kornak’s rebuttal analysis is subject to the standards
set forth in Rule 702 and Daubert. With that in mind, I will detail O’Brien 2024,
again to the extent it is helpful to address the parties’ argument in this context,
followed by Dr. Kornak’s criticisms of O’Brien 2024. I then turn to the Plaintiffs’
arguments to exclude Dr. Kornak’s opinions on the flaws of O’Brien 2024.
a. 	O’Brien 2024
O’Brien 2024, discussed numerous times in this Report and Recommendation,
was published to address issues in the Sister Study data to shed further light on a
potential association between genital talcum powder use and cancer. (See O’Brien
2024 at 1.) To fully understand Dr. Kornak’s criticisms of O’Brien 2024, one must
understand O’Brien 2024’s data and methods,127 both of which I discuss below in
turn.
127 	O’Brien 2024 enjoys much ink in this Report and Recommendation as it permeates the
parties’ briefs since it is a post-2020 Opinion study. In the context of considering the instant
motion, an in-depth discussion of O’Brien 2024 and its methods is necessary.
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(1) 	The Sister Study
As noted above, O’Brien 2024 is an analysis of data collected through the
“Sister 	Study,” 	which 	is 	a 	cohort 	study 	conducted 	from 	2003 	to 	2009 	of
approximately 50,000 women residing in the United States, aged 35 to 74, who never
had breast cancer when they enrolled in the study but had a sister who had breast
cancer. (O’Brien 2024 at 2.) The authors of the study monitored the respondents for
the incidence of cancers, including ovarian cancer, and confirmed cancer cases
among the respondents, including fatal ones, with medical data when possible. (Id.
at 3.) Respondents received a questionnaire approximately every three years. (See
O’Brien 2023 at 377.)
The 	initial 	Sister 	Study 	questionnaire, 	utilized 	at 	enrollment, 	asked
respondents whether they never, sometimes, or frequently applied talcum powder to
their vaginal area at ages 10 to 13 and whether they applied talcum powder in the
year preceding enrollment128 in the Sister Study. (O’Brien 2024 at 2.)129 Following
its collection, several studies analyzed the data for various reasons, one of which is
128 	The frequency options for selection in the year preceding enrollment were as follows:
never, less than once per month, 1–3 times per month, 1–5 times per week, and more than 5 times
per week. (O’Brien 2024 at 2–3.)
129 	The Sister Study also collected information regarding each respondents’ race/ethnicity,
attained education, examiner-measured BMI, BMI age 30–39 years, age at menarche, duration of
hormonal birth control use, parity, menopausal status, hormone therapy use, geographic region of
residence, smoking status, alcohol use, childhood household income level, adult household
income, highest attained education level in the household when the participant was age 13 years,
marital status, and weight relative to peers in teen years. (Id. at 4.)
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the association of talcum powder use and ovarian cancer. A 2016 analysis found no
statistically significant association in that respect. (See Gonzalez 2016.) Dr. Katie
O’Brien, the principal author of O’Brien 2024, similarly found no statistically
significant association in another, earlier, study conducted in 2020. (See O’Brien
2020.)
However, Dr. O’Brien coordinated a 2023 analysis that collected additional
data from Sister Study respondents through a follow-up questionnaire.130 (See id.)
The 	follow-up 	questionnaire, 	administered 	between 	2017 	and 	2019, 	asked
respondents whether they had ever used talcum powder, and, if so, their age at first
and most recent use, as well as their frequency of use during each decade. (O’Brien
2024 at 3.) The key finding was that most respondents were more likely to report
talcum powder use at enrollment, whereas respondents who had been diagnosed with
cancer prior to the follow-up were more likely to report talcum powder use at follow-
up. (See O’Brien 2023 at 383.).
(2) 	O’Brien 2024’s quantitative bias analysis corrections
The gap between the Sister Study enrollment and follow-up questionnaires
presented additional issues. For different reasons, data on respondents’ talcum
powder use “were sometimes contradictory or missing.” (O’Brien 2024 at 4.) For
130 	The purpose of O’Brien 2023 was to document and analyze patterns in respondents’ use
and reliability of recall with respect to intimate care products such as talcum powder and douching
thought to be associated with gynecological cancers. (See O’Brien 2023 at 376.)
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instance, respondents who passed away before 2017 obviously did not respond at
follow-up. (See id.) Other respondents stated that they had used talcum powder at
enrollment, but at follow-up, gave contradictory responses that they never used it.
(See id.)
As mentioned earlier, O’Brien 2024 sought to address these issues by using
“quantitative bias analysis,” which “estimates what the observed association would
have been had systematic error been absent given a set of assumptions that determine
the extent of bias.” Julie M. Petersen et al., A Systematic Review of Quantitative Bias
Analysis Applied to Epidemiological Research, Int’l J. of Epidemiology 1708, 1709
(2021).131 O’Brien 2024’s quantitative bias analysis involved four scenarios132 in
which corrections were made to the data:
No correction, fill in missing data (“Scenario 1”): O’Brien 2024 did not
correct any contradictory responses, but filled in missing data, prioritizing a
respondent’s answers to the initial questionnaire at enrollment (i.e., respondents who
reported use at enrollment but failed to respond at follow-up were considered users).
(O’Brien 2024 at 4, Table A5, App. 1.) Scenario 1 found a statistically insignificant
association between genital talcum powder use and ovarian cancer, with a hazard
ratio (“HR”) of 1.07 (CI: .84 to 1.35). (Id. at 9, 12, Table 2.)
131 	I take judicial notice of the definition of quantitative bias analysis. The parties do not
specifically address its general definition, but also do not appear to dispute it.
132 	I identify O’Brien 2024’s four scenarios using the same titles that the study used.
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Fill in missing data, correct contradictory data, assume unexposed
(“Scenario 2”): O’Brien 2024 corrected contradictory data in addition to filling in
missing data. (Id. at 4, Table A5, App. 1.) For respondents who reported nonuse at
enrollment at a certain age but later indicated use at that same age, O’Brien 2024
assumed that 80% were users. (Id.) For respondents who reported use at enrollment
and nonuse at follow-up, O’Brien 2024 assumed that 90% were users. (Id.)
Respondents who did not answer at follow-up were assumed to be nonusers. (Id.)
Scenario 2 found a statistically insignificant association between genital talcum
powder use and ovarian cancer, with an HR of 1.17 (CI: .92 to 1.49). (Id. at 9, 12,
Table 2.)
Fill in missing, correct contradictory data, if undefined, assume exposed
extreme exposed (“Scenario 	3”): 	Supplementing 	Scenario 	2, 	O’Brien 	2024
categorized all respondents that reported nonuse at enrollment but no answer at
follow-up as users. (Id. at 4, Table A5, App. 1.) Scenario 3 found a statistically
significant association between genital talcum powder use and ovarian cancer, with
an HR of 3.34 (CI: 2.51 to 4.44). (Id. at 9, 12, Table 2.)133
Correct contradictory data, use multiple imputation to fill in missing or
undefined (“Scenario 4”): O’Brien 2024 used multiple imputation with chained
133 	Scenarios 2 and 3 therefore present extreme cases with respect to respondents who did not
answer at follow-up, with the true measure of use in respondents who failed to answer at follow-
up falling somewhere in between Scenarios 2 and 3.
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equations134 (“MICE”) “to generate covariate-informed probabilistic imputations of
the exposure status of participants” who reported nonuse at enrollment but did not
provide an answer about genital talc use at follow-up. (Id. at 4, Table A5, App. 1.)
The covariates O’Brien 2024 used in Scenario 4 included demographic information,
socioeconomic information, and cancer history, among other categories. (Id. at Table
2, n.d.)
Put 	differently, 	in 	Scenario 	4, 	O’Brien 	2024 	used 	existing 	data 	to
probabilistically determine what missing data would likely show. For example, if
hypothetical 	respondents 	A 	and 	B 	were 	otherwise 	identical 	with 	respect 	to
demographics, socioeconomic status, and health, but A did not answer a question (or
gave a contradictory response), A’s true answer is likely to track B’s answer.
Scenario 4 found a statistically significant association between genital talcum
powder use and ovarian cancer, with an HR of 1.82 (CI: 1.36 to 2.43). (Id. at 9, 12,
Table 2.)
(3) 	O’Brien 2024’s recall bias adjustments
In addition to the missing data, O’Brien 2024 also sought to address the more
general problem of recall bias. (Id. at 2, 4.) As discussed elsewhere in this Report
134 	As more fully discussed infra, multiple imputation is a statistical method that fills in
missing data points for a given respondent who did not answer a question by finding another
respondent with similar key characteristics who did answer the question. The method then
“imputes” the answering respondent’s data for the missing respondent, on the assumption that two
respondents who share key characteristics probably would give the same answer. (See also supra
Part V.B.)
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and Recommendation, recall bias in this context exists because self-reporting
respondents who have ovarian cancer may be more likely to report prior talcum
powder use than respondents without cancer. (See O’Brien 2023 at 383.) The
increased likelihood of such a bias may be due to public attention to a potential
connection between talcum powder use and ovarian cancer. (See id.)
To account for recall bias, O’Brien 2024 started with Scenario 4, which
reflected contradictory data correction and imputation of missing data. (Id. at 4.)
O’Brien 2024 then “implemented recall bias corrections by changing the exposure
status of a specified percentage of women with certain characteristics.” (Id. at 4, 9,
App. 1.) First, O’Brien 2024 recategorized certain percentages (10%, 25%, 50%,
75%, 90%) of respondents who contracted ovarian cancer to be nonusers. (Id. at 4,
9, App. 1.) These respondents initially reported nonuse or failed to answer but were
categorized as users based on their post-diagnostic status or imputation. (Id. at 4, 9,
App. 1.) If 25% of cancer cases are recategorized to be nonusers, there is still a
statistically significant association between talcum powder use and ovarian cancer,
but the HR drops to 1.41 (CI: 1.06 to 1.87). (Id. at 9.)
Second, O’Brien 2024 modified the first set of corrections by recategorizing
certain percentages (10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%) of ovarian cancer cases as
nonusers based on their infrequent or short-term use of talcum powder. (Id. at 4, 9,
App. 1.) If 90% of infrequent users are recategorized as nonusers, there is still a
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statistically significant association between talcum powder use and ovarian cancer,
but the HR drops to 1.48 (CI: 1.06 to 1.87). (Id. at 9.)
Third, O’Brien 2024 recategorized certain percentages (5%, 10%, 15%, 25%,
50%) of respondents who did not contract ovarian cancer and were nonusers to be
infrequent or short-term users. (Id. at 4, 9, App. 1.) If 10% of noncancer cases are
recategorized, there is still a statistically significant association between talcum
powder use and ovarian cancer, but the HR drops to 1.53 (CI: 1.15 to 2.04). (Id. at
9.)
(4) 	O’Brien 2024’s results
O’Brien 	2024 	concluded 	that, 	after 	quantitative 	bias 	and 	recall 	bias
corrections are made, the data support a hypothesis that genital talcum powder use
is associated with ovarian cancer. (Id. at 14.) The authors caution that their results
“do not establish causality and do not implicate any specific cancer-inducing agent”
and are still subject to confounding or external variables. (Id.)
b. 	Dr. Kornak
(1) 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs do not appear to challenge Dr. Kornak’s qualifications. (See Pls.’
Kornak Br. at 20–25.) In any event, such a challenge would not prevail.
Dr. Kornak is a Professor in Residence of Biostatistics in the Department of
Epidemiology and Biostatistics in the School of Medicine at the University of
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California, San Francisco (“UCSF”). (Kornak Rep., App’x A.) He also serves as the
head of the Health Data Science Program and the Director of the UCSF Biostatistics
Consulting Unit, part of the UCSF Clinical and Translational Sciences Institute. (Id.)
He received his Bachelor of Science in Mathematics with Statistics in 1996, and his
Ph.D. in statistics in 2000, both from the University of Nottingham in the United
Kingdom. (Id.)
Dr. Kornak has over twenty years of research experience in applying
biostatistics across a number of disciplines, including epidemiology. (Id.) Notably,
he has led research projects funded by the National Institutes of Health, which also
employs Dr. Katie O’Brien. (Id.) Dr. Kornak has published more than 150 peer-
reviewed publications concerning biostatistics. (Id.)
Accordingly, I recommend that the Court find Dr. Kornak to be qualified to
opine on O’Brien 2024’s quantitative bias and recall bias corrections.
(2) 	Methodology and opinions
In general, Dr. Kornak opines that O’Brien 2024’s two data correction
measures (i. quantitative bias analysis correction of missing and contradictory data,
and ii. correction for recall bias) are flawed and unreliable. (See Kornak Rep. ¶¶ 10-
14.)
In his rebuttal report, Dr. Kornak first examines Scenarios 1 through 3 and
identifies flaws in each that he opines skew the overall results in favor of finding an
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association between genital talc use and ovarian cancer. (See id. ¶¶ 32–39.) His
primary focus, however, is on Scenario 4 (multiple imputation). He explains that
application of quantitative bias analysis is both inappropriate for the Sister Study
dataset, and even if appropriate, was unreliably applied to that dataset, leading to
flawed results. (See id. ¶¶ 40–71.) Dr. Kornak also identifies flaws in O’Brien 2024’s
recall bias corrections. (See id. ¶¶ 72–76.)
As I explain in further detail below, Dr. Kornak’s analysis involves an
application of accepted statistical principles to the methods used in O’Brien 2024.
He points out where he believes O’Brien 2024 deviates from these principles and
identifies the consequences of those deviations. Dr. Kornak applies the methodology
that 	rebuttal 	experts 	generally 	undertake, 	particularly 	in 	this 	litigation, 	i.e.,
criticizing the opinions and methodology of the adverse expert or a study relied upon
by the expert. For most of the criticisms he raises, Dr. Kornak appears to rely on his
experience generally in biostatistics and his experience dealing with missing data in
particular. (See Kornak Dep. at 103:20–104:19.) He expresses that the use of
multiple imputation requires some level of scientific judgment. (See id. at 105:8–
106:5.)
Rationale for Using Multiple Imputation. At the outset, Dr. Kornak
questions O’Brien 2024’s rationale for using multiple imputation. He notes that
O’Brien 2023 observed that “[d]iscrepancies in self-reported genital talc use were
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primarily driven by women who initially reported using during early adolescence,
but later reported never using.” (Id. (quoting O’Brien 2023 at 384).) Based on that
observation, Dr. Kornak questions why O’Brien 2024 assumes that misreporting was
a substantial problem in respondents who indicated nonuse at enrollment but did not
answer at follow-up. (Id.)
Appropriateness of Using Multiple Imputation. Dr. Kornak then turns to
the methodology of multiple imputation and its applicability to the Sister Study
dataset. Dr. Kornak directs most of his attention to O’Brien 2024’s Scenario 4.135 Dr.
Kornak describes O’Brien 2024’s use of MICE as “comput[ing] the probability that
any particular survey respondent was a genital talc user based on her demographic,
economic, and health characteristics.”136 (Id. ¶ 44.) Appearing to rely on an academic
article describing the methodology of applying MICE, he opines that MICE is an
inappropriate method for the Sister Study dataset because MICE is not appropriate
135 	Although the focus of Dr. Kornak’s rebuttal is Scenario 4, he offers the following criticisms
of the other scenarios:
Scenario 1: Dr. Kornak opines that the adjustments made in Scenario 1 introduce further recall
bias into O’Brien 2024’s analysis. (Kornak Rep. ¶¶ 33–34.) This is because when a respondent did
not answer on talcum powder use at enrollment but claimed use at follow-up, the follow-up answer
is retrospective and more prone to recall bias. (Id.)
Scenario 2: Largely following his criticism of Scenario 1, Dr. Kornak attacks O’Brien 2024’s
recategorization of 80% of respondents who did not answer at enrollment but reported use at
follow-up as genital talc users. (Id. ¶ 36.) This recategorization, in Dr. Kornak’s view, exacerbated
the effect of recall bias. (Id.)
Scenario 3: Dr. Kornak accepts that Scenario 3 is an intentionally extreme analysis to provide an
illustration rather than a true measure of the association between genital talc use and ovarian
cancer. (Id. ¶ 39.)
136 	Dr. Kornak notes that some information about how O’Brien 2024 applied MICE is missing,
thus complicating any analysis of it. (See id.)
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for data missing not at random (“MNAR”)137 (i.e., a situation where respondents with
a particular characteristic are more likely to skip a question, but that characteristic is
related to the endpoint being measured). (Id. ¶¶ 48–51 (citing M.J. Azur et al.,
Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations: What Is It and How Does It Work?, 20
Int’l J. Methods Psych. Rsch. (1), 40, 40–49 (2011)).) Dr. Kornak believes that the
Sister Study data is MNAR because, as O’Brien 2024 recognizes, respondents with
cancer were more likely to not answer questions about talcum powder use at follow-
up. (Id. ¶ 50.)138
Lastly, 	Dr. 	Kornak 	also 	notes 	that 	in 	these 	circumstances, 	imputation
exacerbates the problem of recall bias because O’Brien 2024’s imputation uses
existing data from the Sister Study that may already be affected by recall bias. (See
id. ¶¶ 45–46.)
Application of Multiple Imputation. Assuming that MICE is an appropriate
method for the Sister Study dataset, Dr. Kornak submits that it was not reliably
137 	As Dr. Kornak explains, data can be categorized in three ways: (1) data that are missing
completely at random (i.e., respondents who accidentally skip a question in a way unrelated to
their characteristics); (2) data missing at random (i.e., respondents in a particular category are more
likely to skip a certain question, but that question is unrelated to the endpoint being measured);
and (3) missing data that is not at random, i.e., MNAR. (See Kornak Rep. ¶ 39.) In Dr. Kornak’s
view, there are specific methods to address MNAR data, but O’Brien 2024 did not use them. (Id.
¶ 51.)
138 	Additionally, Dr. Kornak opines that imputation is not as reliable when the group of
respondents for which data is missing (and thus must be imputed) is markedly different from the
set of respondents whose data is existing (and serves as the basis for imputation. (Id. ¶ 47.) The
difference in incident cancer between the two groups negatively affects the reliability of the
analysis, in Dr. Kornak’s view. (See id.)
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applied 	for 	three 	reasons. 	First, 	Dr. 	Kornak 	opines 	that 	the 	demographic,
socioeconomic, and health data that O’Brien 2024 used to impute genital talcum
powder use are not reliable predictors of use based on prior studies of the Sister
Study data. (Id. ¶¶ 52–54 (citing Chang 2024.) Second, relying on his independent
assessment of the O’Brien 2024 data, Dr. Kornak opines that O’Brien 2024’s use of
ovarian cancer status as a data point in the imputation creates a circular feedback
loop. (Id. ¶¶ 56–57.) This loop occurs for two reasons: a generally higher prevalence
of genital talcum powder use among women with ovarian cancer and recall bias. (Id.
¶ 57.) Both, in Dr. Kornak’s view, lead to more imputation of genital talcum powder
use than may be warranted. (Id.) Dr. Kornak faults O’Brien 2024 for not completing
a separate imputation analysis without using ovarian cancer status as a data input.
(Id. ¶ 58.) Third, again relying on his independent assessment of the data, Dr. Kornak
opines that the percentage of respondents subject to correction or imputation (40%)
in O’Brien 2024 is unreasonably high, generating significant uncertainty in the
results. (Id. ¶¶ 59–61.)139
Results of Multiple Imputation. Dr. Kornak lastly addresses the results of
O’Brien 2024’s multiple imputation methodology. (See id. ¶¶ 66–71.) He argues
139 	Dr. Kornak also identifies certain inconsistencies in the Sister Study questionnaires that
could affect the results of applying MICE to its data. For example, the enrollment questionnaire
allowed respondents to indicate that they did not know about their genital talcum powder use but
the follow-up questionnaire did not. (Id. ¶ 63.) To the extent that inconsistencies in the
questionnaire generated flawed data, imputation based on that data would carry over those flaws.
(Id. ¶ 65.)
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that to be reliable, O’Brien 2024’s results should remain robust even if minor
modifications are made to the multiple imputation methodology used. (Id. ¶ 70.) Dr.
Kornak then illustrates how small changes to the methodology result in a statistically
insignificant finding. (See id. ¶ 71.)
Recall Bias. With respect to O’Brien 2024 recall bias corrections, Dr. Kornak
first notes that the O’Brien 2024 authors’ corrections for recall bias are arbitrarily
applied in discrete scenarios that do not account for all of the ways recall bias can
affect the analysis. (Id. ¶ 73.) Based on his independent review of the data, he notes
that there is an inverse relationship between the percentage of respondents who are
recategorized and the resultant HR. (Id.) As there are no validated estimates for the
number of respondents who are affected by recall estimates, he believes higher
recategorizations (which lead to lower HRs) are more appropriate. (Id. ¶ 74.)
(3) 	Reliability
As noted above, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Kornak’s opinions should be
excluded because O’Brien 2024 deserves deference as a peer-reviewed study and
because Dr. Kornak’s rebuttal is unreliable and “made for litigation.” (See Pls.’
Kornak Br. at 21–25.) Defendants argue in opposition that the soundness of O’Brien
2024’s methodology is no reason to exclude Dr. Kornak’s criticisms of it and Dr.
Kornak’s methods are reliable and reliably applied. (See Defs.’ Kornak Br. at 13-
23.) I agree.
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Plaintiffs’ first argument does not directly engage with Dr. Kornak’s opinions.
Instead, Plaintiff asserts that because O’Brien 2024 is “sufficiently reliable,” any
critique offered by Dr. Kornak must necessarily be unfounded. (Pls.’ Kornak Br. at
21.) Plaintiffs highlight that O’Brien 2024 underwent multiple rounds of peer
review, and that none of the reviewers identified the concerns now raised by Dr.
Kornak. (Id.) This argument is misplaced. Plaintiffs cite no authority for the
proposition that the perceived reliability of a study itself furnishes a legal basis to
preclude a rebuttal expert from critiquing that study. No such precedent exists. By
suggesting that the asserted reliability of O’Brien 2024 forecloses any expert
criticism, Plaintiff fundamentally misapprehends the Daubert framework, which
permits—indeed, expects—experts to address the strengths and weaknesses of the
scientific materials on which other experts rely. As noted above, rebuttal experts
serve a limited role in litigation, particularly where, as here, the party offering them
bears no burden of proof. See Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 138, 140
(“Rebuttal experts thus ‘have a less demanding task because they have no burden to
produce models or methods of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiff[’s]
expert[].’” (alterations in original) (quoting In re Digital Music, 321 F.R.D. at 78));
see id. at 140 (“At bottom, a rebuttal expert need not proffer a methodology or
model, but only critique the opposing expert’s.”); In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at
1368 (defense experts’ “opinions properly may be limited to criticizing the analysis
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and conclusions presented by another party”). Their task is to critique and test the
reasoning, assumptions, and methods of an opposing expert, not to construct an
affirmative 	model 	of 	their 	own. 	I 	do 	not 	doubt 	that 	in 	certain 	disciplines,
standardized and peer-reviewed methodologies exist for evaluating another expert’s
work. See In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., No. 16-md-2724, 2024 WL
4980784, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2024) (“[A]ll experts must meet the Daubert
standards, if a rebuttal expert is to discredit another expert’s model by making
affirmative statements or findings of their own they must still provide good grounds
based in methods and principles of analytical evaluation to ground their opinions
that discredit an analytical expert opinion.”). Nevertheless, because the methods
employed by a rebuttal expert necessarily depend on the particular analyses being
challenged, it would be inconsistent with Daubert and with the practical realities of
expert practice to require that a rebuttal expert’s critiques themselves be peer-
reviewed as a precondition to admissibility. The methods employed by a rebuttal
expert, such as Dr. Kornak, remain a proper subject for cross-examination.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ talismanic focus on the fact that O’Brien 2024 was
peer reviewed misses the mark. Peer review is but one of many factors that courts
consider in applying the flexible Daubert standard.140 See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S.
140 	Some courts have expressed doubts concerning pre-publication peer review’s significance
in the Daubert analysis. See In re Roundup, 737 F. Supp. 3d at 908 (“There are a vast number of
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at 141–42 (“[A]s the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is ‘flexible,’ and
Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all
experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude
when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate
reliability determination.”). Therefore, to the extent Dr. Kornak criticizes how the
authors of O’Brien 2024 conducted the study, the fact that the study underwent
several rounds of peer review does not immunize it from being challenged in this
litigation.141
Indeed, my conclusion that the methods underlying Dr. Kornak’s opinions are
reliable is based on other factors, such as the statistical principles Dr. Kornak cites
to illustrate how O’Brien 2024’s deviations from these principles potentially produce
inaccurate results, and Dr. Kornak’s experience with missing data and imputation
generally. (See, e.g., Kornak Rep. ¶¶ 24, 48, 53, 70; see also Kornak Dep. at 103:20–
104:19, 148:8–149:6.) For example, Dr. Kornak identifies the three categories of
peer-reviewed journals out there. Pre-publication editorial peer review, just by itself, is far from a
guarantee of scientific reliability.”).
141 	That said, the reliability of O’Brien 2024 is not the subject of Plaintiffs’ motion; rather, it
is the reliability of Dr. Kornak’s criticism of O’Brien 2024 that is at issue. Focusing again on peer
review, Plaintiffs appear to argue that Dr. Kornak’s methods were not peer reviewed. Although
Plaintiffs do not meaningfully develop that argument, and Defendants do not appear to address it,
I am unpersuaded that the lack of methodological peer review in Dr. Kornak’s rebuttal warrants
exclusion. It bears emphasis that peer review is only one factor among many, and need not be
present in every case. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141; Schneider, 320 F.3d at 406 (“[W]e note
that expert testimony does not have to obtain general acceptance or be subject to peer review to be
admitted under Rule 702.”).
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datasets with missing datapoints and explains why he believes the Sister Study is
MNAR and why MICE is inappropriate for an MNAR dataset. (Id. ¶¶ 48–50.) He
then identifies alternative methods that would be more appropriate for an MNAR
dataset. (Id. ¶ 51.) In another example, Dr. Kornak cites prior studies of the Sister
Study dataset showing that the demographic, economic, and health characteristics
the O’Brien 2024 authors used as predictors in their imputation model are not strong
predictors of talcum powder use and explains how this leads to unreliability in
O’Brien 2024’s analysis. (See id. ¶¶ 52–55.) These are the quintessential analyses of
a rebuttal expert as Dr. Kornak identifies infirmities in O’Brien 2024 and offers
alternative methodologies. See Capri Sun GmbH., 595 F. Supp. at 138; Mahaska
Bottling Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (courts routinely permit defense experts to
testify “even if the expert primarily critiques the opposing expert’s approach without
offering an alternative approach”); In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1368 (defense
experts’ 	“opinions 	properly 	may 	be 	limited 	to 	criticizing 	the 	analysis 	and
conclusions presented by another party”); In re Zyprexa, 489 F.Supp. 2d at 285
(“[D]efendants’ experts have a less demanding task, since they have no burden to
produce models or methods of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiffs’
experts.”).
Plaintiffs, for their part, contend that Dr. Kornak’s criticisms lack merit. They
argue that the scientific literature supports the use of MICE in these circumstances
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and that the method does not invariably require strong predictors to yield accurate
imputations. (See Rebuttal Rep. of Dr. Elizabeth A. Stuart, Ph.D., ECF No. 33011-
11, at 7-8, 10.) This disagreement, however, reflects nothing more than a reasonable
and legitimate divergence of views within the biostatistical community. Such
professional differences do not warrant exclusion under Rule 702. Rather, they
present a paradigmatic “battle of the experts”—one that is properly explored through
cross-examination and resolved by the jury, not by pretrial disqualification of
competing methodologies. See United States v. Maxwell, No. 20-CR-330, 2021 WL
5283951, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 2021) (“But if experts disagree on the proper
interpretation of evidence, ‘it is not the Court’s role to resolve the dispute through
exclusion of one of the expert’s opinions.’” (quoting In re Digital Music, 321 F.R.D.
at 80)); Templeton v. Bishop of Charleston, No. 18-CV-02003, 2021 WL 3419442,
at *9 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2021) (“Daubert principles support admission of a scientific
theory if it is within ‘the range where experts might reasonably differ.’ In other
words, where legitimate disagreement exists within the scientific community, it is
for the jury, not the judge, ‘to determine which of several competing scientific
theories has the best provenance.’” Further, “Rule 702 does not require exclusion of
all but the most scientifically supported view, and it clearly contemplates the
admission of testimony by experts who have fundamental disagreements about the
scientific principles at issue.”) (internal citations omitted); Grasinger v. Caterpillar,
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Inc., No. 21-CV-956, 2023 WL 4846843, at *9 (W.D. Pa. July 28, 2023) (“‘Daubert
neither requires nor empowers trial courts to determine which of several competing
scientific theories has the best provenance.’”) (quoting Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at 85).
Next, I turn to Plaintiffs’ other arguments that challenge different aspects of
Dr. Kornak’s methodology. Plaintiffs fault Dr. Kornak for (i) preparing his opinion
hastily; (ii) consulting with Cornerstone Research (“Cornerstone”), an expert search
firm used by Defendants, in preparing his opinions; and (iii) failing to read materials
supporting O’Brien 2024’s methodology.142 None of Plaintiffs’ arguments are
adequate bases for preclusion under Daubert.
With respect to Plaintiffs’ contention that Dr. Kornak’s report reflects undue
haste, I do not find that the limited time available to prepare his analysis warrants
exclusion. The parties do not dispute that all experts—on both sides—had a
compressed window in which to address O’Brien 2024, which was published on
May 15, 2024. (O’Brien 2024 at 1.) Pursuant to the Court’s scheduling order, expert
reports were due May 28, 2024. Defendants correctly note that Plaintiffs were
subject to the same constraints and indeed opposed Defendants’ request for
142 	Plaintiffs further contend that the purportedly “incendiary” and inflammatory language
used in Dr. Kornak’s report renders his analysis unreliable. (Pls.’ Kornak Br. at 19.) I disagree.
While experts should avoid unnecessary rhetoric and vitriol, Rule 702 and Daubert focus on the
reliability of an expert’s principles, methods, and application of those methods—not the stylistic
choices reflected in the report. If the underlying methodology satisfies the governing standards, an
expert’s word choice, whether restrained or intemperate, does not bear on admissibility. Any
concerns regarding tone are more appropriately addressed through cross-examination or in limine
motion practice, not exclusion.
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additional time. (Defs.’ Kornak Br. at 19–20.) Plaintiffs’ own experts submitted
supplemental reports responding to O’Brien 2024 within that same short interval.
Against that backdrop, the fact that Dr. Kornak prepared his report under time
pressure does not render his methodology unreliable. The record shows that he
devoted more than 70 hours to the task. (See ECF No. 33011-8, Dr. Kornak Invoice.)
Any alleged haste, therefore, goes to the substance and weight of his opinions rather
than their admissibility, and is an issue appropriately explored through cross-
examination.
The 	compressed 	timeline 	likewise 	explains 	Dr. 	Kornak’s 	reliance 	on
Cornerstone143 to conduct preliminary research and assist in the preparation of his
opinions. Plaintiffs do not contend, however, that Cornerstone’s involvement—or
that of Defendants’ counsel—was improper or that it exerted any undue influence
on the substance of Dr. Kornak’s analysis. To the contrary, Dr. Kornak testified that
he independently formulated his opinions, and nothing in the record suggests that
the report was drafted by Cornerstone or counsel without his input or substantive
analytical 	work. 	(See 	ECF 	No. 	33011-10 	(“Kornak 	Dep.”) 	at 	48:10–22.)
Accordingly, the participation of Cornerstone and counsel implicates the weight of
143 	Cornerstone is a consulting firm that connects attorneys with applicable experts to provide
testimony on litigation matters, among other things, and at times, will provide administrative
support to the testifying expert. (See Kornak Dep. at 28:17–30:3, 33:22–35:15.) Dr. Kornak does
not have an employment relationship with Cornerstone. (Id.)
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Dr. Kornak’s opinions, not their admissibility under Rule 702. See Venus v. Seville
Food, LLC, No. 14-cv-2476, 2017 WL 2364192, at *17 (D.N.J. May 31, 2017).
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Kornak’s opinions are unreliable because
he did not fully read certain articles cited in O’Brien 2024, pointing to portions of
his deposition testimony in support of this claim. (Pls.’ Kornak Br. at 23.) Plaintiffs
center their argument on Dr. Kornak’s purported failure to thoroughly digest one
such article—White & Royston, Imputing Missing Covariate Values for the Cox
Model, 28 Statist. Med. 1982 (2009)—which O’Brien 2024 cited in support of
including ovarian cancer status in its imputation model. Although Dr. Kornak
acknowledged that his review of White & Royston was limited, the record does not
support the inference that he ignored or refused to consider the study. Rather, his
testimony reflects that he reviewed the article for its relevance to O’Brien 2024 and
concluded that it did not alter his assessment of the methodology employed. (Kornak
Dep. at 332:14–336:9.) Plaintiffs’ criticism therefore challenges his review and
conclusion of lack of relevance of this article, not the reliability of the methods he
applied.
Such challenges go to the weight of Dr. Kornak’s testimony. They are
appropriately addressed through cross-examination, not through exclusion under
Rule 702. See In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy, 2018 WL 4030585, at *6
(finding that simply because an expert did not consider all studies deemed relevant
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by the opposing party or overlooked a study “does not mean that he unreliably
applies his methodology”).
Therefore, I recommend that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the
Opinions of Dr. Kornak.
VI. 	CONTAMINATION AND TESTING MOTIONS
The parties have filed six motions addressing issues generally related to
contamination and testing. These motions concern, inter alia, (1) the testing of
Defendants’ talcum powder products for the presence of asbestos; (2) whether the
mines from which Defendants obtained talc for their products were contaminated
with asbestos; (3) whether asbestos, heavy metals, and fragrance chemicals allegedly
present in Defendants’ talcum powder products cause or contribute to ovarian
cancer; and (4) whether the gynecologic tissue of certain bellwether Plaintiffs
contained talc or other deleterious particles.
Before turning to these motions, I address two preliminary matters. First,
Defendants seek to preclude Dr. Longo from testifying in this MDL regarding his
findings of chrysotile asbestos in Defendants’ talcum powder products, based on his
new—and purportedly improved—PLM methodology. Defendants have requested,
and I agreed to, a Daubert evidentiary hearing to assess the reliability of Dr. Longo’s
PLM-chrysotile opinions. Those hearings took place on January 15 and 16, 2026.
Importantly, Plaintiffs represent that Dr. Longo’s PLM-chrysotile testing will not be
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offered during any of the six bellwether trials, including the first of such bellwethers,
Judkins.
To expedite resolution of the Rule 702 motions and to ensure that the first
bellwether trial proceeds without unnecessary delay, I have reserved decision on the
admissibility 	of 	Dr. 	Longo’s 	PLM-chrysotile 	opinions 	pending 	the 	Daubert
evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, this Report and Recommendation does not
address the portion of Defendants’ asbestos motion challenging Dr. Longo’s new
PLM methodology. (ECF No. 33012-2 (“Defs.’ Asbestos Br.”) at 18–57.) Likewise,
I have reserved decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Asbestos Testing
Opinions of Matthew S. Sanchez, Ph.D., Ann G. Wylie, Ph.D., and Shu-Chun Su,
Ph.D.144 (ECF No. 33006), as these doctors rebut Dr. Longo’s new PLM opinions.
A separate Report and Recommendation addressing Dr. Longo’s PLM-chrysotile
opinions will issue following the hearing.
Second, two of Defendants’ motions advance causation-related arguments
that 	are 	more 	appropriately 	considered 	in 	the 	context 	of 	general 	causation.
Defendants’ asbestos motion seeks to exclude more than a dozen of Plaintiffs’
experts from testifying that the asbestos and “fibrous talc” allegedly contained in
Defendants’ products causes ovarian cancer. (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83–93, 97–102.)
144 	Dr. Su testified at a Rule 104 hearing before me on January 15, 2026. Due to time
constraints, Dr. Wylie’s testimony is being separately rescheduled.
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In addition, Defendants’ heavy metals and fragrances motion exclusively advances
causation-related arguments; Defendants seek to exclude eighteen Plaintiffs’ experts
from testifying that Defendants’ products “contain trace amounts of purportedly
carcinogenic heavy metals (nickel, chromium and cobalt) and fragrances that cause,
or contribute to causing, ovarian cancer.” (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br.
at 1.) Consequently, I have addressed Defendants’ causation-related arguments
concerning asbestos, heavy metals, and fragrances in the general causation section
above. (See supra Parts V.B.6, 7.)
A. 	Asbestos
In this section, I address two motions: Defendants’ Motion to Exclude
Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Asbestos-Related Opinions (ECF No. 33012) and Plaintiffs’
Motion to Exclude the Geology Opinions of Drs. Mary Poulton and Laura Webb
(ECF No. 32996).
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Asbestos-
Related Opinions
i. 	Drs. William Longo and Mark Rigler
In this this round of Daubert motions, Defendants have again moved to
“exclude Dr. Longo’s TEM testing for amphibole asbestos.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at
57.) In my prior Opinion, after considering Defendants’ arguments and evaluating
the reliability of Dr. Longo’s three-step TEM methodology, I concluded that
Plaintiffs met their burden of establishing that Dr. Longo’s opinion concerning the
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results of his TEM analysis is reliable for purposes of admissibility under Daubert.
In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 147–54.
Defendants 	seek 	reconsideration 	under 	Judge 	Shipp’s 	April 	30, 	2024
Memorandum Order, contending that my ruling “rests on a basis that is no longer
viable under the amendments to Rule 702.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 67.) They reason
that portions of my prior Opinion in this context improperly characterized their
challenges to Dr. Longo’s methodology as matters of weight for the jury. (Id. at 65–
67.) Aside from that contention, Defendants’ arguments made here concerning Drs.
Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM-amphibole opinions remain substantially unchanged—
often repeating verbatim—the arguments previously raised during the initial round
of motion practice. (Compare Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 57–82 with ECF No. 9736-3
(“Defs.’ 2019 Asbestos Br.”).)
For the reasons set forth below and in the 2020 Opinion, I recommend that the
Court deny Defendants’ motion to exclude the TEM-amphibole opinions of Drs.
Longo and Rigler. Defendants have not demonstrated that my prior ruling admitting
TEM testing demonstrably failed to adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023
amendment. Nor have they presented any new science in support of their current
position that would materially change the outcome. In essence, Defendants simply
disagree with my prior ruling, which is not a valid basis for reconsideration under
the April 30, 2024 Order. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness and for the
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benefit of the Court, I will again examine whether Drs. Longo and Rigler reliably
applied their three-step TEM methodology in identifying amphibole asbestos
particles in Defendants’ talcum powder products.
a. 	Qualifications
I must first address whether Drs. Longo and Rigler are qualified to testify as
experts in this MDL. In my prior Opinion, I found Dr. Longo, a materials scientist,
“qualified to testify as an expert on the issue of whether the subject talc products
contain asbestos.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 147. Defendants do
not challenge this particular ruling. Accordingly, since no new issues have been
raised regarding his expertise, my prior reasoning and ruling that Dr. Longo is
qualified to testify as an expert in this litigation stands.
Defendants’ motion also addresses Dr. Rigler, a microbiologist who was the
Chief Science Officer at Dr. Longo’s company, MAS. Defendants state that Dr.
Rigler “had a much more limited role related to the talc testing at issue and has since
left MAS,” but “he was listed as a co-author of one of the earlier MAS reports.”
(Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 10–11.)
I noted in my prior Opinion that Plaintiffs “also designated Dr. Longo’s
former-assistant, Mark Rigler, as a potential expert in this matter as the coauthor of
Dr. Longo’s expert report.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 147 n.23.
However, I did not rule on Dr. Rigler’s qualifications.
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In opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs argue that “Drs. Longo and
Rigler are uniquely qualified to analyze the asbestos content of” Defendants’ talcum
powder products, and that “their testimony is admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.” (ECF No. 33131 (“Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br.”) at 18.) Defendants do not
dispute Dr. Rigler’s qualifications in their briefing.
I find that Dr. Rigler is qualified to testify in this matter. Dr. Rigler received
a Ph.D. in Microbiology from the University of Georgia. (ECF No. 33132-2 Ex. 9
(“Rigler Curriculum Vitae”) at 1.) He worked at MAS with Dr. Longo for
approximately 30 years, holding various positions including Chief Science Officer
and Senior Consulting Scientist. (Id.) Dr. Rigler specializes in electron microscopy
and has experience testing for the presence of asbestos. (ECF No. 33132-2, Ex. 11
(“Rigler Dep. Tr.”) at 8:24-9:17; 219:21-223:2.) Dr. Rigler has authored or
coauthored dozens of scientific publications and is a member of several professional
organizations, including the American Society for Testing and Materials. (Rigler
Curriculum Vitae at 1–4.) Since 2019, Dr. Rigler has worked at MAS as a Senior
Consulting Scientist. (Id. at 1.) Based on these past experiences and academic
background, I find Dr. Rigler qualified to offer his expert opinion in microbiology,
electron microscopy, and whether Defendants’ talc products contain asbestos.
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b. 	Methodology and Conclusions
In their Second Supplemental Report dated February 1, 2019, which was the
subject of my prior TEM-amphibole ruling, Drs. Longo and Rigler describe the
three-step TEM methodology used by MAS to detect asbestos in Defendants’ talc
products.145 (ECF No. 33014-25 (“Longo 2d Supp. Rep.”).) Dr. Longo also testified
about TEM methodology during the previous Daubert evidentiary hearing over
which I presided.
In their report, Drs. Longo and Rigler explained that MAS tested historical
samples of Johnson’s Baby Powder, Shower to Shower, and “Imerys’ railroad car
cosmetic talcum powder”146 from the 1960s through the early 2000s “for the possible
presence of amphibole asbestos.” (Id. at 2.) MAS’s TEM analysis purportedly
established that 42 of the 70 samples tested “contained detectable amounts of
amphibole asbestos fibers and bundles (tremolite solid solution series and or
anthophyllite solid solution series).” (Id. at 8; see id. at 17–18, 22, 31–32.) For
perspective, the report stated: “The total amount of regulated asbestos structures
counted in the 42 positive . . . samples was 187 bundles and fibers.” (Id. at 25.)
145 	I note that neither Dr. Longo’s Third Supplemental Report of November 17, 2023, nor his
Fourth Supplemental Report of April 29, 2024, reported any new studies or information regarding
the TEM methodology or results; they are directed to his PLM testing.
146 	Imerys Talc America, Inc. f/k/a Luzenac America, Inc. f/k/a Rio Tinto Minerals, Inc. is a
former supplier of talc to Defendants.
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To prepare the talcum powder samples for TEM testing, MAS analysts used
a heavy liquid separation technique. (Id. at 11–12; see ECF No. 33132-1, Ex. 5
(“Daubert H’rg Tr.”) at 474:21–477:24; 483:6–20.) This method concentrated the
samples by placing the talcum powder into a test tube containing a heavy liquid
solution and spinning it in a centrifuge, which caused lower density materials, such
as talc, to “go to the surface” and higher density materials, such as amphibole
asbestos, to “go to the bottom of the test tube.” (Id. at 477:11–24.) Dr. Longo
testified that heavy liquid separation is a generally accepted preparation method.147
(Id. at 652:2–5.)
Next, MAS analysts examined the samples under a transmission electron
microscope.148 (Longo 2d Supp. Rep. at 12–13; see Daubert H’rg Tr. at 486:8–16.)
Drs. Longo and Rigler explained that it is “well recognized” that the use of a
transmission electron microscope “is the only analytical method with the appropriate
sensitivity for the analysis of trace mineral concentrations that can be much less than
147 	Defendants do not challenge or otherwise object to the reliability of Drs. Longo’s and
Rigler’s heavy liquid separation method, and I have no basis to find that this method has not been
generally accepted in the scientific community or is otherwise unreliable.
148 	Transmission electron microscopes work by generating and passing a beam of electrons
through a sample to form an image. (IWGACP White Paper at 27.) Dr. Longo testified that such a
microscope can cost approximately $750,000. (Daubert H’rg Tr. at 463:2–9.) PLM, by contrast,
“is an optical microscopy technique where the illumination of the object under view involves
polarized visible light.” (IWGACP White Paper at 26.) “This technique can be used to identify
minerals based on optical properties.” (Id.)
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0.01 wt. %.” (Longo 2d Supp. Rep. at 5.) At the Daubert hearing, Dr. Longo
explained the advantages of using TEM over PLM:
Q. 	What 	is 	briefly 	transmission 	electron
microscopy, and how does it compare to PLM, polarized
light 	microscopy 	in 	terms 	of 	the 	advantages 	and
disadvantages when you are testing talc for asbestos?
A. 	The advantages are it allows you to get a
much higher sensitivity. It allows you to identify the
asbestos 	fibers 	according 	to 	the 	rules 	using
microchemistry. It allows you to determine the crystalline
structure using the diffraction technique. It doesn’t use
light. It uses electrons. So that because you are using
electrons, you could see much smaller size asbestos fibers
than you see in the polarized light microscopy because you
are using light. It is a much more sensitive instrument, and
it is probably the instrument that should be used for the
analysis of asbestos for talc.
(Daubert H’rg Tr. at 487:8–23.)
Dr. Longo then set forth the three-step TEM methodology that MAS used to
identify amphibole asbestos in the talcum powder samples:
Q. 	Is there a general consensus in the scientific
community as set forth in the published methods as to the
three 	steps 	that 	have 	to 	be 	undertaken 	when 	doing
transmission electron microscopic analysis on a material
to determine whether it contains asbestos?
A. 	Yes, there is.
Q. 	We’re looking at page 12 of your report, and
I circled step No. 1. That is step No. 1?
A. 	It is called morphology, the dimensions of the
fiber or bundle of asbestos you are looking at. Step 1 has
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to have an aspect ratio greater than or equal to 5-to-1. The
length of the asbestos structure has to be at least a half a
micrometer in length or greater. It has to have substantially
parallel sides so that each side of the asbestos structure
essentially is almost straight. You could have a little bit of
crookedness, but substantially parallel. That is Step 1.
Q. 	What is Step 2 as shown in your report?
A. 	Step 2 is once you have made, that you can
see and measure that Step 1 is satisfied, you perform
mineral chemistry called energy dispersive X-ray analysis
to determine the chemistry of that particular asbestos
structure. So it gives you the ability to do that. That’s Step
2.
Q. 	What is Step 3 as shown in the slide and in
your expert report?
A. 	Step 3 is to perform what’s called selected
area 	electron 	diffraction 	or 	SAED, 	which 	gives 	you
information on the crystalline structure of that asbestos
structure.
(Id. at 487:24–489:4; see id. at 645:16–646:12.) Dr. Longo testified that only fibers
or fiber bundles that satisfied all three steps of this TEM methodology were
considered positive for asbestos. (Id. at 517:13–519:6; 524:1–5; 648:16–649:19; see
Longo Second Suppl. Rep. at 12–13.)
c. 	Analysis
Defendants argue that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM methodology is
unreliable because they ignore “clear definitions for ‘asbestos’ and ‘asbestiform’ in
the methodologies and regulations they rely on,” instead defining “what they call
‘asbestos’ solely by reference to whether a mineral structure meets certain ‘counting
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criteria.’” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 65.) Defendants specifically object to Drs. Longo’s
and Rigler’s reliance on the counting criteria (or rules) set forth in the EPA’s
AHERA regulations. (Id. at 68–69.)
Defendants contend that AHERA defines asbestos as the asbestiform varieties
of the six regulated minerals, but the AHERA counting criteria relied upon by
MAS—that a particle “has an aspect ratio greater or equal to 5:1, a length greater or
equal to .5 microns, and parallel sides”—“sweeps in minerals that cannot be asbestos
because they are not asbestiform,” including cleavage fragments. (Id.) Defendants
further contend that “the fact that a particle meets this definition under the counting
criteria means simply that it is a fiber; it doesn’t provide any information about what
kind of fiber it is.” (Id. at 69.) As a result, “Dr. Longo and Dr. Rigler will count all
‘fibers’ of the minerals as ‘asbestos’ even if not asbestiform and therefore not
asbestos.” 	(Id.) 	Defendants 	claim 	this 	“methodological 	failing 	renders 	their
purported identification of asbestos wholly unreliable.” (Id. at 68.)
Next, Defendants argue that, because “AHERA relates to remediation,” its
counting criteria apply only when “asbestos is known to be present” and not when,
“as here, the presence of asbestos is disputed.” (Id. at 69–70.) According to
Defendants, “it would clearly be impermissible for Drs. Longo and Rigler to import
a methodology developed for identifying the amount of asbestos known to be present
to a context where the entire point of the analysis is to determine whether or not
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asbestos is present in the first instance;” therefore, their TEM method “fails to
answer the relevant question and is thus inherently unreliable.” (Id. at 71–72.)
In my prior Opinion, I found Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s three-step TEM
methodology reliable under 	Daubert 	and generally accepted in the scientific
community. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 148–54. I expressly
rejected Defendants’ arguments regarding AHERA, finding the “TEM method
applied by Dr. Longo, and his reliance on the AHERA counting rules, were reliable;
thus, any disagreement with those rules is a question for the jury.” Id. at 150; see
Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note to 2023 amendment (“[O]nce the court
has found it more likely than not that the admissibility requirement has been met,
any attack by the opponent will go only to the weight of the evidence.”).
After noting that Dr. Longo agreed with Defendants that—at the first step of
the TEM methodology—“certain cleavage fragments could be counted as asbestos”
under the AHERA counting criteria, I reasoned that Defendants’ position “does not
take into account” that steps two and three of the TEM methodology seek to
eliminate certain fibers, which are counted in step one, that are not asbestos. In re
Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 149–50. As Dr. Longo testified, steps two
and three of the methodology “eliminate most of those fragments based on their
chemistry and electron diffraction pattern.” Id. at 150. Furthermore, Defendants did
not then—and do not now—challenge whether MAS performed its “counting in
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accordance with the AHERA counting rules.” Id. Instead, both then and now,
“Defendants take issue with the rules themselves” as applied to the testing of
consumer talc products. Id. Finally, I found that Dr. Longo set forth good grounds
to apply the AHERA counting criteria in situations where the substances being tested
were not previously confirmed to contain asbestos. 	Id. 	at 149–50. I further
highlighted that, while they “contend the AHERA counting rules are not accurate,”
Defendants did “not identify to which set of rules Dr. Longo should have adhered.”
Id. at 150.
I find no reason to depart from my prior ruling because Plaintiffs have
established, 	by 	a 	preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence, 	that 	the 	three-step 	TEM
methodology employed by Drs. Longo and Rigler satisfies the admissibility
requirements under Rule 702 and Daubert. I am persuaded, after reviewing the
evidence and the parties’ arguments, that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s methodology is
generally accepted within the scientific community and constitutes a sufficiently
reliable means of identifying asbestos in talc-based consumer products. I am also
satisfied that MAS’s analysts reliably applied this methodology in conducting their
testing. Notably, Defendants’ challenges focus primarily on the alleged unreliability
of 	the 	methodology 	itself, 	rather 	than 	its 	application 	by 	MAS’s 	analysts.
Accordingly, 	I 	turn 	to 	Defendants’ 	arguments 	and 	explain 	why, 	within 	the
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framework of Rule 702, their criticisms of Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM
methodology go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
Testing for trace amounts of asbestos is no simple feat, as asbestos fibers are
exceedingly small. To this day, there is little dispute within the scientific community
that no standardized, U.S. government-approved microscopy method exists for
detecting asbestos in talc-containing cosmetic products. (IWGACP White Paper at
4–7.) But that does not mean tests are not performed, or should not be performed, to
detect asbestos—particularly since such testing is necessary to identify and prevent
exposure to potential carcinogens. Laboratories have employed multiple analytical
techniques, including scanning electron microscopy, PLM, and TEM. (Id. at 14–16.)
Each of these methods has advantages and limitations, (id.), although “most
accredited laboratories with expertise in asbestos-testing routinely perform TEM
when testing talc-containing cosmetic products,” (id. at 10). Admittedly, the absence
of 	a 	standardized 	testing 	method 	for 	talc-based 	cosmetic 	products 	has 	led
“laboratories to combine and/or adapt published testing methods developed for the
analysis of asbestos in air or building materials,” (id. at 11), including those
established under AHERA. (Id. at 11–16.) Thus, Defendants’ argument that Drs.
Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM methodology is unreliable simply because “AHERA
relates to remediation, i.e., the process of removing asbestos from schools and other
environments where asbestos is known to be present,” is not only unavailing, but
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misses the mark. (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 69.) At the outset, I note that if I were to
adopt Defendants’ position and find that it is unreliable for laboratories such as Dr.
Longo’s MAS to use and incorporate microscopy methods for asbestos in air, bulk
building materials, and other matters, it would follow that no reliable method exists
to identify asbestos in cosmetic products. This defies conventional wisdom.
Furthermore, and more importantly, Drs. Longo and Rigler did not rely solely
on AHERA in formulating the counting criteria that MAS used to determine
morphology at step one of the TEM methodology. Their Second Supplemental
Report provided that “fibers or bundles with substantially parallel sides and an aspect
ratio of 5:1 or greater, and at least 0.5 μm in length were counted as regulated
asbestos fibers and bundles per standard TEM counting rules as described by ASTM
D5755, ASTM D5756, ISO 10312, ISO 13794, AHERA (TEM section only) and
D7712-11.”149 (Longo 2d Supp. Rep. at 12.) Dr. Longo testified at the Daubert
evidentiary hearing that the counting rules that MAS used are “pretty much the same
counting rules for all the standard TEM methods, the American Society of Testing
Materials, International Standards Organization, and EPA. They all use the counting
rules to determine the morphology.” (Daubert H’rg Tr. at 495:5–14.) He further
149 	ASTM International, formerly known as American Society for Testing and Materials
(“ASTM”), is a standards organization that develops and publishes voluntary consensus standards,
including test methods. Similarly, the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) is an
independent, non-governmental international organization that develops and publishes standards
such as test methods.
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testified regarding the preamble to the AHERA regulations, which explains the
rationale for classifying a particle with an aspect ratio of 5:1 or greater as asbestos:
“It is consistent with the panel of microscopists’ observations that asbestos structures
have aspect ratios equal to and greater than 5:1 whereas the majority of nonasbestos
structures, minerals and particles . . . have aspect ratios of less than 5:1.” 52 Fed.
Reg. 41826, 41840 (Oct. 30, 1987). Thus, a particle that satisfies AHERA’s counting
criteria exhibits a fibrous morphology consistent with asbestos (which is then to be
confirmed at steps two and three of the TEM methodology).
Defendants nevertheless contend that the counting criteria used by MAS
cannot reliably distinguish between asbestos and non-asbestos cleavage fragments,
reasoning that “because of the way amphibole rocks break, you can get some pieces
that would be longer and thinner and could resemble asbestos fibers if examined
individually.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 65, 67–68.) Dr. Longo testified that cleavage
fragments—that is, crushed up pieces of non-asbestiform rock—are not asbestos.
(Daubert H’rg Tr. at 569:15–20.) He also acknowledged that cleavage fragments
can resemble asbestos fibers under a transmission electron microscope, and that
there is a “slight chance” that some fragments can have a minimum length greater
than or equal to .5 microns, an aspect ratio of 5:1, and substantially parallel sides,
“but the probability is not too high.” (Id. at 574:5–23.) Dr. Longo explained that the
“overwhelming majority of these cleavage fragments” have an aspect ratio less than
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3:1. (Id. at 574:24–575:18; see ECF No. 33132-1 (“Longo Dep.”) at 238:13–19;
240:21.) Therefore, while it is possible that a cleavage fragment could satisfy the
AHERA counting criteria, Plaintiffs have presented good grounds to conclude that,
at step one of the TEM methodology, the criteria used by MAS can reliably
distinguish between asbestos and non-asbestos, including cleavage fragments.
Additionally, Defendants contend that “AHERA defines asbestos as the
asbestiform varieties of the six regulated minerals” but “Drs. Longo and Rigler act
as though” the AHERA counting criteria are “AHERA’s definition of asbestos.”
(Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 69.) According to Defendants, the AHERA counting criteria
relied upon by MAS cannot distinguish between asbestiform and non-asbestiform
minerals, which they claim is necessary to determine whether a mineral qualifies as
asbestos.150 (Id.) Plaintiffs counter that asbestiform versus non-asbestiform is a “false
distinction” in this context, and that the generally accepted three-step TEM
methodology was designed to identify regulated asbestos. (Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br.
at 29–33.) I agree with Plaintiffs on this issue.
Drs. Longo and Rigler do not treat the AHERA counting criteria as AHERA’s
definition of asbestos, and any suggestion to the contrary reflects a misunderstanding
150 	In their brief, Defendants explain that the term asbestiform is an adjective describing the
distinctive way a mineral forms in nature, i.e., its habit. (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 57–58.) “Minerals
that crystallize in an asbestiform habit have a crystal structure that can be separated into fibers
with high tensile strength and flexibility.” (Id. at 58.)
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of the distinction between how U.S. regulatory agencies define asbestos and how
laboratories identify the presence of asbestos using TEM analytical methods. It is
undisputed that the AHERA counting criteria do not require a microscopist to
determine whether a particle is “asbestiform”—that is, the microscopist does not
need to determine the particle’s habit of growth, but that limitation does not render
Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM methodology unreliable. Dr. Longo testified that the
purpose of the AHERA counting criteria, at step one, is to identify minerals
exhibiting a fibrous morphology consistent with asbestos. (Daubert H’rg Tr. at
467:6–468:19.) Since a fibrous morphology alone does not establish that a mineral
is 	asbestos, 	Drs. 	Longo’s 	and 	Rigler’s 	TEM 	methodology 	incorporates 	two
complementary analytical techniques to confirm the presence of asbestos. At step
two of the methodology, MAS performed an energy dispersive X-ray analysis
(“EDXA”) to confirm that the chemical composition of the mineral is consistent with
that of asbestos, as opposed to talc or some other unregulated mineral. (Longo
Second Suppl. Rep. at 12–13; see Daubert H’rg Tr. at 487:24–489:4; 524:1–5;
645:16–646:12.) At step three, MAS conducted selected-area electron diffraction
(“SAED”) to confirm that the crystalline structure of the mineral matched reference
standards for asbestos. (Id.) Only fibers or bundles that satisfied all three steps were
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counted as amphibole asbestos.151 (Id.) Defendants’ argument focuses solely on step
one of the methodology without regard for the remaining two steps, and thus, they
fail to account for the reliability of the methodology as a whole. I am not persuaded,
in light of the evidence presented by Plaintiffs, that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s
reliance on the AHERA counting criteria at step one renders their methodology
unreliable.
Tellingly, Johnson & Johnson previously used a similar TEM method to
identify “asbestiform minerals in powdered talc.” (ECF No. 33132-3 (“J&J Test
Method TM7024”) at 2.) Dr. Mary Poulton, a geological engineer and one of
Defendants’ experts in this MDL, confirmed that this method was used to test talc
from Johnson & Johnson’s source mines. (ECF No. 32996-8 (“Poulton Rep.”) at 13.)
The method, TM7024, states that the “combined techniques of transmission electron
microscopy (TEM), selected area electron diffraction (SAED) and energy dispersive
x-ray analysis (EDXRA) permit the detection of asbestiform minerals based on
morphological characteristics, followed by a definitive mineralogical identification
of each fiber.” (J&J Test Method TM7024 at 2.) Additionally, this method defines a
fiber similar to Drs. Longo and Rigler: “An elongated particle with parallel sides and
151 	In my prior Opinion, I found Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s EDXA and SAED methods
sufficiently reliable for purposes of Daubert. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at
152–54. Defendants no longer challenge those methods, like they did during the first round of
motions. (See Defs.’ 2019 Asbestos Br. at 50–72.)
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an aspect ratio K3:1.” (Id. at 8.) In fact, Dr. Longo testified that using an aspect ratio
of 5:1, like he did, is more conservative and restrictive than using an aspect ratio of
3:1. (Daubert H’rg Tr. at 497:11–499:3.) Defendants do not claim otherwise.
Finally, Defendants contend that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM analysis
cannot reliably distinguish between a single fiber and a bundle of fibers. (Defs.’
Asbestos Br. at 74–83.) I considered this same argument in my prior Opinion,
finding that “these issues go to the weight of Dr. Longo’s opinions, rather than
reliability.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 151; see id. at 150–52.
I previously concluded that “any errors in differentiating between fibers and
bundles” at step one of the TEM methodology “do not ultimately demonstrate that
Dr. Longo’s testing is unreliable,” because steps two and three “further confirm
whether the counted fibers or bundles” identified at step one are, in fact, asbestos.
Id. at 151–52. Other than a conclusory claim in a footnote that this “puts the cart
before the horse,” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 74 n.198), Defendants do not meaningfully
address this conclusion, nor do they adequately explain how an alleged inability to
distinguish between a single fiber and a bundle of fibers renders Drs. Longo’s and
Rigler’s methodology unreliable. It is undisputed that the TEM method does not
require a determination that a particle formed in an asbestiform habit. (Daubert H’rg
Tr. at 524:1–5; 587:17–582:3; 582:9–17; 589:25–590:5.) Rather, the method applies
counting criteria to identify a particle’s fibrous morphology, then confirms its
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elemental composition and crystal structure through EDXA and SAED analyses.
(Id.) Only particles satisfying all three steps of the methodology are classified as
asbestos, regardless of whether the particle is a fiber or a bundle of fibers. (Id.)
According to Dr. Longo, a bundle of fibers is simply further confirmation that the
particle is asbestiform. (Id.)
In conclusion, Defendants’ motion that my prior ruling be reconsidered and
the outcome changed is rejected. Plaintiffs have demonstrated, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s three-step TEM methodology can
reliably detect the presence of amphibole asbestos in talc-containing products and is
generally accepted in the scientific community. In fulfilling my role as gatekeeper,
I am not required to find that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s methodology is perfect or
that every MAS testing result is correct. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1318 (explaining
the test “is not the correctness of the expert’s conclusions but the soundness of his
methodology”); In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 744 (stating that the grounds for an expert’s
opinion “do not have to be perfect” and “good grounds for an expert’s conclusions”
may exist “even if the judge thinks that a scientist’s methodology has some flaws”);
see also Best v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 181 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“Admissibility 	under 	Rule 	702 	does 	not 	require 	perfect 	methodology.”).
Furthermore, Defendants have not presented any new evidence that would warrant
reconsideration 	of the TEM testing 	technique or the bases upon 	which 	the
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conclusions drawn from that testing rest. Defendants’ criticisms of Drs. Longo’s and
Rigler’s methodology primarily concern the inherent limitations of TEM, albeit an
accepted method, as an analytical technique, rather than the specific methodology
employed here. However, these criticisms do not move the needle on my finding that
Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s overall TEM methodology is more likely than not reliable
for the reasons set forth above and in my prior Opinion. Accordingly, to the extent
Defendants take issue with the limitations of TEM or the results of MAS’s testing,
such concerns are appropriately explored through cross-examination.
ii. 	Drs. Robert Cook and Mark Krekeler
Next, Defendants argue that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler’s opinions about the
alleged presence of asbestos in talc” or from Defendants’ source mines should be
excluded “because their opinions are not derived from reliable methods and are not
supported by the data on which they rely.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 93.) Defendants
claim that both experts “unreliably base their opinions on counsel-generated
collections and summaries of documents.” (Id. at 94.) They further contend that
“Drs. Cook and Krekeler’s opinions are also unreliable and inadmissible because the
documents on which they rely do not support their conclusions.”152 (Id. at 95.)
152 	Notably, Defendants only dedicate a few pages of their asbestos brief to the alleged
unreliability of Drs. Cook and Krekeler’s opinions. And they do not address Drs. Cook’s and
Krekeler’s reports and methodologies in any meaningful way. For the purposes of completeness, I
will discuss these experts in greater detail.
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In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions are
supported by reliable scientific evidence that establishes asbestos was present in the
talc ore used to source Defendants’ talcum powder products. Plaintiffs further argue
that the charts compiled by counsel were merely clerical summaries of documents
that the experts independently reviewed and relied on. While Plaintiffs admit that
the charts contain “a few inadvertently included examples not sourced from the
correct mines or intended for industrial use” (Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br. at 89), they
maintain that Defendants’ criticisms go to weight, not admissibility.
I did not address Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s proposed testimony in my prior
Opinion. Accordingly, my analysis of this portion of Defendants’ motion is not
controlled by Judge Shipp’s April 30, 2024 Order. I will fully consider the parties’
positions.
a. 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Cook as an expert in the fields of geology and mining,
and 	Dr. 	Krekeler 	in 	the 	fields 	of 	geology, 	mineralogy, 	and 	environmental
geoscience. (ECF Nos. 33017-9 and -10 (“Cook Amend. Rep.”); Krekeler Rep.)
Defendants do not dispute that Drs. Cook and Krekeler are qualified to testify within
their proffered fields of expertise.153 In light of their training and experience, and
153 	Defendants do, however, argue that Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and nearly all of Plaintiffs’ other
experts are not qualified to testify regarding the carcinogenicity of heavy metals. As noted above,
I addressed Defendants’ causation-related arguments in the general causation section. (See supra
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Defendants’ lack of objection to their qualifications, I find, and thus recommend to
the Court, that Dr. Cook is qualified to act as an expert in the fields of geology and
mining, and that Dr. Krekeler is qualified to act as an expert in the fields of geology,
mineralogy, and environmental geoscience.
b. 	Dr. Robert Cook’s Methodology and Conclusions
Dr. Cook stated in his report that he was “asked to review the geology of the
talc deposits that sourced Defendants’ talcum powder products, to evaluate the
mining practices employed, and to assess Defendants’ sampling and testing from a
mining perspective.” (Cook Amend. Rep. at 2.)
Dr. Cook explained that, in forming his opinions, he “reviewed the following:
results 	of 	my 	professional 	experience 	examining 	talc 	and 	related 	mineral
occurrences, my experience with optical examination of drill core and commercial
rock products for asbestos and other related minerals, the published literature, and
documents produced in this litigation.” (Id. at 3; Ex. B at 1–21.) He testified at his
deposition that he reviewed over a thousand pages of documents, and that he
approached this matter “as I would any research project” or consulting project for a
mining company. (Cook Dep. at 456:1–462:16.) Dr. Cook’s report addressed, among
other topics, the mining and processing of talc ore, the specific mines from which
Part V.A.) In that section, I also addressed Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s credentials and professional
experience, which I will not repeat here.
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Defendants sourced their talc, the mineralogical characteristics of those deposits,
and historical testing that purportedly identified asbestos and other contaminants in
the source mines. (Cook Amend. Rep. at 3–21.)
Relevant to Defendants’ arguments, Dr. Cook included in his report a chart
summarizing testing “conducted by or for J&J and Imerys,” which he claimed
represents “some of the reported instances within Defendants’ internal documents
where 	serpentine 	asbestos 	(chrysotile), 	amphibole 	asbestos, 	or 	potentially
asbestiform amphiboles have been found in samples of talc used to source J&J
talcum powder products.” (Id. at 13.) This chart compiled documents from the 1950s
through the 2000s and contains roughly 100 entries. (Id. at 13–21.) For each entry,
it provided—where available—the date of the document, the testing laboratory, the
type of material tested (including talc ore, mill samples, and finished product), the
source mine, and the corresponding test results. (Id.) Dr. Cook stated that this chart
“is largely composed of the chart produced during the deposition of Johnson &
Johnson corporate representative Dr. John Hopkins.” (Id. at 13 n.17.) Dr. Cook
testified that the first draft of his report contained lengthy narrative descriptions of
Defendants’ historical testing results, which he found cumbersome. (Cook Dep. at
55:19–60:8.) After reviewing the chart from Dr. Hopkins’s deposition, Dr. Cook
asked Plaintiffs’ counsel to assist in preparing the charts, using information he
instructed counsel to include. (Id.) He further testified that he reviewed all the
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documents cited in those charts, and that he substantively reviewed the charts
themselves before issuing his report. (Id.)
As it relates to asbestos, Dr. Cook concluded, based on his “education,
training, and experience in the fields of mining and geology” as well as his “review
of the relevant information,” (Cook Amend. Rep. at 2–3), that it is his “opinion to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the talc deposits that were used to
source Defendants’ talcum powder products (Italy, Vermont, and China) contain
fibrous 	talc, 	and 	chrysotile 	and/or 	fibrous 	amphiboles, 	all 	known 	human
carcinogens.” (Id. at 42.)
c. 	Dr. Mark Krekeler’s Methodology and Conclusions
In his report, Dr. Krekeler stated that he was “asked to examine whether
Imerys and Johnson & Johnson acted in accordance with industry standards and/or
maintained adequate quality control in mining talc for use in cosmetic talcum
powder products (Johnson’s Baby Powder and Shower to Shower).” (Krekeler Rep.
at 1.) Like Dr. Cook, Dr. Krekeler’s report addressed the locations and geology of
the mines from which Defendants sourced their talc, the mining and processing
methods employed, and historical testing data reflecting the presence of asbestos and
other potential contaminants in the talc deposits at those mines.
To reach the opinions set forth in his report, Dr. Krekeler “reviewed
documents, both those produced by the defendants as well as deposition transcripts
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of company witnesses.” (Id. at 2; see id., Ex. B at 72–97.) He “also conducted an
extensive review of peer-reviewed literature and other works, such as geologic
survey documents and government agency information.” (Id. at 2.) Finally, he relied
on his “experience and methodology in both the academic and private sector in
preparing [his] opinions.” (Id.)
In pertinent part, Dr. Krekeler opined to “a reasonable degree of certainty
within the confines of [his] discipline as an expert in mineralogy, geology and
environmental geoscience,” (id. at 1), that “asbestos and fibrous talc was and is
present in the mines Defendants used for cosmetic talc.” (Id. at 45.)
In support of that opinion, Dr. Krekeler explained that the documents he
“reviewed provide strong evidence that the talc used by Imerys and Johnson &
Johnson to produce Johnson’s Baby Powder and Shower to Shower came from
mines that contained asbestos minerals, or fibrous talc in an asbestiform habit.” (Id.
at 14.) His report also included a chart summarizing documents that allegedly
establish the presence of asbestos in Defendants’ source mines. (Id. at 14–23.) Dr.
Krekeler’s asbestos-related chart is largely identical to the chart contained in Dr.
Cook’s report, and sets forth information such as the date of the document, the
testing laboratory, the type of material tested, the source mine, and the corresponding
test results. (Compare id., with Cook Amend. Rep. at 13–21.) At his deposition, Dr.
Krekeler testified that he “asked counsel to create the charts that are in the report,”
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and that he reviewed the documents and directed counsel as to which documents to
include in those charts. (Krekeler Dep. at 39:9–41:14.)
d. 	Drs. Robert Cook and Mark Krekeler’s “Counsel-
Generated Charts”
As an initial matter, relying on State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Electrolux Home
Products, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1048 (N.D. Ind. 2013) and Crowley v. Chait,
322 F. Supp. 2d 530, 546 (D.N.J. 2004), Defendants argue that Drs. Cook’s and
Krekeler’s opinions are unreliable because they serve as mere conduits for “counsel-
generated collections and summaries of documents.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 94.)
According to Defendants, Drs. Cook and Krekeler included “virtually identical”
charts in both of their reports, and “the analyses of the documents reflected in these
charts plainly were not the work of Drs. Cook and Krekeler but of counsel.” (Id.)
Plaintiffs insist that Defendants’ argument “is directly contravened by Drs.
Cook and Krekeler’s testimonies and reports.” (Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br. at 89.)
Plaintiffs explain that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler requested the creation of the charts
based on their examinations of the underlying documents, reviewed the charts, and
contributed to their entries,” and that counsel merely “performed the clerical task of
creating the chart.” (Id. at 92.) In other words, “the charts were simply clerical
compilations of documents reviewed by Drs. Cook and Krekeler.” (Id. at 93.) On
that 	basis, 	Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	the 	cases 	Defendants 	cite—State 	Farm 	and
Crowley—are factually distinguishable. (Id. at 92–93.)
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In State Farm, the court barred Dr. Christine Wood, an expert for Electrolux,
from testifying as to any conclusion she derived from her comparative analysis of
the risk of fire involving Electrolux dryers and dryers in general, including her
conclusion that Electrolux dryers are not unreasonably dangerous. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 980 F. Supp. 2d at 1035, 1045–51. The court found Dr. Wood’s
statistical 	analysis 	unreliable because she relied 	solely 	on 	data provided 	by
Electrolux regarding its dryer fires and “admittedly did nothing to independently
verify the reliability of this information before she used it in her calculations.” Id. at
1049. The court further observed that Dr. Wood could have—but did not—obtain
data on Electrolux dryer fires from one of the same sources she used to determine
the number of fires involving dryers manufactured by other companies. Id. at 1048–
1050. In effect, Dr. Wood merely parroted the information provided to her by
Electrolux.
In Crowley, the court limited the testimony of expert Loren Kramer because
he “relied upon information that is simply too unreliable to be trusted.” Crowley,
322 F. Supp. 2d at 547. Specifically, “Kramer prepared his reports on the basis of
statements prepared by Plaintiff’s counsel about the testimony of only eight out of
more than 150 deponents” in the case. Id. at 545. The court faulted Kramer for
relying “on summaries prepared by counsel” and for conducting “little independent
investigation into the witnesses beyond the summaries prepared for him.” Id. at 546.
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The court reasoned that “to make Kramer the mouthpiece of these deponents, and to
allow him to offer testimony to a jury as to conclusions he has reached on the basis
of this highly filtered version of events, is unacceptable.” Id. at 546–47. Finally, the
court stated that “Kramer’s reliance upon the spoonfed depositions led him to draw
questionable conclusions . . . that he might not have drawn had he properly reviewed
all of the depositions in an unfiltered fashion.” Id. at 547.
State Farm and Crowley are inapposite. In both of those cases, the experts
formed their opinions based on limited or incomplete information supplied to them
by a party or counsel, without independently reviewing or verifying the underlying
data. Those are not the circumstances here. Having reviewed their testimony and the
charts themselves, I find that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s deposition testimony
clearly reflects that they requested counsel’s assistance in preparing the charts, but
using information that they directed to be included, such as historical testing results
from Johnson & Johnson, and that both experts independently reviewed the
documents summarized therein. (See Cook Dep. at 55:19–60:8; Krekeler Dep. at
39:9–41:14.) According to Dr. Cook, the chart was intended to improve the overall
readability of his final report by replacing the detailed narrative summaries in his
draft report with a more concise and organized presentation. (Cook Dep. at 55:19–
60:8.) Moreover, and as discussed more fully below, Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s
opinions are not based solely on the information contained in the charts; they
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reviewed and relied upon additional materials and data, including scientific literature
and other documents produced in this litigation, in forming their opinions. In short,
unlike State Farm and Crowley, I do not find that the information included in the
subject charts is “highly filtered” data “spoonfed” to the experts by counsel.
Accordingly, I find that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s inclusion of “counsel-
generated” charts in their reports does not render their testimony unreliable because,
unlike the experts in State Farm and Crowley, they did not serve as mere conduits
for Plaintiffs and their counsel.
e. 	The Adequacy of Drs. Robert 	Cook and Mark
Krekeler’s Factual Foundation
Defendants next argue that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions should be
excluded as unreliable because some of the documents on which they rely—
including certain historical documents and testing results—do not support their
conclusions regarding the alleged presence of asbestos in the mines from which
Defendants sourced their talc. (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 95–97.)
First, Defendants contend that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler rely on documents
that have nothing to do with the issues presented in this litigation because they are
from geographic regions and mines that were not sources of talc for Defendants’ talc
products.” (Id. at 95 & n.240.) Second, they assert that “many of the data on which
Drs. Cook and Krekeler rely were derived from testing in mines that were used to
produce industrial talc—not cosmetic grade talc.” (Id. at 95–96.) Finally, Defendants
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argue that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler fail to differentiate between asbestiform and
nonasbestiform minerals” which renders their opinions unreliable because the
“presence of nonasbestiform minerals in the mines where [D]efendants sourced their
talc cannot support Drs. Cook and Krekeler’s logical leap to the conclusion that those
mines also contained the asbestiform variety of those minerals.” (Id. at 96–97.)
Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants’ arguments are “meritless” because they
“fail to discredit or even acknowledge the numerous examples of Defendants’ data
that Drs. Cook and Krekeler reference, all showing positive test results for asbestos”
in the talc used to source Johnson & Johnson’s products. (Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br. at
89.) Plaintiffs concede, however, that Drs. Cook and Krekeler “inadvertently
included” a few “examples not sourced from the correct mines or intended for
industrial use.” (Id.) They nevertheless claim that the “presence of a few documents
and reports allegedly involving other mines does not invalidate the substantial data
from the mines the parties agree were used to source talc.” (Id. at 94.) According to
Plaintiffs, Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s asbestos-related opinions are supported by a
comprehensive body of evidence. (Id. at 94–96.) I agree.
It is undisputed that, over the span of approximately a century, Defendants
sourced talc from different mines around the world. Dr. Mary Poulton, one of
Defendants’ own experts, explains that Defendants sourced talc from: (1) the
Fontane mine in the Val Chisone region of Italy; (2) southern Vermont, including
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the Argonaut, Hamm, Hammondsville, and Rainbow mines; and (3) mines in
Guangxi Province, Longsheng County in China. (See Poulton Rep. at 2–5.)
After 	considering 	their 	reports, 	deposition 	testimony, 	and 	the 	parties’
submissions, I find that Plaintiffs have established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions regarding the presence of
asbestos at Defendants’ source mines in Italy, Vermont, and China are sufficiently
supported by general geological principles corroborated by region-specific data.
Indeed, by providing “background information, discuss[ing] regional geology and
its application, and then focus[ing] on specific mines using Defendants’ internal
documents,” 	(Pls.’ 	Asbestos 	Opp. 	Br. 	at 	96), 	Drs. 	Cook’s 	and 	Krekeler’s
methodologies 	are 	sufficiently 	reliable 	under 	Daubert’s 	more-likely-than-not
standard, such that I find their opinions regarding the source mines are admissible.
Drs. Cook and Krekeler began by discussing the formation of talc deposits.
(Cook Amend. Rep. at 4; Krekeler Rep. at 2–5.) They explained that talc deposits
typically form over millions of years, as preexisting rocks are altered through
geological processes that involve heat, pressure, and chemical reactions. (Id.) As a
result of these geological processes, also known as metamorphism, talc deposits are
often accompanied by contaminants such as asbestos. (Id.) Simply put, the same
metamorphic conditions that produce talc can also produce asbestos. According to
Dr. Cook, the distribution of asbestos “can be quite irregular within individual talc
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deposits themselves or their immediately adjacent host rocks.” (Cook Amend. Rep.
at 4.) Dr. Krekeler similarly explained that “natural talc formation is commonly
accompanied by veins of other minerals, including asbestiform minerals like
tremolite” and that the “presence of asbestos in talc deposits [has] been common
knowledge amongst 	industrial 	mineral companies, 	research 	professionals 	and
mining geologists, dating back to as early as the 1930’s (Hess, 1933).” (Krekeler
Rep. at 5.) Defendants do not dispute these geological principles.
Next, I address Defendants’ argument that Drs. Cook and Krekeler fail to
distinguish between asbestiform and non-asbestiform minerals. This assertion raises
several issues relevant to the evaluation of historical documents. In addressing this
argument, I will also address some of the region-specific data that Drs. Cook and
Krekeler rely on in support of their opinions related to Defendants’ source mines in
Italy, Vermont, and China.
In support of their position, Defendants assert that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler
each cite reports from the Battelle Memorial Institute, an organization that tested
cosmetic talc samples in the 1950s, for the proposition that cosmetic talc contained
tremolite.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 96.) They further claim that “the Battelle report
does not indicate that the tremolite identified was of the asbestiform variety.” (Id.)
Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive. Drs. Cook and Krekeler have not
“ignored” the distinction between asbestiform and non-asbestiform minerals. (Id.)
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Dr. Krekeler explained in his report that “asbestiform refers to a mineral that has
grown into a fibrous aggregate of long, thin and flexible crystals that readily separate
into smaller crystals” and noted that the “term fiber is an important qualifier for
asbestos” because “there are asbestiform and nonasbestiform varieties of tremolite,
actinolite, crocidolite and anthophyllite.” (Krekeler Rep. at 4.) Dr. Cook likewise
testified that the term asbestiform pertains to a mineral’s “fibrous nature.” (Cook
Dep. at 105:20–106:7.)
Furthermore, Defendants’ criticism that Drs. Cook and Krekeler relied on
historical documents that did not specify whether the referenced minerals are
asbestiform or non-asbestiform is misplaced. Many of the documents from the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s—including Defendants’ own records—do not reflect the
level of mineralogical precision that Defendants now demand. That is hardly
surprising given that asbestos is a general term with varying definitions, which has
contributed to uncertainty in the interpretation of historical evidence. (IWGACP
White Paper at 8–9; IARC Monographs vol. 100C at 221.) In that connection, the
fact that a document does not expressly state that the tremolite identified in
Defendants’ talcum powder was of the asbestiform variety does not preclude the
reasonable inference that the reference was to tremolite asbestos, for the reasons
described below.
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For example, both Drs. Cook and Krekeler cited a 1973 memorandum in
support of their opinions that Defendants’ source mines were contaminated with
asbestos. (Cook Amend. Rep. at 15; Krekeler Rep. at 17.) At that time, Defendants
were sourcing talc from Vermont. In the memorandum, a Johnson & Johnson
executive 	discussed 	potential 	strategies 	related 	to 	the 	company’s 	asbestos
“controversy” and acknowledged that the company had identified “tremolite or
actinolite” that “might be classified as asbestos fibers” in its Baby Powder:
1. 	It is our joint conclusion that we should not rely on
the “Clean Mine” approach as a protective device for Baby
Powder 	in 	the 	current 	Asbestos 	or 	Asbestos-Form
controversy. We believe this mine to be very clean;
however, we are also confident that fiber forming or fiber
type minerals could be found. The usefulness of the
“Clean Mine” approach for asbestos only is over.
2. 	It is possible that the technique of identification for
asbestos or asbestos-form minerals will be an optical
approach. It 	probably 	will 	be some variation 	of the
McCrone 	method. 	This 	method 	with 	appropriate
concentrating techniques will permit a good laboratory to
identify asbestos or tremolite in a talc sample.
* * *
b. 	As 	for 	Baby 	Powder, 	the 	entire 	thrust 	of 	our
communications 	with 	the 	FDA 	has 	concentrated 	on
asbestos 	as 	harmful 	fiber-like 	material. 	Sophisticated
techniques have been proposed to make sure that fiber-
form materials present in samples were identified as being
asbestos. The implication is that all other fiber-forms, if
present, were talc or other minerals and these were safe.
This posture will no longer be satisfactory. If the FDA
Food Division, which is moving more rapidly than the
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Cosmetics Division, publishes a standard, it will probably
be to ban asbestos-form or fibrous material in talc. That
could eliminate the current use of talc in packaging
materials. These talcs contain widely varying amounts of
tremolite or fibrous talc. Our Baby Powder contains talc
fragments classifiable as fiber. Occasionally sub-trace
quantities of tremolite or actinolite are identifiable (optical
Microscope) and these might be classified as asbestos
fiber.
(ECF 	No. 	33132-1, 	Ex. 	2 	(“April 	26, 	1973 	Memorandum”) 	at 	1–2.) 	This
memorandum plainly 	indicates that 	the tremolite and 	actinolite identified 	in
Defendants’ talc were likely asbestos. Thus, Drs. Cook and Krekeler reasonably
relied on the memorandum—which was just one of roughly 100 entries in their
asbestos-related charts—to support their contamination opinions.
In fact, there is ample evidence to support the conclusion that Defendants’
source mines in Vermont were contaminated. Drs. Cook and Krekeler relied on
multiple other test results—as set forth in their asbestos-related charts—confirming,
for example, the presence of chrysotile, fibrous tremolite, and fibrous actinolite at
the Argonaut, Hamm, and Hammondsville mines. (Cook Amend. Rep. at 16, 19–21;
Krekeler Rep. at 18–19, 22–23.) Notably, Defendants do not challenge the validity
of those other test results, many of which were performed by or for Johnson &
Johnson.
Additionally, contrary to Defendants’ contention, Drs. Cook and Krekeler
reasonably relied on the 1958 Battelle Report in support of their opinions regarding
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the presence of asbestos in Defendants’ source mines in Italy. In the 1950s,
Defendants engaged the Battelle Memorial Institute to conduct testing to determine
why their talcum powder exhibited a highly undesirable characteristic known as grit.
(W.L. Smith, 	Progress Report on Further Studies on the Measurement and
Correlation of the Physical Properties of Talc to Johnson and Johnson, Battelle
Mem’l Inst., (1958)). In the 1958 Report, Battelle explained what was causing the
grittiness in Defendants’ talcum powder:
Grit consists of that portion of ground talc which is
angular, 	or 	oversize, 	particularly 	in 	thickness. 	Grit
includes both oversize and nonplaty talc particles as well
as mineral contaminants. It occurs as aggregates of talc
and contaminants, as acicular and fibrous particles of talc
and amphibole, as shards and granules of amphibole or
carbonate, and as prismatic grains of titanite, rutile, zircon,
apatite, and other accessory minerals.
(Id. at 3.) Battelle further stated: “The Italian No. 1 talc contains from less than 1
percent to about 3 percent of contaminants. The contamination is natural and consists
mostly of carbonate with minor amphibole and rare accessory minerals . . . . The
amphibole component has been established to be the variety tremolite.” (Id.) While
the Battelle Report does not use the term asbestiform—or even the word asbestos—
it concludes that Defendants’ talcum powder was contaminated with amphibole
tremolite, and highlights the presence of fibrous amphibole particles. Thus, it was
reasonable for Drs. Cook and Krekeler to conclude that the Battelle Report evidences
the presence of tremolite asbestos in Defendants’ Italian talc.
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While there is ample region-specific data regarding the mines in Italy and
Vermont, it is undisputed that there is limited publicly available information
concerning the region of China from which Defendants sourced talc, specifically
Guangxi Province. Laura Webb, one of Defendants’ experts, states in her report:
“Little information is available in the peer-reviewed published literature on the talc
deposits in the Guangxi Province in China.” (ECF No. 32996-9 (“Webb Rep.”) at
23.) Dr. Cook agrees that little “is known about Chinese talc deposits.” (Cook
Amend. Rep. at 12.) Despite these informational gaps, both Drs. Cook and Krekeler
explain that talc ore from Guangxi Province occurs in carbonate rock types, which
are commonly associated with the presence of actinolite and tremolite. (Id. at 4, 10,
12–13; Krekeler Rep. at 10–11.) Defendants do not dispute this general geological
principle. Additionally, in reaching his opinions, Dr. Krekeler relied on an article by
Dr. Wilhelm Schober entitled “Asia Pacific Talc,” (Krekeler Rep., Ex. B at 84),
which reports that most mines in Guangxi contain talc deposits hosted in magnesium
carbonate 	rock 	and 	that 	accompanying 	minerals 	include 	tremolite. 	(Wilhelm
Schober, Asia Pacific Talc, Indus. Minerals, at 59 (1998); see IARC, Monographs
on the Identification of Carcinogenic Hazards to Humans, vol. 136: Talc and
Acrylonitrile 55 (2025) (citing Dr. Schober’s article in support of its determination
that mines located in Guangxi Province may contain tremolite asbestos).) Further,
during oral argument on November 25, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel noted that a 2019
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report prepared by AMA Analytical Services, Inc. for the FDA identified the
presence of asbestos in Defendants’ talcum powder products. (ECF No. 33132-9
(“AMA Certificate of Analysis dated July 24, 2019”).) It is undisputed that
Defendants were sourcing talc from China during this period. Although this testing
post-dates Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s reports, it corroborates their opinions
regarding the potential presence of asbestos in Defendants’ talc supply sourced from
China.154
Finally, I disagree with Defendants’ contention that the presence of a few
potentially irrelevant data points renders the opinions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler
wholly unreliable. Although an expert’s methodology may raise reliability concerns
if it relies heavily on test results unrelated to the mines or talc products at issue, that
is not the circumstance here. Defendants identify only a small number of allegedly
irrelevant items, and the majority of the evidence on which Drs. Cook and Krekeler
rely is directly attributable to the regions and mines from which Defendants sourced
talc. Put differently, Drs. Cook and Krekeler base their conclusions on a broad body
of materials that extends well beyond the isolated test results Defendants claim have
tainted their analyses. Even if the challenged data were excluded, the unchallenged
data 	would 	remain 	more 	than 	sufficient 	to 	support 	their 	conclusions 	by 	a
154 	Plaintiffs’ counsel also noted, during oral argument, that Dr. Longo found asbestos in
Chinese talc samples. However, these tests were performed using his PLM methodology, not the
TEM methodology, the only testing I have found to be admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert.
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preponderance of the evidence. As case law makes clear, factual imperfections in
the data underlying an expert’s opinion do not, standing alone, warrant exclusion
under 	Daubert so long as the opinion rests on a sufficiently reliable factual
foundation. See Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (“To the extent [an expert’s] credibility, data, or factual assumptions have
flaws, these flaws go to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility.”). Thus,
Defendants’ criticisms of certain underlying data go to the weight of the evidence
and the experts’ credibility, not to admissibility.
In conclusion, having reviewed these experts’ supporting evidence, taken
together, it adequately buttresses their opinions that asbestos was present in
Defendants’ source mines in Italy, Vermont, and China. Thus, because I find it more
likely than not that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions satisfy Rule 702’s
admissibility requirements, “any attack by the opponent will go only to the weight
of the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note to 2023 amendment.
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that the Court deny Defendants’
motion to preclude Drs. Cook and Krekeler from opining on the alleged presence of
asbestos in Johnson & Johnson’s source mines.
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Geology Opinions of Drs. Mary
Poulton and Laura Webb
Plaintiffs seek to exclude the opinions of Defendants’ experts, Mary Poulton,
Ph.D. and Laura Webb, Ph.D. First, Plaintiffs argue that Drs. Poulton and Webb are
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not qualified because they lack the requisite academic or practical experience
necessary to support their opinions regarding the lack of asbestos at the mines used
by Defendants to source talc. Second, Plaintiffs contend that the opinions of Drs.
Poulton and Webb are unreliable and not based on any discernible methodology.
In opposition, Defendants assert that Drs. Poulton and Webb are eminently
qualified to offer their opinions in this MDL and that Plaintiffs’ argument on this
point is frivolous. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ challenges to the
methodologies employed by Drs. Poulton and Webb are equally unfounded.
According to Defendants, Drs. Poulton and Webb reliably rebut the opinions of
Plaintiffs’ geology experts, Drs. Cook and Krekeler.
I did not address these experts or issues in my prior Opinion, and thus, I will
consider the parties’ arguments without restriction.
i. 	Rule 	702’s 	Qualification 	Requirement 	is 	Liberally
Construed
As noted supra, a witness qualifies as an expert if he or she possesses
“specialized knowledge regarding the area of testimony.” Elcock, 233 F.3d at 741
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The basis of this specialized
knowledge can be practical experience as well as academic training and credentials,”
but “at a minimum,” the witness “must possess skill or knowledge greater than the
average layman.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Third
Circuit has “eschewed imposing overly rigorous requirements of expertise and [has]
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been satisfied with more generalized qualifications.” In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741.
Indeed, it is “an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony simply because the trial
court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best qualified or because the
proposed expert does not have the specialization that the court considers most
appropriate.” Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “If the expert meets [Rule 702’s] liberal minimum qualifications, then the
level of the expert’s expertise goes to credibility and weight, not admissibility.”
Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 809.
ii. 	Dr. Mary Poulton’s Qualifications
Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Poulton fails to meet even the liberal qualification
standard applied in federal court because she lacks the credentials, training, and
“hands-on” experience necessary to opine on issues related to talc, asbestos, and
mining. (ECF No. 32996-1 (“Pls.’ Geology Br.”) at 10–13.) They contend that Dr.
Poulton does not hold a degree in geology and is not a certified professional
geologist, an exploration geologist, or a licensed professional engineer. (Id.)
Plaintiffs further assert that she has not published any peer-reviewed articles on talc
or asbestos and is unfamiliar with the geology of the mining regions from which
Defendants obtained their talc. (Id.) They also fault her for having visited only one
talc mine and for never having worked for or consulted with a mining company. (Id.)
According to Plaintiffs, “Dr. Poulton’s career in academia without any first-hand
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knowledge of the issue on which she offers opinions does not qualify her as an
expert.” (Id. at 13.)
Defendants contend—and I agree—that Dr. Poulton is qualified to opine on
talc mining and to serve as a rebuttal expert witness.155 (ECF No. 33113 (“Defs.’
Geology Opp. Br.”) at 8–11.) They offer her as an expert in geological engineering,
a discipline that integrates geology with mining and civil engineering. (ECF No.
32996-5 (“Poulton Dep.”) at 40:22–41:11.) Dr. Poulton holds B.S., M.S., and Ph.D.
degrees in Geological Engineering from the University of Arizona. (Poulton Rep. at
2.) She served on the University of Arizona faculty for 28 years, achieving the rank
of Distinguished Professor in Mining and Geological Engineering. (Id.) She also
served 	as 	head 	of 	the 	University’s 	Department 	of 	Mining 	and 	Geological
Engineering for 14 years. (Id.)
Furthermore, Dr. Poulton has authored more than 100 research papers,
conference papers, abstracts, and reports, and has taught courses in mineral
exploration, mineralogy and petrology for mining engineers, field methods in
geophysical 	exploration, 	computer 	methods 	in 	geological 	engineering, 	mine
surveying, introduction to the global mining industry, and international mine safety
and health law. (Id.) She has received multiple honors—including the National
155 	The manner in which rebuttal experts are reviewed is discussed in the legal standard
section, see supra Part IV.D and below as relevant to the parties’ arguments here.
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Engineering Award from the American Association of Engineering Societies and the
Daniel 	C. 	Jackling 	Award 	from 	the 	Society 	of 	Mining, 	Metallurgy, 	and
Exploration—and has held leadership roles in professional organizations, a research
publication, and a government advisory committee. (Id.) She has also testified before
Congress on workforce needs in mining and petroleum. (Id.)
Dr. Poulton is distinguished within her field, and her specialized knowledge
closely aligns with her proffered testimony. Based on her engineering experience,
her review of the reference literature, and her analysis of the reports of Drs. Cook
and Krekeler and the documents cited therein, Dr. Poulton intends to testify that Drs.
Cook and Krekeler used “flawed methodologies, incomplete sampling results, and
incorrect facts about ore body characterization and selective mining” at the source
mines “to reach their conclusions that the talc sourced for Johnson’s Baby Powder
and Shower to Shower was known to contain asbestos and heavy metals that
exceeded product specifications.” (Id. at 1.)
Defendants have established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr.
Poulton satisfies Rule 702’s qualification requirement. In light of her academic
credentials, professional experience, and subject-matter expertise, Dr. Poulton
possesses specialized knowledge relevant to her proffered testimony. Her advanced
degrees in geological engineering, decades of teaching and research in mining and
geological engineering, and professional accomplishments demonstrate a depth of
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knowledge far exceeding that of a layperson. Plaintiffs’ arguments, at best, go to the
weight and credibility of her opinions. As the Third Circuit has made clear, it would
be an abuse of discretion to deem Dr. Poulton unqualified simply because she is not
a certified professional geologist or has not published any peer-reviewed articles on
talc or asbestos, particularly in light of the fact that she is being proffered to rebut
Plaintiffs’ geology experts. See Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244 (it is an abuse of discretion
if the court excludes testimony because the proposed expert is not the “best
qualified” or lacks what the court views as the “most appropriate” specialization);
see also In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741 (“Rule 702’s liberal policy of admissibility
extends to the substantive as well as the formal qualification of experts.”).
Accordingly, I find that Dr. Poulton is qualified to testify as an expert in
geological engineering and to offer rebuttal opinions concerning the methodologies
and conclusions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler.
iii. 	Dr. Laura Webb’s Qualifications
Plaintiffs argue that “Dr. Webb lacks both academic qualifications and
practical experience to support her opinions.” (Pls.’ Geology Br. at 13.) According
to Plaintiffs, Dr. Webb rarely “encounters talc in her work” and “has never examined
samples of talc for the purpose of identifying asbestos.” (Id. at 13–14.) They further
claim that “Dr. Webb has never performed any academic research or studies focused
on talc or asbestos” and has not published any peer-reviewed articles regarding talc,
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asbestos, or “the talc deposits in Vermont, Italy, or China used to source J&J’s Baby
Powder and Shower to Shower.” (Id. at 14.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Webb
lacks the knowledge and “hands-on” experience necessary “to provide an opinion
regarding the presence (or absence) of asbestos at the talc mines used to source J&J
talcum powder products.” (Id. at 14–15.)
In response, Defendants assert that Dr. Webb “is eminently qualified to opine
on the scientific principles that govern the formation of mineable high-grade talc
deposits and the possible relationship, or lack thereof, of such deposits with
amphibole asbestos” because, among other reasons, she is “a tenured professor of
geology who has almost 20 years of experience in the field, with a particular
specialization in the origin and history of mineral deposits.” (Defs.’ Geology Opp.
Br. at 11.) I agree with Defendants.
Dr. Webb obtained a B.S. in Geology from the University of California, Los
Angeles, and a Ph.D. in Geological and Environmental Sciences from Stanford
University. (Webb Rep. at 1.) Dr. Webb describes herself as “a geologist who
specializes in using the tools of petrology (the origin and evolution of rocks
discerned 	from mineralogical 	evidence), structural 	geology 	(interpreting 	rock
deformation), and geochronology (radiometric dating) to understand the histories of
rocks and regions.” (Id.) Dr. Webb served as a Research Assistant Professor at
Syracuse University for nine years and is currently a tenured Associate Professor in
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the Department of Geology at the University of Vermont. (Id.) Dr. Webb teaches
courses 	in 	petrology, microstructures, geochronology, and tectonics, and 	has
coauthored 33 peer-reviewed scientific papers addressing geology and petrology.
(Id. at 2.) Dr. Webb has also “worked extensively in regions with complex geologic
histories, such as those in Italy, Vermont and China,” and is familiar “with the
regional geology of the Fontane and Guangxi mine regions and [has] experience
working near the southern Vermont mines.” (Id.)
Defendants offer Dr. Webb as an expert in the field of geology and, according
to her report, she was asked to opine “on the scientific principles that govern the
formation of mineable high-grade talc deposits used in the manufacture of Johnson’s
Baby Powder and Shower to Shower, and to investigate the possible relationship of
such deposits . . . to amphibole asbestos.” (Id. at 1.) She was also asked to evaluate
“plaintiffs’ experts’ reports by Dr. Cook and Dr. Krekeler, and address[ ] differences
in 	the 	formation 	of 	amphibole 	minerals 	with 	different 	crystal 	habits 	(e.g.,
asbestiform vs. prismatic) and the physical and chemical properties that impact
biopersistence and toxicity.” (Id.) Based on her review of the scientific literature and
other materials, her educational background, and her professional experience as a
geologist, Dr. Webb opined that “the cosmetic talc sources used for Johnson’s Baby
Powder and Shower to Shower were limited to mines that were free of asbestiform
minerals.” (Id. at 24.) She further opined that, based on general geologic principles
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and the available data, Drs. Cook and Krekeler inappropriately concluded that the
talc 	deposits 	mined 	for 	use 	in 	Defendants’ 	talcum 	powder 	products 	were
contaminated with asbestos. (Id. at 1.)
Defendants have established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr.
Webb satisfies Rule 702’s qualification requirement. Dr. Webb holds advanced
degrees in the field of geology from leading universities. She teaches and publishes
in the areas of geology and petrology, and has extensive experience working in
geologically complex regions. Without a doubt, Dr. Webb’s specialized knowledge
in “the histories of rocks and regions” directly relates to the opinions she offers
regarding the formation of the talc deposits at issue, regardless of whether she
possesses specific expertise related to talc or asbestos. The alleged deficiencies
identified by Plaintiffs—such as her lack of peer-reviewed articles addressing talc,
asbestos, and the relevant talc deposits in Italy, Vermont, and China—bear on the
weight of her opinions, not their admissibility. Consistent with the Third Circuit’s
liberal approach to expert qualification, I find that Dr. Webb is qualified to testify as
an expert in geology and to offer rebuttal opinions concerning Drs. Cook’s and
Krekeler’s methodologies and conclusions.
iv. 	Analysis Regarding Dr. Mary Poulton
Plaintiffs first argue that Dr. Poulton’s testimony should be excluded because
“her opinions, as she admitted, amount to nothing more than a critique of” the
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opinions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler “rather than an expert evaluation.” (Pls.’
Geology Br. at 17–19.) While their argument is neither a model of clarity nor
supported by any legal authority, Plaintiffs appear to contend that Dr. Poulton’s
methodology—namely, attacking the opinions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler—is
unreliable. Defendants counter that Plaintiffs fundamentally misunderstand the role
of a defense expert and assert that federal courts recognize that “assessing the
methodology of plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions is an appropriate methodology for a
defense expert” like Dr. Poulton. (Id. at 13–16.) Again, I agree with Defendants.
All experts who seek to testify in federal court must satisfy Rule 702’s
admissibility 	requirements, including 	defense 	experts. 	See 	Fed. 	R. 	Evid.702.
However, as Defendants correctly note, courts recognize that “the proper role of
rebuttal experts [is] to critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out
potential flaws in the plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp.
2d at 835; see also Mahaska Bottling Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (courts routinely
permit defense experts to testify “even if the expert primarily critiques the opposing
expert’s approach without offering an alternative approach.”); In re Abilify, 299 F.
Supp. 3d at 1368 (defense experts’ “opinions properly may be limited to criticizing
the analysis and conclusions presented by another party”). Simply put, defense
experts “have a less demanding task, since they have no burden to produce models
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or methods of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiffs’ experts.” In re
Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
Here, I reject Plaintiffs’ argument that Dr. Poulton’s testimony is improper or
unreliable merely because her methodology involves critiquing Drs. Cook’s and
Krekeler’s opinions. Dr. Poulton testified regarding the scope of her assignment at
her deposition, explaining that she was asked to review the reports of Drs. Cook and
Krekeler and to determine whether she “agreed with what they did, what they found,
and then if not, why.” (Poulton Dep. at 22:20–23:13.) The primary focus of her
analysis was on Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions concerning “mining and
beneficiation practices.”156 (Id.) With respect to her methodology, Dr. Poulton
testified that she “started with the assumption that” Drs. Cook and Krekeler “were
correct in their findings, and then [attempted to] corroborate[] their statements with
what [she] saw in the documents.” (Id. at 23:14–24:2.) She further explained that “if
they said information was missing, then I asked for that information or looked for it
within the documents they had” and that she “basically constructed the areas where”
she felt Drs. Cook and Krekeler “were incorrect.” (Id.) I find nothing inherently
unreliable regarding Dr. Poulton’s stated methodology, as it is consistent with the
156 	Dr. Cook explained in his report that beneficiation means “any process that improves the
economic value of the ore by removing the gangue minerals which results in a higher-grade
product.” (Cook Amend. Rep. at 9 n.12.) This includes applying processes to talc ore such as
“primary (jaw) crushing, grinding circuits including roller mills, shear disc devices, flotation,
thickening, filtering, and drying.” (Id. at 9.)
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general role of a rebuttal expert. See In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1368 (finding
defense experts’ opinions, which “were, essentially, critiques of Plaintiffs’ experts’
evidence, methodologies, and conclusions,” “entirely appropriate”).
Since her methodology is sufficiently sound, I must now determine whether
Dr. Poulton’s opinions are supported by sufficient facts or data and whether she
reliably applied her methodology to the facts of the case. In her report, Dr. Poulton
concluded that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler use flawed methodologies, incomplete
sampling results, and incorrect facts about ore body characterization and selective
mining to reach their conclusions that the talc sourced for Johnson’s Baby Powder
and Shower to Shower was known to contain asbestos and heavy metals that
exceeded product specifications.” (Poulton Rep. at 1.) Specifically, Dr. Poulton
identified the following alleged deficiencies in Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s reports:
A. 	Drs. Cook and Krekeler improperly conflate non-
ore samples with ore samples.
B. 	Drs. Cook and Krekeler improperly conflate non-
asbestiform minerals with asbestiform minerals.
C. 	Drs. Cook and Krekeler improperly extrapolate
general mineralogy from different regions to the exact
mineralogy of ore that went into Johnson’s Baby Powder
or Shower to Shower.
D. 	Dr. Cook improperly conflates the mineralogy of
non-cosmetic grade talc mines with cosmetic grade ore
that went into Johnson’s Baby Powder or Shower to
Shower.
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E. 	Dr. 	Krekeler 	improperly 	cites 	data 	regarding
regions 	in 	China 	where 	talc 	was 	never 	sourced 	for
Johnson’s Baby Powder or Shower to Shower to opine that
the specific Chinese ore body sourced for Johnson’s Baby
Powder or Shower to Shower was contaminated with
asbestos.
F. 	Drs. Cook and Krekeler rely on irrelevant test
results for their opinions that Johnson’s Baby Powder and
Shower to Shower were contaminated with asbestos.
G. 	Dr. 	Cook 	relies 	on 	test 	results 	that 	postdate
production for cosmetic talc at the Argonaut mine, which
cannot be extrapolated to ore sourced from earlier sections
of the mine as mines are continually in development.
H. 	Drs. 	Cook 	and 	Krekeler’s 	opinions 	regarding
inadequate sampling are premised on misrepresentations
of documents and sampling theory and lack evidentiary
support.
I. 	Drs. 	Cook 	and 	Krekeler 	incorrectly 	assert 	that
selective 	mining 	was 	impossible, 	make 	improper
assumptions 	about 	how 	drill 	campaigns 	must 	be
conducted, misstate facts regarding mine planning and
rely on incomplete data to opine that quality control was
ineffective.
(Id.; see id. at 5–33.) In forming these opinions, Dr. Poulton relied on her “analysis
of the reports of Drs. Cook and Krekeler, examination of documents presented, use
of reference literature, and [her] engineering experience.” (Id. at 1; see id. at 34–47;
Poulton Dep. at 19:20–24.) In addition to critiquing Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s
opinions, Dr. Poulton also addressed the mines used by Defendants to source talc in
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Italy, Vermont, and China, including discussing matters related to mine design and
mining practices. (Poulton Rep. at 2–5.)
After reviewing Dr. Poulton’s report, deposition testimony, and the parties’
submissions, I find that Defendants have established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Dr. Poulton’s opinions rest on a sufficient factual foundation and
reflect a sound application of her methodology to the facts of this case. Dr. Poulton
reviewed and relied on the documents cited by Drs. Cook and Krekeler in their
reports, along with other relevant materials. As a rebuttal expert, she was asked to
identify, and did so, specific shortcomings in their opinions, provided a reasoned
basis for each of her criticisms, and relied on facts and data to support her
conclusions. See In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1368 (denying motion to exclude
defense experts’ testimony on similar grounds). I am satisfied that Dr. Poulton’s
opinions are admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert because they are grounded in
her expertise in geological engineering and mining and are supported by ample
scientific and record evidence.
Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that Dr. Poulton’s opinions are unreliable
because they lack scientific rigor, are based on cherry-picked scientific evidence,
constitute ipse dixit, lack credibility, and are irrelevant and incorrect. (See Pls.’
Geology Br. at 17–31.) I disagree. “[T]he question of whether the expert is credible
or the opinion is correct is generally a question for the fact finder, not the court.”
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Summit 6, LLC, 802 F.3d at 1296. None of Plaintiffs’ arguments establish that Dr.
Poulton’s methods are unreliable, her data legally or factually insufficient, or her
reasoning disconnected from the facts of the case. Indeed, most of Plaintiffs’
arguments go to weight rather than reliability. For example, Plaintiffs assert that Dr.
Poulton failed to employ sufficient scientific rigor because she only “reviewed
materials 	cited 	by Plaintiff’s [sic] experts but not all of the materials they
considered” in preparing their reports. (Pls.’ Geology Br. at 18.) Plaintiffs claim,
after comparing the experts’ “reliance lists,” that “Dr. Poulton’s conclusions about
the PSC’s experts’ analyses are based upon only a mere fraction of the information
that was actually relied upon by PSC’s experts in reaching their conclusions.” (Id.)
In support of this position, Plaintiffs did not identify any specific documents that Dr.
Poulton failed to consider—relative to Drs. Cook and Krekeler—that would or could
have affected her conclusions. Regardless, Rule 702’s reliability inquiry does not
rise or fall on the number of documents an expert reviews in forming an opinion.
The proper question here is whether Dr. Poulton’s opinions are supported by
sufficient facts and data to rebut the opinions of Plaintiffs’ experts. I answer that in
the affirmative.
Because Dr. Poulton’s opinions are reliable under Rule 702 and Daubert, I
find that Plaintiffs’ objections go to the weight of her testimony, not its admissibility.
See Summit 6, LLC, 802 F.3d at 1299 (“Where the methodology is sound and the
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evidence relied upon is sufficiently related to the case, disputes over the expert’s
credibility or over the accuracy of the underlying facts are for the jury.”).
Accordingly, I recommend that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr.
Poulton.
v. 	Analysis Regarding Dr. Laura Webb
First, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Webb’s opinions are unreliable because “she
failed to use the very observation-based methodology that she normally uses in the
field and outside of the courtroom.” (Pls.’ Geology Br. at 32–33.) Specifically,
Plaintiffs maintain that Dr. Webb departed from her customary “field-based”
practices such as collecting and testing rock and mineral samples. (Id. at 33–36.)
Next, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Webb’s methodology is flawed because she
based her opinions on a limited selection of cherry-picked materials and ignored
various maps, testing, samples, observations, and other data from the actual mines
used to source Defendants’ talcum powder products. (Id. at 36.) Plaintiffs claim that
Dr. Webb’s “extremely narrow review of relevant materials is important” because
she does not opine that there is no asbestos in the mines, but rather, her opinion is
that the evidence she reviewed does not support the conclusion that asbestos is
present in the mines. (Id. at 36–37.)
In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ attacks on Dr. Webb’s
methodology are baseless. (Defs.’ Geology Opp. Br. at 33–42.) They assert that there
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is “no truth” to Plaintiffs’ argument that Dr. Webb failed to use the same type of
methodology she normally uses in her practice as a scientist. (Id. at 33–37.) They
further claim that even a cursory review of Dr. Webb’s report reveals that she
performed a comprehensive review of the relevant scientific literature and that her
opinions are not based on cherry-picked data. (Id. at 38–42.)
After reviewing Dr. Webb’s report, deposition testimony, and the parties’
submissions, I find that Defendants have established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Dr. Webb’s opinions are based on sufficient facts and data, are
grounded in reliable principles and methods, and reflect a sound application of those
principles and methods to the facts of this case. Plaintiffs mischaracterize Dr.
Webb’s deposition testimony to support their position that she practices only a field-
based approach to geology. Rather, the record reveals that Dr. Webb employed the
same research-based methodology she uses in her academic and peer-reviewed
work, and that performing work in the field is merely one of her skill sets. The record
further reveals that Dr. Webb’s opinions regarding the formation of the talc deposits
at issue are grounded in her extensive expertise in geology and petrology and are
supported by ample scientific evidence.
In her report, Dr. Webb stated that her opinions focus primarily on “the
scientific principles that govern the formation of [the] mineable high-grade talc
deposits” used by Defendants to produce their products. (Webb Rep. at 1.) She began
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by defining key terms and outlining important concepts related to minerals, such as
talc and those belonging to the serpentine and amphibole groups. (Id. at 2–6.) She
then discussed the essential characteristics of asbestos and the general principles
underlying the formation of talc deposits. (Id. at 6–11.) She explained, “while talc is
a common metamorphic mineral in metamorphosed ultramafic and carbonate rocks,
mineable high-purity talc deposits are the result of rare instances of rather extreme
metasomatism, in which the bulk composition of a protolith is changed to something
effectively matching (or very close to) the talc mineral composition.” (Id. at 14.) Put
differently, 	mineable 	high-purity 	talc 	deposits, 	like 	those 	allegedly 	used 	by
Defendants, form through rare geological processes that result in deposits made up
almost entirely of talc.
In addition to these general scientific principles, Dr. Webb analyzed the
available scientific literature to determine the specific characteristic of the talc
deposits used by Defendants in Italy, Vermont, and China. (Id. at 14–24.) She
explained that, in forming her opinions, she “relied on peer-reviewed, published
scientific 	literature 	and 	the 	examination 	of 	primary 	sources 	of 	data 	and
observations.” (Id. at 14.) Because information concerning certain mines is limited,
she “integrated regional studies” into her analysis “to understand the broader context
and metamorphic conditions associated with the formation of the talc deposits.” (Id.)
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Her report cited approximately eighty sources of scientific authority, among other
materials, such as the reports of Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and Longo. (Id. at 25–39.)
Ultimately, relying on her “knowledge of petrologic systems, extensive
searching and evaluation of the published scientific literature, and examination of
limited industry reports,” which she used to obtain background information, Dr.
Webb opined that the talc sources used by Defendants “were limited to mines that
were free of asbestiform minerals.” (Id. at 24.) She reasoned that the data she
evaluated “weighs in favor of the conclusion that there is no scientific merit to any
claims of asbestos in the cosmetic talc ores utilized.” (Id.)
Dr. Webb testified that the methodology she applied in forming her opinions
is “the same approach” she would apply to any aspect of her science, “whether it’s
writing a paper or a peer review.” (ECF No. 32996-10 (“Webb Dep.”) at 125:1–7.)
She conducted “an extensive search of the peer-reviewed literature” and other
scientific resources, including U.S.G.S. reports. (Id. at 125:7–126:20.) She also
“tried to really dig into the primary citations” and review “anything written about
the talc bodies” and “surrounding rocks” “to understand the petrology of those
systems.” (Id.) Dr. Webb’s testimony regarding her methodology is consistent with
both the form and substance of her report, and, tellingly, Plaintiffs do not dispute her
ability to perform research-based assignments.
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Plaintiffs instead argue that, because she describes herself as a field-based
geologist, Dr. Webb was required to conduct fieldwork before rendering her
opinions, including, for example, driving “from where she works in Burlington,
Vermont” to “the Hamm, Hammondsville and Argonaut mines” in southern
Vermont to collect samples. (Pls.’ Geology Br. at 33–36.) Plaintiffs’ argument is
based on a factually unfounded and an unsupported assumption that Dr. Webb can
only offer a scientific opinion if she personally collected and tested field samples.
First, Dr. Webb’s work is not limited to field-based geology, and she neither
testified that fieldwork is a prerequisite to forming opinions about mineral deposit
formation, nor have Plaintiffs suggested that there is such a requirement in the
scientific community. When asked, “What is a field-based geologist?” Dr. Webb
testified that “in many cases [she is] actually out in the field making structural
measurements” and “collecting oriented samples.” (Webb Dep. at 109:10–24.)
Whether she conducts fieldwork “depends on the nature of—of the question that [she
is] trying to address.” (Id.) She further stated that being a field-based geologist means
she possesses “the ability to recognize different rock types in the field, the ability to
recognize and document structures, [and] to make the appropriate measurements.”
(Id.) Thus, Dr. Webb was describing one component of her professional expertise,
not expressing a preference for or against any particular methodology. More
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importantly, she did not represent that she cannot form expert opinions without field
studies.
In addition, Dr. Webb testified that whether she goes out into the field to
collect samples “depends on what’s known and documented for the region” and
whether she needs to “build off the existing knowledge base.” (Id. at 118:12–24.)
She concluded that it was not necessary for her to “go out into the field” in this case
because, at least with respect to the Vermont mines, she relied on “the decades of
work of geologists and petrologists” who came before her. (Id. at 127:14–128:6.)
According to Dr. Webb, “if I feel like there is a big gap in that information, that
would drive that need to go out into the field to collect samples, and I just didn’t
arrive at that position in this case.” (Id.) Notably, Drs. Cook and Krekeler also did
not visit any of the mines at issue in this litigation, nor did they conduct any testing.
Second, Plaintiffs cite no legal authority directly supporting their assertion
that Dr. Webb was required to apply a field-based methodology. (See Pls.’ Geology
Br. at 32 n.173.) Defendants correctly note that the cases cited by Plaintiffs are
distinguishable. (Defs.’ Geology Opp. Br. at 36–37.) For example, Plaintiffs rely on
two cases in which the expert acknowledged that a Bradford Hill analysis is the
accepted methodology for establishing a causal link but nevertheless applied a
different and unreliable method. McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation
Grp., Inc., 2013 WL 3487560, at *22 (W.D. Pa. July 12, 2013); Rimbert v. Eli Lilly
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& Co., 2009 WL 2208570, at *14 (D.N.M. July 21, 2009). Plaintiffs also cite several
cases in which the expert purported to apply a particular methodology but, in
practice, failed to do so. Brown v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 765 F.3d 765,
776 (7th Cir. 2014); Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 268–
69 (2d Cir. 2002); Truck Ins. Exch. v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1213 (10th
Cir. 2004). Neither scenario is applicable here.
Critically, Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that field-based
geology is the generally accepted methodology for determining the histories of rocks
and regions. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that Dr. Webb represented
she applied a field-based approach in forming her opinions. Her assignment was to
review the scientific literature and determine the characteristics of the talc deposits
at issue in this litigation, which is precisely what she dId. Thus, the cases cited by
Plaintiffs are neither applicable nor persuasive.
In conclusion, I find that Dr. Webb’s opinions are grounded in a sufficiently
reliable factual foundation, and Defendants have established that she applied the
same level of intellectual rigor in this case that she employs in her professional work
outside the courtroom. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152 (the objective of
Daubert’s gatekeeping requirement “is to make certain that an expert . . . employs
in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of
an expert in the relevant field”). Consequently, Plaintiffs’ criticisms of Dr. Webb—
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including her alleged lack of experience working with talc and asbestos and her
failure to perform any fieldwork—go to the weight, not the admissibility, of her
testimony. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ motion to
exclude Dr. Webb’s testimony and opinions.
B. 	Tissue Sample Motions
As previewed above, the parties have moved to exclude expert opinions and
anticipated testimony concerning the detection, origination, and evaluation of talc
and asbestos-type particles, fragments, and/or fiber in certain bellwether Plaintiffs’
gynecologic and pelvic tissue samples.
Over the course of this litigation, preserved tissue from five bellwether
Plaintiffs—Anna Gallardo, Hilary Converse, Pasqualina Rausa, Carter Judkins, and
Tamara 	Newsome, 	respectively—was 	submitted 	to 	Dr. 	John 	J. 	Godleski, 	a
pulmonary pathologist and analytical microscopist affiliated with Harvard Medical
School, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, and Mass General Brigham
f/k/a Brigham and Women’s Hospital. (See ECF Nos. 33117-7 (“Godleski Gallardo
Rep.”), 33117-8 (“Godleski Converse Rep.”), 33117-9 (“Godleski Rausa Rep.”),
33117-10 (“Godleski Judkins Rep.”), 33117-11 (“Godleski Newsome Rep.”).)
In a methodology described in greater detail below, Dr. Godleski reported the
presence of talc within the sampled tissue of all five of the individual Plaintiffs and,
in 	two 	Plaintiffs, 	tremolite 	asbestos 	particles, 	fragments, 	and/or 	fibers. 	(See
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generally id.) In all of his expert reports, Dr. Godleski concluded that the talc and,
where present, tremolite asbestos “found in the tissues of th[ese] case[s] are
contributory evidence for a causal link between the presence of these materials and
the development of th[ese] patient[s’] ovarian cancer[s].” (See Godleski Newsome
Rep. at 7 (emphasis added); see also Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 8 (talc and tremolite
particles/fibers); Godleski Converse Rep. at 6 (talc); Godleski Rausa Rep. at 5–6
(talc); Godleski Rausa Rep. at 5 (talc).)
Defendants move to exclude Dr. Godleski’s expert opinions, (see ECF No.
33004-2 (“Defs.’ Godleski Br.”)), and further rebut Dr. Godleski’s findings through
Defendants’ own experts—Dr. Juan Felix and Dr. Teri Longacre, (see, e.g., ECF
Nos. 33108-2 (“Felix Converse Rep.”), 33108-3 (“Longacre Newsome Rep.”),
33108-8 (“Felix Judkins Rep.”), 33108-9 (“Felix Gallardo Rep.”)).157 In turn,
Plaintiffs move to exclude portions of Drs. Felix’s and Longacre’s opinions, which
opine, in relevant part,158 that any talc- and asbestos-like particles identified by Dr.
Godleski are more likely a product of post-excision laboratory contaminants rather
than in vivo findings. 	(See generally ECF No. 33002-1 (“Pls.’ Felix & Longacre
Br.”).)
157 	To clarify, Defendants submit Dr. Longacre’s expert report with respect to Plaintiff
Newsome, and the expert reports of Dr. Felix pertaining to Plaintiffs Converse, Judkins, and
Gallardo.
158 	Plaintiffs appear to only contest the admissibility of Drs. Felix’s and Longacre’s opinions
as they relate to the likelihood of particulate contamination in Dr. Godleski’s tissue sample testing.
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My prior Opinion did not address these experts or their respective opinions
and proffered testimony. Therefore, I will evaluate the admissibility of their expert
opinions and testimony under Rule 702, in the first instance, rather than by
limitations set forth by the Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order.
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Godleski
Defendants move to exclude the opinions of Dr. Godleski on the basis that
they are unreliable and do not fit this case.159 Defendants primarily argue that Dr.
Godleski’s core premise—that detecting any amount of talc particulates in sample
tissue evidences a causal link to ovarian cancer—is neither supported by the
scientific studies relied upon by Dr. Godleski, nor by the scientific community at
large. (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 9–12.) Assuming arguendo that a causal link can
be drawn by sufficient scientific support, Defendants further argue that alleged
inadequacies in Dr. Godleski’s methodology and conclusions warrant exclusion of
his opinions related to the presence of talc or tremolite asbestos in the tissue sample
of the individual Plaintiffs. (Id. at 12–18.) Alternatively, Defendants assert that Dr.
Godleski fails to establish that the presence of talc particulates in each of the five
159 	Defendants do not challenge Dr. Godleski’s qualifications as a proffered expert of
pulmonary pathology and analytical microscopy. (See generally Defs.’ Godleski Br.) Yet
Defendants appear to take issue with Dr. Godleski’s prior admission that he is not a gynecologic
pathologist or a gynecologic oncologist. (See id. at 2–3.) For the sake of completeness, I will
assess, infra, the qualifications of Dr. Godleski. See, e.g., Cohen, 125 F.4th at 462.
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bellwether Plaintiffs’ tissue can be traced to their perineal use of Defendants’
products. (Id. at 18–20.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants misconstrue Dr. Godleski’s
methodology, which they assert is reliable. (See, e.g., ECF No. 33117 (“Pls.’
Godleski Opp. Br.”) at 13–15.) Plaintiffs further oppose Defendants’ challenge to
Dr. Godleski because it is based on an improperly heightened Rule 702 requirement,
insofar as it relates to Dr. Godleski’s causal conclusion. (See id. at 15–19.)
i. 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Godleski as an expert in pathology and analytical
microscopy. (See Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 1.) Dr. Godleski holds a B.S. in Biology
from King’s College and an M.D. from the University of Pittsburgh, completed
pathology training at Massachusetts General Hospital, and has been certified in
anatomic pathology since 1975. (Id.) Dr. Godleski has more than five decades of
academic and clinical experience at Harvard Medical School, the Harvard T.H. Chan
School of Public Health, and Mass General Brigham f/k/a Brigham and Women’s
Hospital, among other academic and medical institutions. (See generally id.) He
directed Harvard School of Public Health’s Electronic Microscopy Laboratories
from 1988 to 2017 and led the Pulmonary Pathology Division at Brigham and
Women’s Hospital from 1978 to 2015. (Id.) In his capacity as Director of Harvard
School of Public Health’s Electron Microscopy Laboratories, Dr. Godleski used and
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oversaw use of light microscopy, scanning electron microscopy, and energy
dispersive x-ray spectroscopy. (Id.) Dr. Godleski has authored hundreds of peer-
reviewed scientific publications, including several relevant to talc in the female
genital tract and ovarian cancer.160 (Id.) He currently holds emeritus status as a
Professor of Pathology at Harvard Medical School. (See id.)
On this record, I find that Dr. Godleski possesses specialized expertise in
pathology and microanalytical methods relevant to the detection, localization, and
characterization of talc in gynecologic and pelvic tissue. Although Defendants
imply—without substantive analysis—that Dr. Godleski lacks qualifications in
gynecologic pathology, (see Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 2–3), I recommend that the Court
determine 	he 	is 	qualified 	to 	opine 	regarding 	his 	pathology 	and 	microscopy
methodologies and the conclusions drawn therefrom as to the presence of talc.
Defendants have articulated no reason, let alone a persuasive reason, why Dr.
Godleski’s expertise in pathology and microscopy could not be applied to the
detection of talc or other foreign particulates within gynecologic specimens.
Moreover, the qualification standard under Daubert must be construed liberally, and
160 	(See Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 1–2 (“I have recently published six papers regarding talc
and tissue pathology (references 1–6). The first paper used tissue digestive procedures and
SEM/EDXS to quantify talc in lymph nodes in comparison to the use of in situ SEM/EDXS; the
second described the migration and detection of talc in pelvic tissues from the perineum in a series
of exposed patients who also had ovarian malignancy. The third concerned the use of spectroscopic
magnesium and silicon weight % ratio standards to diagnose talc in human tissues, and the
expected mathematical distribution for such measurements. Three other publications also pertain
to talc identification in tissue and resultant pathology (references 4–6).”)
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the Third Circuit has made clear that an expert should not be excluded “merely
because the court feels that the expert is not the best qualified or that the expert does
not possess the most appropriate specialization.” In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d
at 655. Having reviewed Dr. Godleski’s curriculum vitae and extensive background,
to the extent Defendants seek to exclude Dr. Godleski based on a lack of
qualifications, I reject that argument and recommend that the Court find Dr.
Godleski qualified to provide his expert opinions in this case.
ii. 	Methodology and Opinions
To determine the admissibility of Dr. Godleski’s expert opinions, I find it
necessary to first review the methodologies underlying them. For each of the five
bellwether 	Plaintiffs 	with 	tissue 	samples, 	Dr. 	Godleski 	employed 	the 	same
methodology. Each Plaintiff had undergone a surgical procedure, from which
various tissue samples were removed and preserved.161 (See, e.g., Godleski Gallardo
161 	More specifically, Plaintiff Gallardo underwent a “hysterectomy, bilateral salpingo-
oophorectomy, omentectomy, multiple soft tissue biopsies of the anterior and posterior cul-de-sac,
right and left gutter, right and left pelvic side wall, and diaphragm, and multiple lymph node
excisions including right and left external iliac, right and left obturator, and right and left peri-
aortic nodes.” (Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 2.) Plaintiff Converse underwent a “hysterectomy,
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy, excision of bilateral pelvic and para-aortic lymph nodes, and
peritoneal and diaphragm biopsies.” (Godleski Converse Rep. at 2.) Plaintiff Rausa underwent a
“hysterectomy, bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy, left and right external iliac lymph node excision,
right and left common iliac lymph node excision, right and left para-aortic lymph nodes excision,
right and left pelvic sigmoid peritoneum biopsies, bladder peritoneum biopsy, omen tum biopsy,
right and left diaphragm peritoneum biopsies, small bowel mesentary and serosa nodules biopsies,
right and left paracolic gutter peritoneum biopsies, and right peritoneum paericolic plaque
excision.” (Godleski Rausa Rep. at 2.) Plaintiff Judkins underwent a “hysterectomy, bilateral
salpingo-oophorectomy, left and right pelvic lymph nodes excision, right para-aortic lymph nodes
excision, pelvic sigmoid adhesion biopsy, and infracolic omentum biopsy.” (Godleski Judkins Rep.
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Rep. at 2.) The various surgical medical hospitals or institutions where the surgeries
were performed prepared and stored surgical slides containing the sampled tissue,162
which were stained with hematoxylin and eosin. (See, e.g., id.) The histological
slides were then provided to Dr. Godleski.
Dr. Godleski first studied the histological slides using light microscopy and
confirmed each of the sampled Plaintiffs’ diagnoses by comparing the observed
morphology to the diagnosis in the original hospital surgical pathology report.163
(See, e.g., id.) Dr. Godleski also described the representative microscopic features
consistent with the reported tumor type. (See, e.g., id.) Dr. Godleski next reviewed
at 	2.) 	Plaintiff 	Newsome 	underwent 	a 	“hysterectomy, 	bilateral 	salpingo-oophorectomy,
omentectomy, and right pelvic lymph node excision.” (Godleski Newsome Rep. at 2.)
162 	Plaintiff Gallardo’s histological slides were prepared by the Department of Pathology at
Barnes-Jewish Hospital at Washington University Medical Center in St. Louis, Missouri. (See
Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 2.) Plaintiff Converse’s histological slides were prepared by the
Department of Pathology at Yale Medical Center in New Haven, Connecticut. (See Godleski
Converse Rep. at 2.) Plaintiff Newsome’s histological slides were prepared by the Department of
Pathology at Holy Cross Health in Silver Spring, Maryland. (See Godleski Newsome Rep. at 2.)
Plaintiff Rausa’s histological slides were prepared by the Department of Pathology at Ascension
St. Vincent’s Southside Hospital in Jacksonville, Florida. (See Godleski Rausa Rep. at 2.) Finally,
Plaintiff Judkins’ histological slides were prepared by the Department of Pathology and Laboratory
Medicine at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center in Lebanon, New Hampshire. (See Godleski
Judkins Rep. at 2.)
163 	For Plaintiff Gallardo, Dr. Godleski confirmed the diagnosis of “poorly differentiated
endometrioid adenocarcinoma of the ovary.” (Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 2.) For Plaintiff Converse,
Dr. Godleski confirmed the diagnosis of “clear cell carcinoma of the ovary.” (Godleski Converse
Rep. at 2.) For Plaintiff Judkins, Dr. Godleski confirmed the diagnosis of “poorly differentiated
serous carcinoma of the ovary.” (Godleski Judkins Rep. at 2.) For Plaintiff Rausa, Dr. Godleski
confirmed the diagnosis of “high grade serous carcinoma of the left and right ovaries.” (Godleski
Rausa Rep. at 2.) For Plaintiff Newsome, Dr. Godleski confirmed the diagnosis of “endometrioid
carcinoma of the ovary.” (Godleski Newsome Rep. at 2.)
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the histological slides using polarized light microscopy,164 which allowed him to
“highlight and detect birefringent165 foreign material in the same plane of focus with
the tissues.” (See, e.g., id. at 3.) Varying amounts of birefringent material were
discovered in Plaintiffs’ respective tissue samples. (See id. 	at 2–3; Godleski
Converse Rep. at 2–3; Godleski Newsome Rep. at 2; Godleski Rausa Rep. at 2–3;
Godleski Judkins Rep. at 2.)
According to Dr. Godleski, the discovery of birefringent material in tissue is
“robustly correlated” with the likely discovery of talc particulate in examined areas,
since “talc is a strongly birefringent material.” (See, e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at
4.) Therefore, to detect and identify talc, Dr. Godleski requested paraffin tissue
blocks 	that 	corresponded 	with 	areas 	showing 	the 	greatest 	concentration 	of
birefringent particles and anatomic locations consistent with expected particle
migration pathways—such as ovary, fallopian tube, service, regional lymph nodes,
and omentum. He obtained the corresponding paraffin tissue blocks from the
surgical medical institutions for each sampled Plaintiff for further analysis using
SEM and EDXS.
164 	As discussed above, polarized light microscopy is a form of optical microscopy that uses
polarized light and dispersion to identify minerals by their optical properties, including, inter alia,
indices of refraction, birefringence, sign of elongation, and size. (See ECF No. 33132-7 (“Wylie
Rep.”) at 4.)
165 	According to Plaintiffs, birefringence, in the context of this case, “is an optical property of
talc and other magnesium silicates that causes them to stand out from the carbonaceous tissue
background.” (Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 6.) Defendants do not offer a competing definition.
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In order to avoid introducing contamination from handling the paraffin blocks,
Dr. 	Godleski 	used 	powder-free 	gloves 	on 	pre-cleaned 	services, 	trimmed 	off
approximately 50 micrometers from the block face with a fresh microtome blade to
remove any potential surface contamination from previous handling and/or storage,
rinsed the trimmed surfaces in distilled deionized water to remove soluble residues
from tissue processing, and stored the paraffin tissue blocks, when not in use, in
closed plastic container boxes. (See, e.g., id. at 4.)
For testing of the paraffin tissue blocks, Dr. Godleski examined the face of
the blocks directly (“in situ”) using variable-pressure SEM, which allows the
viewing microscopist to view magnified particles and fibers contained within the
block. (See, e.g., id. at 4.) Once detected, Dr. Godleski used EDXS to measure the
particular particles’ and fibers’ elemental makeup. (See, e.g., id.) Dr. Godleski
confirmed the detection of talc particles by observing their characteristic elemental
signature, e.g., magnesium, silicon, and oxygen in a well-established proportion.
(See, e.g., id.) Talc fibers were detected using this method to confirm their elemental
signature, in addition to a specific shape criterion, i.e., length-to-width ratio greater
than about 3:1 with roughly parallel sides. (See, e.g., id.) Using SEM/EDXS, Dr.
Godleski identified other foreign particles and distinguished non‑talc magnesium
silicates 	and other exogenous 	materials from endogenous elements—such 	as
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calcium, sodium, phosphorus, and iron—that commonly appear in human tissue,
especially in cancer. (See, e.g., id. at 4–6.)
For Plaintiff Gallardo, Dr. Godleski detected birefringent particles in 25 of the
65 histological slides. (See id. at 3–5.) He selected five paraffin tissue blocks
corresponding to those histological slides, from which there was SEM/EDXS
analysis of 795 particles. (Id. at 4–5.) From that number, a total of 208 talc particles
and fibers were detected. (Id.) Additionally, Dr. Godleski identified 30 tremolite
asbestos fiber/fragments as being within the acceptable range of magnesium and
silicon atomic weight percentage ratio. (Id. at 5–6.)
For Plaintiff Converse, Dr. Godleski detected birefringent particles in 25 of
the 45 histological slides. (See Godleski Converse Rep. at 2–4.) He selected seven
paraffin 	tissue 	blocks 	corresponding 	to 	those 	slides, 	from 	which 	there 	was
SEM/EDXS analysis of 255 particles. (Id. at 3–4.) Of the 255, a total of four talc
particles were detected. (Id.)
For Plaintiff Newsome, Dr. Godleski detected birefringent particles in eight
of the 31 histological slides. (See Godleski Newsome Rep. at 2–4.) He selected five
paraffin 	tissue 	blocks 	corresponding 	to 	those 	slides, 	from 	which 	there 	was
SEM/EDXS analysis of 821 particles. (Id.) Thirty-one talc particles were detected
among the 821 particles. (Id.) Additionally, Dr. Godleski identified one tremolite
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asbestos fiber fragment, the detection of which was grounded in its composition of
an acceptable range of magnesium and silicon atomic weight percentage ratio. (Id.)
For Plaintiff Rausa, Dr. Godleski detected birefringent particles in 25 of the
46 histological slides. (See Godleski Rausa Rep. at 2–4.) He examined eight
corresponding paraffin tissue blocks, from which he conducted SEM/EDXS analysis
of 515 particles. (Id. at 3–4.) From this, a total of two talc particles were detected.
(Id.)
For Plaintiff Judkins, Dr. Godleski detected birefringent particles in 21 of the
31 histological slides. (See Godleski Judkins Rep. at 2–4.) He selected eight paraffin
tissue blocks corresponding to those slides, from which he conducted SEM/EDXS
analysis of 932 particles. (Id. at 3–4.) A total of 17 talc particles were detected. (Id.)
Dr. Godleski offered several interpretations of these results. First, he opined
that the microscopy record demonstrates the presence of talc within pelvic tissues,
and in some cases tremolite asbestos, as well. (See Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 4–7;
Godleski Converse Rep. at 4–5; Godleski Newsome Rep. at 3–5; Godleski Rausa
Rep. at 4–5; Godleski Judkins Rep. at 4.)
Second, while Dr. Godleski explained that his techniques only study “an
extremely small volume of tissue,” based on established comparisons from tissue
analyses focused on the detection of asbestos fibers, he nevertheless opined to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the talc particles and fibers detected
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within the very small SEM/EDXS sampling plane suggest a substantially larger
presence within the whole tissue. (See Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6; Godleski
Converse Rep. at 4–5; Godleski Newsome Rep. at 4; Godleski Rausa Rep. at 4;
Godleski Judkins Rep. at 4; see also ECF No. 33004-4 (“Godleski Dep.”) at 111:5–
14 (confirming that Dr. Godleski did not “attempt to count all the particles in the
tissue,” but instead “extrapolate[d]” a tissue burden from the number of particles
actually observed based on a study’s methodology); ECF No. 33004-13 (“Godleski
Dep. II”) at 83:20–84:7 (explaining that Dr. Godleski did not “try to identify every
particle in” tissue, but instead “extrapolate[d] that to what [he] anticipate[d] would
be the total particles per gram of tissue based on” a study’s methodology).)
Finally, Dr. Godleski concluded in a final paragraph of all reports of the five
sampled bellwether Plaintiffs, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” that the
confirmed presence of talc—and where present, tremolite asbestos—is “contributory
evidence for a causal link between the presence of these materials and the
development of th[ese] patient[s’] ovarian cancer[s].” (See Godleski Newsome Rep.
at 7; see also Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 8 (talc and tremolite particles/fibers);
Godleski Converse Rep. at 6 (talc); Godleski Rausa Rep. at 5–6 (talc); Godleski
Rausa Rep. at 5 (talc).)
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iii. 	Reliability
Defendants primarily argue that Dr. Godleski’s opinion regarding the causal
link between talc usage and the development of ovarian cancer must be excluded
because it is (1) unsupported by the scientific and medical literature that Dr.
Godleski relies upon, and (2) supported by an unreliable methodology. As to Dr.
Godleski’s 	methodology, 	Defendants 	specifically 	criticize 	Dr. 	Godleski’s
identification of talc particulates and his extrapolation of a substantial exposure of
talc and asbestos based on the detection rate measured within an “extremely small
volume of tissue.”
For the reasons that follow, I find that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Godleski’s opinions linking the presence of
talc or tremolite asbestos as a contributory cause of ovarian cancer survive Rule 702
scrutiny and, thus, are not admissible. I also find that Plaintiffs have not satisfied by
a preponderance of the evidence the admissibility of Dr. Godlkeski’s opinions that
the quantity of talc present suggests a broader level of exposure, consistent with
methods commonly used in asbestos-related pathology. However, based upon the
scientifically acceptable testing methods used, Dr. Godleski should be permitted to
opine on the identification of talc and/or tremolite asbestos in the tissue samples
from each Plaintiff.
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Plaintiffs first contend that Defendants misconstrue—and thus overstate—the
scope of Dr. Godleski’s opinion regarding the causal relationship between talc and
ovarian cancer. They assert that his conclusion is narrowly framed and does not
purport to establish general causation. According to Plaintiffs, “Dr. Godleski’s
findings are just one piece of the causation puzzle” and do not amount to a
determination of “complete causation.” (Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 17.) They
maintain that rather, “Dr. Godleski’s opinion is merely that the presence of talc and
asbestos in the tissue offers ‘contributory evidence’—that is, one piece of evidence
contributing to the overall causation analysis.” (Id. at 16.) However, the flaw in
Plaintiffs’ position is that Dr. Godleski does not rely on scientific studies sufficient
to support even this more limited, contributory opinion on causation.
Indeed, along with his detection of talc particulates (and where present,
tremolite asbestos), Dr. Godleski appeared to rely on only a limited number of
published studies to support a “contributory” connection between the sampled
bellwether Plaintiffs’ ovarian cancer diagnosis and his findings concerning that
Plaintiff’s talc (or asbestos) exposure. (See, e.g., Godleski Judkins Rep. at 4 (“In
published studies (references 1, 2, 5, 9),166 significant numbers of talc particles were
166 	See McDonald II 2019 at 13–27; McDonald I 2019 at 590–607; Erika Sato et al., Analysis
of Particles from Hamster Lungs Following Pulmonary Talc Exposures: Implications for
Pathogenicity, 17 Particle and Fibre Toxicol. (20), 1–16 (2020) (“Sato 2020”); Cramer 2007 at
498–501.
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detected in pelvic tissues in women with ovarian cancer and a history of perineal talc
use.”); see also, e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6 (“The finding of one fiber with the
magnesium/silicon atomic weight percent ratio of a tremolite asbestos fiber, a known
and widely accepted carcinogen and a known component of cosmetic talc found in
the pelvic tissues (References 11–13)167 is similarly of great importance in linking
Ms. Gallardo’s ovarian cancer to cosmetic talc exposure.”); Godleski Newsome Rep.
at 5 (“The finding of this [t]remolite fiber fragment by the method used here is highly
significant since this form of asbestos is a known contaminant of cosmetic talc and
has been shown in recent tissue digestion studies of pelvic tissue to be found in
women using talc for personal hygiene.” (citing Steffen 2020).)
As to Dr. Godleski’s talc-related causal conclusion, Dr. Godleski referenced
Cramer 2007, a case report of a stage III serous ovarian cancer patient with decades
of perineal talc use. (See, e.g., Godleski Judkins Rep. at 4.) In that study, the patient’s
pelvic lymph nodes were examined by polarized light microscopy and confirmed by
SEM/EDXS. (See Cramer 2007 at 498–99.) Plate-like birefringent particles with a
167 	See Joan E. Steffen et al., Serous Ovarian Cancer Caused by Exposure to Asbestos and
Fibrous Talc in Cosmetic Talc Powders–A Case Series, 62 J. Occupational & Env’t Med. (2), e65–
e77 (2020) (“Steffen 2020”); Ronald E. Gordon et al., Asbestos in Commercial Cosmetic Talcum
Powder as a Cause of Mesothelioma in Women, 20 Int’l J. Occup. & Env’t Health (4), 318–332
(2014) (“Gordon 2014”); Hans Weill et al., Medical Section of the American Lung Association:
Health Effects of Tremolite, 142 Am. Rev. Respiratory Disease (6), 1453–1458 (1990) (“ATS
1990”).
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magnesium 	and 	silicate 	signature 	were 	detected, 	which 	the 	authors 	found
“compatible with talc.” (Id. at 499.)
Defendants criticize that Cramer 2007 is a single, anecdotal, non-causal case
report wherein the authors themselves disclaim any causal relationship between
ovarian cancer and talc usage. (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 11–12 & n.43.) Moreover,
Defendants point out that Dr. Godleski makes no statements or suggestions
regarding talc’s tendency to cause inflammation. Plaintiffs did not substantively
respond to Defendants’ criticism of Dr. Godleski’s reliance on Cramer 2007.168
I agree with Defendants’ position. Cramer 2007 is a single case report
describing the presence of talc particles in the pelvic lymph nodes of a woman with
long-term genital talc use and ovarian cancer. As the authors explain, the purpose of
their report was merely to “infuse a fresh perspective on the talc and ovarian cancer
association.” (Cramer 2007 	at 500.) The authors 	explicitly acknowledge the
limitations 	of 	their 	observations, 	noting 	that 	“case 	reports 	cannot 	establish
causality,” and expressly disclaim “that a causal relationship between ovarian cancer
and talc use is proven for this case or in general.” (Id.) Rather than supporting even
a contributory causal inference, the article concludes that “this description of talc in
168 	I evaluated the applicability of Cramer 2007 in my prior Opinion to a conclusion made by
one of Plaintiffs’ general causation experts, Dr. Anne McTiernan, which is that “talcum powder
products can be absorbed and transported via the lymphatic system or blood stream. Therefore,
inhalation of talcum powder products could result in similar ovarian exposure.” See In re Johnson
& Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 176 & n.41. I found that Cramer 2007 did not support the biological
plausibility of an inhalation theory. See id. at 176–77.
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pelvic lymph nodes of a long-term talc user with ovarian cancer may begin to
reshape understanding about the relationship between talc and ovarian cancer and
shed new light on whether talc used externally in the genital area is capable of
migrating into the pelvis.” (Id. at 501 (emphasis added).) While the report “may
prompt new studies and offer new insights” into the debated association, it neither
confirms nor supports the association. (Id. at 498.)
Moreover, the study’s scope and methodology underscore its exploratory
nature. It is based on a single patient and lacks any control group, quantitative
analysis, or epidemiological framework to test causation. As courts have noted,
“case reports are merely accounts of medical events. They reflect only reported data,
not scientific methodology.” Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1199
(11th Cir. 2002). “Both from a scientific perspective and for legal causation
purposes, the distinction between epidemiological evidence and anecdotal evidence
(i.e., case series and case reports) is substantial and consequential.” In re Abilify, 299
F. Supp. 3d at 1360.
Thus, courts consistently disfavor case reports and case studies as evidence of
causation because they lack controls and statistical context, do not isolate alternative
causes or explain a causal mechanism, and are susceptible to reporting biases—so
while they may sometimes be considered cautiously alongside other scientific
information, they cannot, standing alone, establish causation. See, e.g., In re Mirena
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IUD Prods. Liab. Litig. (“Mirena I”), 169 F. Supp. 3d 396, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(“Case reports are generally disfavored by courts as evidence of causation because
they merely describe ‘reported phenomena without comparison to the rate at which
the phenomena occur in the general population or in a defined control group; [they]
do not isolate and exclude potentially alternative causes; and [they] do not
investigate or explain the mechanism of causation.’”) (quoting Siharath, 131 F.
Supp. 2d at 1361 (alterations in original).169 Cramer 2007 is no exception to this
recognized principle, in that it does not and cannot distinguish between association
and causation.
The authors themselves state that a “more extensive study” is necessary to
determine whether talc is found in the lymph nodes of women who did or did not
use talc and whether such presence bears any relationship to ovarian cancer. (See
Cramer 2007 at 500.) Thus, far from offering causal or even contributory proof,
169 	See also In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 398, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“‘Case
reports lack controls and thus do not provide as much information as controlled epidemiological
studies do. However, case reports are often all that is available on a particular subject. . . . Causal
attribution based on case studies must be regarded with caution. However, such studies may be
carefully considered in light of other information available, including toxicological data.’ The
difficulty with case reports, in other words, is distinguishing between association and causation.
Simply because a patient exposed to a particular substance exhibited a set of symptoms does not
mean that it was the substance that caused the symptoms.” (quoting Mary Sue Henifin, Howard
M. Kipen & Susan R. Poulter, Reference Guide on Medical Testimony, in Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence 439, 475 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., 2d ed. 2000)); In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1309
(explaining that case studies “do not address prior medical history, use of other medications or
drugs, risk factors, or the myriad of other issues necessary to scientifically evaluate whether the
drug actually produced the observed adverse effect. . . .[,] have no controls, are susceptible to
inherent reporting biases, lack statistical context, and are not verifiable through meaningful peer
review,” and therefore “cannot, standing alone, prove causation.” (footnote omitted)).
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Cramer 2007 merely hypothesizes a possible line of inquiry. Glaringly, Dr. Godleski
drew from Cramer 2007 a conclusion that its authors themselves neither reached nor
suggested. Accordingly, this undermines the reliability of Dr. Godleski’s talc-related
contributory causal conclusion. See, e.g., Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 602 F.3d
820, 826 (7th Cir. 2010) (“To the extent that Dr. Hirsch does rely on medical
literature to support his theory, the articles to which he cites stop short of reaching
the same conclusion [he did]. . . . At best, Dr. Hirsch’s testimony would have
amounted to an ‘inspired hunch,’ and the district court certainly did not abuse its
discretion in excluding it.”); McClain, 401 F.3d at 1247, 1251–52 (affirming
exclusion of expert who, among other things, exhibited an “inclination to draw
overreaching 	conclusions 	from 	self-limiting 	medical 	articles, 	show[ing] 	the
speculative nature of his opinions”).170
Dr. Godleski also relied on a collection of case studies, McDonald I 2019,
which followed five patients with ovarian cancer and a history of perineal talc use
in whom talc particles were identified in pelvic tissues using polarized light
microscopy and SEM/EDXS. (See, e.g., Godleski Judkins Rep. at 4.) The authors
170 	See also, e.g., In re Onglyza, 93 F.4th at 346 (“So Dr. Goyal drew ‘unauthorized
conclusions from limited data—conclusions the authors of the study d[id] not make,’ betraying a
‘lack of scientific rigor.’” (alteration in original) (quoting McClain, 401 F.3d at 1248)); In re
Acetaminophen, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 353 (“Dr. Baccarelli is also willing to press conclusions that
study authors are not willing to make. This willingness creates an ‘analytical gap’ between the
conclusions reached by the authors and the conclusions he draws from their work.”); In re Abilify,
299 F. Supp. 3d at 1351 (“Dr. Glenmullen may not extrapolate from this information a finding,
conclusion, or implication about Abilify that the Moore Study authors themselves did not make.”).
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sought to document the presence and distribution of talc in pelvic tissue of talc-
exposed patients and explore a biological pathway—migration via lymphatics—for
talc to reach pelvic organs. (See generally McDonald I 2019.)
Defendants similarly challenge McDonald I 2019 as an unreliable case series
for purposes of demonstrating causation. (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 11–12 & n.43.)
Again, Plaintiffs do not substantively respond to Defendants’ specific attack of Dr.
Godleski’s reliance on McDonald I 2019. And I, again, must agree with Defendants’
position.
The patients described in McDonald I 2019 were evaluated across multiple
pelvic sites, i.e., ovary, fallopian tube, uterus/cervix, and pelvic lymph nodes, using
polarized light microscopy and in situ SEM/EDXS, and compared against six non-
exposed control patients with ovarian carcinoma. (See generally McDonald I 2019.)
Talc was confirmed in two to four distinct pelvic sites per exposed person, with
particles often eliciting inflammation. (See id. at 593.) Notably, the authors also
observed the rare presence of talc in some control patients with no reported talc use.
(See id. at 605.) Consistent with their morphological findings, the authors observed
multi-site evidence of migration and tissue deposition consistent with lymphatic
dissemination and inflammatory responses. (See, e.g., id. at 603.)
But the study does not purport to establish individual-level causation and does
not provide reliable support for that conclusion. It is a descriptive case series without
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a defined source population or outcome comparison group. It does not imply
temporality or dose-response, and does not control for confounding factors relevant
to ovarian carcinogenesis. The presence of talc in tissues—particularly where the
“non-exposed” also had ovarian cancer and talc was observed—supports only
biological plausibility and exposure documentation. And although the authors
themselves 	reference 	epidemiological 	literature 	and 	regulatory 	assessments
classifying perineal talc as “possibly carcinogenic,” the authors’ conclusion is not
causally related. (See id. at 590, 606 (concluding that this study “offer[s] new insight
into the biologic potential of talc, its inflammatory potential, and its migration via
pelvic lymphatics from the perineum”).) As with Cramer 2007, a case series such as
McDonald I 2019 primarily generates a hypothesis.
Although some courts have deemed case reports reliable for purposes of
causal opinions when they exist in large quantities, see, e.g., Bee v. Novartis Pharms.
Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 268, 304–05 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), neither Cramer 2007 nor
McDonald I 2019 provide such support. See also In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d at
184–85 (noting that “hundreds of published case reports,” among other things, “adds
to the reliability of [expert] opinions”).
While Cramer 2007 and McDonald I 2019 do not undermine Dr. Godleski’s
assertion that “published studies” have shown that “significant numbers of talc
particles were detected in pelvic tissues in women with ovarian cancer and a history
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of perennial talc use,” (see, e.g., Godleski Converse Rep. at 5),171 they do not provide
reliable contributory evidence to conclude, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, that talc caused or contributed to the development of ovarian cancer.
Dr. Godleski relied on at least two other published studies in support of his
conclusion that talc presence in human tissue is “contributory evidence for a causal
link between” such presence and the development of ovarian cancer. (See Godleski
Judkins Rep. at 4 (citing McDonald II 2019 & Sato 2020).)
Like the other studies, neither of these two studies bridges the “analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered.” See In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d
at 656. McDonald II 2019 is a method-focused study assessing talc in pelvic lymph
nodes from patients with ovarian tumors that aimed to distinguish true tissue
deposition from laboratory surface contamination. (See generally McDonald II
2019.) The study strengthens the evidence that talc can migrate to pelvic lymph
nodes and that careful methodology is required to avoid overcalling contamination
as in-tissue deposition, but it does not evaluate disease risk or causation or provide
171 	To be precise, McDonald I 2019 reported that “[a]ll patients had significant numbers of
birefringent particles” in two or more pelvic sites. (McDonald I 2019 at 593.) Subsequent
SEM/EDXS confirmed “substantial talc particle counts in the same tissue blocks corresponding to
where birefringent particles were identified by light microscopy.” (See id. at 594.) And although
Cramer 2007 is not a quantitative series, the authors observed talc in three of four examined pelvic
lymph nodes and documented plate-like talc particulates with corresponding elemental signatures
compatible with talc. (See Cramer 2007 at 499.) Therefore, Cramer 2007 corroborates the
observation in principle by documenting talc in pelvic lymph nodes in a long‑term perineal talc
user with ovarian cancer, though it is a single case without broader quantification. (See generally
Cramer 2007.)
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a basis for Dr. Godleski’s own opinion that talc is a contributory cause to ovarian
cancer. (See id.)
Sato 2020 re-analyzed archived materials from a 1987 hamster intratracheal
instillation experiment to characterize the talc exposure and cellular responses using
modern microscopy and spectroscopy. (See generally Sato 2020.) After confirming
the talc powder contained no detectable asbestos, the authors observed talc induced
acute and persistent inflammatory changes when compared with controls. (See id. at
11–14.) The authors interpreted these results as evidence that talc can cause
inflammation 	and 	functional 	immune 	alterations 	independent 	of 	asbestos
contamination, thereby strengthening biological plausibility for inflammation-based
mechanisms. (See id.)
But the study is distinguishable from Dr. Godleski’s opinion, in that it was a
pulmonary, short-duration, high-dose instillation model in hamsters, not pelvic
exposure to humans. (See generally Sato 2020.) See also Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall
Lab’ys, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1480 (D.V.I. 1994), aff’d, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir.
1994) (“The notion that one can accurately extrapolate from animal data to humans
to prove causation without supportive positive epidemiologic studies is scientifically
invalid because it is inconsistent with several universally accepted and tested
scientific principles.”). Additionally, Sato 2020 is being used by Dr. Godleski to
support the proposition that “published studies” have shown “significant numbers of
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talc particles were detected in pelvic tissues in women with ovarian cancer and a
history of perineal talc use.” (See, e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6.) But Sato 2020
involves neither women nor a history of perineal use of talc in hamsters. (Compare,
e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6, with Sato 2020 at 1.) It is therefore wholly
unsupportive of the proposition for which it is cited.
Furthermore, courts are “reluctant to allow expert testimony based upon
animal studies to prove causation in humans unless there are good grounds to
extrapolate data and results from animals to humans.” In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F.
Supp. 2d at 670 (citing In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742–43). Here, Dr. Godleski did not
attempt to explain the import of Sato 2020 on his methodology. Dr. Godleski neither
discussed “differences in absorption, metabolism, and other factors [that] may result
in interspecie[s] variation in responses,” nor consideration of the dose-response
relationship. Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (quoting Fed. Jud. Ctr., Reference Manual
on Scientific Evidence at 130 (1994)); see also In re Valsartan, 2025 WL 314002,
at *24–28 (criticizing expert’s failure to “reliably extrapolate any of the data or
results in the animal studies to humans” and excluding expert’s opinions as, inter
alia, unreliable).
In sum, Plaintiffs have not established the reliability of Dr. Godleski’s causal
opinions by a preponderance of the evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. The
scientific and medical sources relied on by Dr. Godleski do not support his drawn
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link between the presence of talc and its possible contribution to the development of
ovarian 	cancer, thereby 	violating 	Daubert’s 	requirement 	that 	his 	opinion 	be
supported by “good grounds.” 	See id. 	at 590 (“Proposed testimony must be
supported 	by 	appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good 	grounds,’ based 	on 	what is
known.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 702(b) (requiring testimony that is “based on
sufficient facts or data”). Indeed, “when an expert relies on the studies of others, he
must not exceed the limitations the authors themselves place on the study.” In re
Accutane Prods. Liab., No. 04-md-2523, 2009 WL 2496444, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
11, 2009), aff’d, 378 F. App’x 929 (11th Cir. 2010); Mirena I, 169 F. Supp. 3d at
431, 452 (same). And unlike Plaintiffs’ other experts discussed in this Report and
Recommendation, Dr. Godleski neither engaged with the relevant epidemiological
literature nor conducted a Bradford Hill analysis to substantiate his causation
opinion, further undermining the reliability of his methodology.
In short, Dr. Godleski’s “[r]eliance upon medical literature for conclusions
not drawn therein is not an accepted scientific methodology.” Rutigliano v. Valley
Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 785 (D.N.J. 1996). Therefore, I recommend that the
Court preclude Dr. Godleski’s causal opinions regarding talc usage and ovarian
cancer because they are not based on a reliable scientific methodology.
Next, in this particular motion, Defendants do not directly contest Dr.
Godleski’s opinion as it relates to the causal connections drawn from the presence
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of tremolite asbestos found in Plaintiffs Gallardo’s and Newsome’s tissue samples.
(See generally Defs.’ Godleski Br.) In their Asbestos-Related Motion, however,
Defendants make such a challenge.172 (See Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83–84 & n.212.) I
recommend that the Court preclude Dr. Godleski from opining that “tremolite
asbestos found in the tissues of [Plaintiff Gallardo and Plaintiff Newsome is]
contributory evidence for a causal link between the presence of [this] material[] and
the development of [these patients’] ovarian cancer[s].”173 (See Godleski Newsome
Rep. at 7; see also Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 8.)
Dr. Godleski explained that tremolite asbestos fiber is a “known and widely
accepted carcinogen and a known component of cosmetic talc.” (See Godleski
Gallardo Rep. at 6.) Therefore, according to Dr. Godleski, the detection of even a
single tremolite asbestos fiber within Plaintiff Gallardo’s pelvic tissue is “of great
importance in linking Plaintiff Gallardo’s ovarian cancer to cosmetic talc exposure.”
172 	In relevant part, Defendants highlight that Dr. Godleski’s identification of a particle of
tremolite asbestos would likely not be recognized as such by Dr. Longo. (See Defs.’ Asbestos-
Related Br. at 83–84 n.212.) Defendants also argue that “[e]ven if these findings represented
asbestos, [Dr. Godleski’s] case-specific causation opinions regarding asbestos should be excluded
for the same reasons discussed below: Dr. Godleski makes no attempt to compare these results to
the epidemiology literature high occupational levels of exposure to a far more potent type of
asbestos.” (See id.) This notwithstanding, Defendants do appear to question through this motion
Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation of the presence of a larger amount of tremolite asbestos because of its
detection within a small tissue sample. (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 7 n.34.) I address this argument
below with my discussion regarding the admissibility of Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation-related
opinions generally.
173 	As discussed below, I recommend, however, that the Court permit Dr. Godleski to opine
on his identification of tremolite asbestos particles, fragments, and/or fiber detected within Plaintiff
Gallardo’s and Plaintiff Newsome’s respective tissue samples.
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(Id.; see also Godleski Newsome Rep. at 4–5; Godleski Dep. at 103:21–22 (“A. It’s
known that asbestos is a cause of ovarian cancer.”).)
But sources relied on by Dr. Godleski do not provide a scientifically reliable
basis for him to conclude that the presence of tremolite asbestos in gynecologic or
pelvic tissue is contributory evidence of a causal link to ovarian cancer.174 (See
Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6 (citing supra note 167); Godleski Newsome Rep. at 6
(citing Steffen 2020).) Moreover, Dr. Godleski has previously testified that he
cannot cite to “any study that has tried to correlate ovarian cancer risk with the
amount of tremolite found in reproductive tract tissue.” (03/28/24 Godleski Dep. at
103:24–104:3; see also id. at 116:12–16 (“Q. . . . [T]here are no studies that have
attempted to correlate the finding of talc or tremolite in tissue to a risk of developing
endometrioid carcinoma, right? A. That’s correct.”).)
First, 	Dr. 	Godleski’s 	reliance on 	Gordon 	2014 	for this 	proposition 	is
misplaced. Gordon 2014 sought to investigate a “historic” cosmetic talc brand175
linked to mesothelioma in women by determining whether it contained asbestos,
whether normal use generated inhalable fibers, and whether those same fiber types
were present in user tissue. (See generally Gordon 2014.) To do this, the authors
174 	I note that my finding in this section is limited to Dr. Godleski, who cannot opine on the
causal connection between asbestos and ovarian cancer. Other experts who Plaintiffs proffer for
such a connection are separately addressed in this Report and Recommendation. (See supra Part
V.B.6.)
175 	Gordon 2014 does not identify the brand(s) by name.
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tested more than 50 product containers of this specific brand of cosmetic talcum
powder, conducted releasability experiments simulating normal use in a glovebox
and in a bathroom-sized chamber, and performed analyses of lung and lymph node
tissues from a woman who used the product and died of mesothelioma. (See, e.g.,
id. at 319–320, 323.)
The study concluded that the cosmetic talc product contained asbestos,
including tremolite, that typical application can aerosolize measurable asbestos
concentrations, 	and 	that 	inhalation 	of 	those 	fibers 	likely 	contributed 	to 	the
development of mesothelioma in the reported decedent. (See id. at 318–19, 325, 331;
see also id. at 330 (“Our findings indicate that historic talcum powder exposure is a
causative factor in the development of mesotheliomas and possibly lung cancers in
women.”).)
But these methods and conclusions pertain to product contamination, airborne
exposure during use, and deposition in respiratory and lymphatic tissues with a
mesothelioma outcome. (See id.) The study provides no epidemiologic analysis
linking tremolite burdens in gynecologic or pelvic tissue to ovarian cancer incidence.
(See generally id.) It also does not involve the perineal application of asbestos-
containing cosmetic talcum powder, and it does not test ovarian tissue. (See id.) Even
within its mesothelioma analysis, the study detects both anthophyllite and tremolite
and does not isolate tremolite’s effect from other amphiboles or talc particles. (See,
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e.g., id. at 322.) It, therefore, does not support the claim that the mere presence of
tremolite asbestos is contributory evidence of a causal link to ovarian cancer.176
Second, Dr. Godleski’s reliance on an Official Statement of the American
Thoracic Society, adopted in June 1990, is similarly unsupportive of his broader
conclusion that the presence of tremolite asbestos in gynecologic or pelvic tissue is
contributory evidence of a causal link to ovarian cancer. The American Thoracic
Society’s statement reviews scientific and regulatory questions surrounding the
health risks of tremolite. (See generally ATS 2019.) It confirms that tremolite
asbestos may cause the same diseases associated with other amphiboles, with
particular emphasis on mesothelioma and lung cancer. (See, e.g., id. at 15.) But it
does not offer ovarian cancer-specific causal data for tremolite. It also limits its
observations to occupational and airborne exposures in humans, and intrapleural
instillation in animals. (See, e.g., id. at 3–12.) While the statement may bolster Dr.
Godleski’s assertion that tremolite asbestos is “a known and widely accepted
carcinogen,” (see, e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6), it does not purport to draw a
causal link between the presence of tremolite asbestos within gynecologic tissue and
the development of ovarian cancer.
176 	Moreover, Gordon 2014 acknowledges the existence of “a few studies that have examined
talcum powder and its potential to cause ovarian tumors.” (Gordin 2014 at 330). However, the
authors concede that these “studies were inconclusive, but suggested that talc, asbestos, or both
may cause these cancers through vaginal exposure.” (Id.) Importantly, Dr. Godleski neither
addresses this disclaimer in the study nor other studies that have focused on ovarian cancer.
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Lastly, Dr. Godleski’s reliance on Steffen 2020 likewise fails to bridge the
analytical gap. In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 656. The Steffen 2020 case
series describes ten women with serous ovarian cancer who reported long-term
cosmetic talc use. (See generally Steffen 2020.) Talc was detected in all ten women,
and asbestos (e.g., tremolite and anthophyllite) was detected in eight of the ten
women, using transmission electron microscopy. (Steffen 2020 at e65–e66, e73.)
The authors sought to recreate perineal talc application in a controlled room and
measured inhalation exposure of asbestos-containing cosmetic talc.177 (See, e.g., id.
at e66.) They then combined those measurements with each case’s reported talc-use
history to calculate a lifetime inhalation dose. (See id. at e67.) After analyzing each
case’s gynecologic and pelvic tissue (e.g., ovaries, fallopian tubes, pelvic lymph
nodes) using transmission electron microscopy to detect, in part, talc and tremolite
asbestos, they estimated ovarian cancer risk by adapting an EPA mesothelioma dose-
response model to ovarian cancer, and mapping each case’s asbestos-dose estimate
to that model.178 (See, e.g., id. at e65, e67.)
177 	The authors analyzed the talc containers for asbestos and talc. (See, e.g., Steffen 2020 at
e65, e69.) “The asbestos fibers found in the ‘cosmetic’ talc containers matched those found in
tissues.” (See id. at e65.)
178 	In this context, the EPA mesothelioma dose-response model refers to the EPA’s 1986
Airborne Asbestos Health Assessment Update table that gives predicted lifetime mesothelioma
risk from continuous, environmental asbestos exposure, which is assumed to be 24 hours/day, 365
days/year. See Steffen 2020 at e67 n.92 (citing U.S. Env’t Protection Agency, Airborne Asbestos
Health Assessment Update (1986)).
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The authors ultimately concluded that, among other things, these “cases
provide more evidence of the causal link between asbestos, talc, and ovarian cancer
and indicate that asbestos is present in consumer talc products at a level sufficient to
cause disease.” (Id. at e73.) But Dr. Godleski’s reliance on Steffen 2020 for a
contributory causal link between tremolite asbestos and the development of ovarian
cancer suffers from several flaws that undermine the reliability of his methodology.
First, Steffen 2020 is a litigation-derived case series. The paper itself has a
disclaimer that the work “was not experimental and was originally conducted
pursuant to a lawsuit,” whereby plaintiffs’ counsel179 funded the tissue analyses and
patient 	examinations 	and 	interviews. 	(See 	Steffen 	2020 	at 	e65.) 	Indeed,
unsurprisingly, courts have found litigation-derived research to weigh against
reliability. See, e.g., Awad v. Merck & Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
aff’d sub nom., Washburn v. Merck & Co., 213 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A]
significant consideration is whether research was conducted independently or for the
sole purpose of litigation.”); see also Mirena I, 169 F. Supp. 3d at 456 (finding
litigation-derived opinion to be “another factor that demonstrates Dr. Wray’s
opinion is not sufficiently reliable under Daubert and would not stand up in a
scientific setting”).
179 	The funding and disclosure sections of Steffen 2020 do not identify the specific attorneys
or law firms by name beyond describing them collectively as “Plaintiffs’ attorneys in litigation
against Johnson & Johnson (Ingham et al. v. Johnson & Johnson et al.).” (See Steffen 2020 at e65.)
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Second, the study is a case series without controls that focuses on inhalation
exposure—as opposed to perineal exposure—of asbestos. As explained above, a
case report or case series standing alone cannot ordinarily establish causation. See,
e.g., id. at 451. But, Steffen 2020 purports to be more than a case series. The authors
employ a simulation separate from the study’s case series to demonstrate that the
application of talc can create an asbestos-containing dust cloud that users will then
inhale. Taken together, Steffen 2020 purports to establish that when using cosmetic
talc powders, asbestos can be inhaled and migrate to pelvic tissues, which could
cause ovarian cancer. However, because this is a small case series with no control
group—assembled 	in 	a 	litigation 	context—Steffen 	2020 	does 	not 	reliably
demonstrate that tremolite, when present in gynecologic or pelvic tissue, causes the
development of ovarian cancer. It may support the suggestion of a general causal
link when combined with other epidemiological literature, but Steffen 2020, alone,
cannot support a “link[] [between] Plaintiff Gallardo’s ovarian cancer [and] cosmetic
talc exposure.” (See Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6.)
I acknowledge that expert testimony should generally “not be excluded simply
because there is no literature on point,” so long as there are “other factors that
demonstrate the reliability of the expert’s methodology.” Schneider, 320 F.3d at 406;
see Heller, 167 F.3d at 155 (explaining a medical expert need not “always cite
published studies on general causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular
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object caused a particular illness”). Here, however, there is an absence of other
factors 	demonstrating 	the 	reliability 	of 	Dr. 	Godleski’s 	cursory 	methodology
supporting his causal conclusion—even if his opinion is focused on contributory
evidence and not general causation. For example, Dr. Godleski did not discuss any
temporal relationship between the sampled Plaintiffs’ perineal talc usage and their
development of ovarian cancer. Dr. Godleski did not differentiate between potential
degrees of exposure and does not offer alternative explanations for the alleged
association.
Further, Plaintiffs rely on Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc.,
639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011), for the proposition that Daubert does not require each
scientific study or line of proof to independently establish causation; instead, an
expert may reliably synthesize multiple non-dispositive sources of evidence to reach
a causation opinion. (See Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 16–17.) Plaintiffs’ reliance is
misplaced. Milward addresses the admissibility of a general causation opinion
grounded in a “weight of the evidence” methodology, which is not used by Dr.
Godleski. Milward, 639 F.3d at 17.
In reversing the district court’s exclusion of the plaintiffs’ general causation
expert, Dr. Martyn Smith, the First Circuit emphasized Dr. Smith’s use of integrated
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mechanistic and epidemiologic evidence,180 despite the absence of statistically
significant epidemiology. See id. at 19–26. Unlike Dr. Godleski’s methods, Milward
does not endorse using case-specific sampled tissue findings to suggest causation
absent other evidence such as scientific consensus, dose/threshold or reliable
attribution, or differential etiology.
As proponents of Dr. Godleski’s opinions, Plaintiffs bear the burden of
demonstrating admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See Fed. R.
Evid.702; see also Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note to 2023 amendment
(“[T]he rule has been amended to clarify and emphasize that expert testimony may
not be admitted unless the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely
than not that the proffered testimony meets the admissibility requirements set forth
in the rule.” (citing Fed. R. Evid.104(a)); Crowley, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (“The
proponent bears the burden of establishing admissibility by a preponderance of the
evidence.”). 	Because 	Plaintiffs’ 	arguments 	center 	on 	the 	narrowness 	of 	Dr.
Godleski’s causal-related opinion, Plaintiffs advocate that the opinion need not be
based on vast scientific support. I recognize the carefully crafted language used by
Dr. Godleski insofar as it does not expressly opine that a causal relationship exists
180 	Dr. Smith employed a “weight of the evidence” framework that included multiple sources
of evidence: scientific consensus that benzene causes acute myeloid leukemia generally, common
etiology across acute myeloid leukemia subtypes, mechanistic toxicology showing benzene
metabolites cause stem-cell chromosomal damage, epidemiological data suggestive (though not
statistically significant) of an association between benzene exposure and acute promyelocytic
leukemia, and other evidence. See id. at 19–20.
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between the presence of talc and/or asbestos in pelvic tissue and the development of
ovarian cancer. According to Dr. Godleski, such presence is merely “contributory
evidence for a causal link” between them. However, fine tuning language does not
save 	the 	unreliability 	of 	his 	opinion. 	Without 	the 	benefit 	of 	reliance 	on
epidemiological studies,181 sufficiently numbered and/or analogous case reports, or
other “good grounds,” Dr. Godleski lacks adequate support to opine even on the
contributory impact talc and/or tremolite asbestos may have on the causal link
between these materials and ovarian cancer.
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	I 	find 	that 	Plaintiffs 	have 	not 	shown, 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence, that Dr. Godleski’s opinion is reliable. In particular,
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated through Dr. Godleski that the presence of talc or
tremolite asbestos in gynecological or pelvic tissue reliably supports a contributory
cause to the development of ovarian cancer. Accordingly, I recommend that the
Court exclude Dr. Godleski’s opinion and testimony as to these causal conclusions.
See In re Pfizer Inc. Secs. Litig., 819 F.3d 642, 665 (2d Cir. 2016) (excluding
unreliable portions of an expert’s testimony “[w]hen faced with . . . testimony that
contains both reliable and unreliable opinions”).182
181 	After all, the “best evidence of general causation in a toxic tort case” is epidemiological,
and it cannot be ignored where available. See, e.g., In re Zoloft, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 492 (quoting
Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases)).
182 	Defendants also contend that Dr. Godleski fails to offer evidence that any of the sampled
Plaintiffs crossed a scientifically supported “threshold” connecting particle counts to ovarian
cancer risk, including for specific ovarian cancer subtypes, (id. at 12–14), and that Dr. Godleski’s
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Next, Defendants challenge Dr. Godleski’s identification of talc particulates.
(See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 16–17.)183 However, as Plaintiffs correctly point out,
Defendants appear to misconstrue Dr. Godleski’s methodology, (see Pls.’ Godleski
Opp. Br. at 13–14), which I find reliable for purposes of identifying the presence of
talc and/or asbestos.
Defendants argue that Dr. Godleski evaluated birefringent materials using a
“homespun criteria” in detecting that such material is talc. (Defs.’ Godleski Br. at
16–17.) In so arguing, Defendants do not specify what part of Dr. Godleski’s
methodology is “homespun,” or how his testing of talc and/or asbestos materials are
flawed. In fact, Defendants’ challenge of Dr. Godleski’s testing method is quite
cursory. Indeed, without any specificity, Defendants’ arguments essentially amount
to a criticism of Dr. Godleski’s conclusions, but not his methodology. Case law is
clear that the focus “is on the expert’s principles and methodology, not on his
conclusions.” Equinox Props., LLC v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 21-15929,
2023 WL 5447279, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2023) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595).
failure to identify every foreign particle observed within each tissue sample undermines his
causation conclusion, (id. at 17–18). But because these assertions go directly to Dr. Godleski’s
causal conclusion, which I recommend be excluded, I need not address them.
183 	Defendants do not appear to directly take issue with Dr. Godleski’s identification of
tremolite asbestos particles, fibers, and/or fragments. (See generally Defs.’ Godleski Br.) As
discussed above, supra Part VI.B.i, Defendants argue in their Asbestos-Related Motion that Dr.
Godleski’s identification of a single tremolite asbestos fragment in Plaintiff Newsome’s tissue
sample may not be recognized as such by Dr. Longo. (See Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83–84 n.212.)
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In any event, I find Dr. Godleski’s methodology for identifying the presence
of talc within human tissue reliable. The method by which he receives, prepares, and
studies the paraffin tissue blocks has been subject to peer review and is generally
accepted within the scientific community. (See, e.g., Godleski Judkins Rep. at 3
(citing 	Charu 	Thakral, 	Jerrold 	L. 	Abraham, 	Automated 	Scanning 	Electron
Microscopy and X-ray Microanalysis for in situ Quantification of Gadolinium
Deposits in Skin, J. Electron Microscopy (Tokyo), 56(5), 181–7 (2007)); see also
McDonald et al., Magnesium/Silicon Atomic Weight Percent Ratio Standards for the
Tissue 	Identification 	of 	Talc 	by 	Scanning 	Electron 	Microscopy 	and 	Energy
Dispersive 	X-ray 	Analysis, 	Ultrastructural 	Pathology, 	43:6, 	248–260 	(2019)
(defining an empirical, reliable magnesium-to-silicon atomic weight percent ratio
for identifying talc in human tissues using SEM/EDXS).)
In accordance with cited medical and scientific literature, Dr. Godleski uses
SEM/EDXS, 	observes 	morphological 	characteristics, 	and 	conducts 	a 	spectral
analysis. (See generally e.g., Godleski Judkins Rep.) From there, Dr. Godleski
classified a particle as talc only if its magnesium‑to‑silicon atomic weight ratio
matches the established talc standard (around 0.649, within a tight acceptance
window, typically ±5%), with oxygen present, and with morphology consistent with
talc (platy particles and, when present, fibers showing a length‑to‑width ratio greater
than about 3:1 and roughly parallel sides). (Id.) While this data, along with particles’
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locations, is retained and available for confirmatory testing, Defendants’ rebuttal
experts have not independently verified Dr. Godleski’s findings by performing their
own tests. (See Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 7–8.) See also Cohen, 125 F.4th at 462
(noting that “whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis” is “good grounds”
to support the reliability of an expert’s testimony).
Moreover, Dr. Godleski’s qualifications as, among other things, an expert in
analytical microscopy lend sufficient credence to the reliability of his methods of
particle detection and identification. See In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8 (recognizing
that “the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the methodology”
support 	reliability). 	Plaintiffs 	have 	thus 	demonstrated 	the 	reliability 	of 	Dr.
Godleski’s opinions by a preponderance of the evidence as they relate to the
identification of talc and tremolite asbestos.
Finally, Defendants seek exclusion of Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation from a
small, in-situ SEM/EDXS sampling plane to a larger tissue burden. (See Defs.’
Godleski Br. at 14 (citing Godleski Rausa Rep. at 4; Godleski Newsome Rep. at 4).)
Plaintiffs do not meaningfully address this argument in their opposition brief. (See
generally Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br.) In subsequent supplemental briefing, Plaintiffs
argue that Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation opinions are mischaracterized by Defendants
and supported by relevant literature and Dr. Godleski’s education, training, and
professional experience. (See Pls.’ December 8, 2025, Ltr. at 4–6.)
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Defendants first highlight Dr. Godleski’s failure to rely on supportive medical
or scientific literature.184 (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 14 (citing Godleski Rausa Rep.
at 	4; 	Godleski 	Newsome 	Rep. 	at 	4).) 	Dr. 	Godleski 	asserted 	reliance 	on
“[c]omparable studies [that] have been done with asbestos fibers in tissue sections,”
and suggested that “the finding of one fiber in a tissue section comparable to the
amount of tissue studied here would indicate at least 100 fibers per gram of tissue
which is indicative of a substantial exposure.” (See, e.g., Godleski Rausa Rep. at 4
(citing Victor L. Roggli et al., Numbers of Asbestos Bodies on Iron-Stained Tissue
Sections in Relation to Asbestos Body Counts in Lung Tissue Digests, 14 Hum.
Pathology (4), 355–61 (1983) (“Roggli 1983”))185; see also Godleski Dep. at 223:8–
12 (confirming use of “Roggli paper to estimate what the total volume would be per
gram of tissue”).)
As an initial matter, and despite Plaintiffs’ supplemental arguments to the
contrary, 	(see 	Pls.’ 	December 	8, 	2025, 	Ltr. 	at 	4), 	Defendant 	do 	not
“mischaracterize[]” Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation opinions or the methodology
underlying said opinions. As outlined above, Dr. Godleski extrapolates a substantial
184 	Defendants also rely on Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., for the proposition
that such extrapolation cannot be based on speculation. (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 14 (citing Wade-
Greaux, 874 F. Supp. at 1485).) However, Wade-Greaux is distinguishable, because that case
involved an expert’s extrapolation of data from animal studies to human condition, which is not
comparable to the context here.
185 	Neither party attached Roggli 1983 to their briefs for and against the exclusion of Dr.
Godleski’s opinions and anticipated testimony. (See generally Defs.’ Godleski Br.; Pls.’ Godleski
Opp. Br.)
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exposure of talc and asbestos based on the detection rate measured within an
“extremely small volume of tissue.” (See, e.g., Godleski Rausa Rep. at 4.) Plaintiffs
assert that Dr. Godleski utilized a “formula-based extrapolation founded on actual
observation” that is actually “not an extrapolation,” but an “objective clinical
observation.” (See Pls.’ December 8, 2025, Ltr. at 5; see id. (arguing that Dr.
Godleski’s extrapolation opinions are “qualitative—not quantitative”).) But this is
inconsistent with Dr. Godleski’s own testimony, which described a quantitative
methodology based on Roggli 1983’s formulaic methodology. (See Godleski Dep.
at 228:1–9 (confirming that, based on Roggli 1983, “one particle or fiber can
represent hundreds in the tissue per gram, if we have more than one . . . you can do
the math to determine what the number might be expected to be”); see also id. at
223:8–12 (confirming use of “Roggli paper to estimate what the total volume would
be per gram of tissue”).) Therefore, I find that Defendants have not mischaracterized
Dr. Godleski’s methodology in this context.
Next, I find that Roggli 1983 does not support Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation of
a detection of a small amount of talc to a larger burden. Roggli 1983 examined how
asbestos body counts observed on iron-stained paraffin lung sections correlate with
counts obtained from wet-tissue digestions. (See generally Roggli 1983.) After using
correction factors, the authors propose that roughly 200 asbestos bodies per gram of
wet lung tissue corresponded to two asbestos bodies in a 2 × 2 cm tissue section.
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(See generally id.) The authors repeatedly cautioned that local variability and
sampling 	error—especially 	in 	small 	specimens—undermine 	the 	reliability 	of
extrapolating from a small sample to a whole-tissue burden. (See, e.g., id. at 359–
61.)
In addition, neither the authors of Roggli 1983 nor Dr. Godleski attempted to
reconcile Roggli 1983’s applicability of asbestos to the detection of talc in this case.
Additionally, neither the authors of Roggli 1983 nor Dr. Godleski attempted to
address whether the anticipated distribution of asbestos or talc would differ if the
examined tissue was sampled from gynecologic or pelvic tissue as opposed to lung
tissue. Dr. Godleski impermissibly extrapolated conclusions from Roggli 1983 that
“exceed the limitations the authors themselves place[d] on the[se] stud[ies].” Mirena
I, 169 F. Supp. 3d at 431 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
Lastly, the record does not sufficiently support Plaintiffs’ assertion that Dr.
Godleski’s education, training, and/or experience sufficiently support the reliability
of his methodology for his extrapolation opinions. (See, e.g., Nov. 25, 2025 Tr. at
203:12–17 (claiming Dr. Godleski’s “40 years of experience” support the reliability
of his extrapolation methodology).) None of Dr. Godleski’s expert reports indicate—
much less affirmatively state—that his background or professional experience
played any role in forming his extrapolation. (See generally Godleski Gallardo Rep.;
Godleski Converse Rep.; Godleski Newsome Rep.; Godleski Rausa Rep.; Godleski
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Judkins Rep.) Instead, all of his expert reports expressly anchor his extrapolation to
Roggli 1983. (See id.) With one very recent exception, most of Dr. Godleski’s
testimony so far in this case and others relies solely on Roggli studies for support of
his extrapolation methodology and opinions, with no mention of reliance on his
education, training, or experience. (See, e.g., 03/28/24 Godleski Dep. at 111:5–13;
115:2–10; 223:8–12; 228:5–9.)
Dr. 	Godleski 	only 	recently 	testified 	that, 	in 	many 	of 	his 	studies, 	his
“experience is that if we cut additional sections [of tissue] and look at both the block
as well as those additional sections, we’ll have essentially the same number of
particles in each section as we do in the . . . block. So the number of particles we
have, if we find three or four, means there’s three or four at every level all the way
through the block.” (See Pls.’ Dec. 8, 2025 Ltr., Ex. 9 (“Godleski Dep. III”) at
112:27–113:13 (emphasis added).) He further asserted that the literature and his own
experience “support[] making an extrapolation or an assumption” that one would
find comparable levels of talc and/or asbestos throughout a larger tissue sample
based on observations drawn from a smaller sample. (Id. at 145:3–12; see also id. at
145:13–18 (asserting that “this is not a vague extrapolation; this is experience”).)
I am not persuaded that this deposition testimony is sufficient. At the outset,
it appears to be the only evidence suggesting that Dr. Godleski relies on personal
experience as a basis for his extrapolation methodology. That testimony suffers from
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several defects. First, it was given in an action before the Superior Court of the State
of California, County of Los Angeles—not in this MDL. Second, it was elicited more
than four years after Dr. Godleski authored the expert reports at issue here. As a
result, I cannot discern when Dr. Godleski allegedly acquired the experience that
Plaintiffs 	now 	invoke 	to 	support 	a 	methodology 	introduced 	years 	earlier.
Importantly, Dr. Godleski provided no comparable testimony in any deposition taken
in this MDL, nor did he reference such experience in any of his expert reports
submitted in these proceedings. To the contrary, at other points in time, Dr. Godleski
testified that his extrapolation-related opinions were based on his reading of Roggli
1983, without reference to any independent expertise or experience supporting that
approach. (See, e.g., Godleski Dep. at 111:5–13, 115:2–10, 223:8–12, 228:5–9;
Godleski Dep. II at 84:1–7.) Under these circumstances, I do not find that the belated
deposition testimony submitted by Plaintiffs cures the fundamental deficiency I find
fatal to Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation opinion.
In sum, the record demonstrates that Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation is grounded
in unsupportive literature and not in any sufficiently articulated, independent
expertise he claims to possess. Accordingly, I conclude that Dr. Godleski lacks
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sufficiently “good grounds” for such an extrapolation and recommend that the Court
preclude his extrapolation-related opinions. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742.186
iv. 	Fit
Defendants argue that Dr. Godleski’s opinions are irrelevant to this case
because his opinion is silent on whether the five bellwether Plaintiffs actually used
Defendants’ products. (Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 18–20.) Dr. Godleski need not,
however, draw such a conclusion in his capacity as Plaintiffs’ expert on these testing
issues, and importantly, he need not have made that conclusion for purposes of
helping the trier of fact. See Fed. R. Evid.702(a).
In pertinent part, Dr. Godleski “offers the opinion to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that the particles that he identified [in each Plaintiff] are talc or
asbestos.” (Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 18.) Dr. Godleski did not opine on each
186 	Defendants also argue that the manner with which Dr. Godleski selects tissue samples to
examine showcases impermissible sampling bias and casts doubt on his conclusion that a greater
presence of talc—and, where present, tremolite asbestos—likely exists within the overall tissue.
(See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 14–15.) Since I recommend that the Court preclude Dr. Godleski from
opining on this inference, I need not fully address this argument.
For the avoidance of doubt, however, I note that this argument mischaracterizes both Dr.
Godleski’s assignment and his approach. Dr. Godleski did not purport to analyze every tissue
sample available to him, nor was he required to do so. His task was to examine Plaintiffs’ tissue
samples for the presence of foreign materials, including talc. In carrying out that assignment, Dr.
Godleski used his “past experience and the medical literature on the diagnosis of talc in tissues”
to select for additional evaluations those samples that were most likely to contain foreign
particulates, without knowing beforehand the elemental composition of those particulates. (See,
e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 4.) This selection process does not constitute selection bias. As the
record reflects, not every birefringent particle subjected to further testing was ultimately
determined to be talc, undermining Defendants’ premise that he targeted only samples he already
believed would confirm his hypothesis. His methodology thus reflects a reasoned, scientifically
grounded approach—not an outcome-driven effort to curate favorable samples.
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bellwether Plaintiffs’ perineal application of talc, or their respective uses of
Defendants’ products; instead, the affected Plaintiffs and their experts provide that
evidence.187 	(See 	generally 	e.g., 	Godleski 	Judkins 	Rep.) 	Even 	without 	such
conclusions, Dr. Godleski’s opinions would no doubt “help the trier of fact
understand the evidence,” “determine a fact in issue,” or provide “scientific
knowledge for purposes of the case.” In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741, 743–74 & n.12.
Indeed, the “standard for fitness is ‘not that high’ but it is ‘higher than bare
relevance.’” In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (quoting In re Paoli, 35 F.3d
at 745). Any issue Defendants have regarding whether these Plaintiffs applied their
talcum 	powder 	products 	to 	the 	perineum 	area 	should 	be 	probed 	on 	cross-
examination. Therefore, I find that Dr. Godleski’s opinions squarely fit the facts of
this case under Rule 702.
Given the foregoing, I find that Plaintiffs have proven by preponderance of
the evidence that Dr. Godleski is qualified to give his expert opinion on his
identification of talc and tremolite asbestos in the tissue samples from each examined
187 	To be clear, Dr. Godleski’s testimony on talc use is not at issue, given my recommended
ruling on causation. Plaintiffs offer evidence through other experts’ testimony and opinions that
Plaintiffs used Defendants’ cosmetic talcum powder. (See, e.g., Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br.
at 23–24 (“The bellwether plaintiffs daily applied Johnson’s Baby Powder and/or Shower to
Shower to their genital area for decades—the shortest period being 2 years, the longest being 55
years, and the average being just over 42 years. The number of lifetime applications range from
approximately 7,000 to 20,000. Over the course of three decades, bellwether Plaintiffs used
between 221 and 568 containers of Johnson’s Baby Powder and Shower to Shower.” (alteration in
original) (citing ECF No. 33130-37).)
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Plaintiff; however, I recommend that he cannot opine on whether the presence of
talc or tremolite asbestos within gynecologic or pelvic tissue may be a contributory
cause to the development of ovarian cancer. I further recommend that Dr. Godleski
cannot opine on whether the measured quantity of talc within tissue samples implies
a broader exposure level in a manner consistent with asbestos-related pathology
methods. Those portions of his opinions that I recommend are admissible, I find, are
reliable and “fit” the facts at issue in this case. Therefore, I recommend that the Court
grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr.
John J. Godleski.
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude The Opinions Of Dr. Juan Felix And
Dr. Teri Longacre
Plaintiffs move to exclude, under Rule 702, certain opinions and expected
testimony of Drs. Juan Felix and Teri Longacre because they are speculative,
methodologically unsupported, and outside their expertise in particle identification.
(See generally Pls.’ Felix & Longacre Br.) Plaintiffs seek to bar both doctors from
testifying that Dr. Godleski’s detection of talc and, where present, tremolite asbestos,
in five of bellwether Plaintiffs’ gynecologic and pelvic tissue samples is the result
of surgical or post-surgical contamination. (See generally id.) Defendants oppose,
arguing these are permissible, well-founded critiques of Dr. Godleski’s methods and
conclusions and are therefore admissible under Rule 702. (See generally ECF No.
33108 (“Defs.’ Felix & Longacre Opp. Br.”).)
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At the outset, I again address rebuttal experts and the standard by which they
are evaluated on a motion to exclude. Plaintiffs contend that their opinions regarding
contamination are inadmissible because, among other things, they are not supported
by proffered methodology, “evidence,” “a single study or journal article, or
“reference of any kind.” (Pls.’ Felix & Longacre Br. at 7.) Defendants cite several
cases outside of the Third Circuit to suggest that the role of a rebuttal expert is
different than that of an affirmative expert. (See Defs.’ Felix & Longacre Opp. Br.
at 8–11.)
As a general matter, a rebuttal expert need not conduct a parallel analysis
mirroring the methodology being critiqued. See, e.g., Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp.
3d at 140 (“At bottom, a rebuttal expert need not proffer a methodology or model,
but only critique the opposing expert’s.”); In re Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 285
(“[D]efendants’ experts have a less demanding task, since they have no burden to
produce models or methods of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiffs’
experts.”); see also Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (“A number of other
district courts have held that rebuttal expert witnesses may criticize other experts’
theories and calculations without offering alternatives.” (collecting cases)). No
authority within the Third Circuit suggests otherwise.
Nonetheless, because all expert testimony must satisfy Daubert, a rebuttal
expert 	who 	seeks 	to 	undermine 	another 	expert’s 	model 	through 	affirmative
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conclusions or findings must still articulate reliable bases for those views, grounded
in sound methods and principles of analytical evaluation sufficient to support their
opinions and to challenge the opposing opinion. See, e.g., In re Generic Pharms.
Pricing Antitrust Litig., No. 16-md-2724, 2024 WL 4980784, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
3, 2024).
With these considerations in mind, I will first turn to Plaintiffs’ qualification-
based arguments for exclusion, followed by Plaintiffs’ reliability arguments.
i. 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs appear to challenge the qualifications of both Dr. Felix and Dr.
Longacre to offer opinions regarding “particle identification” and the use of
“methodological 	tools 	(i.e., 	SEM)” 	employed 	in 	that 	process 	(“SEM/EDXS
Qualifications”). (Pls.’ Felix & Longacre Br. at 6.) As Defendants correctly note,
Plaintiffs’ challenge to these experts’ SEM/EDXS Qualifications is misplaced.
Plaintiffs seek exclusion only of opinions and testimony related to the alleged
contamination of certain Plaintiffs’ tissue samples during and after their respective
surgical procedures. Accordingly, the SEM/EDXS Qualifications do not pertain to
contamination-related 	issues. 	(See 	generally 	Pls.’ 	Felix 	& 	Longacre 	Br.)
Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, I will evaluate Dr. Felix’s and Dr.
Longacre’s qualifications within the limited scope of Plaintiffs’ narrow motion to
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exclude certain opinions and testimony. Ultimately, I find both Dr. Felix and Dr.
Longacre qualified to opine on the issue of tissue-sample contamination.
Dr. Felix is a board-certified anatomic pathologist and cytopathologist with
subspecialty expertise in gynecologic pathology. (See, e.g., Felix Judkins Rep. at 2.)
He earned his B.A. from Columbia College and M.D. from Cornell University
Medical College. (Id.) Subsequently, Dr. Felix completed residency in anatomic
pathology and a gynecologic pathology fellowship at the New York Hospital-
Cornell Medical Center, joining the faculty there. (Id.) He spent 25 years at the
University of Southern California, advancing to Full Professor, and currently serves
as Chief of Anatomic Pathology, Professor, and Vice Chair in the Department of
Pathology at the Medical College of Wisconsin. (Id.) Prior to his current position,
Dr. Felix acted as Chief of Cytopathology at the Los Angeles County, University of
Southern California Medical Center and Director of Gynecological Pathology at the
Keck Medical Center of the University of Southern California. (Id.)
Dr. Felix has founded two anatomic pathology laboratories and maintains an
active clinical practice, rendering daily diagnoses in gynecologic malignancies,
including ovarian, uterine, and cervical cancers. (Id.) His career reflects substantial
laboratory leadership, academic teaching, and collaborative research focused on
ovarian and uterine cancers. (Id.)
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Dr. Longacre is a board-certified diagnostic surgical pathologist and Professor
of Pathology at Stanford University School of Medicine, where she holds the
Emerita Richard L. Kempson Endowed Chair in Surgical Pathology. (See Longacre
Newsome Rep. at 2–3.) She received her M.D. from the University of New Mexico
School of Medicine in 1985, completed residency in anatomic and clinical pathology
there, and subsequently completed a fellowship in surgical pathology at Stanford.
(Id.) Dr. Longacre directs Gynecologic Pathology and Gastrointestinal Pathology at
Stanford, having founded Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education-
approved fellowships in both Gynecologic Pathology (2007) and Gastrointestinal
Pathology (2013). (Id.) Her leadership roles include prior service on key institutional
committees and presidency of the Association of Directors of Anatomic and Surgical
Pathology. (Id.)
Dr. Longacre has an extensive publication record and senior editorial roles,
including 	co-author 	and 	expert 	editor 	for 	World 	Health 	Organization 	tumor
classifications 	and 	editor of Sternberg’s Diagnostic Surgical 	Pathology. (Id.)
Clinically, she maintains a high-volume practice (approximately 5,000–7,500 cases
annually) 	that 	primarily 	involves 	examination 	of 	surgical 	gynecologic 	and
gastrointestinal specimens, participates regularly in multidisciplinary tumor boards,
provides regional to international consultations, and has served on the American
Board of Pathology Test Committee for gynecologic pathology. (Id.) In her capacity
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as 	a 	board-certified 	clinical 	pathologist, 	Dr. 	Longacre 	provides 	clinical 	and
pathologic consultations to physicians at Stanford, which includes, among other
things, “microscopic review of surgical pathology specimens.” (Id.)
Based on their academic and professional backgrounds, I find that Drs. Felix
and Longacre both possess the requisite qualifications to opine on the likelihood of
specimen 	contamination 	during 	or 	following 	surgical 	procedures. 	Both 	have
“practical experience as well as academic training and credentials” relevant to their
opinions regarding specimen contamination. Elcock, 233 F.3d at 741 (quoting
Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir. 1998)). Both highlight their ongoing
clinical practices, which involve microscopic specimen examination and diagnostic
pathology. Neither claim expertise in SEM/EDXS utilization, and as such, they have
not attempted to offer their opinions on that topic.
Therefore, I recommend 	that the Court 	find 	Drs. Felix 	and 	Longacre
respectively qualified to opine on the alleged potential contamination of certain
Plaintiffs’ tissue samples.
ii. 	Methodology and Opinions
Dr. Longacre opined, in relevant part, that birefringent particles reported in
Plaintiff Newsome’s gynecologic tissues—whether identified as talc or asbestos-
like—are, more likely than not, artifacts introduced during or after surgery and/or
during histologic processing rather than evidence of true in vivo exposure. (See
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Longacre Newsome Rep. at 14–17.) Dr. Longacre emphasized that talc “is known”
to elicit a characteristic foreign body reaction in living tissue. (Id. at 11.) Through
her review of relevant medical records and available histological slides from
Plaintiff Newsome’s surgical procedure, (see id. at 14), Dr. Longacre “found no
foreign body reactions supportive of talc exposure” and “no evidence of particulate
in macrophages,” (see id. at 16). Dr. Longacre therefore opined that the consistent
absence 	of 	such 	histologic 	responses—particularly 	acute 	inflammation, 	the
formation of foreign body giant cells, and particle-laden macrophages—undermines
any inference that the talc and, where applicable, asbestos-like particles reside in
tissue because of biological migration or exposure. (See generally id.)
Dr. Felix likewise concluded, in relevant part, that particles characterized as
talc or talc-like in gynecologic tissue samples, including those from Plaintiffs
Converse, Judkins 	and 	Gallardo, 	are 	more 	consistent 	with 	post-surgical 	and
processing contamination and not evidence of biological exposure. (See, e.g., Felix
Judkins Rep. at 5, 7–9.) Following his review of each respective Plaintiffs’
pathology report and histological slides, Dr. Felix concluded that there is no
evidence of exposure to foreign material, including talcum powder. (Id.) For support,
Dr. Felix pointed to the absence of a discernible foreign body reaction, which,
according to the doctor, is expected from the introduction of a foreign body, like
talc, to vital tissue. (Id.) Normally, according to Dr. Felix, such a reaction would be
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discernable by using routine light microscopy and polarized light microscopy,
though Dr. Felix’s analysis using such methods yielded no expected tissue reaction.
(Id.)
Methodologically, both Drs. Longacre and Felix applied standard surgical
pathology principles, reviewed relevant scientific and medical literature, and offer
pointed criticisms of Dr. Godleski. For example, Dr. Longacre pointed out that
despite attempts to prevent contamination of paraffin tissue samples, Dr. Godleski
“did not control for the tissue processing following surgery.” (See 	Longacre
Newsome Rep. at 15.) Dr. Longacre further criticized Dr. Godleski’s failure to
“recognize that laboratory processing of tissue specimens for histology can not only
introduce contaminants on the surface of the specimen, but also deep within tissue.”
(Id.)
Dr. Felix offered similar criticisms to Dr. Godleski’s opinions and methods,
such as Dr. Godleski’s “failure to address the absence of foreign body reactions in
[Plaintiff] Converse’s tissue” and failure to consider post-surgical contamination as
the source of detected particulate. (See, e.g., Felix Judkins Rep. at 8.) Dr. Felix also
faulted Dr. Godleski’s attempt to “remove” potential contaminants by “removing 50
microns of the [paraffin] block surface” because “tissue specimens . . . are exposed
sequentially to a number of organic compounds that permeate the tissue at the
cellular level.” (Id.)
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iii. 	Reliability
Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	both 	doctors’ 	opinions 	regarding 	alleged 	sample
contamination must be excluded because they are methodologically deficient and
lack scientific support. (See generally Pls.’ Felix & Longacre Br.) In opposition,
Defendants 	argue 	that 	their 	experts’ 	contamination-related 	criticisms 	of 	Dr.
Godleski’s opinions are supported by science and by their own experiences, both of
which suffice as foundation for admissible expert opinions. (See generally Defs.’
Felix & Longacre Opp. Br.) I agree with Defendants and recommend that the Court
deny Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr. Felix’s and Dr. Longacre’s contamination-
related opinions.
First, 	Defendants’ 	experts 	articulate 	a 	specific 	rationale 	for 	their
contamination theory: the absence of any foreign body reaction (e.g., giant cells or
macrophage ingestion) around the particles purportedly identified indicates the
material was more likely introduced post-surgery during processing, not present in
vivo. Plaintiffs, however, do not substantively respond to this foreign-body-reaction
premise. Instead, they characterize the contamination explanation as speculative and
methodologically unsupported.
Drs. 	Felix 	and 	Longacre 	did 	not 	purport 	to 	re-identify 	particles 	via
SEM/EDXS; 	instead, 	they 	used 	routine 	and 	polarized 	light 	microscopy 	on
histological slides to determine tissue exposure to foreign material, such as talc.
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Having found none, they criticized Dr. Godleski’s conclusion that identified talc and,
where applicable, asbestos particles, demonstrate in vivo presence and causation.
Under Rule 702, it is appropriate for defense experts to criticized another expert’s
methodology and conclusions. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 285. Both
defense experts’ opinions are based on reliable “methods and procedures of science,”
as opposed to “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Schneider, 320 F.3d at
404 (citation omitted).
Second, Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Felix’s and Dr. Longacre’s contamination-
related opinions lack scientific support by way of literature and by their own
methodology. (See Pls.’ Felix & Longacre Br. at 4–7.) But both experts relied on a
litany of published scientific studies that support their contamination theory, which
is premised on the absence of a foreign body reaction. (See, e.g., Longacre Newsome
Rep. at 11 (“Talc is known to elicit a foreign body reaction in human tissue.” (citing
sources)); id. at 13 (“[L]aboratory processing of tissue specimens for histology can
not only introduce contaminants on the surface of the specimen, but also deep within
tissue.” (citing sources)); see, e.g., Felix Converse Rep. at 9 (“It is well known that
talc, like virtually any foreign body, will cause a foreign body granulomatous
reaction when introduced into vital (living) tissue.” (citing sources)).) Nor do
Plaintiffs dispute the general proposition that the introduction of talc into living
tissue would cause a discernible foreign body reaction.
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Both experts also explained from their own experience that processing steps
and reagents can permit particulate penetration beyond the block surface. Experts
may base their opinions on their experiences within their respective fields of
expertise. See, e.g., Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152 (explaining that the purpose of Daubert
“is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field”);
Schneider, 320 F.3d at 399–400 (holding abuse of discretion excluding experts’
testimony regarding medical standard of care where testimony was based on
“considerable professional experience” and knowledge of the “standard of care in
the medical field”). As gynecological pathologists, Drs. Felix and Longacre have
decades 	of experience evaluating tissue responses to 	foreign 	material. Their
literature citations and clinical experience support their conclusions about expected
tissue reactions and contamination risk.
Therefore, I recommend that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the
Opinions of Dr. Felix and Dr. Longacre.
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VII. 	REGULATORY, MARKETING, AND CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE
OPINIONS
A. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. David Kessler,
Laura Plunkett, William Sage, and George Newman
Defendants move to exclude the opinion testimony of four expert witnesses
proffered by Plaintiffs on subjects ranging from regulatory and industry standards to
marketing to whether exposure to talc increases the risk of ovarian cancer: (i) David
Kessler, M.D., J.D.; (ii) Laura Plunkett, Ph.D., DABT; (iii) William Sage, M.D.,
J.D.; and (iv) George E. Newman, Ph.D. (See ECF No. 33000-2 (“Defs.’ Regulatory
P Br.”).) Plaintiffs oppose exclusion of these experts (See ECF No. 332998-1 (“Pls.’
Regulatory Opp. Br.”).)
Because I was not asked to analyze testimony from these experts when I
rendered my prior Opinion, Defendants filed “traditional Daubert motions” with
respect to these experts. (April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order at 6.) In analyzing the
admissibility 	of 	their 	testimony 	below, 	I 	address 	Defendants’ 	arguments 	in
connection with making independent findings on qualification, reliability, and fit.
See Cohen, 125 F.4th at 460 (explaining district courts have an “independent
obligation” to “take into account all of the Daubert factors” (citation modified)).
1. 	Dr. Kessler
i. 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Kessler as an expert on “the responsibilities of cosmetic
manufacturers, focusing on the regulatory interface between cosmetic manufacturers
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and the FDA, as well as industry standards.” (ECF No. 33000-6 (“Kessler Rep.”) ¶
22).
Dr. Kessler graduated from Harvard Medical School and the University of
Chicago Law School in the late 1970s. (Kessler Rep. ¶ 1). From 1990 to 1997, Dr.
Kessler served as Commissioner of the United States Food and Drug Administration.
(Id. ¶¶ 2–3). As FDA Commissioner, Dr. Kessler’s responsibilities included
overseeing the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, the Center for Devices and
Radiological Health, the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (which
regulates cosmetics), and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research. (Id. ¶
8). Serving in these roles required familiarity with the United States Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), FDA regulations, and related laws and regulations
pertaining to the marketing, sale, labeling, and safety of consumer products. (See id.)
Dr. Kessler does not recall being “substantially involved in talc cosmetic matters”
during his tenure as FDA Commissioner. (Id. ¶ 24.)
Dr. Kessler has published articles and testified before the United States
Congress on the regulation of food, drugs, and medical devices, as well as on
consumer protection issues. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9.) From January 2021 to January 2023, Dr.
Kessler served as Chief Science Officer of the United States COVID-19 Response
and co-led Operation Warp Speed. (Id. ¶ 5.) He previously taught food and drug law
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at Columbia University Law School and is currently a professor at the University of
California, San Francisco. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.)
Dr. Kessler also has served as: a senior advisor to a private equity firm that
owns 	pharmaceutical 	and 	biomedical 	companies; 	a 	board 	member 	of 	three
pharmaceutical companies; and a board member of a medical device and biologics
company. (Id. ¶ 10.) In those capacities, he has advised companies on the “standards
and duties of care within the pharmaceutical and medical device industry.” (Id.). Dr.
Kessler previously chaired the compliance committee of Aptalis Pharma and
currently chairs the quality committee at Immucor, Inc. (Id.). He attests that his role
as 	quality 	committee 	chair 	“involves 	ensuring 	compliance 	with 	the 	FDA’s
regulations and requirements.” (Id.).
Except as noted below, Defendants do not dispute that Dr. Kessler is qualified
to testify about the regulatory framework and industry standards for cosmetics.
Based on Dr. Kessler’s “broad range of knowledge, skills, and training” as FDA
Commissioner 	and 	continued 	interaction—as 	a 	C-Suite 	advisor, 	author, 	and
academic—with 	regulations 	and 	industry 	standards 	that 	inform 	cosmetic
manufacturers’ standard of care, I find that Dr. Kessler is qualified to testify about
those topics. Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404.
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ii. 	Summary of Dr. Kessler’s Opinions
Dr. Kessler was “asked to address the duties and conduct of defendant
cosmetic companies in the face of a potential health hazard.” (Kessler Rep. ¶ 1.) He
explained that to formulate his “regulatory and safety opinions,” he reviewed the
“epidemiology, 	laboratory 	testing 	methodology, 	chemical 	and 	geological
relationship between talc and asbestos, health consequences with asbestos and
elongated mineral particles, and product formulation and manufacturing.” (Id.) He
had access to documents exchanged in discovery, deposition and trial transcripts,
and publicly available information. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) This approach, Dr. Kessler
submitted, tracked the methods he used while at the FDA, in academia, and on
corporate boards. (Id. ¶ 15). Based on his review, Dr. Kessler reached the following
main conclusions:
• 	Cosmetic products are “among the least regulated” products that fall under
the FDA’s jurisdiction, with less federal regulation of cosmetics than
drugs, medical devises, or food additives. “This is reflected in the fact that
there is no premarket approval of cosmetic products.” (Id., Summary of
Opinions ¶¶ 1, 3.)
• 	Consistent 	with 	FDA 	regulations, 	statutes, 	and 	industry 	standards,
cosmetic manufacturers “have a responsibility to substantiate the safety of
their product,” including the safety of its ingredients, before marketing
them. Manufacturers must have “reasonable certainty in the judgment of
competent scientists” that the product is safe and that there is “no evidence
to suspect their cosmetic product may pose harm. (Id., Summary of
Opinions ¶¶ 3, 5–6.)
• 	“If there is evidence that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the
cosmetic product may pose harm for the proposed conditions of use, such
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product does not meet the industry standards for safety.” (Id., Summary of
Opinions ¶ 7.)
• 	If the safety of a product cannot be substantiated, the manufacturer must
“warn consumers that the safety of their product has not been determined
or not sell their product.” If a “health hazard may be associated with the
product, 	a 	cosmetic manufacturer 	must 	include 	a 	warning 	on 	their
product.” (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 3.)
• 	Beginning in the 1970s, Johnson & Johnson “had evidence of a) the
presence of asbestos because of its known carcinogenicity and absence of
a threshold dose; or b) the presence of non-asbestiform amphiboles or
fibrous 	talc.” 	This 	evidence 	prevented 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson 	from
substantiating the safety of the talc products, and created a “reasonable
basis to believe that such an association between the product and health
risks.” Johnson & Johnson continued to receive information that prevented
it from substantiating the safety of its products in the following decades,
including “a) the FDA’s 2014 petition response acknowledging that there
remains some evidence to suspect or question the safety of talcum powder
products, b) the totality of the medical literature since 2014 that continues
to raise safety questions;” and c) findings from IARC. (See id., Summary
of Opinions ¶¶ 8–15, 17).
• 	Once Johnson & Johnson could not substantiate the safety of the talc
products, Johnson & Johnson should have withdrawn them from the
market. (See id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 9).
• 	Because Johnson & Johnson was “[u]nable to substantiate the safety of
their talcum powder products,” Johnson & Johnson was required, under 21
CFR § 740.10, “to place the following conspicuous statement on the
principal display panel: ‘Warning-The safety of this product has not been
determined.” Johnson & Johnson’s failure to do so violated the FDA’s
labeling requirements. (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 14 (quoting 21 CFR
§740.10).)
• 	Johnson & Johnson’s findings and notice of fibrous or asbestiform material
in talc samples rendered the talc products “adulterated” under the FDCA,
thereby prohibiting their sale. (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 14 (quoting 21
U.S.C. §361).)
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• 	A “reasonable and prudent” company, confronted with evidence that
asbestos is a carcinogen with no safe threshold—evidence that Dr. Kessler
submits was in Johnson & Johnson’s possession—would have improved
testing sensitivity, reformulated the talc products with cornstarch in the
1970s, 	adopt 	the 	most 	conservative 	and 	protective 	procedures, 	or
discontinued sale. (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶¶ 14, 24, 28, 33.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “decided in the 1970’s to aggressively defend its
product. That strategy kept their product on the market for fifty years but
put the public’s health at risk. It need not have been that way if Johnson &
Johnson was willing to bear any additional cost and reformulate the
product.” Johnson & Johnson also initiated studies “only as required by
confrontation.” (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶¶ 18, 26, 30, 36-37, 40–42.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson knew that “false negative results would occur with its
testing methodology, in part because these tests were not sensitive
enough.” Yet 	Johnson 	& Johnson 	opposed 	“efforts 	to 	improve the
sensitivity of the testing methods” for asbestos in its talc products. (Id. ¶¶
201–223.)
• 	“For more than fifty years, J&J made representations that were misleading
and not transparent.” Johnson & Johnson’s deceptive conduct included: (i)
failing “to report to the FDA that laboratory tests found evidence of
naturally occurring mineral silicate fibers of the serpentine and amphibole
series”; (ii) “J&J’s representation to the FDA in their March 17, 2016,
letter that no asbestos-form structures have ever been found during any
testing”; (iii) creating the false impression, as an active participant in the
Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association (“CTFA”), that “changes
in testing resolved the asbestos controversy in talc by researchers and
health agencies”; and (iv) making false and misleading statements to the
public, “gynecologic oncologists 	and the medical 	community.” (Id.,
Summary of Opinions ¶¶ 27, 29, 39–40; id. ¶ 195).
iii. 	Specific Exclusion Arguments and Legal Standards
Defendants argue that Dr. Kessler (a) constructs a factual narrative that does
not constitute proper expert testimony, (b) draws impermissible legal conclusions,
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(c) speculates about Defendants’ state of mind and motivations, and (d) renders
subjective opinions about compliance with ethical standards. To varying degrees,
both parties assert that I should bar other expert testimony for these same reasons.
Thus, before making findings on the reliability, fit, and scope of Dr. Kessler’s
testimony, I will address these specific arguments and explain more generally the
law on expert witnesses constructing factual narratives, offering legal conclusions,
and testifying about a corporation’s state of mind, intent, or compliance with ethical
standards.
a. 	Factual Narrative Challenge
Defendants 	argue 	that 	Dr. 	Kessler 	simply 	rehashes 	internal 	corporate
documents and deposition testimony, without offering independent analysis. (See
Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 10 (arguing Dr. Kessler “summarizes internal documents
and testimony in Section II.C of his report,” like quoting “straightforward statements
from an internal J&J PowerPoint”); id. at 10–11 (characterizing Dr. Kessler’s
“discussion of the safety and geology of asbestos and purportedly positive findings
of asbestos”—and Section VI.A of his report—as “merely a narrative” of internal
documents produced by Defendants, which Dr. Kessler “quotes” “verbatim” without
analysis); id. at 11 (arguing “majority of Section IV of his report consists of Dr.
Kessler rehashing documents”).) Defendants posit that Dr. Kessler’s “narrative
account of events” is a “lay opinion,” which will not help the jury. (Id. at 13).
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In response, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Kessler must identify, and can
summarize, the facts and data underlying his report. (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at
15–16). Plaintiffs also argue that like other courts, I should reject Defendants’ factual
narrative argument because it is a trial objection, not a basis for barring Dr. Kessler’s
testimony altogether. (See id. 17–18 & n.51 (citing cases).)
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, experts may rely on “facts or data in the
case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.” “If the facts
are of the type ‘reasonably relied upon’ by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon a subject, the facts or data need not be independently
admissible in evidence.” Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 414
(3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Evid.703); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii)
(requiring expert witnesses to identify “the facts or data considered by the witness
in forming” opinions in expert report). “It is an abuse of discretion to admit expert
testimony which is based on assumptions lacking any factual foundation in the
record.” Stecyk, 295 F.3d at 414.
While expert testimony must have a sufficient factual foundation, an expert
witness “‘cannot be presented to the jury solely for the purpose of constructing a
factual narrative based on record evidence.’” Krys v. Aaron, 112 F. Supp. 3d 181,
206 (D.N.J. 2015) (quoting Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Schneider, 379 F. Supp.
2d 461, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)); see O’Bryant v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 20-cv-2361,
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2022 WL 7670296, at *13 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2022) (“An expert may testify to a review
of internal documents for the purpose of explaining the basis for his or her admissible
opinions” but “simply parroting [d]efendant’s corporate documents or offering a
narrative account of events from them will not be helpful to the jury.” (citation
omitted)). Instead, such “testimony is properly presented through fact witnesses and
documentary evidence.” O’Bryant, 2022 WL 7670296, at *13.
As noted below, Dr. Kessler may testify as to the FDA regulations and
industry standards that inform the standard of care for cosmetics manufacturers and
may 	offer 	his 	assessment 	of 	how 	Defendants’ 	actions 	comported 	with 	that
framework. In offering that testimony at trial, Dr. Kessler may not quote extensively
from corporate documents, testimony, or other evidence that “should be presented
to the jury directly.” In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 192. Instead, Dr. Kessler’s
“commentary on any documents and exhibits in evidence will be limited to
explaining the regulatory context in which they were created, defining any complex
or specialized terminology, or drawing inferences that would not be apparent without
the benefit of experience or specialized knowledge.” Id.
Because portions of Dr. Kessler’s report help contextualize the information
that he cites, I decline to parse the report “paragraph-by-paragraph to determine
where the report turns from expert analysis to factual narrative.” Liberty Media
Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., 874 F. Supp. 2d 169, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Instead,
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like many other courts that have considered the same challenges to Dr. Kessler’s
testimony, I find that Defendants can object if Dr. Kessler’s trial testimony turns into
a factual narrative. See McCoy v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 22-cv-2075, 2024
WL 1705952, at *20 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2024) (“Dr. Kessler may testify regarding
the facts he relied upon in forming his opinions if such facts are relevant, are not
cumulative, and do not constitute a mere rehashing of otherwise admissible
evidence” and “any specific objections to narrative testimony must wait for trial.”);
King v. DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., No. 23-cv-00196, 2023 WL 5624710, at *4 (D.
Ariz. Aug. 31, 2023) (same); Wells v. Allergan, Inc., No. 12-cv-973, 2013 WL
7208221, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 4, 2013) (same); In re C.R. Bard, Inc., 948 F. Supp.
2d 589, 646 (S.D.W. Va. 2013) (same); In re Yasmin & YAZ (Drospirenone) Mktg.,
Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-02100, 2011 WL 6302287, at *8 (S.D.
Ill. Dec. 16, 2011) (same); In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy, 2017 WL
1836443, at *15 (same); In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-cv-
00064, 2014 WL 120973, at *10 (W.D. La. Jan. 10, 2014) (same).
b. 	Legal Conclusions Challenge
Defendants argue that Dr. Kessler impermissibly testifies as to his own legal
conclusions. (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 13.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Dr.
Kessler improperly concludes that: (i) “the J&J defendants violated legal standards
by failing to ‘substantiate the safety of their talcum powder products,’” (id. at 15
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(citing Kessler Rep. §§ III–IV & ¶¶ 106, 154, 232)); (ii) “‘J&J was required to place
the following conspicuous statement on the principal display panel: Warning – The
safety of this product has not been determined. 21 C.F.R. § 740.10,’” (id. (citing
Kessler Rep. ¶¶ 68–69, 106)); and (iii) “J&J’s talcum powder products were
contaminated with asbestos and therefore ‘adulterated’ under 21 U.S.C. § 361.44,”
(id. 	(citing Kessler Rep. ¶ 139)). Defendants argue that these types of legal
conclusions usurp the jury’s role. (See id. at 14 (citing cases)).
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants miss a critical distinction in the caselaw.
(See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 21 & n.58 (citing cases).) That is, rather than
offering “ultimate legal conclusions,” Dr. Kessler’s opinions “address the relevant
regulatory standards Defendants were subject to, relevant industry standards, and the
appropriateness of Defendants’ actions given the information they possessed at the
time.” (Id. at 21.) In this regard, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Kessler does not overstep
the Court’s role instructing the jury on negligence and failure to warn or the jury’s
role in deciding liability. (See id. 21–22.) Rather, according to Plaintiffs, Dr.
Kessler’s opinions merely help the jury assess the reasonableness of Defendants’
actions by explaining industry standards and applicable regulatory schemes. (See id.)
In determining whether expert testimony will help the factfinder, courts must
“ensure that an expert does not testify as to the governing law of the case.” Berckeley
Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 217 (3d Cir. 2006). While “Federal Rule of
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Evidence 704 permits an expert witness to give expert testimony that ‘embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact,’ an expert witness is prohibited from
rendering a legal opinion.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid.704). That prohibition ensures
that experts do not “usurp the District Court’s pivotal role in explaining the law to
the jury.” Id.
The “line between admissible and inadmissible expert testimony as to the
customs and practices of a particular industry often becomes blurred when the
testimony concerns a party’s compliance with customs and practices that implicate
legal duties.” Id. at 218. In Berckeley, a company accused of violating the securities
laws proffered testimony from a former SEC lawyer with expertise in the relevant
securities transactions. Id. The court permitted her “background testimony” on the
“customs and business practices in the securities industry” because it would “aid the
jury in determining whether” the defendant “had the requisite scienter.” Id. By
contrast, the court prohibited testimony as to whether the company “complied with
legal duties that arose under the federal securities laws”—that is, “as to what was
required under the law, or whether the defendant complied” with the law. Id.
In Krys v. Aaron, the court “endeavor[ed] to better define the line between
permissible testimony on ultimate issues and an impermissible legal opinion.” 112
F. Supp. 3d 181, 192 (D.N.J. 2015). Judge Simandle’s guidance remains instructive:
Taken together, these authorities therefore instruct that
any qualified expert . . . may provide an opinion on
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whether a party’s conduct or actions meet the underlying
bases for an ultimate issue in a case (by, for example,
testifying concerning whether certain acts would in the
abstract be improper and/or inconsistent with a party’s
legal duties), but may not merely instruct the jury on the
result to reach based upon a party’s specific conduct or
actions (by, for example, stating that a party did indeed
violate 	an 	applicable 	duty 	through 	certain 	actions).
Id. at 193.
The Krys plaintiffs proffered testimony from a former CFTC director about
CFTC and CEA segregation requirements. See id. at 191. Applying the principles
noted above, the court excluded the expert’s testimony “to the extent he reaches the
specific conclusion that any Defendant acted in compliance with and/or in violation
of applicable legal duties or segregation requirements.” Id. at 193; see id. at 192
(barring testimony on whether defendants: “complied with their obligations under
federal 	securities 	law”; 	violated 	CFTC 	and 	CEA 	segregation 	and 	auditing
requirements; 	and 	“committed 	fraud, 	breaches 	of 	their 	fiduciary 	duties, 	and
conversion”). But the court permitted expert testimony as to “contextual information
on segregation issues and on common customs and practices in the securities
industry” because that “background information may prove infinitely helpful to the
jury in unpacking the intricacies of” the “complex litigation.” Id. at 193.
Here too, I find that Dr. Kessler offers both admissible testimony relevant to
the ultimate issues in this case and impermissible legal opinions that require
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exclusion. Dr. Kessler may provide background information regarding industry
standards and the FDA’s regulation of cosmetics manufacturers. (See, e.g., Kessler
Rep., Summary of Opinions ¶¶ 1, 4, 5.) This testimony will help the jury understand
“the complex regulatory framework that informs the standard of care” in the
cosmetics industry. In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 191; see United States ex rel.
Silver v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 11-cv-01326, 2023 WL 2808098, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar.
31, 2023) (“Qualified experts may provide background on a statutory or regulatory
scheme so long as their opinions do not state whether the statute or regulation was
violated.”).
Similarly, Dr. Kessler may make factual observations about Defendants’
conduct in reference to that standard of care. That includes opining—based on his
experience and understanding of industry standards—on the steps that reasonably
prudent manufacturers take to substantiate the safety of cosmetic products and
Defendants’ actions in comparison to those standards.188 See In re Fosamax, 645 F.
Supp. 2d at 191 (“A lay jury cannot be expected to understand the complex
regulatory framework that informs the standard of care in the pharmaceutical
industry. Dr. Parisian’s assessment of the reasonableness of Merck’s conduct in light
188 	As detailed below, however, Dr. Kessler cannot testify that Defendants in fact violated any
law, regulation, or legal duty, or that Defendants acted negligently.
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of her experience and her understanding of FDA regulations will be helpful to the
jury.”).
Rather than staying within those bounds, however, Dr. Kessler also drew
several inadmissible legal conclusions. For example, Dr. Kessler concluded that
Johnson & Johnson “was required,” under 21 C.F.R. § 740.10, “to place the
following conspicuous statement on the principal display panel: ‘Warning – The
safety of this product has not been determined.’” (Kessler Rep., Summary of
Opinions ¶ 14; Kessler Rep. ¶ 106.) And he testified that under 21 U.S.C. § 361,
Johnson & Johnson was “prohibited” from selling talcum powder products because
they 	“contained 	poisonous 	and 	deleterious 	substances” 	and 	“were 	therefore
adulterated.” (Kessler Rep. ¶ 139.)
These examples are not exclusive, but should serve as guideposts for the
ultimate admissibility decisions made at trial. In short, Dr. Kessler may provide
background testimony about FDA regulations and industry standards that inform the
standard of care for cosmetics manufacturers.189 He may generally testify about
whether Defendants’ conduct was consistent with those requirements. But he must
189 	In rendering a similar ruling, one court explained that it would “instruct the jury, if
applicable under relevant state law, that evidence of violation of FDA standards may be evidence
of, but does not necessarily establish, negligence.” Mirena I, 169 F. Supp. 3d at 479, n.78. The
court further explained that if there “is any dispute as to what FDA regulations are applicable to
Mirena, the issue can be raised with the Court, and the Court will outline the relevant statutes and
regulations for the jury.” Id. Nothing in this decision precludes either party from seeking a similar
instruction before or during trial.
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stop short of testifying that Defendants violated any law or legal duty, or on the
interaction (if any) between the regulatory scheme that he explains and tort law
liability. And while Dr. Kessler can opine on Defendants’ conduct in comparison to
industry standards, he cannot draw legal conclusions reserved for the jury, including
that the talc products were not safe as a matter of law, that Defendants failed to warn,
or that Defendants were negligent. See In re C.R. Bard, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 629
(barring Dr. Kessler from testifying that manufacturer “failed to warn on its label”
and that products “were not reasonably safe”).
c. 	State of Mind Challenge
Defendants argue that Dr. Kessler improperly opined on Defendants’ state of
mind and motivations. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 17–18.) Plaintiffs dispute
that Dr. Kessler offered speculative testimony regarding Defendants’ state of mind.
(Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 28). According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Kessler’s opinion
addressed (1) when, based on his review of internal company documents, corporate
representative testimony, and other record evidence, Defendants had notice of risks,
and (2) the reasonableness of Defendants’ conduct, based on compliance with FDA
regulations and other regulatory requirements and industry standards. (See id. at 28–
29.)
Experts “may not provide testimony concerning ‘the state of mind’ or
‘culpability’ of Defendants.” Krys, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 203 (citation omitted); see
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Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 440 (D.N.J.
2009) (“[E]xperts cannot opine on intent.”); In re Rezulin, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 547
(“Inferences about the intent or motive of parties or others lie outside the bounds of
expert testimony.”). I agree with Defendants that portions of Dr. Kessler’s report
violate this prohibition, including his assertions that:
• 	Johnson & Johnson “was aware that false negative results would occur
with its testing methodology, in part because these tests were not sensitive
enough.” (Kessler Rep. ¶ 201 (emphasis added).)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “had concerns regarding asbestos and the safety of its
product.” (Id. at 68 (emphasis added).)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “decided in the 1970’s to aggressively defend its
product. That strategy kept their product on the market for fifty years but
put the public’s health at risk. It need not have been that way if J&J was
willing to bear any additional cost and reformulate the product.” (Id. ¶ 88
(emphasis added).)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “continues to mislead the public on its website
factsabouttalc.com.” (Id. ¶ 241 (emphasis added).)
• 	Johnson & Johnson’s “approach to the asbestos issue in talc was to initiate
studies only as required by confrontation.” (Id. ¶ 103.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “created confusion and doubt when the safety of their
product was brought into question.” (Id. ¶ 104.)
Because these assertions concern the state of mind, motives, or culpability of
Defendants, they “lie outside the bounds of expert testimony.” In re Rezulin, 309 F.
Supp. 	2d 	at 	547; 	see, 	e.g., 	In 	re 	Diet 	Drugs 	(Phentermine, 	Fenfluramine,
Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1203, 2000 WL 876900, at *2, 9
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(E.D. Pa. June 20, 2000) (precluding expert from testifying that failure to change
drug label was “driven by [corporation’s] desire to increase profits” because “intent
is a classic jury question”). Thus, I recommend that the Court grant Defendants’
motion to the extent that it seeks to bar Dr. Kessler from opining about Defendants’
state of mind, motivations, or culpability.
As to notice specifically, Dr. Kessler’s report contains both impermissible and
permissible testimony. Dr. Kessler cannot testify directly—based on his review of
documents—that Defendants knew of, actually recognized, or deliberately ignored
certain risks. (See, e.g., Kessler Rep., Summary of Opinions ¶ 15 (impermissibly
speculating about when Defendants had “notice of naturally occurring mineral
silicate fibers of the serpentine and amphibole series”).) Those notice findings are
reserved for the jury.
Based on his regulatory expertise, however, Dr. Kessler may help the jury
make those findings by explaining the types of information sufficient to alert a
reasonably prudent cosmetics manufacturer to potential safety issues and other risks.
In so doing, Dr. Kessler also may discuss the types of scientific and regulatory data
that Johnson & Johnson possessed, and whether that data indicated risks. The studies
and data analyzed by Dr. Kessler are complex and, without his expertise, it may not
be apparent to a layperson why certain information would alert a reasonably prudent
manufacturer to potential safety risks. See Deutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 768
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F. Supp. 2d 420, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (prohibiting expert from testifying on
defendant’s state of mind, but allowing testimony on “whether certain information
contained in the [defendant’s] internal documents indicated certain risks.”).
d. 	Ethical Opinion Challenge
Next, Defendants argue that Dr. Kessler improperly offers subjective views
on the ethical appropriateness of Defendants’ actions, without citing objective
standards or otherwise using any reliable scientific methodology. (Defs.’ Regulatory
Br. at 21–23; see id. at 22, n.78 (“Dr. Kessler’s experience as a former FDA
commissioner does not salvage his claims about defendants’ ethics. As another court
in this circuit explained, ‘ethical standards for [pharmaceutical] companies do not
come from the FDA’”) (citation omitted)). According to Defendants, this includes
opining that, a “‘reasonable and prudent company would attempt to improve the
sensitivity of its testing’ for asbestos, which J&J purportedly did not do.” (Id. at 22
(citing Kessler Rep. ¶¶ 189, 201–202, 214, 222, 250).) Defendants also challenge
Dr. Kessler’s opinion that it was “concerning” that Johnson & Johnson claimed “‘its
product was ‘asbestos free’ without sufficiently ‘vigorous efforts to improve’
testing.” (Id. at 23 (citing Kessler Rep. ¶ 210).) And even if Dr. Kessler’s ethical
opinions were reliable and relevant, Defendants argue they are inadmissible under
Rule 403 because any probative value would be “vastly outweighed by the tendency
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of such testimony to encourage the jury to impose liability on an improper basis.”
(Id. at 25 (citation omitted).)
Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	Dr. 	Kessler 	opines 	on 	the 	reasonableness 	of
Defendants’ actions in comparison to “relevant, objective regulatory requirements
and industry standards,” not his own subjective ethical views. (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp.
Br. at 36.) According to Plaintiffs, in rendering these opinions, Dr. Kessler
permissibly relied on: (i) record evidence (testimony and corporate documents); (ii)
legislation, 	regulations, 	and 	other 	FDA 	documents; 	(iii) 	his 	review 	of
“epidemiology, 	laboratory 	testing 	methodology, 	chemical 	and 	geological
relationship between talc and asbestos, health consequences with asbestos and
elongated mineral particles, and product formulation and manufacturing”; and (iv)
his own “extensive experience in the regulatory sphere,” including answering
regulatory questions as a professor, government official, and corporate board
advisor. (See id. at 37–38).
Under Rule 702, expert testimony must be grounded in reliable principles and
methods, reliably applied to the facts, and “help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid.702. When addressing similar
challenges, 	courts 	applying 	this 	standard 	have 	distinguished 	(1) 	permissible
regulatory and industry standards opinions (which may help the jury), from (2)
impermissible ethics or corporate motives opinions (which are unhelpful and
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subjective). See In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1054 (D. Minn.
2007) (finding expert “may be allowed to testify as to the standard of care for
pharmaceutical companies,” but “may not infuse his personal views as to whether
Bayer acted ethically, irresponsibly or recklessly”).
On the permissible side of that boundary, experts may explain the regulatory
framework and industry standards that inform a manufacturer’s standard of care and
may assess compliance with those standards. See In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. at 191
(allowing testimony explaining “complex regulatory framework that informs the
standard of care in the pharmaceutical industry” and expert’s “assessment of the
reasonableness of Merck’s conduct in light of her experience and her understanding
of FDA regulations”). As noted above, such testimony is “helpful to the jury”
because it contextualizes complex matters beyond the experience of lay persons. Id.
By contrast, moral assessments of “corporate conduct and ethics are not
appropriate subjects of expert testimony because” they are subjective, invade the
province of the factfinder, and have the tendency to unfairly prejudice and confuse
the jury. In re C.R. Bard, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 2d at 611; In re Baycol, 532 F. Supp. 2d
at 1053 (“Personal views on corporate ethics and morality are not expert opinions.”).
Thus, courts prohibit expert opinions that characterize a manufacturer’s conduct as
“unethical,” “irresponsible,” “immoral,” or “bad.” See Bartoli v. Novartis Pharms.
Corp., No. 13-cv-0724, 2014 WL 1515870, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2014)
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(explaining “‘bad company’ opinions are not admissible”); see, e.g., In re Rezulin,
309 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (excluding “opinions concerning purported ethical standards”
because they were “based on [experts] personal, subjective views” and “so vague as
to be unhelpful to a fact-finder”); Wolfe v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., No. 07-cv-348, 2011
WL 1673805, at *8– 9 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 2011) (excluding “subjective views” about
manufacturer’s “social responsibility and ethical obligations” to “develop a better
warning” and “better communicate the risks of their product” as unreliable and
unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403); In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 192
(excluding “mere ‘bad company’ testimony”).
Once again, Dr. Kessler offers admissible and inadmissible testimony. As
explained above, Dr. Kessler may explain the regulatory framework and industry
standards applicable to cosmetic manufacturers. That includes explaining FDA
standards for substantiating product safety and labeling products, as well as the role
of the Cosmetic Ingredient Review (“CIR”). (See Kessler Rep. ¶¶ 27–29, 31–41, 48–
54). And as long as he stays within the limits set forth in this decision (i.e., avoids
testifying that Defendants violated the law or endangered the public), Dr. Kessler
may compare Defendants’ conduct to that framework. These opinions are admissible
because they flow from Dr. Kessler’s “extensive and specialized experience,” and
will help the jury “understand the complex regulatory framework that informs the
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standard of care” in the cosmetics industry. In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 190–
91.
In contrast, some opinions in Dr. Kessler’s report reflect his personal,
subjective views of Defendants’ conduct, rather than the application of any reliable
methodology. For example, Dr. Kessler asserts that:
• 	“making claims that its product was asbestos free without vigorous efforts
to improve the sensitivity of the testing methods is concerning.” (Kessler
Rep. ¶ 210 (emphasis added); id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 25 (same));
• 	Defendants engaged in conduct that “put the public at risk.” (Id. ¶ 242; id.
¶ 250; id. ¶¶ 209–211; id., Summary of Opinions ¶¶ 18, 23–24, 26);
• 	Defendants 	“made 	representations 	that 	were 	misleading 	and 	not
transparent.” (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 27; id. ¶¶ 212, 241, 256).
Dr. Kessler also goes so far as to rely on a CTFA employee’s statement that “‘[t]he
talc industry has a moral and legal responsibility to supply products that can be used
safely.’” (Id. ¶ 56 (citation omitted).)
These statements do not rest on a reliable scientific or regulatory foundation;
they reflect only Dr. Kessler’s subjective views. And they do not help the jury assess
Defendants’ compliance with relevant objective standards; they invite the jury to
impose 	liability 	based 	on 	Dr. 	Kessler’s 	personal 	views 	and 	assessment 	of
Defendants’ corporate ethics. See In re Rezulin, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 545 (precluding
ethics testimony because it would “prejudice and confuse the trier by introducing the
experts’ opinions and rhetoric concerning ethics as alternative and improper grounds
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for decision on bases other than the pertinent legal standards”). Because these
opinions are both unreliable under Rule 702 and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403,
I recommend that Dr. Kessler be precluded from offering subjective testimony at
trial about Defendants’ corporate behavior.
iv. 	Reliability and Fit
While many of the above rulings pertain to my assessment of reliability and
fit, for clarity I set forth my findings on those restrictions here.
Reliability. 	To meet Rule 702’s reliability requirement, Plaintiffs must
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr. Kessler’s opinions are
grounded in a reliable method and that he reliably applied that method to this case.
See Cohen, 125 F.4th at 462. Other than the specific challenges above, Defendants
do not challenge the reliability of Dr. Kessler’s testimony.
Based on my independent review, I find that Dr. Kessler’s testimony, as
limited above, satisfies the reliability requirement. Dr. Kessler reviewed case
documents and scientific literature, identified regulatory and industry standards, and
applied his extensive regulatory, professional, and academic expertise to draw
conclusions about whether Johnson & Johnson’s conduct comported with that
framework. Courts have repeatedly found that this is a reliable method for qualified
regulatory experts, including Dr. Kessler. See, e.g., McCoy, 2024 WL 1705952, at
*21 (finding Dr. Kessler’s method of applying his experience to review of data and
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documents reliable); In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy, 2017 WL 1836443,
at 	*14 	(finding 	Dr. Kessler used 	reliable method by 	applying 	“professional
experience” assessing 	FDA compliance as 	FDA Commissioner and 	advising
“pharmaceutical companies on” compliance “with FDA regulations and industry
standards”).
Fit. “An expert’s testimony ‘fits’ the proceedings” if it “will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Cohen, 125 F.4th at
464. Dr. Kessler’s testimony meets this standard.
The regulation of cosmetics—both by the FDA and through the self-
regulatory structure explained by Dr. Kessler—are complex subjects beyond the ken
of a lay juror. As noted above, because Dr. Kessler’s explanation of statutes,
regulations, and industry standards is relevant to the “complex . . . framework”
governing cosmetics manufacturers, his testimony will help the jury evaluate
Defendants’ conduct. In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. at 191.
Dr. Kessler’s opinions also will help the jury understand how a reasonable
and prudent cosmetics manufacturer would respond to scientific data indicating
potential safety risks, and what information would place such a manufacturer on
notice of those risks. This testimony has relevance to Plaintiffs’ claims, including
their failure-to-warn and negligence claims.
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By contrast, the testimony that I recommend be precluded above would not
assist the jury and risks unfair prejudice. This includes his overt legal conclusions
and characterization of Johnson & Johnson’s conduct as “misleading,” “unethical,”
or “putting the public at risk,” which do not assist the jury and risk unfair prejudice.
Those statements are excluded under Rules 702 and 403.
In short, the portions of Dr. Kessler’s testimony that explain regulatory duties,
industry standards, and reasonable-manufacturer expectations “fit” the case. His
legal conclusions, moral assessments, and comments on Defendants’ state of mind
or corporate intent do not.
v. 	Scope
Finally, Defendants argue that Dr. Kessler’s opinions exceed the scope of his
expertise in three ways: (i) he “opines that J&J’s talc products contained asbestos”;
(ii) “he challenges the adequacy of industry asbestos testing”; and (iii) “he addresses
the supposed geological formation of asbestos in the Vermont talc mines.” (Defs.’
Regulatory Br. 36, n.104 (citing Kessler Rep. ¶¶ 80–140, 161–168.5, 201–202.6);
see id., n.105 (citing Kessler Dep. at 109:7–15, 113:3–25, 283:1–20).) In challenging
these opinions, Defendants submit that Dr. Kessler is not “a mineralogist, geologist,
or microscopist”—the “specialists who are actually credentialed to opine on these
complex subjects.” (Id. at 36 (citing Kessler Dep. at 75:19–77:25); see id. at 37 &
n.110 (citing alleged Kessler admissions that other experts should testify on geology,
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mineralogy, and microscopy aspects).) Defendants contend that Dr. Kessler has
never tested talc or any other material for the presence of asbestos and was not
familiar with talc testing methods before this lawsuit. (See id. at 37). They also argue
that Dr. Kessler’s criticisms of Johnson & Johnson’s talc testing method are not
based in mineralogy or microscopy. (See id.).
Plaintiffs counter that Dr. Kessler’s experience as the FDA Commissioner
qualifies him to offer his asbestos testing and geological opinions. (See Pls.’
Regulatory Opp. Br. at 52; id. at 53 (arguing “[u]nderstanding the intersection of
geology, chemistry, testing methodology, and health effects of toxic substances are
a key component of Dr. Kessler’s background and expertise”).) Plaintiffs contend
that many of the documents that Dr. Kessler reviewed were communications with
and discussions concerning the FDA. (See id. at 53–54). And based on Dr. Kessler’s
“unique background,” Plaintiffs claim that he can offer a public-health-focused
opinion that most microscopists and geologists cannot—that “‘the failure to adopt a
public health approach to asbestos in talc testing, even if that led to overinclusion
and false positives, put consumers at risk.’” (Id. at 54 (quoting Kessler Rep. ¶ 100).)
Dr. Kessler’s experience qualifies him to analyze and opine on the challenged
data and studies in his report, but with limits. In his varied experiences, including as
FDA 	Commissioner, Chief 	Science Officer of the 	United States 	COVID-19
Response, and compliance advisor for pharmaceutical companies, Dr. Kessler is
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familiar with analyzing scientific data from different disciplines. (See Kessler Dep.
at 170:1–5 (explaining that the “FDA finds itself regulating substances that intersect
with environmental, geological, mineralogical substances all the time”).) Based on
his experience analyzing scientific information through the lens of the FDA and as
a regulatory advisor, I find that Dr. Kessler is permitted to testify about how the FDA
evaluates testing data submitted by manufacturers and how testing relates to safety
substantiation obligations under the FDCA. He also may testify, based on his
experience, on whether the testing methods that Johnson & Johnson used were
generally consistent with FDA and industry standards. See Mirena I, 169 F. Supp.
3d at 477 (finding, while FDA expert was “not an epidemiologist,” she had “been
involved with epidemiological studies” and this “experience is sufficient to allow
her to analyze studies and reports and rely on them in forming her opinions”).
Because 	Dr. 	Kessler 	is 	not 	a 	mineralogist, geologist, or microscopist,
however, Dr. Kessler must stop short of opining on the technical validity, strength,
or aspects of any particular test. And while he can testify about studies he relied on
in forming his opinions and how the FDA might interpret testing results, he cannot
testify on whether any talc sample contained asbestos or offer opinions on the
geological properties of talc.
For these reasons, I recommend the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Kessler.
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2. 	Dr. Plunkett
i. 	Dr. Plunkett’s Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Plunkett as an expert in “pharmacology, toxicology,
pharmacokinetics, human health risk assessment[s], and the regulation of cosmetic
products in the United States.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 7.) Dr. Plunkett received
a Ph.D. in pharmacology from the University of Georgia, College of Pharmacy in
1984. (Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶ 3.) She then spent two years as a pharmacology
research associate training fellow at the National Institute of General Medical
Sciences. (Id. ¶ 4.)
From 1986 to 1989, Dr. Plunkett was an assistant professor of pharmacology
and toxicology at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences. (Id. ¶ 5.) In
addition to teaching courses in pharmacology, toxicology, and neurosciences, she
performed 	research 	in 	the 	areas 	of 	neuropharmacology 	and 	toxicology 	and
cardiovascular pharmacology and toxicology. (Id.) More generally, throughout her
professional career Dr. Plunkett has taught “graduate students, law students and
pharmacy students on FDA regulations as they apply to all types of FDA-regulated
products, including cosmetics.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Dr. Plunkett has published peer-reviewed
articles and book chapters on pharmacology and toxicology. (Id. & App’x A.)
From 1989 to the present, Dr. Plunkett has worked as consultant for several
private companies: she was a manager at ENVIRON Corporation from 1989 to 1997;
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she owned Plunkett & Associates from 1997 to 2001; she was the president of
Integrative Biostrategies (IB) LLC from 2001 to 2020; and she has been a partner of
BioPolicy Solutions LLC since 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 6–9 & App’x A.) Dr. Plunkett has
“worked on a variety of projects dealing with the regulation of products by the FDA,
including human drugs (both prescription and over-the-counter drugs), veterinary
drugs, 	biologics, 	medical 	devices, 	cosmetics, 	consumer 	products, 	dietary
supplements and foods.” (Id. ¶ 6.) In those roles, Dr. Plunkett has advised clients on
“regulatory issues and strategies for their products, designed preclinical and clinical
studies for both efficacy and safety, advised clients on issues related to statements
regarding efficacy and warnings for their products based on the current labeling
regulations, and generally acted as a regulatory affairs staff for small companies in
early stages of product development.” (Id.)
Dr. Plunkett has “done a great deal of work on projects related to regulation
of cosmetics and cosmetic ingredients.” (Id. ¶¶ 6–7.) As part of that “regulatory
practice,” she has consulted “cosmetic ingredient manufacturers and manufacturers
of cosmetic products on issues related to ingredient safety, product safety, labeling
claims, and general regulatory compliance issues which include US regulations and
regulations in other countries.” (Id. ¶ 7). That includes advising companies during
the “initial commercialization process, where the client was trying to decide how to
market their product, e.g., as a cosmetic or a drug, as well as to determine if their
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product was safe for human exposure.” (Id. ¶ 7.) It also includes advising companies
on “the safety of ingredients used to manufacture cosmetic products.” (Id.)
Dr. Plunkett “worked on the safety of talc itself” in the 1990s, advising
condom manufacturers “on the safety of talcum powder that was used on the surfaces
of the devices as a dry lubricant.” (Id.) In that capacity, Dr. Plunkett assessed “the
scientific literature, including epidemiology, animal and 	in vitro 	studies that
discussed potential adverse health effects linked to talc exposure, including both
local tissue toxicity and systemic toxicity.” (Id.)
Dr. Plunkett attests to using “risk assessments” across her consultancy work,
including in “many projects where risks related to exposure to chemicals in
consumer products were at issue.” (Id. ¶ 6.) In performing risk assessments, she often
reviews and relies on “epidemiology data, as well as animal and in vitro data in order
to assess risks to human health.” (Id.) In many of Dr. Plunkett’s cosmetic safety
projects, determining whether an ingredient is “generally-recognized as safe”
(“GRAS”) is “critical to determining what type of toxicity testing is needed to
establish that a product or an ingredient is safe for human use.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Dr. Plunkett
states that, like analyses conducted by CIR, her GRAS reviews have involved
“consideration of animal and human toxicity data, cellular and mechanistic data,
human product experience reports, and the type and level of exposure that may occur
when humans are exposed to the ingredient or product.” (Id.)
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As 	a 	pharmacologist 	and 	American 	Board 	of 	Toxicology-certified
toxicologist, Dr. Plunkett’s consulting work often relates to “understanding and
explaining the mechanisms of action” and “toxic effects” of “chemicals of all types.”
(Id. ¶¶ 2, 9.) She also has “designed clinical trials and analyzed pharmacokinetic
data.” (Id.)
Based on her broad range of knowledge, professional experience, and
education, Dr. Plunkett is qualified to testify as an expert in pharmacology,
toxicology, pharmacokinetics, and human health risk assessments. Fed. R. Evid.702.
Dr. Plunkett has spent decades applying toxicology principles, including risk
assessments and weight-of-the-evidence assessments, to evaluate potential hazards
associated with cosmetic products and ingredients. She is qualified to testify in those
areas. Based on her consulting and academic experience, Dr. Plunkett is also
qualified to testify, from a non-legal standpoint (as explained below), about the
general 	regulatory 	framework 	applicable 	to 	cosmetics 	products, 	cosmetic
ingredients, and the cosmetics industry. Dr. Plunkett’s ability to testify in the
foregoing areas is subject to the limitations set forth below.
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Plunkett’s Opinions
Dr. Plunkett was asked to “provide opinions related to the human health
hazards posed by exposure to talcum powder products and how those hazards relate
to the regulatory requirements for marketing cosmetic ingredients and cosmetic
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products in the United States.” (Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶ 10.) To formulate her
opinion, she reviewed: (1) “scientific literature relating to the biological effects and
toxic effects of talc and other constituents that are present in talc body powder”; (2)
FDCA provisions and FDA regulations “relating to the development and marketing
of cosmetic ingredients and finished cosmetic products”; (3) “publicly available
information on safety assessments of talc and products containing talc”; and (4)
documents 	produced 	in 	discovery, 	including 	“internal 	company 	documents,
depositions of company employees, reports of other experts in the litigation, or
documents found on public sites.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Dr. Plunkett stated that these sources
mirror those used in her work as a “pharmacologist, toxicologist, risk assessor,” and
FDA “regulatory specialist.” (Id.)
Dr. Plunkett used “standard and generally accepted methods” that she applies
in her “work as a pharmacologist and toxicologist” to assess “the safety of products.”
(Id. ¶ 11.) Specifically, as detailed below, Dr. Plunkett performed a “human health
risk assessment” to evaluate whether the talc products at issue pose a human safety
risk. (Id.) Based on her review, Dr. Plunkett reached the following main conclusions:
• 	The “weight-of-the evidence indicates that genital exposure to talcum
powder products increases the risk of ovarian cancer in women.” Evidence
supporting that conclusion includes: (1) “the known toxic effects of talc
and the other components of talcum powder products”; (2) “studies that
have identified biologically plausible mechanisms for cancer in humans”;
(3) “ the likelihood that talc particles can reach the ovaries”; (4) “the
existence of a dose-response relationship for toxicity including the risk of
cancer”; and (5) “the large human database that includes studies conducted
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over a period of 40 years showing a consistent signal for ovarian cancer in
women exposed to talcum powder products.” (Id. ¶ 120.)
• 	The “use of talc in cosmetic products does not meet the CIR standard of
safety.” That standard provides that a cosmetic ingredient is safe if there is
“no evidence in the available information that demonstrates or suggests
reasonable grounds to suspect a hazard to the public under the conditions
of use that are now current or that might reasonably be expected in the
future.” 	Given 	the 	“the 	presence 	of 	asbestos, 	fibrous 	talc, 	cobalt,
chromium, and nickel, in the talc body powders manufactured by Imerys
and Johnson & Johnson, a significant biologically plausible human health
risk was identified as a hazard related to talc body powder use at least by
the 1940’s. These risks included a risk of cancer with exposure to
constituents of talc body powders, and even death with acute inhalation of
large.” (Id. ¶¶ 82, 121.)
• 	“Failure to meet the CIR standard for safety meant that Johnson & Johnson
failed to properly substantiate and ensure the safety of their cosmetic body
powder products.” (Id. ¶ 121.)
• 	“Given that Johnson & Johnson was aware that cornstarch-based body
powder products represented a safer alternative, their failure to replace talc
with cornstarch over the years that they marketed talc-based body powders
put consumer health at risk.” (Id. ¶ 121.)
• 	“Based on the knowledge available by the 1950’s, talc body powders
manufactured and sold by Imerys and Johnson & Johnson should have
warned consumers about the toxic constituents, such as asbestos, fibrous
talc, nickel, chromium and cobalt and fragrance, in their products and the
effects that could be produced by exposure to talc dusts.” (Id.)
• 	FDA regulations require cosmetic product labels to “bear a warning
statement “‘whenever necessary or appropriate to prevent a health hazard
that may be associated with the product,’” and a “cause and effect” need
not “be proven for such a warning to be put into place.” (Id. ¶ 122 (quoting
21 CFR 740.1(a)).)
• 	“There was evidence from at least the 1960’s of the risk of ovarian cancer
in women exposed to components of talc body powders,” including
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“asbestos,” and such evidence “has only gained strength over the last six
decades.” Because this “specific ovarian cancer risk was evident by the
1960’s,” under FDA regulations “talc-based cosmetic products, including
products used by women for genital dusting, should have been labeled to
warn of the risk of ovarian cancer with such use.” (Id. ¶ 121–22.)
• 	Defendants “have never placed an adequate warning onto its containers of
talcum powder products” and this “failure to provide consumers with such
information puts public health at risk.” (Id. ¶ 122.)
• 	The “presence of carcinogenic constituents in talc such as asbestos, fibrous
talc, nickel, chromium, and cobalt meant that Johnson & Johnson’s failure
to list those talc constituents on its labeling was consistent with the FDA’s
definition of a misbranded product, and also consistent with the FDA’s
definition of an adulterated product.” (Id. ¶ 123.)
• 	Rather than performing appropriate safety studies or providing consumers
with adequate and timely “safety information about the human health risks
of talc when it was used for genital dusting, industry worked together with
the” Personal Care Products Council (“PCPC”) “to influence the scientific
and regulatory processes related to cosmetic talcum powder products.” (Id.
¶ 124.)
As discussed below, Dr. Plunkett expressly disclaimed offering opinions on
general causation or specific causation. (See ECF No. 33000-8 (“Plunkett 2023
Dep.”) at 72:15–73:1). She instead framed her opinions as addressing whether
exposure to talc products increases the “risk” of ovarian cancer, from the vantage
point of a regulator or toxicologist conducting a precautionary risk assessment. (See
id.)
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments
Defendants 	assert 	five 	main 	arguments 	for 	excluding 	Dr. 	Plunkett’s
testimony, each of which Plaintiffs dispute:
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First, while Defendants agree that a risk assessment is “a generally accepted
method,” they argue that Dr. Plunkett “did not reliably perform that analysis”
because she did not conduct “a general causation analysis” in “reaching her opinion
that talc increases the risk of ovarian cancer.” (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 34–35.)
Defendants argue that Dr. Plunkett’s “exclusion of a causation analysis (and the
Bradford Hill criteria for causation) as part of a risk assessment contradicts generally
recognized scientific approaches, including those outlined in the authorities” she
cites. (Id.) Based on that purported omission, Defendants argue that Dr. Plunkett’s
risk assessment must be excluded as unreliable. (Id. at 34–35.)
In response, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Plunkett “is not testifying as to causation
but only as to risk.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 50.) Plaintiffs submit that Dr.
Plunkett’s opinion, “as a toxicologist, is that the weight-of-the evidence indicates
that genital exposure to talcum powder products increases the risk of ovarian cancer
in women.” (Id.) According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Plunkett reaches that opinion by
conducting a human health risk assessment, a tool routinely used by toxicologists
(including herself) and government bodies to “assess risks to human health related
to exposure to chemicals in the everyday environment.” (Id. at 51.) Plaintiffs contend
that Dr. Plunkett reliably performs each step of the risk-assessment methodology.
(Id. 51–52.)
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Second, Defendants argue that Dr. Plunkett offers improper factual narratives,
quoting at length from Johnson & Johnson corporate documents. (Defs.’ Regulatory
Br. at 12–13.) In response, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Plunkett should be permitted
to testify about documents underlying her report, particularly because she “relies on
this same type of information” when providing toxicology, pharmacology, and
regulatory consulting services in the private sector. (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 19.)
Plaintiffs further contend that because these documents contain “information
unfamiliar to a layperson (e.g., industry jargon and acronyms, description of industry
and regulatory processes, etc.),” Dr. Plunkett’s explanations will help the jury. (Id.
at 18–19.)
Third, Defendants argue that Dr. Plunkett offers improper legal opinions
about FDA regulations applicable to cosmetic products and whether Defendants met
them. According to Defendants, these improper opinions include: (1) comparing
FDA regulations applicable to cosmetic and drug manufacturers; (2) stating that
cosmetics must “carry warnings based on a standard of a possibility of health
hazard”; (3) asserting that Defendants “failed to properly substantiate and ensure the
safety of their cosmetic body powder products” and, as such, “should have warned
consumers about the toxic constituents” of the talc products and provided a label that
“warn[ed] of the risk of ovarian cancer”; and (4) opining that “these alleged failures
rendered Johnson’s Baby Powder an ‘adulterated product.’” (Defs.’ Regulatory Br.
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at 15–16 (quoting Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶¶ 16, 92).) Defendants state that other
courts have precluded Dr. Plunkett from offering similar legal conclusions. (See
Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 14 (collecting cases).)
Plaintiffs 	dispute 	that 	Dr. 	Plunkett 	offers 	improper 	legal 	conclusions.
According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Plunkett (1) explains the regulatory landscape for
cosmetics, and (2) evaluates—from her perspective as a toxicologist and FDA
regulatory specialist, not as a lawyer—whether talc posed a health hazard that
required a warning. Plaintiffs argue that these regulatory and labeling opinions do
not usurp the Court’s role instructing the jury on the law or the jury’s role deciding
liability. Plaintiffs claim that courts have allowed Dr. Plunkett to testify on “FDA
requirements,” including similar “regulatory and labeling issues.” (Pls.’ Regulatory
Opp. Br. at 24–25 (citing cases).)
Fourth, Defendants argue that Dr. Plunkett renders impermissible state-of-
mind opinions about what Defendants knew about purported risks posed by the talc
products and when. Defendants also argue that Dr. Plunkett “speculates about
defendants’ intent and motive,” including opining that Defendants’ “goal was to
mount a defense strategy around talc” and that the “industry had no interest in
sponsoring any new research.” (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 18–19 (quoting Plunkett 3d
Amend. Rep. ¶¶ 78, 96, 104, 115; Plunkett 2021 Dep. at 136:16–24).) Defendants
cite a California state court decision barring Dr. Plunkett from offering similar
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testimony in a talc case, Lloyd v. Johnson & Johnson, No. BC628228 (JCCP No.
4872) (Cal. Super. Ct.) (the “Echeverria Opinion”). (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at
18). Plaintiffs dispute that Dr. Plunkett is testifying about Defendants’ intent.
According 	to 	Plaintiffs, 	Dr. 	Plunkett 	“can 	rely 	on 	company 	documents 	to
demonstrate what the defendants knew or should have known at a given time.” (Pls.’
Regulatory Opp. Br. at 29–30.)
Fifth, Defendants contend that Dr. Plunkett renders subjective judgments
about the ethical appropriateness of Defendants’ conduct. (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at
22 (citing Plunkett 2021 Dep. at 217:20–24).) Plaintiffs respond that Dr. Plunkett’s
opinion about “whether Defendants acted reasonably in the face of mounting
evidence of the risk of talc-induced ovarian cancer” is based on the FDCA, FDA
regulations, and industry standards relating to the development and marketing of
cosmetic 	ingredients 	and 	products, 	rather 	than 	subjective 	standards. 	(Pls.’
Regulatory Opp. Br. at 38–40.)
I address these disputes when analyzing the reliability and fit of Dr. Plunkett’s
opinions below.
iv. 	Reliability
As noted above, to meet their burden on reliability, Plaintiffs must show that
it is more likely than not that Dr. Plunkett’s testimony is based on sufficient facts,
reliable methods, and a reliable application of those methods. Fed. R. Evid.702. For
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the reasons below, I find that Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that, in
general, 	Dr. 	Plunkett’s 	risk-assessment 	opinions 	generally 	reflect 	a 	reliable
application of a recognized human health risk-assessment methodology. Similarly,
Dr. Plunkett’s regulatory and industry standard opinions generally satisfy Rule 702’s
reliability 	requirement. 	In 	both 	contexts, 	however, 	certain 	of 	Dr. 	Plunkett’s
conclusions do not flow from her general reliable methods and must be excluded.
a. 	Risk-Assessment Methodology
Dr. Plunkett performed a human health risk assessment to form her opinion
that exposure to talc products increases the risk of ovarian cancer. (Plunkett 3d
Amend. Rep. ¶ 11.) Government bodies and toxicologists have long used risk
assessments to evaluate the safety of chemicals and determine whether they present
a human health risk. (Id.). In 1983, the National Research Council promulgated a
four-step process for performing a risk assessment that remains in effect today: (1)
hazard identification, (2) dose-response assessment, (3) exposure analysis, and (4)
characterization of the risks. (Id.)
Defendants concede that a risk assessment is a “generally accepted method
for determining risk.” (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 33.) Based upon such general
acceptance, Dr. Plunkett’s own experience conducting risk assessments, and the
standards controlling risk assessments, I find that Dr. Plunkett’s risk assessment
methodology is reliable. See UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.7575
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Acres, 949 F.3d 825, 834 (3d Cir. 2020) (identifying factors for determining
reliability of method).
While the parties agree that a risk assessment may be a reliable method, they
dispute whether Dr. Plunkett’s application of that method was reliable. As noted
above, Defendants contend that Dr. Plunkett failed to reliably perform a risk
assessment because she did not conduct a causation analysis at step one. (Defs.’
Regulatory Br. at 34 (arguing “to identify a hazard (i.e., the first step in a risk
assessment), a scientist must first determine whether a particular toxin is causally
linked to certain health effects”).). Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that Dr. Plunkett
properly applied a weight-of-the-evidence analysis at step one, rather than a
Bradford Hill causation analysis. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 50–51.) Because
this reliability dispute implicates the relationship between (1) a human health risk
assessment in the regulatory and toxicology sphere, and (2) a causation analysis in
toxic-tort and products-liability litigation, I begin by briefly summarizing the
differences between those two standards.
“Regulatory and advisory bodies such as IARC, OSHA and EPA” conduct
risk assessments, often using a “weight of the evidence” analysis, to “assess the
carcinogenicity of various substances in human beings and suggest or make
prophylactic rules governing human exposure.” 	Allen, 102 F.3d at 198. Risk
assessments are conducted “from the preventive perspective that the agencies adopt
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in order to reduce public exposure to harmful substances.” Id. at 198. Put differently,
“the basic goal underlying risk assessments” is “to determine a level that will protect
the most sensitive members of the population.” Rowe v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., No. 06-cv-1810, 2008 WL 5412912, at *16 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2008).
As a result, the “threshold of proof is reasonably lower than that appropriate
in tort law, which ‘traditionally make[s] more particularized inquiries into cause and
effect’ and requires a plaintiff to prove ‘that it is more likely than not that another
individual has caused him or her harm.’” Allen, 102 F.3d at 198 (quoting Wright v.
Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1996)); see Glastetter v.
Novartis Pharms. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The FDA will remove
drugs from the marketplace upon a lesser showing of harm to the public than the
preponderance-of-the-evidence or more-likely-than-not standards used to assess tort
liability.”). Indeed, the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence explains this exact
distinction:
Proof of risk and proof of causation entail somewhat
different questions because risk assessment frequently
calls for a cost–benefit analysis. The agency assessing risk
may decide to bar a substance or product if the potential
benefits are outweighed by the possibility of risks that are
largely 	unquantifiable 	because 	of 	presently 	unknown
contingencies. Consequently, risk assessors may pay heed
to any evidence that points to a need for caution, rather
than assess the likelihood that a causal relationship in a
specific case is more likely than not.
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Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 33 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., 2d ed.
2000.)
Given those distinctions, courts have rejected attempts to use the outcome of
risk assessments, without more, to establish general or specific causation. See, e.g.,
Rowe, 2008 WL 5412912, at *13 (“While the Rowe Plaintiffs tout the risk
assessment method as the ideal means of proving common exposure among the class
members, the Court finds that this method establishes nothing more than an
assumption of common exposure.”); Glastetter, 252 F.3d at 991 (“The FDA’s 1994
decision that Parlodel can cause strokes is unreliable proof of medical causation in
the present case because the FDA employs a reduced standard (vis-a-vis tort
liability) for gauging causation when it decides to rescind drug approval.”).
Step 	1: 	Hazard 	identification. 	Dr. 	Plunkett 	began 	her 	analysis 	by
“identifying, 	collecting, 	reviewing, 	assessing, 	and 	evaluating” 	peer-reviewed
literature on the biological and toxic effects of talc and talc-based products. (Plunkett
3d Amend. Rep. ¶ 12.) As part of those efforts, Dr. Plunkett performed systematic
searches across databases to capture relevant studies and evidence, including in vitro
and in vivo toxicological evidence, mechanistic data, and epidemiological studies.
(See id. ¶¶ 58–60.)
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Dr. Plunkett then synthesized this data using a weight-of-the-evidence
approach, a recognized method used in her field of toxicology to evaluate whether
the totality of evidence supports a hazard conclusion. See Bernard D. Goldstein &
Mary Sue Henifin, 	Reference Guide on Toxicology, in 	Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence, 651 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., 3d. ed. 2011) (“The hazard identification
process often uses ‘weight of evidence’ approaches in which the toxicological,
mechanistic, and epidemiological data are rigorously assessed to form a judgment
regarding the likelihood that the agent produces a specific effect.”); (Plunkett 3d
Amend. Rep. ¶ 13 (“Weight-of-the-evidence methodology, is used as part of
regulatory decision making by regulatory and scientific bodies such as the FDA,”
EPA, OSHA, WHO, and IARC).) By identifying the evidence she reviewed and
explaining how it informed her risk conclusion, I find that Dr. Plunkett reliably
performed a weight-of-the-evidence assessment at the hazard identification step.190
Step 2: Dose-response. Using the same weight-of-the-evidence method, Dr.
Plunkett evaluated the relationship between talc exposure and ovarian cancer. (See
Id. ¶ 11.) In conducting that assessment, Dr. Plunkett evaluated a broad range of
studies 	and 	data, 	including 	in 	vitro 	studies, 	human 	studies, 	and 	regulatory
190 	In this regard, I disagree with Defendants’ claim that hazard identification in a risk
assessment necessarily requires a general or specific causation-type analysis. As long as Dr.
Plunkett limits the nature of the conclusion that she offers to risk—rather than rendering a tort-
causation opinion—her application satisfies the reliability requirement.
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classifications. 	(Id. 	¶¶ 	73–75.) 	Defendants 	do 	not 	challenge 	Dr. 	Plunkett’s
application at the dose-response step and I find that Dr. Plunkett reliability applied
the weight-of-the-evidence method to evaluate dose response.
Step 3: Exposure assessment. Because Dr. Plunkett is not being proffered as
a case-specific expert, she did not attempt to “define any specific exposure for any
specific person in quantitative terms.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Instead, Dr. Plunkett assessed
exposure at the general population level by “defining the routes of human exposure
that would be relevant for evaluating the risks posed by use of the powders and the
type of exposure patterns that have been linked to risks posed by the use of powders.”
(Id.; see id. ¶ 94.) As noted above, regulatory risk assessments often operate at such
levels of generality, focusing on general populations or conditions of use. Within
that limited risk-based scope, I find that Dr. Plunkett’s application of the exposure
assessment step was reliable.
Step 4: Risk characterization. Finally, Dr. Plunkett integrates the above
steps to reach her risk-characterization conclusion: that the “weight-of-the-evidence
indicates that genital exposure to talcum powder products increases the risk of
ovarian cancer in women.” (Id. ¶ 120.) I find that Dr. Plunkett’s risk characterization
is reliable.
Even so, aspects of Dr. Plunkett’s report do not reflect a reliable application
of a risk assessment and should be excluded. While Plaintiffs characterize Dr.
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Plunkett’s opinion as risk-based and disclaim offering her to prove causation, certain
statements in her report cross the line from risk assessment into de facto general
causation opinions. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 72 (referencing “a cause and effect relationship
between talc exposure and human ovarian cancer risk”).) Because these statements
do not flow from Dr. Plunkett’s risk-assessment method, I recommend they be
excluded. More generally, at trial Dr. Plunkett must confine her testimony to a risk-
assessment framework that discusses hazard signals and risk, without presenting
those assessments as determinations of or substitutes for causation.191
Subject to those constraints, I find that Dr. Plunkett reliably applied a reliable
human health risk assessment methodology and has “good grounds” for her core risk
assessment opinions. Cohen, 125 F.4th at 462.
b. 	Regulatory-Based Methodology
In addition to her risk-assessment opinions, Dr. Plunkett also testified more
generally as to the regulatory framework and industry standards applicable to
cosmetic product manufacturers. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶¶ 15–16.) Dr.
Plunkett’s 	explanation 	of 	those 	standards 	flowed 	from 	her 	broad 	“personal
191 	Nothing in this Report and Recommendation precludes either party from seeking an
instruction regarding the distinction between causation in product liability cases and risk in the
context of a human health risk assessment. Nor does my recommendation preclude either party
from seeking a limiting instruction; e.g.—that the jury may consider Dr. Plunkett’s testimony only
for the limited purpose of understanding how toxicologists and regulatory bodies assess and
characterize potential health risks associated with product exposure; that her testimony is not
evidence that talc or asbestos cause ovarian cancer; and that the jury may not treat any discussion
of “risk” as proof of causation.
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knowledge” and “experience,” reflecting a reliable application of non-scientific
testimony. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150; see United States v. Bridges, No. 21-
cv-1679, 2022 WL 4244276, at *8 (3d Cir. Sept. 15, 2022) (finding “experience
based” testimony “satisfies reliability”).
v. 	Fit, Scope, and Specific Challenges
Plaintiffs have met their burden of proving that limited portions of Dr.
Plunkett’s 	testimony 	regarding 	risk-assessment 	and 	the 	applicable 	regulatory
framework fit this case. Other portions of her testimony, however, must be excluded
as irrelevant, improper, or otherwise unduly prejudicial.
As 	discussed 	above, 	because 	risk 	assessments 	operate 	under 	different
assumptions and evidentiary thresholds than tort law, Dr. Plunkett’s risk-based
testimony cannot substitute for proof of general or specific causation in this case.
Even so, risk-assessment testimony may be relevant for limited, non-causation
purposes, particularly where (as here) the proponent offers separate expert testimony
on general and specific causation. See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin,
Reference Guide on Toxicology, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 649
(Fed. Jud. Ctr., 3d. ed. 2011) (“risk assessment information about a chemical can be
somewhat useful in a toxic tort case”).
Here, Dr. Plunkett’s risk-assessment and regulatory framework testimony, if
properly cabined to avoid any discussion of causation, will help the jury understand
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facts relevant to Plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn and negligence claims. For example, her
testimony on how toxicologists and regulatory agencies conduct risk assessments
and 	weigh 	scientific 	evidence 	is 	relevant 	to 	the 	jury’s 	assessment 	of 	the
reasonableness of Defendants’ conduct in light of available information. And her
testimony on the regulatory framework in which cosmetics manufacturers operate
will help the jury understand issues relevant to the standard of care, including
whether any identified risks would prompt a reasonable cosmetic manufacturer to
take further investigative steps or communicate risks to the public. (See, e.g.,
Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶¶ 15–27.) Thus, I find that Dr. Plunkett’s testimony has
sufficient fit to be admissible for those limited purposes, subject to the above and
below restrictions.
Legal 	conclusions. 	While 	Dr. 	Plunkett 	may 	describe 	the 	regulatory
framework governing cosmetics and explain how toxicologists and regulatory
professionals assess safety and risk communication within that framework, Dr.
Plunkett cannot draw inadmissible legal conclusions. Thus, as with Dr. Kessler, Dr.
Plunkett cannot offer opinions that Defendants violated FDA regulations, failed to
comply with legal labeling requirements, marketed products that were “adulterated”
or “misbranded,” failed to warn, or were negligent as a matter of law. As explained
above, 	those 	opinions 	constitute 	impermissible 	legal 	conclusions 	and 	risk
substituting Dr. Plunkett’s judgment for that of the Court and jury.
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State of mind, intent, motives, and ethics. For substantially the same reasons
addressed in my analysis of Dr. Kessler’s testimony, Dr. Plunkett’s opinions
regarding what Defendants “knew,” what their “goal” was, or whether they acted to
influence scientific or regulatory processes do not fit. Determinations of corporate
intent, motive, or state of mind are “classic jury” questions and do not require expert
assistance. In re Diet Drugs, No. MDL 1203, 2000 WL 876900, at *2, 9 (E.D. Pa.
June 20, 2000.) Dr. Plunkett may not testify that Defendants definitely knew of
specific risks, deliberately ignored evidence, or acted with particular motives. To the
extent Dr. Plunkett discusses whether the types of scientific and regulatory data that
Defendants possessed could have altered them to a risk, she must do so only from
the perspective of a reasonable cosmetics manufacturer and not make overt
statements about Defendants’ state of mind. Deutsch v, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 443–44.
Similarly, Dr. Plunkett may not offer subjective assessments regarding the
ethical propriety or appropriateness of Defendants’ conduct. In re Rezulin, 309 F.
Supp. 2d at 543. Dr. Plunkett may testify regarding objective industry practices and
risk-assessment norms relevant to cosmetic safety, but she may not offer moral or
ethical judgments. Nor can she make statements that Defendants in fact put the
public at risk.
Factual Narratives. As with Dr. Kessler, because portions of Dr. Plunkett’s
report help contextualize the information she cites, I decline to parse the report
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“paragraph-by-paragraph to determine where the report turns from expert analysis
to factual narrative.” Liberty Media, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 174. Defendants can object
if Dr. Plunkett’s trial testimony turns into a factual narrative.
For these reasons, I recommend the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Plunkett.
3. 	Dr. Sage
i. 	Dr. Sage’s Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Sage as an expert in the “science of policymaking” and
“regulatory design.” (Sage Rep. ¶ 9.) He claims “particular expertise” in “the
regulation of health and safety,” including in “information-based regulation” and
“self-regulatory models.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Dr. Sage attests that the self-regulation in which
he 	has 	expertise 	“includes 	government-supervised 	health 	and 	financial 	self-
regulation, corporate compliance and corporate governance, and the regulation of
self-governing professions.” (Id.)
Dr. Sage received an M.D. in anesthesia and critical care medicine and a J.D.
from Stanford University. (Id. ¶ 2.) After completing a medical internship, Dr. Sage
spent one year as an anesthesiology and crucial care medicine resident at Johns
Hopkins Hospital. (Id.) He then worked as a corporate lawyer for five years. (Id.)
Dr. Sage left private practice to enter academia in 1995. During his tenures at
Columbia University (1995–2006), the University of Texas at Austin (2006–2022),
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and Texas A&M University (2022–present), he has served as a professor in law and
medical schools, often concurrently. (See id. ¶¶ 1, 4–5.) At Texas, he was also the
vice provost for Health Affairs. (Id. ¶ 4.) In his current role at Texas A&M, Dr. Sage
is a professor in the law school, medical school, and Bush School of Government
and Public Service, and an assistant vice president in the Health Center. (Id. ¶ 1.)
Dr. Sage has taught classes in health law and policy, legislation, regulatory
theory and design, and professional ethics and self-governance. (See id. ¶ 6 & Ex.
A.) He has published many articles and several books, addressing topics like public
health, regulation, and corporate responsibility. (See id., Ex. A.) Dr. Sage also has
advised governmental, academic, and professional organizations, including as a
working group member on President Clinton’s 1993 Health Care Reform Task
Force. (Id. ¶ 7.) He is a member of the National Academy of Medicine and the
American Law Institute and the co-editor of the most recent edition of the Oxford
Handbook of U.S. Health Law. (Id., Ex. A.)
Dr. Sage has taught classes on FDA regulations, including in relation to drugs,
medical devices, and over-the-counter medications. (Sage Dep. at 26:21–27:2.) But
he has never worked for the FDA, has never served on an FDA committee, and has
never communicated with anyone at the FDA about a cosmetic product. (See Sage
Dep. at 45:18–20, 48:2–11.) He has not worked in the cosmetics industry, has not
advised cosmetics manufacturers, had not performed “specific work on cosmetic
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regulations” prior to this case, and has not taught classes on cosmetic manufacturing.
(See Sage Dep. at 25:14–17, 32:22–33:6, 44:4–45:21.)
Based on these facts and my review of Dr. Sage’s report and deposition
transcript, I find that Dr. Sage is qualified to testify only as to regulatory design and
self-regulation in the health and consumer products sectors. Because he lacks direct
experience with cosmetic manufacturers and FDA (and Canadian) regulatory
compliance, however, he is unqualified to offer opinions applying those regulations
to 	Defendants’ 	conduct. 	I 	further 	illustrate 	this 	limitation 	in 	analyzing 	the
admissibility of Dr. Sage’s proposed testimony below.
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Sage’s Opinions
Dr. Sage stated that he was retained to answer two questions: “(a) What are
the regulatory practices and standards under which manufacturers of cosmetics
operate? and (b) Did Johnson & Johnson comply with these standards in its general
development, manufacture, marketing, and sale of talcum powder products.” (Sage
Rep. ¶ 11.) In answering those questions, Dr. Sage reviewed applicable laws and
regulations, industry standards, peer-reviewed literature, corporate documents, and
publicly available information. (Id. ¶ 12.) Based on his review, Dr. Sage reached the
following main conclusions:
• 	The cosmetics industry relies on a “self-regulated” framework that the
FDA does not closely supervise. This system is “principally firm-based,”
and relies on manufacturers to voluntarily comply with FDA standards and
industry codes of conduct. This includes (i) selling “only safe products
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containing 	safe 	ingredients,” 	(ii) 	responsibly 	disclosing 	product
information 	to 	consumers, 	and 	(iii) 	voluntarily 	reporting 	product
information to the FDA. (Sage Rep. ¶¶ 174–175.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “did not establish or maintain the safety of its” talc
products. Even though Johnson & Johnson “knew its products contained
carcinogens, including asbestos, fibrous talc, and heavy metals,” Johnson
& Johnson did not: (i) perform studies to address rising concerns; (ii)
notify the FDA that the talc products contained ingredients that “may be
associated with a health hazard”; or (iii) accurately register its products,
inform the FDA of positive test results, or consistently report adverse
events. (Sage Rep. ¶¶ 176–177, 180, 182.)
• 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson 	did 	not 	(i) 	provide 	consumers 	with 	“required
warnings” of “health hazards associated” with the talc products, (ii) inform
consumers that consuming talc products posed risks, or (iii) disclose that
the safety of the talc products “had not been determined.” (Sage Rep. ¶¶
178–179, 183.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “misled” consumers with “continued reassurance
about safety and purity,” and “marketed and sold a misbranded and
adulterated product. (Sage Rep. ¶¶ 181, 183.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “did not follow its own safety standards or corporate
pledge of legal compliance and ethical self-governance beyond what the
marketplace had always accepted.” (Sage Rep. ¶ 184.)
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments
Defendants assert four main arguments for excluding Dr. Sage’s testimony,
each of which Plaintiffs dispute:
First, Defendants argue that Dr. Sage is unqualified to opine on the alleged
relationship between the talc products and ovarian cancer, and that the opinions he
does offer are not the product of a reliable method. (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. 31–33.)
In response, Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Sage “is not offering any general causation
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opinions regarding whether talcum powder products cause ovarian cancer,” and
merely “discusses the scientific literature, including opinions by Plaintiffs’ other
experts, as part of his broader discussion and opinions related to regulatory practices
and standards.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 49.)
Second, 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	Dr. 	Sage’s 	opinions 	constitute 	legal
conclusions about whether Johnson & Johnson violated federal regulations and legal
duties. These include his opinion that Johnson & Johnson (i) marketed and sold a
misbranded and adulterated product, (ii) did not substantiate the safety of the talc
products, and (iii) failed to provide legally required warnings. (See Defs.’ Regulatory
Br. 13–16.)
Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Sage is a “legal expert on health law and corporate
responsibility” who “should be allowed to offer his opinions on industry standards
and 	the 	regulatory 	framework 	and 	whether 	Defendants 	complied 	with 	these
standards in the marketing and sale” of the talc products. Plaintiffs argue that Dr.
Sage explains those industry standards and regulatory framework “through the lens
of Defendants’ actions,” but does not offer “ultimate legal conclusions about
Defendants’ liability.” (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 22–23.)
Third, Defendants argue that Dr. Sage renders ethical judgments about
Defendants’ corporate conduct and state-of-mind opinions that are speculative and
unduly prejudicial. According to Defendants, this includes opining that Johnson &
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Johnson: (i) knew about health risks associated with the talc products, (ii) did not
engage in “responsible corporate behavior,” and (iii) violated its own representations
regarding ethics. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br. 19–25.)
Plaintiffs disagree, pointing to portions of Dr. Sage’s deposition transcript
where he promises not to offer opinions on Defendants’ intent. Plaintiffs assert that
Dr. Sage may testify about what information Defendants possessed at certain points
in time and whether their actions were reasonable. Plaintiffs also contend that Dr.
Sage may testify about whether Defendants complied with industry, regulatory, and
internal guidelines, and will not state his personal feelings about Defendants’ actions
at trial. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 30–31, 34–36, 40–41).
Fourth, Defendants argue that Dr. Sage narrates corporate documents—
including Johnson & Johnson communications, a patent application, and CIR
communications—without adding any expert analysis. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br.
11–13.) Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that Dr. Sage’s analysis adds helpful context on
the applicable regulatory and industry framework. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br.
19.)
I address these disputes when analyzing the reliability and fit of Dr. Sage’s
opinions below.
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iv. 	Reliability and Scope
Plaintiffs must show that it is more likely than not that Dr. Sage’s testimony
is based on sufficient facts, reliable methods, and a reliable application of those
methods. Fed. R. Evid.702. I find that Plaintiffs have met that burden only as to a
limited portion of Dr. Sage’s testimony.
Dr. Sage “formulated” his opinions by using his “professional knowledge,
experience, 	and 	expertise” 	to 	review 	corporate 	documents, 	“peer-reviewed
literature,” “laws and regulations,” and industry standards. (Sage Rep. ¶ 12.)
According to Dr. Sage, this is the same methodology that he has “applied in [his]
professional and academic career.” (Sage Rep. ¶ 12.) He identifies no other scientific
or non-scientific methodology, such as a comparative analysis of other cosmetic
manufacturer’s practices.
While “extensive and specialized experience” can serve as a reliable method
for making non-scientific observations under Kumho, that only gets Dr. Sage so far.
526 U.S. at 156. As noted above, Dr. Sage’s experience and expertise is in health
law and regulatory design, including industry self-regulation. Given his specialized
background, I find that Dr. Sage’s qualifications and methods are sufficient to permit
him to explain the FDA’s overall regulatory scheme for cosmetics (including the
distinction between the FDA’s oversight of drugs and cosmetics) and the concept of
self-regulation generally and in the cosmetics sector.
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But the balance of Dr. Sage’s opinions are not the product of specialized
expertise or a reliable method. Dr. Sage has no experience working for the FDA or
analyzing FDA disclosures or communications. Nor has he worked for a cosmetic
manufacturer or otherwise previously analyzed compliance efforts or obligations of
a cosmetic company. Because Plaintiffs rely only on Dr. Sage’s experience—
identifying no other methodology—his inexperience in these areas renders the rest
of his testimony unreliable. See In re Rezulin, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (excluding
opinions on compliance with FDA standards as unreliable where experts lacked
relevant experience and cited no other methodology). That inadmissible testimony
includes his opinions that Johnson & Johnson (i) failed to substantiate safety, (ii)
failed to warn and misled consumers, and (iii) marketed and sold misbranded and
adulterated products. It also includes all of Dr. Sage’s compliance opinions, such as
Johnson & Johnson’s purported violations of FDA regulations and disclosure
requirements, industry standards, and internal policies. Finally, it includes his
opinions about Johnson & Johnson’s actions or the information that Johnson &
Johnson allegedly possessed.192
192 	Plaintiffs and Dr. Sage submit that he “is not offering any general causation opinions
regarding whether talcum powder products cause ovarian cancer.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 49;
Sage Dep. at 396:5-6 (“I’m not offering a scientific expert opinion on causation.”).) For the
avoidance of doubt, I recommend the Court find that Dr. Sage is not qualified to opine on any
alleged relationship between talc products and ovarian cancer—either from a tort-law or risk-
assessment perspective—and that such testimony would not stem from a reliable methodology.
Moreover, given the limitations I have recommended be imposed on his testimony, Dr. Sage should
also be precluded from offering any testimony related to: Johnson & Johnson’s knowledge or risks,
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v. 	Fit
With these limitations, Dr. Sage’s cabined testimony will help the factfinder
understand evidence or determine a fact in issue, and thus satisfy Rule 702’s fit
requirement. As noted above, Dr. Sage may testify about the regulatory scheme
applicable to cosmetics manufacturers, including the role of self-regulation. This
information will help the jury understand the complex regulatory environment in
which Defendants operated, and thus better evaluate Defendants’ conduct in relation
to the standard of care. See United States ex rel. Silver v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 11-
1326, 2023 WL 2808098, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2023) (“Qualified experts may
provide background on a statutory or regulatory scheme so long as their opinions do
not state whether the statute or regulation was violated.”).
By contrast, many of the opinions that I recommend be excluded above also
fail the fit requirement or are unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. Dr. Sage’s opinions
that Johnson & Johnson violated FDA regulations and other legal requirements—
including regulations on labeling, disclosures, and substantiating product safety—
are improper legal conclusions. See Rowland v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 9 F. Supp.
3d 553, 561 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (allowing expert to “testify as to the general FDA
alleged hazards posed by the talc products (e.g., whether they contained asbestos, posed health
risks, or cause cancer), or Defendants’ testing methods. Indeed, in their own Daubert motion,
Plaintiffs state that “opinions on what [Johnson & Johnson] knew—and when—about the alleged
presence of asbestos . . . require the application of knowledge about mineralogy, geology, or talc
mining and testing.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 11). Because Dr. Sage lacks such knowledge,
he fails Plaintiffs’ own test.
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regulatory scheme governing pharmaceutical drugs,” but finding opinion on whether
“specific conduct . . . complied with FDA regulations” was “an improper legal
conclusion”); In re Rezulin, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (finding “[e]xpert testimony
interpreting [defendant’s] conduct in disclosing information to the FDA” would “not
assist the fact-finder.”) The same finding applies to his opinion that Johnson &
Johnson misled consumers and sold adulterated and misbranded products. These
statements apply the law to the facts and thus invade the province of the Court and
the jury.
Similarly, during his deposition, Dr. Sage made the types of subjective “bad
company” comments that courts regularly exclude as irrelevant, unhelpful, and
unduly prejudicial. (See, e.g., Sage Dep. at 302:2–7 (describing content of Johnson
& Johnson’s website as “disappointing, frankly shocking, and directly at odds with
its regulatory obligations”)); see Bartoli, 2014 WL 1515870, at *6 (explaining “‘bad
company’ opinions are not admissible”).
Dr. Sage also made speculative inferences about Johnson & Johnson’s state-
of-mind or motives based on his review of documents. (See, e.g., Sage Rep. at 8
(“Johnson & Johnson has known about risk and uncertainty regarding talc and
ovarian cancer for decades.”); id. ¶ 176 (“Johnson & Johnson knew its products
contained carcinogens”); id. ¶ 50 (“Johnson & Johnson’s resistance to the presence
in talcum powder products of fibrous constituents that pose risk to human health is
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strikingly at odds with the factual history.”).) Because Dr. Sage is unqualified to add
scientific or industry context to these documents, the jury can draw these inferences
without his expert testimony. See In re Diet Drugs, 2000 WL 876900, at *9 (finding
if expert “witnesses’ bases for the opinions concerning improper intent come from”
letters and employee statements, “that is what the jury should hear and the question
of . . . intent would flow from such evidence to be determined by the jury.”); In re
Rezulin, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (explaining whether defendant purposefully
“‘buried’ certain lab results” was a “simple inference” drawn from documents
“plaintiffs’ counsel may present directly to the fact-finder”.)193
For these reasons, I recommend the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Sage.
4. 	Dr. Newman
i. 	Dr. Newman’s Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Newman as an expert on “marketing, advertising, and
consumer psychology.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 43.) Dr. Newman holds three
post-graduate degrees from Yale University: an M.S. in Psychology (2005); an M.
Phil. in Psychology (2006); and a Ph.D. in Cognitive Psychology (2008). (ECF No.
193 	Based on the limits that I have imposed on Dr. Sage’s testimony, I need not reach
Defendants’ factual narrative objection. If the need arises, Defendants may raise a factual narrative
objection at trial, similar to my discussion of this issue, supra Part VII.A.1.iii.a.
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33000-13 (“Newman Rep.”) ¶ 2.) In 2011, he completed a three-year post-doctoral
associate program in Marketing at the Yale School of Management. (Id.)
Between 	2011 	and 	2022, 	Dr. 	Newman 	was 	an 	associate professor 	of
management and marketing at the Yale School of Management. (Id. ¶ 1.) During
that tenure, he also held affiliations with Yale University’s Psychology and
Cognitive Science departments and the Yale Center for Customer Insights. (Id.)
Since 2022, Dr. Newman has served as an associate professor of organizational
behavior, human resource management, and marketing at the University of Toronto.
(Id.) He also has served as a visiting professor of marketing at New York University,
the University of Hawaii (Manoa), and Seoul National University. (Id. ¶ 4.) During
his career in academia, Dr. Newman has “taught classes in marketing, consumer
behavior, and marketing management at the undergraduate and graduate (MBA and
PhD) levels.” (Id.)
Dr. Newman also has “taught several seminars on the topics of marketing and
management to executives in senior leadership positions in industry and the U.S.
federal government.” (Id.) He has held advisory roles for academic and professional
organizations, including serving on the editorial boards of the Journal of Consumer
Psychology and the Journal of Sustainable Marketing. (Id. ¶ 5.) And he has published
book chapters and dozens of peer-reviewed articles, including “on the topics of
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marketing 	communications, 	brand 	heritage, 	brand 	authenticity, 	consumer
perceptions of trust, and corporate social responsibility.” (Id. ¶ 7.)
Based on these facts, Defendants do not dispute—and I find—that Dr.
Newman is qualified to testify as an expert witness in marketing, branding, and
consumer psychology, in accordance with the limitations set forth below. To that
end, in connection with limiting portions of Dr. Newman’s testimony on reliability
and fit grounds below, I explain that certain opinions (such as his statements about
the alleged health risks posed by consumption of the talc products) exceed the scope
of his marketing expertise.
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Newman’s Opinions
Dr. Newman states that he was engaged to (i) review Johnson & Johnson’s
marketing practices for the talc products, and (ii) “assess whether the company
engaged 	in 	misleading 	and 	deceptive 	conduct 	that 	created 	confusion 	and
misunderstanding among consumers by failing to communicate and appropriately
inform consumers of health risks associated with” the talc products. (Newman Rep.
¶ 9.) Dr. Newman reviewed Johnson & Johnson consumer marketing materials
(including print advertisements, messaging, and promotions), internal corporate
documents, testimony from Johnson & Johnson employees, and newspaper and
magazine articles. (Id. ¶ 10.)
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Dr. Newman submits that he considered those materials in light of his
professional experience, and in consideration of established principles in the
disciplines of psychology, consumer behavior, and behavioral economics. (See id.
¶¶ 	10–11.) 	Based 	on 	his 	review, 	Dr. 	Newman 	reached 	the 	following 	main
conclusions:
• 	For over a century, Johnson & Johnson’s marketing communications—
including 	“product 	labeling, 	advertisements, 	public 	statements, 	and
endorsements from medical professionals” reflect a strategy that centered
on making the “brand synonymous with trust.” Johnson & Johnson’s
messaging 	“promised 	to 	prioritize 	the 	health 	and 	well-being” 	of
“customers above all else.” (Id. ¶ 12.)
• 	As part of its effort to build a “Trustmark” and “deep, personal trust,”
Johnson & Johnson associated its talc products with the “mother-infant
bond.” (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson succeeded in building consumer trust. Consumers
perceive Johnson & Johnson as a “caregiver” and “innocent” brand. These
favorable consumer perceptions 	created a brand 	“halo” that 	shaped
consumer beliefs on the safety of Johnson & Johnson’s products, reduced
consumers’ sensitivity to risk information, and led to increased sales. (See
id. ¶¶ 14, 37–44.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson was aware of potential health risks concerning the talc
products as early as the 1970s and developed a feasible, market-tested
cornstarch alternative in the 1980s. Even so, Johnson & Johnson continued
to market and sell talc products as safe in the U.S. and Canada until 2020
and globally until 2023. (See id. ¶¶ 16–19.)
• 	By continuing to market the talc products as safe after it knew of potential
health 	risks, 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson 	violated 	its 	promise 	to 	prioritize
customers’ safety and well-being above all else. Through its marketing
efforts, including its targeting of specific demographics, Johnson &
Johnson engaged in “misleading and deceptive conduct that created
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confusion and misunderstanding among consumers.” (See id. ¶¶ 18–19,
98.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson’s “actions needlessly exposed millions of women to a
potential hazard and violated the central promise of trust and safety upon
which their relationship with customers was built.” (Id. ¶ 20.)
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments
Defendants argue that Dr. Newman’s opinions should be excluded for five
main reasons, each of which Plaintiffs contest:
First, Defendants argue that Dr. Newman’s marketing opinions are unreliable
because he considered only Johnson & Johnson internal market research to conclude
that Johnson & Johnson cultivated trust with consumers. Defendants contend that
Dr. Newman failed to conduct experiments or cite any empirical data or hard
evidence—such as public opinion surveys, anthropological, market, or sociological
studies, or other impact evidence—to support those opinions, departing from his
normal professional practices and rendering his testimony speculative. Defendants
argue that the same problems plague Dr. Newman’s opinions that Defendants
engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 25–29.)
In response, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Newman used a methodology that courts
and the consumer-behavior industry accept as reliable, and that he uses in his
professional and academic career. That is, after starting with a null hypothesis, Dr.
Newman compared (i) what he learned about Defendants’ marketing and advertising
practices to (ii) industry codes of conduct promulgated by the American Marketing
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Association, Association of National Advertisers, American Advertising Federation,
and Federal Trade Commission. Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Newman permissibly relied
on Defendants’ own internal documents and communications, deposition testimony,
and marketing materials, studies, and surveys to reach conclusions on the impact of
its marketing over time. Plaintiffs dispute that Dr. Newman was required to conduct
his own survey. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 42–48.)
Second, Defendants argue that even if Dr. Newman’s method were reliable,
his opinions do not fit the facts here. In that regard, Defendants contend that Dr.
Newman’s marketing opinions would not help the factfinder understand evidence or
determine a fact in issue because (i) he does not attempt to tether his opinions to
marketing that any individual plaintiff reviewed, and (ii) his opinions about the
factsabouttalc.com website lack relevance because the website was created years
after any bellwether plaintiff used talc products. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 30.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Newman’s experience and testimony will help
explain how Johnson & Johnson’s marketing practices impacted consumers. (See
Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 42–43.)
Third, Defendants argue that Dr. Newman offers an improper narrative by
regurgitating facts from “straightforward documents.” (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at
12 (arguing Dr. Newman rehashes Johnson & Johnson’s internal documents, a 1982
study on talc, the 1994 and 2008 Citizens’ Petitions to the FDA, an FDA request,
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and Health Canada’s 2021 report.).) Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that Dr. Newman
“offers meaning to Defendants’ actions and inactions and the purposes served in
developing Defendants’ brand.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 20.)
Fourth, Defendants argue that Dr. Newman speculates on Defendants’ state
of mind based on his review of documents. (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 20.) In
response, Plaintiffs argue that based on his review of “thousands of corporate
internal documents,” Dr. Newman opines on the “messaging” that Johnson &
Johnson conveyed—“what J&J promised to its consumers, what J&J stated its
motivations were, and what J&J was aware of and when”—but does not speculate
as to Defendants’ state of mind. (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 34.)
Fifth, Defendants argue that Dr. Newman renders subjective ethical opinions
by stating that Defendants violated both Johnson & Johnson’s own company “credo”
and “what he teaches as ‘best practices’” by “not disclosing” any “health risk
associated with” talc products. (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 22–23.) Defendants also
argue that any probative value of these statements is vastly outweighed by their
tendency to encourage the jury to improperly impose liability, requiring their
exclusion under Rule 403. (Id. at 25.)
Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that Dr. Newman’s testimony on Defendants’
compliance with marketing and advertising codes of conduct promulgated by
professional organizations informs the standard of care and will help the jury
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understand how Johnson & Johnson’s marketing practices impacted consumers.
Plaintiffs also contend that Dr. Newman can testify about Johnson & Johnson’s
corporate credo. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 34–36, 41–43.)
I resolve each of these disputes in connection with analyzing the reliability
and fit of Dr. Newman’s opinions below.
iv. 	Reliability
Plaintiffs have met their burden on reliability by demonstrating, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that some—but not all—of Dr. Newman’s opinions
are based on sufficient facts and data, a reliable methodology, and the reliable
application of that methodology.
For topics that do not involve scientific testimony, the “relevant reliability
concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience,” rather than the
traditional Daubert reliability factors. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150. Courts within and
outside the Third Circuit have held that a “marketing professional’s review and
analysis of company documents to extrapolate marketing strategies, coupled with
the expert’s experience and background may be enough to establish that the expert’s
methodology is reliable.” In re: Tylenol, MDL No. 2436, 2016 WL 807377, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2016) (collecting cases).
In Tylenol, for example, consumers proffered an expert who had taught
marketing research, consumer behavior, and consumer psychology, in addition to
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publishing many articles on how advertising affects consumer perceptions of a
product’s health effects. 2016 WL 807377, at *4. That expert “synthesized” the
defendants “own extensive market research and consumer surveys” and “offered
opinions about how the defendants employed various marketing and psychological
techniques to build the Tylenol brand” as “the ‘safest’ analgesic.” Id. at *5. He also
explained how those techniques “created a certain effect on consumers’ perception
of Tylenol products,” including why it was “reasonable for a consumer” to downplay
certain overuse risks. Id. Because the expert “drew on his background and expertise
in rendering his opinions,” and because his methods reflected a “careful review of
the information presented,” the court found his methodology to be reliable. Id.
Here too, I find that Dr. Newman used a reliable method and reliably applied
it. Starting with a null hypothesis, Dr. Newman used the same systematic analysis
that he applies in his professional and academic career to analyze Defendants’
marketing materials and communications, internal corporate documents about the
talc products, and other data and information. In conducting that review, he
identified and considered six areas of inquiry: relevance; messaging; strategy;
impact; product risks; and response. (See Newman Rep. ¶ 10.) Based on his expertise
in marketing, branding, and consumer psychology, Dr. Newman identified recurring
themes across a century of Johnson & Johnson marketing evidence, linked them to
research on “halo effects,” and contextualized them within Johnson & Johnson’s
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brand-heritage strategy. Subject to the limits discussed herein, those steps constitute
a reliable application of a reliable qualitative method.
Defendants argue that because Dr. Newman did not perform his own survey
or conduct his own experiments, his opinions lack empirical support and his
testimony must be excluded. I disagree, in part. Based on his methodology, Dr.
Newman may synthesize Johnson & Johnson’s branding and messaging strategies,
provide context on industry standard marketing codes, and explain how he expects
messaging themes (including those he identifies) influenced consumer beliefs. See,
e.g., In re Juul Labs, Inc. Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 19-cv-02913,
2022 WL 1814440, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2022) (finding “marketing experts’
experience, review of relevant literature,” and “review of [defendant’s] own
documents provide[d] a reasoned and reliable basis” to “opine generally” about
defendants’ “health messaging and its impact”).194 Dr. Newman also may explain
consumer-psychology principles concerning brand trust, halo effects, and risk
perception.
Other portions of Dr. Newman’s report, however, lack a reliable foundation
or are otherwise inadmissible. While Dr. Newman 	may analyze Johnson &
194 	In rendering those opinions, Dr. Newman does not simply regurgitate facts. He identifies
common themes and adds explanatory context, which courts permit. See, e.g., In re: Tylenol, 2016
WL 807377, at *9 (rejecting factual narrative argument because marketing expert “translate[d] the
meaning of” defendants’ actions in creating Tylenol brand and explained “what purpose they serve
in branding”). If Dr. Newman starts to quote or simply rehash corporate documents at length at
trial, Defendants can object.
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Johnson’s marketing evidence and offer objective opinions on how those materials
could influence consumer perceptions, he cannot testify on how Johnson &
Johnson’s marketing actually impacted or influenced consumers. To that end,
because Dr. Newman did not validate the Johnson & Johnson consumer surveys that
he relied on—by conducting his own experiments, issuing his own surveys, or
speaking to any individual plaintiffs—his conclusion that Johnson & Johnson in fact
“engaged 	in 	misleading 	and 	deceptive 	conduct 	that 	created 	confusion 	and
misunderstanding among consumers” is speculative and does not reliably flow from
his methodology.
Put differently, Dr. Newman may testify about how the advertising themes he
identifies could influence consumer perceptions but may not testify that Johnson &
Johnson’s marketing in fact influenced consumer perceptions. See Montera v.
Premier Nutrition Corp., No. 16-06980, 2022 WL 1225031, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
26, 2022), aff’d in part, 111 F.4th 1018 (9th Cir. 2024) (permitting marketing expert
to explain general marketing principles and synthesize defendant’s marketing
strategies based on review of defendant’s documents, but precluding testimony on
“how consumers actually interpreted the messages” given lack of impact data.)
For the same reasons, Dr. Newman cannot offer causation opinions linking
Johnson & Johnson’s marketing to product use or injury. Dr. Newman engages in
no scientifically accepted methodology to render such testimony. Thus, his opinions
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that Johnson & Johnson’s marketing “needlessly exposed millions of women to a
potential hazard” are inadmissible. (Newman Rep. ¶ 20.)
Dr. Newman also makes several inadmissible assertions about Johnson &
Johnson’s state of mind and corporate conduct. (See, e.g., Newman Rep. at 12 (“By
as early as 1966, Johnson & Johnson was aware of health risks associated with the
use of talcum powder products.”); id. ¶ 65 (opining on Johnson & Johnson’s
awareness of “the potential links between talcum powder use and ovarian cancer”).)
As noted above, this type of subjective testimony does not stem from reliable
principles and usurps the role of the factfinder. See, e.g., O’Bryant, 2022 WL
7670296, at *12 (barring testimony concerning “alleged knowledge and state of
mind,” including whether defendant misled and what defendant “knew at the time”
it developed warnings and labeling.) At trial, Dr. Newman cannot speculate about
Johnson & Johnson’s state of mind or testify that Johnson & Johnson violated ethical
duties.
v. 	Fit and Scope
Dr. Newman’s admissible testimony (as set forth above) fits the case because
it will help the factfinder understand how branding, imaging, and messaging could
shape consumer perceptions of safety. Indeed, because “[a]dvertising methodologies
are esoteric; the average juror could be helped by an explanation of how they work
and were used by defendants.” Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 04-cv-1945,
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2005 WL 2401647, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005); see In re: Tylenol, 2016 WL
807377, at *6 (“The average person may not know about the subtle applied
psychological techniques drug companies use to market their products.”). Here, Dr.
Newman’s analysis of Johnson & Johnson’s “Trustmark” and “mother-child”
marketing themes may help the jury evaluate whether Johnson & Johnson’s marking
conveyed an impression of safety inconsistent with the alleged risks.
By contrast, Dr. Newman’s opinions about Johnson & Johnson’s state of
mind, corporate intent, and alleged false and misleading advertising invade the
province of the factfinder, and are inadmissible. See In re: Tylenol, 2016 WL
807377, at *8 (“[A]n opinion that the advertising was misleading or false would
properly come from the jury, not from an expert.”). And to avoid unfairly prejudicing
the factfinder and exceeding the scope of his expertise, other than offering limited,
general references needed to contextualize the admissible marketing opinions noted
above, Dr. Newman cannot opine on (i) whether using talc products posed health
hazards, (ii) when Defendants were allegedly aware of such risks, or (iii) the history
or purpose of Defendants’ development of a cornstarch alternative.
For these reasons, I recommend the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Newman.
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5. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend the Court grant in part and deny
in part Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. Kessler, Plunkett, Sage,
and Newman, as follows:
1. Dr. Kessler may testify, within the bounds of his expertise, regarding the
regulatory framework governing cosmetics and general industry practices.
But 	he 	is 	precluded 	from 	offering 	legal 	conclusions, 	opinions 	on
Defendants’ intent or state of mind, ethical judgments, or testimony
outside his qualifications, including on the technical validity or aspects of
any particular test or the geological properties of talc.
2. Dr. Plunkett may testify concerning toxicological and risk-assessment
principles and industry practices relevant to cosmetic safety. But she may
not offer legal conclusions, definitive causation opinions, testimony about
Defendants’ knowledge or motives, or subjective ethical assessments.
3. Dr. Sage may offer limited testimony regarding regulatory structures and
industry standards from a policy perspective. But he is barred from
offering legal conclusions, causation opinions, speculative inferences
regarding Defendants’ intent or knowledge, as well as subjective “bad
company” characterizations.
4. Finally, Dr. Newman may testify regarding general marketing principles
and 	consumer-behavior 	concepts. 	But 	his 	opinions 	concerning
Defendants’ 	intent 	and 	definitive 	statements 	about 	how 	Defendants
marketing materials in fact influenced consumers are excluded.
5. To the extent any expert testimony veers into impermissible factual
narrative, legal conclusion, or speculation at trial, appropriate objections
may be raised at that time.
B. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Dr. Kathleen Sutcliffe
Plaintiffs move to exclude the opinion testimony of Dr. Kathleen Sutcliffe, an
expert proffered by Defendants to opine on Johnson & Johnson’s corporate
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knowledge 	and 	conduct. 	(See 	ECF 	No. 	32998-1 	(“Pls.’ 	Regulatory 	Br.”).)
Defendants oppose exclusion. (See ECF No. 33116 (“Defs.’ Regulatory Opp. Br.”).)
My prior Opinion did not cover Dr. Sutcliffe’s testimony. In addressing Plaintiffs’
arguments for excluding Dr. Sutcliffe below, I make independent findings on
qualification, reliability, and fit.
1. 	Summary of Dr. Sutcliffe’s Opinions
Defendants proffer Dr. Sutcliffe as an “expert in organization science,
behavior, and theory.” (Id. 	at 4.) They state that Dr. Sutcliffe “studies how
companies process and respond to information in order to determine what they could
have done better in a given situation and how they can anticipate and prevent future
issues.” (Id.) Dr. Sutcliffe claims particular expertise in understanding “how
organizations process and make sense of ambiguous and equivocal information” and
“make decisions under uncertainty.” (ECF No. 33116-2 (“Sutcliffe Rep.”) ¶ 2.)
Dr. Sutcliffe defined the scope of her work as assessing: (i) what Johnson &
Johnson “knew—and when—about the alleged presence of asbestos in its cosmetic
talc products,” (ii) “what actions it took to acquire this knowledge,” and (iii) “the
extent to which Johnson & Johnson’s actions were consistent with an organizational
commitment to the wellbeing of consumers.” (Id. ¶ 9.) To answer those questions,
Dr. 	Sutcliffe 	reviewed 	internal 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson 	documents 	and 	other
information, 	drew 	on 	her 	experience, 	and 	applied 	a 	qualitative 	method 	and
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“sensemaking” framework that she describes as “widely used and highly cited” in
the field of organizational science. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 42.) In her report, Dr. Sutcliffe reaches
the following main conclusions:
• 	The early 1970s was a period of “disruptive ambiguity” regarding the
safety 	of 	cosmetic 	talc. 	During 	that 	period, 	“confusion 	regarding
definitions of asbestos, and how to identify asbestos in talc, collided with
a lack of regulatory testing standards and evolving science on these
questions.” (See id. ¶ 90.)
• 	In this period of disruptive ambiguity, Johnson & Johnson “actively
pursued knowledge regarding the potential health risks associated with its
baby powder.” That pursuit included Johnson & Johnson’s engagement, in
the “early 1970s,” with “consumers, regulators, scientists, the media, other
manufacturers, suppliers, and trade organizations to make sense of new
scientific knowledge and competing perspectives.” These efforts “were
intended 	to 	advance 	the 	science—and 	to 	promulgate 	accurate
information—related to whether asbestos was present in cosmetic talc.”
Johnson & Johnson’s efforts led to the creation of a “new ‘map’” of
knowledge that “codified Johnson & Johnson’s understanding of the
potential health risks associated with exposure to asbestos and talc and the
safety of its baby powder.” (Id. ¶¶ 14, 91, 161.)
• 	The creation of Johnson & Johnson’s “map” in the mid-1970s “resolved
much of the earlier ambiguity.” (Id. ¶¶ 120, 161.) Over that period, “some
of the key figures who instigated the disruptive ambiguity abandoned their
stances and acknowledged the safety of cosmetic talc, reaffirming Johnson
& Johnson’s ‘map.’” One testing lab and the “FDA would later remark that
much of the testing from this time period was incorrect or suspect, or used
inappropriate definitions of asbestos.” (Id. ¶¶ 120, 161.)
• 	“Since the disruptive ambiguity of the early 1970s, J&J has devoted
significant 	resources 	and 	attention 	to 	developing, 	validating,
disseminating, and challenging” its “map” that “codifies the existing
scientific knowledge regarding the detection of asbestos in talc and the
safety of talc.” Those efforts include (i) “developing and implementing
industry-leading methods for testing its talc sources and its baby powder
for the presence of asbestos,” and (ii) committing “to continued discussion,
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validation, and dissemination of scientific knowledge among researchers
and external stakeholders.” (Id. ¶¶ 15, 190.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson’s “active pursuit, testing, and validation of knowledge
regarding the potential health risks associated with its baby powder reflect
best practices in organizational sensemaking.” Sensemaking “enables
organizations to understand, articulate, and act on knowledge in ways that
are consistent with organizational perspectives and priorities.” (Id. ¶ 16.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson’s actions, during and after the period of disruptive
ambiguity, demonstrate: (i) behavior that Dr. Sutcliffe “would expect to
see in an organization committed to the wellbeing of consumers,” (ii)
Johnson & Johnson’s “ongoing concern about the quality and safety of its
baby powder,” and (iii) proactive engagement “in sensemaking with
regards to the possibility it was not safe.” “Put differently, J&J’s actions
and decisions have been, and continue to be, consistent with the actions of
a responsible company that prioritizes the wellbeing of consumers.” (Id.
¶¶ 16, 189–190, 192.)
• 	By contrast, Johnson & Johnson’s actions “are inconsistent with behaviors
that 	indicate 	carelessness 	or 	disregard” 	for 	consumer 	wellbeing.
“Allegations that J&J ‘knew’ or hid the ‘truth’ about the alleged health
risks associated with its baby powder are inconsistent with the record of
J&J’s actions, decisions, and organizational commitment to the wellbeing
of consumers.” (Id. ¶ 17.)
• 	Plaintiffs 	make 	“broad 	generalizations” 	about 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson,
including that Johnson & Johnson: knew of and concealed “test results
showing that its baby powder contains asbestos and research studies
linking its baby powder to cancer”; manipulated testing results to conceal
asbestos findings from the FDA; violated a duty to warn consumers; had
unethical interactions with regulators; and declined to replace talc-based
baby powers with a cornstarch-alternative to protect profits. (Id. ¶¶ 20–30.)
• 	Plaintiffs’ conclusions 	about 	Johnson & Johnson 	are “based on 	an
incomplete and biased view of the evidence that is not grounded in a
framework for understanding it or a scientific approach to evaluating it.”
To “adequately support their conclusions,” Plaintiffs “would need to
conduct 	an 	organizational 	assessment” 	that 	uses 	“an 	established
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conceptual framework and research methodology based in organizational
theory. Instead, they engage in cherry-picking, a biased review of the
evidence, and inappropriate extrapolation.” (Id. ¶¶ 31, 191.)
2. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments
Plaintiffs move to exclude Dr. Sutcliffe’s opinions for three main reasons,
each of which Defendants dispute:
First, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Sutcliffe is unqualified to testify about
“scientific, technical,” and regulatory topics covered by her report. For example,
Plaintiffs argue that because Dr. Sutcliffe is “no expert in mineralogy, geology, talc
mining, talc testing, or microscopy,” she cannot opine on what Johnson & Johnson
knew and when about the alleged presence of asbestos in talc and “how it responded
to science” on asbestos, talc, testing, and mining. They also argue that she cannot
opine 	on 	“J&J’s 	warnings” 	because 	she 	knows 	“nothing 	about” 	cosmetic
manufacturers’ responsibilities under the FDCA, and “has never consulted with the
FDA or any company regulated by the FDA.” (See Pls.’ Regulatory Br. 1, 8–13.)
In response, Defendants explain that Dr. Sutcliffe is not offering an opinion
on the presence of asbestos in talc, testing or sensitivity, or other “scientific aspects
of talc safety.” Instead, Defendants submit that Dr. Sutcliffe opines “on J&J’s
corporate knowledge and corporate actions”; i.e., “what information J&J knew over
the past several decades and how it responded to that information.” Because Dr.
Sutcliffe has focused her career researching and assessing how organizations process
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information and make decisions under uncertainty, Defendants contend that Dr.
Sutcliffe “has the precise qualifications necessary to offer that opinion.” (See Defs.’
Regulatory Opp. Br. at 1–3, 8–10.)
Second, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Sutcliffe’s opinions fail the reliability test. In
that regard, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Sutcliffe’s “sensemaking” is a subjective,
qualitative methodology that cannot be tested or repeated. Plaintiffs also argue that
Dr. Sutcliffe fails to reliably apply her own standards, instead “cherry-picking
evidence that supports Johnson & Johnson’s litigation position, while ignoring (and
not even reading) evidence that is harmful to J&J.” According to Plaintiffs, these
information gaps make Dr. Sutcliffe’s opinions unreliable. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Br.
at 1–2, 13–30.)
Defendants submit that Dr. Sutcliffe employed a qualitative methodology
within the “widely cited conceptual framework of ‘sensemaking.’” Defendants
contend that this methodology draws on decades of organizational science research,
and that similar qualitative research has been accepted in analogous social science
contexts. Defendants dispute that Dr. Sutcliffe ignored information or limited
research to the 1970s. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 2, 10–23.)
Third, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Sutcliffe’s opinions do not fit the facts. To that
end, Plaintiffs contend that their product liability claims turn “on the presence of a
defect in J&J’s products at the time those products left J&J’s hands, which defect
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made the products unreasonably dangerous.” Plaintiffs argue that these “questions
are answerable by straightforward reference to hard sciences: toxicology; medicine;
epidemiology; material science; the science of consumer warnings.” They submit
that “J&J’s organizational behavior,” ability to engage in “sensemaking,” and “pure-
hearted feelings about the ‘wellbeing’ of consumers” is not on trial. (See Pls.’
Regulatory Br. at 33–35.)
Defendants contest Plaintiffs’ characterization of their claims, arguing that
Plaintiffs 	assert 	negligence 	and 	fraud 	claims 	that 	“put 	J&J’s 	organizational
knowledge, motivations, and behavior at issue.” Defendants highlight Plaintiffs’
allegations that Johnson & Johnson (i) knew “for decades that talc may pose health
risks to consumers,” (ii) “ignored data regarding these risks,” (iii) concealed or
misrepresented material facts, and (iv) “failed to adequately ensure the safety of its
consumers.” According to Defendants, Dr. Sutcliffe’s testimony fits because she
explains that Plaintiffs’ allegations are “inconsistent with the record of J&J’s actions,
decisions, and organizational commitment to the wellbeing of consumers.” (See
Defs.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at. 24–25.)
3. 	Dr. Sutcliffe’s Qualifications
Dr. Sutcliffe holds a Ph.D. in organization theory and behavior from the
University of Texas at Austin. (Sutcliffe Rep. ¶ 1.) She currently serves as a
Bloomberg Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University, with appointments
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in its Carey Business School, School of Medicine, School of Nursing, and
Bloomberg School of Public Health. (Id.) Dr. Sutcliffe previously had a twenty-plus-
year tenure on the faculty of the University of Michigan’s Stephen M. Ross School
of Business and a three-year tenure on the faculty of Minesota’s Carlson School of
Management. (Id. ¶ 1.) Dr. Sutcliffe has taught many courses on organizational
behavior and theory. (Id. ¶ 6.)
For 	decades, 	Dr. 	Sutcliffe 	has 	researched 	organizational 	behavior 	and
decision-making. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3.) Her work focuses on how organizations interpret
complex information, respond to risks, and make decisions under uncertainty. (See
id.) Dr. Sutcliffe is a prolific publisher of peer-reviewed research, having authored,
co-authored, or co-edited four books and dozens of journal articles on organizational
behavior. (Id. ¶ 4.) Her research spans many industries, including healthcare,
manufacturing, and transportation. (Id. ¶ 3.) She touts her published research
assessment of “Toyota’s organizational design and sensemaking system as it
pertained to the problem of its slow recognition” of “unintended acceleration
difficulties.” (Id. ¶ 4.)
Dr. 	Sutcliffe 	also 	has 	consulted 	for 	government 	agencies, 	healthcare
institutions, and private companies. (Id. ¶ 5.) That includes helping reshape a
multinational firm’s organizational processes and practices. (Id.) Among other
professional organizations, Dr. Sutcliffe is a member of the of the Academy of
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Management, the European Group for Organizational Studies, the Institute for
Operations Research and Management Sciences, and the Strategic Management
Society. (Id. ¶ 1.) By appointment of the National Academy of Sciences, Dr.
Sutcliffe also sits on the Committee on Emerging Trends in Aviation Safety. (Id..)
Based on these facts and my full review of Dr. Sutcliffe’s report and
deposition transcript, I find that Dr. Sutcliffe is qualified by specialized knowledge,
under Rule 702, to testify on organizational behavior and theory, including the
structures, processes, and information-management of large corporations. See In re
Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741 (explaining “Rule 702’s liberal policy of admissibility” extends
to experts qualified by “specialized knowledge”). As applied to Johnson & Johnson,
she is qualified to testify generally as to the manner in which Johnson & Johnson
processed and acquired information, subject to the relevance and fit limitations
discussed below.
While Dr. Sutcliffe is generally qualified to opine on how corporations
(including Johnson & Johnson) process information and acquire knowledge, her
report is replete with opinions that exceed the scope of her knowledge, skill,
experience, training, and education. The claims at issue in this case involve highly
technical, scientific inquiries. Both parties have retained a host of experts trained in
hard sciences. At trial, those experts will be called upon to help the jury understand
issues related to the alleged presence of asbestos and other materials in the talc
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products, talc mining, talc testing, and the alleged link between the talc products and
ovarian cancer.
Dr. Sutcliffe lacks the scientific, technical expertise needed to offer opinions
in those areas. See Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 322. To that end, Dr. Sutcliffe never worked
for the FDA or consulted for the FDA. (ECF No. 32998-6 (“Sutcliffe Dep.”) at
57:15–20, 63:15–16.) She has never advised a consumer products company on
complying with the FDCA or assessing product risks. (See Sutcliffe Dep. at 57:21–
60:1.) She has no expertise in FDA regulations, including the standards for cosmetic
warnings, adulteration, or misbranding. (Id. at 55:4–20.) As of her deposition, she
did not know the “ins and outs” of the FDCA, had never taught about the FDCA,
and did not know whether the talc products were subject to the FDCA. (Id. at 27:16–
28:16, 67:10–17.) She is not a mineralogist, geologist, toxicologist, microscopist,
expert in mining for talc, or expert for testing in talc. (Id. at 49:12–50:12.)
Despite disclaiming expertise those areas, Dr. Sutcliffe’s report reached many
conclusions that required this technical and scientific knowledge. For example,
despite disclaiming any expertise in testing, she characterized Johnson & Johnson’s
“testing program” as “rigorous.” (Sutcliffe Rep. ¶ 192; id. ¶ 95 (“J&J invested time
and resources to refine its own testing methodology, which was more rigorous than
that adopted by the industry.”).) Even though she lacks expertise in cosmetics safety,
talc, and asbestos, she testified at deposition that after the 1970s ‘it was pretty clear
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that talc was safe.” (Sutcliffe Dep. at 141:8–10.) And even though she lacks any
expertise on the FDA’s regulatory structure, she challenged Plaintiffs’ labeling and
failure to warn claims by relying on communications with the FDA. (Sutcliffe Rep.
¶ 33 (“Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations disregard the fact that the FDA as the
relevant regulatory body had considered and rejected both asbestos and ovarian
cancer warning labels for talc on several separate occasions.”).)
In sum, Dr. Sutcliffe is qualified to explain generally how corporations
process and acquire information, the sensemaking framework, and the general types
of decision-making structures or information channels characteristic of corporations
focused on safety and consumer well-being. Subject to the limitations discussed
herein, she may also opine—generally, and without crossing the line into scientific
inquiries outside her expertise—on whether Johnson & Johnson’s information
acquisition and decision-making processes aligned with that framework. But Dr.
Sutcliffe is not qualified to offer opinions on any of the scientific or technical matters
described above, including Johnson & Johnson’s testing methods, the safety or
health risks of the talc products, and the presence of asbestos or other materials in
Talc. This means that Dr. Sutcliffe can testify, generally, about how Johnson &
Johnson processed information, but cannot testify as to the technical details of what
information Johnson & Johnson processed.
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4. 	Reliability
“Daubert’s reliability requirement ensures that an expert’s testimony is ‘based
on the methods and procedures of science, not on subjective belief and unsupported
speculation.’” Cohen, 125 F.4th at 461–62 (citation omitted). Meeting reliability
does not require that “a particular scientific opinion has the best foundation, or even
whether the opinion is supported by the best methodology or unassailable research.”
Karlo, 849 F.3d at 81 (citation omitted.) Instead, the court examines whether the
testimony “is supported by ‘good grounds.’” Id. This “inquiry ‘applies to all aspects
of an expert’s testimony: the methodology, the facts underlying the expert’s opinion,
[and] the link between the facts and the conclusion.” Cohen, 125 F.4th at 462
(citation omitted).
The Rule 702 analysis is a “flexible one.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594; see
Pineda, 520 F.3d at 248 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining Daubert reliability factors “‘are
neither exhaustive nor applicable in every case’” (citation omitted)). As the Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules has explained:
Some types of expert testimony will be more objectively
verifiable, and subject to the expectations of falsifiability,
peer review, and publication, than others. Some types of
expert testimony will not rely on anything like a scientific
method, and so will have to be evaluated by reference to
other standard principles attendant to the particular area of
expertise.
Fed. R. Evid.702, advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
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When 	expert 	testimony 	is 	based 	on 	“‘soft 	social 	sciences’”—like 	Dr.
Sutcliffe’s testimony—such “flexibility is necessary.” Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 564 F. Supp. 2d 322, 361 (D.N.J. 2008); see United States v.
Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115, 1123 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Because there are areas of expertise,
such as the ‘social sciences in which the research, theories and opinions cannot have
the exactness of hard science methodologies,” courts have “broad discretion to
determine ‘whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures
of 	reliability.’” 	(citations 	omitted)). 	Thus, 	a 	social 	science 	approach 	is 	not
necessarily unreliable based on “inherent methodological limitations” or because it
cannot “produce ‘a testable hypothesis’ or a ‘known or potential rate of error.’”
Bowers, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 361 (citation omitted). Instead, the Court “must perform
its gatekeeping assessment on measures of reliability that are appropriate to the
particular testimony in question.” Id.
Applying those principles, courts have found that qualitative, social-sciences
methods are reliable when experts review “data, documents, and testimony,” apply
specialized “knowledge and experience,” use a peer-reviewed framework, and
support conclusions through the discussion of relevant literature. Id.; see, e.g., Louis
Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Sunny Merch. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 3d 485, 505 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (admitting testimony when expert used “qualitative” method based on
experience, review of documents and deposition testimony, and field research).
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Here, 	Dr. 	Sutcliffe 	followed 	a 	qualitative 	method 	for 	assessing 	how
corporations process ambiguous information that is generally accepted in the field
of organizational behavior. Dr. Sutcliffe’s method draws on peer-reviewed literature
from leaders in her field, including Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman’s
publication on qualitative data and Karl E. Weick’s publication on sensemaking in
organizations. (See Sutcliffe Rep. ¶ 40 & n.18; id. ¶ 42 & n.20.) Dr. Sutcliffe has
researched the same or similar methods for decades, published dozens of scholarly
works on sensemaking and organizational behavior more generally, and has personal
experience applying that method. See Fed. R. Evid.702, advisory committee’s note
to 2000 amendment (explaining non-scientific testimony must “be evaluated by
reference to other standard principles attendant to the particular area of expertise”;
i.e., a showing that the testimony is “grounded in an accepted body of learning or
experience in the expert’s field”). Within the narrow area in which I found Dr.
Sutcliffe qualified to testify, Dr. Sutcliffe’s method was reliable and she reliably
applied it.195
195 	As noted above, Dr. Sutcliffe is not qualified to offer opinions on the scientific or technical
matters discussed in her report, including Defendants’ testing methods, the safety of the talc
products, and the presence of certain substances in Talc. While that ends the inquiry with respect
to those subjects, even putting qualifications aside, Dr. Sutcliffe’s conclusions in many of those
areas do not reflect a reliable application of a reliable method. For example, Dr. Sutcliffe lacks
good grounds to opine that “much of the ambiguity and concern regarding the safety of cosmetic
talc had been resolved” by 1978, (Sutcliffe Rep. ¶ 118), when she admits that she did not review
“specific studies” (Sutcliffe Dep. at 335:18–21).
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5. 	Fit and Scope
Under Rule 702’s fit restriction, even reliable methods that are reliably
applied will be excluded if there is no connection between the expert’s testimony
and the disputed factual issues in a case. In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743. Here,
Defendants have met their burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Dr. Sutcliffe’s testimony (as limited above and below) will assist the jury.
To that end, Plaintiffs assert state law negligence and fraud claims that place
Defendants’ corporate knowledge and conduct squarely at issue. (See, e.g., ECF No.
226636-2, Pls.’ 2d Amend. Compl. dated Aug. 14, 2023 ¶ 208 (“Defendants engaged
in wrongful conduct and were negligent” by “selling talcum powder products which
contained asbestos and fibrous talc, which Defendants knew or should have known
were dangerous and posed substantial risks of harm”).) Dr. Sutcliffe can help jurors
evaluate those claims by providing background information on how reasonable
corporations process information and make decisions under uncertainty. In that way,
her 	organizational 	framework 	could 	provide 	a 	useful 	context 	for 	evaluating
Defendants’ conduct. Cf. Bridges, 2022 WL 4244276, at *8 (explaining “an expert
educating a jury on general principles of sex trafficking and sexual abuse can be
helpful to the fact finder in assessing fact witnesses’ credibility”).
For these reasons, I recommend the Court to grant in part and deny in part
Plaintiffs’ 	Motion 	to 	Exclude 	the 	Opinions 	of 	Dr. 	Sutcliffe. 	Based 	on 	her
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qualifications and experience, Dr. Sutcliffe can offer general testimony on how
organizations process information and make decisions under uncertainty. That
includes explaining the types of decision-making structures or information channels
she sees in corporations focused on consumer safety and, subject to the limits herein,
whether 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson’s 	information 	acquisition 	and 	decision-making
processes aligned with that framework.
Given her lack of scientific expertise or regulatory experience in the areas
relevant to this case, Dr. Sutcliffe cannot opine on Defendants’ testing methods, the
safety of the talc products (including when any period of “disruptive ambiguity”
regarding Talc began or ended), and the presence of certain substances in Talc. And
for the same reasons discussed in my analysis of Defendants’ motion to exclude
Plaintiffs’ regulatory and marketing experts, Dr. Sutcliffe cannot draw legal
conclusions, opine on Defendants’ state of mind, or make subjective assessments of
Defendants’ conduct, such as what Defendants “knew” or whether they acted like a
good company.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Mindful of the significance of this MDL and the impact the pending Rule 702
motions may have on its course, this Report and Recommendation reflects the
seriousness with which I approached my assignment as a limited-purpose Special
Master. I have undertaken an exhaustive review of the seventeen motions referred to
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me by the Court, engaging closely with an extensive record that includes, inter alia,
voluminous 	briefing, 	expert 	reports, 	deposition 	testimony, 	and 	the 	scientific
literature—including new scientific evidence since my 2020 Opinion—on which the
parties rely. In evaluating the admissibility of the challenged expert opinions, I
applied Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023 amendments, while remaining within the
bounds established by the Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order. Having
afforded the parties’ submissions the careful consideration they warrant, and for the
foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that the pending Rule 702 motions be
resolved in accordance with the determinations set forth in this Report and
Recommendation, as summarized in the chart that follows. A second Report and
Recommendation addressing the motions on which I have reserved decision will
issue following the two Daubert evidentiary hearings presently scheduled for
January 26 and February 6, 2026.
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Hon. Freda L. Wolfson (ret.)
Special Master
Dated: 	January 20, 2026
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW J ERSEY

IN RE: JOHNSON & JOHNSON
TALCUM POWDER PRODUCTS
MARKETING, SALES
PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION

Case No. 3:16-md-2738 (MAS) (RLS)
MDL No. 2738

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. 	INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................1
II. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...................................... 2
A. 	The Talc MDL .......................................................................................2
B. 	The First Round of Rule 702 Motions .................................................. 3
C. 	Johnson & Johnson’s Bankruptcy Proceedings .................................... 4
D. 	The Current Round of Rule 702 Motions ............................................. 5
E. 	The Pending Daubert Motions .............................................................. 6
F. 	My Appointment and Duties as Special Master .................................... 8
III. 	OVERVIEW OF THE 2020 OPINION ........................................................... 9
A. 	Dr. Ghassan Saed.................................................................................10
B. 	Dr. William Longo............................................................................... 11
C. 	Drs. Anne McTiernan, Daniel Clarke-Pearson, and Arch Carson ...... 14
D. 	Dr. Gregory Diette ...............................................................................16
E. 	Dr. Cheryl Saenz..................................................................................18
F. 	Dr. Benjamin Neel ...............................................................................19
IV. 	LEGAL STANDARD ....................................................................................21
A. 	Federal Rule of Evidence 702 .............................................................21
B. 	2023 Amendment to Rule 702.............................................................22
1. 	The Amendments ......................................................................22
2. 	The Impact of the 2023 Amendment ........................................23
C. 	Daubert and its Progeny ......................................................................25
D. 	Admissibility Versus Weight ...............................................................30
E. 	Publication and Peer Review Status ....................................................34
V. 	GENERAL CAUSATION .............................................................................41
A. 	A Brief Primer Regarding Talc and Asbestos......................................42
B. 	Defendants’ General Causation Motions.............................................45
1. 	Scope of Review .......................................................................46
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Experts ......................................................................50
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3. 	The Bradford Hill Factors .........................................................55
4. 	Scientific Developments Since 2020 ........................................59
5. 	The Parties’ Bradford Hill Arguments ......................................68
i. 	Strength of the Association .............................................68
ii. 	Consistency .....................................................................92
iii. 	Biological Gradient (or Dose-Response
Relationship) ................................................................. 111
iv. 	Biological Plausibility ..................................................126
a. 	Ovarian Cancer Subtypes ...................................130
b. 	Migration ............................................................141
c. 	Inflammation, Oxidative Stress, and
Macrophage-Impairment ....................................179
(1) 	Talcum powder and chronic
inflammation, oxidative stress .................186
(2) 	Chronic inflammation and ovarian
cancer .......................................................212
(3) 	Macrophage-impairment and ovarian
cancer .......................................................234
v. 	The Remaining Bradford Hill Factors ..........................242
a. 	Specificity ...........................................................242
b. 	Coherence ...........................................................247
c. 	Analogy ..............................................................252
d. 	Experiment .........................................................255
e. 	Temporality ........................................................257
6. 	Asbestos ..................................................................................260
7. 	Heavy Metals and Fragrances .................................................279
i. 	Consideration of Defendants’ Arguments in the
2020 Opinion ................................................................280
ii. 	Summary of Plaintiffs’ Heavy Metals and
Fragrances Experts and Opinions .................................282
a. 	Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions .................283
b. 	Dr. Michael Crowley’s opinions ........................285
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c. 	Other experts ......................................................292
iii. 	Admissibility Analysis ..................................................304
a. 	Qualifications and Fit .........................................304
(1) 	Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s
qualifications and fit ................................306
(2) 	Dr. Crowley’s qualifications and fit ......... 309
(3) 	Other experts’ qualifications and fit......... 310
(a) 	Heavy metals .................................310
(b) 	Fragrances ......................................314
(c) 	Fit ...................................................315
b. 	Reliability ...........................................................315
(1) 	Heavy metals ............................................315
(a) 	Lack of connection to ovarian
cancer .............................................316
(b) 	Dose-response ................................325
(2) 	Dr. Crowley—fragrance chemicals.......... 328
(a) 	Lack of a link to ovarian cancer .... 329
(b) 	Dose-response ................................335
(c) 	Other experts’ opinions on
fragrance chemicals .......................337
C. 	Plaintiffs’ Motions to Exclude Defendants’ Rebuttal Experts’
Genetics-Related General Causation Opinions and Biological
Plausibility Opinions .........................................................................340
1. 	Defendants’ Experts ................................................................342
i. 	Drs. Saenz, Finan & Holcomb ......................................343
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................343
b. 	Relevant Opinions ..............................................346
ii. 	Dr. DiFeo ......................................................................350
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................350
b. 	Relevant Opinions ..............................................351
iii. 	Dr. Permuth ...................................................................353
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................353
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b. 	Relevant Opinions ..............................................354
iv. 	Dr. Boyd ........................................................................356
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................356
b. 	Relevant opinions ...............................................357
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Arguments ..............................................................363
i. 	Genetics-Related General Causation Opinions ............ 366
ii. 	Biological Plausibility Causation Opinions..................378
a. 	Constituents of Talcum Powder .........................378
b. 	Biological Plausibility Standard .........................388
iii. 	Dr. Boyd ........................................................................395
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................396
b. 	Reliability ...........................................................399
c. 	Fit........................................................................408
iv. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr.
Kornak ..........................................................................410
a. 	O’Brien 2024 ...................................................... 411
(1) 	The Sister Study .......................................412
(2) 	O’Brien 2024’s quantitative bias
analysis corrections ..................................413
(3) 	O’Brien 2024’s recall bias
adjustments...............................................416
(4) 	O’Brien 2024’s results .............................418
b. 	Dr. Kornak ..........................................................418
(1) 	Qualifications ...........................................418
(2) 	Methodology and opinions ......................419
(3) 	Reliability .................................................424
VI. 	CONTAMINATION AND TESTING MOTIONS......................................433
A. 	Asbestos.............................................................................................435
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’
Asbestos-Related Opinions .....................................................435
i. 	Drs. William Longo and Mark Rigler...........................435
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a. 	Qualifications .....................................................437
b. 	Methodology and Conclusions ...........................439
c. 	Analysis ..............................................................442
ii. 	Drs. Robert Cook and Mark Krekeler ..........................454
a. 	Qualifications .....................................................455
b. 	Dr. Robert Cook’s Methodology and
Conclusions ........................................................456
c. 	Dr. Mark Krekeler’s Methodology and
Conclusions ........................................................458
d. 	Drs. Robert Cook and Mark Krekeler’s
“Counsel-Generated Charts” ..............................460
e. 	The Adequacy of Drs. Robert Cook and
Mark Krekeler’s Factual Foundation .................463
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Geology Opinions of
Drs. Mary Poulton and Laura Webb .......................................473
i. 	Rule 702’s Qualification Requirement is Liberally
Construed ......................................................................474
ii. 	Dr. Mary Poulton’s Qualifications ................................475
iii. 	Dr. Laura Webb’s Qualifications ..................................478
iv. 	Analysis Regarding Dr. Mary Poulton .........................481
v. 	Analysis Regarding Dr. Laura Webb ............................488
B. 	Tissue Sample Motions .....................................................................495
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr.
Godleski ..................................................................................497
i. 	Qualifications ................................................................498
ii. 	Methodology and Opinions ..........................................500
iii. 	Reliability .....................................................................507
iv. 	Fit ..................................................................................538
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude The Opinions Of Dr. Juan
Felix And Dr. Teri Longacre ...................................................540
i. 	Qualifications ................................................................542
ii. 	Methodology and Opinions ..........................................545
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iii. 	Reliability .....................................................................548
VII. 	REGULATORY, MARKETING, AND CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE
OPINIONS ...................................................................................................551
A. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. David
Kessler, Laura Plunkett, William Sage, and George Newman..........551
1. 	Dr. Kessler ...............................................................................551
i. 	Qualifications ................................................................551
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Kessler’s Opinions .............................554
iii. 	Specific Exclusion Arguments and Legal Standards .... 556
a. 	Factual Narrative Challenge ...............................557
b. 	Legal Conclusions Challenge .............................560
c. 	State of Mind Challenge .....................................566
d. 	Ethical Opinion Challenge .................................569
iv. 	Reliability and Fit .........................................................574
v. 	Scope.............................................................................576
2. 	Dr. Plunkett .............................................................................579
i. 	Dr. Plunkett’s Qualifications.........................................579
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Plunkett’s Opinions............................582
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments................................585
iv. 	Reliability .....................................................................589
a. 	Risk-Assessment Methodology ..........................590
b. 	Regulatory-Based Methodology ........................596
v. 	Fit, Scope, and Specific Challenges .............................597
3. 	Dr. Sage ...................................................................................600
i. 	Dr. Sage’s Qualifications ..............................................600
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Sage’s Opinions .................................602
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments................................603
iv. 	Reliability and Scope ....................................................606
v. 	Fit ..................................................................................608
4. 	Dr. Newman ............................................................................610
i. 	Dr. Newman’s Qualifications .......................................610
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ii. 	Summary of Dr. Newman’s Opinions ..........................612
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments................................614
iv. 	Reliability .....................................................................617
v. 	Fit and Scope ................................................................621
5. 	Conclusion ..............................................................................623
B. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Dr. Kathleen Sutcliffe ........................623
1. 	Summary of Dr. Sutcliffe’s Opinions......................................624
2. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments ..........................................627
3. 	Dr. Sutcliffe’s Qualifications...................................................629
4. 	Reliability ................................................................................634
5. 	Fit and Scope...........................................................................637
VIII. CONCLUSION............................................................................................638
IX. 	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DECISION CHART ...................640
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SPECIAL MASTER, Hon. Freda L. Wolfson (ret.):
I. 	INTRODUCTION
This multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) consists of thousands of lawsuits filed
by 	individual 	consumers, 	represented 	by 	the 	Plaintiffs’ 	Steering 	Committee
(“Plaintiffs”), who claim that prolonged perineal use of Johnson & Johnson’s talcum
powder products causes ovarian cancer. As part of coordinated pretrial proceedings,
Plaintiffs and the moving defendants—Johnson & Johnson and LLT Management,
LLC, and now known as Red River Talc, LLC (“Defendants”)—have filed multiple
Daubert1 motions.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(a), the Court appointed me as
the Special Master for the limited purpose of addressing the parties’ Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 Daubert-related motions. As detailed below, the parties filed a total
of 17 motions challenging the admissibility of expert testimony. I have been tasked
with issuing a Report and Recommendation addressing whether the challenged
experts’ opinions satisfy Rule 702 and the related Daubert standard. Consistent with
my rigorous gatekeeping obligation, these recommendations address whether (1)
certain proffered experts are qualified to testify, (2) the proffered experts’ opinions
are based on a reliable methodology, and (3) the proffered experts’ testimony fits
within this case. My recommendations are based on the totality of materials
1 	Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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submitted, as well as arguments presented by the parties at an in-person hearing held
on November 25, 2025.
Specifically, I have considered the parties’ briefs, expert reports, deposition
transcripts, presentations during oral argument, and other supporting documents,
including the volume of studies upon which the experts relied in reaching their
conclusions. My reasonings and findings are set forth below, and my decisions are
summarized 	in 	a 	Chart 	attached 	at 	the 	conclusion 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation.2
II. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. 	The Talc MDL
Starting in October 2016, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(“JPML”) began transferring all federal actions involving talc-related ovarian cancer
to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey for coordinated pretrial
proceedings. (See ECF Nos. 1; 3; 9; 10; 14; 48; 61; 76; 77; 78; 80; 81.) The JPML
assigned this MDL to me in my then-role as a District Judge. I oversaw this MDL
until my retirement as Chief U.S. District Court Judge on February 1, 2023. Indeed,
I not only have institutional knowledge of this case, but I rendered various
substantive rulings in the MDL, including the Daubert opinion that is the subject of
2 	For purposes of this review, the terms ‘Report and Recommendation’ and ‘Opinion’ are
used interchangeably.
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the parties’ motions here. Following my retirement from the court, the JPML
assigned the MDL to Hon. Michael A. Shipp, U.S.D.J., who currently presides over
this litigation. (ECF No. 26591.) Since its inception, tens of thousands of cases have
been filed in the MDL. According to the JPML, as of January 5, 2026, this litigation
has over 67,000 actions now pending, with additional short form complaints filed on
a daily basis, making this the largest pending MDL in the United States by a
significant margin.
B. 	The First Round of Rule 702 Motions
After years of discovery in this MDL, in 2019, the parties proffered experts
on various scientific issues related to general causation and the testing of talcum
powder for asbestos and other contaminants. Each side moved to exclude the
testimony of certain of the other side’s experts. As discussed at length in Section III
of this Report and Recommendation, on April 27, 2020, I issued an Opinion and
Order denying Plaintiffs’ motions and granting in part, denying in part Defendants’
motions. See In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods. Mktg., Sales Pracs.
& Prods. Liab. Litig., 509 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.N.J. 2020) (“2020 Opinion”).
In short, while I limited certain conclusions drawn by Plaintiffs’ experts, I
declined to exclude their ultimate opinions that Defendants’ talcum powder products
contained trace amounts of asbestos and that, when applied to the perineum,
Defendants’ talc-based products may cause ovarian cancer in females. Prior to
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issuing my Opinion, I held a multi-day Daubert hearing at which five experts
testified 	on 	behalf 	of 	Plaintiffs 	(Drs. 	Ghassan 	Saed, 	William 	Longo, 	Anne
McTiernan, Daniel Clarke-Pearson, and Arch Carson) and three experts testified on
behalf of Defendants (Drs. Gregory Diette, Cheryl Saenz, and Benjamin Neel). Id.
at 128 & n.2. The parties selected these experts as representatives of each field of
science involved in this action. Id. at 128 n.2. After the issuance of my 2020 Opinion,
the parties proceeded to select bellwether trials.
C. 	Johnson & Johnson’s Bankruptcy Proceedings
However, starting in October 2021, Johnson & Johnson—by and through LTL
Management, LLC and later Red River Talc, LLC—attempted, on three separate
occasions, to use the bankruptcy court system to resolve all talc litigation. They were
unsuccessful. As a result of these bankruptcy proceedings, this MDL has been
subject to various stay orders over the years. Most recently, Red River Talc, LLC
filed suit in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in
September 2024, resulting in an automatic bankruptcy stay. However, on March 31,
2025, Hon. Christopher Lopez, U.S.B.J., entered a Memorandum Decision and
Order denying confirmation of Red River Talc LLC’s plan of reorganization and
dismissing its Chapter 11 case. (ECF No. 33426.) In April 2025, Defendants
declined to pursue an appeal of that decision, (id.), and thus, the stay terminated,
resuming this MDL.
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D. 	The Current Round of Rule 702 Motions
On March 27, 2024, after the second, but before the third, bankruptcy
proceeding, the Court entered the following Text Order allowing a full refiling of
the Rule 702 motions:
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ and
Defendants’ August 23, 2023 correspondences detailing a
disagreement as to the scope of Daubert motions. Upon
review of the parties’ contentions, the Court is persuaded
that the recent changes to Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
the emergence of new relevant science, and the language
of Chief Judge Wolfson’s previous Daubert Opinion make
a full refiling of Daubert motions appropriate.
(ECF No. 30260.) Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Court’s March 27, 2024 Text Order, which Defendants opposed. (ECF Nos. 31080;
32026; 32118.) The parties fundamentally disagreed (and perhaps still do) regarding
the purpose and scope of the renewed Rule 702 motions.
On April 30, 2024, the Court issued a Memorandum Order denying Plaintiffs’
motion for reconsideration and providing the parties “in more vivid detail how it
intends for [renewed] Daubert motions to proceed.” (ECF No. 32122 (the “April 30,
2024 Memorandum Order”) at 5.) The Court explained that, in holding that a full
refiling of the motions is appropriate, it intended “to open up all expert opinions to
Daubert challenges, even those previously considered by Chief Judge Wolfson.”
(Id.) However, the Court made clear that it did not intend to review de novo my prior
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findings or “to start Daubert motions over from scratch.” (Id. at 3.) To that end, the
Court provided the following guidance to the parties:
To ensure there is no room for confusion by the parties,
the Daubert procedure moving forward is as follows: if
Chief Judge Wolfson entered a decision on an issue and
either party wishes to challenge that decision, briefing on
the upcoming in limine motions should set forth Chief
Judge Wolfson’s previous decision and on what basis the
party contends that decision should be reconsidered. In
other words, the briefing should identify either: (1) that
Chief Judge Wolfson’s previous Opinion demonstrably
fails to adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023
amendments; or (2) new science is shown to directly
contradict or challenge Chief Judge Wolfson’s previous
findings. To the extent that the parties seek to file new
Daubert motions not previously considered by the Court,
the parties may file traditional Daubert motions without
restriction.
(Id. at 6.) On July 23, 2024, the parties filed their second round of Rule 702 motions
in accordance with the Court’s directive.
E. 	The Pending Daubert Motions
The parties have collectively filed a total of 17 Rule 702 motions, which
generally fall into four (sometimes overlapping) categories: (1) general causation;
(2) contamination and testing; (3) specific causation; and (4) corporate knowledge,
safety, regulatory compliance, and marketing. The parties seek to exclude, in whole
or in part, the testimony of at least 39 experts.
Specifically, Plaintiffs have filed the following nine motions:
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1. Motion to Exclude the Geology Opinions of Drs.
Mary Poulton and Laura Webb (ECF No. 32996);
2. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Kathleen
Sutcliffe (ECF No. 32998);
3. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. Michael
Finan, Cheryl Saenz, and Kevin Holcomb (ECF No.
32999);
4. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Jennifer
Permuth (ECF No. 33001);
5. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. Juan Felix
and Teri Longacre (ECF No. 33002);
6. Motion to Exclude the Asbestos Testing Opinions
of Matthew S. Sanchez, Ph.D., Ann G. Wylie, Ph.D.
and Shu-Chun Su, Ph.D. (ECF No. 33006);
7. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Analisa
DiFeo (ECF No. 33010);
8. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. John Kornak
(ECF No. 33011); and
9. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Defense Expert
Witness Dr. Jeff Boyd (ECF No. 33060).
In addition, Plaintiffs have filed (1) a Brief regarding the Rule 702 Standard,
(ECF No. 32994); and (2) a Response to the Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum
Order, (ECF Nos. 33009; 33109).
Defendants have filed the following eight motions:
1. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. David
Kessler, Laura Plunkett, William Sage and George
Newman (ECF No. 33000);
2. Motion to Exclude the Specific Causation Opinions
Offered by Dr. Judith Wolf (ECF No. 33003);
3. Motion 	to 	Exclude 	the 	Opinions 	of 	Dr. 	John
Godleski (ECF No. 33004);
4. Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinions
Regarding Alleged Heavy Metals and Fragrances in
Johnson’s Baby Powder and Shower to Shower
(ECF No. 33005);
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5. Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Daniel
Clarke-Pearson (ECF No. 33007);
6. Motion to 	Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ General
Causation Opinions (ECF No. 33008);
7. Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Asbestos-
Related Opinions (ECF No. 33012); and
8. Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinions
Regarding Biological Plausibility/Mechanism (ECF
No. 33013).
After the bankruptcy stay terminated and this MDL resumed, the parties
urged, and the Court agreed, that the Rule 702 motions should be decided in an
expeditious manner so that the first bellwether trial can be conducted in Carter
Judkins v. Johnson & Johnson, et al., No. 3:19-cv-12430-MAS-RLS.
F. 	My Appointment and Duties as Special Master
On June 26, 2025, with the consent of the parties, the Court appointed me “as
a limited-purpose Special Master to address the Rule 702 Motions in this MDL.”
(ECF No. 39429 ¶ 1.) The Court explained that my appointment is both necessary
and appropriate because “there are numerous pending pretrial disputes ‘that cannot
be effectively and timely addressed’ by this Court,” and that my appointment “would
facilitate the prompt adjudication of these disputes and minimize delay in these
proceedings.” (Id. at 1, ¶ 1.)
As I previously advised the parties, the most efficient and orderly means of
resolving the pending Rule 702 motions is through a comprehensive Report and
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Recommendation, rather than deciding them piecemeal.3 In that regard, as directed
by the Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order, the purpose of filing the present
round of motions is not to seek a wholesale reconsideration of my prior Opinion.
Rather, my review of the motions is limited in two material respects: to the extent a
party challenges one of my prior rulings, reconsideration is warranted only if the
party establishes: (1) that my “previous Opinion demonstrably fails to adhere to Rule
702 as clarified by the 2023 amendments” with respect to the challenged ruling, or
(2) “new science is shown to directly contradict or challenge” my prior findings.
(ECF No. 32122 at 6.) Accordingly, I will confine this Report and Recommendation
to those circumstances expressly identified by the Court, including a full review of
new experts’ conclusions that were not previously addressed in my 2020 Opinion.
III. 	OVERVIEW OF THE 2020 OPINION
As mentioned above, I issued my Opinion and Order addressing the parties’
first round of Rule 702 motions on April 27, 2020. As to the scope of that Opinion,
I determined whether the parties’ eight representative experts were qualified to
testify in this MDL and whether their proffered testimony was admissible under the
prior iteration of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509
3 	As discussed more fully below, I am holding separate Daubert hearings with respect to Dr.
William Longo’s new PLM-chrysolite opinions and Plaintiffs’ experts on specific causation on a
schedule consistent with the availability of counsel and the experts. As a result, so as not to delay
the 	issuance 	of 	this 	Report 	and 	Recommendation, 	I 	will 	issue 	a 	separate 	Report 	and
Recommendation addressing those issues and experts.
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F. Supp. 3d at 128. Because my Opinion only addressed motions related to the
representative experts, I applied my reasoning “with equal force to the remainder of
the pending Daubert motions” and directed the parties “to confer and raise any issues
with respect to specific experts, e.g., qualifications, that are not covered by this
Opinion.” Id. at 129. I also recognized that the scientific landscape is not static, with
new studies being released addressing talc’s alleged carcinogenic properties. Id. at
129 n.6. Thus, I advised the parties that “I may amend my rulings at a later time” in
light of new and relevant studies. Id. Against that backdrop, I now provide an
overview of the parties’ then-filed Daubert motions, arguments, and my rulings.
A. 	Dr. Ghassan Saed
Dr. Ghassan Saed, who has not been proffered as an expert in this new round
of motion practice, was introduced by Plaintiffs as an expert in inflammation and
oxidative stress. Id. at 132. At Plaintiffs’ request, Dr. Saed and his laboratory
conducted an in vitro study to explore the role of talc in the carcinogenesis of ovarian
cancer. Id. at 133. After finding Dr. Saed qualified to testify as an expert, id. at 132
n.8, I discussed the design of Dr. Saed’s study and his methodologies, id. at 133–34.
Based on the results of his study, the relevant literature, and his experience, Dr. Saed
made several conclusions in his report, including that Johnson’s Baby Powder causes
cellular inflammation and oxidative stress, and that exposure to Johnson’s Baby
Powder can cause ovarian cancer. Id. at 134–35.
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Defendants sought to exclude Dr. Saed’s testimony by challenging the
admissibility of his opinions on multiple grounds. Id. at 135. I granted in part and
denied in part Defendants’ motion, id. at 129 n.3, upon consideration of the parties’
arguments and the reliability of Dr. Saed’s methodology and opinions, id. at 135–
47. First, I barred Dr. Saed from testifying “at any trial in this matter that his study
demonstrated a link between the use of talcum powder and ovarian cancer.” Id. at
140; see id. at 129 n.3. I found that “Dr. Saed’s opinion that talc causes ovarian
cancer is unsupported by the findings of his study” and that “Dr. Saed’s extrapolation
from inflammation to ovarian cancer is a step too far to constitute a reliable scientific
opinion.” Id. at 139; see id. at 135–40.
Nevertheless, I found Dr. Saed’s study “sufficiently reliable under Daubert to
show that the use of talc may cause inflammation and oxidative stress.” Id. at 140;
see id. at 140–47. Since there was a sufficient basis to support this opinion, I
concluded that the potential flaws highlighted by Defendants related to Dr. Saed’s
lab practices impacted the weight of his testimony, not admissibility. Id. at 146–47.
B. 	Dr. William Longo
Defendants moved to exclude the testimony of Dr. William Longo, who
Plaintiffs proffered as an expert in materials sciences. Id. at 147. I found Dr. Longo
“qualified to testify as an expert on the issue of whether the subject talc products
contain asbestos.” Id. At that time, Dr. Longo and his company, Materials Analytical
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Services, LLC (“MAS”), had tested 72 historical talc samples from the 1960s, 1970s,
1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s for the presence of asbestos using two different
methods: 	transmission 	electron 	microscopy 	(“TEM”) 	and 	polarized 	light
microscopy (“PLM”). Id. After performing these tests, Dr. Longo concluded that 50
out of 72 of the historical samples contained amphibole asbestos. Id. Dr. Longo
further opined that individuals who used Johnson & Johnson talcum powder
products “in the past, would have, more likely than not, been exposed to significant
airborne levels of both regulated amphibole asbestos and fibrous (asbestiform) talc.”
Id. (citation modified).
After carefully considering the parties’ arguments, Dr. Longo’s Daubert
hearing testimony, and the reliability of Dr. Longo’s TEM and PLM methodologies,
I granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion. Id. at 129 n.3; see id. at 147–
57. I found that Plaintiffs “met their burden of demonstrating that the doctor’s
testimony regarding the results of his TEM analysis is reliable for the purposes of
admission under 	Daubert.” 	Id. 	at 147–48. I addressed in detail Defendants’
arguments related to Dr. Longo’s application of the three-step TEM methodology,
including Defendants’ objections regarding Dr. Longo’s reliance on, and application
of, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) “counting rules” under the
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (“AHERA”) regulations. Id. at 148–54.
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I concluded that Defendants’ bases for exclusion did not render Dr. Longo’s TEM
analysis unreliable. Id. Rather, they were questions for a factfinder.
However, I held that Dr. Longo is not permitted to opine at trial as to his
findings of amphibole asbestos in Johnson & Johnson’s talcum powder products
based on his PLM analysis. Id. at 129 n.3, 148, 154–55. I determined that Dr. Longo
improperly, and unexplainedly, used the less sensitive International Organization for
Standardization (“ISO”) 22262-1 method to analyze the talc samples for the
presence of asbestos. Id. at 154–55. I found that Dr. Longo should have used ISO
22262-2 due to the ultra-trace amount of asbestos allegedly contained in the samples.
Id. I also took issue with the fact that “Dr. Longo changed his view regarding the
use of PLM to test cosmetic talc for asbestos solely for the purposes of this
litigation,” and that his PLM methodology “was replete with subjectivity and
reproducibility problems.” Id. at 155.
Furthermore, I barred Dr. Longo from testifying that females who used talcum
powder products in the past were exposed to asbestos. Id. at 129 n.3, 148, 156–57. I
found that Dr. Longo failed “to offer any scientific support for his opinion that the
use of Defendants’ talc products causes exposure, let alone significant exposure, to
asbestos.” Id. at 156–57. Critically, Dr. Longo failed to conduct an exposure
analysis, rendering his exposure-related opinion “too attenuated from his findings of
trace levels of asbestos in talc.” Id. at 157.
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Finally, I permitted Dr. Longo to opine “on the presence of ‘ultra-trace’
asbestos in Defendants’ talc products” because “the issue of whether there is
asbestos, and the amount of asbestos, in Defendants’ talc products are key issues in
this litigation.” Id. I also permitted other Plaintiffs’ experts in this litigation to rely
on Dr. Longo’s findings but limited their reliance solely to his finding that
Defendants’ talc products contain asbestos. Id.
C. 	Drs. Anne McTiernan, Daniel Clarke-Pearson, and Arch Carson
Defendants also sought to exclude Plaintiffs’ experts from opining on general
causation. I addressed three experts who “testified on behalf of Plaintiffs” at the
Daubert 	hearing “on the issue of general causation,” specifically “Dr. Anne
McTiernan, 	an 	epidemiologist; 	Dr. 	Daniel 	Clarke-Pearson, 	a 	gynecologic-
oncologist; and Dr. Arch Carson, a toxicologist.” Id. I found these individuals
qualified in their respective fields of expertise. Id. at 157–60.
In their reports, Drs. McTiernan, Clarke-Pearson, and Carson generally
opined that the use of Defendants’ talcum powder products in the genital perineal
area can cause ovarian cancer. Id. Each expert conducted a Bradford Hill analysis to
form their opinions. Id. The Bradford Hill factors are “(1) temporal relationship; (2)
strength of association; (3) dose-response relationship; (4) replication; (5) biological
plausibility; (6) consideration of alternative explanations; (7) cessation of exposure;
(8) specificity of the association; and (9) consistency with other knowledge.” Id. at
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160. 	In 	weighing 	these 	nine 	factors, 	these 	experts 	reviewed 	“the 	available
epidemiologic studies, which included 28 case control studies, 3 cohort studies, 3
meta-analyses, and 1 pooled analysis.” Id. at 161.
Defendants argued, as they do now, that the Bradford Hill analyses conducted
by Plaintiffs’ experts are unreliable and conclusion driven, thereby warranting
exclusion. Id. I disagreed, with one significant exception described below. After
finding 	that 	the 	Bradford 	Hill 	methodology 	itself 	is 	generally 	reliable 	for
determining a causal relationship, id., I evaluated whether Plaintiffs’ experts reliably
applied each Bradford Hill factor, see id. at 161–87. This analysis involved engaging
with the parties’ arguments, the law, and the science, including the epidemiologic
studies addressing the association between talc use and ovarian cancer. Id.
Ultimately, I found that Plaintiffs’ experts’ application of the Bradford Hill
methodology was reliable, “even if their conclusions in the context of some of these
factors demonstrate a relatively minimal causal relationship between talc use and
ovarian cancer.” Id. at 187. Specifically, I permitted Plaintiffs’ experts to testify at
trial that talcum powder can migrate up and through the female reproductive system
when applied to the perineum, and that once present in the ovaries, talcum powder
can cause chronic inflammation, which may lead to ovarian cancer. Id.; see id. at
172–76. However, I barred Plaintiffs’ experts from testifying “as to their theory that
ovarian cancer may be caused by the inhalation of talcum powder that travels
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through the lymphatic system to the ovaries.” Id. at 129 n.3; see id. at 176–77, 187.
I found that particular theory unreliable and not supported by the scientific evidence.
Id. at 176–77.
Finally, I recognized my important but limited role as gatekeeper under
Daubert. I acknowledged that “there does not appear to be scientific consensus on
the issue of the association between talc use and ovarian cancer.” Id. at 186. What
was (and still is) “clear from the general causation evidence relied on by the experts
on both sides in this matter, is that there is scientific evidence supporting each side’s
opinion.” Id. at 187. “At best, that the body of relevant scientific evidence is
inconclusive and may be open to different interpretations—does not mean one side’s
interpretation is more reliable than the other.” Id. Since Plaintiffs’ experts provided
a sufficiently reliable basis to support their general causation opinions, I determined
that “the question of whose experts are correct is a question for the jury” and that “it
would be erroneous for this Court to make those factual findings on a Daubert
motion.” Id.
D. 	Dr. Gregory Diette
Plaintiffs also filed motions to exclude various defense experts during the
initial round of motion practice. First, Plaintiffs sought to exclude the testimony of
Dr. Gregory Diette, an epidemiologist, who opined after conducting a Bradford Hill
analysis that the “relevant epidemiological evidence does not support a causal
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connection between perineal use of talcum powder products (whatever constituents
those products may contain in addition to talc) and ovarian cancer.” Id. at 188
(citation modified). The doctor focused on “the strength of association, consistency,
dose-response, 	and 	biological 	plausibility 	factors,” 	concluding 	they 	“did 	not
demonstrate a causal relationship.” Id.
While Plaintiffs implied “in their briefing that Dr. Diette is not qualified to
provide an epidemiological opinion as to the relationship between talc use and
ovarian cancer, because the primary focus of his research is pulmonary disease,” I
found that “Dr. Diette has extensive training and experience in epidemiology and,
further, 	that 	his 	medical 	training 	affords 	him 	the 	expertise 	to 	interpret
epidemiological studies.” Id.
Plaintiffs further claimed Dr. Diette failed to reliably apply the Bradford Hill
factors. Id. at 189. However, I found Dr. Diette’s opinions admissible because his
“testimony at the Daubert hearing and his expert report demonstrate that his opinions
reasonably flow from the epidemiological studies and that he followed a reliable
methodology in reaching his conclusions.” Id. at 190; see id. at 190–92.
Accordingly, I denied Plaintiffs’ motion because Dr. Diette’s opinions are
supported by good grounds. Id. at 192. While the parties fundamentally disagreed
“as to which experts’ opinion and interpretation is best,” it is not the Court’s role as
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gatekeeper under Daubert to determine which interpretation is best. “To do so would
usurp the role of the jury.” Id.
E. 	Dr. Cheryl Saenz
Plaintiffs also moved to exclude the opinions of Dr. Cheryl Saenz, a
gynecologic oncologist. Id. I found Dr. Saenz qualified to act as an expert, and after
finding her opinions admissible under Daubert, I denied Plaintiffs’ motion. Id. at
195; see id. at 192–95.
Dr. Saenz opined that “perineal application of talcum powder does not cause
ovarian cancer.” Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
forming her opinions, Dr. Saenz performed an extensive review of the epidemiologic
literature and relied on her experience as a gynecologic oncologist. Id. Dr. Saenz did
not conduct a full Bradford Hill analysis, choosing instead to focus on the strength
of association, consistency, coherence, dose-response, and biological plausibility
factors. Id.
Plaintiffs argued, in support of their motion, that Dr. Saenz improperly gave
greater weight to cohort studies over case-control studies, and that she “dismissed
statistically significant case-control studies simply because they had a relative risk
of less than 2.0” offering “ no epidemiologic authority for her dismissal of the case
control studies.” Id. at 193–94.
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I found that Dr. Saenz “provided ‘good grounds’ for her opinions with respect
to the weight she placed on the varying case-control and cohort studies.” Id. at 194.
Dr. Saenz explained that she placed more weight on cohort studies because they are
more scientifically credible than, and less prone to the biases of, case-control studies.
Id.
In addition, I concluded that “Dr. Saenz’s deliberate choice to not review”
several in vitro studies that Plaintiffs claim demonstrate their theory of biological
plausibility “does not render her opinion inadmissible.” Id. at 194–95. Dr. Saenz
reasonably “explained that because the studies referred to, but did not reveal, any
malignancy from talc, she did not view them as relevant on the question of biological
plausibility.” Id. at 195. Because experts are not required to review every single
study in the relevant body of literature, Plaintiffs’ line of attack was “better explored
on cross-examination.” Id. at 194–95.
F. 	Dr. Benjamin Neel
Finally, Plaintiffs sought to exclude the opinions of Dr. Benjamin Neel, a
cancer biologist, who proffered general causation opinions as well as a rebuttal to
Dr. Saed’s testimony regarding cellular inflammation. Id. at 195–96. Over Plaintiffs’
objection, I found Dr. Neel qualified “to render an opinion with respect to the
epidemiological studies under Daubert.” Id. at 197.
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Dr. Neel opined, after reviewing the epidemiologic literature and conducting
a Bradford Hill analysis, that “there is no evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claim that
perineal use of talcum powder can cause ovarian cancer.” Id. at 196. Next, Dr. Neel
opined that “Dr. Saed’s in vitro study was ‘flawed on multiple levels’ and that the
results of his study do not support his conclusion that Defendants’ products can
cause ovarian cancer.” Id. (citation omitted). He further opined that “[t]alc is not
genotoxic, does not cause mutations, does not cause inflammation in the female
genitourinary tract and has not been shown to cause ovarian cancer.” Id. at 195–96
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs argued that Dr. Neel’s opinion regarding biological plausibility is
unreliable because he did not consider the alleged components of talcum powder,
such as asbestos and heavy metals. Id. at 196–97. I disagreed, finding the alleged
contamination of talc irrelevant to Dr. Neel’s opinions because he was proffered to
rebut Dr. Saed’s methodology in his in vitro study, which made no findings as to
whether any component of talc is carcinogenic. Id. at 197. Plaintiffs further argued
that Dr. Neel’s Bradford Hill analysis is unreliable because he placed too much
weight on biological plausibility. Id. Again, I disagreed. Id. at 197–98. I found that
“Dr. Neel presented good grounds for his opinion that, where an association is weak
and inconsistent, biological plausibility may become more important in the overall
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Bradford Hill analysis.” Id. at 197. Accordingly, I denied Plaintiffs’ motion to
exclude Dr. Neel’s opinions. Id. at 198.
IV. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Federal Rule of Evidence 702
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. As
amended effective December 1, 2023, Rule 702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the
form 	of 	an 	opinion 	or 	otherwise 	if 	the 	proponent
demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not
that:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of
the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid.702 (emphasis added to reflect the changes from the prior rule).
Based on the Rule, the party offering expert testimony bears the burden of
establishing its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence, consistent with
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a). Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 & n.10; see Fed. R.
Evid.104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a
witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.”); Fed. R. Evid.702
advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“[T]he admissibility of all expert
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testimony is governed by the principles of Rule 104(a).”). “The preponderance
standard ensures that before admitting evidence, the court will have found it more
likely than not that the technical issues and policy concerns addressed by the Federal
Rules of Evidence have been afforded due consideration.” Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
B. 	2023 Amendment to Rule 702
1. 	The Amendments
First, and critically, Rule 702 was “amended to clarify and emphasize that
expert testimony may not be admitted unless the proponent demonstrates to the court
that it is more likely than not that the proffered testimony meets the admissibility
requirements set forth in the rule.” Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note to
2023 amendment (citing Fed. R. Evid.104(a)). The Advisory Committee explained
that, in the years leading up to the amendment, “many courts” had erroneously “held
that the critical questions of the sufficiency of an expert’s basis, and the application
of the expert’s methodology, are questions of weight and not admissibility.” Id.
Therefore, the amendment is meant to clarify that “the preponderance standard”
under Rule 104(a) “applies to the three reliability-based requirements added in
2000—requirements that many courts have incorrectly determined to be governed
by the more permissive Rule 104(b) standard.” Id.
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Before admitting expert testimony, a court must ensure that the party offering
the testimony has established—by a preponderance of the evidence—that the
testimony will assist the trier of fact and that it is “based on sufficient facts or data,”
“the product of reliable principles and methods,” and is “a reliable application of
those principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid.702(a)–(d).
Second, Rule 702(d) was “amended to emphasize that each expert opinion
must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded from a reliable application of
the expert’s basis and methodology.” Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note
to 2023 amendment. The Advisory Committee reiterated the importance of the
court’s gatekeeping role “because just as jurors may be unable, due to lack of
specialized knowledge, to evaluate meaningfully the reliability of scientific and
other methods underlying expert opinion, jurors may also lack the specialized
knowledge to determine whether the conclusions of an expert go beyond what the
expert’s basis and methodology may reliably support.” Id.
2. 	The Impact of the 2023 Amendment
The Advisory Committee made clear that the amendment to Rule 702 is
limited in nature, stating: “Nothing in the amendment imposes any new, specific
procedures. Rather, the amendment is simply intended to clarify that Rule 104(a)’s
requirement applies to expert opinions under Rule 702.” Id. The Committee further
explained that the Rule does not require “the court to nitpick an expert’s opinion in
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order to reach a perfect expression of what the basis and methodology can support.”
Id. Nor does the preponderance standard “require perfection.” Id. On the other hand,
Rule 702 “does not permit the expert to make claims that are unsupported by the
expert’s basis and methodology.” Id.
Since the amendments, courts have consistently concluded, and the parties do
not dispute, that the amendments “did not substantively change the relevant [Rule
702] standard.” EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC, 137 F.4th 1333, 1339 n.8 (Fed. Cir.
2025); see Le v. Zuffa, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-01045, 2024 WL 195994, at *5 n.5 (D.
Nev. Jan. 18, 2024) (“[The 2023] amendment codified what was already the
prevailing understanding of Rule 702’s requirements.”); Reflex Media, Inc. v.
SuccessfulMatch.com, 758 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (explaining that
the 2023 “amendment is not intended to be a ‘seachange’ in the performance of the
Court’s ‘gatekeeper’ function with respect to the admissibility of expert opinions”);
In re Valsartan, Losartan, & Irbesartan Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 19-md-02875, 2025
WL 1024048, at *9 n.15 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2025) (stating that “[t]he amendment does
not substantively alter Rule 702”); In re Acetaminophen—ASD-ADHD Products
Liab. Litig., 707 F. Supp. 3d 309, 335 n.27 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Nothing in the
amendment imposes any new, specific procedures.” (quoting Fed. R. Evid.702
advisory committee’s note to 2023 amendment)).4 Indeed, Judge Shipp, in his April
4 	In re Acetaminophen is currently on appeal in the Second Circuit.
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30, 2024 Memorandum Order here, likewise concluded that the 2023 amendment to
“Rule 702 did not change evidentiary standards, but clarified them.” (ECF No.
32122, at 4.) Consequently, cases interpreting Rule 702 that “predate the 2023
amendments remain fully applicable.” Reflex Media, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 3d at 1049.
C. 	Daubert and its Progeny
The 	U.S. 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	long 	recognized 	that, 	in 	determining
admissibility under Rule 702, courts serve “a gatekeeping role” to ensure “an
expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at
hand.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
147–48 (1999) (applying the gatekeeping role to all expert testimony, not just
scientific testimony). Similarly, in the Third Circuit, courts apply this “rigorous
gatekeeping function” to prevent the jury from hearing expert testimony that does
not have the proper indicia of reliability. Cohen v. Cohen, 125 F.4th 454, 460 (3d
Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
It is well settled that “Rule 702 contains three distinct substantive restrictions
on the admission of expert testimony: qualifications, reliability, and fit.” Id. (citation
modified); see Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404 (“Rule 702 embodies a trilogy of
restrictions on expert testimony . . . .”).
“First, the witness must be qualified to testify as an expert.” Calhoun v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2003). “Qualification
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requires that the witness possess specialized expertise.” Id. (citation modified). This
requirement is liberally construed, and courts have held that “a broad range of
knowledge, skills, and training qualify an expert as such.” Id. (citation modified).
“Second, 	the 	testimony 	must 	be 	reliable.” 	Id. 	“Daubert’s 	reliability
requirement ensures that an expert’s testimony is based on the methods and
procedures of science, not on subjective belief and unsupported speculation.” Cohen,
125 F.4th at 461 (citation modified). However, “admissibility does not hinge on
whether a particular scientific opinion has the best foundation, or even whether the
opinion is supported by the best methodology or unassailable research.” Id. at 462
(citation modified). “The court instead looks to whether the expert’s testimony is
supported by good grounds.” Id. (citation modified). “This inquiry applies to all
aspects of an expert’s testimony: the methodology, the facts underlying the expert’s
opinion, and the link between the facts and the conclusion.” Id. (citation modified).
To determine whether an expert’s testimony is supported by good grounds,
the court may consider any of these several factors:
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2)
whether the method has been subject to peer review; (3)
the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and
maintenance 	of 	standards 	controlling 	the 	technique’s
operation; (5) whether the method is generally accepted;
(6) the relationship of the technique to methods which
have been established to be reliable; (7) the qualifications
of the expert witness testifying based on the methodology;
and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has been
put.
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Id. (citation modified). These factors are not “a definitive checklist or test.” Daubert,
509 U.S. at 593. Rather, the court’s inquiry is “a flexible one” that focuses “on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 594–
95.
With that said, “conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from
one another” and a court is not required “to admit opinion evidence that is connected
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 146 (1997). “A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Id. As such, it is
appropriate for the court to “examine the expert’s conclusions in order to determine
whether they could reliably follow from the facts known to the expert and the
methodology used.” Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
Third, and finally, “the expert testimony must fit, meaning the expert’s
testimony must be relevant for the purposes of the case and must assist the trier of
fact.” Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 321 (citation modified). “Fit is not always obvious, and
scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other,
unrelated 	purposes.” 	Cohen, 	125 	F.4th 	at 	464 	(citation 	modified). 	The 	fit
requirement “goes primarily to relevance, so an expert’s testimony will be excluded
if it is not scientific knowledge for purposes of the case.” Id. (citation modified);
Hoefling v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co., LLC, 576 F. Supp. 3d 262, 279 (E.D. Pa.
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2021) (“Although they may be logically relevant in the evidentiary sense, they lack
a specific connection to general causation here. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.,
35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating the fit standard is ‘higher than bare
relevance’).” (citation omitted)).
Rule 702 equally applies to rebuttal experts. See Fed. R. Evid.702; Capri Sun
GmbH v. Am. Beverage Corp., 595 F. Supp. 3d 83, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“[R]ebuttal
experts must [still] meet Daubert’s threshold standards regarding the qualifications
of the expert, sufficiency of the data, reliability of the methodology, and relevance
of the testimony.” (alterations in original) (quoting In re Digital Music Antitrust
Litig., 321 F.R.D. 64, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-
8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 348 F. Supp. 3d 680, 696 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (noting that rebuttal
expert “testimony must still be based upon reliable science, as required by
Daubert.”); accord In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., No. 16-md-2724,
2024 WL 4980784, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2024); Cohen, 125 F.4th at 461 (“[T]he
proponent of [rebuttal expert] testimony must still be ‘offering a qualified expert
with good grounds to support his criticism.’” (quoting U.S. v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d
215, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)).
However, even so, parties offering rebuttal expert evidence often do not bear
the burden of proof, such as demonstrating causality. Accordingly, rebuttal experts
are generally not required to conduct a parallel analysis mirroring the methodology
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being critiqued. See Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 138 (“Rebuttal experts
thus ‘have a less demanding task because they have no burden to produce models or
methods of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiff[’s] expert[].’”
(alterations in original) (quoting In re Digital Music, 321 F.R.D. at 78)); U.S. Bank,
N.A. v. Glogowski L. Firm, PLLC, 339 F.R.D. 579, 581 (W.D. Wash. 2021)
(“Defendants, on the other hand, will often produce expert reports solely for the
purpose of contradicting 	or rebutting 	a plaintiff’s 	report 	because defendants
generally need not produce any evidence to prevail.”).
Instead, courts recognize that “the proper role of rebuttal experts [is] to
critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out potential flaws in the
plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct Mktg., Inc., 829
F. Supp. 2d 802, 835 (D. Minn. 2011); see Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d 530,
551 (D.N.J. 2004) (“Rebuttal evidence is properly admissible when it will ‘explain,
repel, counteract or disprove the evidence of the adverse party.’” (quoting Step-
Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 752 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991))); see also, e.g., Mahaska
Bottling Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (explaining that courts routinely permit defense
experts to testify “even if the expert primarily critiques the opposing expert’s
approach without offering an alternative approach”); In re Abilify (Aripiprazole)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1368 (stating that defense experts’ “opinions
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properly may be limited to criticizing the analysis and conclusions presented by
another party”); Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (“At bottom, a rebuttal
expert need not proffer a methodology or model, but only critique the opposing
expert’s.”); In re Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (“[D]efendants’ experts have a
less demanding task, since they have no burden to produce models or methods of
their own; they need only attack those of plaintiffs’ experts.”); Aviva Sports, Inc.,
829 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (“A number of other district courts have held that rebuttal
expert witnesses may criticize other experts’ theories and calculations without
offering alternatives.”) (collecting cases).
That said, it is the court that serves as the gatekeeper of expert evidence, not
a rebuttal expert. To the extent that a rebuttal expert usurps the court’s role in
determining the admissibility of expert evidence offered by the opposing party, those
opinions may be inadmissible. See T.N. Incorporation, Ltd. v. Fid. Nat’l Info. Servs.,
Inc., No. 18-cv-5552, 2021 WL 5980048, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2021) (“It is the
role of the trial court, not expert witnesses, to act as ‘gatekeepers’ to ensure the
relevance and reliability of all expert testimony.”).
D. 	Admissibility Versus Weight
While this issue will be addressed in greater detail in each relevant context for
the expert(s) being challenged, the governing principle is well established and
straightforward: “Determinations of admissibility, which fall within the gatekeeping
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role of the court, are separate from determinations of weight and credibility, which
are within the province of the jury in a jury case.” EcoFactor, Inc., 137 F.4th at 1339.
In practice, however, the boundary between the court’s gatekeeping role and the
factfinder’s function has often proven difficult to delineate, particularly where, as
here, Rule 702 challenges implicate highly technical and complex scientific issues.
Recognizing this difficulty, the Advisory Committee explained that certain
“challenges to expert testimony will raise matters of weight rather than admissibility
even under the Rule 104(a) standard.” Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note
to 	2023 	amendment. 	According 	to 	the 	Committee, 	and 	consistent 	with 	the
preponderance standard, “once the court has found it more likely than not that the
admissibility requirement has been met, any attack by the opponent will go only to
the weight of the evidence.” Id. For instance, if a court finds that an expert has a
sufficient basis to support an opinion, “the fact that the expert has not read every
single study that exists will raise a question of weight and not admissibility.” Id.
However, the Committee did not address the types of deficiencies that would render
an expert’s methods or results unreliable in the first instance.
In a law review article that predated the 2023 amendment, Hon. Thomas D.
Schroeder, who at the time was a Member of the United States Judicial Conference
Advisory 	Committee 	on 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Evidence 	and 	Chair 	of 	the
Subcommittee on Rule 702, addressed what he saw as “lingering confusion in the
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caselaw as to the proper standard for the trial court’s discharge of its gatekeeping
role for the admission of expert testimony.” Thomas D. Schroeder, Toward a More
Apparent Approach to Considering the Admission of Expert Testimony, 95 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 2039, 2040 (2020). As a result, Judge Schroeder proposed “several
suggestions for trial and appellate courts to consider for better decisionmaking in
discharging their duty to apply Rule 104(a)’s preponderance standard to the elements
of Rule 702.” Id.
Relevant 	here, 	one 	of 	Judge 	Schroeder’s 	suggestions 	provides 	helpful
guidance regarding the point at which a particular challenge to an expert’s method
or results crosses the line from a question of weight to one of admissibility:
[T]here will be challenges to the weight of an opinion’s
basis even under a proper Rule 104(a) analysis. This does
not automatically render the question one for a jury, as
some of the cases suggest. Rather, the trial judge, as
gatekeeper, must determine whether such challenges are
so significant that the factual basis for the opinion fails to
reach the preponderance standard or, instead, whether the
alleged defects are sufficiently minor, such that they do
not undermine the remaining basis. In the latter instance,
the alleged flaws do not impugn the reliability or validity
of the method or results. For example, an expert who
allegedly failed to include a handful of patients in a study
of over 100 patients, or an expert whose opinion is
supported by a dozen studies but is contrary to a study that
would not undermine her ultimate conclusion would likely
pass the Rule 104(a) bar. Of course, where there is a
legitimate question of fact on which the admissibility of
the expert opinion turns, Rule 104(a) does not allow the
trial court to make that call, and the jury must decide.
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Id. at 2061–62.
In distinguishing between “significant” and 	“minor” defects, the Sixth
Circuit’s recent decision in 	In re Onglyza, 93 F.4th 339 (6th Cir. 2024), is
instructive.5 	See 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Evidence—Expert 	Testimony—Judicial
Conference Amends Rule 702, 138 Harv. L. Rev. 899, 905 (2025) (“Drafters of the
amendments may be encouraged by the Sixth Circuit,” including its In re Onglyza
decision, “which has enthusiastically embraced the amendments to Rule 702.”).
In that MDL, the plaintiffs alleged that saxagliptin, a diabetes drug, caused
their heart failure. In re Onglyza, 93 F.4th at 342. The district court excluded Dr.
Parag 	Goyal, 	the 	plaintiffs’ 	sole 	general 	causation 	expert, 	finding 	that
methodological flaws rendered his testimony unreliable under Rule 702. Id. at 342,
344. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the
lower court had three valid reasons to find Dr. Goyal’s testimony unreliable. Id. at
348. First, his reliance on a single study “to the exclusion of all other studies
involving human data,” including four studies that found no association between
saxagliptin and heart failure, “was unreliable.” Id. at 345. “By ignoring all other
human studies” without adequate explanation, “Dr. Goyal failed to base his opinion
5 	The Sixth Circuit applied the “old” version of Rule 702 “because it was still in force at the
time of the district court’s decision (January 5, 2022).” In re Onglyza, 93 F.4th at 345 n.4.
Nevertheless, the court explained that “the district court’s reasoning aligns with the updated Rule
702, since it placed the burden of showing that Dr. Goyal was admissible on plaintiffs,” and that
its “decision here would be the same under either version of the Rule.” Id.
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on ‘sufficient facts or data.’” Id. at 346 (citing Fed. R. Evid.702(b)). Second, “Dr.
Goyal’s use of animal data was unreliable because he has no expertise in interpreting
animal studies.” Id. at 347. In addition to being unqualified and relying on studies
that did not diagnose the animals with heart failure, “Dr. Goyal admitted to ignoring
multiple peer-reviewed animal studies dispelling a causal link between saxagliptin
and heart failure.” Id. Finally, “Dr. Goyal did not reliably apply Bradford Hill” since
he “cherry-picked data to bolster his case” and “inconsistently applied several
Bradford Hill factors.” Id. In light of these significant defects, the plaintiffs failed to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Goyal satisfied Rule 702’s
admissibility requirements. Id. at 348.
E. 	Publication and Peer Review Status
While not dispositive, “publication in a peer reviewed journal is relevant ‘in
assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which
an opinion is premised.’” United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515, 520 (D.N.J.
2000) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594); accord In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613,
663–64 (3d Cir. 1999). As such, “[p]ublication in a peer-reviewed journal typically
satisfies” the consideration of whether “‘the theory and procedures have been
submitted 	to 	the 	scrutiny 	of 	the 	scientific 	community.’” 	United 	States 	v.
Gissantaner, 990 F.3d 457, 464 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Bonds, 12
F.3d 540, 559 (6th Cir. 1993)). This is so because peer review “‘conditions
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publication on a bona fide process’ of review by other scientists and experts in the
field.” Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1995)). Indeed, the peer review process for publication in a scientific journal is
far more rigorous than that of a student publication or a law journal. Gissantaner,
990 F.3d at 464–65 (“No offense to former, current, and future members of law
journals everywhere: But it is one thing to convince lawyers in training to publish a
piece; it is quite another to convince peers in a professional community to publish a
piece. That is why readership and citation are pivotal when it comes to legal
scholarship and why publication itself is noteworthy in scientific scholarship—and
ultimately why publication in a peer-reviewed journal alone typically satisfies this
Daubert inquiry.”); see id. (collecting cases). “[S]ubmission to the scrutiny of the
scientific community is a component of ‘good science,’ in part because it increases
the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.” Daubert, 509
U.S. at 593.
As such, expert testimony based on sound conclusions reasonably drawn from
peer-reviewed studies is typically considered reliable. Even “‘flaws in methodology’
uncovered by peer review do not necessarily equate to a lack of scientific validity,
since the methods may be based on scientific principles and the alleged flaws go
merely to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence and the testimony.”
Bonds, 12 F.3d at 559. Rather, “peer review and publication should be viewed as
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evidence that the theory and methodology are scientific knowledge capable of being
scrutinized and have in fact been scrutinized by the scientific community.” Id.
However, peer review and publication status of a study do not insulate it from
judicial scrutiny. Goodrich v. John Crane, Inc., No. 4:17-cv-00009, 2018 WL
4677773, at *23 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2018) (rejecting argument that study was
reliable simply because it “ha[d] been peer reviewed” and “published”). One such
instance where a court may exclude expert testimony based on a peer-reviewed study
is 	when 	the study’s methodology 	is 	so flawed, the court cannot 	ignore its
deficiencies. See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 737 F. Supp. 3d 898, 902–03,
908–09 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (excluding expert who relied on a peer-reviewed, published
meta-analysis because “simply intoning that a paper was peer-reviewed and that it
was (apparently) produced before the author was thinking about getting involved in
litigation isn’t enough to compensate for methodological problems as glaring as
those described here,” the flaws being that the hypothesis contemplated a dose-
response relationship even though at least one study showed no dose-response
relationship, diluting the results by mixing study types and data, using inconsistent
exposure measurements, and failure to adjust results for exposure to other potential
toxins), aff’d sub nom., Bulone v. Monsanto Co., No. 24-cv-4241, 2025 WL 2730843
(9th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025)); In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F. Supp.
3d 1075, 1164–65, 1171–73 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (criticizing experts’ reliance on two
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published, peer-reviewed studies in part because the court found, upon its own
“substantive review,” that both studies failed to control for confounding factors, and
“even if general acceptance of the methodologies used in these two studies was
established, acceptance in the scientific community and peer review are not
necessarily sufficient to establish the reliability of a scientific methodology”);
Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 666, 678 (D. Nev. 1996)
(excluding the testimony of an expert whose “study suffer[ed] from very serious
flaws” because the expert “took no steps to eliminate selection bias in the study
group, he failed to identify the background rate for the observed disorders in the
[relevant] community, he failed to control for potential recall bias, he simply ignored
the lack of reliable dosage data, he chose a tiny sample size, and he did not attempt
to eliminate so-called confounding factors which might have been responsible for
the incidence of neurological disorders in the subject group”); Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt
Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 974 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (citing with approval a case
where “the district court rejected a peer-reviewed article, but only after pointing out
that the reviewers were not in a position to identify certain flaws in the protocol used
in the study, were not given the results of trials showing different results and were
not given the comments of the FDA ‘concerning the inadequacies of the . . . results’”
(quoting Zeneca, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1999 WL 509471, at *29–30 (S.D.N.Y. July
19, 1999))).
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Moreover, 	articles 	published 	in 	peer-reviewed 	journals 	are not 	always
sufficient to support an expert’s opinion. See, e.g., In re Paraquat Prods. Liab. Litig.,
730 F. Supp. 3d 793, 849 (S.D. Ill. 2024) (explaining that, when considering the
“brevity and lack of scientific analysis” in an “opinion article” published in a peer-
reviewed journal, “the Court was and still is skeptical of its ability to independently
validate Dr. Wells’ general causation opinion”).6 Nor can an expert support his or
her opinion with one peer-reviewed article to the complete exclusion of other
relevant data. In re Onglyza, 93 F.4th at 343, 345–47 (affirming exclusion of an
expert who relied on one published human study and several animal studies because
the expert (1) without explanation, ignored other human studies, and (2) conceded
he was not qualified to interpret animal studies’ data as it applied in humans).
6 	When analyzing the peer-review status, a court may distinguish between “true peer review”
and pre-publication peer review or “editorial peer review.” “True peer review” is “the essence of
science” and is accomplished when “[o]ne investigator makes her methods and findings public, so
that others can attack or support her conclusion by following the same protocols while asking what
besides the stated principle could account for the documented results.” Valentine, 921 F. Supp. at
675. In contrast, “‘editorial peer review’ consists of the reference by a journal editor of an article
submitted for publication to two or more outside reviewers,” who “make confidential comments
on the article’s scientific accuracy, style, originality and importance, and make a recommendation
to the journal that the article be accepted or rejected.” Id. “Because the scope of editorial peer
review is necessarily narrower than true peer review, it is a serious error to conflate the two
processes, and, by extension, to assume that because an article is accepted for publication, even in
a prestigious scientific journal, that the science it contains is therefore valId.” Id. However, this is
not to suggest that articles subject to “editorial peer review” should per se fail under Daubert, or
that the distinction will necessarily arise in every case, particularly since peer review is not, on its
own, dispositive. Indeed, “expert testimony does not have to obtain general acceptance or be
subject to peer review to be admitted under Rule 702.” Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 406 (3d
Cir. 2003). And “[w]here there are other factors that demonstrate the reliability of the expert’s
methodology, an expert opinion should not be excluded simply because there is no literature on
point.” Id. For instance, “the particular application at issue may never previously have interested
any scientist,” leaving no opportunity for peer review. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 151.
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Critically, courts must bear in mind that the above-cited peer-review examples
represent the exception, not the rule. Indeed, peer review remains a “matter[] far
afield from the expertise of judges,” and as such, courts should exercise “great
caution in deciding more than” is necessary. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 599 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As such, it will apparently be the case
more often than not that the factfinder is permitted to hear the expert testimony, as
parties’ disputes or critiques regarding the testimony will go to its weight rather than
admissibility. Boncher v. 3M Co., No. 5:24-cv-01403, 2025 WL 511116, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 14, 2025) (“The Court notes Defendants’ objections to the limitations of the
design and implementation of [a seminal study], including its failure to avoid or
address potential confounding by other infection control measures instituted by the
hospital. However, these limitations and potential shortcomings in the research do
not make the study per se unreliable, as the strength of the study goes to its weight,
not admissibility.” (citation omitted)). “A test need not perfectly and identically
recreate real-world conditions 	to be reliable enough 	to 	clear 	Daubert’s low
admissibility bar: Daubert ‘does not require a paradigm of scientific inquiry as a
condition precedent to admitting expert testimony.’ Admissibility just requires good
grounds . . . .” VanDine v. Summit Treestands, LLC, 738 F. Supp. 3d 599, 613 (E.D.
Pa. 2024) (citation modified) (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 156
(3d Cir. 2000)). As the First Circuit summarized: “As long as an expert’s scientific
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testimony rests upon ‘good grounds, based on what is known,’ it should be tested by
the adversary process—competing expert testimony and active cross-examination—
rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its
complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.” Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of
Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 596).
In sum, when evaluating expert testimony under Rule 702, the court must
undertake its gatekeeping function with rigor, ensuring—by a preponderance of the
evidence—that the expert is qualified, that his or her opinion is grounded in
sufficient facts or data, that it flows from reliable principles and methods, and that
those methods have been reliably applied to the case-specific facts. This inquiry is
flexible, but it is not perfunctory; the court must examine both methodology and the
logical connection between underlying facts and the conclusions drawn, excluding
opinions that rest on speculation, cherry-picking, or analytical gaps too great to
overlook. At the same time, the Rule recognizes that not every flaw is fatal—once
the minimum reliability threshold is met, remaining criticisms generally speak to
weight, not admissibility, and become the province of the factfinder. Ultimately, the
court’s task is to admit only those opinions supported by “good grounds,” while
reserving unreliable or methodologically unsupported conclusions from reaching the
jury.
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V. 	GENERAL CAUSATION
The parties have filed five motions concerning general causation, which
addresses “whether an agent increases the incidence of disease in a group” as
compared to specific causation, which asks “whether the agent caused any given
individual’s disease.” Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 623, 627 (3d ed. 2011).7
In this MDL, each side has proffered multiple, distinguished experts who
opine on the question of whether exposure to Defendants’ talcum powder products—
including all alleged contaminants—is capable of causing ovarian cancer. I will first
address Defendants’ general causation motions, along with Defendants’ causation-
related arguments concerning asbestos, fibrous talc, heavy metals, and fragrances,
before turning to Plaintiffs’ general causation motions.
7 	As in my prior Opinion, I rely on the Reference Guide on Epidemiology for guidance on
issues of general causation. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 160 n.34. This guide is
part of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, a compilation of reference guides intended
“to provide the tools for judges to manage cases involving complex scientific and technical
evidence.” Fed. Judicial Ctr., Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence xv (3d ed. 2011). Relevant
here, epidemiology is the “study of the distribution and determinants of disease or other health-
related states and events in populations and the application of this study to control of health
problems.” Green at 623.
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A. 	A Brief Primer Regarding Talc and Asbestos8
Talc is a naturally occurring mineral that is mined from the Earth for
commercial purposes. In its pure mineral form, talc “is a hydrous magnesium
phyllosilicate 	mineral 	with 	a 	chemical 	composition 	of 	Mg3Si4O10(OH)2.”
(Interagency 	Working 	Grp. 	on 	Asbestos 	in 	Consumer 	Prods., 	White 	Paper:
IWGACP Scientific Opinions on Testing Methods for Asbestos in Cosmetic Products
Containing Talc 27 (Dec. 2021) (“IWGACP White Paper”).)9 Talc morphology is
typically described as platy or lamellar—that is, flat and plate-like. (Id. at 18 n.38;
see also Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer, World Health Org., Monographs on
the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, vol. 93: Carbon Black, Titanium
Dioxide, and Talc 277 (2010) (“IARC Monographs vol. 93”).) However, talc may
also exhibit a fibrous morphology. (IWGACP White Paper at 18; see also IARC
Monographs vol. 93 at 277.) And in some instances, talc may “form as true mineral
fibres that are asbestiform.” (IARC Monographs vol. 93 at 277.)
8 	This section is not intended to serve as a definitive scientific exposition of talc and asbestos.
Rather, the purpose of this general overview is to provide relevant background and context for the
parties’ arguments.
9 	In 2018, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) established an interagency
working 	group 	composed 	of 	subject-matter 	experts 	to 	develop, 	among 	other 	objectives,
standardized testing methodologies for detecting asbestos in cosmetic products manufactured with
talc as an ingredient. The working group published a white paper setting forth foundational
scientific 	principles, 	relevant 	background 	information 	regarding 	testing, 	and 	various
recommendations. In this section, I have referenced the working group’s white paper as well as
other neutral, third-party resources, such as IARC Monographs.
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Asbestiform means the “specific variety of a mineral or type of mineral
fibrosity, associated with a unique fibrous habit of crystal growth, in which the fibers
are long and thin and possess high tensile strength and flexibility.” (IWGACP White
Paper at 24.) Habit is defined as the “characteristic external shape of an individual
crystal or crystal group due to crystal growth.” (Id. at 26.) “A mineral may exhibit
multiple habits due to different conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure, geological
events) that were prevalent when crystal growth took place.” (Id.)
Because 	of 	its 	unique 	properties—“platyness, 	softness, 	hydrophobicity,
organophilicity and inertness”—talc is used in a wide variety of products “including
paint, polymers, paper, ceramics, animal feed, rubber, roofing, fertilizers, cosmetics
and pharmaceuticals.” (IARC Monographs vol. 93 at 289.) Relevant here, talc-based
personal care products have been used widely, either as baby powders or adult body
powders to absorb sweat and odors. It is undisputed that Defendants used talc
sourced from mines in Italy, the United States (specifically, Vermont) and China for
its Johnson’s Baby Powder and Shower to Shower products.
Asbestos is a generic term with “many definitions” that are “used in the
commercial, geological, and regulatory domains.” (IWGACP White Paper at 8–9;
see also Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer, World Health Org., Monographs on
the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, vol. 100C: Arsenic, Metals,
Fibres, and Dusts 221 (2012) (“IARC Monographs vol. 100C”).) The lack of
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consistent usage has contributed to uncertainty and confusion in both academic
literature and laboratory testing related to asbestos. (Id.) In commercial and
mineralogical contexts, asbestos describes a “group of fibrous silicate minerals that
occur in an asbestiform habit of growth in which the bulk mineral readily separates
into long, thin, strong fibers.” (IWGACP White Paper at 24.) Thus, asbestos does
not refer to a single mineral but rather encompasses a set of minerals with specific
characteristics. These minerals fall into two principal groups: serpentine and
amphibole.
Like 	talc, 	asbestos 	minerals 	are 	mined 	for 	their 	commercially 	useful
properties. Asbestos fibers possess high tensile strength, flexibility, excellent
thermal stability, adsorption capacity, and resistance to chemical, thermal, and
biological degradation. (IARC Monographs vol. 100C at 221.) These properties
make asbestos fibers “desirable for a wide range of industrial applications” such as
“roofing, thermal and electrical insulation, cement pipe and sheets, flooring, gaskets,
friction materials (e.g., brake pads and shoes), coatings and compounds, plastics,
textiles, paper, mastics, thread, fibre jointing, and millboard.” (Id.) “Since peaking
in the 1970s, there has been a general decline in world production and consumption
of asbestos” due to increased government regulations and outright bans. (Id. at 222.)
In the regulatory context, U.S. government agencies define asbestos as “the
following six minerals, which historically have been used in commerce: chrysotile
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(a member of the serpentine group) and five species of the amphibole mineral group,
specifically 	asbestiform 	riebeckite 	(also 	known 	as 	‘crocidolite’), 	asbestiform
grunerite-cummingtonite (also known as ‘amosite’), tremolite asbestos, actinolite
asbestos, and anthophyllite asbestos.” (IWGACP White Paper at 8.) Asbestos is
regulated by various agencies including the EPA, 40 C.F.R. § 763.83 and 40 C.F.R.
§ 61.141; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1001(b); and the Mine Safety and Health Administration, 30 C.F.R. §
56.5001(b)(1).
B. 	Defendants’ General Causation Motions
Defendants have filed two general causation motions: Motion to Exclude
Plaintiffs’ Experts’ General Causation Opinions, (ECF No. 33008), and Motion to
Exclude 	Plaintiffs’ 	Experts’ 	Opinions 	Regarding 	Biological
Plausibility/Mechanism, (ECF No. 33013). Plaintiffs strenuously oppose both
motions, which seek to preclude 14 of their experts from testifying regarding any
alleged causal link between Defendants’ talc-based products and ovarian cancer. The
thrust of Defendants’ motions is that Plaintiffs’ experts unreliably applied the
Bradford Hill criteria, which are traditionally employed to distinguish a causal
connection from a mere association, with Defendants devoting an entire motion to a
single factor—biological plausibility. There is no question that general causation is
among the most significant issues in this MDL, as reflected by the parties’
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submission of 285 pages of briefing and thousands of pages of supporting exhibits
related to these motions. Before I turn to the parties’ arguments, several preliminary
matters must be addressed to place Defendants’ motions in context.
1. 	Scope of Review
Defendants filed largely similar motions addressing general causation and
biological plausibility during the first round of motion practice. (See ECF No.
33008-2 (“Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br.”); ECF No. 33013-1 (“Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br.”); 	see also 	ECF No. 9736 (“Defs.’ 2019 General
Causation Br.”); ECF No. 9736-1 (“Defs.’ 2019 Biological Plausibility Br.”).)
As noted above, I ruled on the opinions of Plaintiffs’ representative general
causation experts—Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, and McTiernan. See In re Johnson
& Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 157–87. I then applied that reasoning “with equal
force to the remainder of the pending Daubert motions” and directed the parties to
raise any issues regarding specific experts not addressed in the Opinion “within 45
days of the date of the accompanying Order.” Id. at 129. All parties were aware of,
and agreed to, this representative-expert approach. Neither party raised any expert-
specific concerns 	within the 45-day period, nor did 	either side seek timely
reconsideration under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendants have renewed their motions challenging general causation and
biological plausibility. In these motions—as well as in their motions concerning
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asbestos, heavy metals, and fragrances—Defendants address Plaintiffs’ experts
collectively, asserting that the experts’ methodologies suffer from deficiencies
purportedly common to all. By way of illustration, Defendants’ heavy metals and
fragrances motion seeks to exclude the opinions of eighteen experts. Given the
number of experts and the complexity of the scientific issues presented, it is
understandable that Defendants elected to proceed through consolidated, issue-
specific motions rather than expert-specific challenges. This approach, however,
obscures important differences among the experts and makes it more difficult to
assess the reliability of any particular expert’s opinion. Although many experts
ultimately reach similar conclusions, they do not employ identical methodologies or
rely on the same exact body of materials. By presenting their challenges collectively,
Defendants effectively place upon the Special Master and the Court the burden of
disentangling a voluminous record to determine, expert by expert, whether the
proffered methodologies and conclusions satisfy the requirements of Rule 702 and
Daubert. In that connection, Defendants’ arguments frequently focus on one or a
few experts without clearly specifying whether or how those arguments apply to the
remaining experts, and they often rely on extensive record citations embedded in
footnotes rather than developed analysis. As a result, the Special Master and the
Court are left to infer the scope and substance of many of Defendants’ arguments.
Nonetheless, because Plaintiffs have likewise briefed these issues on a collective
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basis, this Report and Recommendation addresses the parties’ arguments in the same
manner, while at the same time, endeavoring to account for the distinct opinions and
methodologies of each expert at issue, resulting in this lengthy opinion.
Furthermore, under Judge Shipp’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order,
Defendants are not entitled to a wholesale reconsideration of my prior rulings, as I
have already addressed the vast majority of the issues raised in their general
causation motions. In an effort to comply with the limitations set forth in that Order,
Defendants have reframed their arguments, now asserting that my prior rulings failed
to adhere to Rule 702 as amended and that newly available scientific evidence
requires revisiting my findings. Their core contention, however, remains unchanged:
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions should be excluded “because the experts distort
epidemiology in a results-oriented manner,” “disregard longstanding concepts such
as statistical significance,” and do not meaningfully grapple with scientific evidence
undermining a causal relationship.10 (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 3.)
It is undisputed that “new science” has become available since my 2020
Opinion, with multiple relevant epidemiological studies having been published in
the intervening years. In light of these developments, I find it both necessary and
10 	For comparison, Defendants opened their prior general causation brief as follows:
“Plaintiffs’ experts’ general causation opinions are methodologically unsound and should be
excluded under Daubert because they misapply scientific principles, engage in unsupported leaps
of logic, and distort epidemiology in a results-oriented manner that transforms an important tool
for advancing public health into an unprincipled weapon for litigation.” (Defs.’ 2019 General
Causation Br. at 1.)
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appropriate to reexamine my prior general causation rulings, particularly given the
parties’ competing interpretations of the current scientific record. Plaintiffs assert
that “post-2020 developments” bolster the opinions of their general causation
experts. (ECF No. 33129 (“Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br.”) at 3.) Defendants, by
contrast, contend that “the most recent developments on which plaintiffs and their
experts hang their hats have confirmed that the relevant science has not established
a causal link.” (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 1.)
Thus, I will address the parties’ arguments as they relate to each of the
Bradford Hill factors below, focusing—as Plaintiffs correctly note—on “scientific
evidence that is truly new” and “the impact of any truly new law.” (Pls.’ General
Causation Opp. Br. at 6.) I will not disturb any prior Bradford Hill ruling unless, as
Defendants argue, I determine that I was less than faithful to the requirements of
Rule 702 with respect to a specific ruling.
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2. 	Plaintiffs’ Experts11,12
Defendants’ general causation motions seek to exclude the testimony of the
following Plaintiffs’ experts, all of whom—except for Dr. Bernard Harlow—
performed a Bradford Hill analysis to establish an alleged causal relationship
between the use of talcum powder products and ovarian cancer:
• 	Dr. Arch Carson: Dr. Carson is a physician specializing in medical toxicology
who holds an M.D. from Ohio State University College of Medicine and a
Ph.D. in toxicology from the Kettering Laboratory at the University of
Cincinnati, and has taught medical students, graduate students, and post-
graduate medical trainees at the University of Texas School of Public Health
in Houston since the 1990s. (ECF No. 33008-42 (“Carson Rep.”) at 1.)
• 	Dr. Daniel Clarke-Pearson: Dr. Clarke-Pearson, who holds a B.A. from
Harvard College and an M.D. from Case Western Reserve University School
of Medicine, is currently “a Professor in the Department of Obstetrics and
11 	Almost all expert reports and deposition transcripts appear multiple times in the record
under different exhibit numbers and ECF numbers. For ease of reference, and to avoid unnecessary
repetition, this Report and Recommendation identifies each report and transcript by a single
representative ECF number and refers to it consistently throughout, regardless of duplicative
filings elsewhere in the docket.
12 	I note that Drs. Carson, Kane, and Smith did not issue updated reports since the prior round
of motions in 2019. Defendants nonetheless continue to cite to these experts’ reports. (See, e.g.,
Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 65 n.161, 67.) Plaintiffs’ position is that because these experts
have not issued supplemental reports, that I need not reconsider those experts’ analyses. (Oral
Argument on 2024 Motions dated Nov. 25, 2025 (“Nov. 25, 2025 Tr.”) 111:9 to 113:9.) I agree.
Defendants’ general causation brief notes, for example, that Dr. Carson “failed to provide an
updated report or testimony to address any of the recent objective scientific literature that
undermines and discredits the methodology [he] utilized to reach his general causation opinions,”
and “[a]ccordingly, Dr. Carson’s opinions are outdated.” (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 27
n.73.) However, and notably, Defendants have not made any specific arguments as to why those
experts’ methodologies are unreliable based on any change in the legal landscape or how my
previous decision misapplied Rule 702 specifically as to those experts’ general causation analyses.
Instead, Defendants have a ripe opportunity for questioning on cross-examination, as to how, if at
all, new science post-dating Dr. Carson’s report affects his opinions. The same is true for Dr. Kane
and Dr. Smith. (See Nov. 25, 2025 Tr. 111:16–21.) Accordingly, on this record, I do not find a basis
on which to consider these three reports anew in the context of general causation.
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Gynecology and the Division of Gynecologic Oncology at the University of
North Carolina” and is “certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and
Gynecology as a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology as well as a
subspecialist 	in 	gynecologic 	oncology.” 	(ECF 	No. 	33008-15 	(“Clarke-
Pearson 3d Amend. Rep.”) at 2–3.)
• 	Dr. Michele Cote: Dr. Cote is a cancer epidemiologist specializing in female
cancers and health disparities who obtained a “Master of Public Health with a
concentration 	in 	Epidemiology 	from 	the 	University 	of 	Alabama,
Birmingham” and a Ph.D. in Epidemiologic Sciences from the University of
Michigan, and who is the Director of the Susan G. Komen Tissue Bank and
“a tenured Professor of Epidemiology at the Fairbanks School of Public
Health in the Department of Epidemiology at Indiana University.” (ECF No.
33008-16 (“Cote Amend. Rep.”) at 3–5.)
• 	Dr. Bernard Harlow: Dr. Harlow, who is a Professor of Epidemiology at the
Boston University School of Public Health, received a Ph.D. in Epidemiology
from the University of Washington and, over the past 35 years, “has focused
on epidemiologic research specifically in women’s cancers and other benign
gynecological disorders,” including coauthoring four published research
articles addressing talc use and ovarian cancer. (ECF No. 33008-10 (“Harlow
Rep.”) at 1–2.)13
• 	Dr. Sarah Kane: Dr. Kane is a gynecologic pathologist “certified by the
American Board of Pathology in Anatomic Pathology, Clinical Pathology,
and Cytopathology,” who received her M.D. from Ohio State University
College of Medicine, and completed a residency in Anatomic and Clinical
Pathology 	at 	Massachusetts 	General 	Hospital, 	as 	well 	as 	a 	two-year
gynecologic and cytology fellowship as the Robert E. Scully Fellow in
13 	I note that instead of analyzing the Bradford Hill factors, Dr. Harlow’s methodology
involves 	establishing 	a 	causal 	hypothesis 	and 	then 	identifying 	and 	rejecting 	non-causal
explanations of an association. During oral argument on November 25, 2025, defense counsel
explained that Defendants’ critique of Dr. Harlow’s methodology “is the same critique that we
have of folks who are employing a Bradford Hill methodology.” (Nov. 25, 2025 Tr. at 92:14–
93:12.) Accordingly, I will analyze Dr. Harlow’s methodology and opinions in connection with
Plaintiffs’ other general causation experts.
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Pathology at the same hospital, during which she studied the causes and
mechanisms of disease, including gynecologic cancer and disease. (ECF No.
33005-20 (“Kane Rep.”) at 2.)
• 	Dr. Anne McTiernan: Dr. McTiernan, who holds a Ph.D. in Epidemiology
from the University of Washington and an M.D. from New York Medical
College, is “a Full Professor at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center in Seattle,
Washington, Division of Public Health Sciences, Program in Epidemiology”
as well as “a Full Research Professor at the University of Washington School
of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology, and the University of
Washington School of Medicine, Department of Medicine, Division of
Geriatrics.” (ECF No. 33008-9 (“McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep.”) at 3–6.)
• 	Dr. Patricia Moorman: Dr. Moorman, who earned a Master of Science in
Public Health and a Ph.D. in Epidemiology from the University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill, is “an epidemiologist with more than 25 years of
experience in conducting research on women’s health issues including ovarian
cancer” and is “a tenured professor in the Department of Community and
Family Medicine, Duke University School of Medicine.” (ECF No. 33005-23
(“Moorman Rep.”) at 3.)
• 	Dr. Jack Siemiatycki: Dr. Siemiatycki obtained an M.Sc. in Mathematical
Statistics and a Ph.D. in Epidemiology and Medical Statistics from McGill
University in Canada, completed a post-doctoral fellowship with IARC,
taught epidemiology at McGill University and the University of Montreal, and
has devoted most of his “research career to investigating links between
environmental, occupational and lifestyle factors and various types of cancer”
including, relevant here, chairing the IARC Monograph panel tasked with
evaluating the carcinogenicity of talc.14 (ECF No. 33008-6 (“Siemiatycki 3d
Amend. Rep.”) at 3–6, 24–25; id., Ex. A at 3.)
14 	In 2010, IARC published Monographs Volume 93, which addresses talc and is cited by
both parties as an authoritative reference. In 2025, after the parties briefed the instant motions,
IARC issued a new Monographs—Volume 136—reexamining the potential carcinogenicity of talc.
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• 	Dr. Sonal Singh: Dr. Singh, who holds a medical degree and a Master of
Public Health, devotes most of his professional time to epidemiologic
research, has taught at Johns Hopkins University and the Wake Forest
University School of Medicine, and is currently an Associate Professor of
Family Medicine and Community Health at UMass Chan School of Medicine,
with 	joint 	appointments 	in 	the 	Division 	of 	Health 	Systems 	Science,
Department of Medicine, and the Department of Population and Quantitative
Health Sciences. (ECF No. 33008-50 (“Singh Rep.”) at 3–5; ECF No. 33008-
53 (“Singh Supp. Rep.”), Ex. A.)
• 	Dr. Ellen Blair Smith: Dr. Smith is a physician with an M.D. from the
University of North Carolina “who specializes in the treatment of women with
cancer (including ovarian cancer),” has treated hundreds of women with
epithelial ovarian cancer during her more than 28 years in private practice,
and pursued further education in Hospice and Palliative Care to enhance the
end-of-life care of her gynecologic oncology patients. (ECF No. 33008-51
(“Smith Rep.”) at 1; id., Ex. A at 1.)
• 	Dr. Rebecca Smith-Bindman: Dr. Smith-Bindman is a clinician-scientist who
earned an M.D. from the University of California, San Francisco, has
extensive expertise in epidemiology, biostatistics, and a range of research
study designs, and is presently “a professor of Epidemiology and Biostatistics,
Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reproductive Medicine, and Health Policy” at
her alma mater, as well as the Director of the Radiology Outcomes Research
Laboratory. (ECF No. 33008-8 (“Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep.”) at 4–6;
id., Ex. A at 1.)
• 	Dr. Judith Wolf: Dr. Wolf is a board-certified gynecologic oncologist and
physician with more than thirty years’ experience who specializes in the care
of 	women 	with 	cancer, 	attended 	medical 	school 	at 	Northeast 	Ohio
Universities 	College of Medicine, and completed her residency 	at 	the
University of Texas at San Antonio, as well as a fellowship at MD Anderson
Cancer Center, where she remained on faculty for more than twenty years as
a Professor in the Department of Gynecologic Oncology. (ECF No. 33008-7
(“Wolf 3d Amend. Rep.”) at 1–2.)
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(See Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 1 n.3; Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility
Br. at 1 n.2.)
In addition to the experts discussed above, Defendants’ biological plausibility
motion seeks to exclude two additional experts:
• 	Dr. Shawn Levy: Dr. Levy received his “Ph.D. in biochemistry and completed
a postdoctoral fellowship in genetics at Emory University,” has taught various
courses at Vanderbilt University Medical Center, the University of Alabama
at Birmingham, and the University of Alabama in Huntsville, and is currently
“the Chief Scientific Officer at Element Biosciences,” where he focuses “on
developing disruptive DNA sequencing technology on the AVITI platform.”
(ECF No. 33013-13 (“Levy 2d Amend. Rep.”) at 2–3.)
• 	Dr. Laura Plunkett: Dr. Plunkett is “a pharmacologist, toxicologist, United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory specialist and partner
in a consulting company known as BioPolicy Solutions, LLC” who “received
a B.S. degree in 1980 from the University of Georgia and a Ph.D. in
pharmacology from the University of Georgia, College of Pharmacy in 1984,”
and has “worked in both government and academic research” and has “taught
pharmacology and toxicology at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels.”
(ECF No. 33013-27 (“Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep.”) at 3–6.)
(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 1 n.2.)
Defendants do not dispute the qualifications of any of the experts at issue in
their general causation motions, nor do they challenge my prior ruling that Drs.
Carson, Clarke-Pearson, and McTiernan are qualified to testify as experts in this
MDL. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 157–60. I also find that Plaintiffs
have established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their general causation
experts possess specialized knowledge and expertise based on their academic
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backgrounds and professional experience, and that they satisfy Rule 702’s liberally
construed qualification requirement. See Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237,
244 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, and McTiernan
remain qualified as experts, as no new issues have been raised regarding their
expertise, and Drs. Cote, Harlow, Kane, Levy, Moorman, Plunkett, Siemiatycki,
Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf are likewise qualified to testify as experts
in their respective fields.
Having determined qualifications, I turn to the Bradford Hill factors.
3. 	The Bradford Hill Factors
In 1965, Sir Austin Bradford Hill published an article that provided guidance
on a fundamental question that had long plagued the field of medicine: when “an
association between two variables”—the exposure to an agent and the development
of a disease—is “perfectly clear-cut and beyond what we would care to attribute to
the play of chance,” “what aspects of that association should we especially consider
before deciding that the most likely interpretation of it is causation?” Austin
Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 Proc.
R. Soc’y Med. 295 (1965). To answer that question, Dr. Hill set forth nine factors—
which he referred to as “viewpoints”—to consider in determining whether an
association reflects a true causal relationship: (1) strength; (2) consistency; (3)
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specificity; (4) temporality; (5) biological gradient; (6) plausibility; (7) coherence;
(8) experiment; and (9) analogy.15 Id. at 295–99.
In the article, Dr. Hill discussed the limitations of his approach and cautioned
against mechanistically applying his “viewpoints” in making causal judgments,
stating:
Here then are nine different viewpoints from all of which
we should study association before we cry causation. What
I do not believe—and this has been suggested—is that we
can 	usefully 	lay 	down 	some 	hard-and-fast 	rules 	of
evidence that must be observed before we accept cause
and 	effect. 	None 	of 	my 	nine 	viewpoints 	can 	bring
indisputable evidence for or against the cause-and-effect
hypothesis and none can be required as a sine qua non.
What they can do, with greater or less strength, is to help
us to make up our minds on the fundamental question - is
there any other way of explaining the set of facts before
us, is there any other answer equally, or more, likely than
cause and effect?
Id. at 299.
The Reference Guide on Epidemiology sets forth a modern iteration of the
nine factors used to determine whether a cause-and-effect relationship exists: (1)
temporal relationship; (2) strength of the association; (3) dose-response relationship;
(4) replication of the findings; (5) biological plausibility (coherence with existing
knowledge); (6) consideration of alternative explanations; (7) cessation of exposure;
15 	The Bradford Hill factors are discussed in greater detail in connection with the parties’
arguments below.
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(8) specificity of the association; and (9) consistency with other knowledge. Green
at 599–600. “These guidelines reflect criteria proposed by the U.S. Surgeon General
in 1964 in assessing the relationship between smoking and lung cancer and expanded
upon by Sir Austin Bradford Hill in 1965 and are often referred to as the Hill criteria
or Hill factors.” Id. at 600.
Like Dr. Hill’s 1965 article, the Reference Guide makes clear that applying
these factors to demonstrate a causal link requires reasoned judgment:
There is no formula or algorithm that can be used to assess
whether a causal inference is appropriate based on these
guidelines. One or more factors may be absent even when
a true causal relationship exists. Similarly, the existence of
some factors does not ensure that a causal relationship
exists. 	Drawing 	causal 	inferences 	after 	finding 	an
association 	and 	considering 	these 	factors 	requires
judgment and searching analysis, based on biology, of
why a factor or factors may be absent despite a causal
relationship, and vice versa. Although the drawing of
causal inferences is informed by scientific expertise, it is
not a determination that is made by using an objective or
algorithmic methodology.
Id. Critically, “epidemiology cannot prove causation; rather, causation is a judgment
for epidemiologists and others interpreting the epidemiologic data.” Id. at 598.
I call attention to the different versions of the Bradford Hill criteria because
some of Plaintiffs’ experts apply Dr. Hill’s original factors, while others apply a
modern iteration of those factors. In addition, Defendants’ general causation brief
cites the original factors, while Plaintiffs’ opposition refers to the Reference Guide.
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Nevertheless, both formulations of the Bradford Hill criteria are widely
recognized as reliable methods for assessing causation. See In re Zoloft (Sertraline
Hydrochloride) Prods. Liab. Litig., 858 F.3d 787, 795–96 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding
that the original Bradford Hill factors are “generally reliable”); In re Deepwater
Horizon BELO Cases, 119 F.4th 937, 941 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing the Reference
Guide factors); see also In re Abbott Lab’ys, Preterm Infant Nutrition Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 3026, No. 22-md-00071, 2025 WL 1283927, at *5 & n.15 (N.D.
Ill. May 2, 2025) (noting that the Reference Guide “articulates the nine Hill factors
slightly differently” from the original formulation, but finding no “meaningful
difference between the two articulations of the Bradford Hill analysis”). For
purposes of this Report and Recommendation, and because neither party disputes
the inherent reliability of either version, I find both versions of the Bradford Hill
factors to be reliable in determining causal relationship between talc and ovarian
cancer.
Nevertheless, 	as 	stated 	in 	my 	prior 	Opinion, 	while 	the 	Bradford 	Hill
methodology itself may be the proper analytical framework, experts must reliably
apply the factors in forming their general causation opinions. See In re Johnson &
Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 161. This is the crux of Defendants’ position: Plaintiffs’
experts failed to reliably apply the factors. Indeed, the Third Circuit in In re Zoloft—
which remains one of the seminal cases on this topic—explained that “despite the
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fact that both the Bradford Hill and the weight of the evidence analyses are generally
reliable, the ‘techniques’ used to implement the analysis must be 1) reliable and 2)
reliably 	applied.” 	858 	F.3d 	at 	796. 	Because 	Bradford 	Hill 	is 	a 	flexible
methodology—meaning that experts “can theoretically assign the most weight to
only a few factors, or draw conclusions about one factor based on a particular
combination of evidence”—the way in which “an expert conducts such an analysis
must be reliable; all of the relevant evidence must be gathered, and the assessment
or weighing of that evidence must not be arbitrary, but must itself be based on
methods 	of 	science.” 	Id. 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted).
Accordingly, to reliably apply the methodology, an expert must explain, at a
minimum, “1) how conclusions are drawn for each Bradford Hill criterion and 2)
how the criteria are weighed relative to one another.” Id.
4. 	Scientific Developments Since 2020
Against that backdrop, I noted in my prior Opinion that Plaintiffs’ “general
causation experts conducted a review of the available epidemiologic studies, which
included 28 case-control studies, 3 cohort studies, 3 meta-analyses, and 1 pooled
analysis.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 161. After evaluating
Plaintiffs’ experts’ application of each Bradford Hill criterion—including the
epidemiologic studies they considered and the weight they assigned to each
criterion—I found their general causation opinions admissible under Rule 702 and
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Daubert, with one exception. See id. at 157–87 (excluding the experts’ inhalation
theory 	of 	biological 	plausibility). 	Since 	then, 	additional 	peer-reviewed
epidemiologic studies have been published, examining the alleged relationship
between genital powder use and ovarian cancer.
By way of brief background, “cohort studies measure and compare the
incidence of disease in the exposed and unexposed (‘control’) groups, while case-
control studies measure and compare the frequency of exposure in the group with
the disease (the ‘cases’) and the group without the disease (the ‘controls’).” Green
at 557. Simply put, cohort studies follow groups of individuals with and without
exposure to an agent, and then the groups are observed over time to determine
whether the exposed group is more likely to develop the disease. Id. at 621. Case-
control studies, on the other hand, start with people who already have the disease,
and then compare them to a group of individuals who do not, in order to identify
potential risk factors. Id. at 620. In addition, a meta-analysis is a “technique used to
combine the results of several studies to enhance the precision of the estimate of the
effect size and reduce the plausibility that the association found is due to random
sampling error.” Id. at 624. Finally, a pooled analysis combines individual-level data
from multiple studies and reanalyzes them together as if they were one large dataset.
In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 161.
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Epidemiologic studies typically report their results in terms of the odds ratio
(“OR”), relative risk (“RR”), or hazard ratio (“HR”), which are related but not the
same. As Defendants correctly observe, for purposes of evaluating general causation
in this MDL, “these are essentially interchangeable concepts that describe the
increase (or decrease) in risk between exposure and disease.” (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 8.) Dr. McTiernan provides a clear explanation of these measures
in her report:
The strength of a relationship between an exposure and the
occurrence of disease is commonly expressed in terms of
relative risk. In cohort studies, relative risk is the ratio of
risk (or incidence) of a disease among people with an
exposure to that among people without that exposure. In
cohort studies, the hazard ratio can be used, and is the
chance of an event occurring in one group (exposed)
divided by the chance of the event occurring in another
group (nonexposed). In case-control studies, the odds ratio
is used, which is the ratio of the odds of exposure among
cases to the odds of exposure among controls. Relative
risks, odds ratios, and hazard ratios above 1.0 indicate an
increased risk, while those below 1.0 imply a protective
effect. Therefore, a relative risk of 1.3 represents a 30%
increased risk.
(McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 13–14.) Importantly, a value of 1.0 for any of these
measures indicates “no association between exposure to the agent and disease.”
Green at 567.
Relatedly, an association refers to the “degree of statistical relationship
between two or more events or variables.” Id. at 619. “Events are said to be
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associated when they occur more or less frequently together than one would expect
by chance” or random error. Id. However, association “does not necessarily imply a
causal relationship.” Id. “Events are said not to have an association when the agent
(or independent variable) has no apparent effect on the incidence of a disease (the
dependent variable).” Id. “This corresponds to a relative risk of 1.0.” Id.
In 	an 	epidemiologic context, causation describes 	“an 	event, condition,
characteristic, or agent being a necessary element of a set of other events that can
produce an outcome, such as a disease.” Id. at 620. This does not require that the
agent be the only cause of disease. Id. For instance, “smoking is a necessary element
of a set of events that result in lung cancer, yet there are other sets of events (without
smoking) that cause lung cancer.” Id. As such, “a cause may be thought of as a
necessary link in at least one causal chain that results in an outcome of interest.” Id.
at 620–21.
One final foundational concept is important to understand before turning to
the discussion of the new epidemiologic studies. A confidence interval (“CI”)
“provides both the relative risk (or other risk measure) found in the study and a range
(interval) within which the risk likely would fall if the study were repeated numerous
times.” Green at 573. “Thus, if a confidence level of .95 is selected for a study, 95%
of similar studies would result in the true relative risk falling within the confidence
interval.” Id. at 621. “The width of the confidence interval provides an indication of
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the precision of the point estimate or relative risk found in the study; the narrower
the confidence interval, the greater the confidence in the relative risk estimate found
in the study.” Id. “Where the confidence interval contains a relative risk of 1.0, the
results of the study are not statistically significant”—meaning one cannot rule out
the possibility of no association based on the data. Id.
With these concepts in mind, I now turn to the epidemiologic studies
published since 2020 that address talc use and ovarian cancer:
• 	O’Brien et al. 202016 conducted a pooled prospective cohort analysis
to evaluate whether genital powder use is associated with ovarian
cancer. Data were pooled from four large, U.S.-based cohorts: Nurses’
Health Study, Nurses’ Health Study II, Sister Study, and Women’s
Health Initiative Observational Study. The pooled sample included
252,745 women (median baseline age 57), of whom 38% reported ever
using powder in the genital area, with 22% reporting frequent use
(≥1/week) and 10% reporting long-term use (≥20 years). During 11.2
years of median follow-up (3.8 million person-years), 2,168 ovarian
cancers occurred (58 per 100,000 person-years). Compared to never
use, the HR for ever use was 1.08 (95% CI, 0.99-1.17), with similarly
modest 	estimates 	for 	frequent 	and 	long-term 	use. 	The 	authors
concluded there was no statistically significant association between
genital powder use and ovarian cancer but noted that the study may
have been underpowered to identify a small increase in risk.
• 	Davis et al. 202117 conducted a pooled case-control analysis to evaluate
associations between genital powder use and ovarian cancer among
16 	Katie M. O’Brien et al., Association of Powder Use in the Genital Area With Risk of
Ovarian Cancer, 323 JAMA 49 (2020) (“O’Brien 2020”).
17 	Colette P. Davis et al., Genital Powder Use and Risk of Epithelial Ovarian Cancer in the
Ovarian Cancer in Women of African Ancestry Consortium, 30 Cancer Epidemiol. Biomarkers &
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African-American and white women. The study used data from five
studies 	in 	the 	Ovarian 	Cancer 	in 	Women 	of 	African 	Ancestry
Consortium. The analysis included 620 African-American cases and
1,146 controls, and 2,800 white cases and 6,735 controls who reported
genital powder use prior to 2014. Genital powder was defined as any
powder applied directly to the genital/perineal/rectal area or indirectly
via pads, tampons, or underwear. Exposure was 	categorized 	by
frequency (≤1/week, >1/week) and duration (<20 years, ≥20 years).
Ever genital powder use was reported by 35.8% of African-American
cases and 29.5% of white cases. Among all women combined, ever use
was associated with 32% higher odds of ovarian cancer (OR = 1.32;
95% 	CI 	= 	1.17–1.48). 	Stratified 	analyses 	showed 	a 	significant
association among White women (OR = 1.36; 95% CI = 1.19–1.57)
and a non-significant association among African-American women
(OR = 1.22; 95% CI = 0.97–1.53).
• 	Phung et al. 202218 conducted a pooled analysis of nine case-control
studies from the Ovarian Cancer Association Consortium to assess
whether ovarian cancer risk factors, including genital talcum powder
use, differ in women with and without endometriosis. In total, this
analysis included 8,500 cases and 13,592 controls for all risk factors;
however, 	there 	were 	fewer 	cases 	and 	controls 	included 	in 	the
estimation of the association between ovarian cancer and talc use
because one of the nine studies did not collect information on talc use.
Genital powder use was categorized based on the area of application
(genital or nongenital) and by ever versus never use. Genital talc use
was positively associated with risk for women with and without
endometriosis. Among women without endometriosis, ever use of
genital powder was associated with a modestly increased risk of
ovarian cancer (OR = 1.12; 95% CI = 1.01-1.25). Among women with
endometriosis, the association was stronger (OR = 1.38; 95% CI =
Prev. 1660 (2021) (“Davis 2021”). One of the coauthors, Dr. Moorman, is an expert for Plaintiffs
in this MDL.
18 	Minh Tung Phung et al., Effects of Risk Factors for Ovarian Cancer in Women With and
Without Endometriosis, 118 Fertil. & Steril. 960 (2022) (“Phung 2022”).
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1.04-1.84). The authors concluded that, although associations between
ovarian cancer and most risk factors were similar among women with
and without endometriosis, there was some suggestion of differences
by endometriosis status for risk factors such as body mass index,
menopausal hormone therapy use, and genital talcum powder use.
• 	Woolen et al. 202219 conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis
to evaluate the association between frequent perineal talcum powder
use and ovarian cancer. The authors noted that prior systemic reviews
focused on ever use—“a non-specific exposure that could dilute or
obscure a meaningful association as ever use would combine women
with low and high exposures to talcum powder.” The analysis involved
11 studies (10 case-control and one cohort—O’Brien 2020) and
included 66,876 patients and 6,542 ovarian cancer cases. Study
selection criteria included publication of primary data, reporting on
multiple times per week (≥ 2 times per week) perineal exposure to
talcum powder, including direct genital/perineal application or indirect
use via pads, underwear, or intravaginal devices. Across the studies,
frequent talc use was associated with a 47% higher risk of ovarian
cancer (adjusted pooled summary OR = 1.47; 95% CI = 1.31-1.65),
with no evidence of bias and low statistical heterogeneity. The authors
concluded 	that 	frequent 	use 	of 	perineal 	talcum 	powder 	use 	is
associated with increased risk of ovarian cancer.
• 	Chang 202420 conducted a prospective cohort analysis within the Sister
Study, a U.S. nationwide cohort of 50,884 women aged 35–74 who
had a sister with breast cancer but were themselves breast cancer-free
at 	enrollment. 	In 	this 	analysis, 	49,899 	participants 	reported 	the
frequency of use for 41 personal care products (“PCPs”), including
19 	Sean A. Woolen, Ann A. Lazar & Rebecca Smith-Bindman, Association Between the
Frequent Use of Perineal Talcum Powder Products and Ovarian Cancer: A Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 37 J. Gen. Intern. Med. 2526 (2022) (“Woolen 2022”). Dr. Smith-Bindman, a
coauthor of the study, is one of Plaintiffs’ experts in this MDL.
20 	Che-Jung Chang et al., Use of Personal Care Product Mixtures and Incident Hormone-
Sensitive Cancers in the Sister Study: A U.S.-Wide Prospective Cohort, 183 Env’t. Int’l 108298
(2024) (“Chang 2024”).
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genital 	talc 	use. 	The 	“study 	utilized 	a 	sophisticated 	mixtures
approach”—using beauty, hygiene, and skincare product groupings—
to examine the relationship between PCPs and the incidence of
hormone-sensitive cancers. Genital talc use was included within the
hygiene mixture analysis. Over an average of 11.6 years of follow-up,
the cohort experienced 4,226 breast cancer cases, 277 ovarian cancer
cases, and 403 uterine cancer cases. In adjusted models, the hygiene
mixture was positively associated with ovarian cancer risk (HR = 1.35;
95% CI = 1.00–1.83), the beauty mixture was positively associated
with postmenopausal breast cancer (HR = 1.08; 95% CI = 1.01–1.16),
and the skincare mixture was inversely associated with breast cancer
risk (HR = 0.91; 95% CI = 0.83–0.99). No significant associations
were observed for individual products—including genital talc use—
after correcting for multiple comparison. The authors concluded that
their findings from this multi-product, joint-effect approach contribute
to the growing body of evidence for associations between PCPs and
breast cancer and provide novel information on ovarian and uterine
cancer.
• 	O’Brien et al. 202421 reanalyzed the association between intimate care
products, primarily genital talc use, and ovarian cancer in the Sister
Study cohort using updated exposure data and quantitative bias
analysis. Genital talc use was initially reported at enrollment (2003–
2009), with additional exposure information collected in a follow-up
survey 	(2017–2019). 	Because 	many 	ovarian 	cancer 	cases 	were
diagnosed before the follow-up survey, the authors applied multiple
imputation 	and 	quantitative 	bias 	analysis 	to 	address 	differential
misclassification and missing data.22 In models adjusted for exposure
misclassification, genital talc use was positively associated with
21 	(ECF No. 33011-5, Katie M. O’Brien et al., Intimate Care Products and Incidence of
Hormone-Related Cancers: A Quantitative Bias Analysis, 42 J. Clin. Oncol. 2645 (2024)
(“O’Brien 2024).)
22 	Differential misclassification is a type of “bias that is due to the misclassification of
individuals or a variable of interest when the misclassification varies among study groups.” Green
at 622. “This type of bias occurs when, for example, it is incorrectly determined that individuals
in a study are unexposed to the agent being studied when in fact they are exposed.” Id.
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ovarian cancer (HRs ranging from 1.17 to 3.34). Under moderate
assumptions, ever use was associated with an approximately 40%
higher rate of ovarian cancer (HR = 1.40; 95% CI = 1.04–1.89),
compared to never use, with consistently increasing dose-response
patterns for both frequency and duration of use. No comparable
positive associations were observed between genital talc use and breast
or uterine cancer. The authors cautioned that the results do not
establish causality and do not implicate any specific cancer-inducing
agent. They reasoned that those reporting talc use could be recalling
products that contained talc, cornstarch, or a mixture, and women may
have used different products at different times. Some talc may have
also been contaminated with asbestos or other potentially harmful
chemicals. Chronic irritation of the ovaries or fallopian tubes from talc
or 	talc-like 	products 	could 	also 	potentially 	contribute 	to
carcinogenesis. In addition, the authors explained that their findings of
a positive association between genital talc use and ovarian cancer are
consistent with prior studies, noting that pooled or meta-analyses of
case-control studies have produced odds ratios of 1.2–1.4. Ultimately,
the authors concluded that their results support a positive association
between genital talc use and ovarian cancer incidence, but they do not
pinpoint 	a 	specific cause 	or 	mechanism. 	They 	also 	emphasized
remaining uncertainty about how much recall bias and missing data
may have inflated risk estimates.
As I explained in my prior Opinion, what is “clear from the general causation
evidence relied on by the experts on both sides in this matter, is that there is scientific
evidence supporting each side’s opinion.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp.
3d at 187. That remains true even in light of recent epidemiologic studies. Although
there is no clear scientific consensus as to whether a causal relationship exists
between genital talcum powder use and ovarian cancer, the available evidence is
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“open to different interpretations.” Id. As discussed above at length, the Bradford
Hill analysis requires the exercise of expert judgment in assessing causation. So long
as that analysis is reliably conducted and draws conclusions adequately supported
by sufficient facts or data, the resulting opinions more likely than not satisfy Rule
702’s reliability standard. Ultimately, if the analyses are reliable, the expert is
permitted to espouse his/her view before a jury.
5. 	The Parties’ Bradford Hill Arguments
In their motions, Defendants principally focus on four Bradford Hill factors:
strength of the association, consistency, biological gradient (or dose-response
relationship), and biological plausibility. They also briefly address the remaining
factors: specificity, coherence, analogy, experiment, and temporality. My discussion
will follow the parties’ arguments.
i. 	Strength of the Association
This Bradford Hill factor concerns the strength of the association between
exposure to an agent and disease—that is, the relative risk—which “is one of the
cornerstones for causal inferences.” Green at 602. “The higher the relative risk, the
greater the likelihood that the relationship is causal.” Id. A lower relative risk “can
reflect causality,” but such associations should be more closely scrutinized “because
there is a greater chance that they are the result of uncontrolled confounding or
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biases.”23 Id. However, Dr. Hill cautioned, “[w]e must not be too ready to dismiss a
cause-and-effect hypothesis merely on the grounds that the observed association
appears to be slight. There are many occasions in medicine when this is in truth so.”
Hill at 296.
As to this gating factor, Plaintiffs’ experts conclude that it supports a causal
relationship because the epidemiologic evidence reflects a positive association
between genital talc use and ovarian cancer, with reported relative risks ranging from
approximately 20% to 60% higher among users compared to non-users. (Carson
Rep. at 8–9, 10; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 13; Cote Amend. Rep. at 35–36;
Kane Rep. at 33–34; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 96–97; Moorman Rep. at 11–
29; Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 70–71; Singh Supp. Rep. at 19–20; Smith Rep.
at 19, 21; Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 32, 34–36; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at
18–19.) Indeed, as discussed above, in addition to studies that I previously reviewed
in my 2020 Opinion, there are subsequent studies that the experts relied upon to
further strengthen their opinions on the association between talc use and ovarian
cancer, which will be discussed, infra.
23 	“Confounding refers to a situation in which an association between an exposure and
outcome is all or partly the result of a factor that affects the outcome but is unaffected by the
exposure.” Green at 621. Bias refers to an “effect at any stage of investigation or inference tending
to produce results that depart systematically from the true values.” Id. at 620. Importantly, “[i]n
epidemiology, the term bias does not necessarily carry an imputation of prejudice or other
subjective factor, such as the experimenter’s desire for a particular outcome.” Id. “This differs
from conventional usage, in which bias refers to a partisan point of view.” Id.
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As I noted in my prior Opinion, and which remains true, Defendants “do not
suggest that the experts’ calculation of relative risk, based on the aggregate studies,
was not reliably reached.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 164. Instead,
they argue that the strength of the association cannot support the causal inference
drawn by Plaintiffs’ experts. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 36–37 (“Here,
the relative risk is much lower (approximately 1.3–1.6 in the meta-analyses on which
plaintiffs’ experts rely), weighing heavily against causation.”).) Defendants also
challenge 	the 	experts’ 	discussion 	of 	public-policy 	considerations 	and 	their
comparisons to other exposures with similar relative risks, such as secondhand
smoke and lung cancer, asserting that in those contexts other Bradford Hill factors
were uniquely compelling. (Id. at 37–40.)24 Finally, Defendants contend that the
epidemiologic studies relied on by Plaintiffs’ experts are affected by both recall bias
and confounding. (Id. at 40–47.)
24 	While public policy is indeed an important consideration for resolution of the ultimate issue
in this case, I do not address this argument in this Report and Recommendation for several reasons.
First, Plaintiffs’ experts’ passing comments on public policy do not inform the foundation for their
ultimate purpose in seeking to testify in this litigation, i.e., their scientific expertise on the general
causation issue. Second, Defendants introduce associations like secondhand smoke and lung
cancer as comparators to the agent-disease relationship here—not for the purpose of my evaluation
or analysis of the link between smoking and cancer. In their reports, Plaintiffs’ experts reference
these comparators to establish that a causal relationship can exist even if the strength of association
is moderate. Defendants take issue with these comparisons. I need not analyze the purported
comparators because, according to Hill, even moderately strong associations can support
causation, see Hill at 296, and because I find it more likely than not that the experts’ conclusions
regarding the strength of association are supported by good grounds, making analysis of
comparators unnecessary.
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Having reviewed the reports of Plaintiffs’ experts as amended and updated
since the prior motion practice,25 as well as the parties’ arguments and submissions,
I do not find that: (1) my prior ruling regarding the strength of association factor
demonstrably failed to adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023 amendments; or
(2) the epidemiologic studies published since 2020 cause me to change any of my
previous findings related to this factor. Indeed, there have been no seismic shifts in
the scientific landscape that would warrant reconsideration of my ruling here. In fact,
the majority of additional studies support the association between talc and ovarian
cancer, without any new studies concluding that no causal link exists. I therefore
find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Plaintiffs’ experts have applied
reliable methodologies to arrive at their opinions that the pre- and post-2020
epidemiologic studies, taken as a whole, demonstrate a positive, statistically
significant association between genital talc powder use and ovarian cancer.
Moreover, I thoroughly addressed and rejected Defendants’ substantially
similar arguments in my prior Opinion, finding that Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions
regarding this factor were admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert, and that their
“decisions to place significant weight on the strength of association factor” were
25 	Each proffered expert has issued updated reports since I decided the 2020 Daubert motions,
which address the post-2020 scientific landscape, except Drs. Carson, Kane, and Smith. I have
already discussed why I need not reconsider those experts’ analyses at this juncture. (See supra
Part III.)
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supported by good grounds. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 163; see
id. at 162–68. As Rule 702 requires, my analysis focused on “whether the experts
used a sound methodology in reaching their conclusion that the relative risk range
of 1.2 to 1.6 demonstrates a risk association between talc powder use and ovarian
cancer.” Id. at 164. I found that Plaintiffs’ experts reliably applied their methodology
in evaluating this Bradford Hill factor because they “examined, as they must, the
totality of the available epidemiological evidence on talc use and ovarian cancer, and
drew conclusions based on sound scientific reasoning.” Id. Consequently, and after
careful consideration, I determined that Defendants’ arguments regarding the
magnitude of the association, recall bias, and confounding went to the weight of the
evidence, 	and 	not 	its 	admissibility. 	Id. 	at 	162–68. 	Simply 	put, 	Defendants’
challenges reflected “their disagreement with the conclusions of the experts—not
the methodology employed in consideration of the studies.” Id. at 168.
While I find no reason to depart from my prior ruling on this factor, for the
parties’ and the Court’s benefit, I will fully address Defendants’ current arguments.
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions should be excluded because
they erroneously “all claim that a ‘strong’ association has been reported between talc
use and ovarian cancer.” (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 37.) I rejected this
argument in my prior Opinion, finding there is “no threshold, or a magical number,
of a relative risk that must be found in order to place significant weight on the
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strength of association factor.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 163.
Defendants now cite two recent cases—In re Acetaminophen and In re Viagra—in
support of the same proposition previously rejected: that risk ratios between 1.0 and
2.0 are too small or weak to support a causal inference. (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 37; see also Defs.’ 2019 General Causation Br. at 31–35.) However,
neither case holds that a relative risk below 2.0 is legally insufficient to support
causation; 	instead, both 	courts 	excluded 	the experts’ 	testimonies 	because of
methodological 	shortcomings, 	not 	because of the magnitude 	of the 	reported
associations. See In re Acetaminophen, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 346–48 (excluding
expert’s opinion for, inter alia, failing to “separately address” studies evaluating
disparate diagnoses, e.g., autism spectrum disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder, and other neurodevelopmental disorders, and failing to “explain how the
strength (or weakness) of association evidence for each of them has impacted his
overarching assessment”); In re Viagra (Sildenafil Citrate) & Cialis (Tadalafil)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 3d 781, 794–96 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (excluding
expert’s opinion because she was unable to specify grounds upon which she
perceived a strong association, instead testifying generally “that she found it in the
‘totality’ of the evidence”). Accordingly, Defendants cite no legal authority holding
that, as a matter of law, a relative risk in the range of 1.2 to 1.6 is facially insufficient
to support Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusion that this Bradford Hill factor is met.
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Furthermore, because Defendants’ challenge amounts to a debate over
whether the observed association should be characterized as weak, moderate, or
strong, (Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 74), in my view, this argument attacks
the experts’ conclusions on the ground that the observed association appears slight,
while disregarding the central reliability inquiry: whether the expert has reviewed
all relevant evidence and explained “(1) how conclusions are drawn for each
Bradford Hill criterion and (2) how the criteria are weighed relative to one another.”
In re Zoloft, 858 F.3d at 796. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ experts’ positive associations
derive directly from their independent reviews of the relevant studies—which were
all authored by practitioners with relevant expertise, peer-reviewed within their
fields, and published in scientific journals. (See, e.g., O’Brien 2020; O’Brien 2024;
Woolen 2022; Chang 2024; and Davis 2021.) As discussed in detail above, the more
recent studies are largely comprised of cohort and pooled analyses, rather than case
studies, analyzing hundreds of thousands of women’s health and hygiene patterns
across decades. (See supra Part V.B.4.)
For the majority of these studies, Defendants do not critique the researchers’
methodologies, but instead take issue with the experts’ characterizations of the
studies’ conclusions and outcomes, and purported failure to adequately account for
confounding factors and recall bias. (See Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 17–20
(disputing Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the findings of O’Brien 2020, Davis 2021, and
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Chang 2024).) They do, however, attack Woolen 2022, describing it as having been
“discredited” by the National Cancer Institute (“NCI”), on the basis that the NCI
later advised readers that Woolen 2022’s “results should be interpreted with care,”
because, in Defendants’ words, the study reflects a “post hoc analysis that used
subjective and inconsistent criteria to narrow the data it examined.” (Defs.’ General
Causation Br. at 20–21, 30.) Yet cautionary language advising the audience to
“interpret 	[a 	study’s 	results] 	with 	care” 	stops 	short 	of 	a 	methodological
condemnation that renders a study unreliable; measured academic consideration
does not equate to scientific repudiation. Nor do Defendants point to any other
support for the criticism that the study is insufficient such that Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions should be excluded for having cited and relied on this study.
As discussed above, Woolen 2022 was a meta-analysis that examined the
association between frequent perineal talc use and ovarian cancer using pooled data
from 11 studies. (Woolen 2022 at 2528.) The study found a “pooled adjusted odds
ratio of 1.47% (95% CI 1.31, 1.65),” for frequent use of perineal talcum powder. (Id.
at 2530.) As Woolen 2022 was “the first systematic review to focus on multiple
times per week users,” the authors also acknowledged the design’s limitations,
including variations across surveys that may have excluded certain frequent-use
patients “if the questionnaire did not explicitly capture” multiple-times-per-week
usage information, as well as potential variances in the definitions of talcum powder
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use by frequency and duration. (Id. at 2531–32.) While these constraints may
provide grounds for caution in interpretation, they do not rise to the level of
wholesale methodological unreliability by Plaintiffs’ experts’ that would justify
exclusion under Rule 702, particularly since this is but one of many studies that the
experts relied upon to reach their conclusions on strength of association.
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ experts acknowledge and account for those limitations
when explaining why, however, they do not discount the study’s conclusion in their
assessments. For example, Dr. McTiernan noted that despite its constraints, the study
is consistent with, and confirms, prior data by “add[ing] to the previously published
literature which shows a consistent elevated risk of ovarian cancer with genital
exposure to talcum powder product.” (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 81). She also
explained that although “[s]ome included studies were unable to differentiate
between perineal talcum powder product and cornstarch users,” “other research
shows only 1–2% of perineal powder users reported cornstarch.” (Id. (citing Daniel
W. Cramer et al., The Association Between Talc Use and Ovarian Cancer: A
Retrospective Case-Control Study in Two U.S. States, 27 Epidemiol. (3) 334–346
(2016) (“Cramer 2016”)); see also, e.g., Moorman Supp. Rep. at 4 (explaining that
the pooled OR was higher than the summary ORs from other published analyses
which was “to be expected given that other meta-analyses defined the exposure as
any use of talc whereas the exposure was defined as frequent use of talc in this meta-
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analysis”).) Accordingly, such limitations are more appropriately addressed through
cross-examination and competing expert testimony, which allow the factfinder to
evaluate the weight to be afforded to Woolen 2022 in the overall causation analysis.
See, e.g., Tree-Removal Rts. In re Land in Gordon Cnty., Ga., 283 F. Supp. 3d at
1346 (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard under Rule 702 to explain
that (1) “the gatekeeping function under Rule 702 is not intended to supplant the
adversary system or the role of the jury: vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof,” and (2) “in most
cases, objections to the inadequacies of a study are more appropriately considered
an objection going to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility”) (first
quoting Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014); and then
quoting Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2011)).
Defendants direct more pointed criticism at O’Brien 2024, asserting that the
study “imputed—i.e., made up” a substantial volume of missing exposure data when
evaluating retrospective talc-use information from Sister Study participants. (Defs.’
General Causation Br. at 21–22.) That characterization, however, obscures the actual
methodological detail underlying the study’s analysis. Confronted with incomplete
follow-up responses, the authors employed a multiple-imputation framework to
estimate exposure status and generate adjusted effect estimates. The study explained
that “[d]ata on intimate care product use were sometimes contradictory or missing,”
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from follow-up questionnaires in the Sister Study, specifically because, for example,
“those 	who 	died 	of 	their 	disease 	could 	not 	have 	completed 	the 	follow-up
questionnaire.” (O’Brien 2024 at 3, 14; see also Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at
30 (acknowledging that some “women [] were lost to the cohort before they could
answer the follow-up questions about lifetime use (for example, those who had
already died)”).) Therefore, the researchers “used quantitative bias analyses to
implement different approaches for imputing exposure in women who initially
reported never use but did not complete the follow-up questionnaire. These
comparisons were crucial for understanding potential biases, as women with incident
cancer were overrepresented in this undefined group.” (O’Brien 2024 at 3 (emphasis
added).) Using quantitative bias analysis, O’Brien 2024 “compared four possible
scenarios . . . : (1) no correction; (2) contradictory data correction; (3) contradictory
data 	correction 	plus 	categorizing 	missing 	or 	undefined 	as 	exposed; 	and 	(4)
contradictory data correction with multiple imputation of missing or undefined
data.” (Id. at 4.) Specifically, the researchers conducted ten iterations correcting for
conflicting responses and then summarized the results across 100 imputed data sets
to address confounding and uncertainty. (Id.) The study described in detail the steps
taken using “multiple imputation with chained equations (MICE; PROC MI, SAS
v9.4 [Cary, NC]) to generate covariate-informed probabilistic imputations of the
exposure status of participants who were undefined or missing,” resulting in an
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approach that they call “our best estimate of the true association in the absence of
recall or other unknown biases.” (Id.)
Several of Plaintiffs’ experts, such as Dr. Singh, (Singh Rep. at 1), cited to
what is known across the scientific literature as “Rubin’s Rule,” based on the 1987
publication by Donald B. Rubin that is often credited as codifying this methodology.
See, e.g., Romuladus E. Azuine et al., Prenatal Risk Factors and Perinatal and
Postnatal Outcomes Associated With Maternal Opioid Exposure in an Urban, Low-
Income Multiethnic U.S. Population, 2 JAMA Netw. (6) (2019); David C. Whiteman
et al., The Effect of Screening on Melanoma Incidence and Biopsy Rates, 187 Br. J.
Dermatol. 515 (2022). Scholars invoke this method when faced with a situation
where there is missing data that is not possible to obtain for a variety of unavoidable
reasons, ranging from material “missing completely at random” to “missingness
dependent on the unobserved values,” e.g., when a participant has died due to the
disease being studied. Peng Li, Elizabeth A. Stuart & David B. Allison, Multiple
Imputation: A Flexible Tool for Handling Missing Data, 314 J. Am. Med. Ass’n (18)
1966–67 (2015). Multiple imputation has been described in the peer-reviewed
literature as “the process of replacing missing data with 1 or more specific values,
to allow statistical analysis that includes all participants and not just those who do
not have any missing data.” Id. (emphasis added). While missing data can be
approximated by “estimat[ing] what each missing value might have been and replace
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it with a single value in the data set,” Rubin’s multiple imputation approach “better
handles missing data by estimating and replacing missing values many times.” Id.
This “reduces the change of false-positive or false-negative conclusions.” Id.
This accords with Plaintiffs’ experts’ characterizations of this process as
consistent with “well-established epidemiologic methods of multiple imputation that
have been in existence for decades,” and as a means of producing the most
informative estimate where recall bias and missing data are present. (Singh Rep. at
1 (citing Donald B. Rubin, Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys, Wiley
& Sons (1987)); ECF No. 33130-5, (“Harlow Supp. Rep.”) at 1; Cote Amend. Rep.
at 25; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 49 (explaining that multiple imputation does
not involve “making up data,” but instead fills in missing values based on observed
relationships within the dataset); Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 22 (“[T]he
authors used established techniques of multiple imputation to generate covariate-
informed probabilistic imputations of exposure status for participants with undefined
or missing values.”).) In her report, Dr. McTiernan described in detail, relying on
many of the same principles expounded upon above, how and why she agreed that
this methodology is sound. (See McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 50.)
Accordingly, I do not find Defendants’ characterization of O’Brien 2024 as
having “made up” data to be persuasive for purposes of assessing the reliability of
the methodology in the context of Rule 702. As I have described above, the study’s
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use of multiple imputation and quantitative bias analysis reflects well-established
statistical methodologies long accepted within the epidemiologic and broader
scientific communities for addressing missing data and recall bias—particularly in
longitudinal studies where loss to follow-up is unavoidable. Both the study’s authors
and Plaintiffs’ experts in detail describe the assumptions, limitations, and analytical
steps underlying this approach, and the methodology is grounded in peer-reviewed
principles dating back decades. Defendants’ objections therefore challenge the
inferences drawn from the imputed data and the weight to be accorded to those
results, not the reliability of the methods employed. Such criticisms are properly
explored through cross-examination and competing expert testimony, rather than
exclusion under Rule 702.
In sum, while Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusions, I find
that the experts have reviewed the epidemiologic evidence and articulated, in a
sufficiently reliable manner to satisfy the more likely than not standard, how they
evaluated the strength of association under the Bradford Hill framework and how
that factor fits within their overall causal assessment. For example, relying on both
pre- and post-2020 epidemiologic studies, Dr. Cote states that the “effect sizes seen
in most of the studies examining the association between the genital use of talcum
powder and ovarian cancer are around 1.25 in magnitude.” (Cote Amend. Rep. at
36.) Dr. McTiernan similarly concludes that pooled and meta-analyses show that
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“risk of ovarian cancer among ever users of talcum powder products is 22–31%
higher than in women who never used these products.” (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep.
at 96.) Dr. Siemiatycki opines that the “meta-RR estimate is 1.3,” meaning “the best
estimate from the epidemiologic literature is that women who regularly used talcum
powder products in the genital area had a 30% higher risk of ovarian cancer than
women who did not use such powders.” (Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 71.) He
asserts that such a “meta-RR could not have occurred by chance.” (Id.) Other experts
estimate that the risk among genital talc users may be as high as 50 to 60%,
particularly among frequent users. (Singh Supp. Rep. at 19–20; Smith Rep. at 19,
21; Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 32, 34–36.)
Next, Defendants claim that “the very small reported relative risk” between
talc use and ovarian cancer “is likely being driven by recall bias, thanks in part to
extensive lawyer 	advertising 	that 	has 	scared 	women.” 	(Defs.’ 	2024 	General
Causation Br. at 4.) Recall bias refers to the tendency of participants in case-control
studies who have been diagnosed “with disease (cases) . . . to recall past exposures
more readily than individuals with no disease (controls).” Green at 585. I addressed
Defendants’ recall bias arguments in my prior Opinion, including their concerns
about case-control studies and external influences such as media attention, which I
will not repeat here. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 164–68.
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Defendants now rely on three recent studies—Goodman 202426, O’Brien
202327, and Davis 2021—which they contend “conclusively demonstrate” that recall
bias explains the observed association between talc use and ovarian cancer. (Defs.’
2024 General Causation Br. at 40–43.) I disagree. None of these studies conclude
that recall bias actually occurred in the underlying epidemiologic literature. Rather,
they identify recall bias as a potential source of error and, in some instances, use
hypothetical or modelled scenarios to illustrate how differential misclassification
could influence risk estimates. Critically, none establish that the epidemiologic
evidence on which Plaintiffs’ experts rely is materially distorted by recall bias or
that such bias would nullify the positive associations consistently observed across
multiple studies. That is not to say that recall bias could not have affected the
underlying data. However, as discussed below, Plaintiffs’ experts have adequately
accounted for recall bias and other potential confounders in forming their opinions.
Defendants also challenge the experts’ reliance on O’Brien 2024, arguing,
inter alia, that Dr. McTiernan twisted the study’s findings by stating it “proved that
recall bias does not explain the relative risks seen for ovarian cancer with genital talc
exposure over decades of research around the world.” (Defs.’ 2024 General
26 	Julie E. Goodman et al., Quantitative Recall Bias Analysis of the Talc and Ovarian Cancer
Association, 7 Glob Epidemiol. (2024) (“Goodman 2024”).
27 	Katie M. O’Brien et al., Douching and Genital Talc Use: Patterns of Use and Reliability
of Self-reported Exposure, 34 Epidemiol. (3) 376–84 (2023) (“O’Brien 2023”).
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Causation Br. at 43; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 53.) As discussed above, O’Brien
2024 ran ten iterations across 100 imputed data sets to specifically “investigate[] the
potential impact of recall bias on the association between genital talc use and ovarian
cancer.” (O’Brien 2024 at 4.) The study’s authors described these quantitative bias
analyses as “a major strength,” of the study because “they provide a comprehensive
illustration of the possible impacts of missing data and recall bias under a variety of
scenarios.” (Id. at 14.) In that regard, while Defendants are correct in asserting that
O’Brien 2024 did not prove the lack of recall bias, and that Dr. McTiernan’s above
statement overstates this specific finding in O’Brien 2024, Defendants nonetheless
overlook the broader context of Dr. McTiernan’s and other experts’ discussions of
the study. (See infra, note 26.)
In her report, Dr. McTiernan began with a detailed analysis of O’Brien 2024.
(McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 48–54.) She set forth what she viewed as the study’s
strengths, when considered in the context of prior analyses and reasoning why the
potential for recall bias cannot adequately explain updated findings. I find that Dr.
McTiernan accurately described the study’s methods and findings and reasonably
interpreted its results and overall significance in light of her review of the Bradford
Hill analysis, with the possible exception of the above discussion of Dr. McTiernan’s
overstatement of the impact of recall bias. Specifically, she emphasized that the
study had a “more stable estimate of hazard ratios (relative risk)” and “more power
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to detect statistically significant associations,” because it was able to evaluate “more
cases accrued over a longer period of follow-up.” (Id. at 53.) O’Brien 2024 also
analyzed lifetime exposure, rather than the more limited period used in prior studies.
(Id.) Even with these more concentrated findings, the resulting HRs were consistent
with “genital talc exposure over decades of research around the world,” establishing
that recall bias alone cannot explain the ultimate conclusions.28 (Id.) Accordingly,
Dr. McTiernan’s discussion of O’Brien 2024 does not bespeak a lack of scientific
rigor, as Defendants contend.
Defendants 	also 	assert 	that 	Drs. 	Harlow 	and 	Cote 	distort 	the 	study’s
conclusions. (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 43 n.108.) I disagree. I find that these
experts 	have 	applied 	reliable 	methodologies 	and 	made 	adequately 	supported
extrapolations from O’Brien 2024 in arriving at their conclusions. For example, Dr.
Harlow addressed the potential for recall bias, noting that O’Brien 2024 applied a
recall bias correction to the reported risk ratio for “ever use” of perineal talc to arrive
at 1.40—a figure “similar to what many earlier studies have reported.” (Harlow
28 	I emphasize that despite Defendants’ selective quote from Dr. McTiernan that O’Brien
2024 “proved that recall bias does not explain the relative risks,” a closer read of her analysis
demonstrates that despite this phraseology in her summary of the study, her longer discussion and
analysis of the study appropriately accounted for how the study mitigated recall bias in its
methodology. In other words, I understand Dr. McTiernan’s comment in this regard to summarize
the high-level finding that based on the iterations of analysis O’Brien 2024 applied, the approach
resulted in the authors’ “best estimate of the true association in the absence of recall bias or other
unknown biases.” (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 50 (quoting O’Brien 2024 at 4).) Of course,
Defendants are free to use the expert’s words against her and probe this language on cross-
examination; however, I do not find this a sufficient ground to exclude her opinion on this point.
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Supp. Rep. at 4.) Indeed, the corrected estimate resulted in even more elevated
increased risk ratios for both “frequent use” and “long term use” subjects. (Id.)
Further, Dr. Harlow added that while “the authors [of the O’Brien 2024 study] state
that they cannot rule out the presence of unmeasured confounding,” any such
presence “would have had to occur before the first onset of talc exposure” and have
a “magnitude . . . sufficient to offset the observed talc and ovarian cancer association
present in this analysis.” (Id.) Based on this reasoning, Dr. Harlow concluded that
“unmeasured confounding is highly unlikely to have any impact on these findings.”
(Id.) Dr. Cote made similar assessments based on hypothetical over-estimations of
potential recall bias, explaining that even assuming “90% of women were reassigned
to never use” from either “infrequent or short term use,” the “analyses . . . showed
positive associations,” thus bolstering her conclusion that despite potential recall
bias, “there remained a positive association between genital talc use and ovarian
cancer.” (Cote Amend. Rep. at 25.)
None of these analyses rise to the level of Defendants’ claim that the “experts
are drawing conclusions that study authors were not willing to make.” (Defs.’
General Causation Br. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Instead, O’Brien
2024, in its own words, concluded that the study’s “findings support the hypothesis
that there is a positive association between genital talc use and ovarian cancer
incidence,” even though “there is still uncertainty as to how much recall bias and
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missing data could upwardly bias effect estimates.” (O’Brien 2024 at 14.) Moreover,
O’Brien 2024 assessed findings from nearly 50,000 women over the span of nearly
two decades, making it “one of the largest studies to collect data on intimate care
product use,” and therefore significantly powered to detect statistically significant
associations and account for potential recall bias. (Id. at 2, 14.) The experts’
explanations of same applied sound methodology to attempt to account for those
gaps that O’Brien 2024 identified; they accordingly arrived at the same finding of
“a positive association” between talc use and ovarian cancer. (Id.) Any further
challenges that Defendants have to the experts’ characterizations of the study on this
point are therefore a question of weight based on the scientists’ conclusions, rather
than their methodologies in reaching those conclusions.
Defendants next assert that Plaintiffs’ experts “fail to meaningfully address”
potential confounding in case-control studies. (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 44.)
Again, I disagree. Despite Defendants’ characterization that Dr. Harlow “ignore[d]”
the issue in his report, in addition to the recall bias analysis discussed above, Dr.
Harlow 	“[a]ddress[ed] 	skepticism 	related 	to 	this 	research,” 	explaining 	that
“[a]lthough case-control studies have long been disparaged as being backwards
versions of cohort studies . . . epidemiologists today understand case-control studies
to be conceptually identical to cohort studies, apart from an efficiency gain that
comes from sampling the denominators rather than conducting a complete census.”
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(Harlow Rep. at 17–18 (citing Kenneth J. Rothman, 	Six Persistent Research
Misconceptions, 29 J. Gen. Intern. Med. (7) 1060–1064 (2014).) As a general matter,
Dr. Harlow also concluded that “none of the non-causal explanations can account
adequately for the consistent positive association across so many studies,” when
considered in conjunction with the other Bradford Hill criteria such as consistency
and biological plausibility. (Id. at 20.)29
More specifically on the issue of confounders, Defendants fault Plaintiffs’
experts for giving little attention to douching as a potential confounder. (Defs.’
General Causation Br. at 45–47.) However, they do not meaningfully address that
recent data—including O’Brien 2024—reported that “[d]ouching was not strongly
associated with any of the examined outcomes,” ovarian cancer among them.
(O’Brien 2024 at 12; see also id. at 7, Table 2.) In fact, O’Brien 2024 only found “a
possible positive association between douching and ovarian cancer” for those
classified as “[f]requent douch[ers] and douch[ers] age 20–39 years.” (Id. at 13
(emphasis added).) In light of those findings, the absence of a detailed discussion of
29 	Defendants also claim that Dr. Clarke-Pearson “ignore[d]” confounding in case-control
studies in his report. (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 44.) But his report acknowledged that, in his
“opinion, meta-analysis studies are much stronger [than cohort and case-control studies] in that
they include larger numbers of patients resulting in greater statistical power.” (Clarke-Pearson 3d
Amend. Rep. at 9.) He therefore emphasized meta-analyses and pooled studies, rather than case-
control or cohort studies, to arrive at his conclusions. This directly tracks his opinions that I
previously considered. See In re J&J, 509 F. Supp. at 165–66. If Defendants seek to probe that
evaluation and the weight he affords certain types of studies over others, they may do so on cross-
examination, but his analyses and methodologies survive the preponderance of the evidence
standard.
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douching as a confounder in Plaintiffs’ expert reports is not entirely unexpected or
unreasonable.
Moreover, Defendants criticize Dr. Moorman’s treatment of two pre-2020
studies, Nicole L. Gonzalez, Douching, Talc Use, and Risk of Ovarian Cancer, 27
Epidemiol. 797 (2016) (“Gonzalez 2016”) and Iwona M. Gabriel, Douching, Talc
Use, and Risk for Ovarian Cancer and Conditions Related to Genital Tract
Inflammation, 28 Cancer Epidemiol. Biomarkers Prev (11), 1835 (2019) (“Gabriel
2019”).30 (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 45–47.) In her most recent report,
however, Dr. Moorman explained why she viewed Gonzalez 2016’s finding of a
relative risk below one as an outlier, noting that it is “only 1 of 3 studies out of the
27 studies included in the major meta-analyses” to report such a result and that its
estimate was based solely on talc use during the 12 months before enrollment, which
yielded a talc-use prevalence of just 14 percent. (ECF No. 33130-63 (“Moorman 2d
Supp. Rep.”) at 5.) She then evaluated more recent post-2020 literature in further
assessing the weight Gonzalez 2016 should be afforded. (Id. at 5–7.) Drawing on
30 	In her 2023 report, Dr. Moorman characterized Gabriel 2019 as finding that “[i]n contrast
to the talc findings, douching was not significantly associated with ovarian cancer (OR 0.98, 95%
CI 0.83–1.17 overall; OR 1.03, 95% CI 0.77–1.38 among talc users; and OR 0.94, 95% CI 0.76–
1.16 among those who never used talc).”) (ECF No. 33130-62 (“Moorman Supp. Rep.”) at 3.) And
indeed, the study itself concluded that “[d]ouching is not an independent risk factor for ovarian
cancer, but the combination of talc use and store-bought douches may modestly increase the risk.”
(Id. at 1.) I therefore do not find that Dr. Moorman’s conclusions are “unauthorized by the data she
cites.” (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Dr. Moorman does
not undertake further discussion of this study in her most recent report. (See generally ECF No.
33130-63, “Moorman 2d Supp. Rep.”)
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O’Brien 2024, Dr. Moorman observed that the reported associations for talc use were
generally stronger than those for douching, which, in her view, supports specificity
because one would expect recall errors to affect the two exposures similarly; if recall
bias alone explained the observed associations, comparable associations with
douching would be expected. (Id. at 9.) In light of these considerations, and given
the current scientific record, it is methodologically reasonable for experts to place
greater emphasis on factors and studies supported by more consistent or robust data.
More to the point, as Plaintiffs note, Defendants previously “made [these]
exact claim[s]” before me in the prior Daubert motions, upon which I found that the
expert reports were not lacking in their consideration of recall bias and confounding.
(Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 78 (citing In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F.
Supp. 3d at 166–68).) And the post-2020 “new science” only includes one case-
control study (Davis 2021), which was in fact founded upon data from the WHI
cohort study—minimizing concerns of recall bias because of the nature of the
prospective study. (See Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 32.) Finding the relevant
circumstances substantially unchanged on this issue, I find no reason to depart from
my prior assessment of the experts’ reasonable accounting for potential confounding
factors. I reiterate that to the extent Defendants observe that Plaintiffs’ experts have
not assessed the studies “for all potential confounders,” those questions are ripe for
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cross-examination at trial—particularly since Defendants only focused on douching
as their point of contention in their papers. (Id. at 45.)
To conclude, Plaintiffs’ experts generally gave this factor significant weight
in their Bradford Hill analyses. I do not find the experts’ conclusions regarding the
strength of association to be ipse dixit, but are instead based upon reliable study
results, having drawn adequately supported conclusions from the existing data, and
satisfying the more likely than not standard. To be clear, my determination that
Plaintiffs’ experts may opine on why they perceive a strength of association between
talc and ovarian cancer based on the available literature does not equate to a holding
that the factor is satisfied for purposes of establishing causation. That is ultimately a
question for the factfinder. See Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note to 2023
amendment (“The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits
standard of correctness.”). Accordingly, “Defendants’ argument with respect to
whether the association is ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ is one that goes to the weight of the
experts’ testimony, not the reliability.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at
163. 	I 	find, 	however, 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts 	have 	met 	their 	burden 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence under Rule 702 to demonstrate that they applied
reliable methodology and extrapolated conclusions adequately supported by the
literature on strength of association, such that their opinions are admissible for
inclusion at trial.
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ii. 	Consistency
This 	factor 	measures 	the 	consistency 	of 	the 	observed 	association 	and
examines whether the result has “been repeatedly observed by different persons, in
different places, circumstances and times.” Hill at 296. “Rarely, if ever, does a single
study 	persuasively 	demonstrate 	a 	cause-effect 	relationship.” 	Green 	at 	602.
Consistency in research findings “is an important factor in making a judgment about
causation.” 	Id. 	“Different 	studies 	that 	examine 	the 	same 	exposure-disease
relationship generally should yield similar results.” Id.
In my 2020 Opinion, I addressed Defendants’ arguments concerning this
factor and concluded that the experts’ methodologies were sufficiently reliable under
Daubert. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 168–172. At that time,
Defendants 	advanced 	two 	primary 	contentions. 	First, 	they 	argued 	that 	the
epidemiologic literature was not truly consistent because cohort and case-control
studies reached different outcomes, emphasizing that since no cohort study had
identified a statistically significant association between talc use and ovarian cancer,
consistency is lacking. Id. at 169. Second, Defendants contended that Plaintiffs’
experts did not adequately grapple with the cohort data, taking issue with the experts’
views on the cohort studies’ limited statistical power, the assertedly insufficient
duration of follow-up relative to ovarian cancer’s latency period, and the studies’
inability to ascertain each participant’s talc exposure with precision. Id. at 171–72.
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To assess consistency in light of Defendants’ arguments, I reviewed Dr.
McTiernan’s “consistency analysis in her expert report, explaining that 24 of the 28
case-control studies show relative risks greater than 1.1 for women who had any
perineal exposure to talcum powder products, compared with never users.” Id. at
169. I reasoned the expert found that over half of those studies were statistically
significant, while the others “had a sample size lower than that estimated to be
needed to have power to detect a statistically significant result.” Id. My opinion then
detailed Dr. McTiernan’s methodology in “consider[ing] statistical significance with
respect to both cohort and case control studies,” including evaluating the type of
analysis performed, “whether p-value or confidence interval.” Id. at 170–71. I cited
to leading epidemiologists’ corroboration of Dr. McTiernan’s approach, concluding
that “according to the experts, in the epidemiology context, inconsistent statistical
significance from one study to the next does not, in of itself, show inconsistency
under Bradford Hill.” Id. at 171.
Defendants reprise similar arguments here. In the first portion of their
argument, they claim that Plaintiffs’ experts improperly downplay O’Brien 2020’s
findings because they do not support their positions, i.e., that the study had “the
power to detect a statistically significant risk if it existed,” but did not so conclude.
(Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 52.) Specifically, they fault the experts for
stretching the O’Brien 2020 data to “attempt to show consistency” by relying on a
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subgroup analysis that found a “very small, but statistically significant, association
for women with a patent reproductive tract.” (Id.) Defendants also attack Plaintiffs’
experts’ reliance on O’Brien 2024, which according to Defendants, only yielded data
that supports Plaintiffs because the “authors imputed a number of ‘corrections’ and
‘assumptions’ into the Sister Study cohort data.” (Id. at 53–54.) They then advance,
as they did in 2020, their disagreement with Plaintiffs’ critiques around latency and
follow-up periods, emphasizing that Plaintiffs’ “concerns about imprecise exposure
data would apply to case-control studies as well.” (Id. at 54–58.) Defendants rely on
public health agencies, such as the NCI and FDA, purportedly recognizing that
studies do not show a consistent association between perineal talc use and ovarian
cancer. (Id. at 47 & n.120.)
Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ experts “improperly disregard
statistical significance” in order to “manufacture consistency.” (Id. at 58, 64.)
Defendants assert that courts have repeatedly rejected efforts by plaintiffs’ experts
to minimize the role of statistical significance. (Id. at 58–60 (citing In re Zantac, 644
F. Supp. 3d at 1222, 1237–38; In re Lipitor, 892 F.3d 624, 641–42 (4th Cir. 2018)).)
In their view, Plaintiffs’ consistency assessments rely primarily on point estimates
that trend toward increased risk, which Defendants characterize as “effectively
ignor[ing] statistical significance.” (Id. at 60.) Defendants also disagree with my
prior description of their position, stating that they “have never argued that statistical
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significance is a litmus test for consistency,” but they maintain that the concept
cannot be disregarded altogether. (Id. at 61–62.) Finally, Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs’ experts apply statistical significance inconsistently, highlighting, for
example, the experts’ attention to statistically significant subgroup findings in
O’Brien 2020, while giving less weight to the remainder of that study’s results. (Id.
at 62.)
Plaintiffs first respond that my 2020 Opinion found “there was adequate
evidence of consistency in 2020, even though the three cohort studies available at
the time did not clearly show an association that was statistically significant,” and
that the only thing that has changed is that now, “the scientific record is even stronger
and better described,” with “[n]othing in the new science rebut[ting the] existing
findings.” (Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 79, 82.) To illustrate this point, they
focus on Health Canada’s 2021 assessment, O’Brien’s follow-up commentary to her
2020 	study, 	and 	O’Brien 	2024—all 	finding 	consistency 	among 	the 	existing
epidemiological studies across decades.31 (Id. at 80–81.)
31 	Both parties rely on statements and findings by public health agencies—including the FDA,
Health Canada, and WHO—in support of their respective positions regarding the carcinogenicity
of Defendants’ talcum powder products. Although I addressed this issue briefly in my prior
Opinion, I pause here to clarify how such materials are considered in resolving the parties’ pending
motions. I am mindful of the role played by public health agencies in evaluating potential health
risks. Their mandate is to protect the public at large, often through precautionary risk assessment
intended to inform regulatory policy or public guidance. In carrying out that mandate, agencies
may reasonably err on the side of caution and may employ standards that differ in material respects
from those governing expert admissibility under Rule 702 and Daubert. Accordingly, I do not treat
agency findings as dispositive of the causation issues presented, nor do I assign greater or lesser
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In response to Defendants’ second argument, Plaintiffs assert that “the modern
trend is to take statistical significance into account without rigidly excluding all
studies that are not statistically significant,” citing scientific literature and case law
that supports their position. (Id. at 84–87.) Because “[n]othing in the science of
statistics has changed since 2020 to upend [my] findings,” they reason that there is
“all the more reason to reject J&J’s rehashed argument” based on the updated
literature. (Id. at 88.) If anything, Plaintiffs claim, now “the shoe is on the other
foot,” because Defendants are the ones who appear to “ignore the statistically
significant results of O’Brien 2020 and O’Brien 2024.” (Id. at 89–90.)
As a preliminary matter, I must address the correct standard for considering
statistical significance within the context of the Bradford Hill factors. The Reference
Guide explains that “significance testing only bears on whether the observed
magnitude [of an association between an agent and an outcome] arose as a result of
random chance, not on whether the null hypothesis [i.e., that there is no association]
is true.” Green at 577 n.81.32 In other words, a finding that a study’s results are
weight to the views of one agency over another or attempt to resolve differences among them. This
does not mean, however, that such materials are to be disregarded. Rather, they form part of the
broader scientific landscape and often reflect a reasoned and methodologically sound engagement
with the existing body of scientific evidence on which the parties’ experts also rely. In that context,
I note only that no public health agency has affirmatively concluded that there is no causal
connection between talc use and ovarian cancer.
32 	In mathematical terms, “epidemiologists use a convention that the p-value must fall below
some selected level known as alpha or significance level for the results of the study to be
statistically significant. Thus, an outcome is statistically significant when the observed p-value for
the study falls below the preselected significance level.” Green at 576–77. “The most common
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statistically significant indicates a degree of confidence that a real effect or
relationship exists within the population being studied. However, “[t]here is some
controversy among epidemiologists and biostatisticians about the appropriate role of
significance 	testing,” 	because 	“[e]pidemiologists 	have 	become 	increasingly
sophisticated in addressing the issue of random error . . . without the necessity of
rejecting all studies that are not statistically significant.” Id. at 579 (emphasis
added). Specifically, meta-analyses can “ameliorate concerns about random error.”
Id.
In line with those scientific principles, as I explained in my prior Opinion, the
Third 	Circuit has “declined 	to 	adopt 	a bright-line rule” regarding 	statistical
significance. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (citing In re Zoloft,
858 F.3d at 793; see also In re Lipitor, 892 F.3d at 642 (same). Instead, Zoloft
explained that “[a] causal connection may exist despite the lack of significant
findings, due to issues such as random misclassification or insufficient power,” and
at the same time, “[i]f a causal connection does not actually exist, significant findings
can still occur due to, inter alia, inability to control for a confounding effect or
detection bias.” 858 F.3d at 793; see also Green at 24 (“What role should statistical
significance play in assessing the value of a study? Epidemiological studies that are
significance level, or alpha, used in science is .05,” which means that “the probability is 5% of
observing an association at least as large as that found in the study when in truth there is no
association.” Id. at 577; see also, e.g., In re Lipitor, 892 F.3d at 634 (same).
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not conclusive but show some increased risk do not prove a lack of causation.”). Of
course, statistical significance can overlap with the strength of association factor
because it implicates level of risk and strength of causation; however, the parties
here have addressed this issue under the consistency factor because it 	also
necessarily involves whether the data studying the relationship between talc and
ovarian cancer is sufficiently consistent across the board.
Accordingly, I emphasize that this factor evaluates “consistency” across
differing 	studies 	not 	“statistical 	significance,” 	which 	means 	that 	statistical
significance is not the only data that I must consider related to this factor. In that
connection, despite Defendants claiming that they “have never argued that statistical
significance is a litmus test for consistency,” they nonetheless base their entire
argument in support of this factor on that exact measure. (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 63; see id. at 49–58 (focusing on Plaintiffs’ experts’ attacks on the
cohort studies pertaining to statistical significance); id. at 58 (subsection entitled,
“Plaintiffs’ Experts Improperly Disregard Statistical Significance In Reaching Their
Conclusions On Consistency”).) Even so, to the extent that statistical significance is
an aspect of consistency, as I noted in 2020 and I find no basis to depart from here,
“the causation experts considered statistical significance with respect to both cohort
and case control studies, and did so in a reliable fashion.” In re Johnson & Johnson,
509 F. Supp. 3d at 170.
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I will first review the relevant post-2020 studies. To begin, O’Brien 2020
evaluated whether genital powder use is associated with ovarian cancer by pooling
data from four large cohort studies covering over 250,000 women, but only 2,168
ovarian cancers developed in that population. (O’Brien 2020 at 49.) The authors
conducted approximately 11 years of follow-up reporting. (Id.) The study did not
find a statistically significant association on this measure but acknowledged that it
“may have been underpowered to identify a small increase in risk.” (Id.) The results
showed a “possible positive association among women with patent reproductive
tracts,” but “the association was not significantly different from that observed in
women with nonpatent reproductive tracts,” and the authors therefore clarified that
“this finding should be considered only exploratory and hypothesis generating.” (Id.
at 56.) However, in a follow-up Letter to the Editor, Dr. O’Brien agreed with
critiquing colleagues “that our results, particularly the analyses limited to women
with intact reproductive tracts, should not be discounted because of lack of statistical
significance,” and that as applied broadly to the study, they “never equated the lack
of statistical significance to evidence of no association.” (ECF No. 33130-38,
O’Brien et al., Letters to the Editor 323 JAMA 2095, 2096–97 (May 26, 2020).)
In a study published by the same lead author four years later, O’Brien 2024
used 	updated 	exposure 	data 	and 	quantitative 	bias 	analysis 	to 	reanalyze 	the
association between “intimate care products,” including genital talc, and ovarian
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cancer. (O’Brien 2024 at 1.) As has already been discussed at length, O’Brien 2024
“used quantitative bias analyses to implement different approaches for imputing
exposure” where follow-up data was lacking, by running and summarizing effect
estimates across 100 imputed data sets. (Id. at 4.) The authors “found evidence
supporting a positive association between ever genital talc use and incident ovarian
cancer,” collecting ORs across pooled and meta-analyses of case-control studies and
HRs from a pooled analysis of prospective cohort studies, as well as analyses of the
targeted age range (20–39 years)—“which is consistent with previous studies that
considered ages of use.” (Id. at 13.)
Indeed, since my 2020 Opinion, the experts now have a more robust record of
scientific evidence upon which to make their assessments, given the post-2020
cohort studies. Tellingly, Defendants’ prior attack on the consistency factor rested
in large part on, in their view, the absence of a statistically significant cohort study;
yet throughout their current moving brief, they do not seriously engage with O’Brien
2024, which updated findings for a cohort of nearly 50,000 women and found “a
positive association between use of intimate care products, including genital talc,
and ovarian cancer.” (Id. at 1.) The sum total of their discussion of O’Brien 2024 is
focused on condemning its usage of imputed data. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation
Br. at 53–54.) I have already explained, supra, why that argument is unavailing to
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entirely discount or reject the findings of O’Brien 2024 at this evidentiary stage. (See
supra Part V.C.2.iv.)
Plaintiffs’ experts, on the other hand, relied on post-2020 cohort study
literature to “confirm[] that the associations between perineal talcum powder product
use and ovarian cancer risk are present” for diverse groups, including across races
and endometriosis histories.33 (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 82–83; see also Smith-
Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 21–23 (explaining that O’Brien 2024 reported a
“significant increase in ovarian cancer risk for genital powder use, with effect
estimates that are in range with previous studies” and consistent with studies like
Woolen 2022 and the Nurses Health Study); Cote Amend. Rep. at 25 (noting the
33 	I acknowledge that the parties also rely on differing statements from public health agencies
in support of their positions on this factor. Defendants note that the NCI and FDA have
“recognized” inconsistency in the epidemiologic literature. (Defs.’ General Causation Br. at 47.)
A closer review of the cited materials, however, shows that the NCI source is a PDQ webpage
“written and maintained by the PDQ Screening and Prevention Editorial Board, which is
editorially independent of NCI,” and therefore does not constitute an official NCI or NIH policy
statement. Ovarian, Fallopian Tube, and Primary Peritoneal Cancer Prevention (PDQ)–Health
Professional 	Version, 	National 	Cancer 	Institute 	(“NCI 	2024 	PDQ”),
https://www.cancer.gov/types/ovarian/hp/ovarian-prevention-pdq (last updated Apr. 9, 2025).
Defendants’ reliance on the FDA is grounded in a 2014 letter evaluating the body of evidence
available at that time. (See ECF No. 33008-4, “FDA 2014 Denial Letter.”) I do not view either
source as providing a basis to revisit my prior conclusions on this factor—particularly given that
the FDA letter was addressed in my 2020 Opinion and is now even more dated. In re Johnson &
Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 185–86. Plaintiffs, by contrast, cite Health Canada’s 2021 screening
assessment, which found “a high degree of consistency in the epidemiological studies across
several decades conducted in different parts of the world.” (Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 80
(quoting Health Canada, Screening Assessment: Talc, 1, 33 (Apr. 2021).) Although Health
Canada’s conclusions are similarly non-binding, that assessment considered more recent literature
and evaluated the Bradford Hill criteria in detail under international scientific standards. None of
the various agency statements, standing alone, is determinative of whether the challenged experts’
consistency analyses satisfy Rule 702. I address them here only to clarify the nature and limitations
of the sources upon which the parties rely.
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“consistency of the positive association between genital talc use and ovarian cancer,”
as well as the “strikingly similar estimates of association” derived from “decades of
studies in various populations and different investigators across the globe”); ECF
No. 33130-58 (“Singh 2d Supp. Rep.”) at 5 (observing that O’Brien 2024’s
confidence intervals findings overlap with “the entire body of evidence . . . from
case-control 	studies, 	cohort 	studies, 	pooled 	analysis 	of 	cohorts 	and 	meta-
analysis.”).)
The experts acknowledged the aspects of O’Brien 2020 that Defendants
emphasize—such as the absence of an overall statistically significant association—
but they also explained why, notwithstanding those findings, they continued to view
the consistency factor as satisfied. In doing so, they noted that the study’s authors
themselves observed that the analysis “may have been underpowered,” and they
articulated how that limitation informed their interpretation of the results. (O’Brien
2020 at 49; see, e.g., McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 19, 50, 75; Smith-Bindman 3d
Amend. Rep. at 30–31; Harlow Rep. at 13; Cote Amend. Rep. at 18–19; Singh Supp.
Rep. at 6–7, 10–12, 20; Moorman 2d Supp. Rep. at 17–18; Clarke-Pearson 3d
Amend. Rep. at 9; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 11.) Having reviewed each of these
reports, I cannot find that the experts unreasonably extrapolated or misinterpreted
O’Brien 2020 such that their opinions can be excluded on that basis. Moreover, the
findings and concordant analyses that Plaintiffs’ experts made based on the follow-
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up study, O’Brien 2024, provide more recent, updated data upon which the experts’
opinions on this factor were also based. I therefore find a sound methodological basis
upon which Plaintiffs’ experts may testify as to their interpretations of consistency
across the existing data, acknowledging that Defendants will have the opportunity
to question them as to how they interpret the literature to support their conclusions.
In response to Defendants’ second point, I do not find that Plaintiffs’ experts
“ignore” statistical significance in the literature writ large. (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 62.) The experts instead explained how they accounted for statistical
significance and why they afforded it certain weight. Indeed, as discussed above, the
case law and scientific treatises make clear that statistical significance is far from
the be-all end-all of consistency calculations. For example, Defendants fault Dr.
Moorman for “selectively rely[ing] on statistical significance” when it supports her
opinion, by citing to her analysis of O’Brien 2020’s subset of talc users with patent
reproductive tracts. (Id. at 63.) But, upon a further examination, Dr. Moorman
explained in detail not only why she focused her analysis on that cohort but also
surveyed other experts in the field who support that position—most notably, the
O’Brien 2020 authors’ own response that “agree[d] that the analyses limited to
women with intact reproductive tracts should not be discounted.” (O’Brien et al.,
Letters to the Editor 323 JAMA at 2096–97.) (emphasis added).) It is a well-
reasoned methodology that does not amount to “cherry-picking,” (Defs.’ 2024
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General Causation Br. at 63 (quoting In re Acetaminophen I, 707 F. Supp. 3d 309,
364 (S.D.N.Y. 2023))), but instead reflects how an expert examined and explained
the available data. Whether Dr. Moorman’s opinion should ultimately prevail is not
my determination here, so long 	as her conclusions proceed 	from a reliable
application of the methodology. I find that they do. Defendants are free to challenge
the doctor’s conclusions before a jury.
Highlighting additional examples, Dr. Siemiatycki reiterated that “the absence
of statistical significance is not tantamount to proof of the absence of an association.”
(Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 10 (citations omitted); see also Matrixx Initiatives,
Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 40–41 (2011) (“A lack of statistically significant
data does not mean that medical experts have no reliable basis for inferring a causal
link between a drug and adverse events. . . . [M]edical professionals and researchers
do not limit the data they consider to the results of randomized clinical trials or to
statistically significant evidence.”).) He further described how a study’s sample size
relates 	to 	its 	statistical 	power, 	depending 	on 	the 	type 	of 	study 	and 	its
characteristics—including 	observing 	that 	Sir 	Bradford 	Hill 	himself 	did 	not
“explicitly list[]” statistical significance as a factor due, in part, to the complications
with measuring that figure depending on RR and sample size. (Siemiatycki 3d
Amend. Rep. at 16–17, 20–21.) The doctor instead opined that “the single number
which reflects quite well the statistical strength of a study, be it case-control or
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cohort, is the number of exposed cases,” which he distilled by analyzing 34 studies’
exposed cases and RRs. (See id. at 84–86 (Table 2).) Based on that calculation, 31
results showed an RR of over 1.0, which “is clearly strong and in defiance of the null
hypothesis,” that there is no true association, which would result in “as many of the
RR estimates to be below 1.0 as to be above 1.0.” (Id. at 37.)
Dr. Smith-Bindman concurred that “it is more important to estimate the effect
size and the uncertainty surrounding the estimate (with a point estimate and
confidence interval) rather than using a significance level and p-value to determine
if there is/or is not a meaningful association,” because, for example, “[t]here is no
inherent or meaningful difference between a study with a p-value of 0.04 compared
with 0.06, and yet these are often wrongly considered reflective of significant and
non-significant results respectively.” (Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 16.)34 She
acknowledged that of the dozens she reviewed, “the sample size of some studies was
small and resulted in high statistical uncertainty,” which made “quantifying a precise
association between exposure and cancer . . . difficult.” (Id. at 18.) Specifically, she
acknowledged that the WHI study did “not demonstrate a statistically significant
association,” but that the study admitted limitations based on its “short period of
follow up and limited exposure information,” which “would tend to bias the results
34 	This accords with the quoted testimony from Dr. McTiernan in my 2020 Opinion on the
same issue. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 170–71.
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toward the null.” (Id. at 22–23.) I reiterate that I considered and dispensed with
Defendants’ challenges to those positions in my 2020 Opinion, concluding that this
is “a dispute over whether the experts are correct in discounting the causative results
of the cohort studies,” which “relate[s] to the weight of their testimony, not their
reliability.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 172. Because I find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the experts’ methodologies on the consistency
factor are reliable, and that their opinions reliably proceed therefrom, I recommend
that the Court not depart from that holding at this juncture.
Before leaving this factor, I must note that Defendants’ invocation of other
courts’ treatment of certain experts, is not only taken out of context, but also does
not have any bearing on those experts’ proffered opinions here regarding the
relationship between talcum powder and ovarian cancer. For example, Defendants
cite In re Lipitor, 892 F.3d at 641–42, where the Fourth Circuit affirmed excluding
Dr. Singh’s general causation opinion regarding Lipitor, stemming from his reliance
on non-statistically significant trends in the field. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation
Br. at 59–60.) But that example differs here, where Dr. Singh has explained the
methodology he used to support his opinions in relation to statistically significant
findings, and why he accounted for certain findings and studies over others. (See
generally Singh 2d Supp. Rep.) Similarly lacking, Defendants quote In re Zantac to
posit that the Southern District of Florida “excluded Drs. McTiernan and Moorman
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for ‘routinely . . . disregard[ing] the concept of statistical significance.’” (Defs.’ 2024
General Causation Br. at 59 (quoting 644 F. Supp. 3d at 1222; id. at 1237–38).) But
Defendants omit that court’s distinction drawn between Dr. McTiernan’s approach
in this very litigation and Zantac:
Before 	this 	MDL, 	Dr. 	McTiernan 	characterized
statistically insignificant data (under the conventional
definition) as statistically insignificant. In In re Johnson &
Johnson 	Talcum 	Powder 	Products 	Marketing, 	Sales
Practices & Products Litigation (In re Talc), another
MDL, 	Dr. 	McTiernan 	authored 	a 	77-page 	expert
report. 509 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	130. 	In 	that 	report, 	Dr.
McTiernan 	characterizes 	studies 	as 	either 	statistically
significant or statistically insignificant. McTiernan Dep.
Ex. 26 at 41 (“Among the 8 studies which were not
statistically significant . . . ”). Dr. McTiernan’s opinion
in that litigation was expressly based upon risk rates that
were statistically significant; she did not ground her
opinion on statistically insignificant data. Id. at 9 (“I base
this opinion on the statistically significant elevated risk
estimates . . . ”).
644 F. Supp. 3d at 1231–32 (citation modified). The court went on to find that Dr.
McTiernan’s methodology had evidently changed in relation to her testimony in
Zantac, 	where 	she, 	according 	to 	that 	court, 	“at 	some 	point 	[changed] 	her
understanding of the concept of statistical insignificance.” Id. at 1232. But whether
that was in fact the situation in Zantac is (1) of no moment here, where other courts
have noted the difference between her methodology here and in that unrelated case;
and (2) does not take into account my fulsome discussion of the proper role of
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statistical significance, as well as Dr. McTiernan’s exploration of that concept. (See
supra Part V.B.4.)
As to Dr. Moorman, the Zantac court in fact excluded her opinion despite
explaining that it “does not question the reliability of Dr. Moorman’s expert opinion
because she fails to adequately explain her methodology,” instead observing that in
contrast to Dr. McTiernan, “Dr. Moorman clearly explains what studies most
influence her opinion, and she explains why those studies influence her,” as well as
noting that she “relied upon statistically insignificant data with less frequency than
Dr. McTiernan.” Id. at 1243 & n.138. Rather, the court excluded Dr. Moorman
because, in that court’s view, “although the primary focus of a Daubert inquiry is an
expert’s methodology, this Court is permitted to consider the fact that the Plaintiffs’
experts’ general causation conclusions . . . are unique and isolated to this litigation,”
despite noting that the factor “weighs moderately in favor of exclusion.” Id. at 1254.
I reiterate that these cases are not analogous to these very experts’ methodologies
and approaches here—as the Zantac court itself distinguished them.
Again, nowhere do Defendants respond to these experts’ methodologies
finding 	O’Brien 2024 to be statistically 	significant, except 	to 	reiterate their
challenges to its imputed data.
In sum, Plaintiffs’ experts concluded that the Bradford Hill consistency
criterion is met because more than four decades of epidemiologic research reliably
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show an elevated risk of ovarian cancer associated with perineal talc use across
different study designs, populations, geographic regions, and time periods. (See
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 45–48; Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 72–73; Smith-
Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 28, 36; Harlow Rep. at 12–13, 20; Cote Amend. Rep.
at 36; Singh Supp. Rep. at 17–18; Moorman Rep. at 15–29; Clarke-Pearson 3d
Amend. Rep. at 13; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 7–9, 11–12.) Dr. Siemiatycki, for
example, explained that dozens of studies across decades “have produced an RR
greater than the null value of 1.0. If there [] were no association between talcum
powder use and ovarian cancer, we would expect to see as many RRs lower than 1.0
as higher than 1.0,” analogizing the pattern to “flipping a coin 30 times and getting
a heads 28 or 29 times.” (Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 72; see also Cote Amend.
Rep. at 36 (“In my opinion, having reviewed hundreds of epidemiologic studies and
publishing my own pooled and meta-analyses, the consistency of the effect sizes
seen across populations is strikingly consistent.”).)
The replication of the association between perineal talcum powder and
ovarian cancer across diverse settings, tumor subtypes, and decades of research
reflects the type of uniform, reproducible pattern that Bradford Hill identified as
evidence of a consistent relationship. As Plaintiffs’ experts explained, these studies
repeatedly produce positive associations, including statistically significant increased
risks in the majority of case-control studies and confirmed elevations in recent large
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pooled and meta-analytic analyses, even across variations in methodology, exposure
assessment, and demographic composition.
Indeed, as emphasized throughout this Report and Recommendation, my role
as a Rule 702 gatekeeper is to assess whether the experts have adequately considered
the existing literature and applied a reliable methodology in interpreting it to support
their opinions which must be based upon good grounds—not to determine whether
I ultimately agree with their purported conclusions. See Cohen, 125 F.4th at 461–62
(holding that Daubert’s standard “does not hinge on whether a particular scientific
opinion has the best foundation, or even whether the opinion is supported by the best
methodology or unassailable research,” but instead “looks to whether the expert’s
testimony is supported by good grounds,” including methodology, facts, and the
links between the facts and conclusion) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). With respect to the consistency factor, for the reasons stated above, I find
that Plaintiffs’ experts have done so. As in the prior round of motion practice, the
parties continue to debate the relative weight to assign particular studies or findings;
however, the briefs and expert reports reflect that Plaintiffs’ experts have, by a
preponderance of the evidence, reliably applied their methodologies to review and
interpret published, peer-reviewed research. In this respect, the parties’ disagreement
over the strengths and limitations of the post-2020 studies relates more to an
evidentiary dispute appropriate for the factfinder than to a methodological flaw or
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unsound conclusion requiring exclusion under Rule 702. I therefore find no basis to
exclude Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions on this factor, and conclude that the remaining
disputes are matters of weight for the jury, not admissibility.
iii. 	Biological Gradient (or Dose-Response Relationship)
Dose “refers to the intensity or magnitude of exposure to an agent multiplied
by the duration of exposure.” Green at 622. A dose-response relationship exists when
“a change in amount, intensity, or duration of exposure to an agent is associated with
a change—either an increase or a decrease—in risk of disease.” Id. “Generally,
higher exposures should increase the incidence (or severity) of disease.” Id. at 603.
However, this pattern is not universal. Some causal agents “do not exhibit a dose-
response relationship when, for example, there is a threshold phenomenon (i.e., an
exposure may not cause disease until the exposure exceeds a certain dose).” Id.
Accordingly, “a dose-response relationship is strong, but not essential, evidence that
the relationship between an agent and disease is causal.” Id.
In my 2020 Opinion, I summarized the parties’ dispute as centered on two
core issues: (1) the weight that the dose-response factor should be afforded in a
Bradford Hill analysis, including what type of data can establish a sufficiently strong
dose-response; and (2) whether Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions on the existence of a
dose-response relationship are “adequately supported by the studies on which they
rely.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 179. I noted that, in accordance
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with the above-mentioned epidemiological principles, “a strong dose-response is not
necessarily required for an expert to find a causal nexus.” Id. at 179 (citing Ferguson
v. Riverside Sch. Dist. No. 416, No. 00-cv-0097, 2002 WL 34355958, at *6 (E.D.
Wash. Feb. 5, 2002)).
My 	discussion 	of 	the 	parties’ 	dispute 	then 	centered 	largely 	on 	their
“competing interpretations” of the Terry 2013 pooled analysis study. Id. at 177 n.42,
180. Dr. McTiernan described the Terry 2013 methodology that divided study
participants into categories depending on their usage level of talcum powder
products, and found an increased relative risk based on level of use. Id. at 177–78.
In response, Defendants claimed that Terry 2013 actually “concluded that there was
no trend in risk with increasing talc use” because including non-users as a category
of subjects skewed the data to find a cumulative dose-response. 	Id. 	at 180.
Evaluating the parties’ arguments then, I found reasonable Dr. McTiernan’s opinion
that it is “appropriate to include non-users when you are looking at a dose-response
effect,” in the same way that a randomized trial would compare findings among users
of an agent to a placebo group. Id. I independently reviewed Terry 2013 and
explained that the study “did not wholly rule out a dose-response relationship, but
instead found the data to be inconsistent,” and therefore I concluded that despite the
parties’ “different interpretations of the Terry study,” this dispute boiled down to a
question of weight, rather than admissibility because “it is not the Court’s position
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as a gatekeeper to determine whose interpretation of the studies is correct,” so long
as there are good grounds to support the opinions. Id. at 180.
In their current motion, Defendants repeat many of the same arguments I
previously considered. They contend that the dose-response relationship factor
weighs against causation and that Plaintiffs improperly minimize it despite its central
importance in toxicology. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 65–67.) Instead,
they 	claim, 	the 	epidemiologic 	record 	does 	not 	evince 	a 	true 	dose-response
relationship between perineal talc exposure and ovarian cancer, but that “plaintiffs’
experts half-heartedly attempt to manufacture” one “by twisting the epidemiologic
data.” (Id. at 67.) Defendants explore the same pre-2020 studies they raised in the
prior round of motion practice to reiterate that none of the studies conclusively
determined that a dose-response relationship exists. (Id. at 67–69.) Lastly, they
repeat their prior objection to Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions regarding threshold
exposure. (Id. at 69–70.) In Defendants’ view, the absence of a dose-response
trend—together with methodological problems in the studies used by the experts—
means this Bradford Hill factor weighs against causation, and the experts’ efforts to
discount it are methodologically unreliable.
In response, Plaintiffs emphasize that Defendants’ arguments are “largely
recycled attacks” from the prior round of motion practice, and that in fact, the
evidence for a biological gradient has strengthened, particularly with post-2020
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cohort studies. (Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br. at 90.) In their view, improved
prospective data (O’Brien 2024), the patent-tract subgroup in pooled cohorts
(O’Brien 2020), and meta-analytic results focused on heavier users, (Woolen 2022),
collectively 	demonstrate 	that 	ovarian 	cancer 	risk 	increases 	with 	greater 	talc
exposure, particularly with frequent and long-term use. (Id. at 91–92.)
As Plaintiffs correctly observe, Defendants’ briefing does not engage with any
of the post-2020 epidemiologic literature that was unavailable at the time of my 2020
Opinion, with the exception of O’Brien 2020. Instead, Defendants rely primarily on
earlier studies, a 2014 FDA letter, and a PDQ Screening and Prevention Editorial
Board 	webpage 	that 	expressly 	“does 	not 	provide 	formal 	guidelines 	or
recommendations for making health care decisions.” (Pls.’ General Causation Opp.
Br. at 90; see NCI, Ovarian, Fallopian Tube, and Primary Peritoneal Cancers
Prevention 	(PDQ) 	– 	Health 	Professional 	Version, 	available 	at
https://www.cancer.gov/types/ovarian/hp/ovarianprevention-pdq 	(“NCI 	PDQ”)).
Even so, Defendants—and the sources they cite—characterize the evidence as
“sorely lacking,” which is not equivalent to affirmative evidence demonstrating the
absence—let alone “inverse”—of a dose-response relationship, and reflects an
assessment based solely on pre-2020 science. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at
64, 69; see also NCI PDQ (“the data are inadequate” to establish a clear dose-
response relationship).) Defendants further argue that “imprecision” in exposure
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measurements 	is 	a 	“fundamental 	weakness” 	that 	weighs 	against 	any 	causal
inference, citing cases in which none of the underlying studies recorded actual
dosages. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 66–67 (quoting In re Acetaminophen
I, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 350).) But it is a considerable leap to suggest that a record
entirely devoid of dosage information is analogous to the presence of some degree
of imprecision in exposure assessment—an issue that arises with some frequency in
observational epidemiology and does not, standing alone, bar reliance on the
literature. Because I find the analogy inapposite to the evidence and methodologies
at issue here, I do not find Defendants’ argument on this point persuasive.35
Defendants claim that my prior Opinion “misread” certain case law, including
Ferguson, because general causation was not at issue in that matter. (Id. at 66.)
Ferguson grappled with the dose-response factor in assessing whether the expert’s
causative opinion between the presence of mold in school and injuries suffered by
students was sound under Rule 702. 2002 WL 34355958, at *1. The court explained
that dose-response is not essential if there is no threshold level for injury from
exposure to a harmful agent; rather, the court stated that “‘it makes little sense to
require a plaintiff to establish a dose/response relationship or threshold level in a
35 	Measuring talc exposure is not analogous to, for example, measuring the amount of
cigarettes a person smokes or the dose of medicine a person consumes. Measuring the amount of
talcum powder a person applies each time varies, and therefore does not lend itself to accurate
measurement. This “impression” in and of itself does not render plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions
unreliable, and is a matter for cross-examination.
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situation . . . where the dose/response relationship or threshold level will always vary
from individual to individual.’” Id. at *6 (quoting Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co., 243 F.3d 255, 263–64 (6th Cir. 2001)). The court went on to say, “‘[w]hile
precise information concerning the exposure necessary to cause specific harm to
humans and exact details pertaining to the plaintiff’s exposure are beneficial, such
evidence is not always available, or necessary, to demonstrate that a substance is
toxic to humans given substantial exposure,’” and therefore it does not need to
“‘invariably provide the basis for an expert’s opinion on causation.’” Id. (quoting
Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1999)). Indeed, in
Westberry, the Fourth Circuit admitted expert testimony that exposure to talc caused
sinus problems despite the inability to determine threshold level of exposure
necessary to cause the plaintiff’s injuries. 178 F.3d at 264. Consistent with that line
of cases, I explained that “a strong dose-response is not necessarily required for an
expert to find a causal nexus.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 179. In
any event, this case is not devoid of any evidence of dose-response which is further
explained, infra.
Defendants next argue that my prior determination—that “Terry did not
wholly rule out a dose-responsive relationship”—was insufficient to support my
conclusion that Plaintiffs met their burden under Rule 702 on this factor. (Defs.’
2024 General Causation Br. at 67–68.) They rely on In re Onglyza, for the principle
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that epidemiologic literature should not be interpreted as demonstrating a causal
relationship absent compelling evidence. 93 F.4th at 346. That decision, however, is
materially distinguishable from the circumstances presented here. In Onglyza, the
Sixth Circuit upheld the exclusion of an expert who “failed to engage with” multiple
large-scale studies involving approximately 175,000 users and dismissed them as
limited 	due 	to 	confounding 	without 	identifying 	any 	specific 	confounders 	or
explaining the methodological basis for discounting them. Id. at 345. Moreover, the
expert—not the court—asserted that studies “should be interpreted as cause-and-
effect” unless compelling evidence suggests otherwise. Id.
Nothing in Onglyza undermines the reasoning of my 2020 Opinion or the
positions advanced by Plaintiffs’ experts in this MDL. In 2020, I first cited
authoritative scientific sources to explain that a dose-response relationship “is
strong, but not essential, evidence” of causation, In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F.
Supp. 3d at 180 (quoting Green at 603), and then observed that Terry found “the data
inconsistent”—not that a dose-response relationship existed by default in the
absence of contrary findings, id. at 180. Nor does Onglyza suggest otherwise. There,
the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the district court excluded the expert because he
failed to explain how he inferred causation from a study that itself did not reach a
causal conclusion. 93 F.4th at 346. Here, by contrast, and as discussed below,
Plaintiffs’ experts articulate the methodological basis for their interpretations of the
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literature and explained how they reached their views on dose-response using the
available evidence.
Although the parties agree that the “new science” issued since 2020 provides
the impetus for the renewed motions, Defendants’ arguments on this factor primarily
challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ interpretations of pre-2020 literature that was already
addressed in my 2020 Daubert ruling. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 67–69;
In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 177–80.) Notably, Defendants do not
meaningfully 	engage 	with 	the 	post-2020 	scientific 	developments 	on 	which
Plaintiffs’ experts now rely. In this respect, Defendants have not identified how the
“new science is shown to directly contradict or challenge” my earlier findings. (Apr.
30, 2024 Memorandum Order (emphasis added).) Accordingly, I proceed to evaluate
Plaintiffs’ experts’ current opinions in light of the full evidentiary record, including
the post-2020 landscape, to address the Rule 702 standard.
As I previously discussed, O’Brien 2020 conducted a pooled prospective
cohort analysis based on four large cohort studies comprising over 250,000 women.
(See supra Part V.B.5.ii; O’Brien 2020 at 49.) The study found “no clear dose-
response trends for duration and frequency of powder use in the genital area in
relation to ovarian cancer risk,” despite noting that “the study was underpowered to
detect small changes in risk.” (O’Brien 2020 at 56.) O’Brien 2020 did detect “a
possible positive association among women with patent reproductive tracts,” a
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finding the authors considered to be “exploratory and hypothesis generating”
because “the association was not significantly different” from that among women
with nonpatent reproductive tracts. (Id.) The authors also “avoided” recall bias “by
excluding those with preexisting ovarian cancer.” (Id. at 57.) Additionally, the study
noted that “information on powder exposure is typically more limited in cohort
studies compared with case-control studies, particularly with respect to dose and
duration of use,” and suggested that “ongoing or future” studies collect such
information. (Id.)
Two years later, Woolen 2022 issued a meta-analysis to examine in depth the
association between frequent perineal talc use and ovarian cancer using pooled data
from eleven studies. (Woolen 2022 at 2528.) The study found a “pooled adjusted
odds ratio of 1.47% (95% CI 1.31, 1.65),” for frequent use of perineal talcum
powder. (Id. 	at 2530.) Although the meta-analysis could not model a single
continuous 	gradient 	across 	all 	studies 	due 	to 	differing 	exposure 	metrics, 	it
highlighted that studies using higher-frequency or higher-cumulative-use categories
(for example, daily use, > 30 times per month, or > 10,000 lifetime applications)
consistently showed elevated risks. (Id. at 2529.) The paper specifically noted
prospective cohort evidence demonstrating increased risk correlated to increasing
frequency, including a higher hazard in daily users, which the authors characterized
as supportive of a dose-response pattern. (Id. at 2531.) The authors acknowledged
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that by restricting inclusion to studies explicitly reporting frequent use, they
necessarily excluded some studies whose questionnaires did not capture higher-use
categories, as well as the fact that exposure definitions varied across studies. (Id. at
2531–32.)
The last major study that bears upon dose-response is O’Brien 2024. Those
researchers used updated exposure data and quantitative bias analysis to reanalyze
the association between “intimate care products,” including genital talc, and ovarian
cancer. (O’Brien 2024 at 1.) As has already been discussed at length, they “used
quantitative bias analyses to implement different approaches for imputing exposure”
wherein follow-up data was lacking, by running and summarizing effect estimates
across 100 imputed data sets. (Id. at 4.) The authors “found evidence supporting a
positive association between ever genital talc use and incident ovarian cancer,”
including specifically finding an approximately 40% higher rate of ovarian cancer
compared to never-users “with consistently increasing dose-response patterns for
both frequency and duration of use.” (Id. at 13.) Despite acknowledging limitations
such 	as 	“unmeasured 	confounding” 	and 	the 	potentially 	non-generalizable
demographics of the study participants, O’Brien 2024 announced that “higher rates
[were] seen for frequent and long-term users.” (Id. at 2.)
In broad strokes, Plaintiffs explain that Woolen 2022 specifically studied the
frequency of use of perineal talcum powder products in relation to ovarian cancer,
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and that O’Brien 2024 analyzed dose-response focusing on frequent and long-term
users, calculating increased risks of 82% and 100%, respectively. (See Pls.’ General
Causation Opp. Br. at 91–92.) Indeed, NIH’s issuance of a press release in June 2024
announcing O’Brien 2024’s findings is a strong indicator of the advent of “new
science” in this regard—science that Plaintiffs advocate supports their position,
because the study’s “key findings” include a “[p]ersistent positive association
between genital talc use and ovarian cancer, with the strongest associations observed
for frequent and long-term users and for use during the reproductive years.” (ECF
No. 33130-8, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, Genital Talc Use
May Be Linked to Increased Risk of Ovarian Cancer, NIEHS (June 2024) (“NIEHS
Press Release”) (emphasis added).) Defendants’ only response to this appears to be
that O’Brien 2024 cannot be trusted because of the imputed data discussed above. I
have already explained why I do not find that argument convincing. (See supra Part
V.B.5.iii.)
Based on the studies themselves and the experts’ interpretations of them, I do
not find that any of the post-2020 literature “directly contradicts or challenges” the
evidentiary record before me in 2020. (Apr. 30, 2024 Memorandum Order.) Rather,
the newer studies provide additional grounds upon which Plaintiffs’ experts may
reliably extrapolate that the dose-response factor is satisfied. For example, Dr. Singh
explained 	that 	O’Brien 	2024’s 	pooled 	data 	demonstrated 	“a 	consistent 	and
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statistically significant increased risk of ovarian cancer for both frequent genital talc
users (HR 1.99, 95% CI 1.43–2.78) and long-term genital talc users (HR 2.2, 95%
CI 1.52–3.19) compared to never users,” and that “sometime use of genital talc (HR
1.56, 95% CI 1.09–2.22) and use for one decade only (HR 1.48, 95% CI 1.06–2.06)
was also associated with a statistically significant increased risk.” (Singh 2d Supp.
Rep. at 1; O’Brien 2024 at 10 (Table 3).) He further calculated that the data showed
“[l]ong-term users of genital talc had a more than doubling in the risk of ovarian
cancer,” 	and 	concluded 	that 	the 	“strong 	monotonic 	dose-response 	effect,
accompanied by statistically significant positive tests for trend, and the large
magnitude of the dose-response, provides strong support” for this factor. (Singh 2d
Supp. Rep. at 6.)
Dr. McTiernan similarly stated in her supplemental report that “frequent use
of genital talcum powder products doubled risk of ovarian cancer,” and noted that
the statistical test for trend—a standard measure of dose-response—was “highly
significant at P < 0.001.” (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 51; see also O’Brien 2024
at 10 (Table 3).) She concluded that O’Brien 2024, which considered data on lifetime
patterns of talc use, “provided a more accurate picture of dose-response,” including
when accounting for recall bias, and “showed clearly that increased exposure to
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genital talc was associated with increased risk, which was statistically significant.”36
(Id. at 54.)
Dr. McTiernan also discussed Woolen 2022, emphasizing its value as the first
meta-analysis to focus on frequent use (rather than ever use), and noting that it
reported “strong data that women who used perineal talcum powder products two or
more times per week had a statistically significant 47% increased risk of developing
ovarian cancer.” (Id. at 81; Woolen 2022 at 2531.) She identified certain limitations,
such as the exclusion of studies that did not capture frequent-use patterns and
occasional inability to distinguish between talc and cornstarch products. (Woolen
2022 at 2531–32.) She ultimately considered the latter issue of minimal significance
because “other research shows only 1–2% of perineal powder users report using
cornstarch.” (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 81 (citing Cramer 2016).) The analyses
offered by Dr. Singh and Dr. McTiernan are grounded in the cited literature and
36 	Defendants again rely on Zantac, noting that the court there excluded Dr. McTiernan’s
opinion regarding the dose-response relationship. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 69.) In
Zantac, the court’s ruling rested in part on the conclusion that “no study concluded [that a dose-
response] relationship existed, with some even observing the inverse.” 644 F. Supp. 3d at 1240.
That factual premise, however, is not present here. Defendants quote this excerpt from Zantac to
suggest it applies here; yet none of the studies the parties cite found an inverse dose-response
relationship, nor do Defendants assert they do beyond simply quoting Zantac in this regard. (Defs.’
General Causation Br. at 69.) Instead, as discussed above, Defendants present an argument about
imprecision in the exposure data—an asserted methodological weakness that, in their view,
counsels against drawing causal inferences. (Id. at 66.) As already explained, methodological
imprecision is not equivalent to evidence of an inverse dose-response relationship. (See supra
V.B.5.i. & ii.) Accordingly, the reasons for excluding an expert’s testimony in another proceeding
do not control where, as here, the underlying record and factual circumstances are materially
different.
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generally align with other Plaintiffs’ experts who ascribed significant weight to this
factor. (See Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 44–55; Moorman 2d Supp. Rep. at 3–
11; Harlow Rep. at 8; see also Harlow Supp. Rep. at 3 (not using standard Bradford
Hill criteria but addressing the same factors in his analysis).)
Some experts, by contrast, explained why they did not ascribe substantial
weight to the dose-response factor in their Bradford Hill analyses. For example, Dr.
Smith-Bindman stated that, based on her review of the literature, “most studies of
talcum powder products and ovarian cancer show a dose response, with the caveat
that some studies do not, and several studies did not assess.” (Smith-Bindman 3d
Amend. Rep. at 37.) She noted that both O’Brien 2020 and O’Brien 2024
“confirm[ed] a dose response relationship 	where women 	with 	more lifetime
applications had higher risks as did women who reported long-term talc use or the
most applications,” but she assigned this factor less weight because not all
carcinogenic exposures necessarily demonstrate a linear dose-response pattern;
some, she explained, follow a threshold model. (Id.) She further stated that this
consideration is particularly relevant here because asbestos is understood to exhibit
a threshold dose-response, and thus, in her view, while the presence of a dose-
response relationship supports causation, the absence of such a pattern in any given
study would not alter her overall conclusion. (Id.; see also id. at 11–12.) This
reasoning is consistent with both pre- and post-2020 literature. (See, e.g., O’Brien
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2020 at 56; Woolen 2022 at 2531; O’Brien 2024 at 1–2, 13.) Certain other experts
similarly assigned moderate or limited weight to the factor while still recognizing
that many studies collecting frequency or duration data report evidence of dose
response. (See Cote Amend. Rep. at 37; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 13; Wolf
3d Amend. Rep. at 19.)
Defendants renew their objection to what they characterize as a “threshold”
theory, arguing that it is speculative because Plaintiffs’ experts cannot identify a
specific threshold dose. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 69–70.) But this
argument does not engage with any post-2020 scientific literature, nor does it
identify case law that interprets Rule 702 differently from my prior analysis. See In
re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 179–80. Moreover, courts applying the
amended Rule 702 have reiterated that the absence of a quantified exposure
threshold does not, by itself, render an expert’s causation opinion inadmissible. See,
e.g., Ruffin v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 137 F.4th 276, 282–83 (5th Cir. 2025) (dose-
response is “but one factor” and “does not require an expert to provide a specific,
quantitative exposure dose” so long as the expert reliably explains how the substance
is capable of causing the condition); Thompson v. Orkin, LLC, No. 20-cv-13085,
2025 WL 18639, at *14 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 2, 2025) (collecting cases recognizing that
precise exposure levels are not always necessary where other evidence supports
causation).
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For these reasons, I find that Plaintiffs’ experts have continued to apply well-
reasoned 	methodologies 	and 	to 	draw 	conclusions 	that 	are 	supported 	by 	the
literature—whether they afforded the dose-response factor significant, moderate, or
limited weight—based on their analyses of both pre- and post-2020 peer-reviewed
studies. Defendants’ critiques do not meaningfully address the more recent scientific
evidence that informs the experts’ current opinions. I reiterate that I do not opine, let
alone conclude, whether the existing data ultimately proves the existence of a dose-
response relationship between talc and ovarian cancer. While the studies support this
Bradford Hill factor, I also acknowledge that this factor does not share some of the
same force in the literature as do other factors. But I do find that, under Rule 702,
by a preponderance of the evidence, Plaintiffs’ experts have met the reliability
requirements with respect to this factor and may offer their opinions at trial.
Defendants 	remain 	free 	to 	challenge 	the 	strength 	or 	interpretation 	of 	those
conclusions, including their assertion that no dose-response relationship has been
conclusively 	demonstrated, 	through 	cross-examination 	and 	competing 	expert
testimony.
iv. 	Biological Plausibility
In his 1965 article, on the factor of biological plausibility, Sir Bradford Hill
advised: “It will be helpful if the causation we suspect is biologically plausible. But
this is a feature I am convinced we cannot demand. What is biologically plausible
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depends upon the biological knowledge of the day.” Hill at 298. Similarly, the
Reference Guide counsels that to demonstrate biological plausibility “depends upon
existing knowledge about the mechanisms by which the disease develops.” Green at
604. “When biological plausibility exists, it lends credence to an inference of
causality.” Id. “However, observations have been made in epidemiologic studies that
were not biologically plausible at the time but subsequently were shown to be
correct.” Id. Accordingly, these authorities caution that while biological plausibility
may support a causal inference, plausibility necessarily depends on the state of
scientific knowledge at the relevant time, and a limited or weak showing of
biological plausibility does not, standing alone, negate causation. See In re Viagra,
424 F. Supp. 3d at 791 (“In the abstract, there is no independent requirement that a
plaintiff establish it to be biologically plausible that exposure to a particular drug or
substance could cause the disease or condition at issue,” and therefore, “‘[b]iological
plausibility’ thus is only a subsidiary consideration in the larger question of general
causation.”); see also In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308 (“[A]n expert on
biological plausibility need not definitively prove the biological means by which a
drug acts in the body.”); In re Neurontin Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
612 F. Supp. 2d 116, 149 (D. Mass 2009) (finding that biological plausibility
supported expert’s opinion on causation despite the fact that there was “robust debate
in 	the 	scientific 	community” 	on 	the 	proposed 	mechanism); 	In 	re
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Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1247 (W.D.
Wash. 2003) (“The fact that the mechanism remains unclear does not call the
reliability of the opinion into question.”); Berg v. Johnson & Johnson, 940 F. Supp.
2d 983, 993 (D.S.D. 2013) (in permitting expert testimony that it was biologically
plausible for talcum powder to cause ovarian cancer, the court observed that “[a]t
times, mechanistic explanations are merely hypothesized—although hypotheses are
sometimes accepted in showing exposure can cause a disease” (citation and
quotations omitted)).
Here, Defendants advance a series of challenges to Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions on biological plausibility, contending that because those opinions rest on a
multi-step causal theory, Plaintiffs must reliably establish each component of that
theory under Rule 702. In particular, Defendants argue that the experts: (1)
improperly conflate distinct ovarian cancer subtypes with differing etiologies and
risk factors; (2) rely on insufficient evidence to demonstrate that externally applied
talc can migrate to the ovaries or fallopian tubes; (3) fail to establish that talc
exposure causes chronic inflammation and/or oxidative stress; (4) lack reliable
scientific support that such chronic inflammation can cause ovarian cancer; and (5)
improperly rely on in vitro studies to support theories involving oxidative stress or
macrophage impairment. (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 2–4, 9–48.)
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These arguments are framed against Defendants’ broader contention that my
prior rulings applied an unduly permissive interpretation of Rule 702 by treating
asserted gaps in biological plausibility as matters of weight rather than admissibility,
and that the 2023 amendments to Rule 702 require courts to resolve such issues at
the admissibility stage. Defendants also argue that I improperly shifted the burden
of proof by requiring them to disprove Plaintiffs’ theories, and that intervening
scientific developments undermine the experts’ opinions. Plaintiffs dispute each of
these assertions, maintaining that the correct Rule 702 standard was applied and that
Defendants 	identify 	no 	conclusive 	new 	scientific 	evidence 	warranting
reconsideration of the prior rulings.
To assess Defendants’ present motion within the framework set forth in the
Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order, it is necessary to revisit the earlier
Daubert rulings addressing biological plausibility. During the initial round of
Daubert motions, Defendants advanced materially similar challenges, including that
Plaintiffs’ experts improperly treated ovarian cancer as a single disease, failed to
establish a plausible migration pathway for talc, and lacked reliable evidence that
talc 	exposure 	could 	lead 	to 	chronic 	inflammation 	or 	carcinogenesis. 	Those
arguments were considered in detail and largely rejected, except for the inhalation-
and-lymphatic-transport theory, which I excluded. See In re Johnson & Johnson,
509 F. Supp. 3d at 175–76, 181–83.
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Defendants’ current motion reprises the same core thesis: that Plaintiffs’
biological plausibility opinions rest on a speculative, multi-step causal chain
unsupported by reliable evidence. Although Defendants now refine those objections
by 	reference 	to 	amendments 	in 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts’ 	reports, 	the 	selection 	of
bellwether Plaintiffs, recently published literature, and the amended text of Rule 702,
these refinements do not materially alter the substance of the challenge. Nor do they
demonstrate that my prior admissibility analysis fails to comport with Rule 702 as
amended. 	Importantly, 	Defendants 	identify 	no 	“new 	science” 	that 	directly
contradicts or undermines the evidentiary bases on which the prior rulings rested.
a. 	Ovarian Cancer Subtypes
Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs’ experts’ biological plausibility opinions
are 	unreliable 	because 	they 	treat 	“ovarian 	cancer” 	as 	a 	unitary 	disease,
notwithstanding heterogeneity in sites of origin, carcinogenic pathways, and risk
factors across ovarian cancer subtypes. (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 9–
12.) In Defendants’ view, any biological mechanism offered in support of general
causation must be subtype-specific, given that different subtypes arise in different
tissues and involve distinct etiologies. Defendants also emphasize that the selected
bellwether cases involve different ovarian cancer subtypes and contend that the
experts improperly rely on studies examining ovarian epithelial cells, which
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Defendants assert are not the cells of origin for high-grade serous carcinoma arising
in the fallopian tube fimbriae. (See id. at 12–14.)
Defendants contend that I did not adequately address this issue in 2020. My
prior Opinion found the experts’ opinions reliable as they relate to the evaluation of
epithelial ovarian cancer. I reasoned that the fact that Plaintiffs’ experts do not opine
on the biological mechanism for different epithelial ovarian cancer subtypes does
not call into question the reliability of their opinions. Then, as now, I examined the
reliability of the experts’ methodology and whether it is reliably applied to the facts
of this case.
As a general matter, ovarian cancer is an umbrella term encompassing several
distinct categories of malignancies, traditionally classified by cell type of origin,
including epithelial tumors, germ cell tumors, and sex cord–stromal tumors.
Epithelial 	ovarian 	cancer—the 	most 	common 	category—comprises 	multiple
histologic 	subtypes, 	such 	as 	serous, 	endometrioid, 	clear 	cell, 	and 	mucinous
carcinomas. (See, e.g., Brett M. Reid et al., Epidemiology of Ovarian Cancer: A
Review, 14 Cancer Biol. Med. (1), 9–32 (2017) (“Reid 2017”); see also Wolf 3d
Amend. Rep. at 3; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 20; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend.
Rep. at 4.) Importantly, as Defendants’ referenced literature suggests, “[m]ost
epidemiologic research . . . focuses on epithelial” ovarian cancer, since “more than
90% of malignant ovarian tumors are epithelial in origin.” (See Reid 2017 at 9
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(emphasis added).) It is, therefore, unsurprising that the studies underlying the
experts’ opinions principally examine the association between talcum powder use
and epithelial ovarian cancer.
At the outset, it bears repeating that a finding of biological plausibility
“depends upon existing knowledge about the mechanisms by which the disease
develops.” Green at 604. Accordingly, biological plausibility must be grounded in
“reliable scientific knowledge and reasoning,” not in scientific proof that has yet to
be developed. In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308. Based on that standard,
Defendants’ contention—that Plaintiffs’ experts either failed to account for, or that
the record lacks, epidemiologic studies stratified by epithelial ovarian cancer
subtype—does not render the experts’ methodologies unreliable. As the experts
explain, infra, and as the scientific literature reflects, epithelial ovarian cancer is a
heterogeneous disease in which certain subtypes—particularly high-grade serous
carcinoma—have been studied far more extensively than others. Where dispositive
data is limited or unavailable, it is scientifically appropriate for experts to rely on a
broader body of supportive epidemiologic, mechanistic, and pathological evidence
bearing on, for example, epithelial ovarian cancer generally. 	See, e.g., 	In re
Roundup, 390 F. Supp. 3d at 1126–27, 1129 (“[T]he Bradford Hill framework asks
experts to survey all the available evidence that might support or disprove causation.
A broad survey of the available evidence is neither unusual in expert testimony nor
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necessarily inappropriate.”); In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prod. Liab.
Litig. Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, MDL No. 2545, 2017 WL 1833173, at *9,
14 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2017) (“The Court agrees with plaintiffs that there is nothing
inherently unreliable about a method that relies on the totality of the evidence,
provided that the expert considers the evidence carefully and explains how the
weight of the various pieces of evidence led him to his conclusion.”). These experts’
opinions therefore rest on the application of existing scientific knowledge to the
question of biological plausibility, rather than on speculation or unsupported
extrapolation. The absence of definitive subtype-specific studies reflects the current
state of the science, not a methodological flaw, and does not preclude experts from
offering biologically plausible opinions grounded in the available evidence.
That said, several experts do in fact discuss different subtypes of epithelial
ovarian 	cancer 	in 	forming 	their 	biological 	plausibility 	opinions. 	(See, 	e.g.,
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 20 (providing overview of “different subtypes of
cancer of the ovary,” highlighting that only “epithelial ovarian cancer has been
studied in relation to use of talcum powder products,” and emphasizing importance
for “epidemiological studies of cancer . . . to identify . . . the type of cancer, stage of
cancer at diagnosis, and subtype of cancer”); Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 3
(“Talcum powder exposure is most clearly demonstrated to be associated with serous
cancer and other epithelial cancer subtypes (in particular, clear cell and endometrioid
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carcinoma), but because these other cancers are less common, and because fewer
studies 	have 	evaluated 	these 	cancers 	in 	sufficient 	numbers, 	quantifying 	the
associations 	is 	more 	difficult. 	In 	my 	opinion, 	this 	risk 	is 	likely 	overall 	in
approximately the same range as for serous cancer.”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 3
(“[Epithelial cancer] subtypes include serous, endometrioid, clear cell, mucinous,
undifferentiated or mixed. Of these, serous is by far the most common and accounts
for 70% of EOC. Epithelial ovarian cancers are those that are associated with talcum
powder products.”); see also, e.g., Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 22–25 (recognizing
bellwether Plaintiffs’ varied diagnoses).) Based on the available science, and the
underlying epidemiological studies upon which Plaintiffs’ experts rely in forming
their opinions, I find these discussions grounded in sound methodology.
Nevertheless, Defendants rely on Hoefling v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co.,
LLC in arguing that the experts’ failure to account for distinct subtypes of epithelial
ovarian cancer renders their methodologies unreliable. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 9–10 (citing Hoefling, 576 F. Supp. 3d 262).) Defendants’
argument is misplaced. In Hoefling, the district court excluded an expert’s general
causation opinion because the sources on which the expert relied did not support
causation for the specific anatomic site at issue—namely, the tonsil and oropharynx.
576 F. Supp. 3d at 272–75. The expert impermissibly extrapolated from evidence of
oral-cavity cancers without scientific justification and failed to meaningfully engage
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with the full body of relevant epidemiologic literature, among other methodological
deficiencies. See id.
By contrast, the sources relied on by Plaintiffs’ experts support the biological
plausibility theories concerning talcum powder use and epithelial ovarian cancer.
Plaintiffs’ experts do not derive subtype-specific conclusions from literature that
exceed the scope of the underlying studies. Rather, as discussed above and reflected
in their respective reports, the experts evaluate the association at the level of
epithelial ovarian cancer because both the relevant studies and the scientific
literature more broadly have focused predominantly on that category of disease,
rather than its sub-types. Nor do Plaintiffs’ experts disregard heterogeneity among
ovarian cancer subtypes. Instead, they accounted for the current state of the science,
which recognizes such heterogeneity. In that context, the experts’ reliance on
epithelial ovarian cancer as the relevant analytical frame is methodologically sound
and does not reflect the sort of unsupported extrapolation identified in Hoefling.
Defendants’ 	reliance 	on 	Siharath 	v. 	Sandoz 	Pharmaceuticals 	Corp. 	is
similarly misplaced. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 10 (citing
Siharath v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2001).)
In Siharath, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony and granted summary
judgment because every step of the proposed causal chain lacked independent
scientific support. Id. at 1370–71, 1373–74. After reviewing the full body of
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available 	medical 	evidence—including 	peer-reviewed 	epidemiologic 	studies,
learned treatises, case reports, and animal models—the court concluded that the
record did not demonstrate, or even meaningfully suggest, that Parlodel caused
hemorrhagic stroke. Id. at 1370–71. In short, the experts in Siharath advanced a
theory for which the scientific literature provided no reliable evidentiary foundation.
This case presents a materially different record. Here, Plaintiffs’ experts rely
on a substantial and evolving body of epidemiologic, mechanistic, and experimental
literature supporting the biological plausibility of an association between perineal
talc use and epithelial ovarian cancer, even if that literature does not resolve every
mechanistic question or permit exhaustive differentiation among all epithelial
subtypes. Unlike Siharath, this is not a case in which the scientific literature
uniformly contradicts—or fails to support—the proposed causal mechanism.
The distinction is further illustrated by the nature of the biological comparison
at issue. In Siharath, the court relied on a clear and well-established biological
dichotomy 	between 	ischemic 	strokes—caused 	by 	impaired 	blood 	flow—and
hemorrhagic strokes—caused by vascular rupture—and concluded that evidence
supporting one could not be reliably extrapolated to the other absent a scientific
foundation. Id. at 1355, 1371. Here, Defendants seek to analogize that dichotomy to
differences among epithelial ovarian cancer subtypes. But that analogy is not borne
out by the scientific literature on which Plaintiffs’ experts rely. Unlike the literature
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at issue in Siharath, the epidemiologic and mechanistic studies addressing talc use
and ovarian cancer are not framed in a manner that materially distinguishes among
epithelial subtypes or limits their findings to only certain subtypes. Rather, those
studies generally evaluate epithelial ovarian cancer as a category and do not identify
biological distinctions that would preclude the application of their findings across
epithelial subtypes. In that context, Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on this body of
literature does not involve the kind of unsupported extrapolation that concerned the
court in Siharath.
In short, Siharath involved a scientific record in which the asserted causal
relationship was unsupported at each analytical step. In contrast, Defendants’
arguments here challenge the scope and precision of the evidence supporting
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions, not the absence of such evidence. The analytical gaps
identified in 	Siharath 	were fatal under Rule 702 and 	Daubert; the asserted
limitations here instead present scientific disputes that should be explored through
cross-examination and the presentation of competing expert testimony, rather than
exclusion.
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ experts improperly rely on two in
vitro studies to bridge a subtype gap, because neither study is tied to the distinct sites
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of origin or biology to endometroid cancer or clear cell cancer.37 This argument is
distinct from Defendants’ challenge to the reliability of the experts’ macrophage-
inhibition theory, which is premised on Mandarino 2020 and Tania Emi et al.,
Transcriptomic 	and 	Epigenomic 	Effects 	of 	Insoluble 	Particles 	on 	J774
Macrophages, 16 Epigenetics (10), 1053–70 (2021) (“Emi 2021”), and which I will
separately address, infra.
One of the in vitro studies is Harper/Saed 2023, which exposed normal human
ovarian epithelial cells and fibroblasts to varying concentrations of talcum powder
or titanium dioxide for 72 hours, assessed anchorage-independent growth using a
cell-transformation assay, and performed immunohistochemical analyses. (See
generally Harper/Saed 2023.) The authors reported a dose-dependent increase in
transformed colonies in talc-exposed ovarian epithelial cells, with no such findings
in control samples. (See id.) Mandarino 2020 similarly examined the biological
effects 	of 	talc 	exposure 	by 	exposing 	mice 	macrophages—with 	and 	without
estradiol—to talc, measuring reactive oxygen species and gene-expression changes,
and co-culturing those macrophages with murine ovarian epithelial cells. (See
generally Mandarino 2020.) The authors reported increased oxidative stress and
37 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 13–14 (citing Angelo Mandarino et al., The
Effect of Talc Particles on Phagocytes in Co-Culture with Ovarian Cells, 180 Env’t Res. (2020)
(“Mandarino 2020”); Amy K. Harper et al., Talcum Powder Induces Malignant Transformation in
Normal Human Primary Ovarian Epithelial Cells, 75 Minerva Obstetrics & Gynecology (2)
(2023) (“Harper/Saed 2023”).)
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alterations in macrophage gene expression relevant to cancer development and
immunosurveillance. (See id.)
Defendants argue that Harper/Saed 2023 is of minimal relevance to high-
grade serous carcinoma because it examined ovarian epithelial cells in vitro rather
than fallopian tube fimbrial epithelium, from which high-grade serous carcinoma is
now understood to predominantly arise. Defendants raise a similar critique of
Mandarino 2020, asserting that it is not tied to any specific epithelial ovarian cancer
subtype or site of origin.
I do not find that Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on these studies renders their
opinions 	or 	methodologies 	unreliable 	under 	Rule 	702. 	Although 	Defendants
correctly observe that neither study evaluates every epithelial ovarian cancer subtype
nor is tethered to a specific anatomic site of origin, those limitations do not render
the studies irrelevant for purposes of biological plausibility. Plaintiffs’ experts do
not rely on these in vitro studies to advance subtype-specific causation opinions.
Rather, the studies are cited as part of a broader mechanistic body of evidence that
talc can induce cellular changes—such as oxidative stress, inflammation, and altered
immune function—consistent with carcinogenic processes. The experts explicitly
situate these findings alongside epidemiologic data, other in vitro and animal studies,
and regulatory assessments. In that context, Harper/Saed 2023 and Mandarino 2020
represent 	two 	recent 	contributions 	to 	a 	much 	larger 	evidentiary 	record, 	not
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standalone proof of biological plausibility, and certainly not standalone proof of
general causation. (See, e.g., Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 6 (“Recently,
Harper and Saed demonstrated that exposure to Johnson’s Baby Powder causes p53
mutations, 	cell 	proliferation 	and 	malignant 	transformation 	in 	normal 	ovarian
epithelial cells.”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“[Harper/Saed 2023] reported cell
proliferation, neoplastic transformation and p53 mutations when cells in culture
were 	exposed 	to 	Johnson’s 	Baby 	Powder.”); 	Levy 	2d 	Amend. 	Rep. 	at 	16
(“Mandarino and colleagues independently published separate work showing the
pro-oxidant effect of talc in a cell culture system.”); see also Plunkett 3d Amend.
Rep. at 46–47 (discussing Mandarino 2020).)
Indeed, multiple Plaintiffs’ experts cited Mandarino 2020 in conjunction with
numerous additional studies spanning several decades of research. For example, Dr.
Plunkett cites Mandarino 2020 and twenty-five other studies for support of the
proposition that scientific literature since the 1960s “has continued to accumulate
showing that . . . [cosmetic grade] talc has adverse effects in cells, tissues, animals
and humans.” (Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 27–28.) Dr. Wolf similarly cites
Mandarino 2020 and ten other studies for support of the proposition that “[t]alcum
powder causes inflammation/oxidative stress both in vitro and in vivo (in both animal
and human tissues).” (Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16.)
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In sum, Defendants have not shown that my prior ruling addressing Plaintiffs’
experts’ treatment of epithelial ovarian cancer subtypes “demonstrably fail[ed] to
adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023 amendments.” (April 30, 2024
Memorandum Order.) Rather, I find that Plaintiffs’ experts more likely than not
employ 	a 	sufficiently 	reliable 	methodology—grounded 	in 	experimentation,
interpretation, and application of a cumulative, multidisciplinary body of scientific
evidence—and that their use of the two in vitro studies for purposes of biological
plausibility does not warrant exclusion under Daubert.
b. 	Migration
Next, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ central premise that externally applied
perineal talc can reach the ovaries or fallopian tubes. (Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 14–27.) Defendants contend that the experts’ migration opinions
are 	inadmissible 	and 	advance 	three 	principal 	grounds 	for 	exclusion. 	First,
Defendants argue that the human experimental studies cited by Plaintiffs’ experts do
not involve the external application of talc to the perineum. (Id. at 15–19.) Second,
Defendants maintain that certain animal studies are inapposite and/or inconsistent.
(Id. 	at 	19–21.) 	Third, 	Defendants 	claim 	that 	reports 	identifying 	talc 	within
gynecologic or pelvic tissues do not establish that such talc originated from perineal
use. (Id. at 21–25.) Additionally, Defendants reiterate their position that the experts’
alternative migration theory—via inhalation and/or lymphatic transport—lacks
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sufficient evidentiary support.38 (Id. at 25–27.) Indeed, the bulk of Defendants’
challenge to the experts’ migration opinions generally rests on the fact that literature
“do[es] not directly support their theory that externally applied talc can migrate up
[or reach] the vagina to the ovaries.” (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 14–
15 (citing In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 174).)
Since the issuance of my 2020 Opinion, neither party has presented new
evidence establishing whether externally applied perineal talc does—or did—result
in talc being present in an individual’s ovaries. Indeed, I have already addressed
Defendants’ arguments raised here in my prior Opinion. Critically, as I stated then,
see In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 174–75, and elsewhere in this
Report 	and 	Recommendation, 	(see, 	infra, 	at 	Part 	V.C.2.ii.b), 	biological
plausibility—as 	its 	name 	suggests—does 	not 	require 	definitive 	proof 	of 	the
biological mechanism by which talc reaches ovaries. An expert need only “provide
reliable support that demonstrates that the mechanism is plausible.” In re Johnson
& Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 175; see also In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308
(“[A] biological plausibility opinion is admissible so long as it is derived from and
supported by reliable scientific knowledge and reasoning.” (collecting cases)).
38 	It appears that Plaintiffs are reasserting the inhalation theory, which I excluded previously.
(See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 30 (“[Plaintiffs’] experts’ opinions on
inhalation as a secondary mechanism are reliable and admissible.”); see also Kane Rep. at 4;
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 89; Moorman Rep. at 33; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 30; Wolf 3d
Amend. Rep. at 15, 19–20.) I will address this issue even though Plaintiffs have not, on these
motions, sought to formally reintroduce this theory of migration.
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Neither party has provided convincing arguments or case law to suggest that the
admissibility of a biological plausibility opinion is held to a different standard than
I applied in my prior Opinion.
On these bases, I find that both parties have failed to establish that: (1) my
prior Opinion “demonstrably fail[ed] to adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023
amendments” as it related to the admissibility of Plaintiffs’ experts’ migration
opinions, and (2) “new science . . . directly contradict[s] or challenge[s]” my
previous findings on the same. (See April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order.) I will
address the parties’ arguments in full.
In support of their first argument, Defendants contend that the design
differences of studies relied on by Plaintiffs’ experts create an analytical gap that
precludes extrapolation to external perineal use. Defendants highlight that those
studies39 involved particles deposited into the internal reproductive tract, not
externally on the perineum. Defendants also criticize the experts’ reliance on studies
that used non-talc tracers (e.g., carbon, albumin microspheres), often with subjects
positioned to facilitate upward transport, such as pelvis being elevated, prolonged
39 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 15–17 (citing G.E. Egli & Michael Newton,
The Transport of Carbon Particles in the Human Female Reproductive Tract, 12 Fertil. & Steril.
(2), 151–55 (1961) (“Egli & Newton 1961”); P.F. Venter & M. Iturralde, Migration of a Particulate
Radioactive Tracer from the Vagina to the Peritoneal Cavity and Ovaries, 55 S. Afr. Med. J. (23),
917–19 (1979) (“Venter & Iturralde 1979”); G. Kunz et al., The Uterine Peristaltic Pump. Normal
and Impeded Sperm Transport Within the Female Genital Tract, in The Fate of the Male Germ
Cell 267, 270 (Ivell & Holstein eds. 1997) (“Kunz 1997”).)
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supine positioning, and 	sometimes 	with use of oxytocin to 	promote uterine
contractions.40
Plaintiffs 	respond 	that 	Defendants’ 	criticisms 	go 	to 	the 	weight, 	not
admissibility, because biological plausibility does not require a study precisely
replicating real-world perineal use to be reliable. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 14–21.) In that regard, Plaintiffs emphasize that
regulatory authorities and medical sources recognize perineal use as a primary
exposure route and the plausibility of upward migration, citing the FDA, the IARC,
and Health Canada. (See id. at 15.) Plaintiffs also argue that ordinary behavior and
female anatomy make perineal-to-vaginal transfer plausible, as acknowledged by
some of Defendants’ experts. (See id. at 15–16.) In Plaintiffs’ view, studies that
begin with material in the vagina are probative of what occurs after perineal
application. (See id. at 15–17.) Plaintiffs suggest, as do their experts, that once in the
reproductive tract, documented physiological mechanisms—uterine peristalsis and
retrograde menstruation—drive transport to the uterus, fallopian tubes, and ovaries.
(See id. at 17–18.) Additionally, Plaintiffs cite multiple human tracer and particulate
studies showing upward migration within minutes to days, which I previously
deemed a reliable basis for expert migration opinions. (See id. at 18–21 (citing, e.g.,
40 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 18–19 (citing Egli & Newton 1961; Venter
& Iturralde 1979; A.C.E. Sjösten et al., Retrograde Migration of Glove Powder in the Human
Female Genital Tract, 19 Hum. Reprod. (4), 991–995 (2004) (“Sjösten 2004”).)
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Egli & Newton 1961; Venter & Iturralde 1979).) Finally, Plaintiffs contend the
studies’ use of particles other than talc is not fatal to their admissibility because the
particles are similar in size and morphology to talc and show the same upward
behavior. (See id. at 20–21.)
Taken together, Defendants’ critiques of individual studies do not establish
that Plaintiffs’ experts’ methodologies are unreliable; rather, the totality of the
evidence—principally 	human 	studies, 	supplemented 	by 	animal 	data, 	in 	vitro
experiments, 	and 	regulatory 	assessments—reliably 	supports 	the 	biological
plausibility, though not with certainty or definitively, that perineally applied talc
may migrate to the upper reproductive tract.
To begin, Defendants take issue with the experts’ reliance on three studies,
(see Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 16 & n.22),41 which I previously
considered in my prior Opinion, see In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at
173–74. Admittedly, they do not specifically involve the perineal application of talc
to research subjects. Rather, these studies generally sought to demonstrate that inert,
41 	Specifically, Defendants highlight that Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, Cote, McTiernan,
Plunkett, and Wolf rely on Egli & Newton 1961, (see Carson Rep. at 7; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend.
Rep. at 12; Cote Amend. Rep. at 13; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 88; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep.
at 31–32; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 14); that Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, McTiernan, and Wolf
rely on Venter & Iturralde 1979, (see Carson Rep. at 7; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 12;
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 88–89; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 14); and that Drs. Plunkett and
Wolf rely on Kunz 1997, (see Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 31, 38–39, 41; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at
14).
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sperm-sized particles placed in the vagina can rapidly and passively ascend through
the uterus into the fallopian tubes.
• 	In Egli & Newton 1961, clinicians “deposited” “[s]terile carbon particles”
“in the posterior fornix” of three women at or near the day of ovulation
and, after giving oxytocin, found particles in tubes within approximately
30 minutes in two cases. (See Egli & Newton 1961 at 152–54.)
• 	In 	Venter 	& 	Iturralde 	1979, 	doctors 	“deposited” 	“human 	albumin
microspheres” in the “posterior fornix” of 24 women “placed in the supine
position with the buttocks slightly elevated” and showed with imaging and
tissue counts that the microspheres moved up through the uterus into the
tubes and ovaries. (See Venter & Iturralde 1979 at 917–18.)
• 	In Kunz 1997, the authors tracked “[a]lbumin macrospheres” placed “at
the external os of the uterine cervix”42 and showed that, among other
things, uterine peristaltic contractions rapidly carry these sperm‑sized
particles from the cervix into the uterus. (See generally Kunz 1997.)
In sum, these studies all observed upward transport of the particles from their deposit
location, which all involved some measure of internal application.
Defendants similarly challenge several studies on which Plaintiffs’ experts
rely for their transport-via-retrograde menstruation theory.43, 44
42 	“External os” refers to the external opening of the cervical canal at the vaginal end of the
cervix, adjacent to the posterior vaginal fornix, or the cervix’s opening into the vagina. (See, e.g.,
Kunz 1997 at 268.)
43 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 16–17 (citing M.J. Blumenkrantz et al.,
Retrograde Menstruation in Women Undergoing Chronic Peritoneal Dialysis, 57 Obstet. &
Gynecol. 	(5), 	667–70 	(1981) 	(“Blumenkrantz 	1981”); 	Juoko 	Halme 	et 	al., 	Retrograde
Menstruation in Healthy Women and in Patients with Endometriosis, 64 Obstet. & Gynecol. (2),
151–54 (1984) (“Halme 1984”)).)
44 	Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ experts’ retrograde migration theory should have been
excluded because in my previous Opinion, I expressly stated that “migration has never been
demonstrated in circumstances analogous to perineal dusting.” (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 14–15 (citing In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 174).)
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• 	Blumenkrantz 1981 examined whether retrograde menstruation occurs
routinely by monitoring peritoneal fluid in 11 premenopausal women on
chronic peritoneal dialysis. (See Blumenkrantz 1981 at 667–68.) Peritoneal
blood was seen in 9 of 11 women and was otherwise rare in men or non-
menstruating women, leading the authors to conclude, among other things,
that retrograde flow into the peritoneal cavity is common. (See id. at 668–
70.)
• 	Halme 	1984 	prospectively 	assessed 	331 	pelvic 	fluid 	samples 	at
laparoscopy and classified its color by cycle timing. (See generally Halme
1984.) During perimenstrual phase, the authors observed that 90.4% of
sampled women with open fallopian tubes “had an appreciable amount of
red blood cells,” versus 15.4% of sampled women with occluded fallopian
tubes having the same or similar result. (See id. at 153.) The authors
concluded that retrograde menstruation through patent tubes is a common
physiologic event and that occlusion limits peritoneal blood. (See id. at
153–54.)
In short, these studies observed the upward movement of menstrual blood through
the fallopian tubes—a mechanism which was observed in nearly all investigated
women. (See generally id.)
With that context, Defendants’ migration challenge largely rests on the
absence of studies that begin with the external application of talc to the perineum
and then directly demonstrate talc’s presence in the ovaries or fallopian tubes. But
this framing misapprehends both the nature of biological plausibility analysis and
the way the scientific literature addressing reproductive tract transport is structured.
As I have previously explained, biological plausibility does not require definitive
proof of the precise mechanism by which an exposure reaches a target organ. Rather,
an expert must provide reliable scientific support demonstrating that the proposed
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mechanism is plausible in light of existing biological knowledge. See In re Johnson
& Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 175; In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308. That
standard has not changed under the 2023 amendments to Rule 702.
Viewed through that lens, the analogies employed by Plaintiffs’ experts are
scientifically apt. The human transport studies on which they principally rely—
including, among others, Egli & Newton 1961, Venter & Iturralde 1979, and Kunz
1997—were designed to examine whether inert, tiny particles placed at or near the
vaginal opening can move upward through the reproductive tract via normal
physiologic processes. Although those studies do not involve perineal dusting per
se, they directly address the critical biological question at issue: whether particles of
comparable size and morphology can ascend from the lower reproductive tract to the
uterus, fallopian tubes, and ovaries.
The studies uniformly demonstrate that upward transport occurs rapidly and
passively, driven by well-established physiologic mechanisms such as uterine
peristalsis. Importantly, the materials in these studies were placed at shallow, distal
locations within the reproductive tract—often in the posterior fornix or at the
cervical os—making them probative of what may occur once material enters the
vaginal canal, regardless of the precise initial mode of entry as opined by the experts.
In this context, the experts’ inference that perineally applied talc may enter the
vagina through ordinary hygiene practices and thereafter be subject to the same
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transport mechanisms is not speculative but grounded in known anatomy and
physiology reflected in the studies they cite.
The same is true of the experts’ reliance on studies documenting retrograde
menstruation. Blumenkrantz 1981 and Halme 1984 establish that retrograde flow of
menstrual material through patent fallopian tubes into the peritoneal cavity is a
physiologic occurrence. As Plaintiffs’ experts are well aware, these studies do not
purport to model talc exposure directly; rather, they demonstrate the existence of a
biologically plausible pathway by which particulate matter present in the lower
reproductive tract may reach the upper tract and surrounding tissues. The absence of
talc-specific tracing in these studies does not negate their relevance to biological
plausibility.
Defendants’ criticisms—that these studies involve internal placement, non-
talc tracers, or experimental conditions facilitating transport—do not render the
experts’ methodology unreliable. Such critiques speak to the degree of analogy, not
to whether the analogy itself is scientifically reasonable. As courts have recognized,
biological plausibility may be established through multiple lines of evidence, such
as transport physiology, analog particle studies, and known anatomic mechanisms,
particularly 	where 	ethical 	and 	practical 	constraints 	preclude 	direct 	human
experimentation. See Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 17–
19, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding a reliable inference of biological plausibility and
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reversing the district court’s “reasoning that because no one line of evidence
supported a reliable inference of causation, an inference of causation based on the
totality of the evidence was unreliable”); see also id. at 24–25 (recognizing that the
absence of dispositive epidemiological studies due to “difficulties of data collection
in the United States” is not fatal and citing cases); In re Roundup, 390 F. Supp. at
1129–30 (holding that Bradford Hill framework requires experts to survey all
available 	evidence 	and 	admitting 	mechanistic 	evidence 	supporting 	biological
plausibility despite absence of direct human data). Indeed, Plaintiffs’ experts explain
that prospective human studies involving perineal talc application, repeated tissue
sampling, or long-term cancer outcome measurement would be unethical and
infeasible. (See Singh Rep. at 7; Singh Supp. Rep. at 23; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep.
at 33; Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 33.) In that setting, reliance on analog
studies and mechanistic inference is not only accepted scientific practice but may be
the only method by which biological plausibility can reasonably be assessed.
Thus, the use in certain studies of non-talc tracers or migration-facilitating
conditions does not, standing alone, render Plaintiffs’ experts’ methodologies—or
their application to the facts here—unreliable. Plaintiffs’ experts cite tracer studies
not to establish talc-specific chemistry, but to illustrate a plausible migration
pathway governed principally by reproductive tract anatomy and particle transport
mechanics, rather than by the chemical composition of talc itself. (See, e.g., Wolf 3d
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Amend. Rep. at 13–15; Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 32–33.) To be clear,
Plaintiffs’ experts do not ignore the studies’ use of non-talc particles to demonstrate
migration. (See, e.g., Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 14; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at
88–89; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 12.) Rather, they use these studies, among
others, to reasonably extrapolate that talc applied to the perineum can migrate to the
upper reproductive tract. Under the governing 	standards, Plaintiffs 	need not
definitively 	prove 	biological 	plausibility. 	It 	is 	enough 	for 	these 	experts 	to
demonstrate that their biological plausibility opinions are reliably supported, even if
such support is not definitive proof of their opinions.
Consistent with that approach, Health Canada has recognized that the inert
particles used in several foundational migration studies—including, among others,
Egli & Newton 1961, De Boer 1972,45 Venter & Iturralde 1979, and Kunz 199646—
were “similar in size to talc.” (Health Canada Screening Assessment 2021.) Where,
as here, the proposed mechanism turns on particle size, form, and transport
dynamics, the use of inert particulates with comparable physical characteristics
provides a scientifically appropriate basis for demonstrating a plausible migration
pathway.
45 	C.H. De Boer et al., Transport of Particulate Matter Through the Human Female Genital
Tract, 28 J. Reprod. Fert. 295–97 (1972) (“De Boer 1972”).
46 	G. Kunz et al., The Dynamics of Rapid Sperm Transport Through the Female Genital Tract:
Evidence From Vaginal Sonography of Uterine Peristalsis and Hysterosalpingoscintigraphy, 11
Hum. Reprod. 627–32 (1996) (“Kunz 1996”).
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Lastly, Defendants criticize Drs. Cote’s and Plunkett’s reliance on De Boer
1972, a study that observed varying degrees of transportation of inert carbon
particles deposited in the uterine cavity, cervical canal, and vagina. Specifically, De
Boer 1972 found that inert India ink placed in the uterine cavity was often and
rapidly transported to the fallopian tubes in over half of cases; transport from the
cervix occurred in roughly a third of cases; and movement from the vagina into the
uterus was rare, i.e., twice in thirty-seven cases. (See generally De Boer 1972.)
Defendants stress as unsupportive De Boer 1972’s own data,47 which shows
frequent transit to the fallopian tubes when particles were placed in the uterus, but
almost never when placed in the vagina—highlighting that the study does not
support migration from the external perineum through the vagina. (See Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 17.) Defendants also claim that Dr. Cote ignored De
Boer 1972’s arguably unfavorable data, since Dr. Cote only referenced De Boer
1972’s findings concerning frequent movement from the uterus to the fallopian tubes
and not its observation of rare migration from the vagina to the uterus. (See id.; see
also Cote Amend. Rep. at 13 (summarizing De Boer 1972 as providing “evidence
[that] ink traveled to the fallopian tubes at least half of the time when placed in the
uterus”).)
47 	It is unclear whether Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on De Boer 1972 as
it relates to retrograde migration, or as it may relate to migration-via-perineal application.
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But Defendants mischaracterize Drs. Cotes’ and Plunkett’s reliance on this
study. They did not rely on or reference De Boer 1972 as sole or primary proof of
upward migration; instead, they relied on and referenced a large body of literature,
both predating and following the publication of De Boer 1972, that uses non-talc
substances sufficiently similar in size and morphology to talc to show the plausibility
of upward migration. (See Cote Amend. Rep. at 13 (citing, inter alia, De Boer 1972
and, inter alia, Egli & Newton 1961 and Venter & Iturralde 1979, as collectively
providing “[i]nsight as to how talc products and their components can migrate from
the perineum through the genital tract to the ovaries and fallopian tubes”); Plunkett
3d Amend. Rep. at 32–33 (summarizing De Boer 1972 and other migration-related
studies as “provid[ing] early notice of the ability of particles to move up the female
reproductive tract” (emphasis added)).) To be sure, the parties do not discuss or
challenge every study, experiment, or assessment that Plaintiffs’ experts rely on or
refer to in support of the plausibility of a migratory mechanism. While I have
reviewed this support, this Report and Recommendation does not endeavor to
discuss or otherwise consider every study relied on or referred to by each of Plaintiffs
experts that Defendants do not expressly challenge.48 For this same reason, the fact
48 	(See, e.g., Cote Amend. Rep. at 13–14 (citing, e.g., Carl G. Hartman, How Do Sperms Get
Into the Uterus?, 8 Fertil. & Steril. (5), 403–27 (1975); J.C. Phillips et al., Studies on the
Absorption and Disposition of 3H-Labelled Talc in the Rat, Mouse, and Guinea-Pig and Rabbit,
16 Food & Cosmet. Toxicol. (2) 161–63 (1978); Heather N. Lynch et al., Systematic Review of the
Association Between Talc and Female Reproductive Tract Cancers, Front. in Toxicol. (2023));
Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 31 (citing, e.g., Tim H. Parmley & J. Donald Woodruff, The Ovarian
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that Dr. Cote did not expressly discuss the infrequent transportation to the uterus of
inert carbon particles when they are placed in the vagina does not render her opinions
regarding migration unreliable.
Defendants’ criticisms of flaws or findings of a particular study—here, De
Boer 1972—do not undermine the ultimate conclusions that Plaintiffs’ experts draw
from them, given that they cite to a robust grouping of studies showcasing the
relative evolution of migratory evidence.49 Drs. Cote and Plunkett accurately
characterize De Boer 1972, and do not draw or enlarge opinions that the study’s
authors themselves fail to make. Moreover, De Boer 1972 did not produce evidence
disproving upward migration from the vagina to the uterus following application or
insertion of inert particles into the vagina, since it did not demonstrate that no
migration occurred. Defendants’ criticisms of Plaintiffs’ reliance on De Boer 1972
go to the weight owed to their migratory opinions, not to their admissibility.
Mesothelioma, 120 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. (2), 234–41 (1974); David L. Gardner et al., Potential
Delivery of Contraceptive Agents to the Female Reproductive Tract, Controlled Release of
Pesticides & Pharms. 99–109 (1981); M.G. McCalley et al., Radionuclide Hysterosalpingography
for Evaluation of Fallopian Tube Patency, 26 J. Nucl. Med. (8), 868–74 (1985); S. Kadanali,
Evaluation of Active and Passive Transport Mechanisms in Genital Tracts of IUD-Bearing Women
with Radionuclide Hysterosalpingoscintigraphy, 63 Contraception (1), 41–45 (2001); Stefan
Kissler 	et 	al., 	Uterine 	Contractility 	and 	Directed 	Sperm 	Transport 	Assessed 	by
Hysterosalpingoscintigraphy (HSSG) and Intrauterine Pressure (IUP) Measurement, 83 Acta
Obstetricia et Gynecologica Scandinavica (4), 369–74 (2004); I. Zervomanolakis et al., Physiology
of Upward Transport in the Human Female Genital Tract, 1101 Ann. of the New York Acad. of
Sci. (1), 1–20 (2007)).)
49 	See supra note 48; see also Egli & Newton 1961; Venter & Iturralde 1979; Kunz 1997;
Blumenkrantz 1981; Halme 1984.
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Next, in support of their argument related to animal studies, Defendants assert
that the experts’ biological plausibility opinions are unreliable because they rely on
animal studies that cannot be validly extrapolated to human perineal talc use. (See
Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 19–21.) To that end, they criticize certain
experts’ reliance on two studies that involved the application or insertion of talc in
rodent genital tracts.50 They fault these experts for “ignor[ing]” primate studies that
found no talc translocation to fallopian tubes or ovaries,51 and for inadequately
addressing 	at 	least 	one 	primate 	study 	that 	artificially 	maximized 	upward
transportation.52
Plaintiffs respond that their experts’ reliance on animal data is appropriate for
establishing biological plausibility, but, in any event, their experts ground their
migration and mechanism opinions on human-based evidence and use animal-based
studies only for supplemental support. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 21–23.) Plaintiffs further submit that courts routinely allow animal
50 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 19–20 (citing Nadi Keskin et al., Does Long-
Term Talc Exposure Have a Carcinogenic Effect on the Female Genital Systems of Rats? An
Experimental Pilot Study, 280 Arch. Gynecol. Obstet. (6), 925–31 (2009) (“Keskin 2009”)); W.J.
Henderson et al., The Demonstration of the Migration of Talc from the Vagina and Posterior Uterus
to the Ovary in the Rat, 40 Env’t Research (2), 247–50 (1986) (“Henderson 1986”).)
51 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 20 (citing Alfred P. Wehner et al., On Talc
Translocation from the Vagina to the Oviducts and Beyond, 24 Food Chem. Toxicol. (4) 329–38
(1986) (“Wehner 1986”).)
52 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 20–21 (citing Alfred P. Wehner et al., Do
Particles Translocate from the Vagina to the Oviducts and Beyond, 23 Food Chem. Toxicol. (3)
367–72 (1985) (“Wehner 1985”).)
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studies to inform biological plausibility, and the animal-based literature relied upon
by their experts does not undercut their opinions. (See id.)
As a general matter, the reliance on animal studies for purposes of establishing
general causation has two often-recognized disadvantages. “First, animal study
results must be extrapolated to another species—human beings—and differences in
absorption, metabolism, and other factors may result in interspecies variation in
responses.” Green at 346; see also Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d
434, 466 (W.D. Pa. 2003); In re Valsartan, 2025 WL 3141002, at *24–25. Second,
“the high doses customarily used in animal studies require consideration of the dose-
response relationship and whether a threshold no-effect dose exists.” Id. Therefore,
the admissibility of animal studies for proving causation in humans requires “good
grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans.” In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743.
Here, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on animal studies for
their biological plausibility opinions as they relate to their theories on the upward
migration of talc—not their general causation opinions. To be sure, animal studies
may be relied upon for demonstrating biological plausibility. See, e.g., In re 3M
Combat Arms Earplugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:19-md-2885, 2021 WL 4132269,
at *4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2021) (“Animal studies may support a biological
plausibility opinion so long as an expert explains how and why the animal data can
be reliably extrapolated to support conclusions about humans.” (citing In re Abilify,
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299 F. Supp. 3d at 1310)). Along these lines, there is an analytical difference
regarding the admissibility of biological plausibility opinions premised on, among
other things, animal studies, compared to the admissibility of general causation
opinions supported by the same. After all, biological plausibility “lends credence to
an inference of causality,” Green at 604, but is not itself dispositive of general
causation.
Defendants do not acknowledge that there is a distinction to be drawn when
assessing reliance on animal studies for general causation purposes as opposed to
for biological plausibility purposes. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at
19–20 (“[A]nimal studies are not admissible to prove human causation absent ‘good
grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans.’” (emphasis added) (quoting In re
Hum. Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., 582 F. Supp. 2d 644, 657 (D.N.J. 2008).) Following
a review of those Plaintiffs’ experts who rely on or discuss animal studies for support
of the biological plausibility of a migratory mechanism, I find that the experts have
sufficiently “explain[ed] how and why the animal data can be reliably extrapolated
to support conclusions about humans.” In re 3M Combat Arms Earplugs, 2021 WL
4132269, at *4. For example, Dr. Plunkett explained that rodent ovaries are
“completely covered by a bursal sac,” unlike human ovaries, which makes migration
to ovarian tissue via vaginal penetration more unlikely in rats and mice—thereby
limiting detection of ovarian translocation in those species compares with humans.
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(See Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 35–36, 43–45.) Dr. Cote contrasted species, noting
that 	animal 	evidence 	of 	translocation 	is 	inconsistent 	and 	“may 	be 	species-
dependent,” with rats showing ovarian talc after intrauterine or, with sufficient time,
intravaginal exposure, but rabbits and primates generally not showing translocation
in specific experiments. (See Cote Amend. Rep. at 13.) These experts, among others,
compare or acknowledge human and animal reproductive anatomy to explain why
migration observed—or not observed—in animals informs but does not control the
plausibility of particle migration in humans.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ experts make clear that their reliance on animal
studies is neither the only nor their primary basis for their migration-related
biological plausibility opinions. Instead, Plaintiffs’ experts rely on a totality-of-
evidence approach for determining biological plausibility, for which animal studies
provide other support. (See, e.g., McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 94 (“In my opinion,
these animal studies . . . . provide[] further evidence of a biologically plausible
mechanism supporting causation of ovarian cancer from the use of talcum powder
products.” (emphasis added)); Kane Rep. at 6 (“[A]nimal studies on exposure and
disease are performed to advance our understanding of the human response to the
same dose-adjusted exposure, and thus animal data is often relevant and important
in that it can provide important information that forms part of the total evidence
assessment.”).) Despite Defendants’ objections to certain experts’ use of a few select
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animal studies, those objections do not render the experts’ opinions unreliable just
because they are not dispositive, human-based evidence. See In re Testosterone
Replacement Therapy, WL 1833173, at *14.
Furthermore, several of Plaintiffs’ experts recognize that the applicability of
animal studies to humans is limited. (See, e.g., Carson Rep. at 7 (“There are a limited
number of animal studies suggesting that this transport does not occur. These are not
as compelling as the human evidence because of anatomical and physiological
differences between animals and humans in this regard, as well as the overwhelming
evidence in humans.” (citations omitted)); Cote Rep. at 13 (“[A]nimal studies do not
provide consistent evidence of translocation of talc—it may be species dependent.”);
id. at 37 (“Human studies were more convincing than animal studies, likely due to
the difficulties in replicating what is often a lifetime of use of talc in humans to
dosing and administration in animals (whose physiology may not closely align with
human female genital tract).”); Kane Rep. at 6 (“Human data is generally more
relevant than animal data when assessing causation in humans.”); McTiernan 3d
Amend. Rep. at 32 (“Given the differences between animals and humans in terms of
anatomy of the genital tract, the studies in humans are the most reliable in terms of
human health risk assessment and the toxicokinetics of talc applied externally to the
perineal area.”).)
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The experts’ discussion of contrary evidence further bolsters the reliability of
their methodologies and application. See In re Zoloft (Sertraline Hydrochloride)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 26 F. Supp. 3d 449, 461 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (finding expert’s
“fail[ure] 	to 	account 	adequately 	for 	contrary 	evidence 	. 	. 	. 	not 	reliable 	or
scientifically sound”); In re Mirena Ius Levonorgestrel-Related Prods. Liab. Litig.
(No. II) (“Mirena II”), 341 F. Supp. 3d 213, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Where an expert
ignores evidence that is highly relevant to his conclusion, contrary to his own stated
methodology, exclusion of the expert's testimony is warranted.”).
Turning to Defendants’ substantive challenges, Defendants criticize Drs.
McTiernan and Wolf’s reliance on Keskin 2009, and Drs. McTiernan and Plunkett’s
reliance on Henderson 1986, arguing that neither animal study reliably demonstrates
talc migration in the context of human perineal application. (See Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 19–20 & n.32, 34 (citing McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep.
at 90, 93; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 31, 35–36).)
Keskin 	2009 	assessed 	whether 	long-term 	perineal 	or 	intravaginal 	talc
exposure can be associated with potential carcinogenic effects on the female genital
organs of rats. (See generally Keskin 2009.) The authors assigned 28 rats to four
groups of seven: two control groups, one group receiving intravaginal talc, and one
group receiving perineal talc. (See generally id. at 925.) After undergoing talc
exposure for three months, the authors performed histopathologic evaluation of the
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vulva, vagina, uterus, fallopian tubes, ovaries, and peritoneum, and found consistent
foreign body reactions, inflammatory changes, and infections in talc-exposed
groups. (See id. at 925–26.)
Henderson 1986 sought to determine whether exogenous talc can migrate
from the lower female genital tract to the ovaries. (See Henderson 1986 at 247.) The
authors 	instilled 	talc 	suspensions 	into 	eight 	female 	rats 	intrauterinely 	and
intravaginally. The study confirmed the presence of talc particles after intrauterine
instillation and after four days of intravaginal exposure. (See id. at 248.) In other
words, the study showed that talc particles introduced into a rat vagina or uterus can
migrate to the ovary and localize in ovarian tissue within about four days. (See id.)
Defendants first argue that Keskin 2009 is not sufficiently supportive of
Plaintiffs’ migration theory because “talc was applied in enormous quantities not
analogous to human exposure.” (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 19.) But
Drs. McTiernan and Wolf cite Keskin 2009 for support of their theory that talc use
causes inflammation and/or oxidative stress, and not for support of talc’s migratory
potential. (See McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 90 (“Talc exposure has also been
linked to increased inflammation. It can induce granulomous and other inflammatory
responses 	in vivo.”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Talcum powder causes
inflammation/oxidative stress both in vitro and in vivo (in both animal and human
tissues).”).) Therefore, whether these experts appropriately extrapolated Keskin
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2009’s inflammation-and oxidative stress-related findings to humans will be detailed
in the appropriate section below.53
Moreover, 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts 	appropriately 	caveat 	Henderson 	1986’s
findings, noting that animal studies, generally, and Henderson 1986 specifically
cannot be solely relied upon for migratory or causal conclusions. (See, e.g.,
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 93–94 (assessing animal studies within “weight of
evidence” approach); Cote Amend. Rep. at 13 (discussing varied results in talc-
related animal studies and concluding that “animal studies do not provide consistent
evidence of translocation of talc—it may be species dependent.”).)
Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ experts failed to give due weight to, or
improperly ignored, Wehner 1986, which Defendants characterize as demonstrating
“no talc migration in monkeys.” (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 20.) In
Wehner 1986, the authors examined whether repeated vaginal depositions of talc in
primates would result in translocation to the uterus, oviducts, ovaries, or peritoneal
cavity. Over a 45-day period, six primates received more than thirty talc depositions
in the posterior vaginal fornix, after which the animals underwent peritoneal lavage
and tissue collection, with six untreated primates serving as controls. (See Wehner
53 	Even if Dr. McTiernan and Dr. Wolf relied on Keskin 2009 for support “of a mechanism of
action opinion rather than a general causation opinion,” it constitutes reliable methodology. See In
re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., 2010 WL 1489730, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2010). Indeed, Keskin
2009 offers evidence of a plausible pathway for talc to migrate from the perineum to the upper
reproductive tract, despite lacking an established dose-response scale that can be applied to
humans for purposes of causation.
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1986 at 329–30.) The authors detected talc in the vagina and cervix of treated
animals, but not in the uterus, oviducts, ovaries, or peritoneal lavage fluId. (See id.
at 329, 331–32.)
Contrary 	to 	Defendants’ 	assertion, 	Wehner 	1986 	was 	not 	ignored 	by
Plaintiffs’ experts. Several experts cited, discussed, or expressly analyzed the study.
(See Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 35–37; Singh Rep. at 57; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at
21; Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 21; Carson Rep. at 51.) Dr. Plunkett, in
particular, discussed Wehner 1986 at length, noting that it was the only animal study
at the time reporting no translocation of talc to the oviducts and contrasting it with
other animal and primate studies that did report migration. (See Plunkett 3d Amend.
Rep. at 35–37.) She further highlighted that the Wehner 1986 authors themselves
acknowledged potential explanations for their findings, including lower dosing, use
of different materials, and prolonged maintenance of the primates in a supine
position, as compared to other studies. (See Wehner 1986 at 337.) Dr. Singh
similarly 	observed 	that 	differences 	in 	timing, 	assessment 	techniques, 	and
interspecies considerations in Wehner 1986 preclude ruling out talc migration
altogether. (Singh Rep. at 57.) Both Drs. Plunkett and Singh also noted that the study
was industry funded, which they considered in assessing its weight. (Plunkett 3d
Amend. Rep. at 36; Singh Rep. at 57.)
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Rule 702 does not require that every expert address every study bearing on an
issue. The fact that only some of Plaintiffs’ experts discuss Wehner 1986 does not
render their migration-related biological plausibility opinions inadmissible. More to
the point, those experts who did consider Wehner 1986 reasonably assessed its
limitations, distinguished its unfavorable findings, and evaluated it in the context of
other 	animal 	studies, 	human 	evidence, 	and 	regulatory 	assessments. 	Any
disagreement with the weight those experts accorded the study is properly addressed
through cross-examination, not exclusion.54
Finally, in support of their third argument, Defendants contend that studies
identifying talc in human reproductive tissues do not necessarily or reliably support
migration from perineal use, pointing to five specific tissue-identification studies on
which several of Plaintiffs’ experts rely.55
54 	Though not discussed by Defendants, it is clear from my prior Opinion that, given my
recitation of Dr. Carson’s testimony, I considered the implication of Wehner 1986’s primate
observation and its finding that there was no measurable translocation of talc beyond the cervix.
See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 173. Defendants do not explain how my prior
consideration of Wehner 1986 was erroneous or whether such consideration undermined my
biological plausibility ruling under the amended Rule 702.
55 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 21–25 (citing W.J. Henderson et al., Talc and
Carcinoma of the Ovary and Cervix, 78 J. Obstet. Gynaecol. Br. Commonw. (3), 266–72 (1971)
(“Henderson 1971”); D.S. Heller et al., The Relationship Between Perineal Cosmetic Talc Usage
and Ovarian Talc Particle Burden, 174 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol (5), 1507–1510 (1996) (“Heller
1996”); Sandra A. McDonald et al., Migration of Talc from the Perineum to Multiple Pelvic Organ
Sites: Five Case Studies with Correlative Light and Scanning Electron Microscopy, 152 Am. J.
Clinical Pathology (5), 590–607 (2019) (“McDonald I 2019”); Sandra A. McDonald et al.,
Correlative Polarizing Light and Scanning Electron Microscopy for the Assessment of Talc in
Pelvic Lymph Nodes, 43 Ultrastruct. Pathol. (1), 13–27 (2019) (“McDonald II 2019”); Kurt E.
Johnson et al., Analytic Comparison of Talc in Commercially Available Baby Powder and in Pelvic
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More specifically, Defendants argue that: (i) Henderson 1971 did not report
users’ talc exposure, thereby precluding any inference regarding perineal use; (ii)
Heller 1996 detected talc in the ovaries of both reported users and non-users, with
particle counts unrelated to exposure history, which Defendants contend undermines
any association with perineal dusting; (iii) McDonald I 2019 and McDonald II 2019
are anecdotal case reports involving small samples, including findings of talc in
certain purportedly unexposed controls, with no reported blinding and an asserted
risk of contamination or bias—particularly given the involvement of several
Plaintiffs’ litigation experts as co-authors; and (iv) Johnson 2020 failed to reliably
establish that talc identified in resected pelvic tissue originated from patients’ use of
Johnson’s 	Baby 	Powder. (Defs.’ 2024 Biological 	Plausibility 	Br. at 	22–25.)
Defendants contend that these studies do not reliably support the biological
plausibility of perineal talc migration.
As with the experts’ reliance on animal studies, Defendants overstate the
import of these studies on Plaintiffs’ experts’ broader biological plausibility
opinions. The experts do not rely solely on these studies to establish the plausibility
of talc migration from the perineum to the ovaries or fallopian tubes. Instead, they
consider these studies with other migratory-focused studies, as discussed above, that
Tissues Resected from Ovarian Carcinoma Patients, 159 Gynecologic Oncology (2), 527–33
(2020) (“Johnson 2020”).)
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collectively support their biological plausibility theories. Significantly, in addition
to this body of literature, Plaintiffs’ experts also rely on regulatory assessments that
have acknowledged or endorsed migration as a plausible biological pathway. For
example, several of Plaintiffs’ experts expressly rely on statements from the FDA,
IARC and Health Canada to support their opinion that perineally applied talc can
migrate from the perineum through the genital tract and thus provide a biologically
plausible pathway to the ovaries. (See, e.g., Moorman Rep. at 33 (finding support of
migration from pathology studies and FDA’s 2014 response stating that “the
potential for particulates to migrate from the perineum and vagina to the peritoneal
cavity is indisputable”); Singh Supp. Rep. at 14 (relying on, inter alia, Health
Canada’s assessment to support migration as “mode of action”); McTiernan 3d
Amend. Rep. at 94 (considering Health Canada assessment and its determination
that “perineal application of talc results in migration to ovaries and fallopian
tubes”).)
Of particular note is Health Canada’s “mode of action” section in its recent
April 2021 Screening Assessment of talc, which expressly recognizes retrograde
particle movement as a biologically plausible pathway, noting that “[m]igration or
retrograde movement of talc particles from the vagina to the ovaries has been
identified as a plausible explanation of . . . talc particles in the upper reproductive
tract.” (See Health Canada Screen Assessment 2021 at 19 (citing Henderson 1986;
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Heller 1996; Daniel W. Cramer et al., Presence of Talc in Pelvic Lymph Nodes of a
Woman with Ovarian Cancer and Long-Term Genital Exposure to Cosmetic Talc,
110 Obstet. & Gynecol. (2), 498–501 (2007) (“Cramer 2007”).); see also id. at 34
(“Overall, the available animal and human studies described . . . clearly indicate that
particles, including talc, may transfer from the vagina to the fallopian tubes and
ovaries following perineal application.”).)56
Substantively, the experts’ reliance on the challenged studies does not
undermine the reliability of their biological plausibility opinions or the manner in
which those opinions were reached. Defendants’ critiques largely isolate individual
studies and fault them for acknowledged limitations. In that regard, they first
challenge the reliance of Drs. Clarke-Pearson, Cote, Kane, McTiernan, Singh, and
Smith on Henderson 1971—which reported talc particles embedded in ovarian and
cervical tumor tissue but did not identify the exposure source or trace an anatomic
route—by arguing it “does not plausibly show migration” because the study did not
report whether the tissue donors used perineal talc. (See generally Henderson 1971.)
Plaintiffs’ experts do not suggest otherwise. As reflected in their reports, the
experts characterize Henderson 1971 as providing indirect support for migration by
56 	I also note that Defendants strenuously object to my consideration of the Health Canada
Screening Assessment 2021, which they contend is unreliably based on a meta-analysis, is ripe
with bias, and fails to support the conclusions drawn therefrom. (See Nov. 25, 2025 Tr. at 48:25–
52:10.) But Defendants’ objections are not specific to migration. Moreover, as indicated, other
agencies than Health Canada have made similar conclusions regarding talc migration.
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demonstrating 	that 	talc 	can 	be 	present 	in 	upper 	genital 	tract 	tissues, 	while
recognizing that the study does not establish how the particles arrived there. (See,
e.g., Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend Rep. at 7, 12; Cote Amend. Rep. at 13; Smith Rep.
at 18.) Indeed, as observed by the experts, while Henderson 1971 does not purport
to prove migration, it nevertheless provides an early observational data point
consistent with the plausibility of transport, which the experts then evaluate
alongside later and more targeted studies. Used in this limited manner, the experts
did not unreasonably extrapolate Henderson 1971’s conclusion.
Defendants similarly object to the experts’ reliance on Heller 1996, arguing
that the study cannot support their opinions because it detected talc in ovarian tissue
from both reported perineal users and non-users and found talc particle counts to be
“completely unrelated” to reported exposure, thereby failing, in Defendants’ view,
to demonstrate migration or causation. (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at
22–23.) Plaintiffs’ experts, however, do not overstate the significance of Heller
1996’s findings.
Heller 1996 examined ovarian tissue from twenty-four women to assess
whether talc burden correlated with reported perineal talc use. (See generally Heller
1996.) The study detected talc in all ovaries examined, regardless of self-reported
use, and did not find a clear exposure–burden correlation. (See generally id.)
Plaintiffs’ experts acknowledge that Heller 1996 does not establish trace exposure
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source. Instead, they rely on the study for the narrower proposition that talc can be
found in ovarian tissue, and thus, can reach that anatomical site—an inference that
bears on plausibility of mode of migration. Several experts, including Dr. Plunkett,
expressly 	recognize 	the 	study’s 	limited 	findings, 	including 	the 	potential 	for
misclassification of exposure, while explaining why those limitations do not negate
the 	study’s 	relevance 	to 	the 	migration 	question. 	(Plunkett 	3d 	Amend. 	Rep.
(discussing limitations but opining that “the results showing higher overall particles
counts in women reporting perineal application of talc are nevertheless consistent
with the ability of talc particles to migrate up the female reproductive tract”); see
also Singh Rep. at 57 (acknowledging that in Heller 1996, the “talc particle counts
were unrelated to reported levels of perineal talc exposure,” which “reflects the
challenges in measuring exposure to talc”); Cote Amend. Rep. at 13 (recognizing
the authors’ suggestion that the results may be “due to widespread exposure to talc
during diapering”).)
More recent studies provide additional context and support.57 McDonald I
2019 identified talc particles in multiple pelvic tissues—including lymphatic sites—
of women with a reported history of perineal talc use. (See generally McDonald I
57 	By Defendants’ account, Drs. Cote, Clarke-Pearson, and Harlow reference or specifically
rely on McDonald I 2019, and Drs. Plunkett and Singh cite to or expressly rely on McDonald II
2019, in broad support of their biological plausibility opinions. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 22 n.42.) Similarly, Drs. Cote, Plunkett, and Singh reference Johnson 2020 for
the same or similar reasons. (See id.)
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2019.) Plaintiffs’ experts rely on this finding for the limited and appropriate purpose
of assessing the plausibility of a migration pathway. In their reasoned view, the
presence of talc across multiple pelvic locations, rather than in a single isolated site,
supports the inference that talc is capable of tissue transport and deposition within
the pelvic region. (See, e.g., Cote Amend. Rep. at 13; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend.
Rep. at 12; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 39–40.) The experts do not extrapolate from
these observations to draw definitive conclusions regarding exposure, dose, or
causation, nor do they treat the study as dispositive. Compare id., with McDonald I
2019 at 590, 603, 605; see also id. at 590, 605 (concluding that this study “offer[s]
new insight into the biologic potential of talc, its inflammatory potential, and its
migration via pelvic lymphatics from the perineum”).)
McDonald II 2019, which was expressly designed to address contamination
concerns raised in earlier literature, similarly detected talc in pelvic lymph nodes
under controlled conditions. (See generally McDonald II 2019.) Plaintiffs’ experts
cite this study to corroborate the biological feasibility of migration via pelvic or
lymphatic pathways, again stopping short of asserting proof. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d
Amend. Rep. at 39–40.) Used in this circumscribed manner, the experts’ reliance on
McDonald I and McDonald II reflects a reasoned and methodologically sound
application of the literature, not an unreasonable or unsupported extrapolation under
Rule 702.
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Likewise, Johnson 2020 compared talc particle size and morphology in
commercial talc products with particles identified in pelvic tissues from ovarian
cancer patients reporting perineal talc use. The study found that the dominant
particle class in consumer talc products closely matched the dominant class detected
in pelvic tissues. (See Johnson 2020 at 531–32.) The authors interpreted this
similarity as consistent with externally applied talc reaching pelvic sites. (See, e.g.,
id. at 523 (“In conclusion, our study lends support to the contention, also evidenced
by other literature reports, that externally-applied talc can migrate from the perineum
to other pelvic sites . . . .”).) In that regard, Plaintiffs’ experts rely on Johnson 2020
for precisely that limited inference—consistency in particle characteristics—not as
a standalone proof of exposure pathway.
While Defendants devote much of their argument in this context to attacking
the studies underlying Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions, I cannot find that Plaintiffs’
experts overstated or mischaracterized these studies’ conclusions. To the contrary,
the experts’ reports consistently and accurately describe what each study does—and
does not—demonstrate, and explain how each fits within a broader evidentiary
framework. (See, e.g., Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 7 (reporting Henderson
1971’s findings of “talc ha[ving] been identified deeply imbedded in ovarian cancer
tissue samples”), 12 (citing Henderson 1971, Heller 1996, Johnson 2020, and other
studies to support opinion that “the female reproductive tract is open and allows
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migration 	of 	potential 	pathogens 	into 	peritoneal 	cavity”); 	Cote 	Rep. 	at 	13
(“[Henderson 1971, Heller 1996, McDonald I 2019, Johnson 2020] suggest that
perineal use of talc can and does make its way into tissues in the reproductive tract,
including the ovaries and fallopian tubes.”); Kane Rep. at 14 (“[Henderson 1971,
Heller 1996, and other studies] have demonstrated the presence of talc in ovarian
tissue.”), 16 (“Henderson [1971] first observed talc particles embedded in both
ovarian tumors and normal ovaries.”); McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 88–89
(discussing studies that “have shown that talcum powder products can migrate to the
ovaries and fallopian tubes”); Singh Rep. at 18 (citing Henderson 1971, Heller 1996,
and other studies for the theory that “[t]alcum powder particles can migrate to the
fallopian tubes and ovaries”), 57 (citing Henderson 1971, Heller 1996, and other
studies for support that “[g]enital talc can migrate up the fallopian tubes and ovaries
and talc particles have been detected within the ovaries of women who report
perineal talc use”); Singh Supp. Rep. at 14–15 (summarizing McDonald I 2019 and
McDonald II 2019 as evidence of retrograde migration and citing Johnson 2020 for
“additional proof of retrograde migration of talc particles”); Plunkett 3d Amend.
Rep. at 31 (citing, inter alia, Heller 1996 as “demonstrating the presence of talc
particles in the ovaries of women who had reported use of talcum products in the
genital area”), 31 (finding the McDonald studies corroborate the FDA’s 2014
migratory plausibility conclusion), 37–38 (recognizing Heller 1996 as “a small piece
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of the overall evidence that supports the ability of talc to migrate from the vagina to
the ovaries”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 14 (citing Henderson 1971, Heller 1996, and
other studies for “conclud[ing] that [the presence of talc particles in the adnexa,
ovaries, and peritoneum] occurs as a result of migration of talc particles from the
vagina through the cervix, uterus, and fallopian tubes”); Smith Rep. at 16 (citing
Henderson 1971, among other studies, for support that “the female genital tract
functions as a conduit for foreign material to enter the peritoneal cavity”).
Far from treating any single study as conclusive, Plaintiffs’ experts expressly
acknowledge the limitations of the literature on which they rely, including contrary
findings, contamination concerns, species differences in animal models, and the
absence of direct human experimentation. They nevertheless explain—through
reasoned analysis—why the collective body of evidence supports the biological
plausibility 	of 	talc 	migration 	through 	the 	female 	reproductive 	tract. 	This
acknowledgment of limitations, coupled with an explanation of why the experts find
the supporting evidence more persuasive, reflects methodological rigor rather than
unreliability. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 37–38 (acknowledging criticism
of Heller 1996 “that women reporting no perineal use had talc detected in ovarian
tissue”); Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 12 (“I have reviewed the small body of
literature suggesting that migration of particles does not occur and do not think these
studies are compelling.”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 14–15 (“I have considered the
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limited evidence to the contrary and find it non-persuasive.”); Carson Rep. at 7
(“There are a limited number of animal studies suggesting that this transport does
not occur. These are not as compelling as the human evidence because of anatomical
and physiological differences between animals and humans in this regard, as well as
the overwhelming evidence in humans.”); see also Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 37
(discussing no evidence of translocation in Wehner 1986).)
From a Rule 702 standpoint, this approach is consistent with accepted
scientific practice. Plaintiffs’ experts do not present indirect or incomplete studies
as definitive proof.58 Instead, they synthesize multiple lines of evidence—including
human observational findings, tissue-identification studies, mechanistic research,
and anatomical considerations—to assess biological plausibility. In other words, the
experts’ conclusions drawn from the confluence of these studies are reasonable.
As before, Defendants ask that I disaggregate the literature and reject
plausibility unless each study independently establishes migration. Rule 702 does
not 	impose 	that 	requirement. 	Biological 	plausibility 	may 	be 	supported 	by
cumulative, indirect, and mechanistic evidence, so long as the expert explains how
that evidence is reasonably interpreted. See, e.g., In re PPA, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1241
(finding an expert’s opinion on biological plausibility reliable when supported by
58 	Nor have Defendants identified intervening “new science” that undermines the evidentiary
foundation upon which these opinions rest or demonstrates that the experts’ reasoning is unsound
under the amended Rule 702 standard.
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the “cumulative effect” of evidence, including reliance on “reports, textbooks and
treatises, and the clinical experience of several experts and other scientists” as well
as other evidence). Accordingly, I find, as I did previously, that Plaintiffs’ experts
have established by a preponderance of the evidence that their biological plausibility
opinions regarding talc migration are grounded in sufficient facts and data and reflect
a reliable application of scientific principles to the available evidence.
As 	to 	Plaintiffs’ 	inhalation-and-lymphatic 	transport 	migration 	theory,
Defendants assert that I correctly excluded this theory in my prior Opinion and urge
that I do so again. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 25–27.) Plaintiffs
respond by arguing that the reliability of their experts’ opinions on inhalation has
strengthened with the advent of additional evidence. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. 28–30.) I disagree with Plaintiffs and find that there
remains an insurmountable absence of data supporting this theory.59
Plaintiffs point to additional studies and regulatory assessments that they
contend 	support 	their 	expert’s 	opinions 	that 	talc 	can 	reach 	the 	ovaries 	via
inhalation.60 As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ experts appear to, again, rely upon
59 	Additionally, Plaintiffs do not argue that my prior exclusion of the inhalation theory
“demonstrably fail[ed] to adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023 amendments.” (See generally
Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br.; see also April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order.)
Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffs’ experts rely on studies previously considered, I see no basis to
revisit my prior decision excluding Plaintiffs’ theory on inhalation.
60 	(See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. 28–30 (citing, e.g., Health Canada
Screening Assessment 2021; Joan E. Steffen et al., Serous Ovarian Cancer Caused by Exposure
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studies that I considered or addressed in my prior Opinion. (See, e.g., Kane Rep. at
4, 14; Moorman Rep. at 33; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 89, 101; Wolf 3d Amend.
Rep. at 15; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 30.) But the new studies referenced by these
experts are insufficient to bridge the “analytical gap” between inhalation of talcum
powder and its potential migration to ovaries and/or fallopian tubes. See In re Hum.
Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
First, Plaintiffs point to the “extensive review of the scientific evidence on
inhalation of talc” contained within Health Canada Screening Assessment 2021,
which includes discussion of McDonald II 2019. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 28–30.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, however,
Health Canada Screening Assessment 2021 states, among other things, that “whether
inhalation of talc particles could result in ovarian exposure due to lymphatic transfer
of particles or whether responses may be immune-mediated has not been adequately
investigated for use in mode of action analysis.” (See Health Canada Screening
Assessment 2021 at 45.) Indeed, Plaintiffs’ reference to the identified health effects
following inhalation of “respirable talc particles” does not address or support the
migration of those talc particles via inhalation to ovaries or fallopian tubes. (See Pls.’
Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 28 (citing Health Canada
to Asbestos and Fibrous Talc in Cosmetic Talc Powders-A Case Series, 62 J. Occup. & Env’t Med.
(2), e65–e77 (2020) (“Steffen 2020”); McDonald II 2019 at 13–27.)
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Screening Assessment 2021 at 41); see also Health Canada Screening Assessment
2021 at 43 (“Based on the available data, ovarian cancer was identified as a critical
health effect for the perineal route of exposure to talc.”).) Similarly, Health Canada’s
assessment of McDonald II 2019 does not support migration via inhalation, because
McDonald II 2019 was a method-focused study observing talc entry into pelvic
tissues and regional nodes after perineal exposure. (See generally McDonald II
2019.)
Lastly, and as discussed in greater length with respect to the admissibility of
Dr. Godleski’s opinions and testimony, Steffen 2020 is not sufficiently supportive
of this inhalation theory. Steffen 2020 reports a litigation-linked case series of 10
women with serous ovarian cancer who used cosmetic talc. (See generally Steffen
2020.) The case series asserts that perineal use can produce “important inhalation
exposure to asbestos,” and characterizes inhalation as an “accepted route of
transmigration to the peritoneum and ovary.” (See id. at e69.) But standing alone,
Steffen 2020 does not offer sufficient scientific support or reasoning for a migration-
via-inhalation theory.
In sum, Plaintiffs’ renewed reliance on inhalation-and-lymphatic transport
does not cure the fundamental analytical deficiencies that led to exclusion of this
theory in my prior Opinion. The additional studies and regulatory materials cited by
Plaintiffs do not supply reliable data linking inhalation of cosmetic talc to deposition
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in the ovaries or fallopian tubes, nor do they meaningfully narrow the analytical gap
between pulmonary exposure and ovarian tissue presence. To the contrary, the
Health 	Canada 	Screening 	Assessment 	expressly 	acknowledges 	that 	ovarian
exposure via inhalation and lymphatic transfer has not been adequately investigated,
and it identifies ovarian cancer as a critical health effect associated with perineal—
not inhalation—exposure. The McDonald studies, including McDonald II 2019,
address migration following perineal exposure and do not support inhalation-based
transport. Steffen 2020, standing alone, offers a litigation-linked case series that
asserts—but 	does 	not 	scientifically 	substantiate—a 	migration 	pathway 	via
inhalation.
Accordingly, 	despite 	Plaintiffs’ 	characterization 	of 	the 	record 	as
“strengthened,” the evidentiary landscape remains materially unchanged. The
inhalation theory continues to rest on speculation rather than reliable scientific
evidence and fails to satisfy Rule 702’s requirement that expert opinions be
grounded in sufficient facts and data and the reliable application of scientific
principles. I therefore recommend the Court reaffirm my prior ruling excluding
Plaintiffs’ experts’ inhalation-and-lymphatic transport migration theory, and I
preclude Plaintiffs’ experts from testifying regarding this unsubstantiated theory.
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c. 	Inflammation, Oxidative Stress, and Macrophage-
Impairment
Lastly, Defendants move to exclude the experts’ biological plausibility
opinions on the ground that they have not identified a biologically plausible
mechanism by which perineal talc could cause ovarian cancer. (See, e.g., Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 27.)
Defendants take the same tack here as with migration, urging exclusion by
attacking the literature on which Plaintiffs’ experts rely. In broad terms, Defendants
first contend that the experts ignore the absence of histological evidence that talcum
powder causes chronic inflammation; that animal studies are non-analogous and
therefore uninformative; and that clinical uses of talc, i.e., pleurodesis, reflect
reactions unrelated to chronic inflammation and carcinogenesis. (See id. at 28–31.)
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on in vitro studies for
evidence of “subcellular markers of inflammation or oxidative stress” is unreliable
both in principle and in application—i.e., as a general scientific approach and as the
basis for the specific conclusions they draw. (See id. at 31–35.) Third, Defendants
attack “review articles,” among other studies on which Plaintiffs’ experts rely,
arguing 	they 	are 	methodologically 	weak 	and 	do 	not 	establish 	that 	chronic
inflammation 	causes 	ovarian 	cancer. 	(See 	id. 	at 	36–41.) 	Fourth, 	Defendants
challenge Plaintiffs’ experts reliance on Harper/Saed 2023 for the proposition that
talc exposure allegedly induces “malignant transformation” of normal human
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primary epithelial cells in vitro. (See id. at 41–45.) Finally, Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs’ macrophage-inhibition theory should be excluded because it rests only on
two in vitro mouse-cell studies that generate a hypothesis, thereby making the theory
impermissibly speculative and not plausible under the correct Rule 702 standard.
(See id. at 45–58.)
Plaintiffs oppose exclusion on these grounds by arguing that their experts
meet Rule 702’s reliability standard because biological plausibility requires a
credible, 	evidence-based 	mechanism—not 	definitive 	proof—and 	their 	experts
synthesize the totality of available evidence that talc can plausibly cause ovarian
cancer via chronic inflammation and related oxidative stress. (See Pls.’ Opp. to
Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 30–31.) Substantively, Plaintiffs point to
peer-reviewed literature linking chronic inflammation to carcinogenesis in ovarian
tissue and documenting pro-inflammatory and oxidative effects from talc and/or
asbestos exposure. (See id. at 31–43.) Plaintiffs emphasize that their experts’ reliance
on in vitro studies is appropriate—both as a general scientific approach and in
specific studies—to show that talc can trigger chronic inflammation and oxidative
stress. (See id. at 43–45.) Plaintiffs also summarize the literature linking chronic
inflammation to ovarian cancer, including Harper/Saed 2023, to correct what they
claim are Defendants’ misunderstandings and mischaracterizations of the studies
upon which their experts rely. (See id. at 45–52.) Additionally, Plaintiffs respond
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that opinions premised on certain macrophage studies are admissible under a totality
of evidence approach to demonstrate that talc can alter macrophage function, which
may in turn cause ovarian cancer. (See id. at 52–53.)
Once again, Defendants’ arguments largely rest on the premise that my prior
Opinion applied the wrong legal standard or otherwise departed from Rule 702 as
clarified in 2023. In relevant part, my prior Opinion evaluated the admissibility of
opinions regarding the association between talc use and inflammation and oxidative
stress, as well as the related association between inflammation and oxidative stress
and ovarian cancer. During the first round of Daubert motions, Plaintiffs offered Dr.
Saed as an expert in oxidative stress and ovarian cancer. See In re Johnson &
Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 130, 132. Ultimately, I permitted Dr. Saed to testify that
talcum powder exposure can induce cellular inflammation and oxidative stress based
on his in vitro work because his methods were testable, peer-reviewed, and involved
generally accepted techniques. See id. at 140. I excluded, however, Dr. Saed’s
extrapolation 	that 	such 	inflammation, 	which 	itself 	is 	represented 	as 	a 	pro-
carcinogenic process involving oxidative stress, causes ovarian cancer because his
in vitro study did not demonstrate malignant transformation, actual single nucleotide
polymorphisms mutations, or clinically relevant biomarkers. See id. at 135–140.
For Plaintiffs’ previously proffered experts’ Bradford Hill analyses, I allowed
testimony that talc can plausibly migrate through the female reproductive tract and
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that chronic inflammation and oxidative stress in ovarian tissue could contribute to
carcinogenesis. See id. at 172–75. I reviewed the current science as provided by the
parties, which largely consisted of peer-reviewed in vitro work and otherwise
accepted methods, and noted the absence of definitively contrary evidence. See id.
In permitting admission, I emphasized that biological plausibility requires a credible,
science-based mechanism rather than certainty or proof; opinions must be grounded
in reliable science rather than an expert’s say-so. See id. Consistent with these
boundaries, I permitted Defendants’ expert, Dr. Benjamin Neel, to rebut only Dr.
Saed’s admissible inflammation and oxidative stress opinions, reinforcing the
gatekeeping line between plausible cellular-level effects and unsupported causation
inferences. See id. at 195–98.
Now, and in view of my prior ruling, Defendants essentially contend that my
prior ruling cannot stand because a biological plausibility hypothesis based on
scientific research and reasoning is inadmissible if it is not definitively proven. (See
Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 27–28 (citing In re Acetaminophen, 707 F.
Supp. 3d at 350; In re Accutane Prods. Liability, 511 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1296 (M.D.
Fla. 2007)); see also id. at 7–8.) That is not the governing standard, and my prior
Opinion correctly declined to require definitive proof. See In re Johnson & Johnson,
509 F. Supp. 3d at 175.
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I start with Defendants’ reliance on In re Acetaminophen and In re Accutane,
which I find unpersuasive. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 27–28.) In
In re Acetaminophen, the district court excluded plaintiffs’ experts’ biological
plausibility opinions because their methodologies and evidence did not reliably
establish 	a 	mechanism 	by 	which 	prenatal 	acetaminophen 	exposure 	causes
neurodevelopmental disorders, including autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”) and/or
attention 	deficit/hyperactivity 	disorder 	(“ADHD”). 	707 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	309.
Specifically, the court excluded Dr. Baccarelli’s plausibility conclusions because the
physiological processes for ASD/ADHD were unknown at the time of writing and
because his theories were premised on the unreliable opinions of other experts. See
id. at 351. The court also excluded Dr. Cabrera’s mechanistic opinions because,
among other things, he failed to “identify a mechanism by which either ASD or
ADHD is created in utero.” Id. at 358–59. The court criticized Dr. Cabrera’s reliance
on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development’s “Adverse Outcome
Pathway 20,” which is built around mercury and oxidative stress leading to learning
and/or memory impairment, because it did not reliably map to acetaminophen or to
ASD or ADHD. Id. On the key-oxidative stress step, the court emphasized the
absence of replicated data and the misplaced reliance on inapposite human studies
and inconsistent behavioral animal evidence. See id. at 359–61. In other words, the
court 	excluded 	Dr. 	Cabrera’s 	biological 	plausibility 	opinion 	because 	his
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methodologies created an analytical gap and failed reliable application, not because
causation was not conclusively proven. In re Acetaminophen did not alter Rule 702
or impose any requirement of “definitive” mechanistic proof; rather, the court
applied the ordinary gatekeeping standard—which asks whether, more likely than
not, 	the 	opinion 	rests 	on 	sufficient 	facts, 	reliable 	principles, 	and 	a 	reliable
application.
In In re Accutane, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida
excluded plaintiffs’ expert’s biological plausibility opinion that Accutane disrupts
gastrointestinal mucosal integrity, which can initiate or amplify inflammatory
responses, and thus, induce or exacerbate inflammatory bowel syndrome (“IBS”).
511 F. Supp. 2d at 1295–96. In excluding plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion, the court
observed that the three proposed mechanisms were largely untested hypotheses
lacking general acceptance in the scientific community at the time—and, critically,
that plaintiffs’ expert expressly acknowledged these limitations. See id. at 1296–97.
The court’s statement that plaintiffs’ expert’s biological theory was “merely
plausible, not proven” does not impose a requirement of definitive proof; it reflects
the lack of reliable, scientifically validated support for any proposed mechanism or
epidemiologic evidence of increased incidence, and thus falls squarely within Rule
702’s reliability inquiry rather than a demand for correctness. See id. Accordingly,
In re Accutane does not alter the admissibility standard under amended Rule 702. It
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instead 	reaffirms 	that 	plausibility, 	absent 	reliable 	methodology 	and 	data, 	is
insufficient for admissibility—not that definitive proof is required. See id.
Here, Plaintiffs’ experts’ biological plausibility opinions do not suffer from
the same fatal flaws that led the courts in In re Acetaminophen and In re Accutane
to exclude biological plausibility and mechanistic opinions. As will be explained
below, 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts’ 	reliably 	employ 	methodologies 	that 	support 	their
respective opinions. Unlike in In re Acetaminophen, for example, Plaintiffs’ experts
here do not “cherry-pick[] isolated findings, ignor[e] inconsistent findings, and
disregard[] limitations expressed by” the studies’ authors. In re Acetaminophen, 707
F. Supp. 3d at 361.
Defendants also contend that, in admitting testimony regarding the biological
plausibility of talc leading to chronic inflammation, I impermissibly shifted the
burden of proof. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 5 (citing In re
Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 175 (“Defendants have not introduced any
evidence that this theory has been disproven as a matter of science, and therefore, I
have no basis to find that such a hypothesis is implausible so as to warrant exclusion
under a Daubert inquiry.”)).) Defendants misinterpret my prior ruling. The language
Defendants seize upon was used to underscore the absence of meaningful scientific
criticism or contrary evidence in the relevant literature that would call into question
the plausibility of Plaintiffs’ experts’ theory. In context, my prior observation that
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Defendants had not introduced evidence disproving the hypothesis did not serve as
the basis for admissibility. Instead, it reflected that Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions were
not contradicted by established scientific findings that would render their proposed
mechanism 	implausible. 	The 	admissibility 	determination 	rested 	on 	Plaintiffs’
affirmative showing—through reliable scientific literature, mechanistic reasoning,
and expert analysis—that perineal talc migration and resulting chronic inflammation
and/or oxidative stress constitute plausible biological mechanisms under Daubert
and Bradford Hill. Defendants’ argument ignores that context and mischaracterizes
the rationale for the prior ruling.
Against that backdrop, I will now turn to Defendants’ substantive arguments.
As follows, I will first address the parties’ arguments on the admissibility of expert
opinion and testimony concerning the association between talcum powder use and
chronic inflammation and oxidative stress; second, on the association between
inflammation and oxidative stress and the development of ovarian cancer; and
finally, on Plaintiffs’ macrophage-inhibition theory.
(1) 	Talcum powder and chronic inflammation, oxidative stress
I begin with Defendants’ objections to expert testimony concerning the
purported association between perineal talc use and chronic inflammation and
oxidative stress. Plaintiffs’ experts—including Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, Kane,
Levy, McTiernan, Moorman, Plunkett, Siemiatycki, Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman,
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Wolf, and Cote—opine that talc use is associated with chronic inflammation and
oxidative stress. In forming these opinions, Plaintiffs’ maintain that their experts rely
on various bodies of scientific literature,61 as well as their professional experience
and subject-matter knowledge.
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ experts, including Dr. Cote, ignore the
absence of histological evidence that talcum powder causes chronic inflammation.
(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 28–29.) For support, Defendants point
to Henderson 1971 and Heller 1996 as examples of studies that demonstrate that talc
does not induce inflammation. (See id.) As discussed within the context of Plaintiffs’
experts’ migration-related opinions, Henderson 1971 is a study that used extraction
and replication “to examine tissue from patients with ovarian and cervical tumours”
and that ultimately revealed talc particles embedded within ovarian and cervical
tumor tissues. Henderson 1971 did not assess or report inflammatory histopathology.
Heller 1996 was a pathoepidemiologic study that examined ovaries from women
with and without reported perineal talc use and explicitly looked for histologic
evidence of tissue reaction. Ultimately, the authors found no inflammatory response
associated with ovarian talc particles.
61 	It bears emphasis that Defendants challenge many of the same studies on which Plaintiffs’
experts rely to support both their migration opinions and their opinions that talc use is associated
with chronic inflammation as a causally relevant mechanism. Accordingly, in addressing
Defendants’ objections to the studies relied upon by Plaintiffs’ experts in support of their chronic-
inflammation theory, I incorporate by reference the earlier substantive discussion of those studies
to the extent relevant to the arguments presented here.
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Responding to Defendants’ contention, Plaintiffs point to a vast body of
largely 	unchallenged 	research 	and 	regulatory 	assessments 	relied 	upon 	and
referenced by their experts that show the plausible association between talc exposure
and chronic inflammation. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br.
at 31–30 & n.94–125.) As I have stressed, Plaintiffs’ experts anchor their biological
plausibility opinions in the totality of evidence, and not any one particular study.
(See, e.g., Singh Supp. Rep. at 22 (emphasizing that “body of evidence” strengthens
biological 	plausibility); 	Smith-Bindman 	3d 	Amend. 	Rep. 	at 	33–34, 	37–38
(addressing, 	inter 	alia, 	biological 	plausibility 	within 	“totality 	of 	evidence”
framework); Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 2, 13 (considering “extensive body
of literature in its totality” and “using the concepts outlined by Bradford Hill” in
forming causation-related opinions); Kane Rep. at 37–38 (detailing biologically
plausible mechanisms as part of integrated analysis).) As such, Defendants’ criticism
of one or two isolated studies does not undermine the remaining body of evidence
upon which the experts rely.
But even solely focusing on the substance of Henderson 1971 and Heller
1996, while these two older studies did not report that talc exposure causes chronic
ovarian inflammation, their findings do not undercut the reliability of Plaintiffs’
experts’ 	methodologies. 	Henderson 	1971 	did 	not 	discuss 	inflammation 	as 	a
mechanism or histologic finding. Therefore, Defendants’ contention that Henderson
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1971 did “not report that [talc] induced any inflammation” is misleading. (See Defs.’
2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 28 & n.53.) Defendants notably omit, however,
the authors’ conclusion that “[a]lthough it is impossible to incriminate talc as a
primary cause of carcinomatous changes within either the cervix or ovary on the
preliminary observations described [in the study], the possibility that talc may be
related 	to 	other 	predisposing 	factors 	should 	not 	be 	disregarded 	and 	further
investigations are obviously required.” (See Henderson 1971 at 271.)
Furthermore, while Heller 1996 found “no evidence of response to talc, such
as foreign body giant cell reactions or fibrosis in the tissue,” (Heller 1996 at 1508),
Plaintiffs rely on or reference other, more recent studies to assert the link between
talc use and inflammation, (see Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br.
at 31–30 & n.94–97, 99–103, 105–115, 117–125).62 Despite Heller 1996’s contrary
findings, the existence of conflicting evidence is not a sufficient basis to exclude an
expert’s opinion or anticipated testimony. See ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696
F.3d 254, 290 (3d Cir. 2012). Emphasis on a methodologically unchallenged, albeit
purportedly contrary, study in view of a larger body of evidence is fodder for cross-
examination and does not upend an expert’s opinion under the governing standard.
62 	See Woolen 2022; Paul K. Mills et al., Perineal Talc Exposure and Epithelial Ovarian
Cancer Risk on the Central Valley of California, 112 Int’l J. of Cancer (3), 458–64 (2009); Melissa
A. Merritt, Talcum Powder, Chronic Pelvis Inflammation and NSAIDs in Relation to Risk of
Epithelial Ovarian Cancer, 122 Int’l J. of Cancer (1), 170–76 (2008); see also Health Canada
Screening Assessment 2021.
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Defendants further fault Dr. Cote and other experts for purportedly lacking
knowledge of studies examining an association between talcum powder use and
chronic inflammation in humans. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 29
(citing, e.g., Cote Dep. at 217:6–14 (“I don’t know of a systematic study that has
examined [inflammation or granulomatous reaction in the reproductive tract or
gynecologic tissue of a woman who used talc and got ovarian cancer].”); ECF No.
33013-54 (“Harlow Dep.”) at 392:3–8 (“I don’t know of any studies [reporting talc
in the presence of inflammation in the ovary before ovarian cancer has been
diagnosed].”)).) That argument mischaracterizes both the testimony and the context
in which it was given. Neither Dr. Cote nor Dr. Harlow conceded a lack of familiarity
with relevant scientific literature. Rather, Dr. Cote testified that she was unaware of
any study specifically assessing inflammation in the reproductive tract or other
gynecologic tissues of women who used talc and later developed ovarian cancer.
(See Cote Dep. at 217:6–14.) Dr. Harlow similarly testified that he was not aware of
studies documenting talc in the presence of ovarian inflammation prior to an ovarian
cancer diagnosis. (See Harlow Dep. at 392:3–8.) Notably, neither Plaintiffs nor
Defendants identify the existence of any such studies. In other words, Defendants
do not point to overlooked or ignored literature; instead, they rely on testimony
acknowledging the absence of studies that would directly resolve the question. The
absence of dispositive human studies, however, does not require exclusion of an
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expert opinion, so long as other factors support the reliability of the methodology
employed. See In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 656–57 (recognizing that the
lack of studies either proving or disproving a causal hypothesis is not, standing
alone, fatal to admissibility).
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ experts rely on several animal
studies that they contend are unsupportive of their opinions regarding the association
between talc exposure and chronic inflammation. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 29–30.) They challenge the reliability of Plaintiffs’ experts’
methodologies on the basis that they improperly rely on Keskin 2009.63 First,
Defendants contend that Keskin 2009 does not demonstrate talc-induced neoplastic
change. 64 (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 29.) Second, Defendants
assert 	that 	certain 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts—such 	as 	Drs. 	McTiernan, 	Wolf, 	and
Moorman—ignored that limitation. (See id.) Both arguments are unavailing.
As discussed, Keskin 2009 provides experimental evidence that repeated
intravaginal or perineal talc exposure elicits a local inflammatory response in rat
genital tissue. (See Keskin 2009 at 925 (concluding that “[t]alc has unfavorable
63 	Defendants previously challenged Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on Keskin 2009, insofar as
it failed to demonstrate upward migration following perineal application.
64 	Interestingly, Defendants argued during the last round of Daubert motions that Plaintiffs’
experts improperly failed to consider Keskin 2009 in forming their coherence opinions—not that
their consideration of Keskin 2009 undermined their biological plausibility opinions. (See Defs.’
2024 General Causation Br. at 86.) I addressed this argument in my prior Opinion. See In re
Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 183.
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effects on the female genital system,” but that “this effect is in the form of foreign
body reaction and infection, rather than being neoplastic”).)65 Defendants do not
adequately explain how the authors’ observation that the study did not identify
neoplastic 	change undermines 	Plaintiffs’ experts’ 	methodologies 	or opinions.
Plaintiffs’ experts cite Keskin 2009 for the limited and appropriate purpose of
demonstrating talc’s capacity to induce inflammatory responses, not as proof of
tumorigenesis. (See McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 90 (“Talc exposure has also been
linked to increased inflammation. It can induce granulomas and other inflammatory
responses 	in vivo.”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Talcum powder causes
inflammation/oxidative stress both in vitro and in vivo (in both animal and human
tissue).”); Moorman Rep. at 34 (“Animal studies also confirm that talc causes
inflammation, as experiments in rats treated with intra-vaginal or perineal talc
showed inflammatory changes in the genital tract.”).) But even in the context of
neoplasm, contrary to Defendants’ interpretation, Keskin 2009 itself cautions against
drawing 	firm 	conclusions 	regarding 	neoplastic 	effects, 	expressly 	calling 	for
additional experimental and clinical studies and noting that prior research has
supported neoplastic effects, particularly in ovarian tissue. (See Keskin 2009 at 927.)
Defendants’ interpretation of the study’s 	limited findings therefore does not
65 	Neither the parties nor their experts clearly define what “neoplastic transformation” entails.
Defendants briefly equate it to “the development of tumor-like properties.” (See Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 44.)
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meaningfully call into question Plaintiffs’ experts’ use of the study for purposes of
assessing inflammation. Moreover, under Rule 702, any alleged failure to emphasize
a study’s limitations bears on weight, not admissibility. See In re Scrap Metal
Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Quiet Tech. DC–8, Inc. v.
Hurel–Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Defendants also challenge these experts’ reliance on experiments conducted
by the National Toxicology Program (“NTP”),66 which they contend are unreliable,
and consequently, lack relevance to the experts’ opinions. (See id. at 30.) I disagree
in part. NTP 1993 evaluated the chronic inhalation toxicology and carcinogenic
potential of non-asbestiform cosmetic-grade talc in mice and rats. (See generally
NTP 1993.) To do so, the authors exposed male and female rats and mice to
aerosolized, asbestos-free talc at target concentrations for a set period. (Id.) In rats,
chronic granulomatous inflammation was nearly universal in exposed groups. (See
id. at 7.) In mice, chronic active inflammation with macrophage accumulation was
similarly observed, though no evidence of carcinogenic activity was observed. (See
id.)
Several Plaintiffs’ experts cite the study—alongside other literature—for the
limited proposition that talc exposure can elicit inflammatory responses. (See, e.g.,
66 	National Toxicology Program, Toxicology and Carcinogenesis Studies of Talc (CAS No.
14807-96-6) in F344/N Rats and B6C3F1 Mice (Inhalation Studies), U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Serv., 421 (1993).
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Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Talcum powder causes inflammation/oxidative stress,
both in vitro and in vivo (in both animal and human tissues).” (citing, inter alia, NTP
1993); Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 6 (“Talcum powder is known to elicit an
inflammatory response in animals and humans.”) (citing, inter alia, NTP 1993);
Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Additional studies have also shown the effects of talc
on the immune responses.”) (citing, inter alia, NTP 1993).) This is an accurate
characterization of NTP 1993’s findings and is properly relied upon by Plaintiffs’
experts for the propositions that it asserts.
Other experts, including Dr. Plunkett, reference NTP 1993 more generally in
discussing talc toxicity and carcinogenic potential, while expressly acknowledging
its limitations and the reported absence of ovarian tumors, which they explain is
unsurprising given the inhalation exposure route and species-specific anatomical
differences. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 44–45.) Dr. McTiernan, however,
takes a different approach by extrapolating from NTP 1993 opinions that are too
attenuated and go beyond the bounds drawn by the authors themselves. Dr.
McTiernan asserts that NTP 1993 is “highly relevant to the role of talc in
carcinogenesis” because, among other things, it 	provides 	“important 	‘signal’
information of talc toxicity relevant to talc and ovarian cancer.” (See McTiernan 3d
Amend. Rep. at 93–94.) But Dr. McTiernan makes no mention of the experiments’
shortcomings as they relate to evidence of the association between talc and ovarian
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cancer risk: that NTP 1993’s primary tumor signals were confined to the lungs of
female 	rats; 	that 	NTP 	1993’s 	conclusions 	of 	carcinogenic 	activity 	relate 	to
respiratory tract outcomes under conditions of chronic inhalation, not genital or
peritoneal exposure; and that NTP 1993’s recitation of migratory studies found no
evidence of talc reaching the ovaries in relevant translocation testing. (See generally
NTP 1993.)
Simply put, NTP 1993 does not support the association between talc and
ovarian cancer risk because its design, findings, and ancillary data do not implicate
the ovary or perineal exposure in carcinogenesis. Therefore, to the extent that any
expert intends to use NTP 1993 to support the association between talcum powder
and ovarian carcinogenesis, they may not do so. To be clear, this is not to say that
NTP 1993 may not be relied upon to support the general proposition of an
association between talc use and inflammation or talc toxicity and carcinogenic
potential, or that such reliance by experts undermines the reliability of their
methodology or its application to this case.
Importantly, several Plaintiffs’ experts expressly address the criticisms that
have been leveled at NTP 1993, including challenges to its design and conclusions,
but explain why the study nonetheless provides relevant toxicological information
regarding talc-induced inflammation. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 43–45
(acknowledging that NTP 1993 “has been criticized and conclusions reached by the
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original authors have been questioned,” yet concludes “even with its limitations, the
study provides important information on talc toxicity that is relevant to assessing the
risks of cancer in humans”); Carson Rep. at 7 (“There are a limited number of animal
studies suggesting that this transport does not occur.” (citing NTP 1993).) That
acknowledgment and contextualization of the study’s limitations supports, rather
than undermines, the reliability of the experts’ methodologies. Plaintiffs’ experts
reasonably and adequately extrapolated NTP 1993’s conclusion to support their
opinion on inflammation.
In sum, I find that although NTP 1993 did not—and was not designed to—
evaluate ovarian carcinogenesis, it remains relevant to the broader question of talc
toxicity and inflammatory response. Under Rule 702, objections grounded in alleged
flaws or limitations of a study generally go to weight, not admissibility. See Karlo
v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 81–83 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The question
of whether a study’s results were properly calculated or interpreted ordinarily goes
to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility.”). Accordingly, I find that
Defendants’ criticisms of NTP 1993 do not warrant exclusion of the experts’
opinions that rely on it for the limited purposes outlined above.
Finally, it bears emphasizing that the experts who rely on or reference Keskin
2009 and NTP 1993 do so in conjunction with a broader body of evidence, including
other animal studies, epidemiologic studies, case reports, literature reviews, and in
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vitro research. Plaintiffs’ experts marshal this collective evidence to support their
view that talcum powder is consistently associated with chronic inflammatory
responses. 	Under 	the 	commonly 	employed 	totality-of-the-evidence 	approach,
Plaintiffs’ experts use animal studies as one component of their analysis, but do not
rely on them in isolation to support their biological plausibility opinions. (See, e.g.,
Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 55 (“The animal cancer data, when considered in
conjunction with the cellular data, indicate that talc is a carcinogen and there likely
is a dose-response threshold for tumor development in rodents. There are several
human studies that provide evidence of a dose-response relationship for talc
exposure and ovarian cancer in women.” (citations omitted)); Moorman Rep. at 9
(“Evidence from epidemiological investigations is combined with relevant studies
from other disciplines, including pathology, animal and mechanistic studies, to make
an assessment of the evidence for a causal association between genital exposure to
talcum powder and ovarian cancer.”).)
Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on pleurodesis is
misplaced because pleurodesis involves administering large amounts of talc to
intentionally invoke an acute inflammatory response that is not analogous to the
alleged chronic mechanism; other agents besides talc can cause the same effect; and
long-term data show no increased rates of cancer following pleurodesis. (See Defs.’
2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 30–31.) Despite similarly structured arguments
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elsewhere in Defendants’ motion, Defendants do not, however, argue against the
applicability 	of 	pleurodesis 	to 	biological 	plausibility 	of 	talc 	exposure 	and
inflammation based on anatomical differences between pulmonary tissue and
ovarian tissue. (See id.)
Plaintiffs’ experts’ references to pleurodesis do not undermine the reliability
of their methodologies or the application of their methodologies to this case. Dr.
Plunkett explained that while talc pleurodesis involves lung-related cells, it is
nonetheless a clinical procedure that intentionally uses talc to provoke an acute
inflammatory response albeit to scar and fuse pleural67 layers, thereby treating
pleural effusions. (See Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 52–53; see also Moorman Rep.
at 33–34 (“[T]alc pleurodesis [is] a treatment for malignant pleura effusions or
pneumothorax that involves instillation of talc into the pleural space.”).) However,
Dr. Plunkett emphasized that this pleurodesis inflammation is acute rather than
chronic, the latter of which she notes is typically the type of inflammation linked to
carcinogenesis, with no regard to origin of site. (Id. at 53.) Dr. Plunkett further noted
that the severity of inflammatory effects in pleurodesis depends on particle size,
citing data that small-particle talc, i.e., approximately 50% less than 10 μm, is
67 	The pleural space is the thin, fluid-filled gap between the two layers of the pleura
(membranes) that surround the lungs. (See Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 52–53; Moorman Rep. at
33–34.)
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associated with worse inflammatory outcomes and recalling that consumer talc
powders generally contain mostly small-particle talc, i.e., less than 10 μm. (Id.)
Likewise, Dr. McTiernan cites clinical and experimental work showing that
talc pleurodesis elicits both local and systemic inflammatory responses. (See
McTiernan 3d Rep. at 90–91.) Dr. McTiernan uses this data to support a mechanistic
pathway in which talc-induced inflammation promotes cellular proliferation and
other tumorigenic processes. (See id.) Along the same line, Dr. Moorman invokes
talc pleurodesis as evidence that talc causes inflammation and fibrosis. (See
Moorman 	Rep. 	at 	33–34.) 	The 	doctor 	explains 	that 	pleurodesis 	results 	in
inflammation and fibrotic adhesion of pleural layers, and, coupled with additional
evidence like pulmonary talcosis, talc exposure can drive inflammatory processes
that fit within recognized cancer biology frameworks involving inflammation. (See
id.) According to Dr. Moorman, talc pleurodesis is just one line in “several lines of
evidence” establishing that “talc can cause inflammation.” (Id.)
Furthermore, the experts cited to Elena Arellano-Orden et al., Small Particle-
Sized Talc Is Associated with Poor Outcome and Increased Inflammation in
Thoracoscopic Pleurodesis, 86 Respiration 201–09 (2013) (“Arellano-Orden 2013”)
to document the inflammatory biology of talc pleurodesis and particle-size gradient
in responses, which they used as a part of the mechanistic evidence that talc induces
inflammation in human tissue. By studying 227 consecutive malignant pleura
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effusion patients undergoing thoracoscopic talc pleurodesis and observing, among
other things, inflammatory responses with small-particle talc, Arellano‑Orden 2013
provided human clinical and mechanistic evidence that talc pleurodesis causes
pleural and systemic inflammatory response.
Having reviewed these opinions, I find that the experts’ discussion of
pleurodesis as evidence that talc can induce inflammation does not warrant exclusion
under Rule 702. At the outset, the experts’ reliance on pleurodesis-related literature
is sufficiently reliable because it is grounded in studies that Plaintiffs’ experts
accurately characterize. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 52 (citing Arellano-
Orden 2013); McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 90–91 (citing Arellano-Orden 2013).)
Notably, 	Defendants 	do 	not 	contend 	that 	these 	studies 	are 	misdescribed 	or
inaccurately reported.
Defendants’ argument that the pleurodesis studies demonstrate only acute,
rather than chronic, inflammation likewise misses the mark at this stage of the
analysis. Plaintiffs’ experts rely on pleurodesis-related studies to support the limited
proposition that talc can provoke a cellular inflammatory response, albeit in
pulmonary tissue. Whether that inflammatory response progresses to chronic
inflammation, and whether such inflammation can in turn contribute to ovarian
carcinogenesis, implicates subsequent steps in the causal chain that are addressed
elsewhere in this section. Importantly, Plaintiffs’ experts do not rely on pleurodesis
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studies alone to support those later steps, nor can they, but instead draw on additional
bodies of evidence to do so.
Next, Defendants 	challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ use of 	in 	vitro 	studies
generally 	because 	they 	purportedly 	fail 	to 	provide 	“good 	grounds” 	for
“extrapolating” from them. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 31–32.) I
disagree.
As a preliminary matter, “in vitro tests provide useful information about
metabolic processes at a cellular level, and may supplement existing animal and
human data.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (quoting Bourne ex
rel. Bourne v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 482, 496 (S.D.
W. Va. 2002)). While “in vitro evidence alone cannot serve as a basis for a general
causation opinion,” In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1310, it still can bolster
“predict[ions] of causation in humans” if consistent and supportive data exists from
human epidemiologic studies, 	In re Zoloft, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 464. Notably,
Defendants identify no portion of my prior Opinion that misstates or misapplies the
role of in vitro studies in supporting general causation or biological plausibility
opinions.
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Rather, Defendants point to several in vitro studies that they contend undercut
the 	experts’ 	opinions 	that 	talc 	causes 	chronic 	inflammation.68 	Specifically,
Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on Fletcher 2019 and Shukla 2009
to support the proposition that talc exposure causes oxidative stress, which in turn
increases the risk of ovarian cancer development. (See id. at 32–35 (citing Levy 2d
Amend. Rep. at 16; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 91; Singh Supp. Rep. at 15;
Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 14–15; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16).)
The authors of Fletcher 2019, which include Dr. Saed, aimed to determine
whether and how talcum powder can induce cellular and molecular changes that
would mechanistically support an association between genital talc use and increased
risk of epithelial ovarian cancer, by testing talc’s effects on oxidative stress
pathways, inflammatory markers, cell proliferation, apoptosis, and selected gene
variants in normal and ovarian cancer cell models. (See generally Fletcher 2019.)
Fletcher 2019 was built on a similar group of authors’ earlier work—a series of in
vitro and molecular studies from Dr. Saed’s laboratory. (See generally id.; see also
Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 48; Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 32.)
68 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 32–36 (citing Nicole M. Fletcher et al.,
Molecular Basis Supporting the Association of Talcum Powder Use with Increased Risk of Ovarian
Cancer, 26 Reprod. Sci. (12), 1603–1612 (2019) (“Fletcher 2019”); Arti Shukla et al., Alterations
in Gene Expression in Human Mesothelial Cells Correlate with Mineral Pathogenicity, 41 Am. J.
of Respiratory Cellular Molecular Biology (1), 114–23 (2009) (“Shukla 2009”)).)
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Notably, it does not appear that Fletcher 2019 is precisely the same study by
Dr. Saed that my prior Opinion previously examined. See In re Johnson & Johnson,
509 F. Supp. 3d at 133–47. However, Defendants lodge many of the same criticisms
against 	Fletcher 	2019 	as 	they 	did 	against 	Dr. 	Saed’s 	previously 	examined
experiments. 	Therefore, 	I 	infer 	methodological 	similarities 	between 	the 	two
experiments.
Fletcher 2019 used in vitro experiments exposing multiple human cell lines—
normal cells human macrophages, human primary normal ovarian epithelial cells,
immortalized human ovarian epithelial cells, immortalized human fallopian tube
secretory epithelial cells, and ovarian cancer cells—to Johnson & Johnson talcum
baby powder, at 5, 20, or 100 μg/mL doses for up to 72 hours to assess, among other
things, dose-response effects. (See Fletcher 2019 at 2.) Experiments were run in
triplicate under standard culture conditions per manufacturer protocols. (See id. at 2,
4–5.) The authors quantified, among other things, mRNA and protein/activity for
key 	antioxidant 	enzymes 	and 	pro-oxidant/inflammatory 	markers,
inflammation/tumor 	marker 	CA-125 	for 	inflammation, 	and 	assessed 	cell
proliferation and measured apoptosis. (See generally Fletcher 2019.) Fletcher 2019
reported that talc exposure drove a shift toward oxidative stress and inflammation
across normal ovarian, normal fallopian, and ovarian cancer cells. (See id. at 3–5.)
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As discussed below, Drs. Levy, McTiernan, Singh, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf
cite Fletcher 2019, among other studies, for the proposition that talc causes oxidative
stress. Defendants first challenge the credibility of Fletcher 2019’s reported data as
it relates to that conclusion. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 33–34.)
In doing so, Defendants largely repeat arguments that were previously raised and
addressed in my prior Opinion. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at
144–47 & n.21. For example, Defendants point to alleged irregularities in laboratory
records, 	asserting 	that 	“portions 	of 	the 	lab 	notebook 	are 	whited 	out 	with
contradictory information written over, and basic mathematical calculations (like
averages) are done incorrectly.” (Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 33.)
Defendants also contend that the reported treatment time is inconsistent, noting that
“the treatment time is reported as 48 hours, which is consistent with Dr. Saed’s initial
and rejected manuscript, but inconsistent with [Fletcher (2019)], which claimed 72
hours of treatment.” (Id.) As Defendants acknowledge, however, I previously
considered these same criticisms and concluded that they “do not fundamentally
undermine the methodologies Dr. Saed utilized when conducting” the experiments.
See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 144–46. Here, as before,
Defendants do not identify how Dr. Saed’s experimental methodology fails to satisfy
Rule 702, either as it existed at the time of my prior ruling or as clarified by the 2023
amendments. At bottom, Defendants’ arguments amount to a renewed request for
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reconsideration of issues already decided. Consistent with my prior ruling, without
repeating those discussions, I again find no basis to conclude that the credibility
concerns 	raised 	by 	Defendants 	render Dr. 	Saed’s 	experimental 	methodology
unreliable. Rather, these criticisms bear on the weight to be afforded to the study and
the conclusions drawn from it, not on the admissibility of the opinions under Rule
702.
Defendants also make passing reference to potential bias concerns underlying
the propriety of Fletcher 2019. Fletcher 2019 disclosed that Dr. Saed served as a paid
consultant and expert witness in talcum powder litigation, though the article stated
that the authors received no financial support “for the research, authorship, and/or
publication of” the article. (See Fletcher 2019 at 9.) Defendants disagree, arguing
that the article “incorrectly states that ‘[t]he author(s) received no financial support’
for it.” (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at n.64.) On that statement alone,
without more particular information, I am unable to assess the potential impropriety
of Fletcher 2019 or confirm that the authors were otherwise financially influenced,
other than Defendants’ say-so. However, this is not to say Defendants may not fully
explore this issue further at trial. And in any event, it “is well-established that an
expert’s bias is not a proper basis to bar testimony under Daubert.” Cage v. City of
Chicago, 979 F. Supp. 2d 787, 827 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (collecting cases).
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Next, Defendants mount a merit-based challenge to Fletcher 2019 and the
opinions derived from it, contending that the study fails to use or establish any
physiologically relevant dose and rests on a mischaracterization of oxidative stress.
To begin, I note that Drs. Levy, McTiernan, Singh, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf cite
Fletcher 2019, among other studies, for the proposition that talc causes oxidative
stress. (See, e.g., Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Talcum powder exposure to normal
and epithelial ovarian cancer cells resulted in an increased pro-oxidant state as
evidenced by observing increased levels of CA-125, caspase-3, nitrate/nitrite, and
key redox enzymes.”); Singh Supp. Rep. at 15 (“Talc showed an increase in
inflammation as shown by a significant increase in CA-125 (P<0.05).”); Smith-
Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 14–15 (“Talc exposure also resulted in a significant
increase in inflammation as determined by increased tumor marker CA-125 (P <
.05).”); Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16 (“Talcum powder causes inflammation/oxidative
stress both in vitro and in vivo (in both animal and human tissues).”).) Several other
Plaintiffs’ experts articulate the association between talcum use, oxidative stress,
and the increased risk of ovarian cancer development, based on Fletcher 2019. (See,
e.g., McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 91 (“This study supports the role of talc in
inducing oxidative stress, providing a molecular basis for epidemiologic studies
demonstrating an increased risk of ovarian cancer with perineal talcum powder
product exposure.”); Singh Supp. Rep. at 15 (“Fletcher [2019] . . . demonstrated that
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talc induces changes in key redox enzymes and enhances the prooxidant state in
normal and EOC cells. This confirms the cellular effect of talc and provide a
molecular mechanism linking genital use to increased ovarian cancer risk through
oxidative stress and inflammation.” (citation omitted)); Smith-Bindman 3d Amend.
Rep. at 15 (“These findings confirm the cellular effect of talc and provide a
molecular mechanism to previous reports linking genital use to increased ovarian
cancer risk.”).)
Having reviewed these opinions, I do not find that Defendants’ substantive
challenges warrant exclusion of Plaintiffs’ experts or those of their opinions
grounded 	in 	Fletcher 	2019. 	My 	prior 	Opinion 	already 	rejected 	Defendants’
contention that Dr. Saed’s laboratory experiment, upon which Fletcher 2019 is
ostensibly based, is inapplicable because it did not use a “physiologically relevant
dose.” As explained at length, the absence of such a dose does not diminish the
study’s value, as the study did not purport to establish definitive causation. See In re
Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 143. Defendants offer nothing new to this
argument, and I do not find a basis to revisit that reasoning under Rule 702 as
amended or newly proffered evidence.
Defendants also contend that Fletcher 2019 did not, in fact, find oxidative
stress. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 34–35.) That argument rests
on an overly narrow characterization of the study’s findings. Fletcher 2019 reports
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mechanistic evidence demonstrating pro-inflammatory and pro-oxidant effects of
talc exposure across multiple human cell types. (See Fletcher 2019 at 1 (finding “that
talc induces significant changes in key redox enzymes and enhances the prooxidant
state in normal and [epithelial ovarian cancer] cells”).) Although Defendants argue
that the study reflects changes in indirect markers rather than direct measurement of
oxidative stress, Fletcher 2019 itself characterizes the observed redox alterations as
evidence of an induced pro-oxidant state. Disagreement over whether those findings
should be labeled “oxidative stress,” or overstate the strength of the inference drawn
from 	the 	reported 	biomarkers, 	goes 	to 	the 	interpretation 	and 	weight 	of 	the
evidence—not to whether Plaintiffs’ experts have mischaracterized the study or
relied on it in a methodologically unreliable manner under Rule 702. Rather, the
experts have reasonably extrapolated Fletcher 2019 for its intended purpose. See In
re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 744 (Plaintiffs’ experts “do not have to demonstrate to the judge
by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their experts are correct,
they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions
are reliable. . . . The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits
standard of correctness.”).
Similarly, the experts’ reliance on Shukla 2009 does not render their opinions
unreliable or inadmissible under Rule 702. Defendants argue that Shukla 2009 does
not support Plaintiffs’ experts’ inflammation theories because it observed significant
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gene-expression changes and greater toxicity in human mesothelial cells, not human
ovarian cells. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 35.)
Shukla 2009 investigated whether exposure to different mineral particles—
including asbestos and nonfibrous talc—induces inflammatory and oxidative-stress–
related molecular responses in human mesothelial cells and human ovarian surface
epithelial 	cells. 	Using 	surface-area-matched 	dosing 	and 	genome-wide 	gene-
expression profiling, the authors found that asbestos produced the most extensive
and 	robust 	transcriptional 	changes, particularly 	in 	mesothelial 	cells, strongly
activating genes associated with inflammation, oxidative stress, cytokine signaling,
and cellular stress responses. (Shukla 2009 at 118–19.) Importantly, nonfibrous talc
also induced measurable gene-expression changes at higher exposures, including
upregulation of inflammatory and oxidative-stress–related genes such as ATF3, IL-
8, PTGS2 (COX-2), and SOD2, demonstrating that talc is not biologically inert
under experimental conditions. (See id. at 118, 121.) As to the human ovarian surface
epithelial cells, which were tested under the same conditions, the authors observed
no meaningful change at the lower dose but observed mRNA levels increase at a
higher dose in two genes—NR4A2 and CXCL2 or MIP2—at eight hours and further
increase in expression of 16 genes at 24 hours. (See id. at 118.)
The authors concluded that mineral pathogenicity correlates with the ability
to trigger early inflammatory and oxidative molecular events, even in the absence of
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neoplastic transformation. 	(Id. 	at 	121–22.) 	Although 	talc’s 	effects 	were 	less
pronounced than those of asbestos, the study identified overlapping stress-response
and cytokine-regulatory pathways that are widely recognized as contributors to
chronic inflammation and carcinogenic processes. (Id. at 121.) Critically, the authors
emphasized that these findings reflect early mechanistic cellular responses, not proof
of cancer causation, and are therefore relevant to assessing biological plausibility
rather than establishing tumorigenesis. (Id. at 121–22.) As such, the study concludes
talc exposure can induce pro-inflammatory and pro-oxidant cellular states that may
be relevant to disease development when considered alongside other lines of
evidence.
Drs. Plunkett, McTiernan, and Clarke-Pearson, among others, cite and discuss
Shukla 2009 to support the mechanistic plausibility that talc can trigger biological
responses—particularly oxidative stress and inflammation—in cell types relevant to
this litigation. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 45–46; McTiernan 3d Amend.
Rep. at 92; Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 6.) Dr. Clarke-Pearson, for example,
specifically found Shukla 2009 supportive of the association between talcum powder
and inflammation because it demonstrated that “non-fibrous (platy) talc caused
expression of genes in ovarian epithelial cells producing inflammatory cytokines.”
(See Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 6.) Dr. Plunkett similarly relied upon Shukla
2009 to illustrate, among other things, that asbestos elicits stronger adverse response
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than nonfibrous talc under the reported in vitro conditions. (See Plunkett 3d Amend.
Rep. at 45–46.) However, Dr. Plunkett noted that the study “did reveal statistically
significant increases in ATF3 and IL8 expression by asbestos and non-fibrous talc
at certain conditions,” and “that some of the genes affected [by asbestos and talc]
are involved in cellular processes that relate to oxidative stress and inflammation.”
(Id. at 46.)
Based on these opinions, I do not find that these experts’ conclusions exceed
those espoused in Shukla 2009, particularly since Shukla 2009 demonstrated adverse
cellular changes following talc and asbestos exposure.69 See In re Accutane, 511 F.
Supp. 2d at 1291 (“When an expert relies on the studies of others, he must not exceed
the limitations the authors themselves place on the study. That is, he must not draw
overreaching conclusions.”) (citing McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233,
1245–1247 (11th Cir. 2005)).
It 	also 	bears 	repeating 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts’ 	opinions 	regarding 	the
association between talc use and inflammation is supported by other animal studies,
in vitro studies, and clinical data, and not solely Shukla 2009 or Fletcher 2019. (See,
e.g., 	Arellano-Orden 	2013 	(showing 	post-talc 	increases 	in 	pro-inflammatory
69 	Plaintiffs’ experts also discuss and distinguish the study’s limitations. For example, Dr.
Plunkett addresses the lesser effects of talc exposure on ovarian cell gene expression by
commenting that the authors “failed to test talc with the same rigor that asbestos was tested in their
study, limiting the data collected on talc itself.” (See Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 46; see also id.
(“[H]owever, testing of only two doses of asbestos limit the conclusions that can be drawn about
differences between cells.”).)
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cytokines from talc pleurodesis patients); Britton Trabert et al., Pre-Diagnostic
Serum Levels of Inflammation Markers and Risk of Ovarian Cancer in the Prostate,
Lung, Colorectal and Ovarian Cancer (PLCO) Screening Trial, 135 Gynecologic
Oncology 	(2), 	297–304 	(2014) 	(“Trabert 	2014”) 	(linking 	higher 	systemic
inflammatory markers to increased ovarian cancer risk); see also Eduardo Henrique
Genofre, et al., Inflammation and Clinical Repercussions of Pleurodesis Induced
Intrapleural Talc Administration, 62 Clinics (San Paolo) (5), 627–34 (2007).)
(2) 	Chronic inflammation and ovarian cancer
Next, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ experts cannot reliably connect chronic
inflammation to ovarian carcinogenesis because their evidence is non-probative,
inconsistent, and/or misinterpreted. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at
36–41.) Defendants cite several different categories of studies and contend that the
experts 	ignored 	the 	underlying 	data, 	where 	applicable, 	and 	that 	the 	studies
themselves do not support Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions. (See id.) I disagree.
At the outset, I note again that Plaintiffs’ experts do not confine their
biological plausibility opinions to the challenged classes of studies. Rather, they
draw on a broader and more diverse evidentiary base. Even within the specific
categories Defendants target, Plaintiffs’ experts rely on multiple studies beyond
those singled out for criticism. And the very studies Defendants attack substantively
support the limited propositions for which Plaintiffs’ experts cite them.
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To start, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ experts improperly rely on so-
called “review articles” that synthesize existing literature rather than generate new
primary data, and that the experts therefore fail to independently analyze the
underlying studies. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 37 (citing Fran
Balkwill & Alberto Mantovani, Inflammation and Cancer: Back to Virchow?, 357
Lancet (9255), 539–545 (2001) (“Balkwill & Mantovani 2001”); Roberta B. Ness &
Carrie Cottreau, Possible Role of Ovarian Epithelial Inflammation in Ovarian
Cancer, 91 J. of the Nat’l Cancer Inst. (17), 1459–1467 (1999) (“Ness & Cottreau
1999”)).) That argument, however, warrants careful contextualization. Defendants
do not challenge Ness & Cottreau 1999 or Balkwill & Mantovani 2001 on the
substance of the scientific propositions for which they are cited. Instead, Defendants’
objection is directed solely to the fact that these publications are classified as “review
articles.” At its core, these so-called “review articles” are peer-reviewed, published,
and widely cited articles that discuss the works of other experts that have also been
peer-reviewed and published. As Daubert notes, “an expert is permitted wide
latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge
or observation.” 509 U.S. at 592.
Aside from the fact that these studies conducted reviews of other literature,
Plaintiffs’ experts rely on these sources for scientific propositions regarding the role
of inflammation in carcinogenesis. (See, e.g., Carson Rep. at 6; Clarke-Pearson 3d
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Amend. Rep. at 5; Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 11; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 15.) For
example, citing to the subject review articles, Dr. Wolf writes that “[i]nflammation
resulting from talcum powder use has been proposed as a potential mechanism for
the association with [epithelial cancers].” (Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 15 (citing, e.g.,
Ness & Cottreau 1999 and Balkwill & Mantovani 2001).) Dr. Singh opines that
“[i]nflammation has long been understood to be an important mechanism underlying
the development of ovarian cancer.” (Singh Rep. at 58 (citing Ness & Cottreau
1999); see also Kane Rep. at 10 (discussing Ness & Cottreau 1999 and its reporting
of inflammation of ovarian epithelium as a risk factor for ovarian cancer).) Dr.
Smith-Bindman 	also 	asserts 	that 	“[c]hronic 	inflammation, 	and 	even 	subtle,
subclinical inflammation, is associated with an increased risk of cancer.” (Smith-
Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 10 (citing, e.g., Balkwill & Mantovani 2001).)
Indeed, both Ness & Cottreau 1999 and Balkwill & Mantovani 2001
sufficiently support the scientific propositions for which they are used. Ness &
Cottreau 1999, entitled “Possible Role of Ovarian Epithelial Inflammation in
Ovarian Cancer,” synthesizes decades of epidemiologic and biological research to
advance 	the 	hypothesis 	that 	inflammation 	plays 	a 	central 	role 	in 	ovarian
carcinogenesis, while Balkwill & Mantovani 2001 revisits a hypothesis first
articulated in the nineteenth century by surveying extensive experimental and
clinical 	evidence 	linking 	inflammation 	to 	tumor 	initiation, 	promotion, 	and
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metastasis. Notably, this article documents that numerous chronic inflammatory
conditions are associated with increased cancer incidence and estimates that
approximately fifteen percent of cancers worldwide are attributable to chronic
infection and inflammation. (See generally Balkwill & Mantovani 2001.) Although
Defendants claim that Balkwill & Mantovani 2001 “is not focused on ovarian
cancer,” (see Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 37), the article expressly
identifies ovarian cancer as associated with inflammatory cofactors and details
ovarian-specific evidence. (See Balkwill & Mantovani 2001 at 539–40.)
Under 	Rule 	702, 	reliance 	on 	peer-reviewed 	synthesis 	literature 	to
contextualize and integrate primary findings is not methodologically improper,
particularly where, as here, the propositions drawn from those sources are well
supported by decades of scientific research and are not meaningfully disputed.
Plaintiffs’ experts accurately characterize these review articles, employ them for
limited and appropriate purposes, and situate them within a broader evidentiary
record that includes epidemiologic, mechanistic, and experimental studies—many
of which Defendants do not challenge. Accordingly, Defendants’ objection to the
experts’ use of these review articles does not undermine the reliability of their
methodologies or warrant exclusion.
Defendants next challenge “original research” that Plaintiffs’ experts relied
on 	to 	demonstrate 	an 	association 	between 	chronic 	inflammation 	and
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carcinogenicity.70 Defendants primarily highlight three studies— Buz’Zard 2007,
Trabert 2014, and Phung 2022—that they argue fail to provide a reliable basis for
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 37–40.)
Defendants contend that Buz’Zard 2007 undermines Plaintiffs’ experts’ causation
theories by showing decreases in indications of oxidative stress, cell proliferation,
and soft agar growth with talc exposure. (See id. at 37–38.) Defendants point out that
Trabert 2014 reports only weak biomarker associations that likely reflect chance
findings or reverse causation and do not withstand statistical correction. (See id. at
38–39.) Defendants go on to say that Phung 2022 does not support Plaintiffs’
experts’ inflammation-based mechanism because the study found no statistically
significant interaction between genital talc use and endometriosis. (See id. at 39–40.)
According to Defendants, these three studies fail to provide a reliable basis for
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions.
I will analyze each of the studies in turn within the context of the parties’
arguments. Buz’Zard 2007 tested whether talc exposure can induce pro-carcinogenic
changes in two human ovarian cell lines and whether Pycnogenol can mitigate those
changes. (See generally Buz’Zard 2007.) The authors exposed immortalized normal
70 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 37–39 (citing Amber R. Buz’Zard et al.,
Pycnogenol® Reduces Talc-Induced Neoplastic Transformation in Human Ovarian Cell Cultures,
21 Phytother. Res. 579–86 (2007) (“Buz’Zard 2007”); Trabert 2014; Minh Tung Phung et al.,
Effects of Risk Factors for Ovarian Cancer in Women With and Without Endometriosis, 118 Fertil.
& Steril. (5), 960–69 (2023) (“Phung 2022”)).)
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ovarian epithelial and immortalized normal ovarian granulosa cell lines to talc, or
pretreated with Pycnogenol and then talc, across different concentrations and timing
to assess cell viability, soft-agar growth as an in vitro transformation assay, and
reactive oxygen species generation. (See id.) The authors found that talc caused an
initial increase in cell viability of immortalized normal ovarian epithelial cells at 5
μg/mL at 24 hours, but a decrease at 200 μg/mL at 24 hours and 500 μg/mL at both
24 and 72 hours. (See id. at 580.) The authors also reported that talc caused an initial
increase in cell viability of immortalized normal ovarian granulosa at 5, 20, 50 and
100 μg/mL over 72 hours but decreased at 500 μg/mL over 24 hours. (See id. at 581.)
For soft-agar growth, the authors observed an increase in the number of transformed
colonies following talc exposure to immortalized normal ovarian epithelial cells at
5 and 20 μg/mL, and an increase in the same following talc exposure to immortalized
normal ovarian granulosa at 5, 20, and 100 μg/mL. (See id.) The authors noted an
“exception” to these results in 100 μg/mL talc treatment in immortalized normal
ovarian epithelial cells, which caused a significant reduction in the number of
transformed colonies. (See id.) Finally, the authors observed initial dose-dependent
decreases in reactive oxygen species in both cell lines but a subsequent rising at
different times under different doses. (See id. at 582.) Specifically, they observed
that talc caused an initial dose-dependent decrease at 24 hours for both human
ovarian cell lines, but an increase was observed at 20 μg/mL at 72 hours and 120
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hours, respectively, and 50 μg/mL at 120 hours, in immortalized normal ovarian
epithelial cells. (See id. at 582.) Similarly, the authors observed reactive oxygen
species increased at .5, 20, and 50 μg/mL at 72 hours and 120 hours, and at 5 and
100 μg/mL at 120 hours. (See id.)
In simpler terms, Buz’Zard 2007 demonstrates a positive correlation between
talc exposure to two human ovarian cell lines and increases in reactive oxygen
species generation over a longer period and greater dose. (See id. at 582.) 	The
authors opine, with scientific support, that reactive oxygen species “at high
concentrations or expressed in a chronic nature can damage cellular macromolecules
and contribute to neoplastic transformation and cell growth.” (Id. at 584.) Therefore,
the authors concluded, among other things, that talc may increase the likelihood of
ovarian cancer by causing abnormal reactive oxygen species—a by-product of
inflammation—and that Pycnogenol can blunt this effect in laboratory experiments.
(See Buz’Zard 2007 at 584, 586.) Furthermore, Buz’Zard 2007 shows a similarly
positive 	correlation 	between 	talc 	exposure 	and 	soft-agar 	growth 	and 	cell
proliferation, but only up to a certain point. (See id. at 581–82.)
Defendants contend that the paper does not reliably support Plaintiffs’
mechanism opinions because, among other things, in immortalized ovarian epithelial
cells, reactive oxygen species generally decreased with talc and cell proliferation
decreased at the highest dose. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 37–38
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(asserting that “almost every talc treatment in immortalized ovarian cells decreased
[reactive oxygen species] levels,” and noting that “[c]ell proliferation decreased at
the highest dose of talc treatment” (emphasis omitted).)71
First, Defendants selectively cite data from Buz’Zard 2007 for their argument
that the study does not support Plaintiffs’ position. Defendants emphasize that “talc
treatment in immortalized ovarian cells decreased” reactive oxygen species levels
but omit that this decrease was only observed at the lowest exposure amount of talc
and at the shortest exposure time. (Compare Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br.
at 38, with Buz’Zard 2007 at 582.) While Defendants focus on this early data point,
Plaintiffs 	focus 	on 	the time-course 	and 	overall 	pattern 	of the 	study, 	which
demonstrates a positive correlation between talc dose, time, and reactive oxygen
species generation. Similarly, Defendants highlight that cell proliferation “also
decreased at the highest dose of talc treatment” but fail to mention the increase in
cell viability observed at a lower dose. (Compare Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility
Br. at 38, with Buz’Zard 2007 at 582.)
Relatedly, Defendants ignore the practical significance of Buz’Zard 2007’s
findings of increased reactive oxygen species generation within the context of the
71 	Plaintiffs acknowledge this but argue that Defendants ignore findings that align with
Plaintiffs’ proposed mechanism; that the study shows time-dependent reactive oxygen species
increases in normal cells; and that the study reports increased anchorage-dependent growth in both
normal stromal and epithelial ovarian cells. (See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility
Br. at 46–47.)
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case. Plaintiffs here are long-term users of cosmetic talcum powder and not test tube
samples subject to mere hours of exposure. The purpose of Buz’Zard 2007,
according to the authors themselves, was to “investigate talc-induced carcinogenesis
and Pyc-induced chemoprevention.” (Buz’Zard 2007 at 579.) In doing so, the
authors found, among other things, that talc “increased proliferation, induced
neoplastic transformation and increased [reactive oxygen species] generation time-
dependently in the ovarian cells.” (Id.)
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ experts who rely on or refer to Buz’Zard 2007 do so
for the limited purpose of reiterating the study’s authors’ findings. Specifically,
Plaintiffs’ experts, including, without limitation, Drs. Levy, McTiernan, Plunkett,
and Cote, invoke Buz’Zard 2007 to support oxidative stress and transformation
mechanisms, and accurately characterize the study’s favorable results. (See Levy 2d
Amend. Rep. at 16 (“[Buz’Zard 2007] reported an increase in [reactive oxygen
species], increased cell proliferation, and neoplastic transformation (conversion into
cancerous cells) in human ovarian cells treated with talcum powder.”); McTiernan
3d Amend. Rep. at 91 (“Exposing human ovarian stroma; and epithelial cells to talc
resulted in increases reactive oxygen species (oxidative stress), cell proliferation and
neoplastic transformation of cells.”); Cote Amend. Rep. at 14 (“Buz’Zard [2007]
also noted in ovarian cancer cell lines that talc increased production of [reactive
oxygen 	species], 	which 	plays 	a 	role 	in 	the 	modulation 	of 	cell 	survival,
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differentiation, cell signaling, and inflammation-related factor production.”); see
also Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 27–28, 45, 55; Kane Rep. at 10.) These experts do
not extrapolate from the study opinions that the authors’ themselves fail to make. Of
course, Plaintiffs’ experts will have to explain certain of the inconsistent results
highlighted by Defendants, but at their core, Defendants’ challenges are against the
authors’ conclusions, which is an issue of weight and not admissibility.
For similar reasons, Defendants’ argument against Trabert 2014 and Phung
2022 do not undermine the reliability of Plaintiffs’ experts’ methodology or
opinions. Trabert 2014 measured 46 inflammation-related markers in stored blood
from women years before any cancer diagnosis and then asked who later developed
ovarian cancer. (See generally Trabert 2014.) The study found that women with
higher pre-diagnosis levels of markers had greater future ovarian cancer risk, with
two markers remaining associated even five or more years before diagnosis. (See id.)
Defendants argue that only three markers “showed association,” one of which had a
small sample size caution, and that applying stricter standards to account for false
positives would have likely nullified nominal findings, thus, providing for at most
slight evidence for inflammation as a causal pathway. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological
Plausibility Br. at 38–39.) Again, Defendants narrowly interpret Trabert 2014’s
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findings, which strengthen the role of inflammation as a plausible mechanistic
pathway for ovarian cancer despite not involving a measurement of talc exposure.72
Phung 2022 conducted a pooled analysis of nine population-based case-
control studies in the Ovarian Cancer Association Consortium, using standardized
in-person or phone interviews and self-completed questionnaires to collect self-
reported endometriosis and risk factor data from 8,500 cases and 13,592 controls.
(See generally Phung 2022.) The study noted a p-for-interaction73 of 0.65, which
Defendants contend is indicative that the apparent difference in risk of endometriosis
was likely due to chance. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 39–40.) Yet
Phung 2022 concluded, among other things, that “[g]enital talc use was . . . positively
associated with risk for women with and without endometriosis, although its
magnitude seemed to be greater for women with than women without.” (Phung 2022
at 964; see also id. at 961 (same).) Plaintiffs’ experts rely on or refer to Phung 2022
for the proposition set forth by the authors of the study. (See, e.g., Cote Amend. Rep.
72 	Plaintiffs’ experts who reference Buz’Zard 2007 and Trabert 2014 do so not in isolation,
but in further support of their opinions regarding the association between chronic inflammation
and ovarian carcinogenicity. In other words, Plaintiffs’ experts do not rely solely on these studies
for support of the association. (See, e.g., Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 5–6; Kane Rep. at 10–
12; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 45, 50.) Thus, even if Buz’Zard 2007 and Trabert 2014 have little
value in supporting the experts’ biological plausibility opinions, Plaintiffs’ experts rely on other
reliable sources of support for the association between chronic inflammation and carcinogenicity,
as discussed herein.
73 	I take judicial notice that a “p-for-interaction” is an estimated measure used in comparing
three variables that quantifies whether an association between the exposure and outcome variables
is statistically different for different levels of the third variable measured. (See Jillian Cotter et al.,
How to Interact With Interactions: What Clinicians Should Know About Statistical Interactions,
13 Hospital Pediatrics (10), e319, e321 (Oct. 2023).)
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at 17; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 17.) Again, Defendants’ challenge is one to weight,
not admissibility, of the strength that Plaintiffs’ experts attribute to the study.
In sum, the experts’ reliance on these three studies does not warrant the
exclusion of their opinions that chronic inflammation may increase the likelihood of
ovarian cancer. Defendants’ challenges to them are essentially challenges to the
conclusions drawn by the authors’ of the respective studies and not attacks on the
studies’ respective methodologies or the methodologies of Plaintiffs’ experts. The
fact that parties or their experts disagree on how to interpret or apply an otherwise
peer-reviewed and published study does not render that study or the opinions
premised on that study inadmissible, see Karlo, 849 F.3d at 83 (explaining that
challenges to a study’s results or interpretation ordinarily goes to the weight of the
evidence and not the admissibility); Hemmings v. Tidyman’s, 285 F.3d 1174, 1188
(9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]n most cases, objections to the inadequacies of a study are more
appropriately considered an objection going to the weight of the evidence rather than
its admissibility.”); see also Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 01-5302, 2006
WL 3246605, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2006) (“[D]isagreements about the conclusions
to be drawn from a particular test affect the weight of a[n expert] report, not its
admissibility.”), so long as the conclusions drawn therefrom are reliable, supported,
and 	within 	the 	parameters 	drawn 	by 	the 	authors 	themselves, 	see 	In 	re
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Acetaminophen, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 353; In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1351;
McClain, 401 F.3d at 1247.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on anti-inflammatory
drug research is methodologically unreliable because the findings are mixed and
vary across drug classes and durations of use.74 Defendants also contend that the
experts “cherry-pick” favorable results while disregarding contrary data. (Defs.’
2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 40–41.) These arguments are unpersuasive.
Plaintiffs’ experts who reference anti-inflammatory drug research do so for the
limited and appropriate purpose of supporting the broader proposition that chronic
inflammation is implicated in ovarian carcinogenesis—not to establish a uniform or
definitive protective effect for any particular medication. (See, e.g., Wolf 3d Amend.
Rep. at 16.)
Despite 	Defendants’ 	assertions, 	the 	experts 	do 	not 	ignore 	conflicting
evidence. To the contrary, they expressly acknowledge that the literature concerning
anti-inflammatory drugs and cancer risk is mixed and, in some respects, inconsistent.
(See, e.g., Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16; Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 14 (“The earlier
74 	(See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 40–41 (citing Britton Trabert et al., Analgesic
Use and Ovarian Cancer Risk: An Analysis in the Ovarian Cancer Cohort Consortium, 111 J. Nat’l
Cancer Inst. (2), 1–9 (2019) (“Trabert 2019”); Britton Trabert et al., Aspirin, Nonaspirin
Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drug, and Acetaminophen Use and Risk of Invasive Epithelial
Ovarian Cancer: A Pooled Analysis in the Ovarian Cancer Association Consortium, 106 J. Nat’l
Cancer Inst. (2), 1–11 (2014) (“Trabert 2014 II”); Lauren M. Hurwitz et al., Association of
Frequent Aspirin Use with Ovarian Cancer Risk According to Genetic Susceptibility, 6 JAMA
Netw. Open (2), 1–8 (2023) (“Hurwitz 2023”).)
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studies 	focusing 	on 	[nonsteroidal 	anti-inflammatory 	drugs] 	NSAIDs 	were
preliminary and results were somewhat inconsistent.”); Kane Rep. at 12 (recognizing
that 	while 	some 	studies 	suggest 	a 	protective 	effect, 	others 	do 	not).) 	This
acknowledgment 	of 	contradictory 	findings 	undermines, 	rather 	than 	supports,
Defendants’ claim of cherry-picking and reflects a balanced engagement with the
scientific record.
Moreover, the studies Defendants challenge are consistent with the experts’
limited use of this literature. Trabert 2014 II reported an association between regular
aspirin use and reduced ovarian cancer risk, while finding weaker or inconsistent
effects for non-aspirin NSAIDs and acetaminophen. Trabert 2019 similarly observed
a modest reduction in risk associated with daily aspirin use, alongside mixed
findings for long-term use of aspirin and other NSAIDs. More recently, Hurwitz
2023 associated frequent aspirin use with a modestly lower risk of several ovarian
cancer subtypes across varying levels of genetic risk. Taken together, these studies
support—among 	other 	studies 	relied 	upon—the 	experts’ 	conclusion 	that
inflammation plays a role in carcinogenesis, even if the magnitude and consistency
of risk modification vary by drug and usage pattern. Plaintiffs’ experts rely on this
body of literature in a circumscribed and appropriate manner, and their consideration
of mixed results does not render their methodologies unreliable under Rule 702.
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Fourth, Defendants’ seek to exclude those Plaintiffs’ experts who rely on
Harper/Saed 	2023. 	(See 	Defs.’ 	2024 	Biological 	Plausibility 	Br. 	at 	41–45.)
Defendants 	substantively 	challenge 	the 	study’s 	findings 	as 	flawed. 	(See 	id.)
Defendants 	further 	emphasize 	peer-reviewed 	criticisms 	of 	Harper/Saed 	2023
concerning the use of non-physiologic doses, non-tubal cells lines, flawed statistics,
and high seeding density. (See id.)
As discussed above, Harper/Saed 2023 describes an in vitro study that treated
human primary ovarian epithelial cells, ovarian epithelial cells, and primary
peritoneal fibroblast cells to talcum powder at 100 or 500 μg/mL for 72 hours, using
titanium dioxide as an inert particulate control. (See Harper/Saed 2023 at 150.) After
72 hours, the exposed cells were assessed with “a cell transformation assay,” and
transformation was confirmed by P53 and Ki-67 immunohistochemistry.75 (See id.
at 150, 154.) The authors reported a dose-dependent increase in transformed ovarian
epithelial cells for talcum powder, but no observed transformation in untreated
ovarian cells, titanium dioxide-treated ovarian cells, and talc-treated primary
fibroblasts. (See id.) Talc-treated ovarian cells showed a mutant-type p53 staining
pattern, and a rise in Ki-67 proliferation index, which the authors found consistent
75 	Dr. Smith-Bindman explains that “P53 gene codes for a protein that acts as a tumor
suppressor, which means that it regulates cell division by keeping cells from growing and dividing
too fast or in an uncontrolled way.” (Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 14.) Dr. Smith-Bindman
also describes Ki-67 as “a nuclear protein that is a market of active cell proliferation.” (Id.)
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with transformation. (See id. at 154.) From these results, the authors concluded that
“[e]xposure to talcum powder induces malignant transformation in ovarian epithelial
cells,” which they opine represents “a direct effect of talcum powder exposure that
is 	specific 	to 	normal 	ovarian 	cells 	and 	further 	supports 	previous 	studies
demonstrating an association between the genital use of talcum powder and an
increased risk of [ovarian cancer].” (See id. at 150, 154–56.)
Several of Plaintiffs’ experts accordingly refer to, or rely on, Harper/Saed
2023 	for 	the 	proposition 	that 	exposure 	to 	talcum 	powder 	causes 	malignant
transformation. (See, e.g., Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend Rep. at 6 (“Recently, Harper
and Saed also demonstrated that exposure to Johnson’s Baby Powder causes p53
mutations, 	cell 	proliferation 	and 	malignant 	transformation 	in 	normal 	ovarian
epithelial cells.”); McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 91 (“A recent study found that
talcum 	powder induced 	malignant 	transformation 	in 	normal 	primary 	ovarian
epithelial cells, in a dose-dependent manner.”); Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at
14 (describing Harper/Saed 2023 and its support with previous studies of talc
exposure inducing malignant transformation in normal human ovarian cells); Wolf
3d Amend. 	Rep. 	at 	16 	(“Harper 2023 	reported 	cell 	proliferation, 	neoplastic
transformation and p53 mutations when cells in culture were exposed to Johnson’s
Baby Powder”); see also Singh Supp. Rep. at 13.)
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At the outset, I acknowledge that Harper/Saed 2023 is not without substantive
criticism. But Defendants’ substantive challenges to Harper/Saed 2023 neither
render Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions unreliable nor the study itself inadmissible.
Substantively, Defendants claim that the study’s observation of malignant
transformation 	is 	incorrect, 	and 	that 	it 	is 	instead 	indicative 	of 	neoplastic
transformation. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 44–45.) They argue
that the study fails to report the dose of applied talc and only reports the
concentration of the solution. (See id. at 43 (citing Harper/Saed 2023 at 155).) They
also contend the authors selected cell models that are not the site of origin for a
common ovarian cancer subtype despite the availability of purportedly appropriate
cells. (See id. at 43–44.)
But at their core, Defendants’ substantive challenges are against the study’s
methodology and the authors’ conclusions, and not against Plaintiffs’ experts’
methodologies, conclusions, or the application of either to the facts of this case. This
is a fatal distinction, as the former improperly expands my limited role as gatekeeper
into a scientific factfinder. My role as Special Master under Daubert, as well as the
Court’s subsequent role under the same standard, is not to address or resolve
scientific disagreements. See Trs. of University of Pennsylvania v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
No. 15-cv-6133, 2022 WL 3973276, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2022) (“Although [a
study] may have flaws, ‘it is not the district court's role under Daubert to evaluate
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the correctness of facts underlying an expert’s testimony.’” (quoting i4i Ltd. P’ship
v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 856 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Defendants’ substantive
criticisms are more appropriate for cross-examination at trial, as they go toward the
weight of Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions premised on the study and not to the
admissibility of their opinions generally. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 83 (explaining that
challenges to a study’s results ordinarily goes to the weight of the evidence not the
admissibility).76
Second, Defendants highlight Harper/Saed 2023’s rejections from multiple
journals whose reviewers criticized it as substantively flawed in an attempt to further
discount the value of the study. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 41–
42.) As 	retold 	by 	Defendants 	and 	corroborated 	by 	the 	peer-reviewers’ own
correspondence with Dr. Saed, the study, as presented, did not meet publication
standards in the targeted journals. Across these journals, the consensus was that the
manuscript was premature and methodologically insufficient to support claims of
malignant transformation or human biological plausibility. Concerns in this regard
76 	For the avoidance of doubt, I find no evidence to suggest that the study’s methodology or
results cannot otherwise be trusted due to potential bias. Although Dr. Saed “has served as a paid
consultant and expert witness for the plaintiffs in the talcum powder litigation,” the “remaining
[six] authors have no potential conflicts of interest to report.” (Harper/Saed 2023 at 157.) 	The
study also concedes that a “portion of [Dr. Saed’s] time conducting this research was paid for by
the lawyers representing plaintiffs in the talcum powder litigation,” but that Dr. Saed “received no
financial support for the authorship or publication of” Harper/Saed 2023. (Id. (emphasis added).)
Dr. Saed’s research in this area spans years, and he is one of several authors who contributed to
the design, performance, and writing of this study. (See id. (noting authors’ contributions).)
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generally revolved around methodology, interpretation, relevance, and statistics. For
example, a reviewer from Gynecologic Oncology, a peer-reviewed medical journal,
primarily criticized on the study’s “reliance on a single commercial assay for
assessment of transformation that has not been established in the literature.” (See
ECF No. 033013-3 at SAED_SEPT222021_SUPPL_000069.) This reviewer called
the results “overinterpreted” due to, among other things, an insufficient correlation
to immunohistochemistry, questioned the clinical relevance “given the arbitrary dose
selection of talcum powder,” and faulted the study’s absence of statistical analysis
and insufficient particle characterization. (See id. at SAED_SEPT222021_SUPPL_
000069–70.) A different 	reviewer 	from 	PLOS 	One, 	a 	peer-reviewed 	journal
published by the Public Library of Science, wrote that the “authors’ conclusions
suggesting acute exposure of talc powder to ovary epithelial cells is associated with
ovarian cancer are outrageous and not supported by the manuscript’s data” “[b]ased
on the minimal amount of data provided in [the] manuscript.” (See ECF No. 033013-
3 at SAED_SEPT222021_SUPPL_000101.)
It is also worth noting that Dr. Jeff Boyd, a molecular geneticist and
gynecologic cancer researcher offered by Defendants to, among other things,
criticize Harper/Saed 2023, voiced credibility concerns surrounding the publication
of 	the 	article. 	(See 	generally 	ECF 	No. 	33060-5 	(“Boyd 	Rep.”).) 	Dr. 	Boyd
characterized Minerva Obstetrics & Gynecology, the English-language rebrand of
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the Italian journal Minerva Ginecologica that published Harper/Saed 2023, as an
extremely obscure journal and emphasized its low standing relative to leading outlets
in the field. (See Boyd Rep. at 14.)
Defendants’ emphasis on peer-review criticisms of Harper/Saed 2023 or on
the quality of Minerva Obstetrics & Gynecology does not render Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions 	regarding 	the 	association 	between 	talcum 	powder 	and 	cellular
inflammation and oxidative stress unreliable under Rule 702. I acknowledge that
prior to publication, Harper/Saed 2023 faced criticism during the peer-review
process and that the study is not without limitations. But, as discussed throughout
this Report and Recommendation, my gatekeeping role is to assess the reliability of
the experts’ methodologies in this case—not to adjudicate the merits, design, or
ultimate correctness of any individual peer-reviewed study.
To be sure, if a study on which experts rely was so fundamentally flawed as
to have no or little evidentiary value, reliance on that study could call into question
the reliability of the experts’ methodology overall. But “‘flaws in methodology’
uncovered by peer review do not necessarily equate to a lack of scientific validity,”
particularly where “the methods may be based on scientific principles and the
alleged flaws go merely to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence and the
testimony.” Bonds, 12 F.3d at 559. Harper/Saed 2023 is undisputedly a peer-
reviewed and published study and has therefore been subject to scientific scrutiny.
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Excluding expert testimony solely because an expert relies on or references a peer-
reviewed study that has drawn criticism would improperly elevate peer-review
disputes into dispositive admissibility barriers under Rule 702. Indeed, the converse
is also true: peer-review approval or general acceptance does not, standing alone,
establish methodological reliability. See In re Zantac, 644 F. Supp. 3d at 1172
(“[E]ven if general acceptance of the methodologies used in these two studies was
established, acceptance in the scientific community and peer review are not
necessarily sufficient to establish the reliability of a scientific methodology.”).
Accordingly, criticisms of Harper/Saed 2023 bear on the weight of the evidence and
the persuasiveness of the experts’ conclusions—not on the admissibility of their
opinions under Rule 702.
For further support, Defendants point to my prior ruling excluding then-expert
Dr. Saed’s opinion that talcum powder causes ovarian cancer, which I found to be
methodologically unreliable under Daubert. (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility
Br. at 42–43 (citing In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 137).) In that ruling,
I also noted that reviewer feedback reinforced—but was not dispositive of—my
conclusion that Dr. Saed’s extrapolation from his in vitro work was unsupported and
that his methodology lacked sufficient reliability for presentation to a jury. In re
Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 137.
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The circumstances here are materially different. Plaintiffs do not now proffer
Dr. Saed as an expert witness. At the time of my prior ruling, Dr. Saed’s biological
plausibility and general causation opinions were premised largely, if not entirely, on
an in vitro study he conducted for purposes of the litigation. By contrast, Plaintiffs’
experts here do not premise their opinions on any single study, much less litigation-
generated 	research. 	Instead, 	they 	rely 	on 	a 	broad 	body 	of 	epidemiologic,
mechanistic, and biological literature, as well as case studies and review articles, to
support their opinions linking inflammation to cancer risk. Harper/Saed 2023 is cited
by Plaintiffs’ experts as one study among many, not as the exclusive or primary
foundation for their conclusions.
Finally, even if I were inclined to discount Harper/Saed 2023 and preclude
any discussion of the study, that preclusion would not justify excluding “any expert
who relies on the paper.” (See Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 42.) As noted
above, Plaintiffs’ experts cite Harper/Saed 2023 and other studies as evidence that
exposure and use of talcum powder may cause inflammation, oxidative stress, and
other biological mechanisms that prompt ovarian carcinogenesis. (See, e.g., Clarke-
Pearson 3d Amend. Rep. at 6; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 91; Smith-Bindman 3d
Amend. Rep. at 14; Wolf 3d Amend. Rep. at 16; Singh Supp. Rep. at 13.) Therefore,
the preclusion of Harper/Saed 2023, in light of Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance, would
not justify wholesale exclusion of Plaintiffs’ experts.
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Based on the foregoing, I find that Plaintiffs’ experts reasonably relied on
Harper/Saed 2023, together with other bodies of scientific evidence, and accurately
limited their extrapolation of that study’s conclusions in support of their opinions
regarding talc’s effects on cellular inflammation.
(3) 	Macrophage-impairment and ovarian cancer
Lastly, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ macrophage inhibition theory, which
purportedly is based on the results of two in vitro studies, i.e., Mandarino 2020 and
Emi 2021.77 Defendants generally contend that the data from these two studies does
not reliably support the theory that talc-induced inflammation or oxidative stress
impairs macrophage function in a manner relevant to ovarian carcinogenesis. (See
Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 4, 45–48.) Defendants maintain that
without a showing that talc can lead to malignant transformation of macrophages
(immune cells that can destroy cancer cells), discussion of any such impairment “is
irrelevant.” (Id. at 46.) Moreover, because the studies analyzed mice, Defendants
argue that the findings are even more limited than in vitro studies generally. (Id.)
They claim that Plaintiffs’ experts “entirely ignore” that the animal subjects were
treated with an “excessive” amount of estrogen—and that even under those “highly
77 	My prior Opinion did not consider this theory. I will therefore address it now. However, I
note that as with biological plausibility and other Bradford Hill factors, neither party squares their
arguments on Plaintiffs’ experts’ reports but instead largely debate the literature from which they
extrapolate their opinions. I will therefore briefly describe each study and refer to the few experts’
reports that discuss them.
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artificial conditions, the authors made no claims that any of the observed changes
were clinically significant.” (Id. at 46–47.) Defendants then conclude that despite
the studies “stopp[ing] well short of mechanistic conclusions,” the experts “exceed
the limitations the authors themselves placed on the stud[ies],” which demonstrates
their unreliability. (Id. at 47–48.)
Plaintiffs respond that Defendants’ argument on this point centers on two
isolated studies, even though the experts “do not rely on Mandarino [2020] or Emi
[2021] in isolation as a basis for a new theory of biological plausibility.” (Pls.’ Opp.
to Defs.’ 2024 Biological Plausibility Br. at 52.) Plaintiffs emphasize that both
studies tested the effect of talc combined with estrogen “on reducing the anti-tumor
abilities of macrophages.” (Id. at 52–53.) They quote Emi 2021’s finding that in vitro
“exposure to . . . talc particles alone, and especially to a combination of talc with
oestrogen leads to substantial genome-wide gene expression changes,” while
Mandarino 2020 determined that “talc alone and especially in combination with
[estrogen] produced changes in gene expression [] may promote pro-tumorigenic
environment 	and 	less 	efficient 	surveillance 	(tumoricidal) 	activity 	of 	the
macrophages.” (Id. at 53 (quoting Emi 2021 at 1064 & Mandarino 2020 at 6).) They
cite Dr. Smith Bindman’s opinion that these “noted changes in expression of
macrophage genes are pertinent to cancer development.” (Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ 2024
Biological Plausibility Br. at 53.)
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I will first summarize the two studies, both of which applied in vitro models
to test whether talc alters macrophage function in ways that could promote ovarian
cancer development, particularly in an estrogen-rich milieu. Mandarino 2020
exposed mouse macrophage lines to asbestos-free talc with or without estradiol, then
co-cultured these macrophages with murine ovarian surface epithelial cancer cells
for 72 hours. (See Mandarino 2020 at 3–6.) The researchers observed a range of
outcomes for the estradiol and talc combination treated cells, including (1) reactive
oxygen species generation and upregulation of gene clusters for the phagocytes,78
leading the authors to conclude that the combination “produced changes in gene
expression that may promote pro-tumorigenic environment and less efficient
surveillance (tumoricidal) activity of the macrophages”; and (2) a “microscopic
observation” that talc-treated MOSEC cells “appeared more fragile than any
controls,” i.e., that the combination of talc and estradiol “affected the macrophages
to permit higher MOSEC-GFP survival.” (Id. at 5–7.) As “the first study linking the
macrophage, talc particles and estrogen in a potential mechanism to explain the
effect of talc” on ovarian cancer, the authors emphasized that their “focus . . . was to
demonstrate whether talc is inert when phagocytized in high-estrogen milieu,”
78 	Phagocytosis 	is 	“the 	engulfing 	and 	usually 	the 	destruction 	of 	particulate 	matter
by phagocytes (e.g. macrophage cells) that serves as an important bodily defense mechanism
against infection by microorganisms and against occlusion of mucous surfaces or tissues by foreign
particles 	and 	tissue 	debris.” 	Phagocytosis, 	Merriam‑Webster.com 	Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/phagocytosis (last visited Jan. 10, 2026).
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concluding that “it is not inert”; they admittedly “did not investigate carcinogenic
properties of talc per se.” (Id. at 7, 9–10.) Additionally, the authors noted that one
limitation of the study was that it applied an estradiol dosage that was “likely at the
higher 	end 	of 	concentration 	ranges,” 	despite 	justifying 	same 	with 	the 	high
concentration within ovarian tissue that “may be an indication of why talc use is
associated with ovarian cancer rather than at other sites.” (Id. at 9.)
One year later, Emi 2021 profiled transcriptomic and epigenomic changes in
mice macrophages following 24-hour exposure to talc or the control substance
titanium dioxide, with or without estradiol. (See Emi 2021 at 1054.) The authors
tested some of the same cells with some of the same types of substances and formulas
as in Mandarino 2020. (Id.) The results showed that all of the talc combined with
estrogen samples “were most dissimilar with vehicle control samples,” while
samples consisting only of talc were similar to the talc-estrogen combination
samples. The authors concluded that “talc alone, and especially talc with oestrogen,
has induced the most changes in the dataset compared to vehicle control.” (Id. at
1055 (internal parentheticals omitted).) The authors also found that “approximately
10 times more genes were significantly different after talc and oestrogen exposure
vs. titanium dioxide and oestrogen when either was compared to the vehicle control.”
(Id. at 1056–57 (internal parentheticals omitted).) Their other methods of testing
produced similar results and assessments. (See id. 	at 1057–64.) The authors
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discussed the biological mechanism by which talc can enter the genital tract and that
“talc 	association 	was 	more 	apparent 	in 	premenopausal 	women 	and 	those
postmenopausal women who were taking oestrogen replacement therapy suggesting
higher oestrogen may fuel the pathogenesis.” (Id. 	at 1065.) After a lengthy
discussion of their epigenomic analysis, they emphasized that their study was “the
first to show that a single short-term exposure of microphages in vitro to particles
can be linked to epigenome-wide DNA methylation changes”—despite noting that
several of the effects were detected by both the talc and non-talc samples. (Id. at
1068.) They concluded that their findings and further hypotheses based on the talc
and titanium dioxide results “merits further testing.” (Id.)
As Defendants note, only a handful of Plaintiffs’ experts considered these
studies in their reports and depositions. (See generally Smith-Bindman 3d Amend.
Rep.; Smith-Bindman Dep.; Levy 2d Amend. Rep.; Singh Supp. Rep.; Plunkett 2021
Dep.) Although I do not find that the experts mischaracterized the two challenged
studies per se, I am not satisfied that the evidence they have provided meets the more
likely than not standard that Rule 702 demands.
The only expert that Plaintiffs cite in their response to Defendants’ argument
on this point is Dr. Smith-Bindman. In her report, the doctor accurately described
both Mandarino 2020 and Emi 2021. (See Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 14.)
However, after quoting Mandarino 2020’s methods and conclusions at length, she
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cursorily stated that based on the study, the finding that exposure to talc in a high-
estrogen environment can compromise macrophage function, “could apply in vivo
to exposure to talc.” (Id.) She not only provided no further explanation for why or
how she reaches that conclusion, but no citations to scientific literature supporting
this opinion. Based on Mandarino’s own conclusion that “further studies [are
needed] to elucidate [the observed mouse-based] mechanism,” (Mandarino 2020 at
1), I cannot find that Dr. Smith-Bindman applied a reliable methodology or
sufficiently sound basis in extrapolating the data in reaching her opinion on this
issue. See, e.g., Heller, 167 F.3d at 153 (The court “must examine the expert’s
conclusions in order to determine whether they could reliably follow from the facts
known to the expert and the methodology used.”). The same is true of Dr. Smith-
Bindman’s passing comment that Emi 2021’s discussion and analysis “provides
evidence of the impact of these particles for initiating cellular changes that would
lead to cancer.” (Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 14.) As to Emi 2021, she did
not even mention that the study was limited to mice—not human subjects—nor did
she link the study to ovarian cancer specifically. (Id.) This so-called analysis misses
the mark and fails to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard under Rule
702 to admit this portion of her opinion.
The other experts that Defendants cite in footnotes similarly fail to adequately
engage with the studies’ actual data and conclusions in arriving at their perfunctory
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statements on this potential biological mechanism. (See, e.g., Levy 2d Amend. Rep.
at 16 (neglecting to mention that the challenged studies were only conducted on
mice, then summarizing Mandarino’s study by saying it “show[ed] the pro-oxidant
effect of talc in a cell culture system,” the effects of which “were not observed” with
the control substances, adding that Emi 2021 made “[s]upporting observations”);
Singh Supp. Rep. at 22 (citing Emi for the proposition that studies have shown
talcum powder can induce malignant transformation “in normal human ovarian cell
lines,” 	without 	providing 	any 	explanation 	for 	such 	extrapolation 	from 	mice
subjects).) Indeed, Mandarino 2020 clearly stated that this was the first study of its
kind and that its “focus . . . was to demonstrate whether talc is inert when
phagocytized in high-estrogen milieu,” but it “did not investigate carcinogenic
properties of talc per se.” (Mandarino 2020 at 7, 9–10.) Emi 2021 also concluded
that their findings and further hypotheses based on the talc and titanium dioxide
results “merit[] further testing.” (Emi 2021 at 1068.) Where the Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions are based on a sum total of two animal studies in the last five years, which
both attested to needing further experimentation and evaluation to confirm whether
their hypotheses can be supported in humans, I do not find that they have sufficiently
met their burden under Rule 702 in this regard. See Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 266 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen an expert opinion is
based on data, a methodology, or studies that are simply inadequate to support the
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conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule 702 mandate the exclusion of that unreliable
opinion testimony.”).
For the avoidance of any doubt, I emphasize that my recommendation on this
sub-issue does not mean that I find an absence of biologically plausible mechanisms
connecting talcum powder to ovarian cancer. I simply find that the data upon which
the experts seek to rely in forming their opinions that talc-induced inflammation and
oxidative 	stress 	impairs 	macrophage 	function 	in 	a 	manner 	relevant 	to 	the
development of ovarian cancer is inadequate to support the conclusions they purport
to draw. My limited recommendation on this point determines only that, under my
charge under Rule 702, “there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data
and the opinion proffered” to support admission of these testimonies. Joiner, 522
U.S. at 146. I therefore find that Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions on the microphage
inhibition theory should be excluded as they only rely on the two studies Defendants
have challenged in their motion.
For the detailed reasons stated above, I recommend that the Court grant in part
and deny in part Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinions
Regarding 	Biological 	Plausibility/Mechanism. 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts’ 	opinions
regarding the plausibility of upward migration, as well as the association between
talcum powder and inflammation and oxidative stress, and association between
chronic inflammation and oxidative stress and ovarian carcinogenesis, are largely
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admissible by a preponderance of the evidence. As noted, I recommend that the
Court exclude Plaintiffs’ experts’ migration-via-inhalation theory and macrophage-
inhibition theory, as they respectively fail to satisfy the preponderance standard
under Rule 702 as amended. As for all of Plaintiffs’ experts and their respective
opinions, Defendants may, of course, cross-examine these experts to show that
particular studies are unreliable or that the experts have improperly derived opinions
from them.
v. 	The Remaining Bradford Hill Factors
I turn next to the remaining Bradford Hill factors—specificity, coherence,
analogy, experiment, and temporality.79
a. 	Specificity
“An association exhibits specificity if the exposure is associated only with a
single disease or type of disease.” Green at 605. While most agents do not cause a
wide variety of effects, id. at 605–06, Dr. Hill advised against overemphasizing the
importance of specificity because an agent may cause more than one disease, Hill at
297. This is especially true for agents that “are not in fact single agents but consist
of numerous harmful agents.” Green at 606. For example, cigarette manufacturers
79 	It bears noting that, notwithstanding Judge Shipp’s guidance, much of Defendants’
argument regarding the remaining Bradford Hill factors effectively seeks reconsideration of prior
rulings, which I will highlight, infra. Indeed, Defendants’ contentions rest largely on disagreement
with my earlier conclusions, and on these motions, such disagreement does not provide a proper
basis for revisiting those determinations, except to evaluate whether my prior 702 rulings comport
with Amended Rule 702.
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“long claimed that because cigarettes have been linked to lung cancer, emphysema,
bladder cancer, heart disease, pancreatic cancer, and other conditions, there is no
specificity and the relationships are not causal.” Id. As such, “whereas evidence of
specificity may strengthen the case for causation, lack of specificity does not
necessarily undermine it where there is a good biological explanation for its
absence.” Id.
In my 2020 Opinion, I explained that at the time, “[e]ach of Plaintiffs’ experts
found this factor to weigh in support of causation, but did not place significant
weight on the factor.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 180. For
example, Dr. Clarke-Pearson noted that the epidemiologic studies appear to be
specifically linking talc use to ovarian cancer, as opposed to other types of cancer;
Dr. Carson reasoned that compared to the typical incidence rate of ovarian cancer in
the general population of women, the research shows that the disease “occurs more
often in women who use talcum powder for hygienic purposes on a regular basis.”
Id. at 181. Defendants’ opposition then was based on “the undisputed fact that
ovarian cancer is not a single disease,” because there exist subtypes with different
risk factors and origins. Id. I concluded that the experts’ opinions rested on “good
grounds and considered scientific evidence” to find a specific association to ovarian
cancer, with a focus on epithelial ovarian cancer. Id. Despite there being “various
subtypes,” I found that 	Defendants 	failed 	to 	“sufficiently demonstrate[] that
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Plaintiffs’ findings are unreliable,” and further, that their disagreements with the
experts’ conclusions “is fodder for cross-examination and not exclusion under
Daubert.” Id.
Defendants present the same argument here, contending that “[t]he proposed
association in this litigation is highly unspecific because ovarian cancer is not a
single distinct disease; rather there are many different subtypes”; they suggest that
this is why “many of plaintiffs’ experts place little weight on the specificity factor.”
(Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 72–73.) They take particular issue with my
prior focus on epithelial and serous ovarian cancer because only two of the six
bellwether plaintiffs have that subtype. (Id. at 73–74.) And, they challenge certain
experts’ position that O’Brien 2024 supports a finding of specificity based on the
study’s conclusion that uterine and breast cancer were not associated with talc use,
claiming those outcomes are irrelevant to the question at hand.
Before addressing these points, I reiterate that Defendants advanced a
materially similar argument in the prior round of briefing. At that time, I concluded
that Defendants had “not sufficiently demonstrated” that the existence of ovarian
cancer subtypes rendered the experts’ methodologies unreliable. In re Johnson &
Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 181. Defendants have not identified any new evidence,
nor any change in the application of Rule 702, that would warrant departing from
that conclusion here.
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In any event, Defendants’ argument is founded on a generalized claim about
cancer subtypes, focusing on selective portions of the experts’ opinions. For
example, they critique Dr. Siemiatycki for ascribing less weight to this factor,
reasoning that he chose to do so post-hoc because the factor does not support his
position. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 73.) However, he in fact opined that
he de-emphasized this factor because in the sixty years since Bradford Hill
announced these criteria, it has become even more widely understood “that some
agents can indeed provoke multiple different pathologies.” (Siemiatycki 3d Amend.
Rep. at 74.) This accords with the Reference Manual excerpt cited above, as well as
Sir Bradford Hill’s own warning that “[w]e must not . . . over-emphasize the
importance of the characteristic,” because “multi-causation is generally more likely
than single causation.” Hill at 297.
Similarly, Dr. Siemiatycki explained that O’Brien 2024 is relevant not
because it reflects a process-of-elimination analysis, but because it bears on whether
the observed association between talc use and ovarian cancer is specific rather than
the product of a generalized reporting bias. (Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 54–55.)
O’Brien 2024 found no association between talc use and either uterine or breast
cancer. (O’Brien 2024 at 13.) While that absence may, in a limited sense, be viewed
as consistent with the Bradford Hill concept of specificity, Dr. Siemiatycki placed
greater emphasis on the implications of those findings for evaluating recall bias.
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(Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 55.) Relying on the accompanying editorial by
Harris 2024, he explained that uterine cancer—like ovarian cancer—is a malignancy
of the reproductive system and relies on similar self-reported exposure histories. (Id.
(citing Harris et al., Epidemiologic Methods to Advance Our Understanding of
Ovarian Cancer Risk, 42 J. Clin. Oncol. (22) 2619 (May 15, 2024).) If ovarian
cancer cases were systematically over-reporting talc exposure, one would reasonably
expect a comparable association to appear among uterine cancer cases as well. (Id.)
The absence of such an association therefore weighs against recall bias as a
nonspecific explanation and supports the inference that the talc–ovarian cancer
association is disease-specific. (Id. at 54–55.)
This reasoning does not rest on the mere absence of associations with other
cancers, but on a comparative assessment of how potential reporting biases would
be expected to manifest across related outcomes. Other experts applied similar logic
in their analyses. (See, e.g., McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 54; Cote Amend. Rep. at
36; Moorman 2d Supp. Rep. at 9 (also addressing analogous considerations with
respect 	to 	douching).) 	I 	find 	no 	basis 	to 	conclude 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts’
methodologies 	regarding 	specificity 	are 	unreliable 	or 	unreliably 	applied;
specifically, I find that their methodologies evince extrapolations that are adequately
supported by the existing data. To the extent Defendants dispute the experts’
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ultimate conclusions, which are supported by their analyses, those disagreements
may be explored through cross-examination at trial.
b. 	Coherence
The coherence factor ensures that the observed association does “not seriously
conflict with the generally known facts of the natural history and biology of the
disease.” Hill at 298.
In my prior Opinion, I summarized Defendants’ three arguments on this
factor: (1) there exist subtypes of ovarian cancer and “the notion that talc would
cause all of them is incoherent”; (2) no animal studies have shown that talc causes
ovarian cancer; and (3) the experts failed to account for studies investigating talc
powder in conjunction with diaphragms or condoms that show no increased risk of
ovarian cancer. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 182. Plaintiffs
responded then that observational studies “are long enough to account for the
development of ovarian cancer,” and that the existing biologic evidence was
consistent with the mechanics of the disease. Id. When evaluating the parties’
arguments, I noted that to assess coherence, the experts “examined generally known
facts regarding inflammation and cancer, and opined that these facts are coherent
with their theory that talc, which may contain carcinogens, can inflame epithelial
cells resulting in cancer.” Id. at 182–83. As with the specificity factor, I did not find
the fact that different types of ovarian cancer exist, to “undermine the experts’
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opinion on this factor.” Id. at 183. I explained why I found Defendants’ arguments
to “merely show disagreement with the conclusion on coherence drawn by the
causation 	experts,” 	rather 	than 	with 	their 	methodology, 	because 	the 	experts
considered the same studies that Defendants raised, but rather “interpreted [them]
differently.” Id. (emphasis added). “Importantly,” I concluded, “Defendants do not
dispute the known fact about the link of cellular inflammation to cancers in general,
which is the basic premise of the experts’ opinion on coherence,” but instead
challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ interpretations based on the data, which goes to weight
rather than admissibility. Id. (internal citation omitted).
On this motion, Defendants first argue that population-level trends undermine
Plaintiffs’ theory of coherence, pointing to declining ovarian cancer incidence rates
between 1990 and 2019, including periods during which talcum powder products
remained on the market. In their view, this trend renders it “incoherent to suggest
that talc causes cancer.” (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at 76.) They also note
that perineal talc use has been reported as more prevalent among African-American
women, while ovarian cancer incidence rates in that population are comparatively
lower—an observation they contend is inconsistent with talc being a causal factor.
(Id. at 76–77.) Relatedly, Defendants emphasize testimony from Dr. Clarke-Pearson
acknowledging that talc is not “‘the only cause of ovarian cancer,’” which they argue
further undermines Plaintiffs’ theory. (Id. (quoting ECF No. 33118-9 (“Clarke-
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Pearson Dep.”) at 134:3–136:9).) Finally, Defendants assert that although several of
Plaintiffs’ experts assign “considerable weight” to the coherence factor, those
experts do not adequately reconcile their opinions with the epidemiologic and
demographic data Defendants highlight. (Id. at 77.) According to Defendants, the
experts instead conflate coherence with biological plausibility, relying on what
Defendants characterize as untested and speculative hypotheses regarding the
mechanisms by which talc could cause ovarian cancer. (Id. at 77–78.)80
I begin by noting, as Dr. Hill himself emphasized, that coherence requires
only that the proposed causal association “not seriously conflict with the generally
known facts of the natural history and biology of the disease.” Hill at 298. Based on
my review of the record, Plaintiffs’ experts have applied that standard in a
methodologically sound manner.
Dr. 	Singh, 	for 	example, 	explained 	that 	recent 	epidemiologic 	studies
demonstrate an 	increased 	risk of ovarian 	cancer among women 	with patent
80 	Defendants also take issue with my prior reasoning that “whether a plaintiff’s ovarian
cancer is caused by genetic mutations or use of talc[] is a question of specific causation.” (Defs.’
2024 General Causation Br. at 75 n.178.) They say that the absence of evidence tying talc to genetic
mutations “underscores the incoherence between the proffered theory of general causation and
what is known about ovarian cancer.” (Id.) But Defendants’ argument here is misplaced because
Plaintiffs’ theory rests on the claim that talc (along with its constituents) directly cause cancer—
separate and apart from any possibility that genetic mutations can independently cause ovarian
cancer. I therefore reiterate that Defendants’ argument does not undermine Plaintiffs’ experts’
general causation opinions. For further explanation of Plaintiffs’ theory regarding inflammation
causing cell damage, as opposed to ovarian cancer stemming from genetic mutations, I refer to my
prior discussion on the biological plausibility factor. (See supra Part V.C.2.iv.)
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reproductive tracts, consistent with earlier findings, as well as a higher risk among
women with endometriosis, an inflammatory condition. (Singh Rep. at 22–23.) He
concluded that these observations are coherent with an association between talc use
and ovarian cancer because inflammation is a biologically recognized mechanism
relevant to carcinogenesis in this context, and he therefore accorded this factor
significant weight. (Id.; see also Singh Supp. Rep. at 6 (explaining that O’Brien
2024’s finding that ovarian cancer risk was highest among women in their twenties
and thirties is coherent with known disease biology and patterns of genital talc use).)
(See supra Part V.C.2.iv.)
Dr. McTiernan likewise recognized that increased inflammation has been
associated with ovarian cancer risk and that talc and other components of talcum
powder products elicit inflammatory responses in tissues where talc has been
detected, including the ovary. (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 101.) At the same
time, she explained that broader population-level trends—such as changes over time
in oral contraceptive use, hysterectomy and tubal ligation rates, and obesity
prevalence—complicate efforts to isolate temporal coherence, and she therefore
assigned this factor comparatively less weight. (Id. at 32–33; see also Siemiatycki
3d Amend. Rep. at 22–23 (drawing similar comparisons in other disease contexts).)
Other 	experts 	treat 	coherence 	as 	closely 	overlapping 	with 	biological
plausibility, 	as 	Defendants 	themselves 	acknowledge. 	(Defs.’ 	2024 	General
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Causation Br. at 77–78; see, e.g., Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 38; Cote
Amend. Rep. at 38; Moorman Rep. at 37–38.) Indeed, some formulations of the
Bradford Hill framework describe biological plausibility as coherence with existing
scientific knowledge. Green at 600. It is therefore appropriate to consider these
factors in tandem, and as such, I incorporate my discussion of biological plausibility,
supra Part V.C.2.iv, into my analysis of coherence.
Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, coherence does not require talc to be the
sole cause of ovarian cancer. The inquiry is whether the proposed association
seriously 	conflicts 	with 	established 	biological 	understanding—not 	whether
alternative 	causal 	pathways 	exist. 	Accordingly, 	Dr. 	Clarke-Pearson’s
acknowledgment that talc is not the only cause of ovarian cancer does not support a
finding of incoherence. The same is true of Defendants’ reliance on declining
ovarian cancer incidence rates during periods when talcum powder products
remained on the market. While such trends may be an appropriate subject for cross-
examination, they do not, standing alone, render the experts’ coherence analyses
methodologically unreliable. As the Rule 702 gatekeeper, I may not substitute
population-level observations selectively emphasized by one party for the experts’
scientific analyses; that task belongs to the factfinder.
Finally, I do not find any methodological infirmity in the fact that different
experts assign differing weight to the coherence factor. So long as those differences
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are supported by empirically grounded reasoning, the relative emphasis placed on
this criterion is a matter for the jury to assess. Indeed, as the Rule 702 advisory
committee notes explain, the experts’ varied evaluations of the same body of data
may assist the factfinder by framing competing interpretations at trial. Regardless of
the weight that each Plaintiffs’ expert ascribed to this factor in their individualized
analyses, 	my 	role 	is 	to 	determine 	whether 	they 	faithfully 	applied 	reliable
methodologies to arrive at their conclusions that this factor is satisfied. I find that
they did. To the extent Defendants wish to question any experts on how and why
their colleagues weighted this factor differently, that is appropriate fodder for cross-
examination.
c. 	Analogy
Dr. Hill in his 1965 article provides little guidance with respect to this factor,
simply stating: “In some circumstances it would be fair to judge by analogy.” Hill at
299. Courts have interpreted this factor to mean that “causal inference is supported
where 	relationships 	similar 	to 	the 	putative 	causal 	relationships 	have 	been
substantiated.” In re Acetaminophen, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 337.
In my prior Opinion, I noted that the proffered experts compared the
relationship between talc and ovarian cancer to that between asbestos and the
development of ovarian and lung cancer. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d
at 184. I also noted that the experts did not weigh this factor heavily. Id. Nonetheless,
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I explained that “[t]here is no dispute that asbestos is carcinogenic” and therefore “it
is not unreliable for the experts to opine that because asbestos has been found in talc,
it 	can 	similarly 	cause 	ovarian 	cancer.” 	Id. 	Defendants 	found 	this 	analogy
“inappropriate,” because the asbestos mineral most associated with ovarian cancer
(i.e., crocidolite) has not been found in talc powder products. Id. at 184–85.
However, I “reiterate[d] that crocidolite is in the same family as the types of asbestos
(anthophyllite and tremolite) that were found in talc—amphibole asbestos”—all of
which are regulated. Id. at 185. I emphasized that the purpose of this factor is to
“compare the causal association at issue to other similarly known causative
relationships,” not to “prove causation.” Id. I therefore explained that the comparison
the experts made between asbestos and talc was “based on these minerals’ tendency
to 	cause 	inflammation, 	which 	could 	lead 	to 	carcinogenesis,” 	and 	that 	this
comparison was more likely than not reliable under Rule 702. Id.
Defendants incorporate by reference their Motion to Exclude Asbestos-
Related Opinions to challenge the experts’ assertions that “asbestos—at least at
levels below heavy occupational exposure—causes ovarian cancer,” to form their
argument that my prior Opinion should not be followed. (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 78.) They rehash their argument that asbestos and talc are “distinct
minerals 	with 	distinct 	chemical 	structures 	and 	morphology,” 	challenging 	the
experts’ “conclusory opinions” which, they say, “fail to . . . suggest what particular
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qualities of asbestos that make it dangerous are ostensibly shared by talc.” (Id. at
79.)
In this portion of their argument, Defendants do not cite to any new law aside
from a parenthetical about a case I have already addressed, In re Acetaminophen,
nor to any “new science” since my prior Opinion. Indeed, their argument squares on
the same claims I previously considered—albeit without any new reasoning upon
which I must depart from my decision. I have already explained my finding that the
“particular qualities of asbestos” that Plaintiffs’ experts invoke in support of their
analogy here, (id.), relate to their “tendency to cause inflammation, which could lead
to carcinogenesis,” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 185. (See, e.g.,
McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 33, 102 (linking increased inflammation with
carcinogenesis, analogizing to talc causing an inflammatory response in the ovaries);
Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 75 (same, acknowledging that this is “a more tenuous
aspect” than the prior factors); Cote Amend. Rep. at 38 (same, affording this “a low
factor in assessment of causality”); Moorman Rep. at 38 (same); Wolf Rep. at 20
(same).) Finally, to the extent Defendants’ arguments here overlap with their
Asbestos-Related Motion, I incorporate by reference my discussion of that issue
here. (See infra Part VI.A.1.)
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d. 	Experiment
Dr. Hill explained that, in limited circumstances, it may be “possible to appeal
to experimental, or semi-experimental, evidence.” Hill at 298. By way of example,
he noted that where an association has been observed, a reduction in exposure
followed by a corresponding decrease in disease incidence may support a causal
inference. Id. Such evidence, where available, may therefore inform the causation
analysis.
In my prior Opinion, I addressed Defendants’ contention that there was “no
reliable support” for Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions under this factor, while recognizing
that the experts “generally did not afford this factor great weight because of the
ethical implications” associated with conducting a randomized trial on talc exposure
and ovarian cancer. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 184. I further noted
that the experts nonetheless referenced in vitro and animal studies in support of their
opinions, and concluded that Defendants’ objections—that contrary experimental
studies 	undermined 	causation—presented 	issues 	of 	weight 	for 	the 	jury, 	not
admissibility. Id.
Defendants now observe that some experts conclude this factor is not
satisfied, while others do not address it at all. (Defs.’ 2024 General Causation Br. at
80.) They again argue that Plaintiffs’ experts selectively rely on certain experimental
data while disregarding other studies. (Id.) As before, however, Defendants identify
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no intervening scientific developments or changes in governing law that would
warrant revisiting my prior analysis of this factor. Moreover, Hill himself cautioned
that experimental evidence is only “[o]ccasionally” available in observational
settings. Hill at 298. Consistent with that understanding, the Reference Manual does
not include this factor in its articulation of the Bradford Hill considerations. See
Green at 600–06. Where Plaintiffs’ experts did engage with this factor, they
explained that a randomized trial would be unethical because genital talcum powder
use may pose a risk of harm. (McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 101–02; see also Singh
Supp. Rep. at 23; Cote Amend. Rep. at 38.) That explanation is consistent with
accepted scientific practice and does not reflect a methodological deficiency.
Because this is not a motion for wholesale reconsideration, and Defendants
have not identified any basis under Judge Shipp’s Order requiring a renewed finding,
I decline to revisit this issue. To the extent the parties dispute how particular
experimental or semi-experimental studies should be weighed, those disagreements
concern evidentiary weight and are properly presented to the jury. My role as the
Rule 702 gatekeeper is limited to determining whether the experts have reliably
applied their methodologies, and whether their resulting opinions more likely than
not are supported by those methodologies, which I find they have done here.
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e. 	Temporality
This factor poses a straightforward—though not always simple—question:
“which is the cart and which the horse?” Hill at 297. As the Reference Guide
explains, “[a] temporal, or chronological, relationship must exist for causation to
exist.” Green at 601. Put differently, “[i]f an exposure causes disease, the exposure
must occur before the disease develops”; if the exposure occurs after disease
development, it cannot be causal. Id.
In my prior Opinion, I noted that Plaintiffs’ experts assigned significant
weight to temporality based on evidence indicating that talc exposure generally
precedes the onset of ovarian cancer. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at
181. Defendants responded that this chronology was “unremarkable,” given that talc
use often begins in early adulthood while ovarian cancer is typically diagnosed later
in life. Id. I concluded that “[b]oth positions are true,” and that the proper weight to
assign this factor was a matter for the factfinder, as Defendants’ objection reflected
scientific disagreement rather than a methodological flaw. Id.
Defendants now reprise that argument, asserting that the experts’ assignment
of “high weight” to the temporality factor is inappropriate. (Defs.’ 2024 General
Causation Br. at 80–81.) They further argue that the inquiry should focus on disease
development rather than diagnosis and contend that, given ovarian cancer’s long
latency period, disease onset may precede talc exposure in some women. (Id. at 81–
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82.) In support, they cite testimony acknowledging the difficulty of pinpointing
temporality where latency periods are extended. (Id.)
As with several other Bradford Hill factors, Defendants do not identify any
intervening scientific developments or changes in governing law that would call for
reconsideration of my prior ruling. Instead, their argument focuses primarily on the
degree 	of 	weight 	certain 	experts 	assign 	to 	temporality, 	rather 	than 	on 	any
unreliability in the methodologies used to evaluate it. (Id. at 80–82.) For example,
Defendants 	criticize 	Dr. 	Smith-Bindman 	for 	describing 	temporality 	as 	an
“important” consideration, but do not identify any methodological deficiency in her
analysis. (Id. at 80 n.194.) In fact, Dr. Smith-Bindman expressly addressed the
concern of reverse causality—where behavior is influenced by disease-related
symptoms—and explained why it does not meaningfully affect the epidemiologic
studies at issue. Specifically, she noted that most case-control studies asked
participants to report only past, not current, talc use, and that cohort studies
necessarily assessed exposure among women who had not yet been diagnosed with
ovarian cancer. (Smith-Bindman 3d Amend. Rep. at 37; see also Moorman Rep. at
29.)
It may be true, as Defendants argue, that such data cannot conclusively
establish that talc exposure preceded the earliest biological development of ovarian
cancer rather than its diagnosis. But that limitation is inherent in the study of diseases
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with long and uncertain latency periods and does not render the experts’ analyses
methodologically unsound. As several experts acknowledged, temporality can be
difficult 	to 	determine 	with 	precision 	in 	this 	context, 	yet 	the 	available 	data
consistently 	indicate 	that 	reported 	talc 	exposure 	preceded 	disease 	onset 	as
understood in epidemiologic practice. (See, e.g., Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 21,
103 (Table 13); McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 60–61.) Notably, O’Brien 2024
attempted to address latency concerns by collecting data on talc use beginning at
very young ages, including ages 10 to 13. (O’Brien 2024 at 3–4.)
In the context of my gatekeeping role, it is not within my purview to determine
whether 	the 	temporal 	relationship 	between 	talc 	and 	ovarian 	cancer 	indeed
demonstrates that the former causes the latter. Instead, my role is simply to assess
whether the Plaintiffs’ experts have reliably described, analyzed, and extrapolated
from the relevant data to opine as they propose to testify at trial. I find that they have.
On the temporality factor, Plaintiffs’ experts have again satisfied their burden, by a
preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence, 	to 	offer 	opinions 	grounded 	in 	reliable
methodologies; drawing conclusions that are adequately supported by the data and
consistent with existing scientific knowledge; while appropriately accounting for the
limitations inherent in latency-based disease research. I see no basis to depart from
my prior conclusion that the remaining disputes concerning temporality concern the
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Those issues are properly
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reserved for the factfinder, particularly where Defendants have not presented any
new evidence that “directly contradict[s] or challenge[s]” my 2020 findings on this
factor. (Apr. 30, 2024 Memorandum Order at 5.)
For these reasons, I recommend that the Court find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Plaintiffs’ experts have reliably applied the Bradford Hill framework
in assessing general causation. The experts reviewed the relevant scientific literature,
addressed 	limitations 	and 	sources 	of 	uncertainty, 	and 	articulated 	reasoned
explanations for how they weighed each factor in reaching their conclusions. To the
extent Defendants challenge the experts’ conclusions or the relative weight assigned
to particular Bradford Hill factors, those arguments reflect disputes over evidentiary
weight rather than methodological reliability. Such disagreements are fodder for
cross-examination and competing expert testimony, but not for exclusion under Rule
702.
6. 	Asbestos
In addition to their General Causation motion papers, Defendants also move
to 	exclude 	the 	opinions 	of 	sixteen 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts 	who, 	according 	to
Defendants, “piggyback off of Drs. Longo and Rigler’s testing and opine that the
alleged asbestos in cosmetic talc causes ovarian cancer.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83.)
In my prior Opinion, I considered this issue within the scope of the “analogy” factor
under the Bradford Hill analysis. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 184–
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85. I explained that “[t]here is no dispute that asbestos is carcinogenic,” and that
IARC has classified the types of asbestos that had been found in talc (anthophyllite
and tremolite) with the type that Defendants argue the literature shows can cause
ovarian cancer (crocidolite). Id. As discussed below, Defendants raise similar
arguments in the context of their Motion to Exclude Asbestos-Related Opinions.
(See Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 88–93.) Therefore, due to the importance of this issue
and for the parties’ and the Court’s benefit, I will provide a fulsome review of the
evidence and arguments in this Report and Recommendation. Accordingly, this
portion of the Report and Recommendation applies as well to the three experts who
have not issued new reports since the prior round of motion practice—Drs. Carson,
Kane, and Smith. (See Carson Rep.; Kane Rep.; Smith Rep.) I further note that, in
support of their asbestos-related motion, Defendants attach the reports of the
remaining thirteen challenged experts that predate the 2024 supplemental reports
many of those experts later issued addressing general causation and the Bradford
Hill factors. (See Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83 n.212.) Plaintiffs do not attach the
experts’ 2024 supplemental reports to their Opposition. Accordingly, for purposes
of this portion of the Report and Recommendation, I limit my analysis to the expert
reports submitted by Defendants in support of the asbestos motion.81
81 	Defendants also challenge Dr. Godleski’s case-specific expert reports for the Newsome and
Gallardo Plaintiffs, which I do not address here. (See Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83 n.212.)
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The sum total of what Defendants seek to exclude is the Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions that asbestos can cause ovarian cancer. Specifically, Defendants argue that
I should exclude such opinions because (1) the studies that the experts rely on to
demonstrate an association with ovarian cancer are “confounded by peritoneal
mesothelioma diagnoses,” (2) the literature “does not support an association between
asbestos and ovarian cancer at the levels described by Dr. Longo and Dr. Rigler,”
and (3) the studies the experts rely on involve a different type of asbestos
(crocidolite) than that detected in talc (chrysotile and non-crocidolite amphibole
types). (Id. at 88–93.) In support of their mesothelioma confounding claim, they
reason that Reid 201182 and Slomovitz 202183 explained that “until very recently
peritoneal 	mesothelioma 	was 	often 	misdiagnosed 	as 	ovarian 	cancer,” 	which,
according to Defendants, “rais[es] a significant likelihood that the ovarian cancer
cases associated with occupational asbestos exposure in prior studies were actually
cases of mesothelioma.” (Id. at 88–89 (internal quotation marks omitted).)
Next, Defendants emphasize that most of the studies Plaintiffs’ experts cite
examined “high levels of occupational exposure to the most potent forms of
asbestos,” which are “not remotely comparable” to the low levels of asbestos Drs.
82 	Allison Reid et al., Does Exposure to Asbestos Cause Ovarian Cancer? A Systematic
Literature Review and Meta-Analysis, 20 Cancer Epidemiol. Biomarkers & Prev. (7), 1287 (2011)
(ECF No. 33016-34 (“Reid 2011”)).
83 	Brian Slomovitz et al., Asbestos and Ovarian Cancer: Examining the Historical Evidence,
31 Int’l J Gynecol. Cancer (1), 122 (2021) (ECF No. 33017-7 (“Slomovitz 2021”)).
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Longo and Rigler detected in Defendants’ talcum powder products—arguing that
“[c]ourts routinely reject” those types of analogies. (Id. at 89 & n.229 (collecting
cases), 90.) They add that the studies of “non-occupational environmental exposure
to asbestos have not found a statistically significant association” to ovarian cancer.
(Id. at 90–91 (emphasis omitted).) Finally, they assert that the studies Plaintiffs’
experts invoke “primarily involve exposure to large amounts of crocidolite asbestos,
which is not alleged to be a contaminant of talc.” (Id. at 91.)
Plaintiffs respond that major regulatory and health bodies—including IARC,
the NCI, the EPA, and the multi-agency IWGACP—recognize asbestos as a human
carcinogen 	that 	causes 	ovarian 	cancer 	without 	confining 	that 	conclusion 	to
occupational settings, and that IARC’s 2012 evaluation (reaffirmed in 2024) applies
to all six asbestos fiber types and expressly encompasses talc containing asbestiform
fibers.84 (Pls.’ Asbestos Br. at 76–77, 87–90.) Plaintiffs quote extensively from
84 	Defendants also move to exclude certain Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions on the ground that
elongated non-asbestiform talc fibers—which Defendants label “fibrous talc”—cannot cause
cancer. (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 97–102.) The record, however, does not support Defendants’
characterization of Plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony. The terminology used by the parties and experts
warrants clarification. Defendants use the term “fibrous talc” to refer to talc fibers that are non-
asbestiform and, in their view, distinct from asbestos. Plaintiffs’ experts, by contrast, use the term
“fibrous talc” to denote talc that occurs in an asbestiform habit—that is, asbestiform talc. As
reflected in the scientific literature, “fibrous talc” is not a term of art with a single meaning and
may be used to describe talc that occurs either in an asbestiform or non-asbestiform habit. This
distinction is critical to understanding the scope of the opinions at issue. Relying on IARC’s
classifications, Plaintiffs’ experts opined that exposure to asbestos and to asbestiform talc can
cause ovarian cancer. (See, e.g., Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br. at 77 (citing IARC 2012’s conclusion that
exposure to asbestos of six fiber types and to asbestiform talc causes ovarian cancer); see also,
e.g., McTiernan Rep. at 10; Wolf Rep. at 76.) A review of the expert reports and deposition
testimony demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ experts consistently confined their opinions to asbestiform
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IARC Monographs vol. 100C to demonstrate that the agency “considered all
published 	occupational 	exposure 	studies 	and 	non-occupational 	environmental
studies” to arrive at its conclusion that “‘a causal association . . . was clearly
established.’” (Id. at 78–79 (quoting IARC 2012 at 256).) Plaintiffs reason that the
sources their experts cite “considered the genital application of talcum powder as a
primary route of asbestos exposure for the general population,” referring specifically
to “dermal contact (i.e. through perineal application of talcum powders),” and did
not limit their findings to only heavy occupational exposure, although “they clearly
could have done so” if that was the authors’ intention. (Id. at 79 (quoting IARC 2012
at 232).) They further add that the FDA, NCI, and EPA also do not “limit their
conclusions . . . to occupational exposure,” again, despite recognizing that the
majority of the relevant data studied that type of exposure. (Id. at 80–82.)
Plaintiffs also dispute Defendants’ contention that “the amount of exposure is
negligible” in the bellwether cases, reiterating that those individual plaintiffs “used
and applied Johnsons Baby Powder and/or Shower to Shower in their genital area
daily for decades.” (Id. at 83–84.) Rejecting Defendants’ mesothelioma confounder
argument, they add that IARC considered and largely discounted misdiagnosis as an
talc and did not define “fibrous talc” as elongated, non-asbestiform talc fibers. (See, e.g.,
McTiernan Rep. at 10 (“Talc fibers grown in an asbestiform habit are often referred to as ‘fibrous
talc.’”); Plunkett Rep. ¶ 101 (noting that fibrous talc contains “asbestiform fibers”).) Because these
experts’ opinions are limited to asbestiform talc and those opinions reliably flow from IARC’s
similar treatment of asbestos and talc grown in an asbestiform habit, Defendants’ argument is
premised in part on a terminological mismatch rather than a substantive disagreement.
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explanation, and that more recent meta-analyses (e.g., Kim 202385; Turati 202386)
report statistically significant associations and conclude that misclassification
cannot explain the excess risk. (Id. at 84–87.)
I begin 	by 	reviewing the scientific literature that 	the parties 	interpret
differently, focusing on the studies to which they devote substantive discussion. In
doing 	so, 	I 	note 	that 	the 	parties’ 	dispute 	centers 	primarily 	on 	competing
interpretations of what those studies examined and what conclusions may properly
be drawn from them. Defendants do not meaningfully challenge—indeed, largely do
not address—the methodologies employed by Plaintiffs’ experts, which is the core
inquiry in my gatekeeping role under Rule 702. Instead, Defendants contend that the
scientific literature, properly understood, supports their position. Absent a showing
of methodological deficiencies—such as the improper derivation of conclusions
from the cited studies—that would render Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions unreliable or
insufficient 	to 	satisfy 	the 	preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence 	standard, 	such
disagreements concerning interpretation and evidentiary weight are matters for the
jury, not grounds for exclusion.
The summaries of the relevant studies are as follows:
85 	Seo Young Kim et al., 15 Asbestos Exposure and Ovarian Cancer: A Meta-analysis (1)
Saf. Health Work (2023) (ECF No. 33132-12 Ex. 91) (“Kim 2023”).
86 	Federica Turati et al. Occupational Asbestos Exposure and Ovarian Cancer: Updated
Systematic Review, 73 Occup. Med. (Lond) (9), 532–40 (2023) (ECF No. 33132-12 Ex. 92)
(“Turati 2023”)).
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• 	Reid 2011: This meta-analysis reviewed fourteen cohort and two case-
control studies between 1950 to 2008. (Reid 2011 at 1287.) Inclusive of all
studies, the analysis revealed that the effect size was 1.75 (95% CI, 1.45–
2.10), meaning that a review of all studies “showed a 75% excess risk of
ovarian cancer in women who had been exposed to asbestos.” (Id. at 1287,
1291.) This was attenuated to 1.29 (95% CI, 0.97–1.73) in studies with
confirmed ovarian cancer cases. (Id. at 1287.) Statistically significant
excess mortality or incidence of ovarian cancer was reported in four out of
14 of the cohort studies. (Id. at 1291.) The authors noted that when “[t]aken
without further analysis, women thought to have ovarian cancer had an
increased rate in the meta-analysis if reporting having been exposed to
asbestos, compared with reference populations,” but cautioned that the
result “may have occurred because of disease misclassification,” i.e.,
peritoneal mesothelioma—despite noting that misclassification between
those two diseases could shift numbers either upward or downward. (Id. at
1291, 1293.) The authors also cautioned that there was a “small number of
cases” because “[m]uch fewer women than men have been exposed to
asbestos, particularly in more heavily exposed occupational settings,”
while in domestic exposure, “levels have generally been relatively low so
that risks and hence numbers of cases have also been few.” (Id.) The study
concluded that the actual cases of ovarian cancer were low in an absolute
sense but proportionate in the context of cases in the general reference
population. (Id. at 1288.) The study did not limit its findings to the
occupational 	context, 	but 	rather 	considered 	data 	deriving 	from
environmental exposure as well. (Id. at 1287–88, 1294.)
• 	Camargo 201187: This meta-analysis pooled data from 20 distinct cohorts
of women with documented occupational asbestos exposure in literature
through March 2010. (Camargo 2011 at 1211.) The analysis found an
overall standardized mortality ratio (“SMR”) of 1.77 (95% CI, 1.37–2.28),
leading the authors to conclude that their “study supports the IARC
conclusion that exposure to asbestos is associated with increased risk of
ovarian 	cancer”—a 	conclusion 	they 	asserted 	generally 	across 	both
occupational and non-occupational exposure. (Id. at 1211, 1216.) The
pooled SMRs were also “larger for cohorts exposed predominantly to
crocidolite (SMR = 2.18; 95% CI, 1.40–3.37) or mixed asbestos (SMR =
2.00; 95% CI, 1.41–2.84) than for cohorts exposed to chrysotile (SMR =
87 	Camargo et al., Occupational Exposure to Asbestos and Ovarian Cancer: A Meta-Analysis,
119 Env’t Health Perspectives 1211 (2011) (ECF No. 33017-6 Ex. 100) (“Camargo 2011”).
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1.40; 95% CI, 1.40–3.37).” (Id. at 1214.) The authors noted that “[a] major
concern in interpreting our findings is that until recently it has been very
difficult to distinguish pathologically between peritoneal mesothelioma
and ovarian cancer,” but that they “did not observe a difference in pooled
SMRs between studies with and without pathologic confirmation” of the
disease. (Id. at 1216.) However, the “power of this test was limited because
there were only two studies with pathologic confirmation.” (Id. (internal
citation omitted).) Another limitation was an “inability to account for
nonoccupational risk factors for ovarian cancer other than age,” but that
when “restricted to highly exposed women [the findings are] compatible
with an underlying dose-response effect.” (Id.)
• 	Kim 2023: This study conducted a meta-analysis of occupational and
environmental studies, covering literature through July 2022. (ECF No.
33131 (“Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br.”), Ex. 91 at 1–2.) For data collected after
the 2012 IARC Monograph publication, the results yielded an SMR of 2.04
(95% CI, 1.03–4.05); for the combined analysis of studies before and after
2012, the SMR was 1.72 (95% CI, 1.43–2.06). (Id. at 1.) The authors noted
that crocidolite “is considered the most carcinogenic,” but that the studies
included exposure to chrysotile and amosite, as well as asbestos in “mixed
form.” (Id. at 3.) As do other studies, the authors noted the potential for
misdiagnosis as peritoneal mesothelioma, (id. 	at 2), as well as the
“differentiation between occupational and nonoccupational exposure,” (id.
at 6–7), but when only accounting for occupational exposure cases, “the
overall direction of the effect estimate did not fundamentally alter our
conclusions but rather increased the effect size slightly,” (id. at 6–7).
The IARC 2012 Monograph was published with the objective “to prepare,
with the help of international Working Groups of experts . . . critical reviews and
evaluations of evidence on the carcinogenicity of a wide range of human exposures.”
(IARC 2012 at 12.) “The Monographs are used by national and international
authorities to make risk assessments, formulate decisions concerning preventative
measures, 	provide 	effective 	cancer 	control 	programmes 	and 	decide 	among
alternative options for public health decisions.” (Id. at 13.) These evaluations are
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“scientific, qualitative judgements on the evidence for or against carcinogenicity
provided by the available data.” (Id.) The Working Group “reviews all pertinent
epidemiological studies and cancer bioassays in experimental animals,” and “reports
that have been published or accepted for publication in the openly available scientific
literature.” (Id. at 13–14.)
As relevant here, the IARC 2012 Monograph noted that “published literature
examining the association between asbestos exposure and cancer of the ovaries is
relatively sparse, because the workforce occupationally exposed to asbestos . . . has
been predominantly male.” (Id. at 253.) Despite these limitations, the Working
Group reviewed and synthesized 11 cohort studies in 13 populations—ten analyzing
occupational exposure and three focusing on community-based or residential
exposure. (Id. at 254–59.)88 The Monograph explained that its “conclusions . . . about
asbestos and its carcinogenic risks apply to these six types of fibers [serpentine
mineral chrysotile, actinolite, amosite, anthophyllite, crocidolite, and tremolite]
wherever they are found, and that includes talc containing asbestiform fibers”; in
other words, the Monograph did not limit its findings to crocidolite or any other
particular type of fiber. (Id. at 219.) Having reviewed the data, the Working Group
found “a causal association between exposure to asbestos and cancer of the ovary,
88 	These include many of the same studies the above meta-analyses reviewed, including those
referenced directly in the parties’ briefs, e.g., Acheson 1982, Ferrante 2007, Reid 2008, and Reid
2009.
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based on five strongly positive cohort mortality studies of women with heavy
occupational exposure to asbestos (Acheson et al., 1982; Wignall & Fox, 1982;
Germani et al., 1999; Berry et al., 2000; Magnani et al., 2008),” adding that “[t]he
conclusion received additional support from studies showing that women and girls
with environmental, but not occupational exposure to asbestos (Ferrante et al. 2007;
Reid et al. 2008, 2009) had positive though non-significant increases in both ovarian
cancer incidence and mortality.” (Id. at 256.) The Monograph also concluded that
while exposure can happen in occupational settings, “[c]onsumer products (e.g.,
cosmetics, pharmaceuticals) are the primary sources of exposure to talc for the
general population. Inhalation and dermal contact (i.e. through perineal application
of talcum powders) are the primary routes of exposure.” (Id. at 232 (emphasis
added).)
As 	of 	2024, 	IARC 	classifies 	asbestos 	as 	a 	Group 	1 	carcinogen, 	i.e.
“carcinogenic to humans,” and talc as Group 2A, i.e., a “probable carcinogen.” (ECF
No. 33132-11, 	IARC Monographs Evaluate the Carcinogenicity of Talc and
Acrylonitrile, IARC Monographs vol. 136, Questions & Answers (Q&A), at 5 (July
5, 2024).) IARC explained these classifications as supported by the fact that there is
“sufficient evidence that asbestos causes . . . cancers of the . . . ovary in humans,”
and “contamination of talc with asbestos remains a major concern and may lead to
exposure of workers and the general population,” because as the Working Group
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noted, “contamination of talc products with asbestos has been documented and []
industry standards used to assess talc in cosmetic and pharmaceutical products have
often not been sufficiently sensitive to rule out contamination with asbestos.” (Id.)89
Plaintiffs also rely on similar conclusions reached by the NCI, EPA, and
IWGACP (which includes representatives from the FDA, National Institutes for
Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”), National Institute of Health (“NIH”),
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (“NIEHS”), OSHA, EPA,
Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”), National Institute of Standards
and Technology (“NIST”), and United States Geological Survey (“USGS”)). (See
Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br. at 80–82, 87–88.) They emphasize, for example, that the
IWGACP arrived at the same conclusion that “[e]xposure to asbestos may also lead
to diseases . . . including cancers of the . . . ovaries” in their analyses of cosmetic
talc products—without limiting their findings along fiber-specific or exposure type
grounds. (IWGACP White Paper at 9; see also ECF No. 33132-11, Ex. 84, Final
Rule Regulating Use of and Limiting Exposure to Chrysotile Asbestos (March 28,
89 	Defendants, however, interpret IARC 2024’s conclusions differently. Echoing their
argument writ large, they claim that IARC’s analyses were “based on five studies involving heavy
occupational exposure predominantly to crocidolite asbestos.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 92.) They
therefore do not consider IARC 2024 to support Plaintiffs’ position in this litigation. However, as
discussed above, IARC did not confine its findings to those contexts. Also, during the November
25, 2025 Oral Argument, Defendants invoked the IARC 2025 Monographs in the context of being
“entirely consistent with what the agency put out in 2024”—that is, in their view, finding
“inadequate evidence of an association [between talc and] ovarian cancer”—despite agreeing that
the 2025 documents are not part of the record in this matter. (Nov. 25, 2025 Tr. 10:11 to 13:4.)
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2024) (noting that “[m]any authorities have established causal associations between
asbestos exposures and . . . cancer of the ovary”).)
Having summarized the relevant literature and publications, I next reviewed
the expert reports that Defendants seek to exclude to determine whether the opinions
regarding the potential for asbestos in talc to cause ovarian cancer are grounded in
the application of reliable methodologies. At the outset, I reiterate that neither party
meaningfully tailors its arguments to the methodologies employed by individual
experts. Instead, the parties focus on competing interpretations of what the existing
data demonstrate. Defendants do not challenge the experts’ methodologies in general
terms; rather, they argue for a particular interpretation of the science—namely, that
only crocidolite asbestos, at high doses and through occupational exposure, bears a
causal relationship to ovarian cancer—and criticize Plaintiffs’ experts for reaching
a broader conclusion that exposure to asbestos, in any form and at any level, has the
potential to cause ovarian cancer.
The starting point of my review, however, is an assessment of the experts’
methodologies under Rule 702, including whether their interpretations of the studies
on which they rely are adequately supported. In that regard, I refer to certain expert
reports as illustrative examples of the methodologies employed. To be clear, the
portions of Plaintiffs’ experts’ reports that Defendants seek to exclude here are
distinct from the Bradford Hill analyses addressing the carcinogenic properties of
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talcum powder itself, discussed supra. (See supra Part V.5.) Instead, the challenged
asbestos-related opinions are offered in the causation context to support the
proposition that asbestos is one component of talc that may cause ovarian cancer.
Defendants move to preclude Plaintiffs’ experts from testifying that asbestos can
cause ovarian cancer at all. Thus, the dispute is not whether Plaintiffs’ experts may
opine as to a particular fiber type, exposure level, or dose, but whether asbestos
possesses carcinogenic qualities capable of causing ovarian cancer.
With this in mind, I find that Plaintiffs’ experts undertook a faithful review of
the scientific literature discussed above—including its respective strengths and
limitations—to 	assess 	whether, 	in 	their 	professional 	judgment, 	a 	sufficient
foundation exists to support their opinions that asbestos contained in talc can cause
ovarian cancer. For example, Dr. Smith cited evidence from medical literature that
talcum powder contains asbestos, which accords with Dr. Longo’s and Defendants’
own testing revealing the same result. (Smith Rep. at 18.) She explained that
“[a]sbestos is well known to be one of the most potent human carcinogens,”
including causing ovarian cancer specifically. (Id.) Dr. Smith discussed that the
IARC 2012 Monograph determined that “all forms of asbestos” are carcinogenic,
finding a “causal association” between ovarian cancer and asbestos. (Id.) She cited
Camargo 2011’s finding of an SMR of 1.77 for risk of ovarian cancer mortality,
which “corroborate[d] the finding of the IARC Working Group.” (Id.) Dr. Smith
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acknowledged Defendants’ argument that distinguishing diagnoses of peritoneal
mesothelioma and ovarian cancer “can be difficult,” but cited several studies in
support of her opinion that “[e]ven with such discrimination, asbestos increases
ovarian cancer risk.” (Id. at 19.)
Dr. Kane took a similar methodological approach in arriving at her proffered
opinion. (See Kane Rep. at 29–33.) The doctor reported seeing “evidence that talcum
powder products manufactured by Johnson & Johnson . . . contained and continue
to contain asbestos,” and explained that asbestos has “been identified as [a] known
carcinogen[] by IARC,” adding that NIOSH has determined that there is “no safe
level of asbestos exposure for any type of asbestos fiber.” (Id. at 29 (internal
quotation marks omitted).) After discussing the different asbestos types and how
they may induce inflammation, she noted that despite asbestos’ widely accepted
causative relationship with mesothelioma, “[t]he relationship between asbestos
exposure and ovarian cancer had been less studied.” (Id.) However, she noted, IARC
has “concluded that there is sufficient evidence to show that asbestos exposure can
cause ovarian cancer.” (Id.) Dr. Kane then reviewed the limited literature from the
1960s through the 1980s, which found higher than expected death rates from ovarian
cancer in connection with asbestos exposure—albeit a connection manifested in
small absolute numbers. (Id. at 30.) As part of her report, she also discussed, where
available, 1960s through 2000s studies’ Standardized Incidence Ratio (“SIR”), the
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types of asbestos involved (whether known, unknown, or a mixture of types), and
the magnitude of exposure (i.e., occupational or environmental). (Id. at 30–32.) She
then reviewed the two 2011 meta-analyses, Reid 2011 and Camargo 2011, which
both found evidence of a link between ovarian cancer and asbestos—the latter a
stronger association than the former. (Id. at 33.) Based on her review of this body of
literature, she opined with “a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that asbestos
exposure can cause ovarian cancer,” and that “to the extent that talcum powder
products contain even small amounts of asbestos, the evidence of causation is even
more compelling.” (Id.)
Furthermore, Dr. Smith-Bindman considered the properties of asbestos and
the research of their presence in talc—specifically in Defendants’ products. (See
ECF No. 33016-30 (“Bindman 2d Amend. Rep.”) at 11–12.) She then discussed the
scientific 	findings 	and 	public 	pronouncements 	regarding 	asbestos 	being 	a
carcinogen. (Id. at 12.) She reviewed similar studies to those discussed above to
support IARC’s conclusion that “there is sufficient evidence that asbestos is
carcinogenic in humans (Group 1) and that asbestos causes cancer of the ovary.”
(Id.) She added that “IARC explicitly stated that the findings . . . applied to all forms
of asbestos.” (Id.)
Having summarized these experts’ methodologies, I further note that the
remaining experts employ materially similar approaches—namely, a review of the
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pertinent scientific literature followed by a reasoned synthesis of that evidence—to
reach their respective opinions regarding the association between asbestos exposure
and ovarian cancer. Where, as here, Plaintiffs’ experts seek to testify only that
asbestos contained in talc powder possesses carcinogenic properties capable of
causing ovarian cancer, that methodological consistency supports the reliability of
their opinions under Rule 702. The challenges that Defendants raise here go to the
weight of the testimony and should be reserved for cross-examination, rather than
exclusion.
Against this methodological backdrop, Plaintiffs further point to the policies
and statements of relevant regulatory agencies mentioned supra, which are largely
consonant with the opinions offered by Plaintiffs’ experts. At the outset, I emphasize
that those agency determinations are not themselves the subject of my Rule 702
inquiry, nor do I assess whether the agencies’ conclusions were reached in a manner
that would satisfy the evidentiary standards governing expert admissibility. My
review remains confined to the reliability of the experts’ own methodologies and
analytical processes.
That 	said, 	in 	evaluating 	whether 	Plaintiffs’ 	experts 	employed 	reliable
methods, it is not insignificant that the analytical approaches they adopted mirror
those employed by regulatory bodies charged with assessing the causal relationship
between asbestos exposure and ovarian cancer. Those agencies relied on the same
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general body of scientific literature disputed here and reached conclusions that
substantially align with those of Plaintiffs’ experts. This provides additional support
for the reasonableness of the experts’ methods and their extrapolations from the
available data. In particular, notwithstanding Defendants’ substantive criticisms
regarding asserted limitations in the underlying studies, regulatory agencies have
concluded that the existing evidence is relevant to cosmetic talc products and have
not confined their guidance or warnings to occupational exposures or to particular
asbestos fiber types, such as crocidolite. Viewed in that context, there is adequate
support and basis for Plaintiffs’ experts—having conducted their own independent
review of the literature—to have applied comparable analytical frameworks in
reaching their respective conclusions.
I emphasize that, in reaching the above conclusion, I do not make any
determination as to whether Plaintiffs’ experts are ultimately correct on the merits.
My role at this stage is limited to assessing whether the challenged opinions are more
likely than not grounded in the application of reliable methodologies and are
sufficiently supported to be presented to a jury under Rule 702. Yet, Defendants’
entire argument in this context bears on criticisms of Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusions
drawn from the studies cited by the experts. But whether the experts’ conclusions
are persuasive in light of the full evidentiary record is a matter for the jury to resolve.
I find that Plaintiffs’ experts have not mischaracterized the methods or findings of
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the studies on which they rely. The experts opined at a general level—that asbestos
can cause ovarian cancer—based on a comprehensive review of the relevant
scientific literature. Even if Defendants dispute whether particular agencies or
researchers properly interpreted asbestos exposure data under specific conditions,
Plaintiffs’ experts have not misstated those studies or their results. Rather, they
accurately presented the data and conclusions as part of a broader analytical
framework supporting their opinions.
Nevertheless, Defendants’ substantive critiques of the evidence are not
without force. As they emphasize repeatedly, much of the epidemiological literature
addressing asbestos and ovarian cancer focuses on occupational exposure, and even
within that body of research, data specific to women are limited—an observation
that takes on added significance when contrasted with the ultra-trace levels of
asbestos identified by Drs. Longo and Rigler, ranging from 0.0092% to 0.0000033%.
(Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 90.) These considerations, however, bear on the weight of
the experts’ opinions, not on the reliability of the methodologies they employ in
order to simply opine that asbestos, as a component of talcum powder within
Defendants’ products, can cause cancer.
For that reason, I decline to rely on the non-binding authority Defendants cite
to 	argue 	that 	such 	differences 	compel 	exclusion. 	Those 	cases 	are 	readily
distinguishable. In Boyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 14-286, 2016 WL 705233 (W.D.
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Wis. Feb. 19, 2016), the court addressed whether workers’ alleged asbestos-related
injuries stemmed from occupational or non-occupational exposure in the context of
workers’ compensation exclusivity. The dispositive issue there was the need to
distinguish among different exposure pathways—such as workplace exposure
versus exposure from living or attending school near a facility. Id. at *19. No such
dispute exists here, where all parties agree that the alleged exposure pathway is
cosmetic talc through perineal application.
The remaining cases Defendants invoke are similarly inapposite. Cerna v.
South Florida Bioavailability Clinic, Inc., 815 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
applied the Frye standard rather than Daubert. Sutera v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc.,
986 F. Supp. 655, 662 (D. Mass. 1997) excluded expert testimony where the
plaintiffs had produced no peer-reviewed epidemiological studies demonstrating an
association between the agent and the disease. And Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
439 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. 2014) concerned whether the plaintiffs satisfied Texas
substantive causation standards—not whether any of the exerts’ opinions were the
product of reliable methodology under Rule 702.
As with all expert testimony, Defendants remain free to rigorously challenge
the experts’ assumptions, reasoning, and conclusions through cross-examination and
the presentation of contrary evidence. At this time, I recommend that the Court
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permit these experts to opine on the causative effect of the types of asbestos that Drs.
Longo and Rigler detected in Defendants’ products and ovarian cancer.
7. 	Heavy Metals and Fragrances
Defendants move to exclude Plaintiffs’ experts from testifying that certain
heavy metals and fragrance chemicals found in Defendants’ products contribute to
the ovarian carcinogenicity of Defendants’ talc products. Defendants’ central
contention is that the experts have not established and cannot establish, through
scientific evidence, a causal link between exposure to the heavy metals or fragrance
chemicals allegedly present in Defendants’ talc products and ovarian cancer.
With respect to heavy metals, Defendants generally argue that Plaintiffs’
mineralogy experts, Drs. Robert B. Cook, Ph.D., and Mark Krekeler, Ph.D., “were
primarily asked to opine on mining processes” but they nevertheless “seek to testify
that the heavy metals at issue are human carcinogens” despite having “zero expertise
in biology or medicine.” (ECF No. 33005-2 (“Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances
Br.”) at 8.) They further argue that twelve other Plaintiffs’ causation “experts each
devote a few sentences buried in their otherwise lengthy reports to the purported
opinion that heavy metals are present in [Defendants’ talc products] and that these
substances cause ovarian cancer.” (Id. at 8–9.) Defendants also contend that these
experts’ heavy metal opinions are unreliable and should be excluded. (Id. at 15–26.)
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As to fragrance chemicals, Defendants argue that several of Plaintiffs’
causation experts impermissibly “parrot” the opinions of Plaintiffs’ fragrance
chemicals expert, Dr. Michael Crowley, Ph.D., that the fragrances added to
Defendants’ products contribute to their alleged carcinogenicity. (Id. at 6, 14–15.)
Defendants claim that thirteen of Plaintiffs’ “experts who have no expertise on this
topic and did not undertake their own, independent analysis blindly adopt Dr.
Crowley’s conclusion.” (Id. at 14.) Defendants posit that Dr. Crowley’s opinions,
and those advanced by all experts who simply mechanically repeat Dr. Crowley’s
opinions, “do not pass muster under Rule 702 or Daubert.” (Id. at 27.)
i. 	Consideration 	of 	Defendants’ 	Arguments 	in 	the 	2020
Opinion
Before addressing the substantive aspects of Defendants’ motion, I must first
address the permissible scope, under Judge Shipp’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum
Order, of Defendants’ challenges.
I addressed the issue of heavy metal contamination in my prior Opinion,
specifically as it related to the biological plausibility factor of the Bradford Hill
analysis. In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 172 & n.39. My analysis
discussed the opinions of Dr. Arch Carson as a representative causation expert. See
id. at 172 & n.39. I observed that “Plaintiffs’ general causation experts present two
theories of biological plausibility, both of which are premised on their understanding
that talc contains asbestos and other heavy metals.” Id. at 172. In a corresponding
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footnote, I addressed Defendants’ argument that “Dr. Carson’s testimony—that the
heavy metals contained in talc, i.e., cobalt, chromium, and nickel, may also cause
ovarian cancer—is unreliable, because these metals have not been proven to be
specifically carcinogenic to the ovary.” Id. at n.39.
I permitted Dr. Carson “to testify that it is plausible that, as carcinogens, these
heavy metals may cause ovarian cancer with respect to his Bradford Hill analysis
only.” Id. Dr. Carson explained during the Daubert hearing that “while there are no
studies linking these specific metals to ovarian cancer, they have been identified by
the IARC as carcinogens, and these metals have been linked to specific types of
cancer.” Id. Relying on IARC’s recognition that identification of a carcinogen’s
target organ or tissue does not preclude the possibility that it may cause cancer at
other sites, Dr. Carson “opined that similar to asbestos, the carcinogenic heavy
metals found in talc may plausibly cause other types of cancer, such as ovarian
cancer.” Id. “To the extent Defendants take issue with that opinion,” I stated, “they
may cross-examine Dr. Carson on that basis.” Id.
Defendants argue that their motion addressing heavy metals is appropriate,
under Judge Shipp’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order, because my ruling related
to Dr. Carson “was not a fulsome Daubert analysis” and “did not address any other
experts’ opinions” on the topic of heavy metals. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and
Fragrances Br. at 2.) Defendants have filed a motion to exclude that encompasses all
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experts who opine on the subject of heavy metals and fragrance chemicals. In
addition, Plaintiffs do not object to my consideration of Defendants’ heavy metals
arguments. Based upon Defendants’ arguments, and because my prior ruling was
confined to Dr. Carson’s opinion and did not consider the opinions of other experts
concerning heavy metals, including Drs. Cook and Krekeler, I believe revisiting my
prior analysis is appropriate. Therefore, I will consider the parties’ heavy metal
arguments (including those arguments that relate to Dr. Carson’s opinion) without
limitation. Likewise, because my prior decision did not analyze the admissibility of
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions regarding fragrance chemicals, I will consider the
parties’ arguments on this matter without limitation.
ii. 	Summary 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	Heavy 	Metals 	and 	Fragrances
Experts and Opinions
I begin my analysis of Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’
Opinions Regarding Alleged Heavy Metals and Fragrances by discussing the
relevant experts’ qualifications and summarizing the opinions that concern heavy
metals and/or fragrances. I start by discussing the qualifications and opinions of Drs.
Cook and Krekeler that Plaintiffs seek to offer at trial, followed by the qualifications
and opinions of Dr. Crowley. I then discuss the opinions of other Plaintiffs’ experts
that rely on the opinions of Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and Crowley.
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a. 	Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions
Both Dr. Cook and Dr. Krekeler offer opinions regarding the presence of
heavy metals—such as nickel, chromium, and cobalt—in the mines used by
Defendants and in their talcum powder products.
Dr. Cook holds an E.M. degree in Mining Engineering from the Colorado
School of Mines, and an M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in geology from the University of
Georgia. (ECF No. 33005-5 (“Cook Rep.”) at 2.) He later entered academia, serving
as a professor and, ultimately, as head of the geology department at Auburn
University. (Id.) He has consulted with the United Nations, NASA, the Department
of Defense, and the Department of Justice, and is a registered geologist in Alabama,
Georgia, and Florida. (Id.) He has authored the state mineralogies for Alabama and
Georgia, describing all minerals known to occur in each state, including deposits
containing talc, asbestos, and heavy metals, and has published approximately 100
research papers concerning geology and related subjects. (Id.) His non-academic
experience includes exploration and consulting for mining companies, specifically
concerning the exploration for and mineralogy of talc deposits independent from his
work on this litigation. (Id.)
Dr. Krekeler holds a Ph.D. in Geotechnical Engineering and Earth Science
from the University of Illinois at Chicago and is a tenured Associate Professor in the
Department of Geology and Environmental Earth Science at Miami University in
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Oxford, Ohio. (ECF No. 33005-4 (“Krekeler Rep.”) at 1.) His academic and research
work 	centers 	on 	mineral 	properties 	and 	mineral-based 	geotechnologies, 	with
particular 	emphasis 	on 	metals 	and 	industrial 	minerals 	occurring 	in 	igneous,
sedimentary, and metamorphic systems, among others. (Id.) As reflected in his
curriculum vitae, Dr. Krekeler has authored or co-authored multiple publications on
mining-related topics. (Id.; see also id., Ex. A.) Beyond his scholarship, Dr. Krekeler
has consulted for mining companies on mineral sampling procedures and techniques
and has provided detailed analyses of ore minerals and waste materials. (Id. at 1.)
He also teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in mineralogy, geochemistry,
ore geology, and analytical techniques. (Id.)
Turning to both experts’ opinions, Dr. Cook explained in his report that “talc
deposits can contain asbestos, asbestiform minerals, or minerals containing elevated
levels of heavy metals and arsenic, making their ores potentially unsafe.” (Cook Rep.
at 4 (footnote omitted).) He opined that the Vermont talc deposits used by
Defendants in their talcum powder products “contained high levels of heavy metals
including nickel and chromium, known carcinogens, and cobalt which has been
classified as a possible human carcinogen.” (Id. at 42; see also id. at 4, 37.) Dr. Cook
reached these conclusions after examining, among other things, the mineralogy of
the Vermont talc deposit, Defendants’ testing, and IARC’s 2012 Monographs. (Id.
at 3–4, 11–13, 30–37, 43.) He further opined, based on Defendants’ internal testing,
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that nickel, chromium, and cobalt were present in Defendants’ “finished talc
products in amounts above Johnson & Johnson’s . . . specified limits.” (Id. at 36.)
Dr. Krekeler similarly reported that “talc often is associated with or contains
arsenic, and heavy metals such as cadmium, cobalt, chromium, lead, and nickel.”
(Krekeler Rep. at 31; see also id. at 6–7.) He also reported that “IARC has classified
chromium (Cr) and nickel (Ni) as human carcinogens, and cobalt (Co) as a Group
2B carcinogen, or a possible carcinogen to humans.” (Id. at 6.) Dr. Krekeler opined,
after reviewing various documents and test results related to heavy metals, that there
is sufficient evidence to conclude that the talc mined in Vermont for Defendants’
talcum powder products contained excess amounts of nickel, chromium, and cobalt.
(Id. at 34–39.) Dr. Krekeler further opined that the presence of these heavy metals
at such elevated levels is consistent with the geology of the Vermont talc deposits.
(Id. at 35, 37, 39.)
b. 	Dr. Michael Crowley’s opinions
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Crowley as an expert in chemistry and pharmaceutical
science. (ECF No. 33005-17 (“Crowley Dep.”) at 30:12-19.) Dr. Crowley holds a
Ph.D. in molecular pharmaceutics from the University of Texas. (ECF No. 33005-
14 (“Crowley Rep.”) at 206.) He is the President of Theridian Technologies, LLC, a
pharmaceutical consulting group, and co-founder of Oticara, Inc., a specialty
pharmaceutical company. (Id.) He has consulted for more than fifty companies,
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primarily in the pharmaceutical industry, regarding “proof of concept, formulation
and 	product 	development, drug 	delivery 	and 	clinical 	development, including
generation of FDA regulatory submissions.” (Id. at 15.) He has developed over fifty
formulations that have been tested in human clinical studies and has authored or co-
authored over fifteen clinical study protocols. (Id.) He has also authored or co-
authored over thirty published articles and abstracts and four book chapters. (Id. at
16.) Further, he has served as a reviewer for peer-reviewed journals and is an
inventor on five U.S. patents, as well as multiple foreign patents and pending
applications. (Id.)
Regarding Dr. Crowley’s opinions, the doctor was tasked to evaluate “the
fragrance components of Johnson and Johnson’s talcum powder products and the
question of whether these substances contribute to the development of ovarian
cancer.”90 (Crowley Rep. at 12.) According to Dr. Crowley, “Johnson’s Baby
Powder contains a mixture of 141 fragrance chemicals, some of which are extracts
that are themselves a mixture of chemicals,” and “the Shower to Shower product
contains a fragrance mixture comprising 53 fragrances, some of which are mixtures
themselves.” (Id.) Dr. Crowley opines, after accounting for fragrance chemicals
90 	Dr. Crowley testified in his deposition that some of the substances he reviewed would not
technically be classified as fragrances. (See, e.g., Crowley Dep. at 199:16–20, 342:12–343:3.) For
simplicity, this Report and Recommendation collectively refers to all substances that were the
subject of Dr. Crowley’s analysis as “fragrance chemicals.”
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present in both products, “there are at least 175 fragrance chemicals between the two
products.” (Id.)
In his report, Dr. Crowley answered two questions: (1) “Are the fragrance
chemicals in compliance with governmental and industry standards?” and (2) “Can
the 	fragrance 	chemicals 	in 	the 	talcum 	powder 	products 	contribute 	to 	the
inflammatory properties, toxicity, and potential carcinogenicity of the products?”
(Id.) To answer these questions, Dr. Crowley “conducted an independent review of
the regulatory standards, safety, toxicological, medical, pharmacological and other
scientific literature concerning the fragrance chemicals present in Johnson’s Baby
Powder and Shower to Shower talcum products.” (Id.)
During his deposition, Dr. Crowley stated that he “tried to examine the totality
of the evidence for each and every chemical and collate. . . in a meaningful way to
examine their properties and to answer the questions that were posed to [him].”
(Crowley Dep. at 111:10–15.) Specifically, Dr. Crowley testified as follows
regarding his methodology:
Q. 	What methodology did you use in reaching
your opinions in this case?
A. 	I was given the list of fragrance chemicals. I
set about identifying them. The names of the chemicals
were in the Thomas Dydek report. That often started by
just plugging that into Google or PubChem to see what I
could find.
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After doing that, I would then try to identify a CAS
[Chemical Abstracts Service] number so I could cross-
reference it into various databases and gather the physical
and chemical properties, as well as the safety profile, in
vitro or in vivo studies, and any published or known
pharmacological properties.
I would then go to IFRA [International Fragrance
Association] 	and 	CIR 	[Cosmetic 	Ingredient 	Review]
websites and look at their - the information they had on it,
the FDA [U.S. Food and Drug Administration] website, in
particular the Inactive Ingredient Database.
I looked in some of the journals, specifically Food
and Chemical Toxicology, to see what the studies were. I
looked at the EFSA website, the European Food Safety
Authorities, you know, all the different places that I’ve
identified in my report and gathered as much information
as I could on it.
Once Appendix A and Appendix B [to the report]
were built, then I started classifying them. How many of
them are considered - are classified as irritants? Which
ones are allergens? Which ones are eye irritants? And so
forth.
I also looked at, you know, the RTECS database,
the Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, and
so forth.
(Id. at 109:5–110:16.)
After conducting his review of the fragrance chemicals, and based on his
“education, training, and experience in the fields of molecular pharmaceutics,
chemistry 	and 	drug delivery,” Dr. Crowley concluded that certain 	fragrance
chemicals used by Defendants in their talcum powder products are not in compliance
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with governmental and industry standards. (Crowley Rep. at 65.) Additionally, Dr.
Crowley opined that “the fragrance chemicals in the Johnson & Johnson talcum
powder products contribute to the inflammatory properties, toxicity, and potential
carcinogenicity of these products.” (Crowley Rep. at 66; see also Crowley Dep. at
199:22–200:12 (opining that “perineal application of the talc products is associated
with a higher risk of cancer . . . and fragrance chemicals . . . contribute to that”).) In
summary, he based this opinion on the following:
• 	Only 1 of the 141 fragrance chemicals in the Baby
Powder product have been investigated for safety in the
vagina in a product approved by the FDA.
• 	Only 2 of the 53 chemicals in Shower to Shower have
been investigated for safety in the vagina in a product
approved by the FDA.
• 	Several fragrance chemicals are irritants, sensitizers,
and 	allergens 	that 	can 	cause 	inflammation 	and
oxidative stress.
• 	In vitro and in vivo studies have demonstrated that
several fragrance chemicals have biological activity,
including 	reproductive 	and 	developmental 	effects.
These studies have been published in peer reviewed
scientific journals.
• 	Four 	chemicals 	in 	Johnson 	and 	Johnson’s 	Baby
Powder 	product 	have 	been 	identified 	by 	the
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
as potential carcinogens: styrene, coumarin, eugenal
and d-limone.
• 	Styrene 	has 	been 	recognized 	as 	a 	carcinogen 	by
multiple governmental regulatory bodies.
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• 	The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency considers
p-cresol, 	also 	known 	as 	4-methylphenol, 	to 	be
“possibly carcinogenic.”
• 	p-Cresol was co-carcinogenic and promoted tumors on
mouse skin.
• 	Three 	fragrance 	chemicals 	added 	to 	Johnson 	and
Johnson’s Shower to Shower are included in the IARC
monographs as possible carcinogens: benzophenone,
eugenol and coumarin.
• 	Benzophenone was recently removed from use in foods
by FDA due to histiocytic sarcoma observed in ovaries
and uterus, higher incidences of kidney tumors and
leukemia in animal studies, and in vivo estrogenic
activity.
• 	Musk ketone is suspected of being a carcinogen, and
has been classified as a Category 3 carcinogen by the
Scientific Committee on Health and Environmental
Risks (SCHER)
• 	Methyl Hydrogenated Rosinate is present in Baby
Powder and Shower to Shower. Methyl Hydrogenated
Rosinate is a film former and used to adhere the
fragrance chemicals to the talcum powder.
• 	The safety margins of the 175 fragrance chemicals
were determined for foods (oral administration) or
cosmetics (topical application to the skin).
• 	Only 3 fragrance chemicals are present in an approved
drug product administered to the vagina according to
the FDA IID.
(Crowley Rep. at 65–66.)
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Dr. Crowley clarified, however, that he did not opine that fragrance chemicals
alone can cause or increase the risk of ovarian cancer or other cancers. (Crowley
Dep. at 105:19–106:14.) He was not asked to consider epidemiological evidence
supporting the notion that fragrance chemicals can cause ovarian cancer. (Id. at
199:2–21.) Nor did he independently research individual chemicals found in
Defendants’ product; his task was to review the “totality of the evidence” concerning
the chemicals. (Id. at 126:13–127:11.) He also was unaware of any scientific
publication that links the fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products to human
ovarian cancer. (Id. at 114:9–115:7.)
Dr. Crowley also clarified that he was not asked to, and did not perform, a risk
assessment, exposure assessment, or dose-response analysis in this matter with
respect to any substance. (Id. at 123:5–8, 124:21–125:5.) Importantly, he testified
that he would have been unable to conduct a risk assessment, exposure assessment,
or dose-response analysis because he did not have the exact composition of fragrance
chemicals in Defendants’ products. (See id. at 200:13–202:6, 204:15–22.) According
to Dr. Crowley, the absence of that data also prevented him from opining that
Defendants’ products violated certain regulatory standards as he could not measure
the concentration of a chemical in the product against any regulatory threshold. (See
id. at 328:15–331:2.)
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c. 	Other experts
Several of Plaintiff’s experts refer and/or rely on the analyses of Drs. Cook,
Krekeler, and/or Crowley. These experts include Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, Cote,
Kane, Levy, McTiernan, Moorman, Plunkett, Siemiatycki, Sage, Singh, Smith,
Smith-Bindman, Wolf, and Zelikoff. I discuss each of these experts and their
reference to the analyses of Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and/or Crowley.91
Dr. Carson: Citing the deposition and an exhibit thereto of Julie Pier,92 the
corporate representative of Imerys Talc America, a talc mining company that
supplied Defendants, Dr. Carson noted that Defendants’ talcum powder products
contain nickel and chromium (which are classified as known carcinogens by IARC)
and cobalt (which is classified as a possible carcinogen by IARC). (See Carson Rep.
at 5–6.) At his deposition, Dr. Carson agreed that IARC has not classified nickel,
chromium, and cobalt as carcinogenic to the ovaries. (ECF No. 33005-12 (“Carson
Dep.”) at 300:20–24.)
91 	Defendants seek to exclude the opinions of the following experts with respect to heavy
metals: Drs. Clarke-Pearson, Cote, Kane, Levy, McTiernan, Moorman, Siemiatycki, Sage, Singh,
Smith, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 9 n.24.) Although
Defendants do not specifically seek to exclude Dr. Carson’s opinion on heavy metals, because I
am reviewing the issue of heavy metals without limitation, my analysis applies to his opinion as
well. Defendants seek to exclude the opinions of the following experts with respect to fragrances:
Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, Cote, Kane, Levy, Moorman, Plunkett, Sage, Singh, Smith, Smith-
Bindman, Zelikoff, Wolf, and McTiernan. (Id. at 14 n.42.) The qualifications of these experts are
discussed elsewhere in this Report and Recommendation.
92 	No party appears to have offered the relevant deposition testimony or deposition exhibit
from Ms. Pier’s deposition as an exhibit. It appears that Ms. Pier testified that certain heavy metals
were present in the talc supplied to Defendants by Imerys Talc America.
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Dr. Carson noted that talc contains fragrance chemicals, “some of which have
been shown to produce cancer in laboratory animals.” (Carson Rep. at 6.) He
acknowledged that these fragrance chemicals are “likely to be present in very small
or trace quantities, and likely present a lower level of risk than the major
components, by mass,” but he nonetheless opines that “any additional risks are added
as part of a total risk profile.” (Id.) He has reviewed the report of Dr. Crowley and
concurred that certain fragrance chemicals “may contribute to the inflammatory
properties, toxicity, and potential carcinogenicity of [Defendants’] products.” (Id.
(citing Crowley Rep.).) At his deposition, Dr. Carson admitted that he has never
published on or researched fragrance chemicals. (Carson Dep. at 63:6–18.) He also
admitted that he does not “have the specific formulation or quantities of [the
fragrance chemicals]” in Defendants’ products. (Id. at 73:15–20; see also id. at
175:13–176:9.) He also agreed that “[t]here is no information available to do a dose-
response estimate for the fragrances” in Defendants’ products. (Id. at 174:3–10.) He
could not say what quantity of fragrance chemicals reach the ovaries, but maintains
that the chemicals do reach the ovaries. (Id. at 177:12–19.)
Dr. Clarke-Pearson: Citing the deposition of Ms. Pier, Dr. Clarke-Pearson
noted that talcum powder contains carcinogens including “heavy metals such as
nickel, chromium and cobalt.” (ECF No. 33005-18 (“Clarke-Pearson Rep.”) at 7–8.)
Citing Dr. Crowley’s report, Dr. Clarke-Pearson further noted that talcum powder
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contains “inflammatory agents, toxins, and carcinogens contained in the fragrance
chemicals in talcum powder.” (Id.) In discussing the plausibility factor of his
Bradford Hill analysis, Dr. Clarke-Pearson noted that talc includes numerous
constituents such as . . . heavy metals and/or chemicals contained in fragrances added
to talcum powder, [both] of which cause an inflammatory reaction leading to
carcinogenesis.” (Id. at 13.) At his deposition, Dr. Clarke-Pearson clarified that he
was not opining that any individual component of talcum powder, such as heavy
metals or fragrance chemicals, independently causes ovarian cancer, but rather that
talcum powder as a whole causes ovarian cancer. (See ECF No. 33005-43 (“Clarke-
Pearson Dep.”) at 288:11–23.) He further acknowledged that he was unaware of
scientific evidence causally linking the heavy metals and fragrance chemicals
identified in Defendants’ products to ovarian cancer and would defer to IARC as to
the carcinogenicity of those substances. (Id. at 290:19–292:10.) Dr. Clarke-Pearson
further acknowledged that his overall causation opinions in this matter do “[n]ot
necessarily” depend on carcinogenic metals or fragrances. (Id. at 291:16–21.)
Dr. Cote: Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr. Cote opined that talc contains
heavy metals “known to be carcinogenic.” (ECF No. 33005-19 (“Cote Rep.”) at 11.)
She further noted that Defendants’ products contain “fragrance chemicals that have
been identified as carcinogenic or inflammatory agents.” (Id. (citing Crowley Rep.).)
In her opinion, heavy metals “can induce an inflammatory response” once they are
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“present in the fallopian tubes and/or ovaries.” (Id. at 37.) At her deposition, Dr.
Cote acknowledged that she did not search for, and is not aware of, any studies
supporting the theory that trace amounts of heavy metals or fragrances cause ovarian
cancer. (ECF No. 33005-33 (“Cote Dep.”) at 142:24–143:4, 146:25.) Dr. Cote
further acknowledged that heavy metals and fragrances are not “necessary” to her
causation opinion that talcum powder and all its constituents in its entirety can cause
ovarian cancer. (Id. at 147:7–17.)
Dr. Kane: Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr. Kane noted that talc contains
heavy metals such as nickel and chromium, which are known carcinogens, and
cobalt, which has been identified as a possible carcinogen by IARC, and that those
metals provide “additional evidence of biological plausibility for talcum powder
products to cause ovarian cancer.” (Kane Rep. at 5, 29, 36.) She also noted that the
alleged presence of the fragrance chemicals (according to Dr. Crowley’s report) in
Defendants’ products “provides additional evidence of biological plausibility for
causation regarding talc and ovarian cancer.” (Id. at 5, 36.) At her deposition, Dr.
Kane acknowledged that she has not specifically analyzed the biological plausibility
of heavy metals or fragrances as ovarian-cancer-causing agents but considered both
together along with other components of talcum powder in her analysis. (See ECF
No. 33005-39 (“Kane Dep.”) at 133:12–136:1.)
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Dr. Levy: Dr. Levy also noted that talc may contain nickel, chromium, and
cobalt, which have carcinogenic properties based on IARC’s classification of them.
(ECF No. 33005-21 (“Levy Rep.”) at 18–20.) According to Dr. Levy, this “supports
the conclusion that talcum powder causes chronic inflammation.” (Id. at 19.) He also
agreed with Dr. Crowley that certain fragrance chemicals added to Defendants’
products 	“contribute 	to 	the 	inflammatory 	properties, 	toxicity, 	and 	potential
carcinogenicity of the products,” and the presence of those chemicals “provides
additional evidence of biological plausibility for talcum powder and ovarian cancer.”
(Id.) At his deposition, Dr. Levy explained that his opinion concerned “the totality
of talc and its components,” and that he had not “performed an analysis to
specifically break apart the relative contributions of any components that may or
may not be present in talc.” (ECF No. 33005-36 (“Levy Dep.”) at 118:9–18; see also
id. at 127:10–24.) He conceded that he did not “specifically look at heavy metals”
in his analysis. (Id. at 155:24–156:12.)
Dr. McTiernan: Dr. McTiernan noted that IARC concluded that “chromium
and nickel are Group 1 human carcinogens” and cobalt is a “possible carcinogen.”
(ECF No. 33005-22 (“McTiernan Rep.”) at 87–88.) Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr.
McTiernan noted that all three metals have been found in Defendants’ products. (Id.)
She concluded that the presence of heavy metals and fragrance chemicals “have been
shown to induce cancer” through “inflammatory response which mediates oxidative
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stress, release of cytokines and resulting genotoxicity which can induce malignant
transformation.” (Id. at 101.) At her deposition, Dr. McTiernan testified that she does
not have “evidence one way or the other” as to whether Defendants’ products contain
any chromium, nickel, and cobalt, and did not address that question. (ECF No.
33005-31 (“McTiernan Dep.”) at 270:20–272:10.)
Dr. Moorman: Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr. Moorman noted that talcum
powder contains chromium and nickel, which are established carcinogens, and
cobalt which is considered a possible carcinogen based on IARC’s findings.
(Moorman Rep. at 35.) She also reviewed and agreed with Dr. Crowley’s report, and
thus concluded that the presence of heavy metals and fragrance chemicals “provide
further evidence that exposure to talc products could result in cancer[.]” (Id. at 35.)
At her deposition, Dr. Moorman acknowledged that she had not independently
reviewed scientific evidence that heavy metals in cosmetic talc powders cause
ovarian cancer to reach her opinion. (ECF No. 33005-40 (“Moorman Dep.”) at
120:16–121:6.) She also admitted that she did not consider any evidence beyond an
IARC 	monograph 	in 	determining 	that 	nickel, 	chromium, 	and 	cobalt 	were
carcinogenic. (Id. at 122:12–123:6.)
Dr. Plunkett: Citing Dr. Crowley’s report, Dr. Plunkett noted that several of
the fragrance chemicals used in Defendants’ product “have been associated with
potential carcinogenic activity.” (Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶ 36.) Citing Ms. Pier’s
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deposition and other documents produced by Defendants, Dr. Plunkett also noted
that Defendants’ product contains heavy metals “known to be carcinogenic in
animals and/or humans.” (Id. ¶ 37.) At her deposition, Dr. Plunkett acknowledged
that she has not “attempted to define an independent risk” for chromium, nickel, and
cobalt individually, or for fragrances. (ECF No. 33005-13 (“Plunkett 2021 Dep.”) at
271:24–272:8; see also id. at 274:5–275:25.) In her view, because those metals share
a similar mechanism to talc, she factored them into her risk assessment for talc
overall. (See id. at 272:9–273:6.) She testified that when faced with the presence of
multiple . . . carcinogens with similar mechanisms of action, you would assume in
[your] risk assessment that those risks could be additive.” (Id. at 275:9–25.)
Dr. Sage: Dr. Sage opined that “[t]alcum powder products contain or may
contain ingredients that pose health hazards to consumers.” (ECF No. 33005-24
(“Sage Rep.”) at 5.) Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr. Sage noted that these
ingredients include chromium and nickel (both known carcinogens), and cobalt (a
possible carcinogen). He also adopted Dr. Crowley’s opinion that the talc products
contain fragrance chemicals that are “potential and known carcinogens, toxins, and
allergens.” (Id. at 6.) Dr. Sage further opined that certain of these ingredients “could
be considered adulterants in talcum powder products.” (Id. at 7.) At his deposition,
however, Dr. Sage clarified that he is “not offering an opinion as a scientific expert
as to whether . . . talcum powder exposure causes ovarian cancer” or an opinion “on
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the causal connection between any one of the[] particular ingredients [found in
talcum powder] and any particular health injury.” (ECF No. 33005-35 (“Sage Dep.”)
at 292:14–20.) Dr. Sage further acknowledged that he did not independently
investigate any scientific evidence linking heavy metals to a risk of ovarian cancer.
(See id. at 293:10–21.)
Dr. 	Siemiatycki: 	Dr. 	Siemiatycki 	noted 	that 	talcum 	powder 	products
generally contain “carcinogens, namely nickel and chromium.”93 (Siemiatycki 3d
Amend. Rep. at 27.) But he conceded that the “extent of the contamination of talcum
powder products by these metals, during the entire period of commercial production
of talcum powder products over the past several decades” is unknown. (Id.) He
further conceded that how exposures to the metals in the products “measure up to
the exposure levels to these metals that may cause cancer” is also unknown. (Id.) In
opining that there is a biologically plausible mechanism through which talc can
cause ovarian cancer, Dr. Siemiatycki opined that “there is also evidence that
commercially-distributed 	talc 	powder 	contained 	some 	heavy 	metals 	that 	are
themselves carcinogenic.” (Id. at 73–74.) At his deposition, Dr. Siemiatycki clarified
that, in his opinions on talcum powder, he was not relying on observations that
93 	Dr. Siemiatycki does not identify his basis for noting that Defendants’ products contain
potentially carcinogenic heavy metals, but he includes in the references section of his report the
Deposition of Julie Pier, the same source that most Plaintiffs’ causation experts cite in support of
their opinions that Defendants’ products contain heavy metals. (Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep., Ex.
B, at 7.)
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Defendants’ products contain heavy metal. (See ECF No. 33005-38 (“Siemiatycki
Dep.”) at 55:20–56:7.)
Dr. Singh: In connection with his opinion on biological plausibility, Dr. Singh
noted that “talcum products contain fibrous talc, heavy metals and fragrance
ingredients which are known or suspected carcinogens” based on Ms. Pier’s
deposition. (Singh Rep. at 60.) He opined that “the presence of these known or
suspected carcinogens provides a plausible biologic explanation for the increased
risk seen in the epidemiologic studies.” (Id.) At his deposition, Dr. Singh indicated
that he has not analyzed how much, if any, heavy metal exposure (from talcum
powder) reaches a woman’s ovaries. (ECF No. 33005-42 (“Singh Dep.”) at 184:9–
13.) He also clarified that he is not specifically opining that heavy metals and
fragrance chemicals are causally associated with ovarian cancer. (Id. at 185:15–19,
298:20–300:11.) Nor was he aware of epidemiological evidence supporting the
theory that exposure to trace amounts of chromium, nickel, and cobalt can cause
ovarian cancer. (Id. at 298:20–300:11.)
Dr. Smith: Dr. Smith opined that the heavy metals allegedly in Defendants’
products “likely contribute to the carcinogenicity of talcum powder products by the
inflammatory mechanism” that she elaborated on in her report and is discussed
elsewhere in this Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 33005-27 (“Smith Rep.”)
at 19.) She also agreed with Dr. Crowley’s opinion that certain fragrance chemicals
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“likely contribute to the inflammatory properties, toxicity and/or carcinogenicity” of
Defendants’ products. (Id. at 19.) At her deposition, Dr. Smith admitted that she did
not 	conduct 	a “comprehensive review” of the evidence supporting 	a causal
connection between heavy metals and fragrance chemicals with ovarian cancer. (See
ECF No. 33005-34 (“Smith Dep.”) at 61:3–62:3.)
Dr. Smith-Bindman: Dr. Smith-Bindman opined that carcinogenic heavy
metals such as nickel, chromium, and cobalt “can cause ovarian cancer through an
inflammatory mechanism.” (ECF No. 33005-28 (“Smith-Bindman Rep.”) at 15.)
She also agrees with Dr. Crowley’s opinion that certain fragrance chemicals “may
contribute to the inflammatory response, toxicity, and potential carcinogenicity of
[Defendants’] talcum powder products.” (Id.) At her deposition, Dr. Smith-Bindman
stated that talcum powder contains trace amounts of heavy metals and contains
fragrance chemicals, but she acknowledged that she has only high-level estimates of
the concentration of heavy metals and chemicals in Defendants’ products and
interpreting those concentrations is not part of her expertise. (See ECF No. 33005-
37 (“Smith-Bindman Dep.”) at 138:7–139:21.)
Dr. Wolf: Citing Ms. Pier’s deposition, Dr. Wolf noted that “talcum powder
products have been shown to contain nickel, chromium, and cobalt” and that the
“inflammatory mechanism for carcinogenesis for these metals is similar to that
described for asbestos, fibrous talc, and platy talc.” (ECF No. 33005-29 (“Wolf
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Rep.”) at 12.) She also opined that many of the fragrance chemicals identified by Dr.
Crowley “are known to be irritants, toxins, and carcinogens,” and some “have been
shown to be harmful to the reproductive organs and function.” (Id.) Dr. Wolf
suggested that the “chemicals would be expected to accompany the talcum powder
as it migrates or is transported through the genital tract to the fallopian tubes and
ovaries” and “[a]t least some of these chemicals would also be expected to be
absorbed through the vaginal mucosa.” (Id.) Dr. Wolf opined that the chemicals
“likely contribute to the inflammatory properties, toxicity, and carcinogenicity of
these talcum powder products.” (Id.)
At her deposition, Dr. Wolf agreed that she did not individually evaluate the
data for heavy metals and/or fragrances to assess their causal relationship to ovarian
cancer. (See ECF No. 33005-30 (“Wolf Dep.”) at 399:22–402:12.) She also agreed
that the inflammatory response caused by foreign substances can—but does not
always—cause ovarian cancer. (Id. at 407:5–14.) Dr. Wolf acknowledged that she
was not fully aware of the roles chromium, cobalt, and nickel played in the human
body as potential nutrients. (See id. at 432:17–435:12.) And Dr. Wolf admitted that
the IARC monographs on which she relies do not indicate that chromium, cobalt,
and nickel are carcinogenic to the ovaries. (See id. at 430:15–432:3, 434:7–10.)
Dr. Zelikoff: Citing IARC’s classifications, Dr. Zelikoff noted that nickel and
chromium are known carcinogens and cobalt is a possible or probable carcinogen
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depending on whether it is accompanied by tungsten chloride. (ECF No. 33005-6
(“Zelikoff Rep.”) at 8-10.) She explained that the “exact mechanisms of nickel-
induced carcinogenesis are not known, but likely involve genetic and epigenetic
routes” and aggravation “through the generation of DNA-damaging reactive oxygen
species (ROS) and the inhibition of DNA repair.” (Id. at 8.) She also noted that
animal studies have found “nickel compounds induce tumors at virtually all sites of
application.” (Id. at 9.)
Dr. Zelikoff noted that chromium comes in different forms, including trivalent
and 	hexavalent 	chromium. 	(Id.) 	She 	explained 	that 	hexavalent 	chromium 	is
considered carcinogenic by IARC and has been “shown to cause direct DNA damage
. . . , mutation, genomic instability, aneuploidy, . . . cell transformation,” and “can
cause damage leading to dysfunctional DNA replication, aberrant cell cycle, DNA
strand breaks, dysfunctional DNA repair and DNA-protein crosslinks and directly
causing 	genotoxicity.” 	(Id.) 	Separately, 	Dr. 	Zelikoff 	opined 	that 	chromium
compounds “can activate transcription factors involved in inflammation and tumor
growth” by “cellular integrity and functions.” (Id. at 9–10.)
Dr. 	Zelikoff 	explained 	that 	cobalt 	can 	cause 	genotoxicity 	through 	2
mechanisms: “(1) DNA breakage induced by cobalt metal and especially hard metal
particles, and (2) inhibition of DNA repair by cobalt (II) ions.” (Id. at 10.) Both
mechanisms “contribute to the carcinogenic potential of cobalt compounds.” (Id.)
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With respect to fragrances, Dr. Zelikoff agreed with Dr. Crowley’s conclusion
that certain fragrance chemicals “likely contribute to the inflammatory properties,
toxicity, and carcinogenicity of these talcum powder products.” (Id. at 12.) At her
deposition, Dr. Zelikoff conceded that she did not opine on a specific causal
connection between heavy metals and ovarian cancer. (ECF No. 33005-11 (“Zelikoff
Dep.”) at 281:1–282:1.) She also conceded that she has no information to suggest a
threshold level for which heavy metals increase a woman’s risk for ovarian cancer.
(Id. at 282:2–286:4.)
iii. 	Admissibility Analysis
Defendants challenge the admissibility of certain experts that opine on
whether the heavy metals and fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products cause or
contribute to the causation of ovarian cancer. I address these challenges below in my
independent analysis of the qualifications, reliability, and fit of each expert’s opinion
as it concerns heavy metals and/or fragrances.
a. 	Qualifications and Fit
Defendants challenge certain experts’ qualifications. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals
and Fragrances Br. at 7–15.) Their arguments first address the qualifications of Drs.
Cook and Krekeler to opine that the heavy metals found in talc are carcinogenic. (Id.
at 8–9.) Defendants further challenge the qualifications of other experts who rely on
the opinions of Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and Crowley. (Id. at 8–15.) I follow the same
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sequence below, addressing Defendants’ challenge to Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s
qualifications, and also address Dr. Crowley’s qualifications, before turning to
Defendants’ qualifications arguments regarding the experts who rely on Dr. Cook’s
and Dr. Krekeler’s opinions. In addition, although Defendants do not challenge the
fit of any of the expert opinions discussed above, I must independently assess it.
As noted above, the qualifications element of Rule 702 “requires that the
witness 	possess 	specialized 	expertise.” 	Calhoun, 	350 	F.3d 	at 	321. 	But 	that
requirement is “liberally” construed. Id. (quoting In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741; see
also Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244 (“[I]t is an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony
simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best
qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the specialization that the
court considers most appropriate.” (quoting Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80
F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996))); Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802,
809 (3d Cir. 1997), as amended (Dec. 12, 1997) (“If the expert meets [Rule 702’s]
liberal minimum qualifications, then the level of the expert’s expertise goes to
credibility and weight, not admissibility.”). Even so, “[a]n expert may be generally
qualified but may lack qualifications to testify outside his area of expertise.”
Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 322. Experts “are permitted to rely on materials used by other
experts in developing their own opinions” but may not “simply ‘parrot’ ideas of
other 	experts.” 	In 	re 	Suboxone 	(Buprenorphine 	Hydrochloride 	& 	Naloxone)
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Antitrust Litig., 13-MD-2445, 2020 WL 6887885, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2020)
(citation omitted).
(1) 	Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s qualifications and fit
Defendants argue that Drs. Cook and Krekeler are unqualified to testify that
the heavy metals allegedly in Defendants’ products are carcinogenic because neither
has the necessary expertise to opine on carcinogenicity.94 (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and
Fragrances Br. at 8 (“Although [Drs. Cook and Krekeler] also seek to testify that the
heavy metals at issue are human carcinogens, they have zero expertise in biology or
medicine and expressly disclaimed having the requisite credentials to weigh in on
these specialized topics.”).) Plaintiffs respond that “Drs. Krekeler and Cook do not
provide medical or epidemiological testimony.” (ECF No. 33120 (“Pls.’ Heavy
Metals and Fragrances Opp. Br.”) at 9.) To Plaintiffs’ point, Drs. Cook and Krekeler
disclaim any opinion that heavy metals cause cancer. Despite such a disclaimer, they
nevertheless suggest that certain heavy metals are carcinogenic, citing academic
and/or regulatory sources in support. (See Krekeler Rep. at 6; Cook Rep. at 27–28,
30, 32; ECF No. 33005-9 (“Krekeler Dep.”) at 25:6–22; ECF No. 33005-10 (“Cook
Dep.”) at 17:3–10, 96:20–22.) For example, Dr. Krekeler cited IARC’s classification
94 	Defendants do not appear to challenge Dr. Cook’s or Dr. Krekeler’s qualifications to opine
on the contents of Defendants’ commercial products (aside from the alleged presence of asbestos)
and instead focus on opinions that heavy metals potentially in their products are carcinogens. (See
Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 8.) As further discussed infra, I independently find that
Drs. Cook and Krekeler are qualified to opine to the mineralogic and geologic contents of talc used
by Defendants based on their credentials and experience.
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of chromium, nickel and cobalt as carcinogens in support of his view that they are
carcinogenic. (Krekeler Rep. at 6; see also id. at 33–34, 36–37.) He further explained
that “[a]cademic and research literature have long-recognized many toxic metals
commonly found in talc as known or possible carcinogens, including: Chromium
(Cr), nickel (Ni), cobalt (Co), arsenic (As).” (Id.) Dr. Cook similarly cited IARC
sources in support of the conclusion that arsenic, nickel, chromium, and cobalt are
carcinogens. (Cook Rep. at 27–28, 30, 32.)
I find that Drs. Cook and Krekeler are qualified to identify certain heavy
metals as carcinogens based on their experience in geology and mineralogy under
Rule 702’s liberal standard for qualifications. Notably, and as further discussed
infra, neither expert opines that the heavy metals they discuss cause ovarian cancer.
While identifying a mineral as a carcinogen certainly involves the life-sciences
disciplines, such identification does not unreasonably fall outside of Dr. Cook’s and
Dr. Krekeler’s expertise, which admittedly involves the characterization of minerals
and the evaluation of their “geology,” “mineralogy,” and “geochemistry.” (Krekeler
Dep. at 24:8–24; see Cook Rep. at 6–7 (citing a variety of articles and sources
characterizing certain heavy metals as toxic or carcinogenic from geologic and
industrial publications).) Accordingly, I find both experts’ background and expertise
in identifying and characterizing such minerals to meet Rule 702’s liberal standard
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for expert qualifications. Therefore, I find Drs. Cook and Krekeler qualified to
identify certain heavy metals as carcinogens.
With respect to fit, I note that neither Dr. Cook nor Dr. Krekeler opine that the
heavy metals they discuss cause ovarian cancer. They stop short at identifying the
metals as carcinogens, in contrast from Plaintiffs’ other experts, who affirmatively
opine that heavy metals and/or fragrance chemicals may cause ovarian cancer. As I
conclude infra, those experts do not use reliable methods in reaching their opinions
that heavy metals and/or fragrance chemicals may cause ovarian cancer. Given that
conclusion, I find that Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s opinions generally identifying
certain heavy metals as carcinogenic do not meet Daubert’s fit criterion because they
“lack[] a ‘valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry,’” which is whether the
metals, as constituents of talc, can cause ovarian cancer. Hoefling, 576 F. Supp. 3d
at 278–79 (excluding an expert’s opinion because the expert could only discuss a
substance’s general carcinogenicity, not its tendency to cause the specific cancer the
plaintiff contracted) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591–92); accord Allen v. Pa.
Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he fact that [a chemical] has
been classified as a carcinogen . . . is not probative of the question whether [the
plaintiff’s] cancer was caused by [the chemical].”). Given the lack of fit, allowing
Drs. Cook and Krekeler to testify at trial regarding the heavy metals’ general
carcinogenicity, without reference to ovarian cancer, will likely confuse the issues
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and mislead the jury. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court grant this aspect of
Defendants’ motion and exclude Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s opinions that certain
heavy metals are carcinogenic.
(2) 	Dr. Crowley’s qualifications and fit
Defendants do not appear to challenge Dr. Crowley’s qualifications to opine
on 	the 	contents 	of 	their 	products 	or 	the 	characterization 	of 	those 	contents.
Nonetheless, I independently find that Dr. Crowley is qualified to opine as to the
contents and characterization of Defendants’ products based on his credentials and
his experience as chemist and consultant in the pharmaceutical industry. His work
in 	analyzing 	the 	contents 	of 	potential 	pharmaceutical 	products 	and 	making
recommendations to companies manufacturing those products concerning their risk
mirrors the analysis supporting his opinion. That said, I note that Dr. Crowley
professes no experience as a medical doctor or with cancer but opines that certain
substances are carcinogenic. (Crowley Dep. at 62:10–63:1.) Nor does he have
expertise in cancer. (Id. at 213:21–214:4.) There does not appear to be any dispute
that Dr. Crowley’s opinion that fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products
contribute to the causation meets the fit Daubert criterion. I independently find that
Dr. Crowley’s opinion fits because it concerns the principal causation issue raised
in this case: whether Defendants’ products cause ovarian cancer.
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(3) 	Other experts’ qualifications and fit
Defendants next challenge the qualifications of other experts who rely in part
on the opinions of Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and Crowley. With respect to heavy metals,
Defendants argue that twelve95 of Plaintiffs’ medical experts are unqualified to opine
that heavy metals are present in Defendants’ products or that these substances cause
ovarian cancer. (Id. at 8–13.) Defendants similarly argue that thirteen96 of Plaintiffs’
experts are unqualified to opine that fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products
cause ovarian cancer. (Id. at 14–15.) I first discuss Defendants’ challenges to
experts’ qualifications to opine on heavy metals and then discuss challenges to their
qualifications to opine on fragrances.
(a) 	Heavy metals
Defendants argue that the medical experts relying on Dr. Cook’s and Dr.
Krekeler’s analyses “lack independent knowledge and expertise in this area and
performed no expert analysis of their own on this subject.” (Id. at 9.) They further
argue 	that 	in 	light 	of 	those 	experts’ 	lack 	of 	qualifications, 	their 	opinions
impermissibly parrot the opinions of other experts. (Id. at 13.)
95 	These 	experts 	are 	Drs. 	Clarke-Pearson, 	Cote, 	Kane, 	Levy, 	McTiernan, 	Moorman,
Siemiatycki, Sage, Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances
Br. at 9 n.24.)
96 	These experts are Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson, Cote, Kane, Levy, McTiernan, Moorman,
Plunkett, Sage, Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman, Wolf, and Zelikoff. (Id. at 14 n.42.)
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I agree with Defendants that the causation experts are not qualified to
independently opine on whether Defendants’ products contain heavy metals. As
Plaintiffs point out, they are epidemiologists, geneticists, toxicologists, pathologists,
or other related medical professionals—not mineralogists or mining experts. (See id.
at 8.)
Drs. Cook and Krekeler are mineralogists and, as discussed above, are
qualified to opine on the presence and characterization of heavy metals in the talc
products at issue. Accordingly, to the extent other experts rely on Drs. Cook’s and
Krekeler’s analyses for the proposition that Defendants’ products contain heavy
metals, such reliance is permissible. See Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s
notes to 2000 Amendments (“The term ‘data’ is intended to encompass the reliable
opinions of other experts.”); Fed. R. Evid.703; Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. NL Indus.,
Inc., No. 09-cv-4117, 2017 WL 3568401, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2017) (“In forming
an 	opinion, 	experts 	may 	rely 	on 	other 	experts’ 	opinions,” 	but 	may 	not
“unblinking[ly] rel[y] on those experts’ opinions.”) (alterations in original) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting In re TMI, 193 F.3d at 716); Comm’r of Dep’t of Plan.
Nat. Res. v. Century Aluminum Co., et al., No. 05-cv-62, 2013 WL 4534742, at *4
(D.V.I. Aug. 26, 2013). If there are any weaknesses in Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s
analyses, those are matters of weight. Whether those weaknesses in turn weaken or
impact the analyses of experts who rely on Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s analyses
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is similarly a matter of weight. See In re Suboxone, 2020 WL 6887885, at *5
(“Experts ‘may use a mix of objective data and subjective analysis from another
expert to . . . create an admissible report,’ and the testifying expert’s knowledge
regarding the underlying facts ‘go[es] to the weight accorded to [that expert’s] report
and testimony, rather than its admissibility.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
I.B.E.W. Loc. Union 380 Pension Fund v. Buck Consultants, No. 03-cv-4932, 2008
WL 2265269, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2008)). Accordingly, I conclude that the
causation experts’ lack of qualifications to opine as to the mineral contents of
Defendants’ products is not a basis for outright exclusion. These experts may not
independently opine on the composition of the talc products at issue. They may,
however, rely on the opinions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler regarding the presence of
heavy metals in those products as a factual predicate in rendering their own opinions
on carcinogenicity.
As to the characterization of heavy metals as carcinogenic, I conclude that
most of Plaintiffs’ causation experts are qualified. As noted above, they are experts
in the life-sciences who are qualified to determine whether certain substances cause
cancer. They reviewed literature that they are qualified to review and made a
scientific judgment based on their review. (See, e.g., Clarke-Pearson Rep. at 8; Levy
Rep. at 18–20; McTiernan Rep. at 88; Moorman Rep at 25; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep.
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¶ 37; Singh Rep. at 60; Smith-Bindman Rep. at 15; Wolf Rep. at 13; Zelikoff Rep.
at 8–10.)
The one exception is Dr. Sage. As discussed infra, Dr. Sage’s opinions
concern Defendants’ compliance with various regulations and he does not purport
to offer causation opinions and did not undertake a causation analysis. (Sage Dep. at
118:15–122:3.) Nor does he have the qualifications to do so. Aside from a brief
period working as a physician, Dr. Sage has worked as a corporate lawyer and law
professor. (Sage Rep. ¶¶ 1–9.). Despite that, like Drs. Cook and Krekeler, Dr. Sage
still ventures into offering causation opinion testimony by referring to certain
substances present in Defendants’ products as carcinogens or carcinogenic. (See
Sage Rep. at 5.) Although Dr. Sage has experience with regulations that pertain to
public health, neither he nor Plaintiffs explain why that experience qualifies him to
offer scientific opinions on the carcinogenicity of heavy metals or fragrance
chemicals. Accordingly, I do not find Dr. Sage not qualified to opine as to
causation.97
Finally, Defendants’ arguments that the experts identified above failed to
properly analyze a causal association between heavy metals and ovarian cancer
concern whether the experts’ opinions are reliable, not whether the experts are
qualified to make such an opinion. I therefore consider those arguments below.
97 	I fully discuss Dr. Sage’s opinions and Defendants’ challenges to them infra.
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(b) 	Fragrances
Defendants’ fragrance chemicals challenge concerning Plaintiffs’ causation
experts is premised on their argument that the experts improperly “parrot” Dr.
Crowley’s opinions (i.e., the experts simply incorporate Dr. Crowley’s opinions
without 	any 	independent 	analysis 	or 	validation). 	(Defs.’ 	Heavy 	Metals 	and
Fragrances Br. at 14–15.) However, issues of improper parroting are issues of
methodology, not qualification. See In re TMI, 193 F.3d at 716 (noting that an
expert’s “failure to assess the validity of the opinions of the experts he relied upon
. . . demonstrates that the methodology he used to formulate his opinion was flawed
under Daubert as it was not calculated to produce reliable results.” (emphasis
added)). I therefore consider Defendants’ arguments when assessing the reliability
of Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions on fragrances.
As noted above, where an expert simply serves as the mouthpiece of another,
the expert’s opinions may be inadmissible as the product of unreliable methods. See
In 	re TMI, 193 	F.3d 	at 	715–16. I therefore discuss 	Defendants’ arguments
concerning Plaintiffs’ causation experts below. It does not otherwise appear that
Defendants challenge any of Plaintiffs’ experts’ qualifications to opine on a causal
connection 	between 	ovarian 	cancer 	and 	fragrance 	chemicals. 	Based 	on 	my
independent review, I find all of these experts qualified to opine on whether
fragrance 	chemicals 	are 	carcinogenic 	under 	Rule 	702’s 	liberal 	standard 	for
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qualification for the same reasons that I find them qualified to opine that certain
heavy metals are carcinogenic.
(c) 	Fit
As for the other experts’ fit, as the absence of any challenge to fit suggests,
those experts’ opinions readily fit the issues raised in this litigation. Each opinion
concerns whether heavy metals and/or fragrance chemicals can cause ovarian
cancer, which as noted above, is the central issue in this multidistrict litigation.
Accordingly, I find that each expert satisfies the fit element.
b. 	Reliability
Defendants make several reliability challenges. They challenge Plaintiffs’
experts’ opinions that heavy metals cause ovarian cancer as unreliable. (Defs.’
Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 15–26.) Defendants further challenge Dr.
Crowley’s opinion that fragrance chemicals contribute to the development of ovarian
cancer as the product of unreliable methods. (Id. at 26–43.) As noted above,
Defendants also challenge the opinions of any Plaintiffs’ experts who rely on Dr.
Crowley’s opinion as improper parroting. (Id. at 14–15.)
(1) 	Heavy metals
Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions that heavy metal exposure
can cause ovarian cancer as unreliable on two grounds: (1) the experts cite no
evidence linking heavy metal exposure to ovarian cancer and (2) the experts cite no
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evidence supporting a dose-response relationship between heavy metal exposure and
ovarian cancer. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 15-26.) I address each
of these arguments in turn.
(a) 	Lack of connection to ovarian cancer
With respect to a causal association between heavy metal exposure and
ovarian cancer, Defendants argue that although the experts cite evidence that heavy
metals can be carcinogenic in general, no expert cites evidence showing a specific
link between heavy metal exposure and ovarian cancer. (Id. at 16–21.) Defendants
argue that the experts must present scientific evidence connecting heavy metals to
ovarian cancer—the specific cancer at issue in this litigation—and the lack of
reference to any literature on this issue is fatal. (Id. at 19–20.) Defendants further
argue that these experts’ identification of a biologically plausible mechanism by
which heavy metals cause ovarian cancer is also unreliable. (Id.) They incorporate
their arguments as to the biological plausibility factor in the Bradford Hill analysis
that 	inflammation 	is 	an 	untested 	hypothesis. 	(Id.) 	But 	even 	assuming 	that
inflammation satisfies the biological plausibility factor, Defendants further argue
that there is no evidence that heavy metals cause inflammation in the ovaries.98 (Id.)
98 	As I have already addressed Defendants’ biological plausibility arguments regarding talc,
see supra Part V.B.1, and recommended that the Court admit that portion of Plaintiffs’ experts’
causation opinions, in this section, I only address Defendants’ arguments concerning the lack of
evidence that heavy metals cause inflammation in the ovaries.
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Plaintiffs respond that a specific link between heavy metals and ovarian
cancer is unnecessary because their experts opine that Defendants’ talc products “as
a whole” cause ovarian cancer, and heavy metals are just one constituent. (Pls.’
Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 13–14, 17.) Plaintiffs emphasize evidence that
the heavy metals at issue are carcinogenic in humans. (See id. at 14–16 (citing reports
from IARC, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (“ATSDR”),
and the NTP.)) Plaintiffs also argue that the presence of a biologically plausible
mechanism through which talcum powder (and the heavy metals it may contain)
causes inflammation, and ultimately carcinogenesis, supports their experts’ opinions
that heavy metals contribute to ovarian cancer. (See id. at 13–14.)
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, when analyzing the reliability of general
causation opinions in similar product liability cases, courts across the nation
typically require experts to cite evidence linking the product to the specific medical
condition at issue. See, e.g., Hoefling, 576 F. Supp. 3d at 274; Ruffin v. BP Expl. &
Prod., Inc., 137 F.4th 276, 285 (5th Cir. 2025) (noting, in excluding general
causation expert, that “[w]hile [the expert’s] testimony does link benzo(a)pyrene to
cancer, his connection of it to prostate cancer, [the plaintiff’s] condition, is
lacking.”); see also In re Paulsboro Derailment Cases, 746 Fed. App’x 94, 99 (3d
Cir. 2018) (affirming exclusion of expert where she “admitted during her deposition
that there ‘is no literature’ showing a link between short-term exposure to vinyl
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chloride and [liver] cancer”); In re Roundup, 737 F. Supp. 3d at 905 (“But saying
there is a ‘compelling link’ or an ‘association’ isn’t the same as saying that Roundup
is capable of causing [non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, a type of cancer] in humans—
which is what a plaintiff’s general causation evidence must enable the jury to
conclude.”).
The lack of literature supporting a connection between heavy metal exposure
and ovarian cancer militates in favor of exclusion of the challenged experts’ heavy
metals causation opinions. Although an expert’s opinion “should not be excluded
simply because there is no literature on point,” there must be “other factors that
demonstrate the reliability of the expert’s methodology” to warrant admission.
Schneider, 320 F.3d at 406; see also Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d
1227, 1237 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Causation can be proved even when we don’t know
precisely how the damage occurred, if there is sufficiently compelling proof that the
agent must have caused the damage somehow.”). Here, the only other theory that
Plaintiffs’ experts offer is that the heavy metals at issue may cause inflammation,
which can contribute to ovarian carcinogenicity. (See, e.g., Smith-Bindman Rep. at
15; Smith Rep. at 19; Levy Rep. at 18; Zelikoff Rep. at 12–13.)
Courts have consistently recognized that the existence of a biologically
plausible mechanism, standing alone, does not compensate for the absence of data
supporting general causation. Hoefling, 576 F. Supp. at 274; accord In re Abilify,
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299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308 (“Although biological plausibility, without more, cannot
establish general causation; its existence ‘lends credence to an inference of causality’
drawn from other, more substantial evidence.”); In re Viagra, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 791
(“Biological plausibility thus is only a subsidiary consideration in the larger question
of general causation.”).
Applied here, these cases stand for the principle that even where evidence
suggests a substance is generally carcinogenic or is associated with one type of
cancer, an expert may not, consistent with Daubert, extrapolate from that evidence
to opine that the substance causes a different cancer in the absence of supporting
data. The presence of a biologically plausible mechanism does not cure that
evidentiary gap. An opinion resting solely on such an extrapolation amounts to an
untested hypothesis and does not satisfy Rule 702’s reliability requirements.
Hoefling is particularly instructive. There, the plaintiff’s general causation
expert relied on authorities’ (including IARC) conclusions that smokeless tobacco
caused oral cancer and other oral conditions. 576 F. Supp. 3d at 272.99 The plaintiff,
99 	The Hoefling court’s summary of the basis of the plaintiff’s general causation expert’s
opinion was as follows: (1) [IARC] concluded “[s]mokeless tobacco causes cancers of the oral
cavity”; (2) the U.S. Surgeon General determined smokeless tobacco “can cause cancer and a
number of non-cancerous oral conditions and can lead to nicotine addiction and dependence”; (3)
the American Academy of Otolaryngology (“AAO”) and CDC determined “smokeless tobacco
products contain cancer causing chemicals,” the most harmful of which include tobacco-specific
nitrosamines (“TSNAs”); and (4) every “major public health organization,” such as the WHO,
American Cancer Society and National Cancer Institute, has identified smokeless tobacco as a
“cause of oral cancer.” Id.
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however, contracted tonsil cancer, and the court noted that “IARC did not conclude
smokeless tobacco causes tonsil or oropharyngeal cancer.” Id.; Culliver v. BP Expl.
& Prod., Inc., No. 21-cv-4942, 2024 WL 1478659, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2024)
(“IARC’s designation of benzo[a]pyrene as a carcinogen, generally, is not sufficient
to show it can cause prostate cancer.” (citing Allen, 102 F.3d at 196–97)). The
Hoefling court therefore found that the general causation expert’s analysis was
unreliable because his sources did not justify his view that the defendants’ products
caused tonsil cancer. 576 F. Supp. at 272.
The Hoefling court also rejected the expert’s reliance on a biologically
plausible mechanism as a sufficient basis to opine that smokeless tobacco can cause
tonsil cancer. See id. at 274. The expert’s belief in the mechanism did “not account
for the absence of data to support general causation.” Id.; see also id. at 279 (noting,
with respect to a different general causation expert, that, “like his colleagues, he
ultimately could not move past biological plausibility and identify data to support
general causation”). The court emphasized the expert’s acknowledgment of the “lack
of 	epidemiological 	research 	establishing 	the 	necessary 	causal 	link 	between
smokeless tobacco and tonsil cancer.” Id. However, the court did not reject the
expert’s testimony solely due to the absence of literature or epidemiological
evidence establishing a causal connection between smokeless tobacco and tonsil
cancer. See id. at 275 (“When an expert’s causation opinion is ‘equivocal or
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inconsistent with’ epidemiological research, the expert must ‘thoroughly analyze’
its ‘strengths and weaknesses.’” (quoting In re Zoloft, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 475)). The
court also pointed out that the expert offered no additional support for his opinion
other than a biologically plausible mechanism and the general carcinogenic nature
of smokeless tobacco, and therefore, failed to meet the reliability prong of Daubert.
See id. That the expert made “‘speculative leaps’ in claiming that a causal link exists
simply because it is biologically plausible” demonstrated that his analysis was
unreliable. Id.
Beyond its speculative nature, the Hoefling court also found that the expert’s
opinion was not the product of a reliable scientific methodology. See id. As the
expert had no evidence to shore up his opinion, it was not falsifiable or testable,
which also rendered the opinion unreliable under Daubert. See id. (“But it is
‘impossible to test a hypothesis’ produced by a subjective methodology because only
its ‘creator’ can ‘test[] or falsify[]’ it.” (alterations in original) (quoting In re TMI,
193 F.3d at 703 n.144.)) In sum, the Hoefling court excluded the expert’s opinion
because it was speculative and unscientific. See id. (concluding that the expert’s
opinion that smokeless tobacco “can cause tonsil cancer is not reliable because it is
nothing more than an ‘untested hypothesis’” and because “it is ‘mere subjective
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belief” propped up by biological plausibility rather than an ‘objective inference[]
from the relevant scientific evidence’” (citations omitted)).100
Here, on the subject of heavy metals, Plaintiffs’ experts offer substantially
similar opinions in scope as to those excluded in Hoefling. Each expert relies on a
similar body of literature that heavy metals are generally carcinogenic. (See Clarke-
Pearson Rep. at 7–8 (citing IARC classifications of chromium, cobalt, and nickel);
Carson Rep. at 6–7 (same); Kane Rep. at 5 (same); Levy Rep. at 18–19 (same);
McTiernan Rep. at 85 (same); Moorman Rep. at 7 (same); Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep.
at 26 (citing IARC classifications and NTP classification of chromium and cobalt);
Sage Rep. at 2, 6 (citing IARC classifications); Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 27,
115 (same); Singh Rep. at 14 (citing academic article on mineral characterization of
talcum powder); Smith Rep. at 19 (citing IARC classifications); Smith-Bindman
Rep. at 4 (same); Wolf Rep. at 13 (same); Zelikoff Rep. at 8–10 (same).) Like the
experts in Hoefling, some of Plaintiffs’ causation experts point to the biologically
plausible mechanism as evidence through which heavy metals could cause ovarian
cancer. (See, e.g., Carson Dep. at 171:16–21; Carson Rep. at 8–10; Levy Rep. at 16,
19; Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. at 50–51; Plunkett 2021 Dep. at 268:7–13.)
100 	The Hoefling court excluded the opinions of two other general causation experts with
similar opinions for same reasons. See id. at 276–80.
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Like the Hoefling court, I conclude that the presence of a biologically
plausible mechanism cannot compensate for the lack of data or evidence connecting
heavy metal exposure to ovarian cancer.101 Without such data, Plaintiffs’ experts
have presented only a hypothesis that heavy metal exposure causes ovarian cancer,
albeit such substances are purportedly contained in talc. That is not a reliable method
under Daubert. Additionally, the experts’ analyses do not appear to have considered
a wider body of literature on the subject of heavy metal exposure causing ovarian
cancer through the mechanism they suggest or otherwise. As Defendants point out,
some experts say that consideration of heavy metal exposure is not necessary to their
opinions on the causative effect of talc on ovarian cancer. (See Siemiatycki Dep. at
55:16–56:7; Levy Dep. at 127:5–128:6; Kane Dep. at 133:23–135:2; Moorman Dep.
at 119:10–123:12; Clarke-Pearson Dep. at 291:16–18; Plunkett 2021 Dep. at
271:15–274:16.) Others acknowledge that they have not specifically investigated the
causal connection between heavy metal exposure and ovarian cancer, are unaware
of any evidence that a connection exists, and/or unaware if anyone has investigated
such a connection. (See Clarke-Pearson Dep. at 289:22–291:18; Carson Dep. at
299:18–300:5; Wolf Dep. at 431:23–432:7, 434:7-10; Cote: Dep. at 111:13–21,
101 	It bears emphasis that, with respect to talc, as distinguished from its component parts,
Plaintiffs’ experts do not rely on biological plausibility in isolation. Rather, they conduct a
Bradford Hill analysis that encompasses not only a biologically plausible mechanism by which
talc may cause ovarian cancer, but also a substantial body of epidemiologic, mechanistic, and
observational evidence supporting an association—and, in their view, a causal link—between talc
exposure and ovarian cancer.
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142:24–143:4; Smith Dep. at 61:9–14; Sage Dep. at 293:10–294:2; Singh Dep. at
184:9–13, 298:24–300:6.) These analytical gaps highlight the hypothetical nature of
these experts’ opinions on heavy metal. While future research may substantiate the
causal connection on which Plaintiffs’ experts seek to opine in this litigation, without
such research, I cannot find, on this record, that the experts’ opinions are reliable.
Finally, I am unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument that evidence connecting
heavy metals to ovarian cancer is unnecessary because the experts opine on talcum
powder “as a whole.” (Pls.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 14.) Plaintiffs cite
no legal authority for the proposition that when the Defendants’ product is a mixture
of substances, it is unnecessary to demonstrate evidence of a causal connection for
any potentially harmful constituent substance, when Plaintiffs themselves have
chosen to opine that the constituent substances cause the cancer at issue. Moreover,
Plaintiffs’ experts concede that they cannot establish the relative contribution of
heavy metals and the other substances in Defendants’ talc products to the causation
of ovarian cancer. Nor have Plaintiffs’ experts explained that heavy metals and other
substances act in concert to cause ovarian cancer. This is in contrast with one
substance, asbestos, where Plaintiffs have proffered sufficient evidence causally
associating asbestos with ovarian cancer. But Plaintiffs have failed to do the same
for heavy metals. For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the experts’ opinions
concerning heavy metals should be excluded in their entirety.
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(b) 	Dose-response
Defendants further challenge Plaintiffs’ experts’ heavy metals opinions
because the experts fail to identify a concentration at which heavy metals may cause
cancer. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 21–26.) They argue that the
failure to identify a threshold above which heavy metals are toxic is independently
fatal to the reliability of Plaintiffs’ experts’ causation opinions. (Id.)
Plaintiffs respond that the lack of a dose-response relationship does not
necessarily undermine the reliability of their experts’ opinions, pointing out that
neither Bradford Hill nor qualitative risk assessments require consideration of a
dose-response relationship. (Id. at 24–25.) They also reprise their arguments that the
presence of a biologically plausible mechanism through which talc (as well as the
heavy metals) can cause ovarian cancer overcomes the absence of a dose-response
relationship. (Id. at 24–28.) While I have already recommended that the experts’
heavy metal opinions be excluded, to be complete, I will address this argument as
well.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, courts generally require some evidence of a
dose-response relationship or evidence compensating for the lack of a dose-response
relationship. 	See 	Pinares 	v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., 19-cv-14831, 2023 	WL
2661521, at *3 (11th Cir. Mar. 28, 2023) (“[W]e have never required an expert to
‘give precise numbers about a dose-response relationship,’ . . . we do require an
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expert 	to 	lay 	a 	‘reliable 	groundwork 	for 	determining 	the 	dose-response
relationship.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Williams v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,
889 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2018))); Sutherland v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., No.
04-cv-0129, 2006 WL 6617000, at *11 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2006) (“If an expert offers
no evidence related to the dose-response relationship, there is an unsurmountable
methodology problem.”); Hartle v. FirstEnergy Generation Corp., No. 08-cv-1019,
2014 WL 868913, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2014) (citing McClain, 401 F.3d at 1241
n.6).
This requirement is evident from my 2020 Opinion, which Plaintiffs cite in
support of their argument that no evidence of dose-response is required. (See Pls.’
Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 24 (citing In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F.
Supp. 3d at 179).) As I concluded in the 2020 Opinion, “a strong dose-response is
not necessarily required for an expert to find a causal nexus.” 509 F. Supp. 3d at 17
(emphasis added). Although Plaintiffs and Defendants disputed the strength of the
dose-response relationship concerning talc and ovarian cancer both now and in 2020,
Plaintiffs’ experts provided some evidence of dose-response. See id. (“Even so, the
causation experts have pinpointed studies that demonstrate evidence of dose-
response, i.e., meta-analyses, and adequately explained why the studies, themselves,
are reliable.”). As discussed supra Part V.B.5.iii, the experts’ reference to a body of
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evidence concerning a connection, and dose response, between talc and ovarian
cancer is sufficient under Daubert.
Unlike with talc and asbestos, however, Plaintiffs appear to concede that they
have provided no evidence of a dose-response relationship between heavy metals
and ovarian cancer. (See Pls.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 24–35.) Their
experts similarly appear to concede that there is no evidence of such a relationship.
(See, e.g., Zelikoff Dep. at 282:10–24; Carson Dep. at 169:17–23, 175:6–176:10;
Plunkett 2021 Dep. at 263:24–264:1; Clarke-Pearson Dep. at 292:6–10.)
Turning to Plaintiffs’ arguments in opposition, I first am unpersuaded that the
presence of a biologically plausible mechanism obviates the need to consider a dose-
response relationship. As noted above, Plaintiffs have provided evidence of a dose-
response relationship between both asbestos and talc with ovarian cancer, as well as
a biologically plausible mechanism. Here, they do not have the requisite evidence of
a dose-response relationship with heavy metals.
For similar reasons, I am also unpersuaded that the experts’ use of qualitative
risk assessment and a Bradford Hill analysis on talcum powder generally obviates
the need for a dose-response relationship to establish the reliability of their experts’
opinions concerning heavy metals. I have recommended, based on the fulsome
discussion supra Part V.B.5.iii, that Plaintiffs’ experts may testify that under their
qualitative risk assessments and attendant Bradford Hill analyses of talcum powder
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there is a causative relationship, including a dose-response relationship between talc
and 	ovarian 	cancer—without 	evaluating 	the individual 	constituent 	substances
(except for asbestos) that are included in Defendants’ products, such as heavy
metals. But Plaintiffs seek to offer expert opinions that those heavy metals are
carcinogenic and can contribute to the causation of ovarian cancer. For that scientific
proposition, Plaintiffs must provide a sufficiently reliable analysis under Rule 702
and Daubert, whether it takes the form of qualitative risk assessment, a Bradford
Hill analysis, or some other reliable methodology. Cf. In re Denture Cream Products
Liab. Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 n.28 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“[T]he lack of any
analytic epidemiological studies does weaken Plaintiffs’ experts’ assertion of
causation.”).
Because Plaintiffs’ experts failed to substantiate their opinions on heavy
metal, I recommend that the Court grant Defendants’ motion to exclude Plaintiffs’
causation experts’ opinions that heavy metals contribute to the toxicity and/or
carcinogenicity of Defendants’ products.
(2) 	Dr. Crowley—fragrance chemicals
Defendants challenge the reliability of Dr. Crowley’s opinions. Like their
heavy metals challenge, Defendants argue that Dr. Crowley’s method is unreliable
because (1) he fails to cite evidence linking fragrance chemical exposure to ovarian
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cancers, and (2) and fails to analyze dosage. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances
Br. at 27–43.)
In response, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Crowley does not offer a medical
causation opinion. According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Crowley instead opines on whether
the “chemical properties of J&J’s fragrance chemicals met regulatory standards, and
whether they can contribute to the inflammatory properties, toxicity, and potential
carcinogenicity of the Talcum Powder Products as a whole.” (Pls.’ Heavy Metals
and Fragrances Br. at 32.) As for reliability, Plaintiffs offer similar responses to those
that they offered with respect to heavy metals. Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Crowley’s
methods are reliable based on his past experience as a chemist and in the
pharmaceutical field and were reliably applied here because he followed the methods
he uses in the industry. (Id. at 32–42.) They further respond that there is sufficient
evidence indicating a relationship between certain fragrance chemicals and ovarian
cancer. (Id. at 42–47.) Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that it was unnecessary for Dr.
Crowley to conduct a dose-response assessment. (Id. at 47–52.)
(a) 	Lack of a link to ovarian cancer
At the outset, I disagree with Plaintiffs that Dr. Crowley does not offer an
opinion that concerns medical causation. Even under Plaintiffs’ own formulation,
Dr. Crowley’s opinion that fragrance chemicals “contribute to the inflammatory
properties, toxicity, and potential carcinogenicity” is an opinion suggesting that
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certain 	substances 	in 	Defendants’ 	products 	may 	cause 	cancer. 	(Id. 	at 	32.)
Characterizing 	his 	opinion 	as 	one 	of 	causation 	or 	one 	of 	“contribution 	to
carcinogenicity” is a distinction without difference because the functional import of
the opinion is the same: Dr. Crowley opines that the fragrance chemicals can cause
(or contribute to) ovarian cancer. (Crowley Dep. at 327:14–328:13 (“Q. You’re not
expressing an opinion as to whether or not the chemical substances that you identify
in this section of your report, [Section] 4.8, either cause or contribute to ovarian
cancer. Correct? [objection omitted] A. Actually, I am . . . I’ve stated fairly clearly,
I feel, that, you know, you’ve got a whole bunch of irritants, . . . sensitizers, . . .
allergens, . . . where that talc particle goes, those fragrance chemicals go with it. . . .
[M]any of them – demonstrated biological activity in animal and in vitro cell models
that demonstrates toxicity and carcinogenicity. . . . I think they can absolutely
contribute to the carcinogenicity of the product in total.”).) This conclusion frames
the rest of the analysis of Dr. Crowley’s opinions. As Dr. Crowley seeks to offer
testimony on causation, he is subject to the same standards that I have applied above
to Plaintiffs’ causation experts with respect to talc, asbestos, and heavy metals.
In that regard, on the issue of a scientific link, Dr. Crowley concedes that there
is no evidence of such a connection between the fragrance chemicals and human
ovarian cancer. (See Crowley Dep. at 114:9–15, 199:16–19 (“I am not aware of an
epidemiological study substantiating the causation of ovarian cancer from the so-
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called fragrance chemicals.”), 234:5–20, 252:12–17, 261:18–24, 264:15–23, 271:5–
19.) Dr. Crowley cites several sources that identify certain fragrance chemicals as
generally carcinogenic and cause specific cancers that are not ovarian cancer. (See,
e.g., Crowley Rep. at 12 (citing classifications of chemicals by IARC, NTP, the
EPA); Crowley Dep. at 249:15–252:17; 256:11–257:21; 262:1–8, 264:15–265:24,
276:22–277:3.) 	Dr. 	Crowley 	also 	relies 	on 	animal 	studies, primarily 	studies
involving animal ovary cells to support his opinion.102 (See, e.g., Crowley Rep. at
21, 23–25; Crowley Dep. at 115:14–119:8, 217:12–218:5, 221:20–222:2; see also
Pls.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 43–44 (identifying animal studies Dr.
Crowley relies upon).)
To reiterate, “[g]enerally, courts are ‘reluctant to allow expert testimony based
upon animal studies to prove causation in humans unless there are good grounds to
extrapolate data and results from animals to humans.’” In re Valsartan, 2025 WL
3141002, at *24 (quoting In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 670); see also Leake
v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560, n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“Animal studies
102 	Plaintiffs argue in opposition that certain studies on fragrance chemicals and ovaries would
be unethical. But as Defendants point out, this does not relieve Plaintiffs of their burden to
demonstrate that their expert opinion testimony is reliable. See De Los Santos v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. 21-01208, 2024 WL 3700205, at *23 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 7, 2024) (“Regardless of any
sympathy this Court may have for Plaintiff’s asserted inability to produce such reliable scientific
evidence as controlled experiments firmly establishing the effects of benzene on humans, which
would be unethical, ‘courts may only admit the state of science as it is.’ Thus, this Court does not
today hold that benzene cannot or did not cause Plaintiff’s alleged injuries; only that he has failed
to prove it with reliable evidence.” (quoting Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202
(11th Cir. 2002)).
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may also provide sufficient scientific basis for an expert’s general causation opinion,
provided there are ‘good grounds to extrapolate [the findings] from animals to
humans[.]’”) (alterations in original) (quoting Fabrizi v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., No.
01-cv-289, 2004 WL 1202984, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Jun. 2, 2004)); In re Paraquat, 730
F. Supp. 3d at 808. The level of support for extrapolation required will vary with the
circumstances of the study, but sufficiently reliable extrapolation generally involves
accounting for metabolic and physiological differences between the animals studied
and humans, as well as differences in dosage. See In re Valsartan, 2025 WL
3141002, at *24; Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
Here, Dr. Crowley does not appear to offer any grounds, much less good
grounds, for extrapolating from the animal studies he cites to humans. Indeed, Dr.
Crowley admits that there “is no animal model for ovarian cancer,” which would
logically require that Dr. Crowley offer a strong basis for extrapolating animal data
to humans. (Crowley Dep. at 278:18–279:8); see In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d
at 657 (“[T]here must be good grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans, just
as the methodology of the studies must constitute good grounds to reach conclusions
about the animals themselves. Thus, the requirement of reliability, or ‘good
grounds,’ extends to each step in an expert’s analysis all the way through the step
that connects the work of the expert to the particular case.” (quoting In re Paoli, 35
F.3d at 742–43)).
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Plaintiffs suggest that the fact that Dr. Crowley relied on studies assessing
hamster ovaries is sufficient to extrapolate the hamster study. (See Pls.’ Heavy
Metals and Fragrances Br. at 43–44 (“Dr. Crowley identifies the studies in his report,
and he also listed the fragrance chemicals in Baby Powder that have specifically
been linked to ovarian abnormalities in animal studies at his deposition: [citing
examples].”).) But the identity of the target organ alone is not sufficient. Dr. Crowley
does not discuss whether there are meaningful differences between hamster ovaries
and human ovaries that may impact extrapolating data. Nor does Dr. Crowley
purport to identify any general differences or similarities between humans and
hamsters that would permit the extrapolation of hamster studies to humans. See In
re Valsartan, 2025 WL 3141002, at *25 (“[R]ats typically have much shorter
lifespans than humans, meaning that the timelines of disease in rodents and humans
differ 	considerably.”). 	At 	one 	point, 	Dr. 	Crowley 	notes 	that 	the 	routes 	of
administration (i.e., whether the chemical was administered orally, vaginally, or
through a different route) of the chemical in a study impacts its extrapolation, but he
does not explain how he can effectively extrapolate from a study using oral
administration to the vaginal administration of fragrance chemicals in humans. (See
Crowley Dep. at 269:8–14.)
In 	addition, 	Dr. 	Crowley 	also 	fails 	to 	provide 	a 	reliable 	method 	for
extrapolating the dosages of fragrance chemicals used in the animal studies he cites.
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For example, Dr. Crowley cites to one study concerning eugenol that caused
“endometrial stromal polyps” in the reproductive systems of rats and explains the
dosage used in the study. (See Crowley Dep. at 271:20–273:7.) But he fails to explain
how that dosage can be extrapolated to humans. (See id.) In another example, Dr.
Crowley relies on a 2006 NTP animal study of benzophenone that observed certain
tumors in rats, including in the rats’ ovaries. (Crowley Dep. at 277:17–280:13.) But,
as 	Defendants 	contend, 	the 	rats 	in 	the 	NTP 	were 	given 	different 	doses 	of
benzophenone, and only certain doses resulted in tumors. (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and
Fragrances Br. at 34.) Dr. Crowley does not account for this variation in dose in his
analysis.
Moreover, Dr. Crowley 	only 	offers animal studies to support a causal
connection between certain fragrance chemicals and human ovarian cancer. While
other Plaintiffs’ experts have relied on animal studies, as is discussed elsewhere in
this Report and Recommendation, in those instances, the experts relied on other
forms of evidence as well, such as epidemiological studies. Here, Dr. Crowley offers
only animal studies in support of his opinion and he does not reliably extrapolate
from them or provide a reliable basis to extrapolate from them. Given these failures,
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I recommend that the Court exclude his opinions that fragrance chemicals contribute
to the toxicity and carcinogenicity of Defendants’ products.103
(b) 	Dose-response
As to Dr. Crowley’s alleged failure to consider a dose-response relationship,
I reiterate that the case law generally requires some, but not necessarily strong,
evidence of a dose-response relationship. I am not persuaded that Dr. Crowley has
advanced sufficient evidence concerning dosage to make his opinions reliable.
Plaintiffs argue that they were not given sufficient information for Dr.
Crowley to consider dosage. (Pls.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br. at 47–48.)
However, Plaintiffs do not specify that they sought the information that they now
claim Defendants failed to provide. Neither party clarifies whether Plaintiffs sought
or moved to compel more specific information concerning the concentrations of
various fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products. (See id. at 40–42.) However,
Plaintiffs carry the burden to demonstrate that Dr. Crowley’s opinions are based on
sufficient facts and data under Rule 702. Barring any issues of improper withholding
of relevant discovery information (which does not appear to be the case here, and,
103 	Although I exclude Dr. Crowley’s causation opinion (i.e., fragrance chemicals in talc
contribute to talc’s toxicity) as the product of an unreliable methodology, that exclusion does not
extend to, or undermine, his identification of the fragrance chemicals present in Defendants’ talc
products.
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in any event, is not an issue before me), if Dr. Crowley does not have sufficient facts
and data to support one of his opinions, it is inadmissible.
Nonetheless, 	Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	no 	consideration 	of 	dose-response
concerning the fragrance chemicals is required for the same reasons that it was not
required for heavy metals. (See id. at 48–52.) Plaintiffs first note that consideration
of dose-response is unnecessary when conducting a qualitative risk assessment. (See
id. at 48–49.) Yet Dr. Crowley admits that he did not conduct a risk assessment. (See
Crowley Dep. at 200:13–202:6, 204:15–22.) Nor has any other expert conducted a
qualitative risk assessment specifically focused on fragrance chemicals. Plaintiffs
also raise the presence of a biologically plausible mechanism by which the fragrance
chemical can cause ovarian cancer as support for the reliability of Dr. Crowley’s
opinions. But as I concluded above with respect to heavy metals, the presence of a
biologically plausible mechanism and the general carcinogenicity of the fragrance
chemicals 	alone 	is 	insufficiently 	reliable 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	some 	additional
supporting evidence, such as a more specific connection to ovarian cancer or a dose-
response relationship. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court exclude Dr.
Crowley’s opinions that fragrance chemicals in Defendants’ products contribute to
those products’ toxicity or carcinogenicity.
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(c) 	Other experts’ opinions on fragrance chemicals
As noted above, I construe Defendants’ argument that certain experts merely
“parrot” Dr. Crowley’s opinions as a challenge to the reliability of those experts’
methodologies. 	Simply 	adopting 	or 	repeating 	another 	expert’s 	conclusions—
particularly where, as here, the underlying opinion is itself unreliable—does not
constitute a reliable method under Rule 702. See In re TMI, 193 F.3d at 716.
Accordingly, to the extent any expert’s opinion on the toxicity of fragrance
chemicals in Defendants’ talc products rests solely on uncritical acceptance of Dr.
Crowley’s conclusions, such testimony is subject to exclusion.
Indeed, with one exception discussed below, each expert who offers opinions
regarding fragrance chemicals indicates that he or she reviewed Dr. Crowley’s report
and concurs with its conclusions, or merely cites that report while providing little to
no independent analysis addressing any causal association between fragrance
chemicals and ovarian cancer. (See Carson Rep. at 6 (citing Crowley Rep.); Clarke-
Pearson Rep. at 8 (same); Cote Rep. at 11–12; Kane Rep. at 5 (same); Levy Rep. at
19 (same); McTiernan Rep. at 88 (same); Moorman Rep. at 35; Sage Rep. at 6–7
(same); Singh Rep. at 60 (same); Smith Rep. at 21–22 (concluding that fragrances
contribute to talc’s carcinogenicity without citation or analysis); Smith-Bindman
Rep. at 15 (citing Crowley Rep.); Wolf Rep. at 12–13 (same); Zelikoff Rep. at 12
(same); see also Sage Dep. at 290:6–291:3; Cote Dep. at 110:22–112:2, 144:24–
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147:6; Wolf Dep. at 171:15–174:11; McTiernan Dep. at 272:11–273:16; Smith Dep.
at 61:15–62:3, 331:3–22; Levy Dep. at 122:22–128:6; Kane Dep. at 130:25–131:7.)
Because these experts appear to have accepted Dr. Crowley’s conclusions
wholesale, without undertaking any independent analysis or validation, I conclude
that they impermissibly parrot his opinions in violation of Rule 702. Accordingly, I
recommend that the Court exclude their opinions concerning whether fragrance
chemicals contribute to the toxicity or carcinogenicity of Defendants’ products. See
In re TMI, 193 F.3d at 716 (noting that failure to assess the validity of another
expert’s work warrants exclusion).104
The only exception appears to be Dr. Plunkett, who explains that she did not
rely on Dr. Crowley’s report but reviewed it after completing an independent
analysis. (ECF No. 33005-13 (“Plunkett 2018 Dep.”) at 336:5–339:14; see also
Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶¶ 35–36.) Accordingly, I do not conclude that Dr. Plunkett
improperly parrots Dr. Crowley’s opinions. However, I do otherwise conclude that
104 	As I have not excluded Dr. Crowley’s opinions concerning the contents of Defendants’
products, Dr. Crowley’s work may serve as a factual predicate establishing the presence of specific
fragrance chemicals in the products at issue. Had Plaintiffs’ causation experts then employed
reliable, independent methodologies to assess whether those identified fragrance chemicals cause
ovarian cancer, their opinions could be admissible notwithstanding the exclusion of Dr. Crowley’s
causation conclusions. That is, reliance on Dr. Crowley for the limited purpose of identifying
which fragrance chemicals are present in the talc products is permissible. However, Plaintiffs’
causation experts stopped there, and did not conduct an independent analysis of whether fragrance
chemicals cause ovarian cancer. Instead, they adopted Dr. Crowley’s carcinogenicity conclusions
wholesale, without validation or separate methodological support. Because their opinions merely
echo Dr. Crowley’s excluded causation opinions—rather than applying independent scientific
reasoning to the identified chemicals—they must likewise be excluded under Rule 702.
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Dr. Plunkett’s opinions suffer from the same methodological problems discussed
above with respect to Dr. Crowley’s opinions. Dr. Plunkett similarly has no evidence
to connect any fragrance chemicals specifically to ovarian cancer, (see id. at 275:9–
25), and is similarly unable to determine the relative contribution of any fragrance
chemical to the overall risk of Defendants’ products, (see Plunkett 2018 Dep. at
167:24–171:15). As such, I recommend excluding Dr. Plunket’s causation opinion
of fragrance chemicals in talc.
To summarize my recommendations with respect to Defendants’ motions
concerning heavy metals and fragrance chemicals, I recommend that the Court (i)
exclude the opinions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler insofar as either expert opines that
a substance is carcinogenic for a lack of fit, (ii) exclude Plaintiffs’ experts’
opinions105 that heavy metals cause or contribute to the causation of ovarian cancer
because those experts did not use reliable methods in causally connecting heavy
metals to ovarian cancer, (iii) exclude the causation opinion of Dr. Crowley related
to fragrance chemicals as he similarly did not use reliable methods in causally
connecting those chemicals to ovarian cancer, and (iv) exclude Plaintiffs’ experts’
105 	As noted above, the relevant Plaintiffs’ causation experts are Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson,
Cote, Kane, Levy, McTiernan, Moorman, Siemiatycki, Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman, and Wolf.
As noted above, my recommendation excluding Plaintiffs’ experts’ heavy metals opinions applies
to Dr. Carson’s opinions notwithstanding the reference to Dr. Carson in the 2020 Opinion.
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opinions106 that fragrance chemicals cause or contribute to the causation of ovarian
cancer because, inter alia, those opinions impermissibly parrot Dr. Crowley’s
excluded opinions or are not the product of reliable opinions.107
C. 	Plaintiffs’ 	Motions 	to 	Exclude 	Defendants’ 	Rebuttal 	Experts’
Genetics-Related 	General 	Causation 	Opinions 	and 	Biological
Plausibility Opinions108
Plaintiffs move to exclude portions of the opinions offered by three of
Defendants’ designated gynecologic oncologists—Dr. Cheryl Saenz, Dr. Kevin
Holcomb, and Dr. Michael Finan. (See generally ECF No. 32999-1 (“Pls.’ Finan,
Saenz & Holcomb Br.”).) Plaintiffs also move to exclude portions of the opinions
offered by Dr. Analisa DiFeo, an ovarian cancer researcher, (see ECF No. 33010-1
(“Pls.’ DiFeo Br.”)), Dr. Jennifer Permuth, a molecular epidemiologist, (see ECF
106 	As noted above, the relevant Plaintiffs’ causation experts are Drs. Carson, Clarke-Pearson,
Cote, Kane, Levy, McTiernan, Moorman, Plunkett, Singh, Smith, Smith-Bindman, Wolf, and
Zelikoff.
107 	I do not find that Plaintiffs’ experts’ failure to reliably link heavy metals or fragrance
chemicals to ovarian cancer undermines the admissibility of their opinions that Defendants’ talc
products, considered as a whole, cause ovarian cancer. As explained throughout this section and
elsewhere in this Report and Recommendation, both Plaintiffs and Defendants have consistently
framed the causation inquiry at the product level—examining the carcinogenicity of cosmetic talc
as a whole and its effects on ovarian tissue. Indeed, Defendants’ own experts expressly adopt that
same approach, evaluating talc in its entirety without parsing causation by individual constituents.
(See, e.g., ECF No. 32999-5 (“Saenz Rep.”) at 58; ECF No. 32999-7 (“Finan Rep.”) at 4; ECF No.
32999-6 (“Holcomb Rep.”) at 3.)
108 	As explained above, I will issue a separate Report and Recommendation addressing the
portions of Plaintiffs’ motions seeking to exclude certain of Defendants’ experts’ specific causation
opinions. Therefore, my decisions resolving Plaintiffs’ motions to exclude the opinions and
testimony of Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, Permuth, DiFeo, and Boyd, will not substantively
address these experts’ specific causation opinions or Plaintiffs’ arguments to exclude them. Rather,
I will focus on the opinions of these experts on general causation.
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No. 33001-1 (“Pls.’ Permuth Br.”)), and Dr. Jeff Boyd, a molecular geneticist and
gynecologic cancer researcher, (see ECF No. 33060-1 (“Pls.’ Boyd Br.”)).
As an overview, Plaintiffs challenge: (i) those portions of Defendants’
experts’ 	opinions 	suggesting 	that 	unidentified 	genetic 	mutations, 	yet-to-be-
discovered genetic mutations, and/or genetic variants of uncertain significance
(“VUS”) 	may 	explain 	Plaintiffs’ 	ovarian 	cancers—or 	ovarian 	cancer 	more
generally—on the grounds that such opinions are speculative and insufficiently
supported;109 (ii) certain experts’ biological plausibility opinions as lacking scientific
reliability and posing a risk of confusing or misleading the jury; and (iii) what
Plaintiffs characterize as the application of an incorrect standard for assessing
biological plausibility, which they contend warrants exclusion of related opinions.
Plaintiffs further move to exclude Dr. Boyd’s critique of mechanistic and in vitro
studies, along with any associated biological plausibility conclusions, arguing that
his opinions are not supported by his qualifications, are methodologically unreliable,
and are not relevant to issues the jury must decide.
Given 	the 	substantial 	overlap 	between 	Plaintiffs’ 	arguments 	for, 	and
Defendants’ arguments against, the partial exclusion of Dr. Saenz, Dr. Holcomb, Dr.
Finan, Dr. DiFeo, Dr. Permuth, and Dr. Boyd, I will address common issues in
109 	It is important to note that Plaintiffs are not seeking to exclude the experts’ opinions on
genetic testing as a general matter; rather, Plaintiffs only seek to preclude opinions regarding
unidentified genetic mutations, yet-to-be-discovered genetic mutations, and/or VUS.
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tandem and recommend rulings accordingly based on my assessment of the Parties’
positions. Although Plaintiffs do not contest most of these experts’ qualifications or
opinions, it is necessary to contextualize my forthcoming recommendations in this
section. Therefore, I will first provide an overview of Defendants’ challenged
experts, the scope of their engagement as Defendants’ experts, and their general
causation and biological plausibility opinions. Next, I will evaluate Plaintiffs’
arguments as they apply to Defendants’ experts’ pertinent methodologies and
opinions.
My prior Opinion addressed only Dr. Cheryl Saenz and did not address the
remainder of Defendants’ experts challenged here. See In re Johnson & Johnson,
509 F. Supp. 3d at 192–95. As discussed below, however, my prior Opinion
addressed certain arguments Plaintiffs now raise, which were largely presented
during the first round of motion practice. These arguments will be addressed in turn,
in accordance with the Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order.
1. 	Defendants’ Experts
Defendants offer Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, Finan, DiFeo, Permuth, and Boyd as
rebuttal experts to certain of Plaintiffs’ proffered experts. Each has submitted one or
several expert reports that purport to challenge, among other things, Plaintiffs’
experts’ general causation opinions that perineal use of cosmetic talcum powder
causes ovarian cancer. Many of these experts also offer affirmative opinions based
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on, among other things, their review of epidemiological and mechanistic literature,
their professional experiences, and their independent review of certain Plaintiffs’
experts’ methodologies and opinions.
In 	resolving 	Plaintiffs’ 	motions 	to 	exclude, 	I 	will 	first 	address 	the
qualifications of Defendants’ experts and consider their general causation and
biological plausibility opinions.
i. 	Drs. Saenz, Finan & Holcomb
a. 	Qualifications
Dr. Cheryl C. Saenz is a board-certified gynecologic oncologist with decades
of clinical and academic experience. (See Saenz Rep. at 1–2; see generally id., Ex.
A.) Dr. Saenz earned a B.A. in Biopsychology from Cornell University in 1985,
obtained her M.D. from the University of California, Irvine, in 1991, and completed
residency in Reproductive Medicine at the University of California Medical Center
in San Diego, California, in 1995. (See id. at 2.) During residency, Dr. Saenz was
awarded a Galloway Fellowship at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, and
shortly thereafter became a Fellow in Gynecologic Oncology at Memorial Sloan
Kettering Cancer Center. (Id.)
Dr. Saenz currently serves as a Clinical Professor in the Department of
Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reproductive Sciences at the University of California,
San Diego, where she has served as an attending physician since 1998. (Id. at 1–2 &
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Ex. A.) In her academic and clinical roles, Dr. Saenz has directed multidisciplinary
treatment planning for gynecologic malignancies for over two decades, served as
Chair of the Cancer Committee at the Moores Cancer Center at the University of
California, San Diego, for twelve years, and is the Medical Director of the Strauss
Family Center for the Early Detection of Ovarian Cancer. (Id. at 2–3 & Ex. A.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Dr. Saenz is qualified to act as an expert in gynecologic
oncology.
Dr. Kevin Holcomb is a board-certified gynecologic oncologist who received
his medical degree from New York Medical College, completed residency in
Obstetrics and Gynecology at The New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, and
undertook an American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology-approved fellowship
in Gynecologic Oncology at Downstate Medical Center/Kings County Hospital.
(See Holcomb Rep. at 1.) Following faculty service as an Assistant Professor at
Downstate Medical Center/Kings County Hospital, Dr. Holcomb became Director
of Gynecologic Oncology at Beth Israel Medical Center, and in 2006 returned to
Weill Cornell Medicine/New York‑Presbyterian, where he has served as Director of
Gynecologic Oncology, Vice‑Chairman of Gynecology, Director of Minimally
Invasive Surgery, and Associate Professor and Associate Dean of Admissions at the
Weill-Cornell Medical College. (Id.)
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Clinically, 	Dr. 	Holcomb 	maintains 	a 	high‑volume practice, performing
roughly 200 surgeries annually and managing chemotherapy, immunotherapy, and
targeted therapy for ovarian‑cancer patients. (Id.) Dr. Holcomb describes his clinical
responsibilities to include, among other things, “the identification of genetic,
reproductive, and environmental risk factors.” (Id.) Academically, Dr. Holcomb has
authored 	or 	co‑authored 	more 	than 	90 	peer‑reviewed 	publications, 	leads
multi‑institutional prospective trials, and reviews for leading journals. (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Dr. Holcomb is qualified to act as an expert in
gynecologic oncology.
Dr. Michael A. Finan is a board-certified obstetrician-gynecologist and
gynecologic oncologist with more than three decades of clinical practice. (See Finan
Rep. at 2.) Dr. Finan earned his undergraduate degree from the University of New
Orleans and his medical degree from Louisiana State University Health Sciences
Center in Shreveport, Louisiana. (Id.) Dr. Finan completed his Obstetrics and
Gynecology residency at the University of South Florida in Tampa and at the Tampa
General Hospital, where he received multiple teaching awards and was elected to
the Alpha Omega Alpha Honor Medical Society. (Id. at 2–3.) Dr. Finan was
thereafter accepted into a fellowship in Gynecologic Oncology at the University of
South Florida, with clinical training at the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Tampa
General Hospital. (Id. at 3.)
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Dr. Finan subsequently joined the Ochser Clinic in New Orleans as a
Gynecologic Oncologist, where he maintained a high-volume surgical and clinical
practice, 	directed 	resident 	research, 	and 	later 	served 	as 	the 	Obstetrics 	and
Gynecologic Residency Program Director. (Id.) Dr. Finan joined the University of
South Alabama as a Professor of Gynecologic Oncology in 2005 and the University
of South Alabama Mitchell Cancer Institute in 2007. (Id.) From 2014 to 2018, he
served as Cancer Center Director of the Mitchell Cancer Institute, overseeing
strategic, research, and faculty development initiatives. (Id. at 4–5.) Since 2020, Dr.
Finan has served as Chief of Cancer Services and Chief of Women’s Services for
the Singing River Health System in Mississippi, where he continues an active
clinical gynecologic oncology practice and leads systemwide cancer services,
clinical research oversight, and cancer risk assessment programs that include
“genetic testing and a more intense screening.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiffs do not dispute
that Dr. Finan is qualified to act as an expert in gynecologic oncology.
b. 	Relevant Opinions
Drs. Saenz, Finan, and Holcomb each offer nearly the same five general
causation opinions: (1) established factors—apart from talc—are known to increase
or decrease ovarian cancer risk; (2) the epidemiology does not show that genital talc
use is a risk factor; (3) talc cannot migrate from the perineum to the fallopian tubes
or ovaries; (4) talc does not cause ovarian cancer by inducing inflammation; and (5)
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there is no evidence talc causes malignant transformation of epithelial cells. (See
generally Saenz Rep.; Holcomb Rep.; Finan Rep.)
Drs. Saenz, Finan, and Holcomb also all assert in their respective discussions
of established risk factors that an individual’s genetic predisposition may cause or
contribute to the development of ovarian cancer. As previewed above, Plaintiffs
move to exclude a narrow aspect of these discussions as they generally relate to the
development of ovarian cancer: that presently unidentified genetic mutations, yet-
to-be-discovered genetic mutations, and/or VUS may cause the development of
ovarian cancers.
Dr. Saenz submits a general expert report that evaluates whether genital use
of cosmetic talc causes ovarian cancer and concludes that it does not, based on a
critique of the epidemiology and biological plausibility evidence. (See generally
Saenz Rep.)110
Across all of Dr. Saenz’s reports, Dr. Saenz critiques the expert opinions of
Dr. Judith Wolf and Dr. Daniel Clarke-Pearson on general and specific causation.
(See, e.g., Saenz Rep. at 10, 15, 45, 51; Saenz Converse Rep. at 4–5 (Dr. Clarke-
Pearson); Saenz Judkins Rep. at 5–6 (Dr. Wolf); Saenz Newsome Rep. at 5–6 (Dr.
110 	Dr. Saenz also submits reports containing case-specific opinions regarding Plaintiff
Converse, (see ECF No. 32999-8 (“Saenz Converse Rep.”)), Plaintiff Judkins, (see ECF No.
32999-9 (“Saenz Judkins Rep.”)), Plaintiff Newsome, (see ECF No. 32999-10 (“Saenz Newsome
Rep.”)), and Plaintiff Rausa, (see ECF No. 32999-11 (“Saenz Rausa Rep.”)).
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Clarke-Pearson); Saenz Rausa Rep. at 6–7 (Dr. Clarke-Pearson).) Dr. Saenz also
challenges Dr. Saed’s methodology and conclusions, (see, e.g., Saenz Rep. at 51–
52), and addresses Dr. Godleski’s pathology opinions as to specific Plaintiffs, (see,
e.g., Saenz Converse Rep. at 7–8; Saenz Judkins Rep. at 5–6; Saenz Newsome Rep.
at 5, 7).
Generally, 	Dr. 	Saenz 	opines, 	among 	other 	things, 	that 	hereditary
predisposition 	is 	a 	well-established 	driver 	of 	epithelial 	ovarian 	cancer, 	with
approximately 	70% 	of 	inherited 	cases 	stemming 	from 	BRCA1 	and 	BRCA2
mutations. (See Saenz Rep. at 5–6; see also id. at 13 (“The most influential of [well-
established factors that have been associated with a woman having an increased risk
of developing ovarian cancer] are mutations in genes that can be inherited and
increase the risk of developing ovarian cancer to as high as 50–60% over the course
of a woman’s lifetime.”).) Dr. Saenz emphasizes that genetic testing previously only
tested for BRCA1 and BRCA2; that modern genetic testing examines over 25 genes;
and that “new genes are being identified and added to testing panels every year.”
(See Saenz Rep. at 3, 5–6.)
Dr. Holcomb “was asked to review the relevant scientific literature to furnish
an opinion as to whether perineal use of talcum powder can cause ovarian cancer as
a general matter, and, specifically, whether it caused [Plaintiff] Anna Gallardo to
develop ovarian cancer.” (Holcomb Rep. at 3.) Dr. Holcomb submits a single expert
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report, wherein he critiques Dr. Wolf’s general causation opinions, (see, e.g., id. at
3), Dr. Wolf’s specific causation opinions of Plaintiff Gallardo, (see id. at 3, 29–34),
and Dr. Saed’s methodology and conclusions, (see id. at 26).
Like other defense experts, Dr. Holcomb generally opines, among other
things, that genetic mutations found in the BRCA1 and/or BRCA2 tumor suppressor
genes are major causes of hereditary ovarian cancer. (See id. at 5–6.) But the
“number of genes potentially associated with an increased risk of ovarian cancer is
continually expanding.” (Id. at 6.)
Dr. Finan “was asked to render an opinion as to whether talcum powder can
cause or contribute to the development of ovarian cancer in general, and specifically,
whether it did so with regards to Linda Bondurant.” (See Finan Rep. at 2.) Dr. Finan
also submits a single expert report, wherein he rebuts Dr. Wolf’s general causation
opinions, (see, e.g., id. at 12–13, 45, 50, 55, 61, 64), her specific causation analysis
of Plaintiff Bondurant, (see, e.g., id. at 63–67), and Dr. Saed’s in vitro methodology
and “malignant transformation” claims, (see, e.g., id. at 62).
Dr. Finan asserts, among other things, that approximately 30% of women with
serous ovarian cancer have a known pathogenic germline mutation, the majority of
which 	are 	attributable 	to 	alterations 	in 	BRCA1 	or 	BRCA2. 	(Id. 	at 	7.) 	But
“[a]dditional genetic mutations continue to be identified, with more than 2 dozen
reported mutations related to ovarian cancer having been identified to date.” (Id.)
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According to Dr. Finan, genetic testing is continually evolving, so a negative result
does not exclude a hereditary cause. (Id. at 7–8; see also id. at 64 (“[G]enetic testing
is a dynamic field with new genetic variants found to be associated with ovarian
cancer on a regular basis.”).) Dr. Finan also posits that VUS “are commonly found
to be associated with diseases as further testing is refined over time” and that
“genetic testing is constantly being developed, expanded, and updated.” (Id. at 7.)
ii. 	Dr. DiFeo
a. 	Qualifications
Dr. Analisa DiFeo is an ovarian cancer researcher with more than two decades
of experience in ovarian cancer genetics and biology research. (See ECF No. 33010-
5 (“DiFeo Rep.”) at 2.) Dr. DiFeo earned a B.S. in Biochemistry from the State
University of New York at Binghamton and a Ph.D. in Cancer Genetics from the
Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, followed by postdoctoral training in
Genetics and Genomic Sciences at Mount Sinai. (See id. at 3; see also id., Ex. A at
1.) In 2012, Dr. DiFeo joined Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
as an Assistant Professor in the Division of General Medical Sciences (Oncology),
later holding a joint appointment in Genetics and Genome Sciences, and was named
the Norma C. and Albert I. Geller Designated Professor in Ovarian Cancer Research.
(See id.) While at Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine, Dr. DiFeo
founded and led a research laboratory. (See id. at 3.)
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Recruited in 2018 to the University of Michigan Medical School, Dr. DiFeo
served as a tenured Associate Professor in the Departments of Pathology and
Obstetrics & Gynecology and, as of May 2024, is a tenured Professor in both
departments. (See id. at 3; see also id., Ex. A at 1.) Dr. DiFeo directs the Michigan
Ovarian Cancer Science and Innovation Consortium and co-leads the institution’s
gynecologic 	cancer 	tumor 	repository, 	which 	supports 	extensive 	collaborative
research. (Id. at 2.) Dr. DiFeo’s work focuses on ovarian cancer genetics and
biology, chemotherapy resistance, tumor initiation, and development of patient-
relevant models, resulting in more than 70 peer‑reviewed publications, multiple
federal and foundation awards, and editorial service for several leading journals.
(See id. at 3–5; see also generally id., Ex. A.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that Dr. DiFeo
is qualified to act as an expert in her proffered area of expertise.
b. 	Relevant Opinions
In her expert report, Dr. DiFeo provide[d] “an overview of cancer, what is
known about ovarian cancer, the origins of ovarian cancer, modeling malignant
transformation, bioassays to assess neoplastic transformation, and an overview on
inflammation.” (Id. at 6.). Dr. DiFeo also opined “on the hypothesized role of talc in
ovarian cancer development and discuss[es] numerous concerns with the data
presented” relied upon by Plaintiffs’ experts and “why the results of their research
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do not constitute scientifically sound evidence that cosmetic talc use can cause
ovarian cancer.” (Id.)
Dr. DiFeo largely concurred with Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, and Finan. She
agreed that scientific evidence does not support a causal link between perineal use
of cosmetic talc and ovarian cancer. (See generally DiFeo Rep.) Dr. DiFeo asserted
that epidemiology does not show an increased risk and that there is no evidence of
meaningful transformation, (see, e.g., id. at 27–31), adding further that cosmetic
talc—regardless of its exact constituents or alleged contaminants—does not cause
or contribute to ovarian cancer, (see, e.g., id. at 6). But unlike Drs. Saenz, Holcomb,
and Finan, Dr. DiFeo did not separately opine on known risk factors or migration.
Rather, Dr. DiFeo concluded that cosmetic talc has not been shown to migrate by
way of reliable study, (see, e.g., id. at 28–29), to trigger chronic inflammation
preceding cancer development, (see, e.g., id. at 16–17), or to induce malignant
transformation, (see, e.g., id. at 17–22, 29–50).
To be sure, Dr. DiFeo explained that genetics is an established risk factor for
ovarian cancer. Dr. DiFeo opined, among other things, that while known hereditary
mutations account for a significant share of ovarian cancer causes—“approximately
24% of ovarian cancer[s] diagnosed have at least one predisposing germline
mutation,” with BRCA1 and BRCA2 being the most common at approximately
“18% of the germline mutations”—the genetic picture is incomplete and evolving.
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(See id. at 13.) Even within known pathways, which include at least 16 genes, Dr.
DiFeo asserted that “there are mutations that remain unknown, have an unclear
impact on cancer progression, or cannot be detected by current tests.” (Id.) In Dr.
DiFeo’s view, although certain genes are recognized to predispose individuals to
ovarian cancer, the “exact mutation in those genes”—classified as VUS—may not
be clear. (Id. at 13.) Moreover, beyond new variants in known genes, “new genes
continue to be identified.” (Id. at 13–14.)
iii. 	Dr. Permuth
a. 	Qualifications
Dr. Jennifer Blythe Permuth is a molecular epidemiologist and tenure-track
Associate Professor in the Department of Cancer Epidemiology at the H. Lee Moffitt
Cancer Center and Research Institute in Tampa, Florida, where she also serves as
Vice Chair of Research in Gastrointestinal Oncology. (See ECF No. 33001-5
(“Permuth Rep.”) at 4.) Dr. Permuth holds a B.S. in Biology from the University of
South Florida, an M.S. in Molecular, Cellular, and Developmental Biology and
Genetics with a specialization in Genetic Counseling from the University of
Minnesota, and a doctorate in Epidemiology from the University of South Florida
College of Public Health. (See id.) Beyond her graduate training in genetics, Dr.
Permuth practiced as a genetic counselor, providing counseling and education to
hundreds of women newly diagnosed with ovarian, fallopian tube, and primary
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peritoneal cancers about hereditary risk, testing options, and implications for family
members. (See id.)
Dr. Permuth has a grant-funded research portfolio and has authored more than
100 peer‑reviewed publications, reviews, and book chapters spanning genetics,
epidemiology, molecular biology, and gynecologic and gastrointestinal oncology.
(See id.) Dr. Permuth also serves as a peer reviewer for leading scientific journals
and as a grant reviewer for the National Cancer Institute. (See id.) Plaintiffs do not
dispute that Dr. Permuth is qualified to act as an expert in her proffered area of
expertise.
b. 	Relevant Opinions
In her expert report, Dr. Permuth addressed “causes of and risk factors for
ovarian cancer” and challenged “the fundamental bases of [P]laintiffs’ experts’
hypotheses and contentions regarding talc as a causal agent.” (See id. at 4.)
Throughout her report, Dr. Permuth also provided “commentary” “on the reports
submitted by Plaintiffs’ epidemiology experts,” including, without limitation, Dr.
McTiernan, Dr. Moorman, Dr. Singh, Dr. Smith-Bindman, Dr. Siemiatycki, Dr.
Cote, Dr. Harlow, and Dr. Levy, and specifically addressed specific causation
opinions for Plaintiffs Bondurant, Converse, Judkins, and Newsome. (See, e.g., id.
at 135–47.)
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Like Dr. DiFeo, Dr. Permuth largely shared the conclusions of Drs. Saenz,
Finan, and Holcomb, identifying known risk and protective factors, (see, e.g., id. at
9–52), concluding that the epidemiology did not demonstrate a causal talc-ovarian
cancer relationship, (see, e.g., id. at 53–115), and opining that there is a lack of
evidence 	of 	talc 	carcinogenicity, 	(see, 	e.g., 	id. 	at 	149). 	Instead 	of 	directly
commenting on migration, Dr. Permuth appears to broadly emphasize the failure of
literature to demonstrate migration as a biologically plausible mechanism. (See, e.g.,
id. at 53, 69, 111–12.)
Dr. Permuth opined that genetics and family history are the strongest risk
factors 	for ovarian cancer, with 	first-degree relatives 	of affected 	individuals
experiencing a three- to seven-fold increased risk and women with a prior breast
cancer diagnosis having approximately a 70% increase in risk. (See id. at 9–10.) Dr.
Permuth explained that up to 20% of ovarian cancers arise from “rare, high-penetrant
mutations in genes”—most notably in BRCA1 and BRCA. (See id.) Dr. Permuth
conceded 	that 	although 	BRCA1 	and 	BRCA2 	gene 	mutations 	are 	relatively
uncommon in the general population, they are more prevalent in certain groups such
as those of Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry. (See id. at 10.) Beyond BRCA1 and BRCA2,
Dr. Permuth identifies pathogenetic variants across approximately 20 additional
genes. (See id.)
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iv. 	Dr. Boyd
a. 	Qualifications
Dr. Jeff Boyd is a molecular geneticist and gynecologic cancer researcher with
more than three decades of leadership in oncology research and academic medicine.
(See Boyd Rep. at 2.) Dr. Boyd holds a B.S. from Duke University and an M.S. and
Ph.D. in Toxicology and Biochemistry from North Carolina State University. (Id.)
Dr. Boyd completed postdoctoral training at the Lineberger Comprehensive Cancer
Center of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. (See id.) Subsequently,
Dr. Boyd served as a section head of Gynecologic Pathobiology at the National
Institutes of Health’s National Institute of Environmental Health Science, an
Associate Professor in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Division of
Gynecologic Oncology, and the Department of Genetics, at the University of
Pennsylvania. (See id.)
From 1997 to 2006, Dr. Boyd directed the Gynecologic and Breast Research
Laboratory in Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center’s Department of Surgery,
and the Diagnostic Molecular Genetics Laboratory in Memorial Sloan Kettering
Cancer Center’s Department of Medicine. (Id.) Dr. Boyd later held senior research
and academic leadership roles at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, the
Anderson Cancer Institute at the Memorial University Medical Center, and the
Mercer University School of Medicine. (Id.)
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Dr. Boyd now serves as Director of the Institute of Cancer Research at the
Feinstein Institutes (Northwell Health), and Vice President, Chief Scientific Officer,
and Director of the Northwell Health Cancer Institute’s Center for Genomic
Medicine, 	with 	professorships 	at 	the 	Zucker 	School 	of 	Medicine 	at
Hofstra/Northwell’s Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology and Department of
Pathology and Laboratory Medicine and the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory. (Id.)
Dr. Boyd has received over $25 million in peer‑reviewed funding and has authored
or co-authored over 200 publications “on the molecular and genetic bases of
gynecologic or breast cancers.” (Id. at 2–3.) Discussed in greater detail below,
Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd is not qualified to “opine on the design and
methodologies of in vitro studies.” (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 19–20.)
b. 	Relevant opinions
Within the scope of his engagement in this matter, Dr. Boyd was asked to
review: (1) two poster presentations by Dr. Saed and the associated 2023 publication
by Dr. Saed and colleagues, (see Boyd Rep. at 2–16); (2) two mechanistic studies on
which Plaintiffs’ experts rely, involving rodent macrophages and talcum powder, led
by Dr. Angelo Mardino in 2020 and Dr. Tania Emi in 2021, respectively, (see id. at
2, 16–20); and (3) selected opinions of Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Levy concerning
genetics and ovarian cancer, (see id. at 2, 22–26).
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Dr. Boyd concluded that Plaintiffs’ mechanistic theory that perineal talc
causes ovarian carcinogenesis is speculative and lacked support from scientific
evidence. In his view, the in vitro studies Plaintiffs’ experts relied upon are
methodologically unsound and do not establish a plausible biological mechanism for
human carcinogenesis at real-world exposures to cosmetic talcum powder.
With respect to Dr. Saed’s work, Dr. Boyd first criticized a poster presented
by Dr. Saed and his co-authors that claimed talc “induces malignant transformation”
in normal ovarian epithelial cells, thereby implying a direct causal mechanism. See
generally Amy K. Harper et al., Talcum Powder Induces Malignant Transformation
of Human Primary Normal Ovarian Epithelial Cells But Not Human Primary
Normal Peritoneal Fibroblasts, 159 Gynecol. Oncol. (1), 140 (2020) (“Harper/Saed
2020 Poster”).111 Notwithstanding Dr. Boyd’s concerns with the publication of the
Harper/Saed 2020 Poster, (see Boyd Rep. at 4–5),112 Dr. Boyd concludes that the
111 	Plaintiffs did not attach the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster to its moving papers. Through
independent research, I located it as an abstract published in a 2020 issue of Gynecologic
Oncology.
112 	Dr. Boyd provides a critical overview of the publication process underlying Harper/Saed
2020 Poster’s dissemination. Dr. Boyd explains that the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster appeared only
in a supplemental issue of Gynecologic Oncology because it had been accepted for poster
presentation at the Society of Oncology 2020 Annual Meeting on Women’s Cancer, which was
later canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (See Boyd Rep. at 4–5.) Dr. Boyd emphasizes that
poster acceptance is not equivalent to peer-reviewed publication: 842 abstracts were submitted to
the Society of Oncology 2020 Annual Meeting, and 743 (88%) abstracts were accepted for
presentation. (See id.) Dr. Boyd also notes that the corresponding manuscript—reiterating the same
research and conclusions—was repeatedly rejected by journals, including Gynecologic Oncology
in 2021 even after additional testing, underscoring that the work did not meet publication standards
and likely would have been rejected in its 2020 form. (See id.)
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study’s “objective” misstates prior findings and overreaches, (see id. at 5–6). Dr.
Boyd further finds the study’s dosing and assay methods woefully deficient. (See id.
at 6–8.) For example, Dr. Boyd claims that the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster omits
essential parameters such as cell numbers, volume, and plate surface area, which
make the actual dose per cell unknowable. (See id. at 6.) Dr. Boyd concludes the
“commercial cell transformation assay kit” was used beyond its validated purpose,
and 	that 	asserting 	“malignant 	transformation” 	after 	a 	72-hour 	exposure 	is
biologically implausible. (See id. at 7.) Finally, Dr. Boyd states that the purported
results of the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster are unreliable because it wrongly treats
colony growth as proof of cancer, claims a dose-response without valid counting,
and reports 11% and 20% increases over zero, which makes no mathematical sense.
(See id. at 8–9.)
Dr. Boyd next criticizes a subsequent poster presented by Dr. Saed and his co-
authors that claims to supplement Harper/Saed 2020 by performing the same
experiments and assaying with cell transformation assay and added p53 and Ki‑67
immunohistochemistry (“Harper/Saed 2021 Poster”). (See Boyd Rep. at 10–14 &
n.41.113) According to Dr. Boyd, the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster was presented at the
113 	Plaintiffs did not attach the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster to its moving papers. Dr. Boyd cites
the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster as “Saed GM, Harper AK, Morris R, Talcum Powder Induces a
Malignant Transformation in Normal Ovarian Epithelial Cells,” but the citation does not contain
sufficiently precise information to permit location or review.
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68th Annual Meeting of the Society for Reproductive Investigation on July 8, 2021.
(Id. at 10.) Dr. Boyd concludes, among other things, that the Harper/Saed 2021
Poster improperly claims to “confirm” malignant transformation that was never
established in the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster; that its reliance on certain published
studies is misplaced because they fail to support the opinions drawn therefrom; and
that 	its 	methods 	still 	use 	unrealistic, 	poorly-described 	doses 	and 	the 	same
commercial assay that cannot prove malignancy. (See id. at 10–12.) Consequently,
Dr. Boyd claims that the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster’s results are misinterpretations of
the presented date. (See id. at 12–13.) Therefore, Dr. Boyd fundamentally disagrees
with the study’s conclusion, finding the continued claim of malignant transformation
and a causal mechanism unsupported—a view he notes was shared by peer reviewers
who called the work premature and unreliable. (See id. at 13–14.)
Like the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster, Dr. Boyd underscores the publication
issues surrounding the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster as illustrative of its inherent
unreliability. 	According 	to 	Dr. 	Boyd, 	Dr. 	Saed 	submitted 	a 	slightly 	altered
manuscript of the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster to Gynecologic Oncology on January 4,
2021 (the “Harper/Saed 2021 Manuscript”). (See Boyd Rep. at 10 n.41 & 13–14.)
Gynecologic Oncology subsequently rejected the manuscript, as did two other
scientific journals. (See id. at 13–14.) Dr. Boyd explains that he was unsurprised that
Gynecologic Oncology rejected the 2021 poster’s manuscript for “several major
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issues,” 	“questionable” 	clinical 	relevance, 	and 	interpretive 	difficulties 	with
potentially premature data. (See id.) Shortly thereafter, an Italian medical journal
called 	Minerva 	Obstetrics 	and 	Gynecology 	accepted 	the 	Harper/Saed 	2021
Manuscript for publication. (See id. at 14 (citing Amy K. Harper et al., Talcum
Powder Induces Malignant Transformation in Normal Human Primary Ovarian
Epithelial Cells, 75 Minerva Obstetrics & Gynecology (2) (2023) (“Harper/Saed
2023 Article”)); see also discussion at supra Part V.B.2.iv.e.).
Dr. Boyd notes that the Harper/Saed 2023 Article used softer language than
its 	previous 	iterations 	but 	is 	otherwise 	an 	insufficient 	repackaging 	of 	the
Harper/Saed 2020 Poster and the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster. (See Boyd Rep. at 14–
15.) Like its previous iterations, Dr. Boyd claims that the Harper/Saed 2023 Article
uses “no new experiments or methodological updates” and therefore perpetuates its
same core flaws. (Id. at 15–16.)
Regarding two macrophage-based mechanistic studies relied on by Plaintiffs’
experts, Dr. Boyd finds them minimally informative to ovarian carcinogenesis
because, among other things, they “do not attempt to demonstrate the effects of talc
on normal human ovarian cells and are of minimal relevance to the biological
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plausibility questions raised in this litigation. (Id. at 16; see also id. at 17–20 (citing
Mandarino 2020114 & Emi 2021115).
Dr. Boyd criticizes Mandarino 2020 because “it has nothing to do with
transformation (malignant or not) of normal ovarian cells.” (See Boyd Rep. at 17.)
He further criticizes Emi 2021 for using a mouse macrophage cell line as opposed
to human ovarian cells and testing only a single high dose, among suffering from
other flaws. (See id. at 19–20.) Dr. Boyd also faults Plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on
Emi 2021, which he describes as “an extension of Mandarino” 2020, because the
study offers only a “hypothesis that merits further testing” and not evidence of
biological plausibility. (See id. at 18–19.)116
On Dr. Levy’s genetics-related causation opinions, Dr. Boyd critiques what
he 	identifies 	as 	misinterpretations 	or 	overstatements—such 	as 	implying 	that
carcinogenic exposure increases the penetrance of inherited risk alleles (e.g.,
BRCA1 and BRCA2) without evidentiary support, conflating post-initiation tumor
114 	Plaintiffs do not attach Mandarino 2020 to their moving papers. Defendants attach it to
their opposition. (See ECF No. 33111-34.)
115 	Plaintiffs do not attach Emi 2021 to their moving papers. Defendants attach it to their
opposition. (See ECF No. 33111-35.)
116 	Because I recommend that the Court not permit Plaintiffs’ experts to offer their
macrophage-inhibition theory, which is largely premised on Mandarino 2020 and Emi 2021, see
supra Part V.B.5.iv.c.3, there is no basis for Dr. Boyd to offer a rebuttal opinion against Plaintiffs’
experts’ use of these studies for this now-impermissible purpose. This is not to say, however, that
Dr. Boyd is precluded from criticizing Mandarino 2020 or Emi 2021 for any other purpose. Thus,
to the extent that Plaintiffs’ experts rely on these studies for a purpose other than for support of
their macrophage-impairment theory, then Dr. Boyd may rebut those opinions based on these two
studies.
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behavior with carcinogenesis, and relying on Dr. Saed’s oxidative stress claims
despite serious methodological flaws. (See id. at 22–25.) Dr. Boyd underscores that
most somatic mutations arise stochastically with DNA replication and that Plaintiffs’
mechanistic bridge from talc to initiated ovarian cancer remains unsubstantiated.
(See id.) Dr. Boyd also criticizes, among other things, Dr. Levy’s reliance on certain
studies that he posits do not support the propositions for which they are used. (See
id.)
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Arguments
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to clarify the scope of Plaintiffs’
motions to exclude genetics-related opinions. Plaintiffs state that they seek to
exclude 	all 	genetics-related 	opinions 	except 	for 	the 	observation 	that 	certain
bellwether Plaintiffs “have no known genetic mutations that are associated with
ovarian cancer.” (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 8; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 8;
Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 5.) In substance, however, Plaintiffs’ motions focus on challenging
the specific causation opinions offered by Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, Finan, and Permuth
as applied to particular bellwether Plaintiffs. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br.
at 5–6; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 4–6.) Plaintiffs do not meaningfully address, or expressly
seek exclusion of, these experts’ genetics-related general causation opinions. Those
opinions mirror, in substance, Dr. DiFeo’s conclusion that deleterious genetic
mutations can play a causal role in the development of ovarian cancer. Unlike Drs.
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Saenz, Holcomb, Finan, and Permuth, Dr. DiFeo offers only general genetics-related
causation opinions and does not opine on specific causation for any bellwether
Plaintiff.117
In light of Plaintiffs’ arguments, and to ensure a clear and consistent resolution
of the admissibility issues presented, I address the genetics-related general causation
opinions of Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, Finan, and Permuth together with those of Dr.
DiFeo. As clarified above, see supra note 1, this Report and Recommendation does
not address the portions of Plaintiffs’ motions seeking to exclude Defendants’
specific causation opinions.
Turning to the merits of their arguments, with respect to Drs. Finan, Saenz,
Holcomb, Permuth, and DiFeo, Plaintiffs first contend that the experts’ genetics-
related general causation opinions are unreliable because they rest on inadmissible
speculation about alternative causes—here, unidentified or yet-to-be-discovered
genetic mutations and/or VUS. Plaintiffs reason that admitting such speculative
opinions risks confusing or misleading a jury.
Second, with respect to Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, DiFeo, Permuth, and
Boyd, Plaintiffs contend that the experts’ biological plausibility opinions are
117 	Indeed, Defendants have expressly stated that Dr. DiFeo does not seek to opine on specific
causation. (See generally DiFeo Rep.; see also ECF No. 33111 (“Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth,
DiFeo & Boyd Brs.”) at 46 (“Section IV of plaintiffs’ motion against Dr. DiFeo is moot because
Dr. DiFeo is not offering case-specific opinions.”).)
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unreliable because they apply a flawed methodology that disregards the actual
constituents of talcum powder. Plaintiffs also argue that the opinions do not fit the
facts of this case, because they apply an improperly heightened “proof” standard
rather than the accepted “plausibility” standard.
Third, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Boyd’s critiques of peer-reviewed studies
rest on subjective belief rather than a reliable methodology. In that regard, Plaintiffs
maintain that his testimony will not assist the trier of fact and risks confusing or
misleading a jury by inviting re-evaluation of research and methods already vetted
through the peer-review process. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd is not
qualified to opine on in vitro study design or methods.
Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ motions, arguing that the genetics-related
general causation opinions are admissible as proper rebuttal that offer the jury
alternative causes. Moreover, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are impermissibly
rehashing arguments already rejected by the Court, and that both science and law
require evaluating general causation based on the talcum powder product as sold—
not its isolated constituents—consistent with how the literature and analogous case
law frame the issue. Finally, Defendants maintain that contrary to Plaintiffs’
contention, Defendants’ experts did not impose an improperly heightened biological
plausibility standard.
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As to Plaintiffs’ specific challenges to Dr. Boyd, Defendants contend his
opinions are proper defense-side critiques grounded in his extensive research and
peer-review experience. In that connection, Defendants insist that peer review does
not immunize published studies from expert criticism, and more to the point, Dr.
Boyd’s testimony will assist the trier of fact by explaining why certain mechanistic
claims 	are 	unreliable. 	Lastly, 	Defendants 	maintain 	that 	Dr. 	Boyd 	is 	amply
qualified—as a long-time cancer researcher, professor, and reviewer/editor—to
opine on the design and methodology of in vitro studies.
i. 	Genetics-Related General Causation Opinions
Plaintiffs argue that the experts’ genetics-related general causation opinions,
which suggest that “imaginary” genetic mutations may cause ovarian cancer, are
inadmissible because they are unreliably speculative, unsupported by current
science, and risk misleading or confusing the jury. (See Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 3–7; see
also Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 5–10; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 4–10.) Across
their motions to exclude, Plaintiffs argue that these experts should only be permitted
to opine that the “science and testing [regarding genetics] to date demonstrate that
Plaintiffs have no known genetic mutations that are associated with ovarian cancer.”
(See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 8; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 8; Pls.’ DiFeo Br.
at 5.)
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Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ efforts to exclude these opinions by arguing that
their experts’ discussions of unidentified genetic mutations, yet-to-be-discovered
genetic mutations, or VUS are proper rebuttal opinions, sufficiently supported by
scientific and medical bases, and do not risk jury confusion because their opinions
are framed as possibility, not inevitability. I agree with Defendants.
First, Plaintiffs appear to have misapplied the burden of proof. They cite
several cases for the proposition that an expert’s opinions must be based on existing
scientific validity and not speculation. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 7;
Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 7; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 4.) But the cases that Plaintiffs rely on do
not directly deal with a defense expert offered to rebut a plaintiff’s expert. See, e.g.,
Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, 82 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 1996) (affirming the
exclusion of plaintiff’s expert’s affirmative opinions); Hoefling, 576 F. Supp. 3d at
275–76 	(excluding 	plaintiff’s 	expert’s 	affirmative 	opinions); 	Henricksen 	v.
ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1168–69 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (same); In
re Bausch & Lomb Contacts Lens Solution Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 515,
520 (D.S.C. 2010) (holding plaintiff expert’s opinion regarding future causation as
insufficiently speculative to overcome summary judgment).
As discussed throughout this Report and Recommendation, “the proper role
of rebuttal experts [is] to critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out
potential flaws in the plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp.
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2d at 835; see also Mahaska Bottling Co., Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 3d 745,
759 (S.D. Iowa 2019) (explaining that courts routinely permit defense experts to
testify “even if the expert primarily critiques the opposing expert’s approach without
offering an alternative approach”). Indeed, “a rebuttal expert need not proffer a
methodology or model, but only critique the opposing expert’s.” Capri Sun GmbH,
595 F. Supp. 3d at 140.
Importantly, Plaintiffs concede that Defendants’ experts at issue here do not
purport to establish causation through unidentified genetic mutations, yet-to-be-
discovered genetic mutations, or VUS. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 5
(“Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, and Finan all theorize that unknown genetic mutations . . .
may have caused Plaintiffs’ ovarian cancers.” (emphasis added)); Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at
3 (“Dr. DiFeo theorizes that unknown genetic mutations . . . may cause ovarian
cancer.” (emphasis added)); Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 4 (“Dr. Permuth theorizes that
unknown genetic mutations . . . may have caused Plaintiffs’ ovarian cancers.”
(emphasis added)).) Put another way, none of these experts have opined or testified
that an alternative cause is the actual cause of ovarian cancer.
Courts routinely admit the opinions and testimony of defense experts who
offer potentially alternative causes for injury or product defect despite not having
conducted their own differential diagnoses. See, e.g., In re 3M Combat Arms
Earplug Prods. Liab. Litig., Case No. 3:19md2885, 2022 WL 823474, at *4 (N.D.
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Fla. Mar. 19, 2022) (“The fact that Dr. Chatham’s opinions on AIHL are not
definitive diagnoses does not compel their exclusion. A defense expert ‘may offer
evidence of potential alternative causes of [an] injury without needing to prove those
alternative-cause theories with certainty or probability.’” (citation omitted)); see also
In re Mentor Corp. ObTape Transobturator Sling Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:07-cv-
00088, 2010 WL 1782272, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2010) (admitting four experts
who “opine that Plaintiffs’ experts did not adequately identify and rule out
alternative causes for Plaintiffs’ injuries” despite not having done a differential
diagnosis 	themselves, 	but 	precluding 	them 	from 	testifying 	that 	“alternative
causes . . . actually caused Plaintiffs’ injuries”); In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair
Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-cv-00931, 2017 WL 6396852, at *2 (S.D. W. Va.
Dec. 13, 2017) (“Defendants, however, need not conduct a differential diagnosis to
identify the specific cause of an injury because they do not bear the burden of
proving causation. Indeed, a defendant’s specific causation expert’s testimony
should not be excluded because it fails to identify the specific cause of a plaintiff’s
injury. In lieu of conducting traditional differential diagnoses, defendants may
instead provide expert testimony suggesting alternative causes for the plaintiff’s
injury in order to rebut the plaintiff’s specific causation testimony.” (citations
omitted)). Moreover, the “alternative causes suggested by a defendant normally
affect the weight that the jury should give the expert’s testimony and not the
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admissibility of that testimony.” Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 202
(4th Cir. 2001).
Still, the admissibility of a defense expert’s opinions must nonetheless satisfy
Rule 702’s admissibility requirements. See Fed. R. Evid.702; In re E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 348 F. Supp. 3d 680, 696 (S.D. Ohio 2016)
(“The defendant’s expert need not give an alternate causal factor within a reasonable
degree of medical certainty. But, the testimony must still be based upon reliable
science, as required by Daubert.”).
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ experts offer unreliable opinions lacking
scientific support because VUS have no proven effect on, or causal link to, ovarian
cancer generally. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 8–9; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at
5–6; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 8–9.) They also argue that the evolving state of genetics
does not justify allowing unsupported speculation to reach the jury, and that opinions
premised on unidentified or unvalidated mutations are too speculative to be
admissible. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 7–8; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 4–5;
Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 7–8.)
Defendants respond that their experts’ opinions show that there are scientific
bases to posit alternative, genetic causes of ovarian cancer generally. (See Defs.’
Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 3–10, 18–23.) Additionally, Defendants
contend that the opinions are grounded in their experts’ clinical experience, reflect
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the current state of the relevant science, are supported by clinical evidence that
predates their involvement, and align with views expressed by certain of Plaintiffs’
own experts. (See id. at 12–16.)
After carefully reviewing the motion papers, the expert reports, and the sworn
testimony of Defendants’ contested experts, I conclude that the general causation
opinions of Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, DiFeo, and Permuth regarding unidentified
or yet‑to‑be‑discovered genetic mutations, as well as VUS, are products of reliable
methods and therefore admissible.
First, these experts all base their genetics-related causal opinions on their
professional 	qualifications 	and 	experiences. 	To 	be 	sure, 	the 	unchallenged
qualifications of Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, Permuth, and DiFeo bolster the
reliability of the methodology underlying their opinions. See Schneider, 320 F.3d at
406–07.
Dr. Finan has decades of clinical experience, and his role in, among other
responsibilities, the Cancer Risk Assessment program for the Singing River Health
System grounds his opinions on family-history-based genetic testing, mutation
identification, and ovarian cancer development. (See, e.g., Finan Rep. at 4; see also
id. at 2, 63 (basing causation opinions on, inter alia, “education, training, and 30
years of medical practice,” as well as a review of peer-reviewed scientific literature
and “relevant statements of national and international organizations”).)
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Dr. Saenz similarly has decades of clinical and academic experience directing
multidisciplinary treatment plans for gynecologic malignancies. (See Saenz Rep. at
1; see also id. at 3 (basing general causation opinions on, inter alia, “education,
experience and expertise,” as well as review of “peer-reviewed published scientific
literature”).)
Dr. Holcomb likewise has decades of experience in clinical and academic
settings, with clinical responsibilities including, among other things, assessing
cancer risk in patients and their families by identifying genetic risk factors. (See
Holcomb Rep. at 1–2; see also id. at 3, 29, 35–46 (relying on, inter alia, his
“education, [his] experience as a gynecologic oncologist and [his] review of the
peer-reviewed published scientific literature” for causation opinions).)
Dr. DiFeo holds a Ph.D in Cancer Genetics from Mount Sinai School of
Medicine, has over two decades of research experience in ovarian cancer genetics,
and leads a translational laboratory that, among other things, detects and analyzes
genetic drivers responsible for the development and progression of ovarian cancer.
(See DiFeo Rep. at 2; see also id. at 2 (basing general causation opinions on
“education, training and expertise as a cancer biologist” and “review of the relevant
literature”).)
Dr. Permuth is, among other things, a former genetics counselor who has
personally counseled hundreds of women with ovarian and related cancers, serves
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in national ovarian cancer research consortia, and has authored over 100 peer-
reviewed publications on genetics, risk factors, and molecular epidemiology. (See
Permuth Rep. at 4; see also, e.g., id. at 53–54 (basing general causation opinions on
“educational background, training, and experience,” as well as a “review of
epidemiologic studies, lab-based molecular and toxicology studies, and other
relevant studies”).)
The Third Circuit has recognized that an expert opinion not explicitly
supported by peer-reviewed published scientific or medical literature can still be
reliable and admissible when the expert has extensive clinical experience. See
Schneider, 320 F.3d at 406; Heller, 167 F.3d at 155. Here, Defendants’ experts not
only rely on their own clinical experience, but also relevant literature in forming
their opinions. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not attempt to distinguish or denounce any
specific scientific or medical study relied on by Defendants’ experts’ genetics-
related causation opinions.
It 	is 	with 	this 	backdrop—educational 	experience, 	clinical 	experience,
Plaintiffs’ medical records, and an extensive review of scientific and medical
literature—that Defendants’ experts assert their genetics-related general causation
opinions. These experts generally agree that while a significant subset of ovarian
cancer is hereditary, the genetic landscape is continuously evolving: BRCA1 and
BRCA2 account for most known mutation-driven cases, but many additional genes
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are implicated as testing panels continue to advance. These experts also agree that
the 	potentially 	deleterious 	effects 	of 	new 	mutations—discussed 	herein 	as
unidentified genetic mutations, yet-to-be-discovered genetic mutations, or VUS—
will be discovered as genetic testing and research advance.
As discussed above, Plaintiffs do not appear to directly challenge the genetics-
related general causation opinions of Dr. Finan, Dr. Saenz, Dr. Holcomb, and Dr.
Permuth 	as 	substantively 	incorrect, 	other 	than 	to 	suggest 	that 	they 	are 	too
speculative. (See, e.g., Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 9–10; Pls.’ Permuth Br.
at 9–10.)
Notably, as Defendants rightly point out, (see Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth,
DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 14–15), several of Plaintiffs’ own experts concede at least
some of Defendants’ experts’ opinions that Plaintiffs now seek to exclude, (see
Clarke-Pearson Dep. at 584:13–15 (“[T]here are factors that we don’t know today
that cause mutations that in aggregate result in cancer.”); see also id. at 453:1–4
(“[Q.] . . . [Y]ou are not of the view that scientists completely understand what causes
ovarian cancer, right? A. Yes.”); id. at 473:15–19 (“In addition to the talc and in
addition to the possible ovarian cancer, there are other factors that we don’t know
about.”); Wolf Dep. at 401:24–402:3 (“Certainly there can always be unknown as
yet hypothetical things that at sometime in the future could be associated with an
increased risk of ovarian cancer or some other type of cancer.”).)
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At its core, this litigation focuses on the general and specific cause of ovarian
cancer; specifically, whether the perineal application of cosmetic talcum powder
causes ovarian cancer generally, and caused ovarian cancer to develop in the
gynecologic tissue of the bellwether Plaintiffs. Putting aside admissibility concerns
regarding specific causation opinions, which will be addressed in a separate Report
and Recommendation, Defendants are entitled to proffer experts to opine on or rebut
opinions regarding the potential causes of ovarian cancer, so long as those opinions
are “based on the methods and procedures of science rather than on subjective belief
or unsupported speculation.” In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 (citation modified). Here,
these genetics-related general causation opinions are supported by sufficiently “good
grounds,” in that they are supported by experts’ educational experience, clinical
experience, medical records, and 	extensive review of scientific and 	medical
literature. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 81 (“‘The test of admissibility is not whether a
particular scientific opinion has the best foundation, or even whether the opinion is
supported by the best methodology or unassailable research.’ Instead, the court looks
to whether the expert’s testimony is supported by ‘good grounds.’” (quoting In re
TMI, 193 F.3d at 665) (citation omitted)).
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that admitting Defendants’ experts’ genetics-related
causal opinions risk confusing or misleading the jury because they are framed in
terms of inevitability, not possibility. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 9–
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10; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 9–10; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 6–7.) Plaintiffs appear to rely on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 403 for this argument. (See Pls.’ Saenz & Holcomb
Br. at 1; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 1; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 1.) Pursuant to that Rule, courts
may exclude evidence that risks “confusing the issues[] [or] misleading the jury.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 403; see also Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 756 n.13 (3d Cir.
2000) (“Permitting . . . a witness to offer an opinion unsupported by a sufficient
factual foundation would significantly increase the risk of misleading the jury and
confusing the issues, the very dangers against which Rule 403 defends.”).
First, 	and 	as 	discussed 	above, 	Defendants’ 	experts 	do 	not 	argue 	that
unidentified genetic mutations, yet-to-be-discovered genetic mutations, or VUS
cause the development of ovarian cancer generally. In other words, these opinions
are appropriately expressed in terms of possibility, not probability or inevitability.
Moreover, the Court can cabin the opinions of these experts to ensure these defense
experts do not overstate their conclusions and testify within the guardrails of
expressing opinions on possible causes. Indeed, Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, DiFeo,
and Permuth identify alternative causes for the development of ovarian cancer
generally and, in doing so, rebut the corresponding opinions offered by Plaintiffs’
experts. Defendants’ experts do not exaggerate their educational backgrounds or
clinical experience, nor do they mischaracterize the scientific and medical literature
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on which they rely. As I mentioned above, Plaintiffs’ own expert express similar
views.
Second, I find that the probative value of these experts’ genetics-related
general causation opinions substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect. Plaintiffs’
challenges to Defendants’ experts’ general causation opinions, which I find reflect a
reliable application of their methodology, go toward the weight of their opinions.
Given that they are otherwise admissible, the opinions of Defendants’ experts’
genetics-related general causation opinions will aid the jury in understanding the
complex scientific landscape underlying this case and help them determine the
ultimate resolution.
Given 	the 	foregoing, 	I 	find 	that 	Defendants 	have 	established 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence the admissibility of the genetics-related general
causation conclusions of Drs. Saenz, Holcomb, Finan, DiFeo, and Permuth. Again,
at this stage, I am not deciding the admissibility of these experts’ genetics-related
specific causation opinions. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court deny the
portions of Plaintiffs’ motions premised on the inadmissibility of genetics-related
general 	causation 	opinions, 	but 	limit 	their 	opinions 	on 	unidentified 	genetic
mutations, yet-to-be-discovered genetic mutations, and/or VUS to being possible,
not inevitable, causes.
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ii. 	Biological Plausibility Causation Opinions
Plaintiffs next argue that the experts’ biological plausibility opinions must be
excluded because they are supported by an unreliable methodology, i.e., ignore the
constituents of talcum powder. Plaintiffs also argue that the opinions must be
excluded because they do not fit the facts of this case and risk misleading or
confusing 	a 	jury 	by 	applying 	an 	improperly 	heightened 	standard 	of 	proof.
Defendants oppose by contending that Plaintiffs’ argument violates the Court’s April
30, 2024, Memorandum Order, and that its experts properly assess general causation
of talcum powder as sold rather than its isolated constituents.
a. 	Constituents of Talcum Powder
Plaintiffs argue that the experts fail to consider all individual constituents of
talcum powder—namely, fibrous talc, platy talc, asbestos, heavy metals, fragrances,
and/or other constituents—in forming their biological plausibility opinions.118 More
specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ experts’ “cherry-pick” scientific and
118 	To be precise, Plaintiffs advance slightly different arguments for excluding the opinions of
Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, Permuth, DiFeo, and Boyd. Unlike Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb, and
DiFeo, Drs. Permuth and Boyd expressly opine that asbestos is carcinogenic. (See Pls.’ Permuth
Br. at 11–12; Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 13.) Plaintiffs fault Drs. Permuth and Boyd for failing to research
the impact that asbestos-containing talc—and other constituents potentially present in talc—may
have on cancer development. (See id.) By contrast, Plaintiffs fault Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb,
and DiFeo for failing to consider the carcinogenic properties of asbestos at all, or to evaluate the
effects of individual talc constituents, including asbestos. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & .) For purposes
of resolving Plaintiffs’ motions, however, this distinction is immaterial. Across all six experts,
Plaintiffs’ central contention is the same: that a biological plausibility analysis which does not
account for the potential carcinogenic effects of individual constituents of cosmetic talc is
methodologically unreliable under Rule 702.
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medical literature that focuses on talc rather than, for example, asbestos-containing
talcum powder.
Defendants oppose by first arguing that Plaintiffs are rehashing an argument
that the Court rejected in direct contravention of this Court’s April 30, 2024,
Memorandum Order. (See Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 25–
27; Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 18–19.)
Defendants correctly observe that I addressed this argument in the context of
Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the opinions of Defendants’ expert, Dr. Benjamin Neel.
See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 195–98. Then, Plaintiffs argued
that Dr. Neel’s opinion regarding biological plausibility was unreliable because he
did not consider the individual constituents of talcum powder, such as asbestos and
heavy metals. Id. at 196–97. I disagreed by finding that the composition of talc was
irrelevant to Dr. Neel’s rebuttal of Dr. Saed’s in vitro methodology, which itself did
not evaluate the carcinogenicity of the individual constituents of talcum powder such
that Dr. Neel’s lack of analysis of asbestos or other constituents did not undermine
the reliability of his opinions. See id. Because my prior Opinion only addressed
motions related to representative experts, I applied my reasoning “with equal force
to the remainder of the pending Daubert motions,” to the extent such reasoning could
be applied to other motions. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 128–
29.
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Here, reprising their former argument, Plaintiffs contend that Drs. Finan,
Saenz, Holcomb, Permuth, DiFeo, and Boyd employed a flawed methodology by
ignoring the constituents of talc when opining about biological plausibility. (See
Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 11–15; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 10–14; Pls.’ DiFeo
Br. at 7–12.) In response to Plaintiffs’ challenge, Defendants maintain that the proper
scientific and legal framing of their experts’ biological plausibility assessments is
that of the product consumers actually use—talcum powder—rather than its separate
constituents. (See Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 27–33; Defs.’
Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 20–26.) Defendants contend that the
scientific and medical literature that both sides rely on—epidemiology, in vitro, and
other mechanistic studies—generally evaluates talcum powder in its commercial
form and not as asbestos, fibrous talc, platy talc, heavy metals, or fragrance
chemicals in isolation. (See Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 27–
28; Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 20–22.) Defendants stress
that, as a result, their experts’ opinions are responses to Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions,
which 	often 	evaluate 	talcum 	powder 	without 	consideration 	of 	its 	individual
constituents. (See Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 29–31; Defs.’
Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 22–24.)
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I agree with Defendants.119 As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ framing of the issue
is misleading. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ experts “ignore” individual
constituents 	of 	cosmetic 	talcum 	powder, 	including 	asbestos, 	and 	employ 	an
unreliable methodology that “impermissibly cherry-picks” by focusing solely on
talc. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 14–15; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 10–12; Pls.’
Permuth Br. at 12–13; Pls.’ Boyd Dr. at 13–14.) The record does not support that
characterization. Defendants’ experts do not disregard the individual components of
talcum powder. Rather, they deliberately evaluate talcum powder as a finished
consumer product, based on their view that the central causation question in this case
is whether perineal use of cosmetic talcum powder—considered as a whole—causes
ovarian cancer. (See, e.g., Saenz Rep. at 58 (“My opinion does not change regardless
of the composition of the talcum powder because the published, peer-reviewed
literature does not support the increased risk of developing ovarian cancer with
perineal application of talc.”); Finan Rep. at 4 (“The application of talcum powder,
regardless of its constituents, to the female perineum does not cause or contribute to
the development of ovarian cancer); Holcomb Rep. at 3 (“I was asked to review the
119 	In further support of their argument, Defendants cite analogous case law to maintain that
general causation opinions must be framed around the product used, not the isolated constituents
of said product. (See Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 31–33 (citing In re Zantac,
644 F. Supp. 3d at1075; Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1156 (E.D. Wash.
2009); Burst v. Shell Oil Co., No. 14-cv-109, 2015 WL 3755953, at *9 (E.D. La. June 16, 2015),
aff’d, 650 F. App’x 170 (5th Cir. 2016)); Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 24–
26 (citing In re Zantac, 644 F. Supp. 3d at 1075; Henricksen, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1156; Burst, No.
2015 WL 3755953, at *9). These cases are in accord with my analysis.
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relevant scientific literature to furnish an opinion as to whether perineal use of
talcum powder can cause ovarian cancer as a general matter . . . .”), ECF No. 32999-
14 (“Holcomb Dep.”) at 40:16–19 (“[M]y opinion is whatever is in that [Johnson &
Johnson] bottle that has been subjected to decades of testing does not increase the
risk of ovarian cancer.”); ECF No. 33001-6 (“Permuth Dep.”) at 42:11–13 (“I looked
at . . . the bulk of epi[demiological] literature, which considered talc as a substance
or as a whole.”); DiFeo Rep. at 6 (“I conclude that cosmetic talc, regardless of its
exact constituents or alleged contaminants, does not cause or contribute to the
development of ovarian cancer.”).)
In this context, phrases such as “regardless of the composition” or “regardless
of its constituents” reflect inclusivity, not exclusion. That is, Defendants’ experts
consider talcum powder inclusive of whatever constituents it may contain, rather
than isolating talc to the exclusion of other components. Accordingly, their
biological plausibility analyses or critiques do not “impermissibly cherry-pick”
evidence, but instead rest on a product-level assessment consistent with their
articulated methodological approach.
Even if Defendants’ experts could be criticized for “cherry‑picking” by
evaluating talc or talc-focused literature without considering talc’s potentially
carcinogenic 	constituents, 	they 	are 	not 	required 	to 	analyze 	each 	purported
component of talcum powder to address biological plausibility for several reasons.
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As I have referenced when addressing Defendants’ motion to preclude, the experts
are not required to review every medical or scientific study available about the topic
on which they are opining. See, e.g., In re C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2187, 2018 WL 4220616, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 5, 2018)
(observing that “nothing in Daubert requires an expert to consider every single
article on a topic in order to be admitted as an expert”); see also In re Testosterone
Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig. Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, MDL
No. 2545, 2018 WL 4030585, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2018).
In that regard, Defendants’ experts often express their opinions as critiques of
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions and underlying methodologies. For example, Dr. Saenz
devotes a substantial portion of her reports to rebutting the opinions of Dr. Wolf, Dr.
Clarke-Pearson, Dr. Saed, and Dr. Godleski. (See, e.g., Saenz Rep. at 10, 15, 45, 51–
52; Saenz Converse Rep. at 4–5 (Dr. Clarke-Pearson), 7–8 (Dr. Godleski); Saenz
Judkins Rep. at 5–6 (Dr. Wolf & Dr. Godleski); Saenz Newsome Rep. at 5–7 (Dr.
Clarke-Pearson & Dr. Godleski); Saenz Rausa Rep. at 6–7 (Dr. Clarke-Pearson).)
Dr. Finan and Dr. Holcomb respectively rebut Dr. Wolf’s causal opinions and Dr.
Saed’s methodology and conclusions. (See Finan Rep. at 12–13, 45, 50, 55, 61, 63–
67; Holcomb Rep. at 3, 26, 29–34.) Dr. Permuth provides “commentary” on reports
submitted by Plaintiffs’ epidemiological experts, including, among others, Dr. Cote
and Dr. Levy. (See Permuth Rep. at 135–47.) Dr. DiFeo “discuss[es] numerous
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concerns with the data presented by” some of the scientific and medical studies relied
on by Plaintiffs. (See DiFeo Rep. at 53–115.) And Dr. Boyd criticizes Dr. Saed’s
methodologies and opinions drawn therefrom, as well as other Plaintiffs’ experts’
reliance on the work of Dr. Saed. (See Boyd Rep. at 2–16.)
Most of Plaintiffs’ experts, at one point or another, opine only as to talc or
talcum 	powder—not 	its 	individual 	constituents—when 	assessing 	biological
plausibility.120 For example, Dr. Wolf testified that her opinion on whether perineal
application of talcum powder causes ovarian cancer does not depend on the presence
of asbestos because she evaluated cosmetic talcum powder “as a whole.” (Wolf Dep.
at 110:16–111:9.) Dr. Clarke-Pearson similarly testified that while he cannot identify
which specific component of talcum powder caused Plaintiff Converse’s ovarian
cancer, he maintains that talcum powder causes ovarian cancer regardless of the
precise constituents. (See Clarke-Pearson Dep. at 293:4–22.) In conducting a review
of the epidemiological research on talc and ovarian cancer, Dr. Michele Cote looked
to “talc as a whole,” or “whatever was in the bottles or containers of talc that the
women were using,” and not its individual components. (See ECF No. 33118-10
(“Cote Dep.”) at 112:17–113:2; see also, e.g., Siemiatycki 3d Amend. Rep. at 2
120 	Indeed, as discussed supra, in recommending exclusion of Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions
regarding the carcinogenic effects of heavy metals and fragrance chemicals, I made clear that those
experts may nonetheless opine on the causal relationship between cosmetic talc—as a product,
inclusive of its constituents—and ovarian cancer. That conclusion reflects the fact that much of the
epidemiologic literature on which the experts rely evaluates talc exposure without distinguishing
among talc’s individual constituents, including asbestos.
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(“[T]here are biologically plausible mechanism to explain how powdering with talc-
based powders can contribute to the development of ovarian cancer.”), 74 (“[T]here
are credible biologically plausible mechanisms by which talcum powder products
can reach the upper genital tract causing an inflammatory response . . . .”).)121
Therefore, as rebuttal to Plaintiffs’ experts, Defendants must necessarily be entitled
to address these experts’ talc-based opinions regarding biological plausibility.
To be sure, some of Plaintiffs’ experts do opine on talcum powder as inclusive
of its individual constituents, and/or its individual constituents separately. (See, e.g.,
Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 18–20; McTiernan 3d Amend. Rep. at 3 (“When I refer to
talc or talcum products in this report, I am referring to commercially available talcum
powder products and all constituent elements contained within.”), 89 (“In my
opinion it is biologically plausible that talcum powder products can reach the ovaries
121 	Additionally, Dr. Godleski’s methodology sought to identify talc and other potentially
deleterious particulates in the gynecologic and pelvic tissue of certain bellwether Plaintiffs to
determine their contribution to the development of ovarian cancer. (See generally Godleski
Gallardo Rep.; Godleski Converse Rep.; Godleski Rausa Rep.; Godleski Judkins Rep.; Godleski
Rausa Rep.)
But Dr. Godleski did not attempt to identify other potentially deleterious materials outside of talc
and asbestos. (See generally id.) Defendants contend that Dr. Godleski’s failure to identify every
foreign particle observed within each tissue sample undermines his causation conclusion. (See
Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 17–18.) In response, Plaintiffs argue, among other things, that this argument
“targets the weight of the evidence offered” and not its admissibility. (See Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br.
at 17–18.) Although Defendants challenge Dr. Godleski’s failure to consider all birefringent
material in his causal conclusions, Plaintiffs here challenge these experts’ failure to consider
individual constituents of talcum powder as it may relate to their biological plausibility opinions.
While the arguments Plaintiffs advance differ in some respects across these motions and in their
opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr. Godleski, the similarities are nonetheless sufficient
to diminish their credibility.
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via migration from the perineum and via inhalation into the lungs, blood stream, and
lymphatic system.”).) A defense expert, however, is not required to address and/or
rebut every assertion contained within every plaintiff’s expert’s opinion. See, e.g.,
Quidel Corp. v. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc., No. 16-cv-3059, 2019 WL
4727939, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2019) (“Indeed, there is no requirement that a
rebuttal expert read the opening expert report cover to cover, and then write a rebuttal
report outlining each and every criticism of the opening expert’s opinions.” (citation
modified)); see also Wherevertv, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:18-
cv-529, 2022 WL 4017049, at *3 & n.3 (M.D. Fl. Sept. 4, 2022).
Moreover, defense experts attack the epidemiologic, in vitro, and mechanistic
studies on which Plaintiffs’ experts rely. Many of these scientific and medical
studies assess talcum powder as a whole—rather than its individual constituents—
when evaluating biological plausibility. For example, several of Plaintiffs’ experts
rely on Dr. Saed’s research. (See, e.g., Levy 2d Amend. Rep. at 15–16; Wolf 3d
Amend. Rep. at 16 (citing Harper/Saed 2023 Article); Clarke-Pearson 3d Amend.
Rep. at 5–6 (citing Dr. Saed’s 2019 study and the Harper/Saed 2023 Article).) Much
of the research makes no effort to differentiate between talc and the individual
constituents of talcum powder.
Finally, an expert is not required to review every single study within a relevant
body of literature. See Johnson v. Vane Line Bunkering, 01-cv-5819, 2003 WL
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23162433, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2003) (noting, in rejecting a Daubert challenge
for alleged failure to meet the reliability requirement, that “the Third Circuit does
not require that an expert review every medical report available to him or her and
does not require that a physician make citations to publications to support his
medical 	conclusions”); 	In 	re 	Testosterone 	Replacement 	Therapy, 	2018 	WL
4030585, at *6 (“The fact that [plaintiff’s expert] does not discuss every study . . .
view[ed] as relevant, or that he may have overlooked a study, does not mean that he
unreliably applies his methodology.”). It is clear, however, that “[w]here an expert
ignores evidence that is highly relevant to [her] conclusion, contrary to [her] own
stated methodology, exclusion of the expert’s testimony is warranted.” In re Mirena
II, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 241.
This is not the case here. Although Defendants’ experts do not cite every
relevant study in the universe of available literature, the admissibility inquiry focuses
on the reliability of their methods. Here, the record demonstrates that their opinions
rest 	on 	a 	reliable 	body 	of 	peer‑reviewed 	evidence, 	educational 	background,
professional 	experience, 	and 	reasoned 	application 	of 	established 	scientific
principles. In this context, the omission of some studies goes to the weight of an
opinion, not admissibility. See, e.g., Luppino v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Civil
Action No. 09-5582, 2015 WL 12819051, at *6 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015) (“[T]he
absence of a study conducted by an expert is relevant to the weight, not the
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admissibility, of his or her conclusion.” (citation omitted)). Of course, Plaintiffs may
cross-examine defense experts’ on the sources they rely upon in forming their
biological 	opinions. 	After 	all, 	“‘vigorous 	cross-examination, 	presentation 	of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence . . . .”’ Heller,
167 F.3d at 152 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
b. 	Biological Plausibility Standard
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ experts’ biological plausibility opinions
must be excluded on the ground that the experts improperly apply a heightened
standard of proof—rather than a plausibility analysis—thereby rendering their
opinions irrelevant, confusing, or misleading. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs
mischaracterize their experts’ testimony, and that the experts properly apply
biological plausibility principles under Bradford Hill by requiring more than
untested hypotheses to support a causal inference. I agree with Defendants.
At the outset, as I have discussed at length, Plaintiffs are correct that biological
plausibility does not require a proven biological mechanism, or even overwhelming
evidence of biological mechanism. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 19–
22; Pls.’ Permuth Br. at 14–17; Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 16–19.) Indeed, even if the
scientific community has not reached consensus on the biological mechanism, that
does not mean the pathway proposed by an expert is not accepted as “plausible.” See
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In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 645 F. Supp. 2d 164, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Still,
although biological plausibility need not require proof certain, any biologically
plausible opinion must be “derived from and supported by reliable scientific
knowledge and reasoning.” In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1308.
Here, contrary to Plaintiffs’ framing, Defendants’ experts do not impose a
requirement of scientific certainty or definitive proof. Rather, they offer general
causation opinions regarding perineal talcum powder use and ovarian cancer and, in
doing so, critique Plaintiffs’ experts’ proposed biological mechanisms on the ground
that those mechanisms lack adequate support in the scientific and medical literature.
Their opinions are thus directed at the sufficiency and reliability of the evidentiary
foundation for Plaintiffs’ theories, not at demanding proof beyond what biological
plausibility requires.
Plaintiffs’ criticism of Dr. Saenz is illustrative. Plaintiffs contend that Dr.
Saenz misapplied biological plausibility by insisting on “proof” that talc migrates
from the perineal area to the ovaries or that such migration causes inflammation.
(See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 16–17 (citing Saenz Rep. at 17–18; ECF
No. 32999-16 (“Saenz Dep.”) at 285:23–286:1; ECF No. 32999-17 (“Saenz Dep.
II”) at 325:14–17.) I disagree. A closer examination of Dr. Saenz’s report and
deposition testimony does not support that characterization. Dr. Saenz does not
require definitive proof of migration or inflammation; rather, in her role as a rebuttal
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expert, she explains that Plaintiffs’ biological plausibility theory is not supported by
the existing epidemiologic and medical literature. She reaches that conclusion based
on her review of the literature and her professional experience. (See Saenz Rep. at
17–18.) To preclude Dr. Saenz—or similarly situated defense experts—from
offering 	such 	rebuttal 	opinions 	would 	improperly 	deprive 	the 	factfinder 	of
competing expert views concerning the relevance, sufficiency, and interpretation of
the scientific evidence. Rule 702 does not require exclusion merely because an
expert concludes that the literature fails to support an opposing party’s theory of
biological plausibility.
I reach the same conclusion with respect to Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning
Drs. Holcomb and Finan. Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Holcomb misapplies the
biological plausibility standard regarding talc migration from perineal use and the
role of inflammation in ovarian carcinogenesis because he testified that he has not
seen literature “proving” either theory.(See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 17–
18 (citing ECF No. 32999-14 (“Holcomb Dep.”) at 108:10–19; 131:14–22, 392:22–
393:4, 421:15–423:20).) That argument mischaracterizes his testimony.
Dr. Holcomb makes clear that he does not require definitive proof to accept a
theory of biological plausibility. Rather, he explains that Plaintiffs’ proposed
mechanisms are not supported by the existing scientific or medical literature. (See
Holcomb 	Dep. 	at 	131:14–22 	(“I 	don’t 	believe 	that 	the 	theory 	of 	chronic
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inflammation, to the degree that it’s been studied, supports the concept that . . .
chronic inflammation from talc . . . causes mutations [or] causes malignant
transformation.”), 422:20–23 (“I have not seen where chronic inflammatory states
have been shown to cause malignant transformation of cancer cells.”).) His use of
the term “convince[],” read in context, reflects his assessment of the sufficiency of
the supporting evidence—not an insistence on scientific certainty. (See id. at
108:15–19 (“I’m not convinced of that based on the literature.” (emphasis added).)
Indeed, Dr. Holcomb testified that biological plausibility requires “an explanation
that at least is possible,” (id. at 104:17–22), and that he disagrees with Plaintiffs’
experts’ plausibility theories because he finds that the relevant literature does not
adequately support their hypotheses. (See id. at 105:6–107:20.)
Plaintiffs argue Dr. Finan improperly applied the biological plausibility
standard for talc migration and malignant transformation by relying on the absence
of “precise” studies. (See Pls.’ Finan, Saenz & Holcomb Br. at 18 (citing Finan
Expert Report at 5, 54; ECF No. 32999-15 (“Finan Carl Dep.”) at 60, 68:8–13,
169:12–170:8).) Dr. Finan’s opinion on the absence of “studies that demonstrate that
talcum powder as a dusting to the female perineum can migrate upwards through the
female genital tract and reach the fallopian tubes or ovaries” is not indicative of an
improperly heightened biological plausibility standard. (Finan Carl Dep. at 68:8–13;
see also id. at 69:10–16 (explaining that “much” of the research into biological
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plausibility of inflammation involves “advanced ovarian cancer,” which Dr. Finan
opines causes the inflammation), 60:5–8 (cautioning against taking his expert
report’s introductory bullet points out of context because they are meant to
summarize his expert report).) Like Dr. Saenz and Dr. Holcomb, Dr. Finan is
commenting on the lack of evidence supporting certain theories of biological
plausibility. This is not the same as requiring evidence that proves Plaintiffs’
experts’ theories. Accordingly, Dr. Finan applies the correct Bradford Hill standard
that biological plausibility must rest on some evidentiary support.
Plaintiffs largely repeat this line of argument against Drs. Permuth and DiFeo.
I remain unconvinced. In short, Plaintiffs argue Dr. Permuth misapplied the
biological plausibility standard for perineal-to-ovarian talc migration, citing her
testimony that she found no evidence “prov[ing] that hypothesis.” (See Pls. Permuth
Br. at 14–15 (citing ECF No. 33001-6 (“Permuth Dep.” at 176:16–177:7).) Again, a
broader review of Dr. Permuth’s testimony shows that this challenged statement is
criticizing a specific study for not supporting the upward migration of talc from the
perineum to the ovaries. (Compare Permuth Rep. at 113, 121–22, with Permuth Dep.
at 176:16–177:7.) This is admissible rebuttal opinion.
Plaintiffs also argue that Dr. DiFeo misapplies biological plausibility with
respect to talc migration, talc-induced malignant transformation, and the role of
inflammation in ovarian cancer. (See Pls.’ DiFeo Br. at 12–16 (citing Permuth Rep.
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at 6, 16–17, 28, 29, 50; ECF No. 33001-6 (“DiFeo Dep.”) at 52:25–53:4, 72:20–21,
74:1–19, 93:8–14, 169:1–15:22, 221).) In support, Plaintiffs point to portions of Dr.
DiFeo’s report and deposition testimony in which she concludes that certain studies
do not support the biological mechanisms they purport to establish, or do not support
Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions. (See id.)
That characterization misconstrues Dr. DiFeo’s analysis. In those instances,
Dr. DiFeo does not conclude that a biological mechanism is impossible simply
because it has not been conclusively proven. Rather, she opines that the cited studies
do not, in her view, support the specific mechanistic conclusions that Plaintiffs’
experts draw from them. For example, Plaintiffs challenge Dr. DiFeo’s statement
that certain studies “do not conclusively show that talc can migrate to the fallopian
tubes or ovaries” because they “were conducted under artificial conditions that do
not mimic the use or perineal application of cosmetic talc.” (See DiFeo Rep. at 28.)
In that context, Dr. DiFeo is not imposing a requirement of conclusive proof; she is
critiquing the studies for failing to substantiate the conclusions they claim to
support.122 (See id.; see also id. at 6, 50.) Elsewhere, Dr. DiFeo similarly notes gaps
or limitations in the evidence underlying Plaintiffs’ biological plausibility theories.
(See, e.g., id. at 16–17, 29.) Identifying an absence or insufficiency of supporting
122 	Moreover, Dr. DiFeo previously testified that something “doesn’t have to be conclusive to
be plausible, but to strengthen the . . . plausibility of it, you want to conclusively confirm that it
has a biological effect.” (DiFeo Dep. at 169:18–22.)
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evidence, however, is not the same as demanding definitive proof. Rather, it reflects
a permissible expert assessment of whether the cited literature adequately supports
the proposed biological mechanisms.
Moreover, Plaintiffs cite to no legal authority for the proposition that a defense
expert may not opine on the existence or absence of relevant scientific or medical
studies. Plaintiffs similarly cite to no legal authority for the proposition that a defense
expert may not base his or her general causation opinions on, among other things,
the existence or absence of relevant studies. And again, “the proper role of rebuttal
experts [is] to critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out potential
flaws in the plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
An otherwise qualified expert may attack an opposing expert’s methodology by
criticizing the methodology, i.e., scientific and medical studies, on which they rely.
See, e.g., id. at 834 (“A number of other district courts have held that rebuttal expert
witnesses may criticize other experts’ theories and calculations without offering
alternatives.” (collecting cases); see also In re Proton-Pump Inhibitor Prods. Liab.
Litig., 	2:17-MD-2789, 	2022 	WL 	18999830, 	at 	*29 	(D.N.J. 	July 	5, 	2022)
(“[C]riticisms of an expert’s explanations for reliance on, or rejection of, particular
studies, 	are 	appropriately 	addressed 	through 	cross-examination, 	not 	through
wholesale exclusion of the expert testimony.”).
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It also bears repeating that Plaintiffs do not challenge most of these experts’
general causation rebuttal opinions on Daubert grounds. Plaintiffs do not appear to
contend that these experts failed to employ reliable methodologies in reaching their
respective conclusions. A central component of each expert’s methodology is a
review of the relevant scientific and medical literature. As explained throughout this
Report and Recommendation, Defendants’ experts often reach conclusions that
differ from those of Plaintiffs’ experts regarding the applicability, reliability, or
significance of the same body of literature. That divergence, however, does not
render the opinions inadmissible. The fact “[t]hat two different experts reach
opposing conclusions from the same information does not render their opinions
inadmissible,” 	so 	long 	as 	they 	still 	meet 	Daubert’s 	threshold 	requirements
concerning qualifications, reliability, and relevance. Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co.,
208 F.3d 581, 589 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp. 3d at
139 (applying to rebuttal experts).
I find that the biological plausibility opinions of Drs. Finan, Saenz, Holcomb,
Permuth, and DiFeo apply the correct standard. They are relevant and do not pose a
risk of confusing or misleading the jury.
iii. 	Dr. Boyd
As previewed above, Plaintiffs move to exclude Dr. Boyd on three grounds
independent from their efforts to exclude other defense experts set forth in this
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section. Plaintiffs first contend that Dr. Boyd is unqualified to opine on the design
and methodologies of certain in vitro studies. Next, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd’s
challenges to various peer-reviewed studies are speculative and lack a reliable
methodology. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Boyd’s testimony will not assist the
trier of fact.
Defendants respond that Dr. Boyd is well qualified to opine on in vitro study
design and methodology, that his opinions are proper, helpful methodological
critiques grounded in his expertise and peer‑review experience, and that his
testimony is relevant because peer review does not immunize the challenged studies.
a. 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Boyd is unqualified to opine on in vitro study
design 	and 	methodology 	because 	he 	lacks 	experience 	conducting 	in 	vitro
experiments or lab-based research of his own. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 19–20.)
Plaintiffs highlight that Dr. Boyd has not conducted hands-on basic laboratory
research 	in 	decades 	and 	has 	not, 	in 	a 	professional 	capacity, 	researched 	or
experimented with genital talcum powder usage and its association with the
development of ovarian cancer. (See id.)
Defendants argue in response that Dr. Boyd’s decades of laboratory-centered
cancer genetics experience, his active role in collaborative lab research programs,
and his longstanding service as a reviewer and journal editor qualify him to assess,
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among other things, in vitro design and ovarian cancer studies. (See Defs.’ Opp. to
Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 43–46.)
Defendants 	have 	the 	better 	argument. 	As 	an 	initial 	matter, 	Plaintiffs
mischaracterize Dr. Boyd’s relevant experience. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 19–20 (citing
ECF No. 33060-6 (“Boyd Dep.”) at 49:23–50:16).) Without citation, Plaintiffs assert
that “Dr. Boyd does not do lab-based research and does not do in vitro studies.” (See
Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 19.) Dr. Boyd’s testimony makes clear, however, that while he does
not “own [a] personal research laboratory at this time in [his] career,” he nonetheless
conducts laboratory research, participates in collaborative laboratory research
programs, and has an active laboratory-based research program. (See Boyd Dep. at
49:21–50:9; see also id. at 134:10–12 (“I don’t have an active research laboratory
any longer, although I have a clinical laboratory . . . .).)
Plaintiffs also argue that Dr. Boyd’s failure to conduct talc-specific research
and talc-specific experimentation makes him unqualified to opine on the objectives,
design, and methodology of talc-specific studies. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 19–20.) That
argument misses the mark. Rule 702 does not require Dr. Boyd to propose a
competing methodology or replicate the challenged analyses as a precondition to
offering methodological critiques of talc-specific study objectives, designs, or
methods. See, e.g., Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 138. The “proper role of
rebuttal experts [is] to critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out
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potential flaws in the plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp.
2d at 835 (emphasis added).
Finally, it is worth reiterating that an expert’s qualifications must still meet
the Daubert qualification standards regardless of whether the expert’s opinions are
offered in rebuttal. The Daubert standard for qualification is liberally construed.
Defendants need not put on the “best qualified” expert to offer a rebuttal opinion.
See In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 655 (quoting Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244).
Rather, Dr. Boyd possesses the requisite specialized expertise to allow him to opine
on the design and methodology of proffered studies conducted or relied on by
Plaintiffs’ experts. Dr. Boyd is, among other things, a credentialed gynecologic
cancer researcher who has held senior research and academic leadership positions in
some of the world’s leading cancer research institutions. (See Boyd Rep. at 1–2; see
also ECF No. 33111-2 (“Boyd CV”).) Dr. Boyd has led or worked in numerous
esteemed cancer research laboratories. (See Boyd CV at 1–4.) Dr. Boyd has authored
or co-authored over 200 peer-reviewed publications “on the molecular and genetic
bases of gynecologic or breast cancers,” and has served in several editorial positions
for reputable medical journals. (See, e.g., Boyd Rep. at 2; see also Boyd CV at 7
(naming editorial positions on Molecular and Cellular Differentiation, Molecular
Carcinogenesis, Gynecologic Oncology, Journal of Clinical Oncology, American
Journal of Pathology, and Anticancer Research).) The fact that Dr. Boyd has not
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personally replicated Dr. Saed’s experiments does not disqualify him from opining
on the design or methodology of these studies. Therefore, I find that Dr. Boyd to be
qualified to offer the opinions challenged by Plaintiffs.
b. 	Reliability
Plaintiffs seek to exclude Dr. Boyd’s opinions regarding the Harper/Saed
2020 Poster, the Harper/Saed 2021 Poster, the Harper/Saed 2023 Article, Mandarino
2020, Emi 2021,123 and certain of Dr. Levy’s opinions on the ground that Dr. Boyd
employed an unreliable methodology. In support, Plaintiffs point to portions of Dr.
Boyd’s deposition testimony in which he purportedly admitted that he conducted no
independent research. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 4–5.) That characterization is not
supported by the cited testimony. The excerpts reflect that, at the time of his
deposition, Dr. Boyd could not recall specific aspects of the research he conducted
in 	connection 	with his 	literature review—not that he failed 	to 	conduct any
independent analysis. Elsewhere in his deposition testimony and supplemental
expert report, Dr. Boyd describes the steps he undertook in forming his opinions,
including reviewing the relevant literature and drawing on his decades of experience
in cancer research. (See, e.g., Boyd Dep. at 49:16–20, 139:13–19.)
123 	I note that these studies are no longer at issue with respect to Plaintiffs’ experts’
macrophage-inhibition theory.
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In any event, Plaintiffs’ criticism misses the mark. Dr. Boyd offers rebuttal
opinions critiquing Plaintiffs’ experts’ studies 	and their interpretation of the
scientific literature. He was not required to conduct original experimental research
to do so. His methodology—reviewing the literature, evaluating the cited studies,
and applying his expertise to assess their reliability and relevance—is a standard and
permissible approach for rebuttal testimony under Rule 702.
Plaintiffs next emphasize the absence of support underlying Dr. Boyd’s
opinions regarding Dr. Saed’s dosing, use of a cell transformation assay kit, and use
of ovarian surface epithelial ovarian cells rather than fallopian tubes cells.124 (See
Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 5–9.) As a general matter, Plaintiffs appear to misunderstand Dr.
Boyd’s role as a rebuttal expert. A rebuttal expert need not conduct his or her own
experimental study or parallel analysis to attack an opposing experts’ methodology
or model. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (“[D]efendants’ experts
have a less demanding task, since they have no burden to produce models or methods
124 	In this context, Plaintiffs’ brief cites to Dr. Boyd’s criticisms of methodology described in
the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster, (see Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 5–9), which Dr. Boyd alleges is repeated across
Dr. Saed’s subsequent studies, including Harper/Saed 2023. In short, this study sought to
“demonstrate whether exposure to talcum powder induces malignant transformation in human
primary normal ovarian epithelial cells and human primary normal peritoneal fibroblasts.” (See
Harper/Saed 2020 Poster.) The study exposed human primary normal ovarian epithelial cells and
peritoneal fibroblasts in triplicate to Johnson & Johnson talcum baby powder at two exposure
concentrations, 100 μg/mL and 500 μg/mL, for 72 hours. (See id.) The cells were then assessed
using a cell transformation assay in accordance with manufacturer protocols. (See id.) Following
assessment, the authors observed the formation of colonies in ovarian epithelial cells that indicated
cell malignant transformation increasing by approximately 11% at 100 μg/mL and 20% at 500
μg/mL, while fibroblasts and titanium dioxide controls showed no detectable transformation at
either dose. (See id.)
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of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiffs’ experts.”). It is sufficient for
the rebuttal expert to ground his critique in his expertise and a review of the materials
on which the opposing expert relied. Accordingly, Dr. Boyd does not, and need not,
offer affirmative opinions. Dr. Boyd may instead criticize Dr. Saed’s methodology
and highlight flaws in his studies’ design. So long as Dr. Boyd’s opinions otherwise
satisfy Daubert’s threshold standards regarding qualifications, reliability, and fit, he
may “critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out potential flaws in the
plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
More specifically, as to Dr. Boyd’s opinions on Dr. Saed’s dosing, Plaintiffs
argue that he failed to conduct independent research that comparable dosing appears
in other peer‑reviewed studies, and that even Defendants’ experts endorsed the
appropriateness of Dr. Saed’s dosing. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 6–7.) However, as
explained below, I find that Dr. Boyd offers proper rebuttal opinions challenging the
methodology and conclusions underlying Dr. Saed’s dose-related opinions. To be
sure, Dr. Boyd does not suggest a proper dosage, other than to explain that in his
view, Dr. Saed’s dosage used in a 2019 study was “extraordinarily high.” Boyd Dep.
at 96:9–11; see also Boyd Rep. at 6 (“Dr. Saed’s 2019 study treated cells with very
high, non-physiologic doses of talcum powder, making it untenable to extrapolate
those experiments to perineal talcum powder application by women.”). Dr. Boyd
goes further to criticize Dr. Saed’s failure to follow accepted scientific methodology
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by not “begin[ning] with the lowest dose possible [and] working up to the point
where a biological effect is observed.” (Boyd Dep. at 97:8–20.) Dr. Boyd then
criticized Dr. Saed’s apparent omission from the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster of dosage
information because of the poster’s claimed reliance on the 2019 study for dosing.
(See Boyd Rep. at 6, 8.)
In forming his opinions that Dr. Saed used an improper dose of talcum
powder, 	Dr. 	Boyd 	relied 	on 	his 	“understanding 	of 	[Dr. 	Saed’s] 	scientific
methodology, [and his] review of laboratory notebooks and previous work [of Dr.
Saed].” (Boyd Dep. at 93:1–15.) Dr. Boyd also relied on the opinions of other peer
reviewers who came to the same conclusion. (See, e.g., Boyd Rep. at 6 & n.16, n.17,
n.18, n.19; Boyd Dep. at 94:2–9.) These bases are sufficient to support Dr. Boyd’s
rebuttal testimony as reliable. Plaintiffs’ references to comparable dosing or
purported testimony about proper dosage do not, standing alone, call into question
the reliability of Dr. Boyd’s methodology. Rather, these are scientific disputes that
go to the weight of Dr. Boyd’s testimony, not its admissibility.
Plaintiffs next argue that Dr. Boyd’s opinions regarding Dr. Saed’s use of a
specific cell transformation assay kit should be excluded because Dr. Boyd lacks
experience with that particular kit as well as commercial assay kits generally and
cannot say whether this kit or commercial assay kits generally are used in the
scientific community. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 7–9.) For further support, Plaintiffs
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point to Dr. Boyd’s deposition testimony, wherein he admitted to not understanding
how the term “cell transformation” was used in the kit’s product guide and was
unaware of whether any existing commercial assay kit tested for “malignant
transformation.” (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 8 (citing Boyd Dep. at 115:19–116:4, 120:2–
11, 122:25–123:5).)
I agree with Plaintiffs and recommend that the Court exclude Dr. Boyd’s
opinions 	and 	testimony 	regarding 	Dr. 	Saed’s 	use 	of 	the 	commercial 	cell
transformation assay kit, “ab235698,” manufactured by Abcam. Dr. Boyd may still,
however, opine on malignant cell transformation and whether he believes it can be
observed within 72 hours following exposure as a general, scientific principle. And
to be clear, this recommendation does not extend to limiting any other portion of Dr.
Boyd’s opinions or testimony challenged by Plaintiffs, as I find they are sufficiently
reliable, by way of both underlying methodology and application to this case.
Dr. Boyd specifically opines that Dr. Saed misused the commercial cell
transformation assay kit that he employed as a part of the Harper/Saed 2020 Poster
by claiming that it demonstrated malignant transformation—a purpose for which the
assay is not validated—and that asserting malignant transformation after only 72
hours is scientifically incoherent and biologically implausible. (See Boyd Rep. at 7.)
In forming his opinion, Dr. Boyd reviewed the assay kit’s product guide,
which states that the kit is intended to measure “cell transformation in mammalian
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adherent 	or 	suspension 	cells 	in 	response 	to 	stimuli 	that 	inhibit 	or 	induce
transformation.” (See Boyd Rep. at 7 n.20; see also Boyd Dep. at 113:11–12 (“I’m
referencing this kit based on what I’ve read from the pamphlet provided.”).) Based
solely on his review and that description, Dr. Boyd opines that the kit does not
support conclusions regarding malignant transformation, as distinct from the more
limited phenomenon of cell transformation as marketed. (See Boyd Rep. at 7.) But
this review, which reflects the methodology underlying Dr. Boyd’s opinions on Dr.
Saed’s use of the commercial cell‑transformation assay kit at issue, is not sufficiently
reliable. Dr. Boyd concedes to having never used the particular assay kit that he is
now challenging. (See Boyd Dep. at 111:15–23.) Dr. Boyd also admitted that he has
never used a commercial cell transformation assay kit of any kind. (See id. at 112:2–
5.) Instead, Dr. Boyd explains that he “produced [his] own reagents” instead of using
a cell transformation assay kit, though he admits that he has not done so for over 25
years. (See id. at 112:4–13.) In sum, Dr. Boyd admits to having neither familiarity
with the cell transformation assay kit used by Dr. Saed, nor commercial cell
transformation assay kits generally. And although he admits to using a cell
transformation assay kit earlier in his career, it was a product of his own creation
used over 25 years ago. Therefore, his criticisms of Dr. Saed’s use of the commercial
cell 	transformation 	assay kit, “ab235698,” manufactured by 	Abcam, are not
supported by a reliable methodology.
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Plaintiffs also cite portions of Dr. Boyd’s deposition in which he testified that
he did not understand how the term “cell transformation” was used in the kit’s
product guide. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 8 (citing Boyd Dep. at 115:19–116:4, 120:2–
11, 	122:25–123:5).) 	Dr. 	Boyd 	also 	criticizes 	the 	kit’s 	language 	as 	an
oversimplification of the carcinogenic process. (See Boyd Dep. at 113:18–114:13.)
For the same reasons as outlined above, Dr. Boyd’s methodology underlying his kit-
specific opinions is without sufficient support and therefore unreliable.
However, Dr. Boyd has demonstrated that his opinions regarding cell
transformation as they relate to the broader carcinogenic process are supported by
his reliance on “several decades of experience in how cells are transformed into
malignant cells.” (Boyd Dep. at 138:8–13.) Thus, he should be permitted to testify
about cell transformation and his 72-hour exposure opinions, but not as they relate
to his criticisms of Dr. Saed’s use of commercial cell transformation assay kit,
“ab235698,” manufactured by Abcam.
Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd’s critique of Dr. Saed’s use of ovarian
surface epithelial ovarian cells rather than fallopian tube cells lacks support because
Dr. Boyd has never personally experimented with fallopian tube cells, cites no
studies using such cells, and did not consider in vitro testing of them. (See Pls.’ Boyd
Br. at 8–9 (citing Boyd Dep. at 134:4–12, 136:22–25, 137:4–13).)
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According to Dr. Boyd, “the great majority of high-grade serous ovarian
cancers, which are the majority of ovarian cancer type, occurs in the fallopian tube,
in which case the use of some normal type of fallopian tube cell would have been
more appropriate.” (Boyd Dep. at 133:22–134:3.) Dr. Boyd cites other peer
reviewers who were critical of Dr. Saed’s studies. (See Boyd Rep. at 6 (“I also agree
with later peer reviewers that Dr. Saed’s decision to use ovarian surface epithelial
cells rather than fallopian tube cells significantly marginalizes his study given that
scientists now agree that most high-grade serous ovarian cancers originate in the
fallopian tubes.”).) Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot credibly argue that Dr. Boyd’s
criticisms lack support, since he supported this opinion not only based on his own
experience, but on other peer-reviewed conclusions.125
Additionally, Plaintiffs mischaracterize Dr. Boyd’s testimony as it relates to
his reliance or lack thereof on studies where fallopian tube cells are used in ovarian
cancer research. When asked whether he could recall “any studies where fallopian
tubes were used,” Dr. Boyd responded that he was unable to “from memory.” (See
Boyd Dep. at 136:22–137:2.) Dr. Boyd similarly could not recall whether he
considered “in vitro testing using fallopian tube cells.” (See Boyd Dep. at 137:4–
13.) But, even if Dr. Boyd did not personally test, research, or consider use of
125 	Plaintiffs spend much time arguing about the significance of the peer review process, (see
Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 17–19), but lose sight of Dr. Boyd’s reliance on peer-reviews of Dr. Saed’s posters.
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fallopian tube cells when studying high-grade serous ovarian cancer, Dr. Boyd may
nevertheless opine “that scientists now agree that most high-grade serous ovarian
cancers originate in the fallopian tubes,” (Boyd Rep. at 6; see also Boyd Dep. at
136:4–8), because, as discussed, the methodology on which he relies in forming such
an opinion is reliable.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd’s criticisms of Dr. Levy’s talc,
inflammation and ovarian cancer opinions are unreliable and should be excluded
because Dr. Boyd ignored several peer‑reviewed studies that Dr. Levy considered.
(See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at 9–10.) Defendants rightly point out that Plaintiffs fail to
explain the significance of these studies to Dr. Boyd’s opinions. (See Defs.’ Opp. to
Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 38.) Plaintiffs do not address the substance of
the studies that Dr. Boyd purportedly ignored, and do not argue how these studies
undermine the reliability of Dr. Boyd’s methodology or opinions. While exclusion
of an expert’s opinions is warranted where “an expert ignores evidence that his
highly relevant to his conclusion, contrary to his own stated methodology,” Plaintiffs
fail to explain how these studies are relevant to Dr. Boyd’s opinions. See In re
Mirena II, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 241.126 The absence of explicit citations to every study
Dr. Levy cites does not, by itself, render Dr. Boyd’s methodology unreliable under
126 	In any event, “a proper rebuttal expert's opinion is not required to be based on the same
data as the expert opinion that it is offered to rebut.” Better Holdco, Inc. v. Beeline Loans, Inc.,
666 F. Supp. 3d 328, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (citation omitted) (collecting cases).
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Daubert. Moreover, most of Dr. Boyd’s critiques of Dr. Levy’s opinions rest on Dr.
Levy’s misreadings of specific studies or on unsupported assertions, (see, e.g., Boyd
Rep. at 22–25), not on affirmative analyses susceptible to challenge by overlooked
literature.
Accordingly, I find Dr. Boyd’s methodology sufficiently reliable under
Daubert, and therefore, I recommend the Court to admit Dr. Boyd as a rebuttal expert
subject to the constraint I detailed above.
c. 	Fit
Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Boyd’s post hoc critiques of published studies will not
assist the jury and instead risk confusion or unfair prejudice. (See Pls.’ Boyd Br. at
17–19.) Defendants respond that peer review does not insulate scientific studies from
scrutiny in litigation, and that Plaintiffs’ position is particularly inconsistent given
that Plaintiffs’ own experts criticize peer-reviewed cohort literature. (See Defs.’ Opp.
to Pls.’ Permuth, DiFeo & Boyd Brs. at 39.) Defendants further note that Plaintiffs’
acknowledgment 	that 	peer 	reviewers 	are 	“typically 	experts” 	underscores 	the
relevance of Dr. Boyd’s testimony, particularly where multiple expert reviewers at
reputable journals criticized and rejected Dr. Saed’s work. (See id. at 41.)
I agree with Defendants. Plaintiffs cite no authority—and I am aware of
none—holding that peer-reviewed or published literature is categorically immune
from critique by rebuttal experts. Adopting such a rule would improperly confer a
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presumption of reliability on all published research, regardless of its methodology
or the rigor of the review process. As discussed above, Dr. Boyd’s critique of
Plaintiffs’ experts’ methodologies and the studies on which they rely goes to weight,
not admissibility.
Under Daubert, courts may evaluate relevance by assessing whether a theory
or method has been peer reviewed or published. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
“Although it is not dispositive of admissibility, publication in a peer reviewed
journal is relevant ‘in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or
methodology on which an opinion is premised.’” Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 520
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). It follows that a defense expert offered in
rebuttal may properly scrutinize and critique the methodology and conclusions of
peer-reviewed studies relied upon by an opposing expert. Such testimony is relevant
and may assist the trier of fact in evaluating complex scientific evidence.
Here, Dr. Boyd does not opine on the admissibility of Plaintiffs’ expert
evidence or usurp the Court’s gatekeeping function. Rather, he critiques the
methodologies underlying Dr. Saed’s research and related studies cited by Plaintiffs’
experts. Specifically, Dr. Boyd opines that the Harper/Saed 2020 and 2021 posters
and 	the 	Harper/Saed 	2023 	article 	suffer 	from 	experimental 	and 	interpretive
deficiencies; that Mandarino 2020 and Emi 2021 do not meaningfully advance the
relevant mechanistic inquiry; and that Dr. Levy’s genetics-related causation opinions
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overstate the data on which they rely. These critiques address scientific design and
interpretation, not admissibility.
Accordingly, I recommend that the Court grant in part and deny in part
Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Boyd.
iv. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Kornak
Plaintiffs move to exclude the opinions of Dr. John Kornak, Ph.D. Defendants
offer Dr. Kornak’s testimony to rebut the PSC’s experts’ opinions to the extent that
those opinions are based on O’Brien 2024. Several of Plaintiffs’ experts rely on
O’Brien 2024, as is discussed elsewhere in this Report and Recommendation.
Generally, O’Brien 2024, which concludes that genital talc use is associated
with an increased risk of ovarian cancer, uses statistical methods to compensate for
missing data points in the underlying dataset, which came from the Sister Study, a
cohort study exploring the relationship between various risk factors and cancer. (See
O’Brien 2024 at 13.) Dr. Kornak primarily criticizes the imputation methods
employed by the authors of O’Brien 2024. (See ECF No. 33011-9 (“Kornak Rep.”).)
Plaintiffs move to exclude Dr. Kornak on primarily two bases. (See generally
ECF No. 33011-1 (“Pls.’ Kornak Br.”).) First, they argue that the methodology used
in O’Brien 2024 deserves great deference such that Dr. Kornak’s opinion critiquing
that methodology should be excluded. (Id. at 21-22.) Second, they maintain that Dr.
Kornak’s critique of O’Brien 2024’s methodology is unreliable because the doctor
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hastily prepared his report and did not review key materials cited by the study. (Id.
at 23-24.)
Defendants 	argue in opposition 	that 	the soundness of O’Brien 	2024’s
methodology is not a legal basis on which a court can exclude Dr. Kornak’s
criticism, and Plaintiffs’ other criticisms of Dr. Kornak are factually baseless. (See
ECF No. 33107 (“Defs.’ Kornak Br.”) at 13–23.)
As set forth above, Dr. Kornak’s rebuttal analysis is subject to the standards
set forth in Rule 702 and Daubert. With that in mind, I will detail O’Brien 2024,
again to the extent it is helpful to address the parties’ argument in this context,
followed by Dr. Kornak’s criticisms of O’Brien 2024. I then turn to the Plaintiffs’
arguments to exclude Dr. Kornak’s opinions on the flaws of O’Brien 2024.
a. 	O’Brien 2024
O’Brien 2024, discussed numerous times in this Report and Recommendation,
was published to address issues in the Sister Study data to shed further light on a
potential association between genital talcum powder use and cancer. (See O’Brien
2024 at 1.) To fully understand Dr. Kornak’s criticisms of O’Brien 2024, one must
understand O’Brien 2024’s data and methods,127 both of which I discuss below in
turn.
127 	O’Brien 2024 enjoys much ink in this Report and Recommendation as it permeates the
parties’ briefs since it is a post-2020 Opinion study. In the context of considering the instant
motion, an in-depth discussion of O’Brien 2024 and its methods is necessary.
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(1) 	The Sister Study
As noted above, O’Brien 2024 is an analysis of data collected through the
“Sister 	Study,” 	which 	is 	a 	cohort 	study 	conducted 	from 	2003 	to 	2009 	of
approximately 50,000 women residing in the United States, aged 35 to 74, who never
had breast cancer when they enrolled in the study but had a sister who had breast
cancer. (O’Brien 2024 at 2.) The authors of the study monitored the respondents for
the incidence of cancers, including ovarian cancer, and confirmed cancer cases
among the respondents, including fatal ones, with medical data when possible. (Id.
at 3.) Respondents received a questionnaire approximately every three years. (See
O’Brien 2023 at 377.)
The 	initial 	Sister 	Study 	questionnaire, 	utilized 	at 	enrollment, 	asked
respondents whether they never, sometimes, or frequently applied talcum powder to
their vaginal area at ages 10 to 13 and whether they applied talcum powder in the
year preceding enrollment128 in the Sister Study. (O’Brien 2024 at 2.)129 Following
its collection, several studies analyzed the data for various reasons, one of which is
128 	The frequency options for selection in the year preceding enrollment were as follows:
never, less than once per month, 1–3 times per month, 1–5 times per week, and more than 5 times
per week. (O’Brien 2024 at 2–3.)
129 	The Sister Study also collected information regarding each respondents’ race/ethnicity,
attained education, examiner-measured BMI, BMI age 30–39 years, age at menarche, duration of
hormonal birth control use, parity, menopausal status, hormone therapy use, geographic region of
residence, smoking status, alcohol use, childhood household income level, adult household
income, highest attained education level in the household when the participant was age 13 years,
marital status, and weight relative to peers in teen years. (Id. at 4.)
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the association of talcum powder use and ovarian cancer. A 2016 analysis found no
statistically significant association in that respect. (See Gonzalez 2016.) Dr. Katie
O’Brien, the principal author of O’Brien 2024, similarly found no statistically
significant association in another, earlier, study conducted in 2020. (See O’Brien
2020.)
However, Dr. O’Brien coordinated a 2023 analysis that collected additional
data from Sister Study respondents through a follow-up questionnaire.130 (See id.)
The 	follow-up 	questionnaire, 	administered 	between 	2017 	and 	2019, 	asked
respondents whether they had ever used talcum powder, and, if so, their age at first
and most recent use, as well as their frequency of use during each decade. (O’Brien
2024 at 3.) The key finding was that most respondents were more likely to report
talcum powder use at enrollment, whereas respondents who had been diagnosed with
cancer prior to the follow-up were more likely to report talcum powder use at follow-
up. (See O’Brien 2023 at 383.).
(2) 	O’Brien 2024’s quantitative bias analysis corrections
The gap between the Sister Study enrollment and follow-up questionnaires
presented additional issues. For different reasons, data on respondents’ talcum
powder use “were sometimes contradictory or missing.” (O’Brien 2024 at 4.) For
130 	The purpose of O’Brien 2023 was to document and analyze patterns in respondents’ use
and reliability of recall with respect to intimate care products such as talcum powder and douching
thought to be associated with gynecological cancers. (See O’Brien 2023 at 376.)
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instance, respondents who passed away before 2017 obviously did not respond at
follow-up. (See id.) Other respondents stated that they had used talcum powder at
enrollment, but at follow-up, gave contradictory responses that they never used it.
(See id.)
As mentioned earlier, O’Brien 2024 sought to address these issues by using
“quantitative bias analysis,” which “estimates what the observed association would
have been had systematic error been absent given a set of assumptions that determine
the extent of bias.” Julie M. Petersen et al., A Systematic Review of Quantitative Bias
Analysis Applied to Epidemiological Research, Int’l J. of Epidemiology 1708, 1709
(2021).131 O’Brien 2024’s quantitative bias analysis involved four scenarios132 in
which corrections were made to the data:
No correction, fill in missing data (“Scenario 1”): O’Brien 2024 did not
correct any contradictory responses, but filled in missing data, prioritizing a
respondent’s answers to the initial questionnaire at enrollment (i.e., respondents who
reported use at enrollment but failed to respond at follow-up were considered users).
(O’Brien 2024 at 4, Table A5, App. 1.) Scenario 1 found a statistically insignificant
association between genital talcum powder use and ovarian cancer, with a hazard
ratio (“HR”) of 1.07 (CI: .84 to 1.35). (Id. at 9, 12, Table 2.)
131 	I take judicial notice of the definition of quantitative bias analysis. The parties do not
specifically address its general definition, but also do not appear to dispute it.
132 	I identify O’Brien 2024’s four scenarios using the same titles that the study used.
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Fill in missing data, correct contradictory data, assume unexposed
(“Scenario 2”): O’Brien 2024 corrected contradictory data in addition to filling in
missing data. (Id. at 4, Table A5, App. 1.) For respondents who reported nonuse at
enrollment at a certain age but later indicated use at that same age, O’Brien 2024
assumed that 80% were users. (Id.) For respondents who reported use at enrollment
and nonuse at follow-up, O’Brien 2024 assumed that 90% were users. (Id.)
Respondents who did not answer at follow-up were assumed to be nonusers. (Id.)
Scenario 2 found a statistically insignificant association between genital talcum
powder use and ovarian cancer, with an HR of 1.17 (CI: .92 to 1.49). (Id. at 9, 12,
Table 2.)
Fill in missing, correct contradictory data, if undefined, assume exposed
extreme exposed (“Scenario 	3”): 	Supplementing 	Scenario 	2, 	O’Brien 	2024
categorized all respondents that reported nonuse at enrollment but no answer at
follow-up as users. (Id. at 4, Table A5, App. 1.) Scenario 3 found a statistically
significant association between genital talcum powder use and ovarian cancer, with
an HR of 3.34 (CI: 2.51 to 4.44). (Id. at 9, 12, Table 2.)133
Correct contradictory data, use multiple imputation to fill in missing or
undefined (“Scenario 4”): O’Brien 2024 used multiple imputation with chained
133 	Scenarios 2 and 3 therefore present extreme cases with respect to respondents who did not
answer at follow-up, with the true measure of use in respondents who failed to answer at follow-
up falling somewhere in between Scenarios 2 and 3.
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equations134 (“MICE”) “to generate covariate-informed probabilistic imputations of
the exposure status of participants” who reported nonuse at enrollment but did not
provide an answer about genital talc use at follow-up. (Id. at 4, Table A5, App. 1.)
The covariates O’Brien 2024 used in Scenario 4 included demographic information,
socioeconomic information, and cancer history, among other categories. (Id. at Table
2, n.d.)
Put 	differently, 	in 	Scenario 	4, 	O’Brien 	2024 	used 	existing 	data 	to
probabilistically determine what missing data would likely show. For example, if
hypothetical 	respondents 	A 	and 	B 	were 	otherwise 	identical 	with 	respect 	to
demographics, socioeconomic status, and health, but A did not answer a question (or
gave a contradictory response), A’s true answer is likely to track B’s answer.
Scenario 4 found a statistically significant association between genital talcum
powder use and ovarian cancer, with an HR of 1.82 (CI: 1.36 to 2.43). (Id. at 9, 12,
Table 2.)
(3) 	O’Brien 2024’s recall bias adjustments
In addition to the missing data, O’Brien 2024 also sought to address the more
general problem of recall bias. (Id. at 2, 4.) As discussed elsewhere in this Report
134 	As more fully discussed infra, multiple imputation is a statistical method that fills in
missing data points for a given respondent who did not answer a question by finding another
respondent with similar key characteristics who did answer the question. The method then
“imputes” the answering respondent’s data for the missing respondent, on the assumption that two
respondents who share key characteristics probably would give the same answer. (See also supra
Part V.B.)
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and Recommendation, recall bias in this context exists because self-reporting
respondents who have ovarian cancer may be more likely to report prior talcum
powder use than respondents without cancer. (See O’Brien 2023 at 383.) The
increased likelihood of such a bias may be due to public attention to a potential
connection between talcum powder use and ovarian cancer. (See id.)
To account for recall bias, O’Brien 2024 started with Scenario 4, which
reflected contradictory data correction and imputation of missing data. (Id. at 4.)
O’Brien 2024 then “implemented recall bias corrections by changing the exposure
status of a specified percentage of women with certain characteristics.” (Id. at 4, 9,
App. 1.) First, O’Brien 2024 recategorized certain percentages (10%, 25%, 50%,
75%, 90%) of respondents who contracted ovarian cancer to be nonusers. (Id. at 4,
9, App. 1.) These respondents initially reported nonuse or failed to answer but were
categorized as users based on their post-diagnostic status or imputation. (Id. at 4, 9,
App. 1.) If 25% of cancer cases are recategorized to be nonusers, there is still a
statistically significant association between talcum powder use and ovarian cancer,
but the HR drops to 1.41 (CI: 1.06 to 1.87). (Id. at 9.)
Second, O’Brien 2024 modified the first set of corrections by recategorizing
certain percentages (10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%) of ovarian cancer cases as
nonusers based on their infrequent or short-term use of talcum powder. (Id. at 4, 9,
App. 1.) If 90% of infrequent users are recategorized as nonusers, there is still a
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statistically significant association between talcum powder use and ovarian cancer,
but the HR drops to 1.48 (CI: 1.06 to 1.87). (Id. at 9.)
Third, O’Brien 2024 recategorized certain percentages (5%, 10%, 15%, 25%,
50%) of respondents who did not contract ovarian cancer and were nonusers to be
infrequent or short-term users. (Id. at 4, 9, App. 1.) If 10% of noncancer cases are
recategorized, there is still a statistically significant association between talcum
powder use and ovarian cancer, but the HR drops to 1.53 (CI: 1.15 to 2.04). (Id. at
9.)
(4) 	O’Brien 2024’s results
O’Brien 	2024 	concluded 	that, 	after 	quantitative 	bias 	and 	recall 	bias
corrections are made, the data support a hypothesis that genital talcum powder use
is associated with ovarian cancer. (Id. at 14.) The authors caution that their results
“do not establish causality and do not implicate any specific cancer-inducing agent”
and are still subject to confounding or external variables. (Id.)
b. 	Dr. Kornak
(1) 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs do not appear to challenge Dr. Kornak’s qualifications. (See Pls.’
Kornak Br. at 20–25.) In any event, such a challenge would not prevail.
Dr. Kornak is a Professor in Residence of Biostatistics in the Department of
Epidemiology and Biostatistics in the School of Medicine at the University of
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California, San Francisco (“UCSF”). (Kornak Rep., App’x A.) He also serves as the
head of the Health Data Science Program and the Director of the UCSF Biostatistics
Consulting Unit, part of the UCSF Clinical and Translational Sciences Institute. (Id.)
He received his Bachelor of Science in Mathematics with Statistics in 1996, and his
Ph.D. in statistics in 2000, both from the University of Nottingham in the United
Kingdom. (Id.)
Dr. Kornak has over twenty years of research experience in applying
biostatistics across a number of disciplines, including epidemiology. (Id.) Notably,
he has led research projects funded by the National Institutes of Health, which also
employs Dr. Katie O’Brien. (Id.) Dr. Kornak has published more than 150 peer-
reviewed publications concerning biostatistics. (Id.)
Accordingly, I recommend that the Court find Dr. Kornak to be qualified to
opine on O’Brien 2024’s quantitative bias and recall bias corrections.
(2) 	Methodology and opinions
In general, Dr. Kornak opines that O’Brien 2024’s two data correction
measures (i. quantitative bias analysis correction of missing and contradictory data,
and ii. correction for recall bias) are flawed and unreliable. (See Kornak Rep. ¶¶ 10-
14.)
In his rebuttal report, Dr. Kornak first examines Scenarios 1 through 3 and
identifies flaws in each that he opines skew the overall results in favor of finding an
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association between genital talc use and ovarian cancer. (See id. ¶¶ 32–39.) His
primary focus, however, is on Scenario 4 (multiple imputation). He explains that
application of quantitative bias analysis is both inappropriate for the Sister Study
dataset, and even if appropriate, was unreliably applied to that dataset, leading to
flawed results. (See id. ¶¶ 40–71.) Dr. Kornak also identifies flaws in O’Brien 2024’s
recall bias corrections. (See id. ¶¶ 72–76.)
As I explain in further detail below, Dr. Kornak’s analysis involves an
application of accepted statistical principles to the methods used in O’Brien 2024.
He points out where he believes O’Brien 2024 deviates from these principles and
identifies the consequences of those deviations. Dr. Kornak applies the methodology
that 	rebuttal 	experts 	generally 	undertake, 	particularly 	in 	this 	litigation, 	i.e.,
criticizing the opinions and methodology of the adverse expert or a study relied upon
by the expert. For most of the criticisms he raises, Dr. Kornak appears to rely on his
experience generally in biostatistics and his experience dealing with missing data in
particular. (See Kornak Dep. at 103:20–104:19.) He expresses that the use of
multiple imputation requires some level of scientific judgment. (See id. at 105:8–
106:5.)
Rationale for Using Multiple Imputation. At the outset, Dr. Kornak
questions O’Brien 2024’s rationale for using multiple imputation. He notes that
O’Brien 2023 observed that “[d]iscrepancies in self-reported genital talc use were
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primarily driven by women who initially reported using during early adolescence,
but later reported never using.” (Id. (quoting O’Brien 2023 at 384).) Based on that
observation, Dr. Kornak questions why O’Brien 2024 assumes that misreporting was
a substantial problem in respondents who indicated nonuse at enrollment but did not
answer at follow-up. (Id.)
Appropriateness of Using Multiple Imputation. Dr. Kornak then turns to
the methodology of multiple imputation and its applicability to the Sister Study
dataset. Dr. Kornak directs most of his attention to O’Brien 2024’s Scenario 4.135 Dr.
Kornak describes O’Brien 2024’s use of MICE as “comput[ing] the probability that
any particular survey respondent was a genital talc user based on her demographic,
economic, and health characteristics.”136 (Id. ¶ 44.) Appearing to rely on an academic
article describing the methodology of applying MICE, he opines that MICE is an
inappropriate method for the Sister Study dataset because MICE is not appropriate
135 	Although the focus of Dr. Kornak’s rebuttal is Scenario 4, he offers the following criticisms
of the other scenarios:
Scenario 1: Dr. Kornak opines that the adjustments made in Scenario 1 introduce further recall
bias into O’Brien 2024’s analysis. (Kornak Rep. ¶¶ 33–34.) This is because when a respondent did
not answer on talcum powder use at enrollment but claimed use at follow-up, the follow-up answer
is retrospective and more prone to recall bias. (Id.)
Scenario 2: Largely following his criticism of Scenario 1, Dr. Kornak attacks O’Brien 2024’s
recategorization of 80% of respondents who did not answer at enrollment but reported use at
follow-up as genital talc users. (Id. ¶ 36.) This recategorization, in Dr. Kornak’s view, exacerbated
the effect of recall bias. (Id.)
Scenario 3: Dr. Kornak accepts that Scenario 3 is an intentionally extreme analysis to provide an
illustration rather than a true measure of the association between genital talc use and ovarian
cancer. (Id. ¶ 39.)
136 	Dr. Kornak notes that some information about how O’Brien 2024 applied MICE is missing,
thus complicating any analysis of it. (See id.)
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for data missing not at random (“MNAR”)137 (i.e., a situation where respondents with
a particular characteristic are more likely to skip a question, but that characteristic is
related to the endpoint being measured). (Id. ¶¶ 48–51 (citing M.J. Azur et al.,
Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations: What Is It and How Does It Work?, 20
Int’l J. Methods Psych. Rsch. (1), 40, 40–49 (2011)).) Dr. Kornak believes that the
Sister Study data is MNAR because, as O’Brien 2024 recognizes, respondents with
cancer were more likely to not answer questions about talcum powder use at follow-
up. (Id. ¶ 50.)138
Lastly, 	Dr. 	Kornak 	also 	notes 	that 	in 	these 	circumstances, 	imputation
exacerbates the problem of recall bias because O’Brien 2024’s imputation uses
existing data from the Sister Study that may already be affected by recall bias. (See
id. ¶¶ 45–46.)
Application of Multiple Imputation. Assuming that MICE is an appropriate
method for the Sister Study dataset, Dr. Kornak submits that it was not reliably
137 	As Dr. Kornak explains, data can be categorized in three ways: (1) data that are missing
completely at random (i.e., respondents who accidentally skip a question in a way unrelated to
their characteristics); (2) data missing at random (i.e., respondents in a particular category are more
likely to skip a certain question, but that question is unrelated to the endpoint being measured);
and (3) missing data that is not at random, i.e., MNAR. (See Kornak Rep. ¶ 39.) In Dr. Kornak’s
view, there are specific methods to address MNAR data, but O’Brien 2024 did not use them. (Id.
¶ 51.)
138 	Additionally, Dr. Kornak opines that imputation is not as reliable when the group of
respondents for which data is missing (and thus must be imputed) is markedly different from the
set of respondents whose data is existing (and serves as the basis for imputation. (Id. ¶ 47.) The
difference in incident cancer between the two groups negatively affects the reliability of the
analysis, in Dr. Kornak’s view. (See id.)
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applied 	for 	three 	reasons. 	First, 	Dr. 	Kornak 	opines 	that 	the 	demographic,
socioeconomic, and health data that O’Brien 2024 used to impute genital talcum
powder use are not reliable predictors of use based on prior studies of the Sister
Study data. (Id. ¶¶ 52–54 (citing Chang 2024.) Second, relying on his independent
assessment of the O’Brien 2024 data, Dr. Kornak opines that O’Brien 2024’s use of
ovarian cancer status as a data point in the imputation creates a circular feedback
loop. (Id. ¶¶ 56–57.) This loop occurs for two reasons: a generally higher prevalence
of genital talcum powder use among women with ovarian cancer and recall bias. (Id.
¶ 57.) Both, in Dr. Kornak’s view, lead to more imputation of genital talcum powder
use than may be warranted. (Id.) Dr. Kornak faults O’Brien 2024 for not completing
a separate imputation analysis without using ovarian cancer status as a data input.
(Id. ¶ 58.) Third, again relying on his independent assessment of the data, Dr. Kornak
opines that the percentage of respondents subject to correction or imputation (40%)
in O’Brien 2024 is unreasonably high, generating significant uncertainty in the
results. (Id. ¶¶ 59–61.)139
Results of Multiple Imputation. Dr. Kornak lastly addresses the results of
O’Brien 2024’s multiple imputation methodology. (See id. ¶¶ 66–71.) He argues
139 	Dr. Kornak also identifies certain inconsistencies in the Sister Study questionnaires that
could affect the results of applying MICE to its data. For example, the enrollment questionnaire
allowed respondents to indicate that they did not know about their genital talcum powder use but
the follow-up questionnaire did not. (Id. ¶ 63.) To the extent that inconsistencies in the
questionnaire generated flawed data, imputation based on that data would carry over those flaws.
(Id. ¶ 65.)
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that to be reliable, O’Brien 2024’s results should remain robust even if minor
modifications are made to the multiple imputation methodology used. (Id. ¶ 70.) Dr.
Kornak then illustrates how small changes to the methodology result in a statistically
insignificant finding. (See id. ¶ 71.)
Recall Bias. With respect to O’Brien 2024 recall bias corrections, Dr. Kornak
first notes that the O’Brien 2024 authors’ corrections for recall bias are arbitrarily
applied in discrete scenarios that do not account for all of the ways recall bias can
affect the analysis. (Id. ¶ 73.) Based on his independent review of the data, he notes
that there is an inverse relationship between the percentage of respondents who are
recategorized and the resultant HR. (Id.) As there are no validated estimates for the
number of respondents who are affected by recall estimates, he believes higher
recategorizations (which lead to lower HRs) are more appropriate. (Id. ¶ 74.)
(3) 	Reliability
As noted above, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Kornak’s opinions should be
excluded because O’Brien 2024 deserves deference as a peer-reviewed study and
because Dr. Kornak’s rebuttal is unreliable and “made for litigation.” (See Pls.’
Kornak Br. at 21–25.) Defendants argue in opposition that the soundness of O’Brien
2024’s methodology is no reason to exclude Dr. Kornak’s criticisms of it and Dr.
Kornak’s methods are reliable and reliably applied. (See Defs.’ Kornak Br. at 13-
23.) I agree.
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Plaintiffs’ first argument does not directly engage with Dr. Kornak’s opinions.
Instead, Plaintiff asserts that because O’Brien 2024 is “sufficiently reliable,” any
critique offered by Dr. Kornak must necessarily be unfounded. (Pls.’ Kornak Br. at
21.) Plaintiffs highlight that O’Brien 2024 underwent multiple rounds of peer
review, and that none of the reviewers identified the concerns now raised by Dr.
Kornak. (Id.) This argument is misplaced. Plaintiffs cite no authority for the
proposition that the perceived reliability of a study itself furnishes a legal basis to
preclude a rebuttal expert from critiquing that study. No such precedent exists. By
suggesting that the asserted reliability of O’Brien 2024 forecloses any expert
criticism, Plaintiff fundamentally misapprehends the Daubert framework, which
permits—indeed, expects—experts to address the strengths and weaknesses of the
scientific materials on which other experts rely. As noted above, rebuttal experts
serve a limited role in litigation, particularly where, as here, the party offering them
bears no burden of proof. See Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 138, 140
(“Rebuttal experts thus ‘have a less demanding task because they have no burden to
produce models or methods of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiff[’s]
expert[].’” (alterations in original) (quoting In re Digital Music, 321 F.R.D. at 78));
see id. at 140 (“At bottom, a rebuttal expert need not proffer a methodology or
model, but only critique the opposing expert’s.”); In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at
1368 (defense experts’ “opinions properly may be limited to criticizing the analysis
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and conclusions presented by another party”). Their task is to critique and test the
reasoning, assumptions, and methods of an opposing expert, not to construct an
affirmative 	model 	of 	their 	own. 	I 	do 	not 	doubt 	that 	in 	certain 	disciplines,
standardized and peer-reviewed methodologies exist for evaluating another expert’s
work. See In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., No. 16-md-2724, 2024 WL
4980784, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2024) (“[A]ll experts must meet the Daubert
standards, if a rebuttal expert is to discredit another expert’s model by making
affirmative statements or findings of their own they must still provide good grounds
based in methods and principles of analytical evaluation to ground their opinions
that discredit an analytical expert opinion.”). Nevertheless, because the methods
employed by a rebuttal expert necessarily depend on the particular analyses being
challenged, it would be inconsistent with Daubert and with the practical realities of
expert practice to require that a rebuttal expert’s critiques themselves be peer-
reviewed as a precondition to admissibility. The methods employed by a rebuttal
expert, such as Dr. Kornak, remain a proper subject for cross-examination.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ talismanic focus on the fact that O’Brien 2024 was
peer reviewed misses the mark. Peer review is but one of many factors that courts
consider in applying the flexible Daubert standard.140 See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S.
140 	Some courts have expressed doubts concerning pre-publication peer review’s significance
in the Daubert analysis. See In re Roundup, 737 F. Supp. 3d at 908 (“There are a vast number of
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at 141–42 (“[A]s the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is ‘flexible,’ and
Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all
experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude
when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate
reliability determination.”). Therefore, to the extent Dr. Kornak criticizes how the
authors of O’Brien 2024 conducted the study, the fact that the study underwent
several rounds of peer review does not immunize it from being challenged in this
litigation.141
Indeed, my conclusion that the methods underlying Dr. Kornak’s opinions are
reliable is based on other factors, such as the statistical principles Dr. Kornak cites
to illustrate how O’Brien 2024’s deviations from these principles potentially produce
inaccurate results, and Dr. Kornak’s experience with missing data and imputation
generally. (See, e.g., Kornak Rep. ¶¶ 24, 48, 53, 70; see also Kornak Dep. at 103:20–
104:19, 148:8–149:6.) For example, Dr. Kornak identifies the three categories of
peer-reviewed journals out there. Pre-publication editorial peer review, just by itself, is far from a
guarantee of scientific reliability.”).
141 	That said, the reliability of O’Brien 2024 is not the subject of Plaintiffs’ motion; rather, it
is the reliability of Dr. Kornak’s criticism of O’Brien 2024 that is at issue. Focusing again on peer
review, Plaintiffs appear to argue that Dr. Kornak’s methods were not peer reviewed. Although
Plaintiffs do not meaningfully develop that argument, and Defendants do not appear to address it,
I am unpersuaded that the lack of methodological peer review in Dr. Kornak’s rebuttal warrants
exclusion. It bears emphasis that peer review is only one factor among many, and need not be
present in every case. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141; Schneider, 320 F.3d at 406 (“[W]e note
that expert testimony does not have to obtain general acceptance or be subject to peer review to be
admitted under Rule 702.”).
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datasets with missing datapoints and explains why he believes the Sister Study is
MNAR and why MICE is inappropriate for an MNAR dataset. (Id. ¶¶ 48–50.) He
then identifies alternative methods that would be more appropriate for an MNAR
dataset. (Id. ¶ 51.) In another example, Dr. Kornak cites prior studies of the Sister
Study dataset showing that the demographic, economic, and health characteristics
the O’Brien 2024 authors used as predictors in their imputation model are not strong
predictors of talcum powder use and explains how this leads to unreliability in
O’Brien 2024’s analysis. (See id. ¶¶ 52–55.) These are the quintessential analyses of
a rebuttal expert as Dr. Kornak identifies infirmities in O’Brien 2024 and offers
alternative methodologies. See Capri Sun GmbH., 595 F. Supp. at 138; Mahaska
Bottling Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (courts routinely permit defense experts to
testify “even if the expert primarily critiques the opposing expert’s approach without
offering an alternative approach”); In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1368 (defense
experts’ 	“opinions 	properly 	may 	be 	limited 	to 	criticizing 	the 	analysis 	and
conclusions presented by another party”); In re Zyprexa, 489 F.Supp. 2d at 285
(“[D]efendants’ experts have a less demanding task, since they have no burden to
produce models or methods of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiffs’
experts.”).
Plaintiffs, for their part, contend that Dr. Kornak’s criticisms lack merit. They
argue that the scientific literature supports the use of MICE in these circumstances
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and that the method does not invariably require strong predictors to yield accurate
imputations. (See Rebuttal Rep. of Dr. Elizabeth A. Stuart, Ph.D., ECF No. 33011-
11, at 7-8, 10.) This disagreement, however, reflects nothing more than a reasonable
and legitimate divergence of views within the biostatistical community. Such
professional differences do not warrant exclusion under Rule 702. Rather, they
present a paradigmatic “battle of the experts”—one that is properly explored through
cross-examination and resolved by the jury, not by pretrial disqualification of
competing methodologies. See United States v. Maxwell, No. 20-CR-330, 2021 WL
5283951, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 2021) (“But if experts disagree on the proper
interpretation of evidence, ‘it is not the Court’s role to resolve the dispute through
exclusion of one of the expert’s opinions.’” (quoting In re Digital Music, 321 F.R.D.
at 80)); Templeton v. Bishop of Charleston, No. 18-CV-02003, 2021 WL 3419442,
at *9 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2021) (“Daubert principles support admission of a scientific
theory if it is within ‘the range where experts might reasonably differ.’ In other
words, where legitimate disagreement exists within the scientific community, it is
for the jury, not the judge, ‘to determine which of several competing scientific
theories has the best provenance.’” Further, “Rule 702 does not require exclusion of
all but the most scientifically supported view, and it clearly contemplates the
admission of testimony by experts who have fundamental disagreements about the
scientific principles at issue.”) (internal citations omitted); Grasinger v. Caterpillar,
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Inc., No. 21-CV-956, 2023 WL 4846843, at *9 (W.D. Pa. July 28, 2023) (“‘Daubert
neither requires nor empowers trial courts to determine which of several competing
scientific theories has the best provenance.’”) (quoting Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at 85).
Next, I turn to Plaintiffs’ other arguments that challenge different aspects of
Dr. Kornak’s methodology. Plaintiffs fault Dr. Kornak for (i) preparing his opinion
hastily; (ii) consulting with Cornerstone Research (“Cornerstone”), an expert search
firm used by Defendants, in preparing his opinions; and (iii) failing to read materials
supporting O’Brien 2024’s methodology.142 None of Plaintiffs’ arguments are
adequate bases for preclusion under Daubert.
With respect to Plaintiffs’ contention that Dr. Kornak’s report reflects undue
haste, I do not find that the limited time available to prepare his analysis warrants
exclusion. The parties do not dispute that all experts—on both sides—had a
compressed window in which to address O’Brien 2024, which was published on
May 15, 2024. (O’Brien 2024 at 1.) Pursuant to the Court’s scheduling order, expert
reports were due May 28, 2024. Defendants correctly note that Plaintiffs were
subject to the same constraints and indeed opposed Defendants’ request for
142 	Plaintiffs further contend that the purportedly “incendiary” and inflammatory language
used in Dr. Kornak’s report renders his analysis unreliable. (Pls.’ Kornak Br. at 19.) I disagree.
While experts should avoid unnecessary rhetoric and vitriol, Rule 702 and Daubert focus on the
reliability of an expert’s principles, methods, and application of those methods—not the stylistic
choices reflected in the report. If the underlying methodology satisfies the governing standards, an
expert’s word choice, whether restrained or intemperate, does not bear on admissibility. Any
concerns regarding tone are more appropriately addressed through cross-examination or in limine
motion practice, not exclusion.
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additional time. (Defs.’ Kornak Br. at 19–20.) Plaintiffs’ own experts submitted
supplemental reports responding to O’Brien 2024 within that same short interval.
Against that backdrop, the fact that Dr. Kornak prepared his report under time
pressure does not render his methodology unreliable. The record shows that he
devoted more than 70 hours to the task. (See ECF No. 33011-8, Dr. Kornak Invoice.)
Any alleged haste, therefore, goes to the substance and weight of his opinions rather
than their admissibility, and is an issue appropriately explored through cross-
examination.
The 	compressed 	timeline 	likewise 	explains 	Dr. 	Kornak’s 	reliance 	on
Cornerstone143 to conduct preliminary research and assist in the preparation of his
opinions. Plaintiffs do not contend, however, that Cornerstone’s involvement—or
that of Defendants’ counsel—was improper or that it exerted any undue influence
on the substance of Dr. Kornak’s analysis. To the contrary, Dr. Kornak testified that
he independently formulated his opinions, and nothing in the record suggests that
the report was drafted by Cornerstone or counsel without his input or substantive
analytical 	work. 	(See 	ECF 	No. 	33011-10 	(“Kornak 	Dep.”) 	at 	48:10–22.)
Accordingly, the participation of Cornerstone and counsel implicates the weight of
143 	Cornerstone is a consulting firm that connects attorneys with applicable experts to provide
testimony on litigation matters, among other things, and at times, will provide administrative
support to the testifying expert. (See Kornak Dep. at 28:17–30:3, 33:22–35:15.) Dr. Kornak does
not have an employment relationship with Cornerstone. (Id.)
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Dr. Kornak’s opinions, not their admissibility under Rule 702. See Venus v. Seville
Food, LLC, No. 14-cv-2476, 2017 WL 2364192, at *17 (D.N.J. May 31, 2017).
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Kornak’s opinions are unreliable because
he did not fully read certain articles cited in O’Brien 2024, pointing to portions of
his deposition testimony in support of this claim. (Pls.’ Kornak Br. at 23.) Plaintiffs
center their argument on Dr. Kornak’s purported failure to thoroughly digest one
such article—White & Royston, Imputing Missing Covariate Values for the Cox
Model, 28 Statist. Med. 1982 (2009)—which O’Brien 2024 cited in support of
including ovarian cancer status in its imputation model. Although Dr. Kornak
acknowledged that his review of White & Royston was limited, the record does not
support the inference that he ignored or refused to consider the study. Rather, his
testimony reflects that he reviewed the article for its relevance to O’Brien 2024 and
concluded that it did not alter his assessment of the methodology employed. (Kornak
Dep. at 332:14–336:9.) Plaintiffs’ criticism therefore challenges his review and
conclusion of lack of relevance of this article, not the reliability of the methods he
applied.
Such challenges go to the weight of Dr. Kornak’s testimony. They are
appropriately addressed through cross-examination, not through exclusion under
Rule 702. See In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy, 2018 WL 4030585, at *6
(finding that simply because an expert did not consider all studies deemed relevant
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by the opposing party or overlooked a study “does not mean that he unreliably
applies his methodology”).
Therefore, I recommend that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the
Opinions of Dr. Kornak.
VI. 	CONTAMINATION AND TESTING MOTIONS
The parties have filed six motions addressing issues generally related to
contamination and testing. These motions concern, inter alia, (1) the testing of
Defendants’ talcum powder products for the presence of asbestos; (2) whether the
mines from which Defendants obtained talc for their products were contaminated
with asbestos; (3) whether asbestos, heavy metals, and fragrance chemicals allegedly
present in Defendants’ talcum powder products cause or contribute to ovarian
cancer; and (4) whether the gynecologic tissue of certain bellwether Plaintiffs
contained talc or other deleterious particles.
Before turning to these motions, I address two preliminary matters. First,
Defendants seek to preclude Dr. Longo from testifying in this MDL regarding his
findings of chrysotile asbestos in Defendants’ talcum powder products, based on his
new—and purportedly improved—PLM methodology. Defendants have requested,
and I agreed to, a Daubert evidentiary hearing to assess the reliability of Dr. Longo’s
PLM-chrysotile opinions. Those hearings took place on January 15 and 16, 2026.
Importantly, Plaintiffs represent that Dr. Longo’s PLM-chrysotile testing will not be
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offered during any of the six bellwether trials, including the first of such bellwethers,
Judkins.
To expedite resolution of the Rule 702 motions and to ensure that the first
bellwether trial proceeds without unnecessary delay, I have reserved decision on the
admissibility 	of 	Dr. 	Longo’s 	PLM-chrysotile 	opinions 	pending 	the 	Daubert
evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, this Report and Recommendation does not
address the portion of Defendants’ asbestos motion challenging Dr. Longo’s new
PLM methodology. (ECF No. 33012-2 (“Defs.’ Asbestos Br.”) at 18–57.) Likewise,
I have reserved decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Asbestos Testing
Opinions of Matthew S. Sanchez, Ph.D., Ann G. Wylie, Ph.D., and Shu-Chun Su,
Ph.D.144 (ECF No. 33006), as these doctors rebut Dr. Longo’s new PLM opinions.
A separate Report and Recommendation addressing Dr. Longo’s PLM-chrysotile
opinions will issue following the hearing.
Second, two of Defendants’ motions advance causation-related arguments
that 	are 	more 	appropriately 	considered 	in 	the 	context 	of 	general 	causation.
Defendants’ asbestos motion seeks to exclude more than a dozen of Plaintiffs’
experts from testifying that the asbestos and “fibrous talc” allegedly contained in
Defendants’ products causes ovarian cancer. (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83–93, 97–102.)
144 	Dr. Su testified at a Rule 104 hearing before me on January 15, 2026. Due to time
constraints, Dr. Wylie’s testimony is being separately rescheduled.
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In addition, Defendants’ heavy metals and fragrances motion exclusively advances
causation-related arguments; Defendants seek to exclude eighteen Plaintiffs’ experts
from testifying that Defendants’ products “contain trace amounts of purportedly
carcinogenic heavy metals (nickel, chromium and cobalt) and fragrances that cause,
or contribute to causing, ovarian cancer.” (Defs.’ Heavy Metals and Fragrances Br.
at 1.) Consequently, I have addressed Defendants’ causation-related arguments
concerning asbestos, heavy metals, and fragrances in the general causation section
above. (See supra Parts V.B.6, 7.)
A. 	Asbestos
In this section, I address two motions: Defendants’ Motion to Exclude
Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Asbestos-Related Opinions (ECF No. 33012) and Plaintiffs’
Motion to Exclude the Geology Opinions of Drs. Mary Poulton and Laura Webb
(ECF No. 32996).
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Asbestos-
Related Opinions
i. 	Drs. William Longo and Mark Rigler
In this this round of Daubert motions, Defendants have again moved to
“exclude Dr. Longo’s TEM testing for amphibole asbestos.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at
57.) In my prior Opinion, after considering Defendants’ arguments and evaluating
the reliability of Dr. Longo’s three-step TEM methodology, I concluded that
Plaintiffs met their burden of establishing that Dr. Longo’s opinion concerning the
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results of his TEM analysis is reliable for purposes of admissibility under Daubert.
In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 147–54.
Defendants 	seek 	reconsideration 	under 	Judge 	Shipp’s 	April 	30, 	2024
Memorandum Order, contending that my ruling “rests on a basis that is no longer
viable under the amendments to Rule 702.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 67.) They reason
that portions of my prior Opinion in this context improperly characterized their
challenges to Dr. Longo’s methodology as matters of weight for the jury. (Id. at 65–
67.) Aside from that contention, Defendants’ arguments made here concerning Drs.
Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM-amphibole opinions remain substantially unchanged—
often repeating verbatim—the arguments previously raised during the initial round
of motion practice. (Compare Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 57–82 with ECF No. 9736-3
(“Defs.’ 2019 Asbestos Br.”).)
For the reasons set forth below and in the 2020 Opinion, I recommend that the
Court deny Defendants’ motion to exclude the TEM-amphibole opinions of Drs.
Longo and Rigler. Defendants have not demonstrated that my prior ruling admitting
TEM testing demonstrably failed to adhere to Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023
amendment. Nor have they presented any new science in support of their current
position that would materially change the outcome. In essence, Defendants simply
disagree with my prior ruling, which is not a valid basis for reconsideration under
the April 30, 2024 Order. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness and for the
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benefit of the Court, I will again examine whether Drs. Longo and Rigler reliably
applied their three-step TEM methodology in identifying amphibole asbestos
particles in Defendants’ talcum powder products.
a. 	Qualifications
I must first address whether Drs. Longo and Rigler are qualified to testify as
experts in this MDL. In my prior Opinion, I found Dr. Longo, a materials scientist,
“qualified to testify as an expert on the issue of whether the subject talc products
contain asbestos.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 147. Defendants do
not challenge this particular ruling. Accordingly, since no new issues have been
raised regarding his expertise, my prior reasoning and ruling that Dr. Longo is
qualified to testify as an expert in this litigation stands.
Defendants’ motion also addresses Dr. Rigler, a microbiologist who was the
Chief Science Officer at Dr. Longo’s company, MAS. Defendants state that Dr.
Rigler “had a much more limited role related to the talc testing at issue and has since
left MAS,” but “he was listed as a co-author of one of the earlier MAS reports.”
(Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 10–11.)
I noted in my prior Opinion that Plaintiffs “also designated Dr. Longo’s
former-assistant, Mark Rigler, as a potential expert in this matter as the coauthor of
Dr. Longo’s expert report.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 147 n.23.
However, I did not rule on Dr. Rigler’s qualifications.
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In opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs argue that “Drs. Longo and
Rigler are uniquely qualified to analyze the asbestos content of” Defendants’ talcum
powder products, and that “their testimony is admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.” (ECF No. 33131 (“Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br.”) at 18.) Defendants do not
dispute Dr. Rigler’s qualifications in their briefing.
I find that Dr. Rigler is qualified to testify in this matter. Dr. Rigler received
a Ph.D. in Microbiology from the University of Georgia. (ECF No. 33132-2 Ex. 9
(“Rigler Curriculum Vitae”) at 1.) He worked at MAS with Dr. Longo for
approximately 30 years, holding various positions including Chief Science Officer
and Senior Consulting Scientist. (Id.) Dr. Rigler specializes in electron microscopy
and has experience testing for the presence of asbestos. (ECF No. 33132-2, Ex. 11
(“Rigler Dep. Tr.”) at 8:24-9:17; 219:21-223:2.) Dr. Rigler has authored or
coauthored dozens of scientific publications and is a member of several professional
organizations, including the American Society for Testing and Materials. (Rigler
Curriculum Vitae at 1–4.) Since 2019, Dr. Rigler has worked at MAS as a Senior
Consulting Scientist. (Id. at 1.) Based on these past experiences and academic
background, I find Dr. Rigler qualified to offer his expert opinion in microbiology,
electron microscopy, and whether Defendants’ talc products contain asbestos.
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b. 	Methodology and Conclusions
In their Second Supplemental Report dated February 1, 2019, which was the
subject of my prior TEM-amphibole ruling, Drs. Longo and Rigler describe the
three-step TEM methodology used by MAS to detect asbestos in Defendants’ talc
products.145 (ECF No. 33014-25 (“Longo 2d Supp. Rep.”).) Dr. Longo also testified
about TEM methodology during the previous Daubert evidentiary hearing over
which I presided.
In their report, Drs. Longo and Rigler explained that MAS tested historical
samples of Johnson’s Baby Powder, Shower to Shower, and “Imerys’ railroad car
cosmetic talcum powder”146 from the 1960s through the early 2000s “for the possible
presence of amphibole asbestos.” (Id. at 2.) MAS’s TEM analysis purportedly
established that 42 of the 70 samples tested “contained detectable amounts of
amphibole asbestos fibers and bundles (tremolite solid solution series and or
anthophyllite solid solution series).” (Id. at 8; see id. at 17–18, 22, 31–32.) For
perspective, the report stated: “The total amount of regulated asbestos structures
counted in the 42 positive . . . samples was 187 bundles and fibers.” (Id. at 25.)
145 	I note that neither Dr. Longo’s Third Supplemental Report of November 17, 2023, nor his
Fourth Supplemental Report of April 29, 2024, reported any new studies or information regarding
the TEM methodology or results; they are directed to his PLM testing.
146 	Imerys Talc America, Inc. f/k/a Luzenac America, Inc. f/k/a Rio Tinto Minerals, Inc. is a
former supplier of talc to Defendants.
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To prepare the talcum powder samples for TEM testing, MAS analysts used
a heavy liquid separation technique. (Id. at 11–12; see ECF No. 33132-1, Ex. 5
(“Daubert H’rg Tr.”) at 474:21–477:24; 483:6–20.) This method concentrated the
samples by placing the talcum powder into a test tube containing a heavy liquid
solution and spinning it in a centrifuge, which caused lower density materials, such
as talc, to “go to the surface” and higher density materials, such as amphibole
asbestos, to “go to the bottom of the test tube.” (Id. at 477:11–24.) Dr. Longo
testified that heavy liquid separation is a generally accepted preparation method.147
(Id. at 652:2–5.)
Next, MAS analysts examined the samples under a transmission electron
microscope.148 (Longo 2d Supp. Rep. at 12–13; see Daubert H’rg Tr. at 486:8–16.)
Drs. Longo and Rigler explained that it is “well recognized” that the use of a
transmission electron microscope “is the only analytical method with the appropriate
sensitivity for the analysis of trace mineral concentrations that can be much less than
147 	Defendants do not challenge or otherwise object to the reliability of Drs. Longo’s and
Rigler’s heavy liquid separation method, and I have no basis to find that this method has not been
generally accepted in the scientific community or is otherwise unreliable.
148 	Transmission electron microscopes work by generating and passing a beam of electrons
through a sample to form an image. (IWGACP White Paper at 27.) Dr. Longo testified that such a
microscope can cost approximately $750,000. (Daubert H’rg Tr. at 463:2–9.) PLM, by contrast,
“is an optical microscopy technique where the illumination of the object under view involves
polarized visible light.” (IWGACP White Paper at 26.) “This technique can be used to identify
minerals based on optical properties.” (Id.)
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0.01 wt. %.” (Longo 2d Supp. Rep. at 5.) At the Daubert hearing, Dr. Longo
explained the advantages of using TEM over PLM:
Q. 	What 	is 	briefly 	transmission 	electron
microscopy, and how does it compare to PLM, polarized
light 	microscopy 	in 	terms 	of 	the 	advantages 	and
disadvantages when you are testing talc for asbestos?
A. 	The advantages are it allows you to get a
much higher sensitivity. It allows you to identify the
asbestos 	fibers 	according 	to 	the 	rules 	using
microchemistry. It allows you to determine the crystalline
structure using the diffraction technique. It doesn’t use
light. It uses electrons. So that because you are using
electrons, you could see much smaller size asbestos fibers
than you see in the polarized light microscopy because you
are using light. It is a much more sensitive instrument, and
it is probably the instrument that should be used for the
analysis of asbestos for talc.
(Daubert H’rg Tr. at 487:8–23.)
Dr. Longo then set forth the three-step TEM methodology that MAS used to
identify amphibole asbestos in the talcum powder samples:
Q. 	Is there a general consensus in the scientific
community as set forth in the published methods as to the
three 	steps 	that 	have 	to 	be 	undertaken 	when 	doing
transmission electron microscopic analysis on a material
to determine whether it contains asbestos?
A. 	Yes, there is.
Q. 	We’re looking at page 12 of your report, and
I circled step No. 1. That is step No. 1?
A. 	It is called morphology, the dimensions of the
fiber or bundle of asbestos you are looking at. Step 1 has
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to have an aspect ratio greater than or equal to 5-to-1. The
length of the asbestos structure has to be at least a half a
micrometer in length or greater. It has to have substantially
parallel sides so that each side of the asbestos structure
essentially is almost straight. You could have a little bit of
crookedness, but substantially parallel. That is Step 1.
Q. 	What is Step 2 as shown in your report?
A. 	Step 2 is once you have made, that you can
see and measure that Step 1 is satisfied, you perform
mineral chemistry called energy dispersive X-ray analysis
to determine the chemistry of that particular asbestos
structure. So it gives you the ability to do that. That’s Step
2.
Q. 	What is Step 3 as shown in the slide and in
your expert report?
A. 	Step 3 is to perform what’s called selected
area 	electron 	diffraction 	or 	SAED, 	which 	gives 	you
information on the crystalline structure of that asbestos
structure.
(Id. at 487:24–489:4; see id. at 645:16–646:12.) Dr. Longo testified that only fibers
or fiber bundles that satisfied all three steps of this TEM methodology were
considered positive for asbestos. (Id. at 517:13–519:6; 524:1–5; 648:16–649:19; see
Longo Second Suppl. Rep. at 12–13.)
c. 	Analysis
Defendants argue that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM methodology is
unreliable because they ignore “clear definitions for ‘asbestos’ and ‘asbestiform’ in
the methodologies and regulations they rely on,” instead defining “what they call
‘asbestos’ solely by reference to whether a mineral structure meets certain ‘counting
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criteria.’” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 65.) Defendants specifically object to Drs. Longo’s
and Rigler’s reliance on the counting criteria (or rules) set forth in the EPA’s
AHERA regulations. (Id. at 68–69.)
Defendants contend that AHERA defines asbestos as the asbestiform varieties
of the six regulated minerals, but the AHERA counting criteria relied upon by
MAS—that a particle “has an aspect ratio greater or equal to 5:1, a length greater or
equal to .5 microns, and parallel sides”—“sweeps in minerals that cannot be asbestos
because they are not asbestiform,” including cleavage fragments. (Id.) Defendants
further contend that “the fact that a particle meets this definition under the counting
criteria means simply that it is a fiber; it doesn’t provide any information about what
kind of fiber it is.” (Id. at 69.) As a result, “Dr. Longo and Dr. Rigler will count all
‘fibers’ of the minerals as ‘asbestos’ even if not asbestiform and therefore not
asbestos.” 	(Id.) 	Defendants 	claim 	this 	“methodological 	failing 	renders 	their
purported identification of asbestos wholly unreliable.” (Id. at 68.)
Next, Defendants argue that, because “AHERA relates to remediation,” its
counting criteria apply only when “asbestos is known to be present” and not when,
“as here, the presence of asbestos is disputed.” (Id. at 69–70.) According to
Defendants, “it would clearly be impermissible for Drs. Longo and Rigler to import
a methodology developed for identifying the amount of asbestos known to be present
to a context where the entire point of the analysis is to determine whether or not
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asbestos is present in the first instance;” therefore, their TEM method “fails to
answer the relevant question and is thus inherently unreliable.” (Id. at 71–72.)
In my prior Opinion, I found Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s three-step TEM
methodology reliable under 	Daubert 	and generally accepted in the scientific
community. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 148–54. I expressly
rejected Defendants’ arguments regarding AHERA, finding the “TEM method
applied by Dr. Longo, and his reliance on the AHERA counting rules, were reliable;
thus, any disagreement with those rules is a question for the jury.” Id. at 150; see
Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note to 2023 amendment (“[O]nce the court
has found it more likely than not that the admissibility requirement has been met,
any attack by the opponent will go only to the weight of the evidence.”).
After noting that Dr. Longo agreed with Defendants that—at the first step of
the TEM methodology—“certain cleavage fragments could be counted as asbestos”
under the AHERA counting criteria, I reasoned that Defendants’ position “does not
take into account” that steps two and three of the TEM methodology seek to
eliminate certain fibers, which are counted in step one, that are not asbestos. In re
Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 149–50. As Dr. Longo testified, steps two
and three of the methodology “eliminate most of those fragments based on their
chemistry and electron diffraction pattern.” Id. at 150. Furthermore, Defendants did
not then—and do not now—challenge whether MAS performed its “counting in
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accordance with the AHERA counting rules.” Id. Instead, both then and now,
“Defendants take issue with the rules themselves” as applied to the testing of
consumer talc products. Id. Finally, I found that Dr. Longo set forth good grounds
to apply the AHERA counting criteria in situations where the substances being tested
were not previously confirmed to contain asbestos. 	Id. 	at 149–50. I further
highlighted that, while they “contend the AHERA counting rules are not accurate,”
Defendants did “not identify to which set of rules Dr. Longo should have adhered.”
Id. at 150.
I find no reason to depart from my prior ruling because Plaintiffs have
established, 	by 	a 	preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence, 	that 	the 	three-step 	TEM
methodology employed by Drs. Longo and Rigler satisfies the admissibility
requirements under Rule 702 and Daubert. I am persuaded, after reviewing the
evidence and the parties’ arguments, that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s methodology is
generally accepted within the scientific community and constitutes a sufficiently
reliable means of identifying asbestos in talc-based consumer products. I am also
satisfied that MAS’s analysts reliably applied this methodology in conducting their
testing. Notably, Defendants’ challenges focus primarily on the alleged unreliability
of 	the 	methodology 	itself, 	rather 	than 	its 	application 	by 	MAS’s 	analysts.
Accordingly, 	I 	turn 	to 	Defendants’ 	arguments 	and 	explain 	why, 	within 	the
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framework of Rule 702, their criticisms of Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM
methodology go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
Testing for trace amounts of asbestos is no simple feat, as asbestos fibers are
exceedingly small. To this day, there is little dispute within the scientific community
that no standardized, U.S. government-approved microscopy method exists for
detecting asbestos in talc-containing cosmetic products. (IWGACP White Paper at
4–7.) But that does not mean tests are not performed, or should not be performed, to
detect asbestos—particularly since such testing is necessary to identify and prevent
exposure to potential carcinogens. Laboratories have employed multiple analytical
techniques, including scanning electron microscopy, PLM, and TEM. (Id. at 14–16.)
Each of these methods has advantages and limitations, (id.), although “most
accredited laboratories with expertise in asbestos-testing routinely perform TEM
when testing talc-containing cosmetic products,” (id. at 10). Admittedly, the absence
of 	a 	standardized 	testing 	method 	for 	talc-based 	cosmetic 	products 	has 	led
“laboratories to combine and/or adapt published testing methods developed for the
analysis of asbestos in air or building materials,” (id. at 11), including those
established under AHERA. (Id. at 11–16.) Thus, Defendants’ argument that Drs.
Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM methodology is unreliable simply because “AHERA
relates to remediation, i.e., the process of removing asbestos from schools and other
environments where asbestos is known to be present,” is not only unavailing, but
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misses the mark. (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 69.) At the outset, I note that if I were to
adopt Defendants’ position and find that it is unreliable for laboratories such as Dr.
Longo’s MAS to use and incorporate microscopy methods for asbestos in air, bulk
building materials, and other matters, it would follow that no reliable method exists
to identify asbestos in cosmetic products. This defies conventional wisdom.
Furthermore, and more importantly, Drs. Longo and Rigler did not rely solely
on AHERA in formulating the counting criteria that MAS used to determine
morphology at step one of the TEM methodology. Their Second Supplemental
Report provided that “fibers or bundles with substantially parallel sides and an aspect
ratio of 5:1 or greater, and at least 0.5 μm in length were counted as regulated
asbestos fibers and bundles per standard TEM counting rules as described by ASTM
D5755, ASTM D5756, ISO 10312, ISO 13794, AHERA (TEM section only) and
D7712-11.”149 (Longo 2d Supp. Rep. at 12.) Dr. Longo testified at the Daubert
evidentiary hearing that the counting rules that MAS used are “pretty much the same
counting rules for all the standard TEM methods, the American Society of Testing
Materials, International Standards Organization, and EPA. They all use the counting
rules to determine the morphology.” (Daubert H’rg Tr. at 495:5–14.) He further
149 	ASTM International, formerly known as American Society for Testing and Materials
(“ASTM”), is a standards organization that develops and publishes voluntary consensus standards,
including test methods. Similarly, the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) is an
independent, non-governmental international organization that develops and publishes standards
such as test methods.
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testified regarding the preamble to the AHERA regulations, which explains the
rationale for classifying a particle with an aspect ratio of 5:1 or greater as asbestos:
“It is consistent with the panel of microscopists’ observations that asbestos structures
have aspect ratios equal to and greater than 5:1 whereas the majority of nonasbestos
structures, minerals and particles . . . have aspect ratios of less than 5:1.” 52 Fed.
Reg. 41826, 41840 (Oct. 30, 1987). Thus, a particle that satisfies AHERA’s counting
criteria exhibits a fibrous morphology consistent with asbestos (which is then to be
confirmed at steps two and three of the TEM methodology).
Defendants nevertheless contend that the counting criteria used by MAS
cannot reliably distinguish between asbestos and non-asbestos cleavage fragments,
reasoning that “because of the way amphibole rocks break, you can get some pieces
that would be longer and thinner and could resemble asbestos fibers if examined
individually.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 65, 67–68.) Dr. Longo testified that cleavage
fragments—that is, crushed up pieces of non-asbestiform rock—are not asbestos.
(Daubert H’rg Tr. at 569:15–20.) He also acknowledged that cleavage fragments
can resemble asbestos fibers under a transmission electron microscope, and that
there is a “slight chance” that some fragments can have a minimum length greater
than or equal to .5 microns, an aspect ratio of 5:1, and substantially parallel sides,
“but the probability is not too high.” (Id. at 574:5–23.) Dr. Longo explained that the
“overwhelming majority of these cleavage fragments” have an aspect ratio less than
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3:1. (Id. at 574:24–575:18; see ECF No. 33132-1 (“Longo Dep.”) at 238:13–19;
240:21.) Therefore, while it is possible that a cleavage fragment could satisfy the
AHERA counting criteria, Plaintiffs have presented good grounds to conclude that,
at step one of the TEM methodology, the criteria used by MAS can reliably
distinguish between asbestos and non-asbestos, including cleavage fragments.
Additionally, Defendants contend that “AHERA defines asbestos as the
asbestiform varieties of the six regulated minerals” but “Drs. Longo and Rigler act
as though” the AHERA counting criteria are “AHERA’s definition of asbestos.”
(Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 69.) According to Defendants, the AHERA counting criteria
relied upon by MAS cannot distinguish between asbestiform and non-asbestiform
minerals, which they claim is necessary to determine whether a mineral qualifies as
asbestos.150 (Id.) Plaintiffs counter that asbestiform versus non-asbestiform is a “false
distinction” in this context, and that the generally accepted three-step TEM
methodology was designed to identify regulated asbestos. (Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br.
at 29–33.) I agree with Plaintiffs on this issue.
Drs. Longo and Rigler do not treat the AHERA counting criteria as AHERA’s
definition of asbestos, and any suggestion to the contrary reflects a misunderstanding
150 	In their brief, Defendants explain that the term asbestiform is an adjective describing the
distinctive way a mineral forms in nature, i.e., its habit. (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 57–58.) “Minerals
that crystallize in an asbestiform habit have a crystal structure that can be separated into fibers
with high tensile strength and flexibility.” (Id. at 58.)
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of the distinction between how U.S. regulatory agencies define asbestos and how
laboratories identify the presence of asbestos using TEM analytical methods. It is
undisputed that the AHERA counting criteria do not require a microscopist to
determine whether a particle is “asbestiform”—that is, the microscopist does not
need to determine the particle’s habit of growth, but that limitation does not render
Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM methodology unreliable. Dr. Longo testified that the
purpose of the AHERA counting criteria, at step one, is to identify minerals
exhibiting a fibrous morphology consistent with asbestos. (Daubert H’rg Tr. at
467:6–468:19.) Since a fibrous morphology alone does not establish that a mineral
is 	asbestos, 	Drs. 	Longo’s 	and 	Rigler’s 	TEM 	methodology 	incorporates 	two
complementary analytical techniques to confirm the presence of asbestos. At step
two of the methodology, MAS performed an energy dispersive X-ray analysis
(“EDXA”) to confirm that the chemical composition of the mineral is consistent with
that of asbestos, as opposed to talc or some other unregulated mineral. (Longo
Second Suppl. Rep. at 12–13; see Daubert H’rg Tr. at 487:24–489:4; 524:1–5;
645:16–646:12.) At step three, MAS conducted selected-area electron diffraction
(“SAED”) to confirm that the crystalline structure of the mineral matched reference
standards for asbestos. (Id.) Only fibers or bundles that satisfied all three steps were
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counted as amphibole asbestos.151 (Id.) Defendants’ argument focuses solely on step
one of the methodology without regard for the remaining two steps, and thus, they
fail to account for the reliability of the methodology as a whole. I am not persuaded,
in light of the evidence presented by Plaintiffs, that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s
reliance on the AHERA counting criteria at step one renders their methodology
unreliable.
Tellingly, Johnson & Johnson previously used a similar TEM method to
identify “asbestiform minerals in powdered talc.” (ECF No. 33132-3 (“J&J Test
Method TM7024”) at 2.) Dr. Mary Poulton, a geological engineer and one of
Defendants’ experts in this MDL, confirmed that this method was used to test talc
from Johnson & Johnson’s source mines. (ECF No. 32996-8 (“Poulton Rep.”) at 13.)
The method, TM7024, states that the “combined techniques of transmission electron
microscopy (TEM), selected area electron diffraction (SAED) and energy dispersive
x-ray analysis (EDXRA) permit the detection of asbestiform minerals based on
morphological characteristics, followed by a definitive mineralogical identification
of each fiber.” (J&J Test Method TM7024 at 2.) Additionally, this method defines a
fiber similar to Drs. Longo and Rigler: “An elongated particle with parallel sides and
151 	In my prior Opinion, I found Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s EDXA and SAED methods
sufficiently reliable for purposes of Daubert. See In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at
152–54. Defendants no longer challenge those methods, like they did during the first round of
motions. (See Defs.’ 2019 Asbestos Br. at 50–72.)
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an aspect ratio K3:1.” (Id. at 8.) In fact, Dr. Longo testified that using an aspect ratio
of 5:1, like he did, is more conservative and restrictive than using an aspect ratio of
3:1. (Daubert H’rg Tr. at 497:11–499:3.) Defendants do not claim otherwise.
Finally, Defendants contend that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s TEM analysis
cannot reliably distinguish between a single fiber and a bundle of fibers. (Defs.’
Asbestos Br. at 74–83.) I considered this same argument in my prior Opinion,
finding that “these issues go to the weight of Dr. Longo’s opinions, rather than
reliability.” In re Johnson & Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 151; see id. at 150–52.
I previously concluded that “any errors in differentiating between fibers and
bundles” at step one of the TEM methodology “do not ultimately demonstrate that
Dr. Longo’s testing is unreliable,” because steps two and three “further confirm
whether the counted fibers or bundles” identified at step one are, in fact, asbestos.
Id. at 151–52. Other than a conclusory claim in a footnote that this “puts the cart
before the horse,” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 74 n.198), Defendants do not meaningfully
address this conclusion, nor do they adequately explain how an alleged inability to
distinguish between a single fiber and a bundle of fibers renders Drs. Longo’s and
Rigler’s methodology unreliable. It is undisputed that the TEM method does not
require a determination that a particle formed in an asbestiform habit. (Daubert H’rg
Tr. at 524:1–5; 587:17–582:3; 582:9–17; 589:25–590:5.) Rather, the method applies
counting criteria to identify a particle’s fibrous morphology, then confirms its
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elemental composition and crystal structure through EDXA and SAED analyses.
(Id.) Only particles satisfying all three steps of the methodology are classified as
asbestos, regardless of whether the particle is a fiber or a bundle of fibers. (Id.)
According to Dr. Longo, a bundle of fibers is simply further confirmation that the
particle is asbestiform. (Id.)
In conclusion, Defendants’ motion that my prior ruling be reconsidered and
the outcome changed is rejected. Plaintiffs have demonstrated, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s three-step TEM methodology can
reliably detect the presence of amphibole asbestos in talc-containing products and is
generally accepted in the scientific community. In fulfilling my role as gatekeeper,
I am not required to find that Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s methodology is perfect or
that every MAS testing result is correct. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1318 (explaining
the test “is not the correctness of the expert’s conclusions but the soundness of his
methodology”); In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 744 (stating that the grounds for an expert’s
opinion “do not have to be perfect” and “good grounds for an expert’s conclusions”
may exist “even if the judge thinks that a scientist’s methodology has some flaws”);
see also Best v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 181 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“Admissibility 	under 	Rule 	702 	does 	not 	require 	perfect 	methodology.”).
Furthermore, Defendants have not presented any new evidence that would warrant
reconsideration 	of the TEM testing 	technique or the bases upon 	which 	the
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conclusions drawn from that testing rest. Defendants’ criticisms of Drs. Longo’s and
Rigler’s methodology primarily concern the inherent limitations of TEM, albeit an
accepted method, as an analytical technique, rather than the specific methodology
employed here. However, these criticisms do not move the needle on my finding that
Drs. Longo’s and Rigler’s overall TEM methodology is more likely than not reliable
for the reasons set forth above and in my prior Opinion. Accordingly, to the extent
Defendants take issue with the limitations of TEM or the results of MAS’s testing,
such concerns are appropriately explored through cross-examination.
ii. 	Drs. Robert Cook and Mark Krekeler
Next, Defendants argue that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler’s opinions about the
alleged presence of asbestos in talc” or from Defendants’ source mines should be
excluded “because their opinions are not derived from reliable methods and are not
supported by the data on which they rely.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 93.) Defendants
claim that both experts “unreliably base their opinions on counsel-generated
collections and summaries of documents.” (Id. at 94.) They further contend that
“Drs. Cook and Krekeler’s opinions are also unreliable and inadmissible because the
documents on which they rely do not support their conclusions.”152 (Id. at 95.)
152 	Notably, Defendants only dedicate a few pages of their asbestos brief to the alleged
unreliability of Drs. Cook and Krekeler’s opinions. And they do not address Drs. Cook’s and
Krekeler’s reports and methodologies in any meaningful way. For the purposes of completeness, I
will discuss these experts in greater detail.
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In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions are
supported by reliable scientific evidence that establishes asbestos was present in the
talc ore used to source Defendants’ talcum powder products. Plaintiffs further argue
that the charts compiled by counsel were merely clerical summaries of documents
that the experts independently reviewed and relied on. While Plaintiffs admit that
the charts contain “a few inadvertently included examples not sourced from the
correct mines or intended for industrial use” (Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br. at 89), they
maintain that Defendants’ criticisms go to weight, not admissibility.
I did not address Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s proposed testimony in my prior
Opinion. Accordingly, my analysis of this portion of Defendants’ motion is not
controlled by Judge Shipp’s April 30, 2024 Order. I will fully consider the parties’
positions.
a. 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Cook as an expert in the fields of geology and mining,
and 	Dr. 	Krekeler 	in 	the 	fields 	of 	geology, 	mineralogy, 	and 	environmental
geoscience. (ECF Nos. 33017-9 and -10 (“Cook Amend. Rep.”); Krekeler Rep.)
Defendants do not dispute that Drs. Cook and Krekeler are qualified to testify within
their proffered fields of expertise.153 In light of their training and experience, and
153 	Defendants do, however, argue that Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and nearly all of Plaintiffs’ other
experts are not qualified to testify regarding the carcinogenicity of heavy metals. As noted above,
I addressed Defendants’ causation-related arguments in the general causation section. (See supra
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Defendants’ lack of objection to their qualifications, I find, and thus recommend to
the Court, that Dr. Cook is qualified to act as an expert in the fields of geology and
mining, and that Dr. Krekeler is qualified to act as an expert in the fields of geology,
mineralogy, and environmental geoscience.
b. 	Dr. Robert Cook’s Methodology and Conclusions
Dr. Cook stated in his report that he was “asked to review the geology of the
talc deposits that sourced Defendants’ talcum powder products, to evaluate the
mining practices employed, and to assess Defendants’ sampling and testing from a
mining perspective.” (Cook Amend. Rep. at 2.)
Dr. Cook explained that, in forming his opinions, he “reviewed the following:
results 	of 	my 	professional 	experience 	examining 	talc 	and 	related 	mineral
occurrences, my experience with optical examination of drill core and commercial
rock products for asbestos and other related minerals, the published literature, and
documents produced in this litigation.” (Id. at 3; Ex. B at 1–21.) He testified at his
deposition that he reviewed over a thousand pages of documents, and that he
approached this matter “as I would any research project” or consulting project for a
mining company. (Cook Dep. at 456:1–462:16.) Dr. Cook’s report addressed, among
other topics, the mining and processing of talc ore, the specific mines from which
Part V.A.) In that section, I also addressed Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s credentials and professional
experience, which I will not repeat here.
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Defendants sourced their talc, the mineralogical characteristics of those deposits,
and historical testing that purportedly identified asbestos and other contaminants in
the source mines. (Cook Amend. Rep. at 3–21.)
Relevant to Defendants’ arguments, Dr. Cook included in his report a chart
summarizing testing “conducted by or for J&J and Imerys,” which he claimed
represents “some of the reported instances within Defendants’ internal documents
where 	serpentine 	asbestos 	(chrysotile), 	amphibole 	asbestos, 	or 	potentially
asbestiform amphiboles have been found in samples of talc used to source J&J
talcum powder products.” (Id. at 13.) This chart compiled documents from the 1950s
through the 2000s and contains roughly 100 entries. (Id. at 13–21.) For each entry,
it provided—where available—the date of the document, the testing laboratory, the
type of material tested (including talc ore, mill samples, and finished product), the
source mine, and the corresponding test results. (Id.) Dr. Cook stated that this chart
“is largely composed of the chart produced during the deposition of Johnson &
Johnson corporate representative Dr. John Hopkins.” (Id. at 13 n.17.) Dr. Cook
testified that the first draft of his report contained lengthy narrative descriptions of
Defendants’ historical testing results, which he found cumbersome. (Cook Dep. at
55:19–60:8.) After reviewing the chart from Dr. Hopkins’s deposition, Dr. Cook
asked Plaintiffs’ counsel to assist in preparing the charts, using information he
instructed counsel to include. (Id.) He further testified that he reviewed all the
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documents cited in those charts, and that he substantively reviewed the charts
themselves before issuing his report. (Id.)
As it relates to asbestos, Dr. Cook concluded, based on his “education,
training, and experience in the fields of mining and geology” as well as his “review
of the relevant information,” (Cook Amend. Rep. at 2–3), that it is his “opinion to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the talc deposits that were used to
source Defendants’ talcum powder products (Italy, Vermont, and China) contain
fibrous 	talc, 	and 	chrysotile 	and/or 	fibrous 	amphiboles, 	all 	known 	human
carcinogens.” (Id. at 42.)
c. 	Dr. Mark Krekeler’s Methodology and Conclusions
In his report, Dr. Krekeler stated that he was “asked to examine whether
Imerys and Johnson & Johnson acted in accordance with industry standards and/or
maintained adequate quality control in mining talc for use in cosmetic talcum
powder products (Johnson’s Baby Powder and Shower to Shower).” (Krekeler Rep.
at 1.) Like Dr. Cook, Dr. Krekeler’s report addressed the locations and geology of
the mines from which Defendants sourced their talc, the mining and processing
methods employed, and historical testing data reflecting the presence of asbestos and
other potential contaminants in the talc deposits at those mines.
To reach the opinions set forth in his report, Dr. Krekeler “reviewed
documents, both those produced by the defendants as well as deposition transcripts
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of company witnesses.” (Id. at 2; see id., Ex. B at 72–97.) He “also conducted an
extensive review of peer-reviewed literature and other works, such as geologic
survey documents and government agency information.” (Id. at 2.) Finally, he relied
on his “experience and methodology in both the academic and private sector in
preparing [his] opinions.” (Id.)
In pertinent part, Dr. Krekeler opined to “a reasonable degree of certainty
within the confines of [his] discipline as an expert in mineralogy, geology and
environmental geoscience,” (id. at 1), that “asbestos and fibrous talc was and is
present in the mines Defendants used for cosmetic talc.” (Id. at 45.)
In support of that opinion, Dr. Krekeler explained that the documents he
“reviewed provide strong evidence that the talc used by Imerys and Johnson &
Johnson to produce Johnson’s Baby Powder and Shower to Shower came from
mines that contained asbestos minerals, or fibrous talc in an asbestiform habit.” (Id.
at 14.) His report also included a chart summarizing documents that allegedly
establish the presence of asbestos in Defendants’ source mines. (Id. at 14–23.) Dr.
Krekeler’s asbestos-related chart is largely identical to the chart contained in Dr.
Cook’s report, and sets forth information such as the date of the document, the
testing laboratory, the type of material tested, the source mine, and the corresponding
test results. (Compare id., with Cook Amend. Rep. at 13–21.) At his deposition, Dr.
Krekeler testified that he “asked counsel to create the charts that are in the report,”
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and that he reviewed the documents and directed counsel as to which documents to
include in those charts. (Krekeler Dep. at 39:9–41:14.)
d. 	Drs. Robert Cook and Mark Krekeler’s “Counsel-
Generated Charts”
As an initial matter, relying on State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Electrolux Home
Products, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1048 (N.D. Ind. 2013) and Crowley v. Chait,
322 F. Supp. 2d 530, 546 (D.N.J. 2004), Defendants argue that Drs. Cook’s and
Krekeler’s opinions are unreliable because they serve as mere conduits for “counsel-
generated collections and summaries of documents.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 94.)
According to Defendants, Drs. Cook and Krekeler included “virtually identical”
charts in both of their reports, and “the analyses of the documents reflected in these
charts plainly were not the work of Drs. Cook and Krekeler but of counsel.” (Id.)
Plaintiffs insist that Defendants’ argument “is directly contravened by Drs.
Cook and Krekeler’s testimonies and reports.” (Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br. at 89.)
Plaintiffs explain that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler requested the creation of the charts
based on their examinations of the underlying documents, reviewed the charts, and
contributed to their entries,” and that counsel merely “performed the clerical task of
creating the chart.” (Id. at 92.) In other words, “the charts were simply clerical
compilations of documents reviewed by Drs. Cook and Krekeler.” (Id. at 93.) On
that 	basis, 	Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	the 	cases 	Defendants 	cite—State 	Farm 	and
Crowley—are factually distinguishable. (Id. at 92–93.)
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In State Farm, the court barred Dr. Christine Wood, an expert for Electrolux,
from testifying as to any conclusion she derived from her comparative analysis of
the risk of fire involving Electrolux dryers and dryers in general, including her
conclusion that Electrolux dryers are not unreasonably dangerous. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 980 F. Supp. 2d at 1035, 1045–51. The court found Dr. Wood’s
statistical 	analysis 	unreliable because she relied 	solely 	on 	data provided 	by
Electrolux regarding its dryer fires and “admittedly did nothing to independently
verify the reliability of this information before she used it in her calculations.” Id. at
1049. The court further observed that Dr. Wood could have—but did not—obtain
data on Electrolux dryer fires from one of the same sources she used to determine
the number of fires involving dryers manufactured by other companies. Id. at 1048–
1050. In effect, Dr. Wood merely parroted the information provided to her by
Electrolux.
In Crowley, the court limited the testimony of expert Loren Kramer because
he “relied upon information that is simply too unreliable to be trusted.” Crowley,
322 F. Supp. 2d at 547. Specifically, “Kramer prepared his reports on the basis of
statements prepared by Plaintiff’s counsel about the testimony of only eight out of
more than 150 deponents” in the case. Id. at 545. The court faulted Kramer for
relying “on summaries prepared by counsel” and for conducting “little independent
investigation into the witnesses beyond the summaries prepared for him.” Id. at 546.
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The court reasoned that “to make Kramer the mouthpiece of these deponents, and to
allow him to offer testimony to a jury as to conclusions he has reached on the basis
of this highly filtered version of events, is unacceptable.” Id. at 546–47. Finally, the
court stated that “Kramer’s reliance upon the spoonfed depositions led him to draw
questionable conclusions . . . that he might not have drawn had he properly reviewed
all of the depositions in an unfiltered fashion.” Id. at 547.
State Farm and Crowley are inapposite. In both of those cases, the experts
formed their opinions based on limited or incomplete information supplied to them
by a party or counsel, without independently reviewing or verifying the underlying
data. Those are not the circumstances here. Having reviewed their testimony and the
charts themselves, I find that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s deposition testimony
clearly reflects that they requested counsel’s assistance in preparing the charts, but
using information that they directed to be included, such as historical testing results
from Johnson & Johnson, and that both experts independently reviewed the
documents summarized therein. (See Cook Dep. at 55:19–60:8; Krekeler Dep. at
39:9–41:14.) According to Dr. Cook, the chart was intended to improve the overall
readability of his final report by replacing the detailed narrative summaries in his
draft report with a more concise and organized presentation. (Cook Dep. at 55:19–
60:8.) Moreover, and as discussed more fully below, Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s
opinions are not based solely on the information contained in the charts; they
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reviewed and relied upon additional materials and data, including scientific literature
and other documents produced in this litigation, in forming their opinions. In short,
unlike State Farm and Crowley, I do not find that the information included in the
subject charts is “highly filtered” data “spoonfed” to the experts by counsel.
Accordingly, I find that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s inclusion of “counsel-
generated” charts in their reports does not render their testimony unreliable because,
unlike the experts in State Farm and Crowley, they did not serve as mere conduits
for Plaintiffs and their counsel.
e. 	The Adequacy of Drs. Robert 	Cook and Mark
Krekeler’s Factual Foundation
Defendants next argue that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions should be
excluded as unreliable because some of the documents on which they rely—
including certain historical documents and testing results—do not support their
conclusions regarding the alleged presence of asbestos in the mines from which
Defendants sourced their talc. (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 95–97.)
First, Defendants contend that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler rely on documents
that have nothing to do with the issues presented in this litigation because they are
from geographic regions and mines that were not sources of talc for Defendants’ talc
products.” (Id. at 95 & n.240.) Second, they assert that “many of the data on which
Drs. Cook and Krekeler rely were derived from testing in mines that were used to
produce industrial talc—not cosmetic grade talc.” (Id. at 95–96.) Finally, Defendants
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argue that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler fail to differentiate between asbestiform and
nonasbestiform minerals” which renders their opinions unreliable because the
“presence of nonasbestiform minerals in the mines where [D]efendants sourced their
talc cannot support Drs. Cook and Krekeler’s logical leap to the conclusion that those
mines also contained the asbestiform variety of those minerals.” (Id. at 96–97.)
Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants’ arguments are “meritless” because they
“fail to discredit or even acknowledge the numerous examples of Defendants’ data
that Drs. Cook and Krekeler reference, all showing positive test results for asbestos”
in the talc used to source Johnson & Johnson’s products. (Pls.’ Asbestos Opp. Br. at
89.) Plaintiffs concede, however, that Drs. Cook and Krekeler “inadvertently
included” a few “examples not sourced from the correct mines or intended for
industrial use.” (Id.) They nevertheless claim that the “presence of a few documents
and reports allegedly involving other mines does not invalidate the substantial data
from the mines the parties agree were used to source talc.” (Id. at 94.) According to
Plaintiffs, Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s asbestos-related opinions are supported by a
comprehensive body of evidence. (Id. at 94–96.) I agree.
It is undisputed that, over the span of approximately a century, Defendants
sourced talc from different mines around the world. Dr. Mary Poulton, one of
Defendants’ own experts, explains that Defendants sourced talc from: (1) the
Fontane mine in the Val Chisone region of Italy; (2) southern Vermont, including
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the Argonaut, Hamm, Hammondsville, and Rainbow mines; and (3) mines in
Guangxi Province, Longsheng County in China. (See Poulton Rep. at 2–5.)
After 	considering 	their 	reports, 	deposition 	testimony, 	and 	the 	parties’
submissions, I find that Plaintiffs have established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions regarding the presence of
asbestos at Defendants’ source mines in Italy, Vermont, and China are sufficiently
supported by general geological principles corroborated by region-specific data.
Indeed, by providing “background information, discuss[ing] regional geology and
its application, and then focus[ing] on specific mines using Defendants’ internal
documents,” 	(Pls.’ 	Asbestos 	Opp. 	Br. 	at 	96), 	Drs. 	Cook’s 	and 	Krekeler’s
methodologies 	are 	sufficiently 	reliable 	under 	Daubert’s 	more-likely-than-not
standard, such that I find their opinions regarding the source mines are admissible.
Drs. Cook and Krekeler began by discussing the formation of talc deposits.
(Cook Amend. Rep. at 4; Krekeler Rep. at 2–5.) They explained that talc deposits
typically form over millions of years, as preexisting rocks are altered through
geological processes that involve heat, pressure, and chemical reactions. (Id.) As a
result of these geological processes, also known as metamorphism, talc deposits are
often accompanied by contaminants such as asbestos. (Id.) Simply put, the same
metamorphic conditions that produce talc can also produce asbestos. According to
Dr. Cook, the distribution of asbestos “can be quite irregular within individual talc
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deposits themselves or their immediately adjacent host rocks.” (Cook Amend. Rep.
at 4.) Dr. Krekeler similarly explained that “natural talc formation is commonly
accompanied by veins of other minerals, including asbestiform minerals like
tremolite” and that the “presence of asbestos in talc deposits [has] been common
knowledge amongst 	industrial 	mineral companies, 	research 	professionals 	and
mining geologists, dating back to as early as the 1930’s (Hess, 1933).” (Krekeler
Rep. at 5.) Defendants do not dispute these geological principles.
Next, I address Defendants’ argument that Drs. Cook and Krekeler fail to
distinguish between asbestiform and non-asbestiform minerals. This assertion raises
several issues relevant to the evaluation of historical documents. In addressing this
argument, I will also address some of the region-specific data that Drs. Cook and
Krekeler rely on in support of their opinions related to Defendants’ source mines in
Italy, Vermont, and China.
In support of their position, Defendants assert that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler
each cite reports from the Battelle Memorial Institute, an organization that tested
cosmetic talc samples in the 1950s, for the proposition that cosmetic talc contained
tremolite.” (Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 96.) They further claim that “the Battelle report
does not indicate that the tremolite identified was of the asbestiform variety.” (Id.)
Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive. Drs. Cook and Krekeler have not
“ignored” the distinction between asbestiform and non-asbestiform minerals. (Id.)
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Dr. Krekeler explained in his report that “asbestiform refers to a mineral that has
grown into a fibrous aggregate of long, thin and flexible crystals that readily separate
into smaller crystals” and noted that the “term fiber is an important qualifier for
asbestos” because “there are asbestiform and nonasbestiform varieties of tremolite,
actinolite, crocidolite and anthophyllite.” (Krekeler Rep. at 4.) Dr. Cook likewise
testified that the term asbestiform pertains to a mineral’s “fibrous nature.” (Cook
Dep. at 105:20–106:7.)
Furthermore, Defendants’ criticism that Drs. Cook and Krekeler relied on
historical documents that did not specify whether the referenced minerals are
asbestiform or non-asbestiform is misplaced. Many of the documents from the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s—including Defendants’ own records—do not reflect the
level of mineralogical precision that Defendants now demand. That is hardly
surprising given that asbestos is a general term with varying definitions, which has
contributed to uncertainty in the interpretation of historical evidence. (IWGACP
White Paper at 8–9; IARC Monographs vol. 100C at 221.) In that connection, the
fact that a document does not expressly state that the tremolite identified in
Defendants’ talcum powder was of the asbestiform variety does not preclude the
reasonable inference that the reference was to tremolite asbestos, for the reasons
described below.
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For example, both Drs. Cook and Krekeler cited a 1973 memorandum in
support of their opinions that Defendants’ source mines were contaminated with
asbestos. (Cook Amend. Rep. at 15; Krekeler Rep. at 17.) At that time, Defendants
were sourcing talc from Vermont. In the memorandum, a Johnson & Johnson
executive 	discussed 	potential 	strategies 	related 	to 	the 	company’s 	asbestos
“controversy” and acknowledged that the company had identified “tremolite or
actinolite” that “might be classified as asbestos fibers” in its Baby Powder:
1. 	It is our joint conclusion that we should not rely on
the “Clean Mine” approach as a protective device for Baby
Powder 	in 	the 	current 	Asbestos 	or 	Asbestos-Form
controversy. We believe this mine to be very clean;
however, we are also confident that fiber forming or fiber
type minerals could be found. The usefulness of the
“Clean Mine” approach for asbestos only is over.
2. 	It is possible that the technique of identification for
asbestos or asbestos-form minerals will be an optical
approach. It 	probably 	will 	be some variation 	of the
McCrone 	method. 	This 	method 	with 	appropriate
concentrating techniques will permit a good laboratory to
identify asbestos or tremolite in a talc sample.
* * *
b. 	As 	for 	Baby 	Powder, 	the 	entire 	thrust 	of 	our
communications 	with 	the 	FDA 	has 	concentrated 	on
asbestos 	as 	harmful 	fiber-like 	material. 	Sophisticated
techniques have been proposed to make sure that fiber-
form materials present in samples were identified as being
asbestos. The implication is that all other fiber-forms, if
present, were talc or other minerals and these were safe.
This posture will no longer be satisfactory. If the FDA
Food Division, which is moving more rapidly than the
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Cosmetics Division, publishes a standard, it will probably
be to ban asbestos-form or fibrous material in talc. That
could eliminate the current use of talc in packaging
materials. These talcs contain widely varying amounts of
tremolite or fibrous talc. Our Baby Powder contains talc
fragments classifiable as fiber. Occasionally sub-trace
quantities of tremolite or actinolite are identifiable (optical
Microscope) and these might be classified as asbestos
fiber.
(ECF 	No. 	33132-1, 	Ex. 	2 	(“April 	26, 	1973 	Memorandum”) 	at 	1–2.) 	This
memorandum plainly 	indicates that 	the tremolite and 	actinolite identified 	in
Defendants’ talc were likely asbestos. Thus, Drs. Cook and Krekeler reasonably
relied on the memorandum—which was just one of roughly 100 entries in their
asbestos-related charts—to support their contamination opinions.
In fact, there is ample evidence to support the conclusion that Defendants’
source mines in Vermont were contaminated. Drs. Cook and Krekeler relied on
multiple other test results—as set forth in their asbestos-related charts—confirming,
for example, the presence of chrysotile, fibrous tremolite, and fibrous actinolite at
the Argonaut, Hamm, and Hammondsville mines. (Cook Amend. Rep. at 16, 19–21;
Krekeler Rep. at 18–19, 22–23.) Notably, Defendants do not challenge the validity
of those other test results, many of which were performed by or for Johnson &
Johnson.
Additionally, contrary to Defendants’ contention, Drs. Cook and Krekeler
reasonably relied on the 1958 Battelle Report in support of their opinions regarding
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the presence of asbestos in Defendants’ source mines in Italy. In the 1950s,
Defendants engaged the Battelle Memorial Institute to conduct testing to determine
why their talcum powder exhibited a highly undesirable characteristic known as grit.
(W.L. Smith, 	Progress Report on Further Studies on the Measurement and
Correlation of the Physical Properties of Talc to Johnson and Johnson, Battelle
Mem’l Inst., (1958)). In the 1958 Report, Battelle explained what was causing the
grittiness in Defendants’ talcum powder:
Grit consists of that portion of ground talc which is
angular, 	or 	oversize, 	particularly 	in 	thickness. 	Grit
includes both oversize and nonplaty talc particles as well
as mineral contaminants. It occurs as aggregates of talc
and contaminants, as acicular and fibrous particles of talc
and amphibole, as shards and granules of amphibole or
carbonate, and as prismatic grains of titanite, rutile, zircon,
apatite, and other accessory minerals.
(Id. at 3.) Battelle further stated: “The Italian No. 1 talc contains from less than 1
percent to about 3 percent of contaminants. The contamination is natural and consists
mostly of carbonate with minor amphibole and rare accessory minerals . . . . The
amphibole component has been established to be the variety tremolite.” (Id.) While
the Battelle Report does not use the term asbestiform—or even the word asbestos—
it concludes that Defendants’ talcum powder was contaminated with amphibole
tremolite, and highlights the presence of fibrous amphibole particles. Thus, it was
reasonable for Drs. Cook and Krekeler to conclude that the Battelle Report evidences
the presence of tremolite asbestos in Defendants’ Italian talc.
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While there is ample region-specific data regarding the mines in Italy and
Vermont, it is undisputed that there is limited publicly available information
concerning the region of China from which Defendants sourced talc, specifically
Guangxi Province. Laura Webb, one of Defendants’ experts, states in her report:
“Little information is available in the peer-reviewed published literature on the talc
deposits in the Guangxi Province in China.” (ECF No. 32996-9 (“Webb Rep.”) at
23.) Dr. Cook agrees that little “is known about Chinese talc deposits.” (Cook
Amend. Rep. at 12.) Despite these informational gaps, both Drs. Cook and Krekeler
explain that talc ore from Guangxi Province occurs in carbonate rock types, which
are commonly associated with the presence of actinolite and tremolite. (Id. at 4, 10,
12–13; Krekeler Rep. at 10–11.) Defendants do not dispute this general geological
principle. Additionally, in reaching his opinions, Dr. Krekeler relied on an article by
Dr. Wilhelm Schober entitled “Asia Pacific Talc,” (Krekeler Rep., Ex. B at 84),
which reports that most mines in Guangxi contain talc deposits hosted in magnesium
carbonate 	rock 	and 	that 	accompanying 	minerals 	include 	tremolite. 	(Wilhelm
Schober, Asia Pacific Talc, Indus. Minerals, at 59 (1998); see IARC, Monographs
on the Identification of Carcinogenic Hazards to Humans, vol. 136: Talc and
Acrylonitrile 55 (2025) (citing Dr. Schober’s article in support of its determination
that mines located in Guangxi Province may contain tremolite asbestos).) Further,
during oral argument on November 25, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel noted that a 2019
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report prepared by AMA Analytical Services, Inc. for the FDA identified the
presence of asbestos in Defendants’ talcum powder products. (ECF No. 33132-9
(“AMA Certificate of Analysis dated July 24, 2019”).) It is undisputed that
Defendants were sourcing talc from China during this period. Although this testing
post-dates Dr. Cook’s and Dr. Krekeler’s reports, it corroborates their opinions
regarding the potential presence of asbestos in Defendants’ talc supply sourced from
China.154
Finally, I disagree with Defendants’ contention that the presence of a few
potentially irrelevant data points renders the opinions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler
wholly unreliable. Although an expert’s methodology may raise reliability concerns
if it relies heavily on test results unrelated to the mines or talc products at issue, that
is not the circumstance here. Defendants identify only a small number of allegedly
irrelevant items, and the majority of the evidence on which Drs. Cook and Krekeler
rely is directly attributable to the regions and mines from which Defendants sourced
talc. Put differently, Drs. Cook and Krekeler base their conclusions on a broad body
of materials that extends well beyond the isolated test results Defendants claim have
tainted their analyses. Even if the challenged data were excluded, the unchallenged
data 	would 	remain 	more 	than 	sufficient 	to 	support 	their 	conclusions 	by 	a
154 	Plaintiffs’ counsel also noted, during oral argument, that Dr. Longo found asbestos in
Chinese talc samples. However, these tests were performed using his PLM methodology, not the
TEM methodology, the only testing I have found to be admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert.
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preponderance of the evidence. As case law makes clear, factual imperfections in
the data underlying an expert’s opinion do not, standing alone, warrant exclusion
under 	Daubert so long as the opinion rests on a sufficiently reliable factual
foundation. See Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (“To the extent [an expert’s] credibility, data, or factual assumptions have
flaws, these flaws go to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility.”). Thus,
Defendants’ criticisms of certain underlying data go to the weight of the evidence
and the experts’ credibility, not to admissibility.
In conclusion, having reviewed these experts’ supporting evidence, taken
together, it adequately buttresses their opinions that asbestos was present in
Defendants’ source mines in Italy, Vermont, and China. Thus, because I find it more
likely than not that Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions satisfy Rule 702’s
admissibility requirements, “any attack by the opponent will go only to the weight
of the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note to 2023 amendment.
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that the Court deny Defendants’
motion to preclude Drs. Cook and Krekeler from opining on the alleged presence of
asbestos in Johnson & Johnson’s source mines.
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Geology Opinions of Drs. Mary
Poulton and Laura Webb
Plaintiffs seek to exclude the opinions of Defendants’ experts, Mary Poulton,
Ph.D. and Laura Webb, Ph.D. First, Plaintiffs argue that Drs. Poulton and Webb are
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not qualified because they lack the requisite academic or practical experience
necessary to support their opinions regarding the lack of asbestos at the mines used
by Defendants to source talc. Second, Plaintiffs contend that the opinions of Drs.
Poulton and Webb are unreliable and not based on any discernible methodology.
In opposition, Defendants assert that Drs. Poulton and Webb are eminently
qualified to offer their opinions in this MDL and that Plaintiffs’ argument on this
point is frivolous. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ challenges to the
methodologies employed by Drs. Poulton and Webb are equally unfounded.
According to Defendants, Drs. Poulton and Webb reliably rebut the opinions of
Plaintiffs’ geology experts, Drs. Cook and Krekeler.
I did not address these experts or issues in my prior Opinion, and thus, I will
consider the parties’ arguments without restriction.
i. 	Rule 	702’s 	Qualification 	Requirement 	is 	Liberally
Construed
As noted supra, a witness qualifies as an expert if he or she possesses
“specialized knowledge regarding the area of testimony.” Elcock, 233 F.3d at 741
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The basis of this specialized
knowledge can be practical experience as well as academic training and credentials,”
but “at a minimum,” the witness “must possess skill or knowledge greater than the
average layman.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Third
Circuit has “eschewed imposing overly rigorous requirements of expertise and [has]
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been satisfied with more generalized qualifications.” In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741.
Indeed, it is “an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony simply because the trial
court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best qualified or because the
proposed expert does not have the specialization that the court considers most
appropriate.” Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “If the expert meets [Rule 702’s] liberal minimum qualifications, then the
level of the expert’s expertise goes to credibility and weight, not admissibility.”
Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 809.
ii. 	Dr. Mary Poulton’s Qualifications
Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Poulton fails to meet even the liberal qualification
standard applied in federal court because she lacks the credentials, training, and
“hands-on” experience necessary to opine on issues related to talc, asbestos, and
mining. (ECF No. 32996-1 (“Pls.’ Geology Br.”) at 10–13.) They contend that Dr.
Poulton does not hold a degree in geology and is not a certified professional
geologist, an exploration geologist, or a licensed professional engineer. (Id.)
Plaintiffs further assert that she has not published any peer-reviewed articles on talc
or asbestos and is unfamiliar with the geology of the mining regions from which
Defendants obtained their talc. (Id.) They also fault her for having visited only one
talc mine and for never having worked for or consulted with a mining company. (Id.)
According to Plaintiffs, “Dr. Poulton’s career in academia without any first-hand
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knowledge of the issue on which she offers opinions does not qualify her as an
expert.” (Id. at 13.)
Defendants contend—and I agree—that Dr. Poulton is qualified to opine on
talc mining and to serve as a rebuttal expert witness.155 (ECF No. 33113 (“Defs.’
Geology Opp. Br.”) at 8–11.) They offer her as an expert in geological engineering,
a discipline that integrates geology with mining and civil engineering. (ECF No.
32996-5 (“Poulton Dep.”) at 40:22–41:11.) Dr. Poulton holds B.S., M.S., and Ph.D.
degrees in Geological Engineering from the University of Arizona. (Poulton Rep. at
2.) She served on the University of Arizona faculty for 28 years, achieving the rank
of Distinguished Professor in Mining and Geological Engineering. (Id.) She also
served 	as 	head 	of 	the 	University’s 	Department 	of 	Mining 	and 	Geological
Engineering for 14 years. (Id.)
Furthermore, Dr. Poulton has authored more than 100 research papers,
conference papers, abstracts, and reports, and has taught courses in mineral
exploration, mineralogy and petrology for mining engineers, field methods in
geophysical 	exploration, 	computer 	methods 	in 	geological 	engineering, 	mine
surveying, introduction to the global mining industry, and international mine safety
and health law. (Id.) She has received multiple honors—including the National
155 	The manner in which rebuttal experts are reviewed is discussed in the legal standard
section, see supra Part IV.D and below as relevant to the parties’ arguments here.
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Engineering Award from the American Association of Engineering Societies and the
Daniel 	C. 	Jackling 	Award 	from 	the 	Society 	of 	Mining, 	Metallurgy, 	and
Exploration—and has held leadership roles in professional organizations, a research
publication, and a government advisory committee. (Id.) She has also testified before
Congress on workforce needs in mining and petroleum. (Id.)
Dr. Poulton is distinguished within her field, and her specialized knowledge
closely aligns with her proffered testimony. Based on her engineering experience,
her review of the reference literature, and her analysis of the reports of Drs. Cook
and Krekeler and the documents cited therein, Dr. Poulton intends to testify that Drs.
Cook and Krekeler used “flawed methodologies, incomplete sampling results, and
incorrect facts about ore body characterization and selective mining” at the source
mines “to reach their conclusions that the talc sourced for Johnson’s Baby Powder
and Shower to Shower was known to contain asbestos and heavy metals that
exceeded product specifications.” (Id. at 1.)
Defendants have established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr.
Poulton satisfies Rule 702’s qualification requirement. In light of her academic
credentials, professional experience, and subject-matter expertise, Dr. Poulton
possesses specialized knowledge relevant to her proffered testimony. Her advanced
degrees in geological engineering, decades of teaching and research in mining and
geological engineering, and professional accomplishments demonstrate a depth of
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knowledge far exceeding that of a layperson. Plaintiffs’ arguments, at best, go to the
weight and credibility of her opinions. As the Third Circuit has made clear, it would
be an abuse of discretion to deem Dr. Poulton unqualified simply because she is not
a certified professional geologist or has not published any peer-reviewed articles on
talc or asbestos, particularly in light of the fact that she is being proffered to rebut
Plaintiffs’ geology experts. See Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244 (it is an abuse of discretion
if the court excludes testimony because the proposed expert is not the “best
qualified” or lacks what the court views as the “most appropriate” specialization);
see also In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741 (“Rule 702’s liberal policy of admissibility
extends to the substantive as well as the formal qualification of experts.”).
Accordingly, I find that Dr. Poulton is qualified to testify as an expert in
geological engineering and to offer rebuttal opinions concerning the methodologies
and conclusions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler.
iii. 	Dr. Laura Webb’s Qualifications
Plaintiffs argue that “Dr. Webb lacks both academic qualifications and
practical experience to support her opinions.” (Pls.’ Geology Br. at 13.) According
to Plaintiffs, Dr. Webb rarely “encounters talc in her work” and “has never examined
samples of talc for the purpose of identifying asbestos.” (Id. at 13–14.) They further
claim that “Dr. Webb has never performed any academic research or studies focused
on talc or asbestos” and has not published any peer-reviewed articles regarding talc,
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asbestos, or “the talc deposits in Vermont, Italy, or China used to source J&J’s Baby
Powder and Shower to Shower.” (Id. at 14.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Webb
lacks the knowledge and “hands-on” experience necessary “to provide an opinion
regarding the presence (or absence) of asbestos at the talc mines used to source J&J
talcum powder products.” (Id. at 14–15.)
In response, Defendants assert that Dr. Webb “is eminently qualified to opine
on the scientific principles that govern the formation of mineable high-grade talc
deposits and the possible relationship, or lack thereof, of such deposits with
amphibole asbestos” because, among other reasons, she is “a tenured professor of
geology who has almost 20 years of experience in the field, with a particular
specialization in the origin and history of mineral deposits.” (Defs.’ Geology Opp.
Br. at 11.) I agree with Defendants.
Dr. Webb obtained a B.S. in Geology from the University of California, Los
Angeles, and a Ph.D. in Geological and Environmental Sciences from Stanford
University. (Webb Rep. at 1.) Dr. Webb describes herself as “a geologist who
specializes in using the tools of petrology (the origin and evolution of rocks
discerned 	from mineralogical 	evidence), structural 	geology 	(interpreting 	rock
deformation), and geochronology (radiometric dating) to understand the histories of
rocks and regions.” (Id.) Dr. Webb served as a Research Assistant Professor at
Syracuse University for nine years and is currently a tenured Associate Professor in
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the Department of Geology at the University of Vermont. (Id.) Dr. Webb teaches
courses 	in 	petrology, microstructures, geochronology, and tectonics, and 	has
coauthored 33 peer-reviewed scientific papers addressing geology and petrology.
(Id. at 2.) Dr. Webb has also “worked extensively in regions with complex geologic
histories, such as those in Italy, Vermont and China,” and is familiar “with the
regional geology of the Fontane and Guangxi mine regions and [has] experience
working near the southern Vermont mines.” (Id.)
Defendants offer Dr. Webb as an expert in the field of geology and, according
to her report, she was asked to opine “on the scientific principles that govern the
formation of mineable high-grade talc deposits used in the manufacture of Johnson’s
Baby Powder and Shower to Shower, and to investigate the possible relationship of
such deposits . . . to amphibole asbestos.” (Id. at 1.) She was also asked to evaluate
“plaintiffs’ experts’ reports by Dr. Cook and Dr. Krekeler, and address[ ] differences
in 	the 	formation 	of 	amphibole 	minerals 	with 	different 	crystal 	habits 	(e.g.,
asbestiform vs. prismatic) and the physical and chemical properties that impact
biopersistence and toxicity.” (Id.) Based on her review of the scientific literature and
other materials, her educational background, and her professional experience as a
geologist, Dr. Webb opined that “the cosmetic talc sources used for Johnson’s Baby
Powder and Shower to Shower were limited to mines that were free of asbestiform
minerals.” (Id. at 24.) She further opined that, based on general geologic principles
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and the available data, Drs. Cook and Krekeler inappropriately concluded that the
talc 	deposits 	mined 	for 	use 	in 	Defendants’ 	talcum 	powder 	products 	were
contaminated with asbestos. (Id. at 1.)
Defendants have established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr.
Webb satisfies Rule 702’s qualification requirement. Dr. Webb holds advanced
degrees in the field of geology from leading universities. She teaches and publishes
in the areas of geology and petrology, and has extensive experience working in
geologically complex regions. Without a doubt, Dr. Webb’s specialized knowledge
in “the histories of rocks and regions” directly relates to the opinions she offers
regarding the formation of the talc deposits at issue, regardless of whether she
possesses specific expertise related to talc or asbestos. The alleged deficiencies
identified by Plaintiffs—such as her lack of peer-reviewed articles addressing talc,
asbestos, and the relevant talc deposits in Italy, Vermont, and China—bear on the
weight of her opinions, not their admissibility. Consistent with the Third Circuit’s
liberal approach to expert qualification, I find that Dr. Webb is qualified to testify as
an expert in geology and to offer rebuttal opinions concerning Drs. Cook’s and
Krekeler’s methodologies and conclusions.
iv. 	Analysis Regarding Dr. Mary Poulton
Plaintiffs first argue that Dr. Poulton’s testimony should be excluded because
“her opinions, as she admitted, amount to nothing more than a critique of” the
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opinions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler “rather than an expert evaluation.” (Pls.’
Geology Br. at 17–19.) While their argument is neither a model of clarity nor
supported by any legal authority, Plaintiffs appear to contend that Dr. Poulton’s
methodology—namely, attacking the opinions of Drs. Cook and Krekeler—is
unreliable. Defendants counter that Plaintiffs fundamentally misunderstand the role
of a defense expert and assert that federal courts recognize that “assessing the
methodology of plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions is an appropriate methodology for a
defense expert” like Dr. Poulton. (Id. at 13–16.) Again, I agree with Defendants.
All experts who seek to testify in federal court must satisfy Rule 702’s
admissibility 	requirements, including 	defense 	experts. 	See 	Fed. 	R. 	Evid.702.
However, as Defendants correctly note, courts recognize that “the proper role of
rebuttal experts [is] to critique plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and point out
potential flaws in the plaintiffs’ experts’ reports.” Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp.
2d at 835; see also Mahaska Bottling Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (courts routinely
permit defense experts to testify “even if the expert primarily critiques the opposing
expert’s approach without offering an alternative approach.”); In re Abilify, 299 F.
Supp. 3d at 1368 (defense experts’ “opinions properly may be limited to criticizing
the analysis and conclusions presented by another party”). Simply put, defense
experts “have a less demanding task, since they have no burden to produce models
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or methods of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiffs’ experts.” In re
Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
Here, I reject Plaintiffs’ argument that Dr. Poulton’s testimony is improper or
unreliable merely because her methodology involves critiquing Drs. Cook’s and
Krekeler’s opinions. Dr. Poulton testified regarding the scope of her assignment at
her deposition, explaining that she was asked to review the reports of Drs. Cook and
Krekeler and to determine whether she “agreed with what they did, what they found,
and then if not, why.” (Poulton Dep. at 22:20–23:13.) The primary focus of her
analysis was on Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s opinions concerning “mining and
beneficiation practices.”156 (Id.) With respect to her methodology, Dr. Poulton
testified that she “started with the assumption that” Drs. Cook and Krekeler “were
correct in their findings, and then [attempted to] corroborate[] their statements with
what [she] saw in the documents.” (Id. at 23:14–24:2.) She further explained that “if
they said information was missing, then I asked for that information or looked for it
within the documents they had” and that she “basically constructed the areas where”
she felt Drs. Cook and Krekeler “were incorrect.” (Id.) I find nothing inherently
unreliable regarding Dr. Poulton’s stated methodology, as it is consistent with the
156 	Dr. Cook explained in his report that beneficiation means “any process that improves the
economic value of the ore by removing the gangue minerals which results in a higher-grade
product.” (Cook Amend. Rep. at 9 n.12.) This includes applying processes to talc ore such as
“primary (jaw) crushing, grinding circuits including roller mills, shear disc devices, flotation,
thickening, filtering, and drying.” (Id. at 9.)
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general role of a rebuttal expert. See In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1368 (finding
defense experts’ opinions, which “were, essentially, critiques of Plaintiffs’ experts’
evidence, methodologies, and conclusions,” “entirely appropriate”).
Since her methodology is sufficiently sound, I must now determine whether
Dr. Poulton’s opinions are supported by sufficient facts or data and whether she
reliably applied her methodology to the facts of the case. In her report, Dr. Poulton
concluded that “Drs. Cook and Krekeler use flawed methodologies, incomplete
sampling results, and incorrect facts about ore body characterization and selective
mining to reach their conclusions that the talc sourced for Johnson’s Baby Powder
and Shower to Shower was known to contain asbestos and heavy metals that
exceeded product specifications.” (Poulton Rep. at 1.) Specifically, Dr. Poulton
identified the following alleged deficiencies in Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s reports:
A. 	Drs. Cook and Krekeler improperly conflate non-
ore samples with ore samples.
B. 	Drs. Cook and Krekeler improperly conflate non-
asbestiform minerals with asbestiform minerals.
C. 	Drs. Cook and Krekeler improperly extrapolate
general mineralogy from different regions to the exact
mineralogy of ore that went into Johnson’s Baby Powder
or Shower to Shower.
D. 	Dr. Cook improperly conflates the mineralogy of
non-cosmetic grade talc mines with cosmetic grade ore
that went into Johnson’s Baby Powder or Shower to
Shower.
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E. 	Dr. 	Krekeler 	improperly 	cites 	data 	regarding
regions 	in 	China 	where 	talc 	was 	never 	sourced 	for
Johnson’s Baby Powder or Shower to Shower to opine that
the specific Chinese ore body sourced for Johnson’s Baby
Powder or Shower to Shower was contaminated with
asbestos.
F. 	Drs. Cook and Krekeler rely on irrelevant test
results for their opinions that Johnson’s Baby Powder and
Shower to Shower were contaminated with asbestos.
G. 	Dr. 	Cook 	relies 	on 	test 	results 	that 	postdate
production for cosmetic talc at the Argonaut mine, which
cannot be extrapolated to ore sourced from earlier sections
of the mine as mines are continually in development.
H. 	Drs. 	Cook 	and 	Krekeler’s 	opinions 	regarding
inadequate sampling are premised on misrepresentations
of documents and sampling theory and lack evidentiary
support.
I. 	Drs. 	Cook 	and 	Krekeler 	incorrectly 	assert 	that
selective 	mining 	was 	impossible, 	make 	improper
assumptions 	about 	how 	drill 	campaigns 	must 	be
conducted, misstate facts regarding mine planning and
rely on incomplete data to opine that quality control was
ineffective.
(Id.; see id. at 5–33.) In forming these opinions, Dr. Poulton relied on her “analysis
of the reports of Drs. Cook and Krekeler, examination of documents presented, use
of reference literature, and [her] engineering experience.” (Id. at 1; see id. at 34–47;
Poulton Dep. at 19:20–24.) In addition to critiquing Drs. Cook’s and Krekeler’s
opinions, Dr. Poulton also addressed the mines used by Defendants to source talc in
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Italy, Vermont, and China, including discussing matters related to mine design and
mining practices. (Poulton Rep. at 2–5.)
After reviewing Dr. Poulton’s report, deposition testimony, and the parties’
submissions, I find that Defendants have established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Dr. Poulton’s opinions rest on a sufficient factual foundation and
reflect a sound application of her methodology to the facts of this case. Dr. Poulton
reviewed and relied on the documents cited by Drs. Cook and Krekeler in their
reports, along with other relevant materials. As a rebuttal expert, she was asked to
identify, and did so, specific shortcomings in their opinions, provided a reasoned
basis for each of her criticisms, and relied on facts and data to support her
conclusions. See In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1368 (denying motion to exclude
defense experts’ testimony on similar grounds). I am satisfied that Dr. Poulton’s
opinions are admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert because they are grounded in
her expertise in geological engineering and mining and are supported by ample
scientific and record evidence.
Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that Dr. Poulton’s opinions are unreliable
because they lack scientific rigor, are based on cherry-picked scientific evidence,
constitute ipse dixit, lack credibility, and are irrelevant and incorrect. (See Pls.’
Geology Br. at 17–31.) I disagree. “[T]he question of whether the expert is credible
or the opinion is correct is generally a question for the fact finder, not the court.”
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Summit 6, LLC, 802 F.3d at 1296. None of Plaintiffs’ arguments establish that Dr.
Poulton’s methods are unreliable, her data legally or factually insufficient, or her
reasoning disconnected from the facts of the case. Indeed, most of Plaintiffs’
arguments go to weight rather than reliability. For example, Plaintiffs assert that Dr.
Poulton failed to employ sufficient scientific rigor because she only “reviewed
materials 	cited 	by Plaintiff’s [sic] experts but not all of the materials they
considered” in preparing their reports. (Pls.’ Geology Br. at 18.) Plaintiffs claim,
after comparing the experts’ “reliance lists,” that “Dr. Poulton’s conclusions about
the PSC’s experts’ analyses are based upon only a mere fraction of the information
that was actually relied upon by PSC’s experts in reaching their conclusions.” (Id.)
In support of this position, Plaintiffs did not identify any specific documents that Dr.
Poulton failed to consider—relative to Drs. Cook and Krekeler—that would or could
have affected her conclusions. Regardless, Rule 702’s reliability inquiry does not
rise or fall on the number of documents an expert reviews in forming an opinion.
The proper question here is whether Dr. Poulton’s opinions are supported by
sufficient facts and data to rebut the opinions of Plaintiffs’ experts. I answer that in
the affirmative.
Because Dr. Poulton’s opinions are reliable under Rule 702 and Daubert, I
find that Plaintiffs’ objections go to the weight of her testimony, not its admissibility.
See Summit 6, LLC, 802 F.3d at 1299 (“Where the methodology is sound and the
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evidence relied upon is sufficiently related to the case, disputes over the expert’s
credibility or over the accuracy of the underlying facts are for the jury.”).
Accordingly, I recommend that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr.
Poulton.
v. 	Analysis Regarding Dr. Laura Webb
First, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Webb’s opinions are unreliable because “she
failed to use the very observation-based methodology that she normally uses in the
field and outside of the courtroom.” (Pls.’ Geology Br. at 32–33.) Specifically,
Plaintiffs maintain that Dr. Webb departed from her customary “field-based”
practices such as collecting and testing rock and mineral samples. (Id. at 33–36.)
Next, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Webb’s methodology is flawed because she
based her opinions on a limited selection of cherry-picked materials and ignored
various maps, testing, samples, observations, and other data from the actual mines
used to source Defendants’ talcum powder products. (Id. at 36.) Plaintiffs claim that
Dr. Webb’s “extremely narrow review of relevant materials is important” because
she does not opine that there is no asbestos in the mines, but rather, her opinion is
that the evidence she reviewed does not support the conclusion that asbestos is
present in the mines. (Id. at 36–37.)
In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ attacks on Dr. Webb’s
methodology are baseless. (Defs.’ Geology Opp. Br. at 33–42.) They assert that there
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is “no truth” to Plaintiffs’ argument that Dr. Webb failed to use the same type of
methodology she normally uses in her practice as a scientist. (Id. at 33–37.) They
further claim that even a cursory review of Dr. Webb’s report reveals that she
performed a comprehensive review of the relevant scientific literature and that her
opinions are not based on cherry-picked data. (Id. at 38–42.)
After reviewing Dr. Webb’s report, deposition testimony, and the parties’
submissions, I find that Defendants have established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Dr. Webb’s opinions are based on sufficient facts and data, are
grounded in reliable principles and methods, and reflect a sound application of those
principles and methods to the facts of this case. Plaintiffs mischaracterize Dr.
Webb’s deposition testimony to support their position that she practices only a field-
based approach to geology. Rather, the record reveals that Dr. Webb employed the
same research-based methodology she uses in her academic and peer-reviewed
work, and that performing work in the field is merely one of her skill sets. The record
further reveals that Dr. Webb’s opinions regarding the formation of the talc deposits
at issue are grounded in her extensive expertise in geology and petrology and are
supported by ample scientific evidence.
In her report, Dr. Webb stated that her opinions focus primarily on “the
scientific principles that govern the formation of [the] mineable high-grade talc
deposits” used by Defendants to produce their products. (Webb Rep. at 1.) She began
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by defining key terms and outlining important concepts related to minerals, such as
talc and those belonging to the serpentine and amphibole groups. (Id. at 2–6.) She
then discussed the essential characteristics of asbestos and the general principles
underlying the formation of talc deposits. (Id. at 6–11.) She explained, “while talc is
a common metamorphic mineral in metamorphosed ultramafic and carbonate rocks,
mineable high-purity talc deposits are the result of rare instances of rather extreme
metasomatism, in which the bulk composition of a protolith is changed to something
effectively matching (or very close to) the talc mineral composition.” (Id. at 14.) Put
differently, 	mineable 	high-purity 	talc 	deposits, 	like 	those 	allegedly 	used 	by
Defendants, form through rare geological processes that result in deposits made up
almost entirely of talc.
In addition to these general scientific principles, Dr. Webb analyzed the
available scientific literature to determine the specific characteristic of the talc
deposits used by Defendants in Italy, Vermont, and China. (Id. at 14–24.) She
explained that, in forming her opinions, she “relied on peer-reviewed, published
scientific 	literature 	and 	the 	examination 	of 	primary 	sources 	of 	data 	and
observations.” (Id. at 14.) Because information concerning certain mines is limited,
she “integrated regional studies” into her analysis “to understand the broader context
and metamorphic conditions associated with the formation of the talc deposits.” (Id.)
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Her report cited approximately eighty sources of scientific authority, among other
materials, such as the reports of Drs. Cook, Krekeler, and Longo. (Id. at 25–39.)
Ultimately, relying on her “knowledge of petrologic systems, extensive
searching and evaluation of the published scientific literature, and examination of
limited industry reports,” which she used to obtain background information, Dr.
Webb opined that the talc sources used by Defendants “were limited to mines that
were free of asbestiform minerals.” (Id. at 24.) She reasoned that the data she
evaluated “weighs in favor of the conclusion that there is no scientific merit to any
claims of asbestos in the cosmetic talc ores utilized.” (Id.)
Dr. Webb testified that the methodology she applied in forming her opinions
is “the same approach” she would apply to any aspect of her science, “whether it’s
writing a paper or a peer review.” (ECF No. 32996-10 (“Webb Dep.”) at 125:1–7.)
She conducted “an extensive search of the peer-reviewed literature” and other
scientific resources, including U.S.G.S. reports. (Id. at 125:7–126:20.) She also
“tried to really dig into the primary citations” and review “anything written about
the talc bodies” and “surrounding rocks” “to understand the petrology of those
systems.” (Id.) Dr. Webb’s testimony regarding her methodology is consistent with
both the form and substance of her report, and, tellingly, Plaintiffs do not dispute her
ability to perform research-based assignments.
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Plaintiffs instead argue that, because she describes herself as a field-based
geologist, Dr. Webb was required to conduct fieldwork before rendering her
opinions, including, for example, driving “from where she works in Burlington,
Vermont” to “the Hamm, Hammondsville and Argonaut mines” in southern
Vermont to collect samples. (Pls.’ Geology Br. at 33–36.) Plaintiffs’ argument is
based on a factually unfounded and an unsupported assumption that Dr. Webb can
only offer a scientific opinion if she personally collected and tested field samples.
First, Dr. Webb’s work is not limited to field-based geology, and she neither
testified that fieldwork is a prerequisite to forming opinions about mineral deposit
formation, nor have Plaintiffs suggested that there is such a requirement in the
scientific community. When asked, “What is a field-based geologist?” Dr. Webb
testified that “in many cases [she is] actually out in the field making structural
measurements” and “collecting oriented samples.” (Webb Dep. at 109:10–24.)
Whether she conducts fieldwork “depends on the nature of—of the question that [she
is] trying to address.” (Id.) She further stated that being a field-based geologist means
she possesses “the ability to recognize different rock types in the field, the ability to
recognize and document structures, [and] to make the appropriate measurements.”
(Id.) Thus, Dr. Webb was describing one component of her professional expertise,
not expressing a preference for or against any particular methodology. More
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importantly, she did not represent that she cannot form expert opinions without field
studies.
In addition, Dr. Webb testified that whether she goes out into the field to
collect samples “depends on what’s known and documented for the region” and
whether she needs to “build off the existing knowledge base.” (Id. at 118:12–24.)
She concluded that it was not necessary for her to “go out into the field” in this case
because, at least with respect to the Vermont mines, she relied on “the decades of
work of geologists and petrologists” who came before her. (Id. at 127:14–128:6.)
According to Dr. Webb, “if I feel like there is a big gap in that information, that
would drive that need to go out into the field to collect samples, and I just didn’t
arrive at that position in this case.” (Id.) Notably, Drs. Cook and Krekeler also did
not visit any of the mines at issue in this litigation, nor did they conduct any testing.
Second, Plaintiffs cite no legal authority directly supporting their assertion
that Dr. Webb was required to apply a field-based methodology. (See Pls.’ Geology
Br. at 32 n.173.) Defendants correctly note that the cases cited by Plaintiffs are
distinguishable. (Defs.’ Geology Opp. Br. at 36–37.) For example, Plaintiffs rely on
two cases in which the expert acknowledged that a Bradford Hill analysis is the
accepted methodology for establishing a causal link but nevertheless applied a
different and unreliable method. McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation
Grp., Inc., 2013 WL 3487560, at *22 (W.D. Pa. July 12, 2013); Rimbert v. Eli Lilly
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& Co., 2009 WL 2208570, at *14 (D.N.M. July 21, 2009). Plaintiffs also cite several
cases in which the expert purported to apply a particular methodology but, in
practice, failed to do so. Brown v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 765 F.3d 765,
776 (7th Cir. 2014); Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 268–
69 (2d Cir. 2002); Truck Ins. Exch. v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1213 (10th
Cir. 2004). Neither scenario is applicable here.
Critically, Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that field-based
geology is the generally accepted methodology for determining the histories of rocks
and regions. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that Dr. Webb represented
she applied a field-based approach in forming her opinions. Her assignment was to
review the scientific literature and determine the characteristics of the talc deposits
at issue in this litigation, which is precisely what she dId. Thus, the cases cited by
Plaintiffs are neither applicable nor persuasive.
In conclusion, I find that Dr. Webb’s opinions are grounded in a sufficiently
reliable factual foundation, and Defendants have established that she applied the
same level of intellectual rigor in this case that she employs in her professional work
outside the courtroom. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152 (the objective of
Daubert’s gatekeeping requirement “is to make certain that an expert . . . employs
in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of
an expert in the relevant field”). Consequently, Plaintiffs’ criticisms of Dr. Webb—
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including her alleged lack of experience working with talc and asbestos and her
failure to perform any fieldwork—go to the weight, not the admissibility, of her
testimony. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ motion to
exclude Dr. Webb’s testimony and opinions.
B. 	Tissue Sample Motions
As previewed above, the parties have moved to exclude expert opinions and
anticipated testimony concerning the detection, origination, and evaluation of talc
and asbestos-type particles, fragments, and/or fiber in certain bellwether Plaintiffs’
gynecologic and pelvic tissue samples.
Over the course of this litigation, preserved tissue from five bellwether
Plaintiffs—Anna Gallardo, Hilary Converse, Pasqualina Rausa, Carter Judkins, and
Tamara 	Newsome, 	respectively—was 	submitted 	to 	Dr. 	John 	J. 	Godleski, 	a
pulmonary pathologist and analytical microscopist affiliated with Harvard Medical
School, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, and Mass General Brigham
f/k/a Brigham and Women’s Hospital. (See ECF Nos. 33117-7 (“Godleski Gallardo
Rep.”), 33117-8 (“Godleski Converse Rep.”), 33117-9 (“Godleski Rausa Rep.”),
33117-10 (“Godleski Judkins Rep.”), 33117-11 (“Godleski Newsome Rep.”).)
In a methodology described in greater detail below, Dr. Godleski reported the
presence of talc within the sampled tissue of all five of the individual Plaintiffs and,
in 	two 	Plaintiffs, 	tremolite 	asbestos 	particles, 	fragments, 	and/or 	fibers. 	(See
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generally id.) In all of his expert reports, Dr. Godleski concluded that the talc and,
where present, tremolite asbestos “found in the tissues of th[ese] case[s] are
contributory evidence for a causal link between the presence of these materials and
the development of th[ese] patient[s’] ovarian cancer[s].” (See Godleski Newsome
Rep. at 7 (emphasis added); see also Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 8 (talc and tremolite
particles/fibers); Godleski Converse Rep. at 6 (talc); Godleski Rausa Rep. at 5–6
(talc); Godleski Rausa Rep. at 5 (talc).)
Defendants move to exclude Dr. Godleski’s expert opinions, (see ECF No.
33004-2 (“Defs.’ Godleski Br.”)), and further rebut Dr. Godleski’s findings through
Defendants’ own experts—Dr. Juan Felix and Dr. Teri Longacre, (see, e.g., ECF
Nos. 33108-2 (“Felix Converse Rep.”), 33108-3 (“Longacre Newsome Rep.”),
33108-8 (“Felix Judkins Rep.”), 33108-9 (“Felix Gallardo Rep.”)).157 In turn,
Plaintiffs move to exclude portions of Drs. Felix’s and Longacre’s opinions, which
opine, in relevant part,158 that any talc- and asbestos-like particles identified by Dr.
Godleski are more likely a product of post-excision laboratory contaminants rather
than in vivo findings. 	(See generally ECF No. 33002-1 (“Pls.’ Felix & Longacre
Br.”).)
157 	To clarify, Defendants submit Dr. Longacre’s expert report with respect to Plaintiff
Newsome, and the expert reports of Dr. Felix pertaining to Plaintiffs Converse, Judkins, and
Gallardo.
158 	Plaintiffs appear to only contest the admissibility of Drs. Felix’s and Longacre’s opinions
as they relate to the likelihood of particulate contamination in Dr. Godleski’s tissue sample testing.
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My prior Opinion did not address these experts or their respective opinions
and proffered testimony. Therefore, I will evaluate the admissibility of their expert
opinions and testimony under Rule 702, in the first instance, rather than by
limitations set forth by the Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order.
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Godleski
Defendants move to exclude the opinions of Dr. Godleski on the basis that
they are unreliable and do not fit this case.159 Defendants primarily argue that Dr.
Godleski’s core premise—that detecting any amount of talc particulates in sample
tissue evidences a causal link to ovarian cancer—is neither supported by the
scientific studies relied upon by Dr. Godleski, nor by the scientific community at
large. (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 9–12.) Assuming arguendo that a causal link can
be drawn by sufficient scientific support, Defendants further argue that alleged
inadequacies in Dr. Godleski’s methodology and conclusions warrant exclusion of
his opinions related to the presence of talc or tremolite asbestos in the tissue sample
of the individual Plaintiffs. (Id. at 12–18.) Alternatively, Defendants assert that Dr.
Godleski fails to establish that the presence of talc particulates in each of the five
159 	Defendants do not challenge Dr. Godleski’s qualifications as a proffered expert of
pulmonary pathology and analytical microscopy. (See generally Defs.’ Godleski Br.) Yet
Defendants appear to take issue with Dr. Godleski’s prior admission that he is not a gynecologic
pathologist or a gynecologic oncologist. (See id. at 2–3.) For the sake of completeness, I will
assess, infra, the qualifications of Dr. Godleski. See, e.g., Cohen, 125 F.4th at 462.
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bellwether Plaintiffs’ tissue can be traced to their perineal use of Defendants’
products. (Id. at 18–20.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants misconstrue Dr. Godleski’s
methodology, which they assert is reliable. (See, e.g., ECF No. 33117 (“Pls.’
Godleski Opp. Br.”) at 13–15.) Plaintiffs further oppose Defendants’ challenge to
Dr. Godleski because it is based on an improperly heightened Rule 702 requirement,
insofar as it relates to Dr. Godleski’s causal conclusion. (See id. at 15–19.)
i. 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Godleski as an expert in pathology and analytical
microscopy. (See Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 1.) Dr. Godleski holds a B.S. in Biology
from King’s College and an M.D. from the University of Pittsburgh, completed
pathology training at Massachusetts General Hospital, and has been certified in
anatomic pathology since 1975. (Id.) Dr. Godleski has more than five decades of
academic and clinical experience at Harvard Medical School, the Harvard T.H. Chan
School of Public Health, and Mass General Brigham f/k/a Brigham and Women’s
Hospital, among other academic and medical institutions. (See generally id.) He
directed Harvard School of Public Health’s Electronic Microscopy Laboratories
from 1988 to 2017 and led the Pulmonary Pathology Division at Brigham and
Women’s Hospital from 1978 to 2015. (Id.) In his capacity as Director of Harvard
School of Public Health’s Electron Microscopy Laboratories, Dr. Godleski used and
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oversaw use of light microscopy, scanning electron microscopy, and energy
dispersive x-ray spectroscopy. (Id.) Dr. Godleski has authored hundreds of peer-
reviewed scientific publications, including several relevant to talc in the female
genital tract and ovarian cancer.160 (Id.) He currently holds emeritus status as a
Professor of Pathology at Harvard Medical School. (See id.)
On this record, I find that Dr. Godleski possesses specialized expertise in
pathology and microanalytical methods relevant to the detection, localization, and
characterization of talc in gynecologic and pelvic tissue. Although Defendants
imply—without substantive analysis—that Dr. Godleski lacks qualifications in
gynecologic pathology, (see Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 2–3), I recommend that the Court
determine 	he 	is 	qualified 	to 	opine 	regarding 	his 	pathology 	and 	microscopy
methodologies and the conclusions drawn therefrom as to the presence of talc.
Defendants have articulated no reason, let alone a persuasive reason, why Dr.
Godleski’s expertise in pathology and microscopy could not be applied to the
detection of talc or other foreign particulates within gynecologic specimens.
Moreover, the qualification standard under Daubert must be construed liberally, and
160 	(See Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 1–2 (“I have recently published six papers regarding talc
and tissue pathology (references 1–6). The first paper used tissue digestive procedures and
SEM/EDXS to quantify talc in lymph nodes in comparison to the use of in situ SEM/EDXS; the
second described the migration and detection of talc in pelvic tissues from the perineum in a series
of exposed patients who also had ovarian malignancy. The third concerned the use of spectroscopic
magnesium and silicon weight % ratio standards to diagnose talc in human tissues, and the
expected mathematical distribution for such measurements. Three other publications also pertain
to talc identification in tissue and resultant pathology (references 4–6).”)
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the Third Circuit has made clear that an expert should not be excluded “merely
because the court feels that the expert is not the best qualified or that the expert does
not possess the most appropriate specialization.” In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d
at 655. Having reviewed Dr. Godleski’s curriculum vitae and extensive background,
to the extent Defendants seek to exclude Dr. Godleski based on a lack of
qualifications, I reject that argument and recommend that the Court find Dr.
Godleski qualified to provide his expert opinions in this case.
ii. 	Methodology and Opinions
To determine the admissibility of Dr. Godleski’s expert opinions, I find it
necessary to first review the methodologies underlying them. For each of the five
bellwether 	Plaintiffs 	with 	tissue 	samples, 	Dr. 	Godleski 	employed 	the 	same
methodology. Each Plaintiff had undergone a surgical procedure, from which
various tissue samples were removed and preserved.161 (See, e.g., Godleski Gallardo
161 	More specifically, Plaintiff Gallardo underwent a “hysterectomy, bilateral salpingo-
oophorectomy, omentectomy, multiple soft tissue biopsies of the anterior and posterior cul-de-sac,
right and left gutter, right and left pelvic side wall, and diaphragm, and multiple lymph node
excisions including right and left external iliac, right and left obturator, and right and left peri-
aortic nodes.” (Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 2.) Plaintiff Converse underwent a “hysterectomy,
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy, excision of bilateral pelvic and para-aortic lymph nodes, and
peritoneal and diaphragm biopsies.” (Godleski Converse Rep. at 2.) Plaintiff Rausa underwent a
“hysterectomy, bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy, left and right external iliac lymph node excision,
right and left common iliac lymph node excision, right and left para-aortic lymph nodes excision,
right and left pelvic sigmoid peritoneum biopsies, bladder peritoneum biopsy, omen tum biopsy,
right and left diaphragm peritoneum biopsies, small bowel mesentary and serosa nodules biopsies,
right and left paracolic gutter peritoneum biopsies, and right peritoneum paericolic plaque
excision.” (Godleski Rausa Rep. at 2.) Plaintiff Judkins underwent a “hysterectomy, bilateral
salpingo-oophorectomy, left and right pelvic lymph nodes excision, right para-aortic lymph nodes
excision, pelvic sigmoid adhesion biopsy, and infracolic omentum biopsy.” (Godleski Judkins Rep.
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Rep. at 2.) The various surgical medical hospitals or institutions where the surgeries
were performed prepared and stored surgical slides containing the sampled tissue,162
which were stained with hematoxylin and eosin. (See, e.g., id.) The histological
slides were then provided to Dr. Godleski.
Dr. Godleski first studied the histological slides using light microscopy and
confirmed each of the sampled Plaintiffs’ diagnoses by comparing the observed
morphology to the diagnosis in the original hospital surgical pathology report.163
(See, e.g., id.) Dr. Godleski also described the representative microscopic features
consistent with the reported tumor type. (See, e.g., id.) Dr. Godleski next reviewed
at 	2.) 	Plaintiff 	Newsome 	underwent 	a 	“hysterectomy, 	bilateral 	salpingo-oophorectomy,
omentectomy, and right pelvic lymph node excision.” (Godleski Newsome Rep. at 2.)
162 	Plaintiff Gallardo’s histological slides were prepared by the Department of Pathology at
Barnes-Jewish Hospital at Washington University Medical Center in St. Louis, Missouri. (See
Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 2.) Plaintiff Converse’s histological slides were prepared by the
Department of Pathology at Yale Medical Center in New Haven, Connecticut. (See Godleski
Converse Rep. at 2.) Plaintiff Newsome’s histological slides were prepared by the Department of
Pathology at Holy Cross Health in Silver Spring, Maryland. (See Godleski Newsome Rep. at 2.)
Plaintiff Rausa’s histological slides were prepared by the Department of Pathology at Ascension
St. Vincent’s Southside Hospital in Jacksonville, Florida. (See Godleski Rausa Rep. at 2.) Finally,
Plaintiff Judkins’ histological slides were prepared by the Department of Pathology and Laboratory
Medicine at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center in Lebanon, New Hampshire. (See Godleski
Judkins Rep. at 2.)
163 	For Plaintiff Gallardo, Dr. Godleski confirmed the diagnosis of “poorly differentiated
endometrioid adenocarcinoma of the ovary.” (Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 2.) For Plaintiff Converse,
Dr. Godleski confirmed the diagnosis of “clear cell carcinoma of the ovary.” (Godleski Converse
Rep. at 2.) For Plaintiff Judkins, Dr. Godleski confirmed the diagnosis of “poorly differentiated
serous carcinoma of the ovary.” (Godleski Judkins Rep. at 2.) For Plaintiff Rausa, Dr. Godleski
confirmed the diagnosis of “high grade serous carcinoma of the left and right ovaries.” (Godleski
Rausa Rep. at 2.) For Plaintiff Newsome, Dr. Godleski confirmed the diagnosis of “endometrioid
carcinoma of the ovary.” (Godleski Newsome Rep. at 2.)
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the histological slides using polarized light microscopy,164 which allowed him to
“highlight and detect birefringent165 foreign material in the same plane of focus with
the tissues.” (See, e.g., id. at 3.) Varying amounts of birefringent material were
discovered in Plaintiffs’ respective tissue samples. (See id. 	at 2–3; Godleski
Converse Rep. at 2–3; Godleski Newsome Rep. at 2; Godleski Rausa Rep. at 2–3;
Godleski Judkins Rep. at 2.)
According to Dr. Godleski, the discovery of birefringent material in tissue is
“robustly correlated” with the likely discovery of talc particulate in examined areas,
since “talc is a strongly birefringent material.” (See, e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at
4.) Therefore, to detect and identify talc, Dr. Godleski requested paraffin tissue
blocks 	that 	corresponded 	with 	areas 	showing 	the 	greatest 	concentration 	of
birefringent particles and anatomic locations consistent with expected particle
migration pathways—such as ovary, fallopian tube, service, regional lymph nodes,
and omentum. He obtained the corresponding paraffin tissue blocks from the
surgical medical institutions for each sampled Plaintiff for further analysis using
SEM and EDXS.
164 	As discussed above, polarized light microscopy is a form of optical microscopy that uses
polarized light and dispersion to identify minerals by their optical properties, including, inter alia,
indices of refraction, birefringence, sign of elongation, and size. (See ECF No. 33132-7 (“Wylie
Rep.”) at 4.)
165 	According to Plaintiffs, birefringence, in the context of this case, “is an optical property of
talc and other magnesium silicates that causes them to stand out from the carbonaceous tissue
background.” (Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 6.) Defendants do not offer a competing definition.
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In order to avoid introducing contamination from handling the paraffin blocks,
Dr. 	Godleski 	used 	powder-free 	gloves 	on 	pre-cleaned 	services, 	trimmed 	off
approximately 50 micrometers from the block face with a fresh microtome blade to
remove any potential surface contamination from previous handling and/or storage,
rinsed the trimmed surfaces in distilled deionized water to remove soluble residues
from tissue processing, and stored the paraffin tissue blocks, when not in use, in
closed plastic container boxes. (See, e.g., id. at 4.)
For testing of the paraffin tissue blocks, Dr. Godleski examined the face of
the blocks directly (“in situ”) using variable-pressure SEM, which allows the
viewing microscopist to view magnified particles and fibers contained within the
block. (See, e.g., id. at 4.) Once detected, Dr. Godleski used EDXS to measure the
particular particles’ and fibers’ elemental makeup. (See, e.g., id.) Dr. Godleski
confirmed the detection of talc particles by observing their characteristic elemental
signature, e.g., magnesium, silicon, and oxygen in a well-established proportion.
(See, e.g., id.) Talc fibers were detected using this method to confirm their elemental
signature, in addition to a specific shape criterion, i.e., length-to-width ratio greater
than about 3:1 with roughly parallel sides. (See, e.g., id.) Using SEM/EDXS, Dr.
Godleski identified other foreign particles and distinguished non‑talc magnesium
silicates 	and other exogenous 	materials from endogenous elements—such 	as
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calcium, sodium, phosphorus, and iron—that commonly appear in human tissue,
especially in cancer. (See, e.g., id. at 4–6.)
For Plaintiff Gallardo, Dr. Godleski detected birefringent particles in 25 of the
65 histological slides. (See id. at 3–5.) He selected five paraffin tissue blocks
corresponding to those histological slides, from which there was SEM/EDXS
analysis of 795 particles. (Id. at 4–5.) From that number, a total of 208 talc particles
and fibers were detected. (Id.) Additionally, Dr. Godleski identified 30 tremolite
asbestos fiber/fragments as being within the acceptable range of magnesium and
silicon atomic weight percentage ratio. (Id. at 5–6.)
For Plaintiff Converse, Dr. Godleski detected birefringent particles in 25 of
the 45 histological slides. (See Godleski Converse Rep. at 2–4.) He selected seven
paraffin 	tissue 	blocks 	corresponding 	to 	those 	slides, 	from 	which 	there 	was
SEM/EDXS analysis of 255 particles. (Id. at 3–4.) Of the 255, a total of four talc
particles were detected. (Id.)
For Plaintiff Newsome, Dr. Godleski detected birefringent particles in eight
of the 31 histological slides. (See Godleski Newsome Rep. at 2–4.) He selected five
paraffin 	tissue 	blocks 	corresponding 	to 	those 	slides, 	from 	which 	there 	was
SEM/EDXS analysis of 821 particles. (Id.) Thirty-one talc particles were detected
among the 821 particles. (Id.) Additionally, Dr. Godleski identified one tremolite
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asbestos fiber fragment, the detection of which was grounded in its composition of
an acceptable range of magnesium and silicon atomic weight percentage ratio. (Id.)
For Plaintiff Rausa, Dr. Godleski detected birefringent particles in 25 of the
46 histological slides. (See Godleski Rausa Rep. at 2–4.) He examined eight
corresponding paraffin tissue blocks, from which he conducted SEM/EDXS analysis
of 515 particles. (Id. at 3–4.) From this, a total of two talc particles were detected.
(Id.)
For Plaintiff Judkins, Dr. Godleski detected birefringent particles in 21 of the
31 histological slides. (See Godleski Judkins Rep. at 2–4.) He selected eight paraffin
tissue blocks corresponding to those slides, from which he conducted SEM/EDXS
analysis of 932 particles. (Id. at 3–4.) A total of 17 talc particles were detected. (Id.)
Dr. Godleski offered several interpretations of these results. First, he opined
that the microscopy record demonstrates the presence of talc within pelvic tissues,
and in some cases tremolite asbestos, as well. (See Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 4–7;
Godleski Converse Rep. at 4–5; Godleski Newsome Rep. at 3–5; Godleski Rausa
Rep. at 4–5; Godleski Judkins Rep. at 4.)
Second, while Dr. Godleski explained that his techniques only study “an
extremely small volume of tissue,” based on established comparisons from tissue
analyses focused on the detection of asbestos fibers, he nevertheless opined to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the talc particles and fibers detected
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within the very small SEM/EDXS sampling plane suggest a substantially larger
presence within the whole tissue. (See Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6; Godleski
Converse Rep. at 4–5; Godleski Newsome Rep. at 4; Godleski Rausa Rep. at 4;
Godleski Judkins Rep. at 4; see also ECF No. 33004-4 (“Godleski Dep.”) at 111:5–
14 (confirming that Dr. Godleski did not “attempt to count all the particles in the
tissue,” but instead “extrapolate[d]” a tissue burden from the number of particles
actually observed based on a study’s methodology); ECF No. 33004-13 (“Godleski
Dep. II”) at 83:20–84:7 (explaining that Dr. Godleski did not “try to identify every
particle in” tissue, but instead “extrapolate[d] that to what [he] anticipate[d] would
be the total particles per gram of tissue based on” a study’s methodology).)
Finally, Dr. Godleski concluded in a final paragraph of all reports of the five
sampled bellwether Plaintiffs, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” that the
confirmed presence of talc—and where present, tremolite asbestos—is “contributory
evidence for a causal link between the presence of these materials and the
development of th[ese] patient[s’] ovarian cancer[s].” (See Godleski Newsome Rep.
at 7; see also Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 8 (talc and tremolite particles/fibers);
Godleski Converse Rep. at 6 (talc); Godleski Rausa Rep. at 5–6 (talc); Godleski
Rausa Rep. at 5 (talc).)
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iii. 	Reliability
Defendants primarily argue that Dr. Godleski’s opinion regarding the causal
link between talc usage and the development of ovarian cancer must be excluded
because it is (1) unsupported by the scientific and medical literature that Dr.
Godleski relies upon, and (2) supported by an unreliable methodology. As to Dr.
Godleski’s 	methodology, 	Defendants 	specifically 	criticize 	Dr. 	Godleski’s
identification of talc particulates and his extrapolation of a substantial exposure of
talc and asbestos based on the detection rate measured within an “extremely small
volume of tissue.”
For the reasons that follow, I find that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Godleski’s opinions linking the presence of
talc or tremolite asbestos as a contributory cause of ovarian cancer survive Rule 702
scrutiny and, thus, are not admissible. I also find that Plaintiffs have not satisfied by
a preponderance of the evidence the admissibility of Dr. Godlkeski’s opinions that
the quantity of talc present suggests a broader level of exposure, consistent with
methods commonly used in asbestos-related pathology. However, based upon the
scientifically acceptable testing methods used, Dr. Godleski should be permitted to
opine on the identification of talc and/or tremolite asbestos in the tissue samples
from each Plaintiff.
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Plaintiffs first contend that Defendants misconstrue—and thus overstate—the
scope of Dr. Godleski’s opinion regarding the causal relationship between talc and
ovarian cancer. They assert that his conclusion is narrowly framed and does not
purport to establish general causation. According to Plaintiffs, “Dr. Godleski’s
findings are just one piece of the causation puzzle” and do not amount to a
determination of “complete causation.” (Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 17.) They
maintain that rather, “Dr. Godleski’s opinion is merely that the presence of talc and
asbestos in the tissue offers ‘contributory evidence’—that is, one piece of evidence
contributing to the overall causation analysis.” (Id. at 16.) However, the flaw in
Plaintiffs’ position is that Dr. Godleski does not rely on scientific studies sufficient
to support even this more limited, contributory opinion on causation.
Indeed, along with his detection of talc particulates (and where present,
tremolite asbestos), Dr. Godleski appeared to rely on only a limited number of
published studies to support a “contributory” connection between the sampled
bellwether Plaintiffs’ ovarian cancer diagnosis and his findings concerning that
Plaintiff’s talc (or asbestos) exposure. (See, e.g., Godleski Judkins Rep. at 4 (“In
published studies (references 1, 2, 5, 9),166 significant numbers of talc particles were
166 	See McDonald II 2019 at 13–27; McDonald I 2019 at 590–607; Erika Sato et al., Analysis
of Particles from Hamster Lungs Following Pulmonary Talc Exposures: Implications for
Pathogenicity, 17 Particle and Fibre Toxicol. (20), 1–16 (2020) (“Sato 2020”); Cramer 2007 at
498–501.
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detected in pelvic tissues in women with ovarian cancer and a history of perineal talc
use.”); see also, e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6 (“The finding of one fiber with the
magnesium/silicon atomic weight percent ratio of a tremolite asbestos fiber, a known
and widely accepted carcinogen and a known component of cosmetic talc found in
the pelvic tissues (References 11–13)167 is similarly of great importance in linking
Ms. Gallardo’s ovarian cancer to cosmetic talc exposure.”); Godleski Newsome Rep.
at 5 (“The finding of this [t]remolite fiber fragment by the method used here is highly
significant since this form of asbestos is a known contaminant of cosmetic talc and
has been shown in recent tissue digestion studies of pelvic tissue to be found in
women using talc for personal hygiene.” (citing Steffen 2020).)
As to Dr. Godleski’s talc-related causal conclusion, Dr. Godleski referenced
Cramer 2007, a case report of a stage III serous ovarian cancer patient with decades
of perineal talc use. (See, e.g., Godleski Judkins Rep. at 4.) In that study, the patient’s
pelvic lymph nodes were examined by polarized light microscopy and confirmed by
SEM/EDXS. (See Cramer 2007 at 498–99.) Plate-like birefringent particles with a
167 	See Joan E. Steffen et al., Serous Ovarian Cancer Caused by Exposure to Asbestos and
Fibrous Talc in Cosmetic Talc Powders–A Case Series, 62 J. Occupational & Env’t Med. (2), e65–
e77 (2020) (“Steffen 2020”); Ronald E. Gordon et al., Asbestos in Commercial Cosmetic Talcum
Powder as a Cause of Mesothelioma in Women, 20 Int’l J. Occup. & Env’t Health (4), 318–332
(2014) (“Gordon 2014”); Hans Weill et al., Medical Section of the American Lung Association:
Health Effects of Tremolite, 142 Am. Rev. Respiratory Disease (6), 1453–1458 (1990) (“ATS
1990”).
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magnesium 	and 	silicate 	signature 	were 	detected, 	which 	the 	authors 	found
“compatible with talc.” (Id. at 499.)
Defendants criticize that Cramer 2007 is a single, anecdotal, non-causal case
report wherein the authors themselves disclaim any causal relationship between
ovarian cancer and talc usage. (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 11–12 & n.43.) Moreover,
Defendants point out that Dr. Godleski makes no statements or suggestions
regarding talc’s tendency to cause inflammation. Plaintiffs did not substantively
respond to Defendants’ criticism of Dr. Godleski’s reliance on Cramer 2007.168
I agree with Defendants’ position. Cramer 2007 is a single case report
describing the presence of talc particles in the pelvic lymph nodes of a woman with
long-term genital talc use and ovarian cancer. As the authors explain, the purpose of
their report was merely to “infuse a fresh perspective on the talc and ovarian cancer
association.” (Cramer 2007 	at 500.) The authors 	explicitly acknowledge the
limitations 	of 	their 	observations, 	noting 	that 	“case 	reports 	cannot 	establish
causality,” and expressly disclaim “that a causal relationship between ovarian cancer
and talc use is proven for this case or in general.” (Id.) Rather than supporting even
a contributory causal inference, the article concludes that “this description of talc in
168 	I evaluated the applicability of Cramer 2007 in my prior Opinion to a conclusion made by
one of Plaintiffs’ general causation experts, Dr. Anne McTiernan, which is that “talcum powder
products can be absorbed and transported via the lymphatic system or blood stream. Therefore,
inhalation of talcum powder products could result in similar ovarian exposure.” See In re Johnson
& Johnson, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 176 & n.41. I found that Cramer 2007 did not support the biological
plausibility of an inhalation theory. See id. at 176–77.
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pelvic lymph nodes of a long-term talc user with ovarian cancer may begin to
reshape understanding about the relationship between talc and ovarian cancer and
shed new light on whether talc used externally in the genital area is capable of
migrating into the pelvis.” (Id. at 501 (emphasis added).) While the report “may
prompt new studies and offer new insights” into the debated association, it neither
confirms nor supports the association. (Id. at 498.)
Moreover, the study’s scope and methodology underscore its exploratory
nature. It is based on a single patient and lacks any control group, quantitative
analysis, or epidemiological framework to test causation. As courts have noted,
“case reports are merely accounts of medical events. They reflect only reported data,
not scientific methodology.” Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1199
(11th Cir. 2002). “Both from a scientific perspective and for legal causation
purposes, the distinction between epidemiological evidence and anecdotal evidence
(i.e., case series and case reports) is substantial and consequential.” In re Abilify, 299
F. Supp. 3d at 1360.
Thus, courts consistently disfavor case reports and case studies as evidence of
causation because they lack controls and statistical context, do not isolate alternative
causes or explain a causal mechanism, and are susceptible to reporting biases—so
while they may sometimes be considered cautiously alongside other scientific
information, they cannot, standing alone, establish causation. See, e.g., In re Mirena
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IUD Prods. Liab. Litig. (“Mirena I”), 169 F. Supp. 3d 396, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(“Case reports are generally disfavored by courts as evidence of causation because
they merely describe ‘reported phenomena without comparison to the rate at which
the phenomena occur in the general population or in a defined control group; [they]
do not isolate and exclude potentially alternative causes; and [they] do not
investigate or explain the mechanism of causation.’”) (quoting Siharath, 131 F.
Supp. 2d at 1361 (alterations in original).169 Cramer 2007 is no exception to this
recognized principle, in that it does not and cannot distinguish between association
and causation.
The authors themselves state that a “more extensive study” is necessary to
determine whether talc is found in the lymph nodes of women who did or did not
use talc and whether such presence bears any relationship to ovarian cancer. (See
Cramer 2007 at 500.) Thus, far from offering causal or even contributory proof,
169 	See also In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 398, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“‘Case
reports lack controls and thus do not provide as much information as controlled epidemiological
studies do. However, case reports are often all that is available on a particular subject. . . . Causal
attribution based on case studies must be regarded with caution. However, such studies may be
carefully considered in light of other information available, including toxicological data.’ The
difficulty with case reports, in other words, is distinguishing between association and causation.
Simply because a patient exposed to a particular substance exhibited a set of symptoms does not
mean that it was the substance that caused the symptoms.” (quoting Mary Sue Henifin, Howard
M. Kipen & Susan R. Poulter, Reference Guide on Medical Testimony, in Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence 439, 475 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., 2d ed. 2000)); In re Abilify, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1309
(explaining that case studies “do not address prior medical history, use of other medications or
drugs, risk factors, or the myriad of other issues necessary to scientifically evaluate whether the
drug actually produced the observed adverse effect. . . .[,] have no controls, are susceptible to
inherent reporting biases, lack statistical context, and are not verifiable through meaningful peer
review,” and therefore “cannot, standing alone, prove causation.” (footnote omitted)).
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Cramer 2007 merely hypothesizes a possible line of inquiry. Glaringly, Dr. Godleski
drew from Cramer 2007 a conclusion that its authors themselves neither reached nor
suggested. Accordingly, this undermines the reliability of Dr. Godleski’s talc-related
contributory causal conclusion. See, e.g., Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 602 F.3d
820, 826 (7th Cir. 2010) (“To the extent that Dr. Hirsch does rely on medical
literature to support his theory, the articles to which he cites stop short of reaching
the same conclusion [he did]. . . . At best, Dr. Hirsch’s testimony would have
amounted to an ‘inspired hunch,’ and the district court certainly did not abuse its
discretion in excluding it.”); McClain, 401 F.3d at 1247, 1251–52 (affirming
exclusion of expert who, among other things, exhibited an “inclination to draw
overreaching 	conclusions 	from 	self-limiting 	medical 	articles, 	show[ing] 	the
speculative nature of his opinions”).170
Dr. Godleski also relied on a collection of case studies, McDonald I 2019,
which followed five patients with ovarian cancer and a history of perineal talc use
in whom talc particles were identified in pelvic tissues using polarized light
microscopy and SEM/EDXS. (See, e.g., Godleski Judkins Rep. at 4.) The authors
170 	See also, e.g., In re Onglyza, 93 F.4th at 346 (“So Dr. Goyal drew ‘unauthorized
conclusions from limited data—conclusions the authors of the study d[id] not make,’ betraying a
‘lack of scientific rigor.’” (alteration in original) (quoting McClain, 401 F.3d at 1248)); In re
Acetaminophen, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 353 (“Dr. Baccarelli is also willing to press conclusions that
study authors are not willing to make. This willingness creates an ‘analytical gap’ between the
conclusions reached by the authors and the conclusions he draws from their work.”); In re Abilify,
299 F. Supp. 3d at 1351 (“Dr. Glenmullen may not extrapolate from this information a finding,
conclusion, or implication about Abilify that the Moore Study authors themselves did not make.”).
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sought to document the presence and distribution of talc in pelvic tissue of talc-
exposed patients and explore a biological pathway—migration via lymphatics—for
talc to reach pelvic organs. (See generally McDonald I 2019.)
Defendants similarly challenge McDonald I 2019 as an unreliable case series
for purposes of demonstrating causation. (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 11–12 & n.43.)
Again, Plaintiffs do not substantively respond to Defendants’ specific attack of Dr.
Godleski’s reliance on McDonald I 2019. And I, again, must agree with Defendants’
position.
The patients described in McDonald I 2019 were evaluated across multiple
pelvic sites, i.e., ovary, fallopian tube, uterus/cervix, and pelvic lymph nodes, using
polarized light microscopy and in situ SEM/EDXS, and compared against six non-
exposed control patients with ovarian carcinoma. (See generally McDonald I 2019.)
Talc was confirmed in two to four distinct pelvic sites per exposed person, with
particles often eliciting inflammation. (See id. at 593.) Notably, the authors also
observed the rare presence of talc in some control patients with no reported talc use.
(See id. at 605.) Consistent with their morphological findings, the authors observed
multi-site evidence of migration and tissue deposition consistent with lymphatic
dissemination and inflammatory responses. (See, e.g., id. at 603.)
But the study does not purport to establish individual-level causation and does
not provide reliable support for that conclusion. It is a descriptive case series without
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a defined source population or outcome comparison group. It does not imply
temporality or dose-response, and does not control for confounding factors relevant
to ovarian carcinogenesis. The presence of talc in tissues—particularly where the
“non-exposed” also had ovarian cancer and talc was observed—supports only
biological plausibility and exposure documentation. And although the authors
themselves 	reference 	epidemiological 	literature 	and 	regulatory 	assessments
classifying perineal talc as “possibly carcinogenic,” the authors’ conclusion is not
causally related. (See id. at 590, 606 (concluding that this study “offer[s] new insight
into the biologic potential of talc, its inflammatory potential, and its migration via
pelvic lymphatics from the perineum”).) As with Cramer 2007, a case series such as
McDonald I 2019 primarily generates a hypothesis.
Although some courts have deemed case reports reliable for purposes of
causal opinions when they exist in large quantities, see, e.g., Bee v. Novartis Pharms.
Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 268, 304–05 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), neither Cramer 2007 nor
McDonald I 2019 provide such support. See also In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d at
184–85 (noting that “hundreds of published case reports,” among other things, “adds
to the reliability of [expert] opinions”).
While Cramer 2007 and McDonald I 2019 do not undermine Dr. Godleski’s
assertion that “published studies” have shown that “significant numbers of talc
particles were detected in pelvic tissues in women with ovarian cancer and a history
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of perennial talc use,” (see, e.g., Godleski Converse Rep. at 5),171 they do not provide
reliable contributory evidence to conclude, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, that talc caused or contributed to the development of ovarian cancer.
Dr. Godleski relied on at least two other published studies in support of his
conclusion that talc presence in human tissue is “contributory evidence for a causal
link between” such presence and the development of ovarian cancer. (See Godleski
Judkins Rep. at 4 (citing McDonald II 2019 & Sato 2020).)
Like the other studies, neither of these two studies bridges the “analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered.” See In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d
at 656. McDonald II 2019 is a method-focused study assessing talc in pelvic lymph
nodes from patients with ovarian tumors that aimed to distinguish true tissue
deposition from laboratory surface contamination. (See generally McDonald II
2019.) The study strengthens the evidence that talc can migrate to pelvic lymph
nodes and that careful methodology is required to avoid overcalling contamination
as in-tissue deposition, but it does not evaluate disease risk or causation or provide
171 	To be precise, McDonald I 2019 reported that “[a]ll patients had significant numbers of
birefringent particles” in two or more pelvic sites. (McDonald I 2019 at 593.) Subsequent
SEM/EDXS confirmed “substantial talc particle counts in the same tissue blocks corresponding to
where birefringent particles were identified by light microscopy.” (See id. at 594.) And although
Cramer 2007 is not a quantitative series, the authors observed talc in three of four examined pelvic
lymph nodes and documented plate-like talc particulates with corresponding elemental signatures
compatible with talc. (See Cramer 2007 at 499.) Therefore, Cramer 2007 corroborates the
observation in principle by documenting talc in pelvic lymph nodes in a long‑term perineal talc
user with ovarian cancer, though it is a single case without broader quantification. (See generally
Cramer 2007.)
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a basis for Dr. Godleski’s own opinion that talc is a contributory cause to ovarian
cancer. (See id.)
Sato 2020 re-analyzed archived materials from a 1987 hamster intratracheal
instillation experiment to characterize the talc exposure and cellular responses using
modern microscopy and spectroscopy. (See generally Sato 2020.) After confirming
the talc powder contained no detectable asbestos, the authors observed talc induced
acute and persistent inflammatory changes when compared with controls. (See id. at
11–14.) The authors interpreted these results as evidence that talc can cause
inflammation 	and 	functional 	immune 	alterations 	independent 	of 	asbestos
contamination, thereby strengthening biological plausibility for inflammation-based
mechanisms. (See id.)
But the study is distinguishable from Dr. Godleski’s opinion, in that it was a
pulmonary, short-duration, high-dose instillation model in hamsters, not pelvic
exposure to humans. (See generally Sato 2020.) See also Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall
Lab’ys, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1480 (D.V.I. 1994), aff’d, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir.
1994) (“The notion that one can accurately extrapolate from animal data to humans
to prove causation without supportive positive epidemiologic studies is scientifically
invalid because it is inconsistent with several universally accepted and tested
scientific principles.”). Additionally, Sato 2020 is being used by Dr. Godleski to
support the proposition that “published studies” have shown “significant numbers of
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talc particles were detected in pelvic tissues in women with ovarian cancer and a
history of perineal talc use.” (See, e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6.) But Sato 2020
involves neither women nor a history of perineal use of talc in hamsters. (Compare,
e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6, with Sato 2020 at 1.) It is therefore wholly
unsupportive of the proposition for which it is cited.
Furthermore, courts are “reluctant to allow expert testimony based upon
animal studies to prove causation in humans unless there are good grounds to
extrapolate data and results from animals to humans.” In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F.
Supp. 2d at 670 (citing In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742–43). Here, Dr. Godleski did not
attempt to explain the import of Sato 2020 on his methodology. Dr. Godleski neither
discussed “differences in absorption, metabolism, and other factors [that] may result
in interspecie[s] variation in responses,” nor consideration of the dose-response
relationship. Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (quoting Fed. Jud. Ctr., Reference Manual
on Scientific Evidence at 130 (1994)); see also In re Valsartan, 2025 WL 314002,
at *24–28 (criticizing expert’s failure to “reliably extrapolate any of the data or
results in the animal studies to humans” and excluding expert’s opinions as, inter
alia, unreliable).
In sum, Plaintiffs have not established the reliability of Dr. Godleski’s causal
opinions by a preponderance of the evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. The
scientific and medical sources relied on by Dr. Godleski do not support his drawn
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link between the presence of talc and its possible contribution to the development of
ovarian 	cancer, thereby 	violating 	Daubert’s 	requirement 	that 	his 	opinion 	be
supported by “good grounds.” 	See id. 	at 590 (“Proposed testimony must be
supported 	by 	appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good 	grounds,’ based 	on 	what is
known.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 702(b) (requiring testimony that is “based on
sufficient facts or data”). Indeed, “when an expert relies on the studies of others, he
must not exceed the limitations the authors themselves place on the study.” In re
Accutane Prods. Liab., No. 04-md-2523, 2009 WL 2496444, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
11, 2009), aff’d, 378 F. App’x 929 (11th Cir. 2010); Mirena I, 169 F. Supp. 3d at
431, 452 (same). And unlike Plaintiffs’ other experts discussed in this Report and
Recommendation, Dr. Godleski neither engaged with the relevant epidemiological
literature nor conducted a Bradford Hill analysis to substantiate his causation
opinion, further undermining the reliability of his methodology.
In short, Dr. Godleski’s “[r]eliance upon medical literature for conclusions
not drawn therein is not an accepted scientific methodology.” Rutigliano v. Valley
Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 785 (D.N.J. 1996). Therefore, I recommend that the
Court preclude Dr. Godleski’s causal opinions regarding talc usage and ovarian
cancer because they are not based on a reliable scientific methodology.
Next, in this particular motion, Defendants do not directly contest Dr.
Godleski’s opinion as it relates to the causal connections drawn from the presence
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of tremolite asbestos found in Plaintiffs Gallardo’s and Newsome’s tissue samples.
(See generally Defs.’ Godleski Br.) In their Asbestos-Related Motion, however,
Defendants make such a challenge.172 (See Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83–84 & n.212.) I
recommend that the Court preclude Dr. Godleski from opining that “tremolite
asbestos found in the tissues of [Plaintiff Gallardo and Plaintiff Newsome is]
contributory evidence for a causal link between the presence of [this] material[] and
the development of [these patients’] ovarian cancer[s].”173 (See Godleski Newsome
Rep. at 7; see also Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 8.)
Dr. Godleski explained that tremolite asbestos fiber is a “known and widely
accepted carcinogen and a known component of cosmetic talc.” (See Godleski
Gallardo Rep. at 6.) Therefore, according to Dr. Godleski, the detection of even a
single tremolite asbestos fiber within Plaintiff Gallardo’s pelvic tissue is “of great
importance in linking Plaintiff Gallardo’s ovarian cancer to cosmetic talc exposure.”
172 	In relevant part, Defendants highlight that Dr. Godleski’s identification of a particle of
tremolite asbestos would likely not be recognized as such by Dr. Longo. (See Defs.’ Asbestos-
Related Br. at 83–84 n.212.) Defendants also argue that “[e]ven if these findings represented
asbestos, [Dr. Godleski’s] case-specific causation opinions regarding asbestos should be excluded
for the same reasons discussed below: Dr. Godleski makes no attempt to compare these results to
the epidemiology literature high occupational levels of exposure to a far more potent type of
asbestos.” (See id.) This notwithstanding, Defendants do appear to question through this motion
Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation of the presence of a larger amount of tremolite asbestos because of its
detection within a small tissue sample. (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 7 n.34.) I address this argument
below with my discussion regarding the admissibility of Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation-related
opinions generally.
173 	As discussed below, I recommend, however, that the Court permit Dr. Godleski to opine
on his identification of tremolite asbestos particles, fragments, and/or fiber detected within Plaintiff
Gallardo’s and Plaintiff Newsome’s respective tissue samples.
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(Id.; see also Godleski Newsome Rep. at 4–5; Godleski Dep. at 103:21–22 (“A. It’s
known that asbestos is a cause of ovarian cancer.”).)
But sources relied on by Dr. Godleski do not provide a scientifically reliable
basis for him to conclude that the presence of tremolite asbestos in gynecologic or
pelvic tissue is contributory evidence of a causal link to ovarian cancer.174 (See
Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6 (citing supra note 167); Godleski Newsome Rep. at 6
(citing Steffen 2020).) Moreover, Dr. Godleski has previously testified that he
cannot cite to “any study that has tried to correlate ovarian cancer risk with the
amount of tremolite found in reproductive tract tissue.” (03/28/24 Godleski Dep. at
103:24–104:3; see also id. at 116:12–16 (“Q. . . . [T]here are no studies that have
attempted to correlate the finding of talc or tremolite in tissue to a risk of developing
endometrioid carcinoma, right? A. That’s correct.”).)
First, 	Dr. 	Godleski’s 	reliance on 	Gordon 	2014 	for this 	proposition 	is
misplaced. Gordon 2014 sought to investigate a “historic” cosmetic talc brand175
linked to mesothelioma in women by determining whether it contained asbestos,
whether normal use generated inhalable fibers, and whether those same fiber types
were present in user tissue. (See generally Gordon 2014.) To do this, the authors
174 	I note that my finding in this section is limited to Dr. Godleski, who cannot opine on the
causal connection between asbestos and ovarian cancer. Other experts who Plaintiffs proffer for
such a connection are separately addressed in this Report and Recommendation. (See supra Part
V.B.6.)
175 	Gordon 2014 does not identify the brand(s) by name.
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tested more than 50 product containers of this specific brand of cosmetic talcum
powder, conducted releasability experiments simulating normal use in a glovebox
and in a bathroom-sized chamber, and performed analyses of lung and lymph node
tissues from a woman who used the product and died of mesothelioma. (See, e.g.,
id. at 319–320, 323.)
The study concluded that the cosmetic talc product contained asbestos,
including tremolite, that typical application can aerosolize measurable asbestos
concentrations, 	and 	that 	inhalation 	of 	those 	fibers 	likely 	contributed 	to 	the
development of mesothelioma in the reported decedent. (See id. at 318–19, 325, 331;
see also id. at 330 (“Our findings indicate that historic talcum powder exposure is a
causative factor in the development of mesotheliomas and possibly lung cancers in
women.”).)
But these methods and conclusions pertain to product contamination, airborne
exposure during use, and deposition in respiratory and lymphatic tissues with a
mesothelioma outcome. (See id.) The study provides no epidemiologic analysis
linking tremolite burdens in gynecologic or pelvic tissue to ovarian cancer incidence.
(See generally id.) It also does not involve the perineal application of asbestos-
containing cosmetic talcum powder, and it does not test ovarian tissue. (See id.) Even
within its mesothelioma analysis, the study detects both anthophyllite and tremolite
and does not isolate tremolite’s effect from other amphiboles or talc particles. (See,
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e.g., id. at 322.) It, therefore, does not support the claim that the mere presence of
tremolite asbestos is contributory evidence of a causal link to ovarian cancer.176
Second, Dr. Godleski’s reliance on an Official Statement of the American
Thoracic Society, adopted in June 1990, is similarly unsupportive of his broader
conclusion that the presence of tremolite asbestos in gynecologic or pelvic tissue is
contributory evidence of a causal link to ovarian cancer. The American Thoracic
Society’s statement reviews scientific and regulatory questions surrounding the
health risks of tremolite. (See generally ATS 2019.) It confirms that tremolite
asbestos may cause the same diseases associated with other amphiboles, with
particular emphasis on mesothelioma and lung cancer. (See, e.g., id. at 15.) But it
does not offer ovarian cancer-specific causal data for tremolite. It also limits its
observations to occupational and airborne exposures in humans, and intrapleural
instillation in animals. (See, e.g., id. at 3–12.) While the statement may bolster Dr.
Godleski’s assertion that tremolite asbestos is “a known and widely accepted
carcinogen,” (see, e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6), it does not purport to draw a
causal link between the presence of tremolite asbestos within gynecologic tissue and
the development of ovarian cancer.
176 	Moreover, Gordon 2014 acknowledges the existence of “a few studies that have examined
talcum powder and its potential to cause ovarian tumors.” (Gordin 2014 at 330). However, the
authors concede that these “studies were inconclusive, but suggested that talc, asbestos, or both
may cause these cancers through vaginal exposure.” (Id.) Importantly, Dr. Godleski neither
addresses this disclaimer in the study nor other studies that have focused on ovarian cancer.
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Lastly, Dr. Godleski’s reliance on Steffen 2020 likewise fails to bridge the
analytical gap. In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 656. The Steffen 2020 case
series describes ten women with serous ovarian cancer who reported long-term
cosmetic talc use. (See generally Steffen 2020.) Talc was detected in all ten women,
and asbestos (e.g., tremolite and anthophyllite) was detected in eight of the ten
women, using transmission electron microscopy. (Steffen 2020 at e65–e66, e73.)
The authors sought to recreate perineal talc application in a controlled room and
measured inhalation exposure of asbestos-containing cosmetic talc.177 (See, e.g., id.
at e66.) They then combined those measurements with each case’s reported talc-use
history to calculate a lifetime inhalation dose. (See id. at e67.) After analyzing each
case’s gynecologic and pelvic tissue (e.g., ovaries, fallopian tubes, pelvic lymph
nodes) using transmission electron microscopy to detect, in part, talc and tremolite
asbestos, they estimated ovarian cancer risk by adapting an EPA mesothelioma dose-
response model to ovarian cancer, and mapping each case’s asbestos-dose estimate
to that model.178 (See, e.g., id. at e65, e67.)
177 	The authors analyzed the talc containers for asbestos and talc. (See, e.g., Steffen 2020 at
e65, e69.) “The asbestos fibers found in the ‘cosmetic’ talc containers matched those found in
tissues.” (See id. at e65.)
178 	In this context, the EPA mesothelioma dose-response model refers to the EPA’s 1986
Airborne Asbestos Health Assessment Update table that gives predicted lifetime mesothelioma
risk from continuous, environmental asbestos exposure, which is assumed to be 24 hours/day, 365
days/year. See Steffen 2020 at e67 n.92 (citing U.S. Env’t Protection Agency, Airborne Asbestos
Health Assessment Update (1986)).
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The authors ultimately concluded that, among other things, these “cases
provide more evidence of the causal link between asbestos, talc, and ovarian cancer
and indicate that asbestos is present in consumer talc products at a level sufficient to
cause disease.” (Id. at e73.) But Dr. Godleski’s reliance on Steffen 2020 for a
contributory causal link between tremolite asbestos and the development of ovarian
cancer suffers from several flaws that undermine the reliability of his methodology.
First, Steffen 2020 is a litigation-derived case series. The paper itself has a
disclaimer that the work “was not experimental and was originally conducted
pursuant to a lawsuit,” whereby plaintiffs’ counsel179 funded the tissue analyses and
patient 	examinations 	and 	interviews. 	(See 	Steffen 	2020 	at 	e65.) 	Indeed,
unsurprisingly, courts have found litigation-derived research to weigh against
reliability. See, e.g., Awad v. Merck & Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
aff’d sub nom., Washburn v. Merck & Co., 213 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A]
significant consideration is whether research was conducted independently or for the
sole purpose of litigation.”); see also Mirena I, 169 F. Supp. 3d at 456 (finding
litigation-derived opinion to be “another factor that demonstrates Dr. Wray’s
opinion is not sufficiently reliable under Daubert and would not stand up in a
scientific setting”).
179 	The funding and disclosure sections of Steffen 2020 do not identify the specific attorneys
or law firms by name beyond describing them collectively as “Plaintiffs’ attorneys in litigation
against Johnson & Johnson (Ingham et al. v. Johnson & Johnson et al.).” (See Steffen 2020 at e65.)
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Second, the study is a case series without controls that focuses on inhalation
exposure—as opposed to perineal exposure—of asbestos. As explained above, a
case report or case series standing alone cannot ordinarily establish causation. See,
e.g., id. at 451. But, Steffen 2020 purports to be more than a case series. The authors
employ a simulation separate from the study’s case series to demonstrate that the
application of talc can create an asbestos-containing dust cloud that users will then
inhale. Taken together, Steffen 2020 purports to establish that when using cosmetic
talc powders, asbestos can be inhaled and migrate to pelvic tissues, which could
cause ovarian cancer. However, because this is a small case series with no control
group—assembled 	in 	a 	litigation 	context—Steffen 	2020 	does 	not 	reliably
demonstrate that tremolite, when present in gynecologic or pelvic tissue, causes the
development of ovarian cancer. It may support the suggestion of a general causal
link when combined with other epidemiological literature, but Steffen 2020, alone,
cannot support a “link[] [between] Plaintiff Gallardo’s ovarian cancer [and] cosmetic
talc exposure.” (See Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 6.)
I acknowledge that expert testimony should generally “not be excluded simply
because there is no literature on point,” so long as there are “other factors that
demonstrate the reliability of the expert’s methodology.” Schneider, 320 F.3d at 406;
see Heller, 167 F.3d at 155 (explaining a medical expert need not “always cite
published studies on general causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular
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object caused a particular illness”). Here, however, there is an absence of other
factors 	demonstrating 	the 	reliability 	of 	Dr. 	Godleski’s 	cursory 	methodology
supporting his causal conclusion—even if his opinion is focused on contributory
evidence and not general causation. For example, Dr. Godleski did not discuss any
temporal relationship between the sampled Plaintiffs’ perineal talc usage and their
development of ovarian cancer. Dr. Godleski did not differentiate between potential
degrees of exposure and does not offer alternative explanations for the alleged
association.
Further, Plaintiffs rely on Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc.,
639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011), for the proposition that Daubert does not require each
scientific study or line of proof to independently establish causation; instead, an
expert may reliably synthesize multiple non-dispositive sources of evidence to reach
a causation opinion. (See Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 16–17.) Plaintiffs’ reliance is
misplaced. Milward addresses the admissibility of a general causation opinion
grounded in a “weight of the evidence” methodology, which is not used by Dr.
Godleski. Milward, 639 F.3d at 17.
In reversing the district court’s exclusion of the plaintiffs’ general causation
expert, Dr. Martyn Smith, the First Circuit emphasized Dr. Smith’s use of integrated
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mechanistic and epidemiologic evidence,180 despite the absence of statistically
significant epidemiology. See id. at 19–26. Unlike Dr. Godleski’s methods, Milward
does not endorse using case-specific sampled tissue findings to suggest causation
absent other evidence such as scientific consensus, dose/threshold or reliable
attribution, or differential etiology.
As proponents of Dr. Godleski’s opinions, Plaintiffs bear the burden of
demonstrating admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See Fed. R.
Evid.702; see also Fed. R. Evid.702 advisory committee’s note to 2023 amendment
(“[T]he rule has been amended to clarify and emphasize that expert testimony may
not be admitted unless the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely
than not that the proffered testimony meets the admissibility requirements set forth
in the rule.” (citing Fed. R. Evid.104(a)); Crowley, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (“The
proponent bears the burden of establishing admissibility by a preponderance of the
evidence.”). 	Because 	Plaintiffs’ 	arguments 	center 	on 	the 	narrowness 	of 	Dr.
Godleski’s causal-related opinion, Plaintiffs advocate that the opinion need not be
based on vast scientific support. I recognize the carefully crafted language used by
Dr. Godleski insofar as it does not expressly opine that a causal relationship exists
180 	Dr. Smith employed a “weight of the evidence” framework that included multiple sources
of evidence: scientific consensus that benzene causes acute myeloid leukemia generally, common
etiology across acute myeloid leukemia subtypes, mechanistic toxicology showing benzene
metabolites cause stem-cell chromosomal damage, epidemiological data suggestive (though not
statistically significant) of an association between benzene exposure and acute promyelocytic
leukemia, and other evidence. See id. at 19–20.
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between the presence of talc and/or asbestos in pelvic tissue and the development of
ovarian cancer. According to Dr. Godleski, such presence is merely “contributory
evidence for a causal link” between them. However, fine tuning language does not
save 	the 	unreliability 	of 	his 	opinion. 	Without 	the 	benefit 	of 	reliance 	on
epidemiological studies,181 sufficiently numbered and/or analogous case reports, or
other “good grounds,” Dr. Godleski lacks adequate support to opine even on the
contributory impact talc and/or tremolite asbestos may have on the causal link
between these materials and ovarian cancer.
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	I 	find 	that 	Plaintiffs 	have 	not 	shown, 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence, that Dr. Godleski’s opinion is reliable. In particular,
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated through Dr. Godleski that the presence of talc or
tremolite asbestos in gynecological or pelvic tissue reliably supports a contributory
cause to the development of ovarian cancer. Accordingly, I recommend that the
Court exclude Dr. Godleski’s opinion and testimony as to these causal conclusions.
See In re Pfizer Inc. Secs. Litig., 819 F.3d 642, 665 (2d Cir. 2016) (excluding
unreliable portions of an expert’s testimony “[w]hen faced with . . . testimony that
contains both reliable and unreliable opinions”).182
181 	After all, the “best evidence of general causation in a toxic tort case” is epidemiological,
and it cannot be ignored where available. See, e.g., In re Zoloft, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 492 (quoting
Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases)).
182 	Defendants also contend that Dr. Godleski fails to offer evidence that any of the sampled
Plaintiffs crossed a scientifically supported “threshold” connecting particle counts to ovarian
cancer risk, including for specific ovarian cancer subtypes, (id. at 12–14), and that Dr. Godleski’s
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Next, Defendants challenge Dr. Godleski’s identification of talc particulates.
(See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 16–17.)183 However, as Plaintiffs correctly point out,
Defendants appear to misconstrue Dr. Godleski’s methodology, (see Pls.’ Godleski
Opp. Br. at 13–14), which I find reliable for purposes of identifying the presence of
talc and/or asbestos.
Defendants argue that Dr. Godleski evaluated birefringent materials using a
“homespun criteria” in detecting that such material is talc. (Defs.’ Godleski Br. at
16–17.) In so arguing, Defendants do not specify what part of Dr. Godleski’s
methodology is “homespun,” or how his testing of talc and/or asbestos materials are
flawed. In fact, Defendants’ challenge of Dr. Godleski’s testing method is quite
cursory. Indeed, without any specificity, Defendants’ arguments essentially amount
to a criticism of Dr. Godleski’s conclusions, but not his methodology. Case law is
clear that the focus “is on the expert’s principles and methodology, not on his
conclusions.” Equinox Props., LLC v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 21-15929,
2023 WL 5447279, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2023) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595).
failure to identify every foreign particle observed within each tissue sample undermines his
causation conclusion, (id. at 17–18). But because these assertions go directly to Dr. Godleski’s
causal conclusion, which I recommend be excluded, I need not address them.
183 	Defendants do not appear to directly take issue with Dr. Godleski’s identification of
tremolite asbestos particles, fibers, and/or fragments. (See generally Defs.’ Godleski Br.) As
discussed above, supra Part VI.B.i, Defendants argue in their Asbestos-Related Motion that Dr.
Godleski’s identification of a single tremolite asbestos fragment in Plaintiff Newsome’s tissue
sample may not be recognized as such by Dr. Longo. (See Defs.’ Asbestos Br. at 83–84 n.212.)
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In any event, I find Dr. Godleski’s methodology for identifying the presence
of talc within human tissue reliable. The method by which he receives, prepares, and
studies the paraffin tissue blocks has been subject to peer review and is generally
accepted within the scientific community. (See, e.g., Godleski Judkins Rep. at 3
(citing 	Charu 	Thakral, 	Jerrold 	L. 	Abraham, 	Automated 	Scanning 	Electron
Microscopy and X-ray Microanalysis for in situ Quantification of Gadolinium
Deposits in Skin, J. Electron Microscopy (Tokyo), 56(5), 181–7 (2007)); see also
McDonald et al., Magnesium/Silicon Atomic Weight Percent Ratio Standards for the
Tissue 	Identification 	of 	Talc 	by 	Scanning 	Electron 	Microscopy 	and 	Energy
Dispersive 	X-ray 	Analysis, 	Ultrastructural 	Pathology, 	43:6, 	248–260 	(2019)
(defining an empirical, reliable magnesium-to-silicon atomic weight percent ratio
for identifying talc in human tissues using SEM/EDXS).)
In accordance with cited medical and scientific literature, Dr. Godleski uses
SEM/EDXS, 	observes 	morphological 	characteristics, 	and 	conducts 	a 	spectral
analysis. (See generally e.g., Godleski Judkins Rep.) From there, Dr. Godleski
classified a particle as talc only if its magnesium‑to‑silicon atomic weight ratio
matches the established talc standard (around 0.649, within a tight acceptance
window, typically ±5%), with oxygen present, and with morphology consistent with
talc (platy particles and, when present, fibers showing a length‑to‑width ratio greater
than about 3:1 and roughly parallel sides). (Id.) While this data, along with particles’
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locations, is retained and available for confirmatory testing, Defendants’ rebuttal
experts have not independently verified Dr. Godleski’s findings by performing their
own tests. (See Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 7–8.) See also Cohen, 125 F.4th at 462
(noting that “whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis” is “good grounds”
to support the reliability of an expert’s testimony).
Moreover, Dr. Godleski’s qualifications as, among other things, an expert in
analytical microscopy lend sufficient credence to the reliability of his methods of
particle detection and identification. See In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8 (recognizing
that “the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the methodology”
support 	reliability). 	Plaintiffs 	have 	thus 	demonstrated 	the 	reliability 	of 	Dr.
Godleski’s opinions by a preponderance of the evidence as they relate to the
identification of talc and tremolite asbestos.
Finally, Defendants seek exclusion of Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation from a
small, in-situ SEM/EDXS sampling plane to a larger tissue burden. (See Defs.’
Godleski Br. at 14 (citing Godleski Rausa Rep. at 4; Godleski Newsome Rep. at 4).)
Plaintiffs do not meaningfully address this argument in their opposition brief. (See
generally Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br.) In subsequent supplemental briefing, Plaintiffs
argue that Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation opinions are mischaracterized by Defendants
and supported by relevant literature and Dr. Godleski’s education, training, and
professional experience. (See Pls.’ December 8, 2025, Ltr. at 4–6.)
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Defendants first highlight Dr. Godleski’s failure to rely on supportive medical
or scientific literature.184 (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 14 (citing Godleski Rausa Rep.
at 	4; 	Godleski 	Newsome 	Rep. 	at 	4).) 	Dr. 	Godleski 	asserted 	reliance 	on
“[c]omparable studies [that] have been done with asbestos fibers in tissue sections,”
and suggested that “the finding of one fiber in a tissue section comparable to the
amount of tissue studied here would indicate at least 100 fibers per gram of tissue
which is indicative of a substantial exposure.” (See, e.g., Godleski Rausa Rep. at 4
(citing Victor L. Roggli et al., Numbers of Asbestos Bodies on Iron-Stained Tissue
Sections in Relation to Asbestos Body Counts in Lung Tissue Digests, 14 Hum.
Pathology (4), 355–61 (1983) (“Roggli 1983”))185; see also Godleski Dep. at 223:8–
12 (confirming use of “Roggli paper to estimate what the total volume would be per
gram of tissue”).)
As an initial matter, and despite Plaintiffs’ supplemental arguments to the
contrary, 	(see 	Pls.’ 	December 	8, 	2025, 	Ltr. 	at 	4), 	Defendant 	do 	not
“mischaracterize[]” Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation opinions or the methodology
underlying said opinions. As outlined above, Dr. Godleski extrapolates a substantial
184 	Defendants also rely on Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., for the proposition
that such extrapolation cannot be based on speculation. (See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 14 (citing Wade-
Greaux, 874 F. Supp. at 1485).) However, Wade-Greaux is distinguishable, because that case
involved an expert’s extrapolation of data from animal studies to human condition, which is not
comparable to the context here.
185 	Neither party attached Roggli 1983 to their briefs for and against the exclusion of Dr.
Godleski’s opinions and anticipated testimony. (See generally Defs.’ Godleski Br.; Pls.’ Godleski
Opp. Br.)
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exposure of talc and asbestos based on the detection rate measured within an
“extremely small volume of tissue.” (See, e.g., Godleski Rausa Rep. at 4.) Plaintiffs
assert that Dr. Godleski utilized a “formula-based extrapolation founded on actual
observation” that is actually “not an extrapolation,” but an “objective clinical
observation.” (See Pls.’ December 8, 2025, Ltr. at 5; see id. (arguing that Dr.
Godleski’s extrapolation opinions are “qualitative—not quantitative”).) But this is
inconsistent with Dr. Godleski’s own testimony, which described a quantitative
methodology based on Roggli 1983’s formulaic methodology. (See Godleski Dep.
at 228:1–9 (confirming that, based on Roggli 1983, “one particle or fiber can
represent hundreds in the tissue per gram, if we have more than one . . . you can do
the math to determine what the number might be expected to be”); see also id. at
223:8–12 (confirming use of “Roggli paper to estimate what the total volume would
be per gram of tissue”).) Therefore, I find that Defendants have not mischaracterized
Dr. Godleski’s methodology in this context.
Next, I find that Roggli 1983 does not support Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation of
a detection of a small amount of talc to a larger burden. Roggli 1983 examined how
asbestos body counts observed on iron-stained paraffin lung sections correlate with
counts obtained from wet-tissue digestions. (See generally Roggli 1983.) After using
correction factors, the authors propose that roughly 200 asbestos bodies per gram of
wet lung tissue corresponded to two asbestos bodies in a 2 × 2 cm tissue section.
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(See generally id.) The authors repeatedly cautioned that local variability and
sampling 	error—especially 	in 	small 	specimens—undermine 	the 	reliability 	of
extrapolating from a small sample to a whole-tissue burden. (See, e.g., id. at 359–
61.)
In addition, neither the authors of Roggli 1983 nor Dr. Godleski attempted to
reconcile Roggli 1983’s applicability of asbestos to the detection of talc in this case.
Additionally, neither the authors of Roggli 1983 nor Dr. Godleski attempted to
address whether the anticipated distribution of asbestos or talc would differ if the
examined tissue was sampled from gynecologic or pelvic tissue as opposed to lung
tissue. Dr. Godleski impermissibly extrapolated conclusions from Roggli 1983 that
“exceed the limitations the authors themselves place[d] on the[se] stud[ies].” Mirena
I, 169 F. Supp. 3d at 431 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
Lastly, the record does not sufficiently support Plaintiffs’ assertion that Dr.
Godleski’s education, training, and/or experience sufficiently support the reliability
of his methodology for his extrapolation opinions. (See, e.g., Nov. 25, 2025 Tr. at
203:12–17 (claiming Dr. Godleski’s “40 years of experience” support the reliability
of his extrapolation methodology).) None of Dr. Godleski’s expert reports indicate—
much less affirmatively state—that his background or professional experience
played any role in forming his extrapolation. (See generally Godleski Gallardo Rep.;
Godleski Converse Rep.; Godleski Newsome Rep.; Godleski Rausa Rep.; Godleski
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Judkins Rep.) Instead, all of his expert reports expressly anchor his extrapolation to
Roggli 1983. (See id.) With one very recent exception, most of Dr. Godleski’s
testimony so far in this case and others relies solely on Roggli studies for support of
his extrapolation methodology and opinions, with no mention of reliance on his
education, training, or experience. (See, e.g., 03/28/24 Godleski Dep. at 111:5–13;
115:2–10; 223:8–12; 228:5–9.)
Dr. 	Godleski 	only 	recently 	testified 	that, 	in 	many 	of 	his 	studies, 	his
“experience is that if we cut additional sections [of tissue] and look at both the block
as well as those additional sections, we’ll have essentially the same number of
particles in each section as we do in the . . . block. So the number of particles we
have, if we find three or four, means there’s three or four at every level all the way
through the block.” (See Pls.’ Dec. 8, 2025 Ltr., Ex. 9 (“Godleski Dep. III”) at
112:27–113:13 (emphasis added).) He further asserted that the literature and his own
experience “support[] making an extrapolation or an assumption” that one would
find comparable levels of talc and/or asbestos throughout a larger tissue sample
based on observations drawn from a smaller sample. (Id. at 145:3–12; see also id. at
145:13–18 (asserting that “this is not a vague extrapolation; this is experience”).)
I am not persuaded that this deposition testimony is sufficient. At the outset,
it appears to be the only evidence suggesting that Dr. Godleski relies on personal
experience as a basis for his extrapolation methodology. That testimony suffers from
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several defects. First, it was given in an action before the Superior Court of the State
of California, County of Los Angeles—not in this MDL. Second, it was elicited more
than four years after Dr. Godleski authored the expert reports at issue here. As a
result, I cannot discern when Dr. Godleski allegedly acquired the experience that
Plaintiffs 	now 	invoke 	to 	support 	a 	methodology 	introduced 	years 	earlier.
Importantly, Dr. Godleski provided no comparable testimony in any deposition taken
in this MDL, nor did he reference such experience in any of his expert reports
submitted in these proceedings. To the contrary, at other points in time, Dr. Godleski
testified that his extrapolation-related opinions were based on his reading of Roggli
1983, without reference to any independent expertise or experience supporting that
approach. (See, e.g., Godleski Dep. at 111:5–13, 115:2–10, 223:8–12, 228:5–9;
Godleski Dep. II at 84:1–7.) Under these circumstances, I do not find that the belated
deposition testimony submitted by Plaintiffs cures the fundamental deficiency I find
fatal to Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation opinion.
In sum, the record demonstrates that Dr. Godleski’s extrapolation is grounded
in unsupportive literature and not in any sufficiently articulated, independent
expertise he claims to possess. Accordingly, I conclude that Dr. Godleski lacks
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sufficiently “good grounds” for such an extrapolation and recommend that the Court
preclude his extrapolation-related opinions. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742.186
iv. 	Fit
Defendants argue that Dr. Godleski’s opinions are irrelevant to this case
because his opinion is silent on whether the five bellwether Plaintiffs actually used
Defendants’ products. (Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 18–20.) Dr. Godleski need not,
however, draw such a conclusion in his capacity as Plaintiffs’ expert on these testing
issues, and importantly, he need not have made that conclusion for purposes of
helping the trier of fact. See Fed. R. Evid.702(a).
In pertinent part, Dr. Godleski “offers the opinion to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that the particles that he identified [in each Plaintiff] are talc or
asbestos.” (Pls.’ Godleski Opp. Br. at 18.) Dr. Godleski did not opine on each
186 	Defendants also argue that the manner with which Dr. Godleski selects tissue samples to
examine showcases impermissible sampling bias and casts doubt on his conclusion that a greater
presence of talc—and, where present, tremolite asbestos—likely exists within the overall tissue.
(See Defs.’ Godleski Br. at 14–15.) Since I recommend that the Court preclude Dr. Godleski from
opining on this inference, I need not fully address this argument.
For the avoidance of doubt, however, I note that this argument mischaracterizes both Dr.
Godleski’s assignment and his approach. Dr. Godleski did not purport to analyze every tissue
sample available to him, nor was he required to do so. His task was to examine Plaintiffs’ tissue
samples for the presence of foreign materials, including talc. In carrying out that assignment, Dr.
Godleski used his “past experience and the medical literature on the diagnosis of talc in tissues”
to select for additional evaluations those samples that were most likely to contain foreign
particulates, without knowing beforehand the elemental composition of those particulates. (See,
e.g., Godleski Gallardo Rep. at 4.) This selection process does not constitute selection bias. As the
record reflects, not every birefringent particle subjected to further testing was ultimately
determined to be talc, undermining Defendants’ premise that he targeted only samples he already
believed would confirm his hypothesis. His methodology thus reflects a reasoned, scientifically
grounded approach—not an outcome-driven effort to curate favorable samples.
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bellwether Plaintiffs’ perineal application of talc, or their respective uses of
Defendants’ products; instead, the affected Plaintiffs and their experts provide that
evidence.187 	(See 	generally 	e.g., 	Godleski 	Judkins 	Rep.) 	Even 	without 	such
conclusions, Dr. Godleski’s opinions would no doubt “help the trier of fact
understand the evidence,” “determine a fact in issue,” or provide “scientific
knowledge for purposes of the case.” In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741, 743–74 & n.12.
Indeed, the “standard for fitness is ‘not that high’ but it is ‘higher than bare
relevance.’” In re Hum. Tissue, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (quoting In re Paoli, 35 F.3d
at 745). Any issue Defendants have regarding whether these Plaintiffs applied their
talcum 	powder 	products 	to 	the 	perineum 	area 	should 	be 	probed 	on 	cross-
examination. Therefore, I find that Dr. Godleski’s opinions squarely fit the facts of
this case under Rule 702.
Given the foregoing, I find that Plaintiffs have proven by preponderance of
the evidence that Dr. Godleski is qualified to give his expert opinion on his
identification of talc and tremolite asbestos in the tissue samples from each examined
187 	To be clear, Dr. Godleski’s testimony on talc use is not at issue, given my recommended
ruling on causation. Plaintiffs offer evidence through other experts’ testimony and opinions that
Plaintiffs used Defendants’ cosmetic talcum powder. (See, e.g., Pls.’ General Causation Opp. Br.
at 23–24 (“The bellwether plaintiffs daily applied Johnson’s Baby Powder and/or Shower to
Shower to their genital area for decades—the shortest period being 2 years, the longest being 55
years, and the average being just over 42 years. The number of lifetime applications range from
approximately 7,000 to 20,000. Over the course of three decades, bellwether Plaintiffs used
between 221 and 568 containers of Johnson’s Baby Powder and Shower to Shower.” (alteration in
original) (citing ECF No. 33130-37).)
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Plaintiff; however, I recommend that he cannot opine on whether the presence of
talc or tremolite asbestos within gynecologic or pelvic tissue may be a contributory
cause to the development of ovarian cancer. I further recommend that Dr. Godleski
cannot opine on whether the measured quantity of talc within tissue samples implies
a broader exposure level in a manner consistent with asbestos-related pathology
methods. Those portions of his opinions that I recommend are admissible, I find, are
reliable and “fit” the facts at issue in this case. Therefore, I recommend that the Court
grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr.
John J. Godleski.
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude The Opinions Of Dr. Juan Felix And
Dr. Teri Longacre
Plaintiffs move to exclude, under Rule 702, certain opinions and expected
testimony of Drs. Juan Felix and Teri Longacre because they are speculative,
methodologically unsupported, and outside their expertise in particle identification.
(See generally Pls.’ Felix & Longacre Br.) Plaintiffs seek to bar both doctors from
testifying that Dr. Godleski’s detection of talc and, where present, tremolite asbestos,
in five of bellwether Plaintiffs’ gynecologic and pelvic tissue samples is the result
of surgical or post-surgical contamination. (See generally id.) Defendants oppose,
arguing these are permissible, well-founded critiques of Dr. Godleski’s methods and
conclusions and are therefore admissible under Rule 702. (See generally ECF No.
33108 (“Defs.’ Felix & Longacre Opp. Br.”).)
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At the outset, I again address rebuttal experts and the standard by which they
are evaluated on a motion to exclude. Plaintiffs contend that their opinions regarding
contamination are inadmissible because, among other things, they are not supported
by proffered methodology, “evidence,” “a single study or journal article, or
“reference of any kind.” (Pls.’ Felix & Longacre Br. at 7.) Defendants cite several
cases outside of the Third Circuit to suggest that the role of a rebuttal expert is
different than that of an affirmative expert. (See Defs.’ Felix & Longacre Opp. Br.
at 8–11.)
As a general matter, a rebuttal expert need not conduct a parallel analysis
mirroring the methodology being critiqued. See, e.g., Capri Sun GmbH, 595 F. Supp.
3d at 140 (“At bottom, a rebuttal expert need not proffer a methodology or model,
but only critique the opposing expert’s.”); In re Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 285
(“[D]efendants’ experts have a less demanding task, since they have no burden to
produce models or methods of their own; they need only attack those of plaintiffs’
experts.”); see also Aviva Sports, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (“A number of other
district courts have held that rebuttal expert witnesses may criticize other experts’
theories and calculations without offering alternatives.” (collecting cases)). No
authority within the Third Circuit suggests otherwise.
Nonetheless, because all expert testimony must satisfy Daubert, a rebuttal
expert 	who 	seeks 	to 	undermine 	another 	expert’s 	model 	through 	affirmative
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conclusions or findings must still articulate reliable bases for those views, grounded
in sound methods and principles of analytical evaluation sufficient to support their
opinions and to challenge the opposing opinion. See, e.g., In re Generic Pharms.
Pricing Antitrust Litig., No. 16-md-2724, 2024 WL 4980784, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
3, 2024).
With these considerations in mind, I will first turn to Plaintiffs’ qualification-
based arguments for exclusion, followed by Plaintiffs’ reliability arguments.
i. 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs appear to challenge the qualifications of both Dr. Felix and Dr.
Longacre to offer opinions regarding “particle identification” and the use of
“methodological 	tools 	(i.e., 	SEM)” 	employed 	in 	that 	process 	(“SEM/EDXS
Qualifications”). (Pls.’ Felix & Longacre Br. at 6.) As Defendants correctly note,
Plaintiffs’ challenge to these experts’ SEM/EDXS Qualifications is misplaced.
Plaintiffs seek exclusion only of opinions and testimony related to the alleged
contamination of certain Plaintiffs’ tissue samples during and after their respective
surgical procedures. Accordingly, the SEM/EDXS Qualifications do not pertain to
contamination-related 	issues. 	(See 	generally 	Pls.’ 	Felix 	& 	Longacre 	Br.)
Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, I will evaluate Dr. Felix’s and Dr.
Longacre’s qualifications within the limited scope of Plaintiffs’ narrow motion to
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exclude certain opinions and testimony. Ultimately, I find both Dr. Felix and Dr.
Longacre qualified to opine on the issue of tissue-sample contamination.
Dr. Felix is a board-certified anatomic pathologist and cytopathologist with
subspecialty expertise in gynecologic pathology. (See, e.g., Felix Judkins Rep. at 2.)
He earned his B.A. from Columbia College and M.D. from Cornell University
Medical College. (Id.) Subsequently, Dr. Felix completed residency in anatomic
pathology and a gynecologic pathology fellowship at the New York Hospital-
Cornell Medical Center, joining the faculty there. (Id.) He spent 25 years at the
University of Southern California, advancing to Full Professor, and currently serves
as Chief of Anatomic Pathology, Professor, and Vice Chair in the Department of
Pathology at the Medical College of Wisconsin. (Id.) Prior to his current position,
Dr. Felix acted as Chief of Cytopathology at the Los Angeles County, University of
Southern California Medical Center and Director of Gynecological Pathology at the
Keck Medical Center of the University of Southern California. (Id.)
Dr. Felix has founded two anatomic pathology laboratories and maintains an
active clinical practice, rendering daily diagnoses in gynecologic malignancies,
including ovarian, uterine, and cervical cancers. (Id.) His career reflects substantial
laboratory leadership, academic teaching, and collaborative research focused on
ovarian and uterine cancers. (Id.)
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Dr. Longacre is a board-certified diagnostic surgical pathologist and Professor
of Pathology at Stanford University School of Medicine, where she holds the
Emerita Richard L. Kempson Endowed Chair in Surgical Pathology. (See Longacre
Newsome Rep. at 2–3.) She received her M.D. from the University of New Mexico
School of Medicine in 1985, completed residency in anatomic and clinical pathology
there, and subsequently completed a fellowship in surgical pathology at Stanford.
(Id.) Dr. Longacre directs Gynecologic Pathology and Gastrointestinal Pathology at
Stanford, having founded Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education-
approved fellowships in both Gynecologic Pathology (2007) and Gastrointestinal
Pathology (2013). (Id.) Her leadership roles include prior service on key institutional
committees and presidency of the Association of Directors of Anatomic and Surgical
Pathology. (Id.)
Dr. Longacre has an extensive publication record and senior editorial roles,
including 	co-author 	and 	expert 	editor 	for 	World 	Health 	Organization 	tumor
classifications 	and 	editor of Sternberg’s Diagnostic Surgical 	Pathology. (Id.)
Clinically, she maintains a high-volume practice (approximately 5,000–7,500 cases
annually) 	that 	primarily 	involves 	examination 	of 	surgical 	gynecologic 	and
gastrointestinal specimens, participates regularly in multidisciplinary tumor boards,
provides regional to international consultations, and has served on the American
Board of Pathology Test Committee for gynecologic pathology. (Id.) In her capacity
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as 	a 	board-certified 	clinical 	pathologist, 	Dr. 	Longacre 	provides 	clinical 	and
pathologic consultations to physicians at Stanford, which includes, among other
things, “microscopic review of surgical pathology specimens.” (Id.)
Based on their academic and professional backgrounds, I find that Drs. Felix
and Longacre both possess the requisite qualifications to opine on the likelihood of
specimen 	contamination 	during 	or 	following 	surgical 	procedures. 	Both 	have
“practical experience as well as academic training and credentials” relevant to their
opinions regarding specimen contamination. Elcock, 233 F.3d at 741 (quoting
Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir. 1998)). Both highlight their ongoing
clinical practices, which involve microscopic specimen examination and diagnostic
pathology. Neither claim expertise in SEM/EDXS utilization, and as such, they have
not attempted to offer their opinions on that topic.
Therefore, I recommend 	that the Court 	find 	Drs. Felix 	and 	Longacre
respectively qualified to opine on the alleged potential contamination of certain
Plaintiffs’ tissue samples.
ii. 	Methodology and Opinions
Dr. Longacre opined, in relevant part, that birefringent particles reported in
Plaintiff Newsome’s gynecologic tissues—whether identified as talc or asbestos-
like—are, more likely than not, artifacts introduced during or after surgery and/or
during histologic processing rather than evidence of true in vivo exposure. (See
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Longacre Newsome Rep. at 14–17.) Dr. Longacre emphasized that talc “is known”
to elicit a characteristic foreign body reaction in living tissue. (Id. at 11.) Through
her review of relevant medical records and available histological slides from
Plaintiff Newsome’s surgical procedure, (see id. at 14), Dr. Longacre “found no
foreign body reactions supportive of talc exposure” and “no evidence of particulate
in macrophages,” (see id. at 16). Dr. Longacre therefore opined that the consistent
absence 	of 	such 	histologic 	responses—particularly 	acute 	inflammation, 	the
formation of foreign body giant cells, and particle-laden macrophages—undermines
any inference that the talc and, where applicable, asbestos-like particles reside in
tissue because of biological migration or exposure. (See generally id.)
Dr. Felix likewise concluded, in relevant part, that particles characterized as
talc or talc-like in gynecologic tissue samples, including those from Plaintiffs
Converse, Judkins 	and 	Gallardo, 	are 	more 	consistent 	with 	post-surgical 	and
processing contamination and not evidence of biological exposure. (See, e.g., Felix
Judkins Rep. at 5, 7–9.) Following his review of each respective Plaintiffs’
pathology report and histological slides, Dr. Felix concluded that there is no
evidence of exposure to foreign material, including talcum powder. (Id.) For support,
Dr. Felix pointed to the absence of a discernible foreign body reaction, which,
according to the doctor, is expected from the introduction of a foreign body, like
talc, to vital tissue. (Id.) Normally, according to Dr. Felix, such a reaction would be
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discernable by using routine light microscopy and polarized light microscopy,
though Dr. Felix’s analysis using such methods yielded no expected tissue reaction.
(Id.)
Methodologically, both Drs. Longacre and Felix applied standard surgical
pathology principles, reviewed relevant scientific and medical literature, and offer
pointed criticisms of Dr. Godleski. For example, Dr. Longacre pointed out that
despite attempts to prevent contamination of paraffin tissue samples, Dr. Godleski
“did not control for the tissue processing following surgery.” (See 	Longacre
Newsome Rep. at 15.) Dr. Longacre further criticized Dr. Godleski’s failure to
“recognize that laboratory processing of tissue specimens for histology can not only
introduce contaminants on the surface of the specimen, but also deep within tissue.”
(Id.)
Dr. Felix offered similar criticisms to Dr. Godleski’s opinions and methods,
such as Dr. Godleski’s “failure to address the absence of foreign body reactions in
[Plaintiff] Converse’s tissue” and failure to consider post-surgical contamination as
the source of detected particulate. (See, e.g., Felix Judkins Rep. at 8.) Dr. Felix also
faulted Dr. Godleski’s attempt to “remove” potential contaminants by “removing 50
microns of the [paraffin] block surface” because “tissue specimens . . . are exposed
sequentially to a number of organic compounds that permeate the tissue at the
cellular level.” (Id.)
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iii. 	Reliability
Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	both 	doctors’ 	opinions 	regarding 	alleged 	sample
contamination must be excluded because they are methodologically deficient and
lack scientific support. (See generally Pls.’ Felix & Longacre Br.) In opposition,
Defendants 	argue 	that 	their 	experts’ 	contamination-related 	criticisms 	of 	Dr.
Godleski’s opinions are supported by science and by their own experiences, both of
which suffice as foundation for admissible expert opinions. (See generally Defs.’
Felix & Longacre Opp. Br.) I agree with Defendants and recommend that the Court
deny Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr. Felix’s and Dr. Longacre’s contamination-
related opinions.
First, 	Defendants’ 	experts 	articulate 	a 	specific 	rationale 	for 	their
contamination theory: the absence of any foreign body reaction (e.g., giant cells or
macrophage ingestion) around the particles purportedly identified indicates the
material was more likely introduced post-surgery during processing, not present in
vivo. Plaintiffs, however, do not substantively respond to this foreign-body-reaction
premise. Instead, they characterize the contamination explanation as speculative and
methodologically unsupported.
Drs. 	Felix 	and 	Longacre 	did 	not 	purport 	to 	re-identify 	particles 	via
SEM/EDXS; 	instead, 	they 	used 	routine 	and 	polarized 	light 	microscopy 	on
histological slides to determine tissue exposure to foreign material, such as talc.
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Having found none, they criticized Dr. Godleski’s conclusion that identified talc and,
where applicable, asbestos particles, demonstrate in vivo presence and causation.
Under Rule 702, it is appropriate for defense experts to criticized another expert’s
methodology and conclusions. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 285. Both
defense experts’ opinions are based on reliable “methods and procedures of science,”
as opposed to “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Schneider, 320 F.3d at
404 (citation omitted).
Second, Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Felix’s and Dr. Longacre’s contamination-
related opinions lack scientific support by way of literature and by their own
methodology. (See Pls.’ Felix & Longacre Br. at 4–7.) But both experts relied on a
litany of published scientific studies that support their contamination theory, which
is premised on the absence of a foreign body reaction. (See, e.g., Longacre Newsome
Rep. at 11 (“Talc is known to elicit a foreign body reaction in human tissue.” (citing
sources)); id. at 13 (“[L]aboratory processing of tissue specimens for histology can
not only introduce contaminants on the surface of the specimen, but also deep within
tissue.” (citing sources)); see, e.g., Felix Converse Rep. at 9 (“It is well known that
talc, like virtually any foreign body, will cause a foreign body granulomatous
reaction when introduced into vital (living) tissue.” (citing sources)).) Nor do
Plaintiffs dispute the general proposition that the introduction of talc into living
tissue would cause a discernible foreign body reaction.
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Both experts also explained from their own experience that processing steps
and reagents can permit particulate penetration beyond the block surface. Experts
may base their opinions on their experiences within their respective fields of
expertise. See, e.g., Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152 (explaining that the purpose of Daubert
“is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field”);
Schneider, 320 F.3d at 399–400 (holding abuse of discretion excluding experts’
testimony regarding medical standard of care where testimony was based on
“considerable professional experience” and knowledge of the “standard of care in
the medical field”). As gynecological pathologists, Drs. Felix and Longacre have
decades 	of experience evaluating tissue responses to 	foreign 	material. Their
literature citations and clinical experience support their conclusions about expected
tissue reactions and contamination risk.
Therefore, I recommend that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the
Opinions of Dr. Felix and Dr. Longacre.
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VII. 	REGULATORY, MARKETING, AND CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE
OPINIONS
A. 	Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. David Kessler,
Laura Plunkett, William Sage, and George Newman
Defendants move to exclude the opinion testimony of four expert witnesses
proffered by Plaintiffs on subjects ranging from regulatory and industry standards to
marketing to whether exposure to talc increases the risk of ovarian cancer: (i) David
Kessler, M.D., J.D.; (ii) Laura Plunkett, Ph.D., DABT; (iii) William Sage, M.D.,
J.D.; and (iv) George E. Newman, Ph.D. (See ECF No. 33000-2 (“Defs.’ Regulatory
P Br.”).) Plaintiffs oppose exclusion of these experts (See ECF No. 332998-1 (“Pls.’
Regulatory Opp. Br.”).)
Because I was not asked to analyze testimony from these experts when I
rendered my prior Opinion, Defendants filed “traditional Daubert motions” with
respect to these experts. (April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order at 6.) In analyzing the
admissibility 	of 	their 	testimony 	below, 	I 	address 	Defendants’ 	arguments 	in
connection with making independent findings on qualification, reliability, and fit.
See Cohen, 125 F.4th at 460 (explaining district courts have an “independent
obligation” to “take into account all of the Daubert factors” (citation modified)).
1. 	Dr. Kessler
i. 	Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Kessler as an expert on “the responsibilities of cosmetic
manufacturers, focusing on the regulatory interface between cosmetic manufacturers
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and the FDA, as well as industry standards.” (ECF No. 33000-6 (“Kessler Rep.”) ¶
22).
Dr. Kessler graduated from Harvard Medical School and the University of
Chicago Law School in the late 1970s. (Kessler Rep. ¶ 1). From 1990 to 1997, Dr.
Kessler served as Commissioner of the United States Food and Drug Administration.
(Id. ¶¶ 2–3). As FDA Commissioner, Dr. Kessler’s responsibilities included
overseeing the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, the Center for Devices and
Radiological Health, the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (which
regulates cosmetics), and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research. (Id. ¶
8). Serving in these roles required familiarity with the United States Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), FDA regulations, and related laws and regulations
pertaining to the marketing, sale, labeling, and safety of consumer products. (See id.)
Dr. Kessler does not recall being “substantially involved in talc cosmetic matters”
during his tenure as FDA Commissioner. (Id. ¶ 24.)
Dr. Kessler has published articles and testified before the United States
Congress on the regulation of food, drugs, and medical devices, as well as on
consumer protection issues. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9.) From January 2021 to January 2023, Dr.
Kessler served as Chief Science Officer of the United States COVID-19 Response
and co-led Operation Warp Speed. (Id. ¶ 5.) He previously taught food and drug law
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at Columbia University Law School and is currently a professor at the University of
California, San Francisco. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.)
Dr. Kessler also has served as: a senior advisor to a private equity firm that
owns 	pharmaceutical 	and 	biomedical 	companies; 	a 	board 	member 	of 	three
pharmaceutical companies; and a board member of a medical device and biologics
company. (Id. ¶ 10.) In those capacities, he has advised companies on the “standards
and duties of care within the pharmaceutical and medical device industry.” (Id.). Dr.
Kessler previously chaired the compliance committee of Aptalis Pharma and
currently chairs the quality committee at Immucor, Inc. (Id.). He attests that his role
as 	quality 	committee 	chair 	“involves 	ensuring 	compliance 	with 	the 	FDA’s
regulations and requirements.” (Id.).
Except as noted below, Defendants do not dispute that Dr. Kessler is qualified
to testify about the regulatory framework and industry standards for cosmetics.
Based on Dr. Kessler’s “broad range of knowledge, skills, and training” as FDA
Commissioner 	and 	continued 	interaction—as 	a 	C-Suite 	advisor, 	author, 	and
academic—with 	regulations 	and 	industry 	standards 	that 	inform 	cosmetic
manufacturers’ standard of care, I find that Dr. Kessler is qualified to testify about
those topics. Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404.
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ii. 	Summary of Dr. Kessler’s Opinions
Dr. Kessler was “asked to address the duties and conduct of defendant
cosmetic companies in the face of a potential health hazard.” (Kessler Rep. ¶ 1.) He
explained that to formulate his “regulatory and safety opinions,” he reviewed the
“epidemiology, 	laboratory 	testing 	methodology, 	chemical 	and 	geological
relationship between talc and asbestos, health consequences with asbestos and
elongated mineral particles, and product formulation and manufacturing.” (Id.) He
had access to documents exchanged in discovery, deposition and trial transcripts,
and publicly available information. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) This approach, Dr. Kessler
submitted, tracked the methods he used while at the FDA, in academia, and on
corporate boards. (Id. ¶ 15). Based on his review, Dr. Kessler reached the following
main conclusions:
• 	Cosmetic products are “among the least regulated” products that fall under
the FDA’s jurisdiction, with less federal regulation of cosmetics than
drugs, medical devises, or food additives. “This is reflected in the fact that
there is no premarket approval of cosmetic products.” (Id., Summary of
Opinions ¶¶ 1, 3.)
• 	Consistent 	with 	FDA 	regulations, 	statutes, 	and 	industry 	standards,
cosmetic manufacturers “have a responsibility to substantiate the safety of
their product,” including the safety of its ingredients, before marketing
them. Manufacturers must have “reasonable certainty in the judgment of
competent scientists” that the product is safe and that there is “no evidence
to suspect their cosmetic product may pose harm. (Id., Summary of
Opinions ¶¶ 3, 5–6.)
• 	“If there is evidence that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the
cosmetic product may pose harm for the proposed conditions of use, such
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product does not meet the industry standards for safety.” (Id., Summary of
Opinions ¶ 7.)
• 	If the safety of a product cannot be substantiated, the manufacturer must
“warn consumers that the safety of their product has not been determined
or not sell their product.” If a “health hazard may be associated with the
product, 	a 	cosmetic manufacturer 	must 	include 	a 	warning 	on 	their
product.” (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 3.)
• 	Beginning in the 1970s, Johnson & Johnson “had evidence of a) the
presence of asbestos because of its known carcinogenicity and absence of
a threshold dose; or b) the presence of non-asbestiform amphiboles or
fibrous 	talc.” 	This 	evidence 	prevented 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson 	from
substantiating the safety of the talc products, and created a “reasonable
basis to believe that such an association between the product and health
risks.” Johnson & Johnson continued to receive information that prevented
it from substantiating the safety of its products in the following decades,
including “a) the FDA’s 2014 petition response acknowledging that there
remains some evidence to suspect or question the safety of talcum powder
products, b) the totality of the medical literature since 2014 that continues
to raise safety questions;” and c) findings from IARC. (See id., Summary
of Opinions ¶¶ 8–15, 17).
• 	Once Johnson & Johnson could not substantiate the safety of the talc
products, Johnson & Johnson should have withdrawn them from the
market. (See id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 9).
• 	Because Johnson & Johnson was “[u]nable to substantiate the safety of
their talcum powder products,” Johnson & Johnson was required, under 21
CFR § 740.10, “to place the following conspicuous statement on the
principal display panel: ‘Warning-The safety of this product has not been
determined.” Johnson & Johnson’s failure to do so violated the FDA’s
labeling requirements. (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 14 (quoting 21 CFR
§740.10).)
• 	Johnson & Johnson’s findings and notice of fibrous or asbestiform material
in talc samples rendered the talc products “adulterated” under the FDCA,
thereby prohibiting their sale. (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 14 (quoting 21
U.S.C. §361).)
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• 	A “reasonable and prudent” company, confronted with evidence that
asbestos is a carcinogen with no safe threshold—evidence that Dr. Kessler
submits was in Johnson & Johnson’s possession—would have improved
testing sensitivity, reformulated the talc products with cornstarch in the
1970s, 	adopt 	the 	most 	conservative 	and 	protective 	procedures, 	or
discontinued sale. (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶¶ 14, 24, 28, 33.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “decided in the 1970’s to aggressively defend its
product. That strategy kept their product on the market for fifty years but
put the public’s health at risk. It need not have been that way if Johnson &
Johnson was willing to bear any additional cost and reformulate the
product.” Johnson & Johnson also initiated studies “only as required by
confrontation.” (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶¶ 18, 26, 30, 36-37, 40–42.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson knew that “false negative results would occur with its
testing methodology, in part because these tests were not sensitive
enough.” Yet 	Johnson 	& Johnson 	opposed 	“efforts 	to 	improve the
sensitivity of the testing methods” for asbestos in its talc products. (Id. ¶¶
201–223.)
• 	“For more than fifty years, J&J made representations that were misleading
and not transparent.” Johnson & Johnson’s deceptive conduct included: (i)
failing “to report to the FDA that laboratory tests found evidence of
naturally occurring mineral silicate fibers of the serpentine and amphibole
series”; (ii) “J&J’s representation to the FDA in their March 17, 2016,
letter that no asbestos-form structures have ever been found during any
testing”; (iii) creating the false impression, as an active participant in the
Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association (“CTFA”), that “changes
in testing resolved the asbestos controversy in talc by researchers and
health agencies”; and (iv) making false and misleading statements to the
public, “gynecologic oncologists 	and the medical 	community.” (Id.,
Summary of Opinions ¶¶ 27, 29, 39–40; id. ¶ 195).
iii. 	Specific Exclusion Arguments and Legal Standards
Defendants argue that Dr. Kessler (a) constructs a factual narrative that does
not constitute proper expert testimony, (b) draws impermissible legal conclusions,
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(c) speculates about Defendants’ state of mind and motivations, and (d) renders
subjective opinions about compliance with ethical standards. To varying degrees,
both parties assert that I should bar other expert testimony for these same reasons.
Thus, before making findings on the reliability, fit, and scope of Dr. Kessler’s
testimony, I will address these specific arguments and explain more generally the
law on expert witnesses constructing factual narratives, offering legal conclusions,
and testifying about a corporation’s state of mind, intent, or compliance with ethical
standards.
a. 	Factual Narrative Challenge
Defendants 	argue 	that 	Dr. 	Kessler 	simply 	rehashes 	internal 	corporate
documents and deposition testimony, without offering independent analysis. (See
Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 10 (arguing Dr. Kessler “summarizes internal documents
and testimony in Section II.C of his report,” like quoting “straightforward statements
from an internal J&J PowerPoint”); id. at 10–11 (characterizing Dr. Kessler’s
“discussion of the safety and geology of asbestos and purportedly positive findings
of asbestos”—and Section VI.A of his report—as “merely a narrative” of internal
documents produced by Defendants, which Dr. Kessler “quotes” “verbatim” without
analysis); id. at 11 (arguing “majority of Section IV of his report consists of Dr.
Kessler rehashing documents”).) Defendants posit that Dr. Kessler’s “narrative
account of events” is a “lay opinion,” which will not help the jury. (Id. at 13).
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In response, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Kessler must identify, and can
summarize, the facts and data underlying his report. (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at
15–16). Plaintiffs also argue that like other courts, I should reject Defendants’ factual
narrative argument because it is a trial objection, not a basis for barring Dr. Kessler’s
testimony altogether. (See id. 17–18 & n.51 (citing cases).)
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, experts may rely on “facts or data in the
case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.” “If the facts
are of the type ‘reasonably relied upon’ by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon a subject, the facts or data need not be independently
admissible in evidence.” Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 414
(3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Evid.703); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii)
(requiring expert witnesses to identify “the facts or data considered by the witness
in forming” opinions in expert report). “It is an abuse of discretion to admit expert
testimony which is based on assumptions lacking any factual foundation in the
record.” Stecyk, 295 F.3d at 414.
While expert testimony must have a sufficient factual foundation, an expert
witness “‘cannot be presented to the jury solely for the purpose of constructing a
factual narrative based on record evidence.’” Krys v. Aaron, 112 F. Supp. 3d 181,
206 (D.N.J. 2015) (quoting Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Schneider, 379 F. Supp.
2d 461, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)); see O’Bryant v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 20-cv-2361,
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2022 WL 7670296, at *13 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2022) (“An expert may testify to a review
of internal documents for the purpose of explaining the basis for his or her admissible
opinions” but “simply parroting [d]efendant’s corporate documents or offering a
narrative account of events from them will not be helpful to the jury.” (citation
omitted)). Instead, such “testimony is properly presented through fact witnesses and
documentary evidence.” O’Bryant, 2022 WL 7670296, at *13.
As noted below, Dr. Kessler may testify as to the FDA regulations and
industry standards that inform the standard of care for cosmetics manufacturers and
may 	offer 	his 	assessment 	of 	how 	Defendants’ 	actions 	comported 	with 	that
framework. In offering that testimony at trial, Dr. Kessler may not quote extensively
from corporate documents, testimony, or other evidence that “should be presented
to the jury directly.” In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 192. Instead, Dr. Kessler’s
“commentary on any documents and exhibits in evidence will be limited to
explaining the regulatory context in which they were created, defining any complex
or specialized terminology, or drawing inferences that would not be apparent without
the benefit of experience or specialized knowledge.” Id.
Because portions of Dr. Kessler’s report help contextualize the information
that he cites, I decline to parse the report “paragraph-by-paragraph to determine
where the report turns from expert analysis to factual narrative.” Liberty Media
Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., 874 F. Supp. 2d 169, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Instead,
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like many other courts that have considered the same challenges to Dr. Kessler’s
testimony, I find that Defendants can object if Dr. Kessler’s trial testimony turns into
a factual narrative. See McCoy v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 22-cv-2075, 2024
WL 1705952, at *20 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2024) (“Dr. Kessler may testify regarding
the facts he relied upon in forming his opinions if such facts are relevant, are not
cumulative, and do not constitute a mere rehashing of otherwise admissible
evidence” and “any specific objections to narrative testimony must wait for trial.”);
King v. DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., No. 23-cv-00196, 2023 WL 5624710, at *4 (D.
Ariz. Aug. 31, 2023) (same); Wells v. Allergan, Inc., No. 12-cv-973, 2013 WL
7208221, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 4, 2013) (same); In re C.R. Bard, Inc., 948 F. Supp.
2d 589, 646 (S.D.W. Va. 2013) (same); In re Yasmin & YAZ (Drospirenone) Mktg.,
Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-02100, 2011 WL 6302287, at *8 (S.D.
Ill. Dec. 16, 2011) (same); In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy, 2017 WL
1836443, at *15 (same); In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-cv-
00064, 2014 WL 120973, at *10 (W.D. La. Jan. 10, 2014) (same).
b. 	Legal Conclusions Challenge
Defendants argue that Dr. Kessler impermissibly testifies as to his own legal
conclusions. (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 13.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Dr.
Kessler improperly concludes that: (i) “the J&J defendants violated legal standards
by failing to ‘substantiate the safety of their talcum powder products,’” (id. at 15
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(citing Kessler Rep. §§ III–IV & ¶¶ 106, 154, 232)); (ii) “‘J&J was required to place
the following conspicuous statement on the principal display panel: Warning – The
safety of this product has not been determined. 21 C.F.R. § 740.10,’” (id. (citing
Kessler Rep. ¶¶ 68–69, 106)); and (iii) “J&J’s talcum powder products were
contaminated with asbestos and therefore ‘adulterated’ under 21 U.S.C. § 361.44,”
(id. 	(citing Kessler Rep. ¶ 139)). Defendants argue that these types of legal
conclusions usurp the jury’s role. (See id. at 14 (citing cases)).
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants miss a critical distinction in the caselaw.
(See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 21 & n.58 (citing cases).) That is, rather than
offering “ultimate legal conclusions,” Dr. Kessler’s opinions “address the relevant
regulatory standards Defendants were subject to, relevant industry standards, and the
appropriateness of Defendants’ actions given the information they possessed at the
time.” (Id. at 21.) In this regard, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Kessler does not overstep
the Court’s role instructing the jury on negligence and failure to warn or the jury’s
role in deciding liability. (See id. 21–22.) Rather, according to Plaintiffs, Dr.
Kessler’s opinions merely help the jury assess the reasonableness of Defendants’
actions by explaining industry standards and applicable regulatory schemes. (See id.)
In determining whether expert testimony will help the factfinder, courts must
“ensure that an expert does not testify as to the governing law of the case.” Berckeley
Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 217 (3d Cir. 2006). While “Federal Rule of
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Evidence 704 permits an expert witness to give expert testimony that ‘embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact,’ an expert witness is prohibited from
rendering a legal opinion.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid.704). That prohibition ensures
that experts do not “usurp the District Court’s pivotal role in explaining the law to
the jury.” Id.
The “line between admissible and inadmissible expert testimony as to the
customs and practices of a particular industry often becomes blurred when the
testimony concerns a party’s compliance with customs and practices that implicate
legal duties.” Id. at 218. In Berckeley, a company accused of violating the securities
laws proffered testimony from a former SEC lawyer with expertise in the relevant
securities transactions. Id. The court permitted her “background testimony” on the
“customs and business practices in the securities industry” because it would “aid the
jury in determining whether” the defendant “had the requisite scienter.” Id. By
contrast, the court prohibited testimony as to whether the company “complied with
legal duties that arose under the federal securities laws”—that is, “as to what was
required under the law, or whether the defendant complied” with the law. Id.
In Krys v. Aaron, the court “endeavor[ed] to better define the line between
permissible testimony on ultimate issues and an impermissible legal opinion.” 112
F. Supp. 3d 181, 192 (D.N.J. 2015). Judge Simandle’s guidance remains instructive:
Taken together, these authorities therefore instruct that
any qualified expert . . . may provide an opinion on
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whether a party’s conduct or actions meet the underlying
bases for an ultimate issue in a case (by, for example,
testifying concerning whether certain acts would in the
abstract be improper and/or inconsistent with a party’s
legal duties), but may not merely instruct the jury on the
result to reach based upon a party’s specific conduct or
actions (by, for example, stating that a party did indeed
violate 	an 	applicable 	duty 	through 	certain 	actions).
Id. at 193.
The Krys plaintiffs proffered testimony from a former CFTC director about
CFTC and CEA segregation requirements. See id. at 191. Applying the principles
noted above, the court excluded the expert’s testimony “to the extent he reaches the
specific conclusion that any Defendant acted in compliance with and/or in violation
of applicable legal duties or segregation requirements.” Id. at 193; see id. at 192
(barring testimony on whether defendants: “complied with their obligations under
federal 	securities 	law”; 	violated 	CFTC 	and 	CEA 	segregation 	and 	auditing
requirements; 	and 	“committed 	fraud, 	breaches 	of 	their 	fiduciary 	duties, 	and
conversion”). But the court permitted expert testimony as to “contextual information
on segregation issues and on common customs and practices in the securities
industry” because that “background information may prove infinitely helpful to the
jury in unpacking the intricacies of” the “complex litigation.” Id. at 193.
Here too, I find that Dr. Kessler offers both admissible testimony relevant to
the ultimate issues in this case and impermissible legal opinions that require
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exclusion. Dr. Kessler may provide background information regarding industry
standards and the FDA’s regulation of cosmetics manufacturers. (See, e.g., Kessler
Rep., Summary of Opinions ¶¶ 1, 4, 5.) This testimony will help the jury understand
“the complex regulatory framework that informs the standard of care” in the
cosmetics industry. In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 191; see United States ex rel.
Silver v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 11-cv-01326, 2023 WL 2808098, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar.
31, 2023) (“Qualified experts may provide background on a statutory or regulatory
scheme so long as their opinions do not state whether the statute or regulation was
violated.”).
Similarly, Dr. Kessler may make factual observations about Defendants’
conduct in reference to that standard of care. That includes opining—based on his
experience and understanding of industry standards—on the steps that reasonably
prudent manufacturers take to substantiate the safety of cosmetic products and
Defendants’ actions in comparison to those standards.188 See In re Fosamax, 645 F.
Supp. 2d at 191 (“A lay jury cannot be expected to understand the complex
regulatory framework that informs the standard of care in the pharmaceutical
industry. Dr. Parisian’s assessment of the reasonableness of Merck’s conduct in light
188 	As detailed below, however, Dr. Kessler cannot testify that Defendants in fact violated any
law, regulation, or legal duty, or that Defendants acted negligently.
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of her experience and her understanding of FDA regulations will be helpful to the
jury.”).
Rather than staying within those bounds, however, Dr. Kessler also drew
several inadmissible legal conclusions. For example, Dr. Kessler concluded that
Johnson & Johnson “was required,” under 21 C.F.R. § 740.10, “to place the
following conspicuous statement on the principal display panel: ‘Warning – The
safety of this product has not been determined.’” (Kessler Rep., Summary of
Opinions ¶ 14; Kessler Rep. ¶ 106.) And he testified that under 21 U.S.C. § 361,
Johnson & Johnson was “prohibited” from selling talcum powder products because
they 	“contained 	poisonous 	and 	deleterious 	substances” 	and 	“were 	therefore
adulterated.” (Kessler Rep. ¶ 139.)
These examples are not exclusive, but should serve as guideposts for the
ultimate admissibility decisions made at trial. In short, Dr. Kessler may provide
background testimony about FDA regulations and industry standards that inform the
standard of care for cosmetics manufacturers.189 He may generally testify about
whether Defendants’ conduct was consistent with those requirements. But he must
189 	In rendering a similar ruling, one court explained that it would “instruct the jury, if
applicable under relevant state law, that evidence of violation of FDA standards may be evidence
of, but does not necessarily establish, negligence.” Mirena I, 169 F. Supp. 3d at 479, n.78. The
court further explained that if there “is any dispute as to what FDA regulations are applicable to
Mirena, the issue can be raised with the Court, and the Court will outline the relevant statutes and
regulations for the jury.” Id. Nothing in this decision precludes either party from seeking a similar
instruction before or during trial.
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stop short of testifying that Defendants violated any law or legal duty, or on the
interaction (if any) between the regulatory scheme that he explains and tort law
liability. And while Dr. Kessler can opine on Defendants’ conduct in comparison to
industry standards, he cannot draw legal conclusions reserved for the jury, including
that the talc products were not safe as a matter of law, that Defendants failed to warn,
or that Defendants were negligent. See In re C.R. Bard, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 629
(barring Dr. Kessler from testifying that manufacturer “failed to warn on its label”
and that products “were not reasonably safe”).
c. 	State of Mind Challenge
Defendants argue that Dr. Kessler improperly opined on Defendants’ state of
mind and motivations. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 17–18.) Plaintiffs dispute
that Dr. Kessler offered speculative testimony regarding Defendants’ state of mind.
(Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 28). According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Kessler’s opinion
addressed (1) when, based on his review of internal company documents, corporate
representative testimony, and other record evidence, Defendants had notice of risks,
and (2) the reasonableness of Defendants’ conduct, based on compliance with FDA
regulations and other regulatory requirements and industry standards. (See id. at 28–
29.)
Experts “may not provide testimony concerning ‘the state of mind’ or
‘culpability’ of Defendants.” Krys, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 203 (citation omitted); see
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Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 440 (D.N.J.
2009) (“[E]xperts cannot opine on intent.”); In re Rezulin, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 547
(“Inferences about the intent or motive of parties or others lie outside the bounds of
expert testimony.”). I agree with Defendants that portions of Dr. Kessler’s report
violate this prohibition, including his assertions that:
• 	Johnson & Johnson “was aware that false negative results would occur
with its testing methodology, in part because these tests were not sensitive
enough.” (Kessler Rep. ¶ 201 (emphasis added).)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “had concerns regarding asbestos and the safety of its
product.” (Id. at 68 (emphasis added).)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “decided in the 1970’s to aggressively defend its
product. That strategy kept their product on the market for fifty years but
put the public’s health at risk. It need not have been that way if J&J was
willing to bear any additional cost and reformulate the product.” (Id. ¶ 88
(emphasis added).)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “continues to mislead the public on its website
factsabouttalc.com.” (Id. ¶ 241 (emphasis added).)
• 	Johnson & Johnson’s “approach to the asbestos issue in talc was to initiate
studies only as required by confrontation.” (Id. ¶ 103.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “created confusion and doubt when the safety of their
product was brought into question.” (Id. ¶ 104.)
Because these assertions concern the state of mind, motives, or culpability of
Defendants, they “lie outside the bounds of expert testimony.” In re Rezulin, 309 F.
Supp. 	2d 	at 	547; 	see, 	e.g., 	In 	re 	Diet 	Drugs 	(Phentermine, 	Fenfluramine,
Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1203, 2000 WL 876900, at *2, 9
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(E.D. Pa. June 20, 2000) (precluding expert from testifying that failure to change
drug label was “driven by [corporation’s] desire to increase profits” because “intent
is a classic jury question”). Thus, I recommend that the Court grant Defendants’
motion to the extent that it seeks to bar Dr. Kessler from opining about Defendants’
state of mind, motivations, or culpability.
As to notice specifically, Dr. Kessler’s report contains both impermissible and
permissible testimony. Dr. Kessler cannot testify directly—based on his review of
documents—that Defendants knew of, actually recognized, or deliberately ignored
certain risks. (See, e.g., Kessler Rep., Summary of Opinions ¶ 15 (impermissibly
speculating about when Defendants had “notice of naturally occurring mineral
silicate fibers of the serpentine and amphibole series”).) Those notice findings are
reserved for the jury.
Based on his regulatory expertise, however, Dr. Kessler may help the jury
make those findings by explaining the types of information sufficient to alert a
reasonably prudent cosmetics manufacturer to potential safety issues and other risks.
In so doing, Dr. Kessler also may discuss the types of scientific and regulatory data
that Johnson & Johnson possessed, and whether that data indicated risks. The studies
and data analyzed by Dr. Kessler are complex and, without his expertise, it may not
be apparent to a layperson why certain information would alert a reasonably prudent
manufacturer to potential safety risks. See Deutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 768
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F. Supp. 2d 420, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (prohibiting expert from testifying on
defendant’s state of mind, but allowing testimony on “whether certain information
contained in the [defendant’s] internal documents indicated certain risks.”).
d. 	Ethical Opinion Challenge
Next, Defendants argue that Dr. Kessler improperly offers subjective views
on the ethical appropriateness of Defendants’ actions, without citing objective
standards or otherwise using any reliable scientific methodology. (Defs.’ Regulatory
Br. at 21–23; see id. at 22, n.78 (“Dr. Kessler’s experience as a former FDA
commissioner does not salvage his claims about defendants’ ethics. As another court
in this circuit explained, ‘ethical standards for [pharmaceutical] companies do not
come from the FDA’”) (citation omitted)). According to Defendants, this includes
opining that, a “‘reasonable and prudent company would attempt to improve the
sensitivity of its testing’ for asbestos, which J&J purportedly did not do.” (Id. at 22
(citing Kessler Rep. ¶¶ 189, 201–202, 214, 222, 250).) Defendants also challenge
Dr. Kessler’s opinion that it was “concerning” that Johnson & Johnson claimed “‘its
product was ‘asbestos free’ without sufficiently ‘vigorous efforts to improve’
testing.” (Id. at 23 (citing Kessler Rep. ¶ 210).) And even if Dr. Kessler’s ethical
opinions were reliable and relevant, Defendants argue they are inadmissible under
Rule 403 because any probative value would be “vastly outweighed by the tendency
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of such testimony to encourage the jury to impose liability on an improper basis.”
(Id. at 25 (citation omitted).)
Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	Dr. 	Kessler 	opines 	on 	the 	reasonableness 	of
Defendants’ actions in comparison to “relevant, objective regulatory requirements
and industry standards,” not his own subjective ethical views. (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp.
Br. at 36.) According to Plaintiffs, in rendering these opinions, Dr. Kessler
permissibly relied on: (i) record evidence (testimony and corporate documents); (ii)
legislation, 	regulations, 	and 	other 	FDA 	documents; 	(iii) 	his 	review 	of
“epidemiology, 	laboratory 	testing 	methodology, 	chemical 	and 	geological
relationship between talc and asbestos, health consequences with asbestos and
elongated mineral particles, and product formulation and manufacturing”; and (iv)
his own “extensive experience in the regulatory sphere,” including answering
regulatory questions as a professor, government official, and corporate board
advisor. (See id. at 37–38).
Under Rule 702, expert testimony must be grounded in reliable principles and
methods, reliably applied to the facts, and “help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid.702. When addressing similar
challenges, 	courts 	applying 	this 	standard 	have 	distinguished 	(1) 	permissible
regulatory and industry standards opinions (which may help the jury), from (2)
impermissible ethics or corporate motives opinions (which are unhelpful and
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subjective). See In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1054 (D. Minn.
2007) (finding expert “may be allowed to testify as to the standard of care for
pharmaceutical companies,” but “may not infuse his personal views as to whether
Bayer acted ethically, irresponsibly or recklessly”).
On the permissible side of that boundary, experts may explain the regulatory
framework and industry standards that inform a manufacturer’s standard of care and
may assess compliance with those standards. See In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. at 191
(allowing testimony explaining “complex regulatory framework that informs the
standard of care in the pharmaceutical industry” and expert’s “assessment of the
reasonableness of Merck’s conduct in light of her experience and her understanding
of FDA regulations”). As noted above, such testimony is “helpful to the jury”
because it contextualizes complex matters beyond the experience of lay persons. Id.
By contrast, moral assessments of “corporate conduct and ethics are not
appropriate subjects of expert testimony because” they are subjective, invade the
province of the factfinder, and have the tendency to unfairly prejudice and confuse
the jury. In re C.R. Bard, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 2d at 611; In re Baycol, 532 F. Supp. 2d
at 1053 (“Personal views on corporate ethics and morality are not expert opinions.”).
Thus, courts prohibit expert opinions that characterize a manufacturer’s conduct as
“unethical,” “irresponsible,” “immoral,” or “bad.” See Bartoli v. Novartis Pharms.
Corp., No. 13-cv-0724, 2014 WL 1515870, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2014)
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(explaining “‘bad company’ opinions are not admissible”); see, e.g., In re Rezulin,
309 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (excluding “opinions concerning purported ethical standards”
because they were “based on [experts] personal, subjective views” and “so vague as
to be unhelpful to a fact-finder”); Wolfe v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., No. 07-cv-348, 2011
WL 1673805, at *8– 9 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 2011) (excluding “subjective views” about
manufacturer’s “social responsibility and ethical obligations” to “develop a better
warning” and “better communicate the risks of their product” as unreliable and
unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403); In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 192
(excluding “mere ‘bad company’ testimony”).
Once again, Dr. Kessler offers admissible and inadmissible testimony. As
explained above, Dr. Kessler may explain the regulatory framework and industry
standards applicable to cosmetic manufacturers. That includes explaining FDA
standards for substantiating product safety and labeling products, as well as the role
of the Cosmetic Ingredient Review (“CIR”). (See Kessler Rep. ¶¶ 27–29, 31–41, 48–
54). And as long as he stays within the limits set forth in this decision (i.e., avoids
testifying that Defendants violated the law or endangered the public), Dr. Kessler
may compare Defendants’ conduct to that framework. These opinions are admissible
because they flow from Dr. Kessler’s “extensive and specialized experience,” and
will help the jury “understand the complex regulatory framework that informs the
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standard of care” in the cosmetics industry. In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 190–
91.
In contrast, some opinions in Dr. Kessler’s report reflect his personal,
subjective views of Defendants’ conduct, rather than the application of any reliable
methodology. For example, Dr. Kessler asserts that:
• 	“making claims that its product was asbestos free without vigorous efforts
to improve the sensitivity of the testing methods is concerning.” (Kessler
Rep. ¶ 210 (emphasis added); id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 25 (same));
• 	Defendants engaged in conduct that “put the public at risk.” (Id. ¶ 242; id.
¶ 250; id. ¶¶ 209–211; id., Summary of Opinions ¶¶ 18, 23–24, 26);
• 	Defendants 	“made 	representations 	that 	were 	misleading 	and 	not
transparent.” (Id., Summary of Opinions ¶ 27; id. ¶¶ 212, 241, 256).
Dr. Kessler also goes so far as to rely on a CTFA employee’s statement that “‘[t]he
talc industry has a moral and legal responsibility to supply products that can be used
safely.’” (Id. ¶ 56 (citation omitted).)
These statements do not rest on a reliable scientific or regulatory foundation;
they reflect only Dr. Kessler’s subjective views. And they do not help the jury assess
Defendants’ compliance with relevant objective standards; they invite the jury to
impose 	liability 	based 	on 	Dr. 	Kessler’s 	personal 	views 	and 	assessment 	of
Defendants’ corporate ethics. See In re Rezulin, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 545 (precluding
ethics testimony because it would “prejudice and confuse the trier by introducing the
experts’ opinions and rhetoric concerning ethics as alternative and improper grounds
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for decision on bases other than the pertinent legal standards”). Because these
opinions are both unreliable under Rule 702 and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403,
I recommend that Dr. Kessler be precluded from offering subjective testimony at
trial about Defendants’ corporate behavior.
iv. 	Reliability and Fit
While many of the above rulings pertain to my assessment of reliability and
fit, for clarity I set forth my findings on those restrictions here.
Reliability. 	To meet Rule 702’s reliability requirement, Plaintiffs must
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr. Kessler’s opinions are
grounded in a reliable method and that he reliably applied that method to this case.
See Cohen, 125 F.4th at 462. Other than the specific challenges above, Defendants
do not challenge the reliability of Dr. Kessler’s testimony.
Based on my independent review, I find that Dr. Kessler’s testimony, as
limited above, satisfies the reliability requirement. Dr. Kessler reviewed case
documents and scientific literature, identified regulatory and industry standards, and
applied his extensive regulatory, professional, and academic expertise to draw
conclusions about whether Johnson & Johnson’s conduct comported with that
framework. Courts have repeatedly found that this is a reliable method for qualified
regulatory experts, including Dr. Kessler. See, e.g., McCoy, 2024 WL 1705952, at
*21 (finding Dr. Kessler’s method of applying his experience to review of data and
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documents reliable); In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy, 2017 WL 1836443,
at 	*14 	(finding 	Dr. Kessler used 	reliable method by 	applying 	“professional
experience” assessing 	FDA compliance as 	FDA Commissioner and 	advising
“pharmaceutical companies on” compliance “with FDA regulations and industry
standards”).
Fit. “An expert’s testimony ‘fits’ the proceedings” if it “will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Cohen, 125 F.4th at
464. Dr. Kessler’s testimony meets this standard.
The regulation of cosmetics—both by the FDA and through the self-
regulatory structure explained by Dr. Kessler—are complex subjects beyond the ken
of a lay juror. As noted above, because Dr. Kessler’s explanation of statutes,
regulations, and industry standards is relevant to the “complex . . . framework”
governing cosmetics manufacturers, his testimony will help the jury evaluate
Defendants’ conduct. In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. at 191.
Dr. Kessler’s opinions also will help the jury understand how a reasonable
and prudent cosmetics manufacturer would respond to scientific data indicating
potential safety risks, and what information would place such a manufacturer on
notice of those risks. This testimony has relevance to Plaintiffs’ claims, including
their failure-to-warn and negligence claims.
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By contrast, the testimony that I recommend be precluded above would not
assist the jury and risks unfair prejudice. This includes his overt legal conclusions
and characterization of Johnson & Johnson’s conduct as “misleading,” “unethical,”
or “putting the public at risk,” which do not assist the jury and risk unfair prejudice.
Those statements are excluded under Rules 702 and 403.
In short, the portions of Dr. Kessler’s testimony that explain regulatory duties,
industry standards, and reasonable-manufacturer expectations “fit” the case. His
legal conclusions, moral assessments, and comments on Defendants’ state of mind
or corporate intent do not.
v. 	Scope
Finally, Defendants argue that Dr. Kessler’s opinions exceed the scope of his
expertise in three ways: (i) he “opines that J&J’s talc products contained asbestos”;
(ii) “he challenges the adequacy of industry asbestos testing”; and (iii) “he addresses
the supposed geological formation of asbestos in the Vermont talc mines.” (Defs.’
Regulatory Br. 36, n.104 (citing Kessler Rep. ¶¶ 80–140, 161–168.5, 201–202.6);
see id., n.105 (citing Kessler Dep. at 109:7–15, 113:3–25, 283:1–20).) In challenging
these opinions, Defendants submit that Dr. Kessler is not “a mineralogist, geologist,
or microscopist”—the “specialists who are actually credentialed to opine on these
complex subjects.” (Id. at 36 (citing Kessler Dep. at 75:19–77:25); see id. at 37 &
n.110 (citing alleged Kessler admissions that other experts should testify on geology,
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mineralogy, and microscopy aspects).) Defendants contend that Dr. Kessler has
never tested talc or any other material for the presence of asbestos and was not
familiar with talc testing methods before this lawsuit. (See id. at 37). They also argue
that Dr. Kessler’s criticisms of Johnson & Johnson’s talc testing method are not
based in mineralogy or microscopy. (See id.).
Plaintiffs counter that Dr. Kessler’s experience as the FDA Commissioner
qualifies him to offer his asbestos testing and geological opinions. (See Pls.’
Regulatory Opp. Br. at 52; id. at 53 (arguing “[u]nderstanding the intersection of
geology, chemistry, testing methodology, and health effects of toxic substances are
a key component of Dr. Kessler’s background and expertise”).) Plaintiffs contend
that many of the documents that Dr. Kessler reviewed were communications with
and discussions concerning the FDA. (See id. at 53–54). And based on Dr. Kessler’s
“unique background,” Plaintiffs claim that he can offer a public-health-focused
opinion that most microscopists and geologists cannot—that “‘the failure to adopt a
public health approach to asbestos in talc testing, even if that led to overinclusion
and false positives, put consumers at risk.’” (Id. at 54 (quoting Kessler Rep. ¶ 100).)
Dr. Kessler’s experience qualifies him to analyze and opine on the challenged
data and studies in his report, but with limits. In his varied experiences, including as
FDA 	Commissioner, Chief 	Science Officer of the 	United States 	COVID-19
Response, and compliance advisor for pharmaceutical companies, Dr. Kessler is
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familiar with analyzing scientific data from different disciplines. (See Kessler Dep.
at 170:1–5 (explaining that the “FDA finds itself regulating substances that intersect
with environmental, geological, mineralogical substances all the time”).) Based on
his experience analyzing scientific information through the lens of the FDA and as
a regulatory advisor, I find that Dr. Kessler is permitted to testify about how the FDA
evaluates testing data submitted by manufacturers and how testing relates to safety
substantiation obligations under the FDCA. He also may testify, based on his
experience, on whether the testing methods that Johnson & Johnson used were
generally consistent with FDA and industry standards. See Mirena I, 169 F. Supp.
3d at 477 (finding, while FDA expert was “not an epidemiologist,” she had “been
involved with epidemiological studies” and this “experience is sufficient to allow
her to analyze studies and reports and rely on them in forming her opinions”).
Because 	Dr. 	Kessler 	is 	not 	a 	mineralogist, geologist, or microscopist,
however, Dr. Kessler must stop short of opining on the technical validity, strength,
or aspects of any particular test. And while he can testify about studies he relied on
in forming his opinions and how the FDA might interpret testing results, he cannot
testify on whether any talc sample contained asbestos or offer opinions on the
geological properties of talc.
For these reasons, I recommend the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Kessler.
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2. 	Dr. Plunkett
i. 	Dr. Plunkett’s Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Plunkett as an expert in “pharmacology, toxicology,
pharmacokinetics, human health risk assessment[s], and the regulation of cosmetic
products in the United States.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 7.) Dr. Plunkett received
a Ph.D. in pharmacology from the University of Georgia, College of Pharmacy in
1984. (Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶ 3.) She then spent two years as a pharmacology
research associate training fellow at the National Institute of General Medical
Sciences. (Id. ¶ 4.)
From 1986 to 1989, Dr. Plunkett was an assistant professor of pharmacology
and toxicology at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences. (Id. ¶ 5.) In
addition to teaching courses in pharmacology, toxicology, and neurosciences, she
performed 	research 	in 	the 	areas 	of 	neuropharmacology 	and 	toxicology 	and
cardiovascular pharmacology and toxicology. (Id.) More generally, throughout her
professional career Dr. Plunkett has taught “graduate students, law students and
pharmacy students on FDA regulations as they apply to all types of FDA-regulated
products, including cosmetics.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Dr. Plunkett has published peer-reviewed
articles and book chapters on pharmacology and toxicology. (Id. & App’x A.)
From 1989 to the present, Dr. Plunkett has worked as consultant for several
private companies: she was a manager at ENVIRON Corporation from 1989 to 1997;
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she owned Plunkett & Associates from 1997 to 2001; she was the president of
Integrative Biostrategies (IB) LLC from 2001 to 2020; and she has been a partner of
BioPolicy Solutions LLC since 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 6–9 & App’x A.) Dr. Plunkett has
“worked on a variety of projects dealing with the regulation of products by the FDA,
including human drugs (both prescription and over-the-counter drugs), veterinary
drugs, 	biologics, 	medical 	devices, 	cosmetics, 	consumer 	products, 	dietary
supplements and foods.” (Id. ¶ 6.) In those roles, Dr. Plunkett has advised clients on
“regulatory issues and strategies for their products, designed preclinical and clinical
studies for both efficacy and safety, advised clients on issues related to statements
regarding efficacy and warnings for their products based on the current labeling
regulations, and generally acted as a regulatory affairs staff for small companies in
early stages of product development.” (Id.)
Dr. Plunkett has “done a great deal of work on projects related to regulation
of cosmetics and cosmetic ingredients.” (Id. ¶¶ 6–7.) As part of that “regulatory
practice,” she has consulted “cosmetic ingredient manufacturers and manufacturers
of cosmetic products on issues related to ingredient safety, product safety, labeling
claims, and general regulatory compliance issues which include US regulations and
regulations in other countries.” (Id. ¶ 7). That includes advising companies during
the “initial commercialization process, where the client was trying to decide how to
market their product, e.g., as a cosmetic or a drug, as well as to determine if their
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product was safe for human exposure.” (Id. ¶ 7.) It also includes advising companies
on “the safety of ingredients used to manufacture cosmetic products.” (Id.)
Dr. Plunkett “worked on the safety of talc itself” in the 1990s, advising
condom manufacturers “on the safety of talcum powder that was used on the surfaces
of the devices as a dry lubricant.” (Id.) In that capacity, Dr. Plunkett assessed “the
scientific literature, including epidemiology, animal and 	in vitro 	studies that
discussed potential adverse health effects linked to talc exposure, including both
local tissue toxicity and systemic toxicity.” (Id.)
Dr. Plunkett attests to using “risk assessments” across her consultancy work,
including in “many projects where risks related to exposure to chemicals in
consumer products were at issue.” (Id. ¶ 6.) In performing risk assessments, she often
reviews and relies on “epidemiology data, as well as animal and in vitro data in order
to assess risks to human health.” (Id.) In many of Dr. Plunkett’s cosmetic safety
projects, determining whether an ingredient is “generally-recognized as safe”
(“GRAS”) is “critical to determining what type of toxicity testing is needed to
establish that a product or an ingredient is safe for human use.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Dr. Plunkett
states that, like analyses conducted by CIR, her GRAS reviews have involved
“consideration of animal and human toxicity data, cellular and mechanistic data,
human product experience reports, and the type and level of exposure that may occur
when humans are exposed to the ingredient or product.” (Id.)
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As 	a 	pharmacologist 	and 	American 	Board 	of 	Toxicology-certified
toxicologist, Dr. Plunkett’s consulting work often relates to “understanding and
explaining the mechanisms of action” and “toxic effects” of “chemicals of all types.”
(Id. ¶¶ 2, 9.) She also has “designed clinical trials and analyzed pharmacokinetic
data.” (Id.)
Based on her broad range of knowledge, professional experience, and
education, Dr. Plunkett is qualified to testify as an expert in pharmacology,
toxicology, pharmacokinetics, and human health risk assessments. Fed. R. Evid.702.
Dr. Plunkett has spent decades applying toxicology principles, including risk
assessments and weight-of-the-evidence assessments, to evaluate potential hazards
associated with cosmetic products and ingredients. She is qualified to testify in those
areas. Based on her consulting and academic experience, Dr. Plunkett is also
qualified to testify, from a non-legal standpoint (as explained below), about the
general 	regulatory 	framework 	applicable 	to 	cosmetics 	products, 	cosmetic
ingredients, and the cosmetics industry. Dr. Plunkett’s ability to testify in the
foregoing areas is subject to the limitations set forth below.
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Plunkett’s Opinions
Dr. Plunkett was asked to “provide opinions related to the human health
hazards posed by exposure to talcum powder products and how those hazards relate
to the regulatory requirements for marketing cosmetic ingredients and cosmetic
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products in the United States.” (Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶ 10.) To formulate her
opinion, she reviewed: (1) “scientific literature relating to the biological effects and
toxic effects of talc and other constituents that are present in talc body powder”; (2)
FDCA provisions and FDA regulations “relating to the development and marketing
of cosmetic ingredients and finished cosmetic products”; (3) “publicly available
information on safety assessments of talc and products containing talc”; and (4)
documents 	produced 	in 	discovery, 	including 	“internal 	company 	documents,
depositions of company employees, reports of other experts in the litigation, or
documents found on public sites.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Dr. Plunkett stated that these sources
mirror those used in her work as a “pharmacologist, toxicologist, risk assessor,” and
FDA “regulatory specialist.” (Id.)
Dr. Plunkett used “standard and generally accepted methods” that she applies
in her “work as a pharmacologist and toxicologist” to assess “the safety of products.”
(Id. ¶ 11.) Specifically, as detailed below, Dr. Plunkett performed a “human health
risk assessment” to evaluate whether the talc products at issue pose a human safety
risk. (Id.) Based on her review, Dr. Plunkett reached the following main conclusions:
• 	The “weight-of-the evidence indicates that genital exposure to talcum
powder products increases the risk of ovarian cancer in women.” Evidence
supporting that conclusion includes: (1) “the known toxic effects of talc
and the other components of talcum powder products”; (2) “studies that
have identified biologically plausible mechanisms for cancer in humans”;
(3) “ the likelihood that talc particles can reach the ovaries”; (4) “the
existence of a dose-response relationship for toxicity including the risk of
cancer”; and (5) “the large human database that includes studies conducted
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over a period of 40 years showing a consistent signal for ovarian cancer in
women exposed to talcum powder products.” (Id. ¶ 120.)
• 	The “use of talc in cosmetic products does not meet the CIR standard of
safety.” That standard provides that a cosmetic ingredient is safe if there is
“no evidence in the available information that demonstrates or suggests
reasonable grounds to suspect a hazard to the public under the conditions
of use that are now current or that might reasonably be expected in the
future.” 	Given 	the 	“the 	presence 	of 	asbestos, 	fibrous 	talc, 	cobalt,
chromium, and nickel, in the talc body powders manufactured by Imerys
and Johnson & Johnson, a significant biologically plausible human health
risk was identified as a hazard related to talc body powder use at least by
the 1940’s. These risks included a risk of cancer with exposure to
constituents of talc body powders, and even death with acute inhalation of
large.” (Id. ¶¶ 82, 121.)
• 	“Failure to meet the CIR standard for safety meant that Johnson & Johnson
failed to properly substantiate and ensure the safety of their cosmetic body
powder products.” (Id. ¶ 121.)
• 	“Given that Johnson & Johnson was aware that cornstarch-based body
powder products represented a safer alternative, their failure to replace talc
with cornstarch over the years that they marketed talc-based body powders
put consumer health at risk.” (Id. ¶ 121.)
• 	“Based on the knowledge available by the 1950’s, talc body powders
manufactured and sold by Imerys and Johnson & Johnson should have
warned consumers about the toxic constituents, such as asbestos, fibrous
talc, nickel, chromium and cobalt and fragrance, in their products and the
effects that could be produced by exposure to talc dusts.” (Id.)
• 	FDA regulations require cosmetic product labels to “bear a warning
statement “‘whenever necessary or appropriate to prevent a health hazard
that may be associated with the product,’” and a “cause and effect” need
not “be proven for such a warning to be put into place.” (Id. ¶ 122 (quoting
21 CFR 740.1(a)).)
• 	“There was evidence from at least the 1960’s of the risk of ovarian cancer
in women exposed to components of talc body powders,” including
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“asbestos,” and such evidence “has only gained strength over the last six
decades.” Because this “specific ovarian cancer risk was evident by the
1960’s,” under FDA regulations “talc-based cosmetic products, including
products used by women for genital dusting, should have been labeled to
warn of the risk of ovarian cancer with such use.” (Id. ¶ 121–22.)
• 	Defendants “have never placed an adequate warning onto its containers of
talcum powder products” and this “failure to provide consumers with such
information puts public health at risk.” (Id. ¶ 122.)
• 	The “presence of carcinogenic constituents in talc such as asbestos, fibrous
talc, nickel, chromium, and cobalt meant that Johnson & Johnson’s failure
to list those talc constituents on its labeling was consistent with the FDA’s
definition of a misbranded product, and also consistent with the FDA’s
definition of an adulterated product.” (Id. ¶ 123.)
• 	Rather than performing appropriate safety studies or providing consumers
with adequate and timely “safety information about the human health risks
of talc when it was used for genital dusting, industry worked together with
the” Personal Care Products Council (“PCPC”) “to influence the scientific
and regulatory processes related to cosmetic talcum powder products.” (Id.
¶ 124.)
As discussed below, Dr. Plunkett expressly disclaimed offering opinions on
general causation or specific causation. (See ECF No. 33000-8 (“Plunkett 2023
Dep.”) at 72:15–73:1). She instead framed her opinions as addressing whether
exposure to talc products increases the “risk” of ovarian cancer, from the vantage
point of a regulator or toxicologist conducting a precautionary risk assessment. (See
id.)
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments
Defendants 	assert 	five 	main 	arguments 	for 	excluding 	Dr. 	Plunkett’s
testimony, each of which Plaintiffs dispute:
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First, while Defendants agree that a risk assessment is “a generally accepted
method,” they argue that Dr. Plunkett “did not reliably perform that analysis”
because she did not conduct “a general causation analysis” in “reaching her opinion
that talc increases the risk of ovarian cancer.” (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 34–35.)
Defendants argue that Dr. Plunkett’s “exclusion of a causation analysis (and the
Bradford Hill criteria for causation) as part of a risk assessment contradicts generally
recognized scientific approaches, including those outlined in the authorities” she
cites. (Id.) Based on that purported omission, Defendants argue that Dr. Plunkett’s
risk assessment must be excluded as unreliable. (Id. at 34–35.)
In response, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Plunkett “is not testifying as to causation
but only as to risk.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 50.) Plaintiffs submit that Dr.
Plunkett’s opinion, “as a toxicologist, is that the weight-of-the evidence indicates
that genital exposure to talcum powder products increases the risk of ovarian cancer
in women.” (Id.) According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Plunkett reaches that opinion by
conducting a human health risk assessment, a tool routinely used by toxicologists
(including herself) and government bodies to “assess risks to human health related
to exposure to chemicals in the everyday environment.” (Id. at 51.) Plaintiffs contend
that Dr. Plunkett reliably performs each step of the risk-assessment methodology.
(Id. 51–52.)
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Second, Defendants argue that Dr. Plunkett offers improper factual narratives,
quoting at length from Johnson & Johnson corporate documents. (Defs.’ Regulatory
Br. at 12–13.) In response, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Plunkett should be permitted
to testify about documents underlying her report, particularly because she “relies on
this same type of information” when providing toxicology, pharmacology, and
regulatory consulting services in the private sector. (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 19.)
Plaintiffs further contend that because these documents contain “information
unfamiliar to a layperson (e.g., industry jargon and acronyms, description of industry
and regulatory processes, etc.),” Dr. Plunkett’s explanations will help the jury. (Id.
at 18–19.)
Third, Defendants argue that Dr. Plunkett offers improper legal opinions
about FDA regulations applicable to cosmetic products and whether Defendants met
them. According to Defendants, these improper opinions include: (1) comparing
FDA regulations applicable to cosmetic and drug manufacturers; (2) stating that
cosmetics must “carry warnings based on a standard of a possibility of health
hazard”; (3) asserting that Defendants “failed to properly substantiate and ensure the
safety of their cosmetic body powder products” and, as such, “should have warned
consumers about the toxic constituents” of the talc products and provided a label that
“warn[ed] of the risk of ovarian cancer”; and (4) opining that “these alleged failures
rendered Johnson’s Baby Powder an ‘adulterated product.’” (Defs.’ Regulatory Br.
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at 15–16 (quoting Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶¶ 16, 92).) Defendants state that other
courts have precluded Dr. Plunkett from offering similar legal conclusions. (See
Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 14 (collecting cases).)
Plaintiffs 	dispute 	that 	Dr. 	Plunkett 	offers 	improper 	legal 	conclusions.
According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Plunkett (1) explains the regulatory landscape for
cosmetics, and (2) evaluates—from her perspective as a toxicologist and FDA
regulatory specialist, not as a lawyer—whether talc posed a health hazard that
required a warning. Plaintiffs argue that these regulatory and labeling opinions do
not usurp the Court’s role instructing the jury on the law or the jury’s role deciding
liability. Plaintiffs claim that courts have allowed Dr. Plunkett to testify on “FDA
requirements,” including similar “regulatory and labeling issues.” (Pls.’ Regulatory
Opp. Br. at 24–25 (citing cases).)
Fourth, Defendants argue that Dr. Plunkett renders impermissible state-of-
mind opinions about what Defendants knew about purported risks posed by the talc
products and when. Defendants also argue that Dr. Plunkett “speculates about
defendants’ intent and motive,” including opining that Defendants’ “goal was to
mount a defense strategy around talc” and that the “industry had no interest in
sponsoring any new research.” (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 18–19 (quoting Plunkett 3d
Amend. Rep. ¶¶ 78, 96, 104, 115; Plunkett 2021 Dep. at 136:16–24).) Defendants
cite a California state court decision barring Dr. Plunkett from offering similar
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testimony in a talc case, Lloyd v. Johnson & Johnson, No. BC628228 (JCCP No.
4872) (Cal. Super. Ct.) (the “Echeverria Opinion”). (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at
18). Plaintiffs dispute that Dr. Plunkett is testifying about Defendants’ intent.
According 	to 	Plaintiffs, 	Dr. 	Plunkett 	“can 	rely 	on 	company 	documents 	to
demonstrate what the defendants knew or should have known at a given time.” (Pls.’
Regulatory Opp. Br. at 29–30.)
Fifth, Defendants contend that Dr. Plunkett renders subjective judgments
about the ethical appropriateness of Defendants’ conduct. (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at
22 (citing Plunkett 2021 Dep. at 217:20–24).) Plaintiffs respond that Dr. Plunkett’s
opinion about “whether Defendants acted reasonably in the face of mounting
evidence of the risk of talc-induced ovarian cancer” is based on the FDCA, FDA
regulations, and industry standards relating to the development and marketing of
cosmetic 	ingredients 	and 	products, 	rather 	than 	subjective 	standards. 	(Pls.’
Regulatory Opp. Br. at 38–40.)
I address these disputes when analyzing the reliability and fit of Dr. Plunkett’s
opinions below.
iv. 	Reliability
As noted above, to meet their burden on reliability, Plaintiffs must show that
it is more likely than not that Dr. Plunkett’s testimony is based on sufficient facts,
reliable methods, and a reliable application of those methods. Fed. R. Evid.702. For
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the reasons below, I find that Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that, in
general, 	Dr. 	Plunkett’s 	risk-assessment 	opinions 	generally 	reflect 	a 	reliable
application of a recognized human health risk-assessment methodology. Similarly,
Dr. Plunkett’s regulatory and industry standard opinions generally satisfy Rule 702’s
reliability 	requirement. 	In 	both 	contexts, 	however, 	certain 	of 	Dr. 	Plunkett’s
conclusions do not flow from her general reliable methods and must be excluded.
a. 	Risk-Assessment Methodology
Dr. Plunkett performed a human health risk assessment to form her opinion
that exposure to talc products increases the risk of ovarian cancer. (Plunkett 3d
Amend. Rep. ¶ 11.) Government bodies and toxicologists have long used risk
assessments to evaluate the safety of chemicals and determine whether they present
a human health risk. (Id.). In 1983, the National Research Council promulgated a
four-step process for performing a risk assessment that remains in effect today: (1)
hazard identification, (2) dose-response assessment, (3) exposure analysis, and (4)
characterization of the risks. (Id.)
Defendants concede that a risk assessment is a “generally accepted method
for determining risk.” (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 33.) Based upon such general
acceptance, Dr. Plunkett’s own experience conducting risk assessments, and the
standards controlling risk assessments, I find that Dr. Plunkett’s risk assessment
methodology is reliable. See UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.7575
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Acres, 949 F.3d 825, 834 (3d Cir. 2020) (identifying factors for determining
reliability of method).
While the parties agree that a risk assessment may be a reliable method, they
dispute whether Dr. Plunkett’s application of that method was reliable. As noted
above, Defendants contend that Dr. Plunkett failed to reliably perform a risk
assessment because she did not conduct a causation analysis at step one. (Defs.’
Regulatory Br. at 34 (arguing “to identify a hazard (i.e., the first step in a risk
assessment), a scientist must first determine whether a particular toxin is causally
linked to certain health effects”).). Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that Dr. Plunkett
properly applied a weight-of-the-evidence analysis at step one, rather than a
Bradford Hill causation analysis. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 50–51.) Because
this reliability dispute implicates the relationship between (1) a human health risk
assessment in the regulatory and toxicology sphere, and (2) a causation analysis in
toxic-tort and products-liability litigation, I begin by briefly summarizing the
differences between those two standards.
“Regulatory and advisory bodies such as IARC, OSHA and EPA” conduct
risk assessments, often using a “weight of the evidence” analysis, to “assess the
carcinogenicity of various substances in human beings and suggest or make
prophylactic rules governing human exposure.” 	Allen, 102 F.3d at 198. Risk
assessments are conducted “from the preventive perspective that the agencies adopt
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in order to reduce public exposure to harmful substances.” Id. at 198. Put differently,
“the basic goal underlying risk assessments” is “to determine a level that will protect
the most sensitive members of the population.” Rowe v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., No. 06-cv-1810, 2008 WL 5412912, at *16 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2008).
As a result, the “threshold of proof is reasonably lower than that appropriate
in tort law, which ‘traditionally make[s] more particularized inquiries into cause and
effect’ and requires a plaintiff to prove ‘that it is more likely than not that another
individual has caused him or her harm.’” Allen, 102 F.3d at 198 (quoting Wright v.
Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1996)); see Glastetter v.
Novartis Pharms. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The FDA will remove
drugs from the marketplace upon a lesser showing of harm to the public than the
preponderance-of-the-evidence or more-likely-than-not standards used to assess tort
liability.”). Indeed, the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence explains this exact
distinction:
Proof of risk and proof of causation entail somewhat
different questions because risk assessment frequently
calls for a cost–benefit analysis. The agency assessing risk
may decide to bar a substance or product if the potential
benefits are outweighed by the possibility of risks that are
largely 	unquantifiable 	because 	of 	presently 	unknown
contingencies. Consequently, risk assessors may pay heed
to any evidence that points to a need for caution, rather
than assess the likelihood that a causal relationship in a
specific case is more likely than not.
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Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 33 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., 2d ed.
2000.)
Given those distinctions, courts have rejected attempts to use the outcome of
risk assessments, without more, to establish general or specific causation. See, e.g.,
Rowe, 2008 WL 5412912, at *13 (“While the Rowe Plaintiffs tout the risk
assessment method as the ideal means of proving common exposure among the class
members, the Court finds that this method establishes nothing more than an
assumption of common exposure.”); Glastetter, 252 F.3d at 991 (“The FDA’s 1994
decision that Parlodel can cause strokes is unreliable proof of medical causation in
the present case because the FDA employs a reduced standard (vis-a-vis tort
liability) for gauging causation when it decides to rescind drug approval.”).
Step 	1: 	Hazard 	identification. 	Dr. 	Plunkett 	began 	her 	analysis 	by
“identifying, 	collecting, 	reviewing, 	assessing, 	and 	evaluating” 	peer-reviewed
literature on the biological and toxic effects of talc and talc-based products. (Plunkett
3d Amend. Rep. ¶ 12.) As part of those efforts, Dr. Plunkett performed systematic
searches across databases to capture relevant studies and evidence, including in vitro
and in vivo toxicological evidence, mechanistic data, and epidemiological studies.
(See id. ¶¶ 58–60.)
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Dr. Plunkett then synthesized this data using a weight-of-the-evidence
approach, a recognized method used in her field of toxicology to evaluate whether
the totality of evidence supports a hazard conclusion. See Bernard D. Goldstein &
Mary Sue Henifin, 	Reference Guide on Toxicology, in 	Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence, 651 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., 3d. ed. 2011) (“The hazard identification
process often uses ‘weight of evidence’ approaches in which the toxicological,
mechanistic, and epidemiological data are rigorously assessed to form a judgment
regarding the likelihood that the agent produces a specific effect.”); (Plunkett 3d
Amend. Rep. ¶ 13 (“Weight-of-the-evidence methodology, is used as part of
regulatory decision making by regulatory and scientific bodies such as the FDA,”
EPA, OSHA, WHO, and IARC).) By identifying the evidence she reviewed and
explaining how it informed her risk conclusion, I find that Dr. Plunkett reliably
performed a weight-of-the-evidence assessment at the hazard identification step.190
Step 2: Dose-response. Using the same weight-of-the-evidence method, Dr.
Plunkett evaluated the relationship between talc exposure and ovarian cancer. (See
Id. ¶ 11.) In conducting that assessment, Dr. Plunkett evaluated a broad range of
studies 	and 	data, 	including 	in 	vitro 	studies, 	human 	studies, 	and 	regulatory
190 	In this regard, I disagree with Defendants’ claim that hazard identification in a risk
assessment necessarily requires a general or specific causation-type analysis. As long as Dr.
Plunkett limits the nature of the conclusion that she offers to risk—rather than rendering a tort-
causation opinion—her application satisfies the reliability requirement.
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classifications. 	(Id. 	¶¶ 	73–75.) 	Defendants 	do 	not 	challenge 	Dr. 	Plunkett’s
application at the dose-response step and I find that Dr. Plunkett reliability applied
the weight-of-the-evidence method to evaluate dose response.
Step 3: Exposure assessment. Because Dr. Plunkett is not being proffered as
a case-specific expert, she did not attempt to “define any specific exposure for any
specific person in quantitative terms.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Instead, Dr. Plunkett assessed
exposure at the general population level by “defining the routes of human exposure
that would be relevant for evaluating the risks posed by use of the powders and the
type of exposure patterns that have been linked to risks posed by the use of powders.”
(Id.; see id. ¶ 94.) As noted above, regulatory risk assessments often operate at such
levels of generality, focusing on general populations or conditions of use. Within
that limited risk-based scope, I find that Dr. Plunkett’s application of the exposure
assessment step was reliable.
Step 4: Risk characterization. Finally, Dr. Plunkett integrates the above
steps to reach her risk-characterization conclusion: that the “weight-of-the-evidence
indicates that genital exposure to talcum powder products increases the risk of
ovarian cancer in women.” (Id. ¶ 120.) I find that Dr. Plunkett’s risk characterization
is reliable.
Even so, aspects of Dr. Plunkett’s report do not reflect a reliable application
of a risk assessment and should be excluded. While Plaintiffs characterize Dr.
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Plunkett’s opinion as risk-based and disclaim offering her to prove causation, certain
statements in her report cross the line from risk assessment into de facto general
causation opinions. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 72 (referencing “a cause and effect relationship
between talc exposure and human ovarian cancer risk”).) Because these statements
do not flow from Dr. Plunkett’s risk-assessment method, I recommend they be
excluded. More generally, at trial Dr. Plunkett must confine her testimony to a risk-
assessment framework that discusses hazard signals and risk, without presenting
those assessments as determinations of or substitutes for causation.191
Subject to those constraints, I find that Dr. Plunkett reliably applied a reliable
human health risk assessment methodology and has “good grounds” for her core risk
assessment opinions. Cohen, 125 F.4th at 462.
b. 	Regulatory-Based Methodology
In addition to her risk-assessment opinions, Dr. Plunkett also testified more
generally as to the regulatory framework and industry standards applicable to
cosmetic product manufacturers. (See, e.g., Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶¶ 15–16.) Dr.
Plunkett’s 	explanation 	of 	those 	standards 	flowed 	from 	her 	broad 	“personal
191 	Nothing in this Report and Recommendation precludes either party from seeking an
instruction regarding the distinction between causation in product liability cases and risk in the
context of a human health risk assessment. Nor does my recommendation preclude either party
from seeking a limiting instruction; e.g.—that the jury may consider Dr. Plunkett’s testimony only
for the limited purpose of understanding how toxicologists and regulatory bodies assess and
characterize potential health risks associated with product exposure; that her testimony is not
evidence that talc or asbestos cause ovarian cancer; and that the jury may not treat any discussion
of “risk” as proof of causation.
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knowledge” and “experience,” reflecting a reliable application of non-scientific
testimony. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150; see United States v. Bridges, No. 21-
cv-1679, 2022 WL 4244276, at *8 (3d Cir. Sept. 15, 2022) (finding “experience
based” testimony “satisfies reliability”).
v. 	Fit, Scope, and Specific Challenges
Plaintiffs have met their burden of proving that limited portions of Dr.
Plunkett’s 	testimony 	regarding 	risk-assessment 	and 	the 	applicable 	regulatory
framework fit this case. Other portions of her testimony, however, must be excluded
as irrelevant, improper, or otherwise unduly prejudicial.
As 	discussed 	above, 	because 	risk 	assessments 	operate 	under 	different
assumptions and evidentiary thresholds than tort law, Dr. Plunkett’s risk-based
testimony cannot substitute for proof of general or specific causation in this case.
Even so, risk-assessment testimony may be relevant for limited, non-causation
purposes, particularly where (as here) the proponent offers separate expert testimony
on general and specific causation. See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin,
Reference Guide on Toxicology, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 649
(Fed. Jud. Ctr., 3d. ed. 2011) (“risk assessment information about a chemical can be
somewhat useful in a toxic tort case”).
Here, Dr. Plunkett’s risk-assessment and regulatory framework testimony, if
properly cabined to avoid any discussion of causation, will help the jury understand
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facts relevant to Plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn and negligence claims. For example, her
testimony on how toxicologists and regulatory agencies conduct risk assessments
and 	weigh 	scientific 	evidence 	is 	relevant 	to 	the 	jury’s 	assessment 	of 	the
reasonableness of Defendants’ conduct in light of available information. And her
testimony on the regulatory framework in which cosmetics manufacturers operate
will help the jury understand issues relevant to the standard of care, including
whether any identified risks would prompt a reasonable cosmetic manufacturer to
take further investigative steps or communicate risks to the public. (See, e.g.,
Plunkett 3d Amend. Rep. ¶¶ 15–27.) Thus, I find that Dr. Plunkett’s testimony has
sufficient fit to be admissible for those limited purposes, subject to the above and
below restrictions.
Legal 	conclusions. 	While 	Dr. 	Plunkett 	may 	describe 	the 	regulatory
framework governing cosmetics and explain how toxicologists and regulatory
professionals assess safety and risk communication within that framework, Dr.
Plunkett cannot draw inadmissible legal conclusions. Thus, as with Dr. Kessler, Dr.
Plunkett cannot offer opinions that Defendants violated FDA regulations, failed to
comply with legal labeling requirements, marketed products that were “adulterated”
or “misbranded,” failed to warn, or were negligent as a matter of law. As explained
above, 	those 	opinions 	constitute 	impermissible 	legal 	conclusions 	and 	risk
substituting Dr. Plunkett’s judgment for that of the Court and jury.
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State of mind, intent, motives, and ethics. For substantially the same reasons
addressed in my analysis of Dr. Kessler’s testimony, Dr. Plunkett’s opinions
regarding what Defendants “knew,” what their “goal” was, or whether they acted to
influence scientific or regulatory processes do not fit. Determinations of corporate
intent, motive, or state of mind are “classic jury” questions and do not require expert
assistance. In re Diet Drugs, No. MDL 1203, 2000 WL 876900, at *2, 9 (E.D. Pa.
June 20, 2000.) Dr. Plunkett may not testify that Defendants definitely knew of
specific risks, deliberately ignored evidence, or acted with particular motives. To the
extent Dr. Plunkett discusses whether the types of scientific and regulatory data that
Defendants possessed could have altered them to a risk, she must do so only from
the perspective of a reasonable cosmetics manufacturer and not make overt
statements about Defendants’ state of mind. Deutsch v, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 443–44.
Similarly, Dr. Plunkett may not offer subjective assessments regarding the
ethical propriety or appropriateness of Defendants’ conduct. In re Rezulin, 309 F.
Supp. 2d at 543. Dr. Plunkett may testify regarding objective industry practices and
risk-assessment norms relevant to cosmetic safety, but she may not offer moral or
ethical judgments. Nor can she make statements that Defendants in fact put the
public at risk.
Factual Narratives. As with Dr. Kessler, because portions of Dr. Plunkett’s
report help contextualize the information she cites, I decline to parse the report
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“paragraph-by-paragraph to determine where the report turns from expert analysis
to factual narrative.” Liberty Media, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 174. Defendants can object
if Dr. Plunkett’s trial testimony turns into a factual narrative.
For these reasons, I recommend the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Plunkett.
3. 	Dr. Sage
i. 	Dr. Sage’s Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Sage as an expert in the “science of policymaking” and
“regulatory design.” (Sage Rep. ¶ 9.) He claims “particular expertise” in “the
regulation of health and safety,” including in “information-based regulation” and
“self-regulatory models.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Dr. Sage attests that the self-regulation in which
he 	has 	expertise 	“includes 	government-supervised 	health 	and 	financial 	self-
regulation, corporate compliance and corporate governance, and the regulation of
self-governing professions.” (Id.)
Dr. Sage received an M.D. in anesthesia and critical care medicine and a J.D.
from Stanford University. (Id. ¶ 2.) After completing a medical internship, Dr. Sage
spent one year as an anesthesiology and crucial care medicine resident at Johns
Hopkins Hospital. (Id.) He then worked as a corporate lawyer for five years. (Id.)
Dr. Sage left private practice to enter academia in 1995. During his tenures at
Columbia University (1995–2006), the University of Texas at Austin (2006–2022),
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and Texas A&M University (2022–present), he has served as a professor in law and
medical schools, often concurrently. (See id. ¶¶ 1, 4–5.) At Texas, he was also the
vice provost for Health Affairs. (Id. ¶ 4.) In his current role at Texas A&M, Dr. Sage
is a professor in the law school, medical school, and Bush School of Government
and Public Service, and an assistant vice president in the Health Center. (Id. ¶ 1.)
Dr. Sage has taught classes in health law and policy, legislation, regulatory
theory and design, and professional ethics and self-governance. (See id. ¶ 6 & Ex.
A.) He has published many articles and several books, addressing topics like public
health, regulation, and corporate responsibility. (See id., Ex. A.) Dr. Sage also has
advised governmental, academic, and professional organizations, including as a
working group member on President Clinton’s 1993 Health Care Reform Task
Force. (Id. ¶ 7.) He is a member of the National Academy of Medicine and the
American Law Institute and the co-editor of the most recent edition of the Oxford
Handbook of U.S. Health Law. (Id., Ex. A.)
Dr. Sage has taught classes on FDA regulations, including in relation to drugs,
medical devices, and over-the-counter medications. (Sage Dep. at 26:21–27:2.) But
he has never worked for the FDA, has never served on an FDA committee, and has
never communicated with anyone at the FDA about a cosmetic product. (See Sage
Dep. at 45:18–20, 48:2–11.) He has not worked in the cosmetics industry, has not
advised cosmetics manufacturers, had not performed “specific work on cosmetic
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regulations” prior to this case, and has not taught classes on cosmetic manufacturing.
(See Sage Dep. at 25:14–17, 32:22–33:6, 44:4–45:21.)
Based on these facts and my review of Dr. Sage’s report and deposition
transcript, I find that Dr. Sage is qualified to testify only as to regulatory design and
self-regulation in the health and consumer products sectors. Because he lacks direct
experience with cosmetic manufacturers and FDA (and Canadian) regulatory
compliance, however, he is unqualified to offer opinions applying those regulations
to 	Defendants’ 	conduct. 	I 	further 	illustrate 	this 	limitation 	in 	analyzing 	the
admissibility of Dr. Sage’s proposed testimony below.
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Sage’s Opinions
Dr. Sage stated that he was retained to answer two questions: “(a) What are
the regulatory practices and standards under which manufacturers of cosmetics
operate? and (b) Did Johnson & Johnson comply with these standards in its general
development, manufacture, marketing, and sale of talcum powder products.” (Sage
Rep. ¶ 11.) In answering those questions, Dr. Sage reviewed applicable laws and
regulations, industry standards, peer-reviewed literature, corporate documents, and
publicly available information. (Id. ¶ 12.) Based on his review, Dr. Sage reached the
following main conclusions:
• 	The cosmetics industry relies on a “self-regulated” framework that the
FDA does not closely supervise. This system is “principally firm-based,”
and relies on manufacturers to voluntarily comply with FDA standards and
industry codes of conduct. This includes (i) selling “only safe products
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containing 	safe 	ingredients,” 	(ii) 	responsibly 	disclosing 	product
information 	to 	consumers, 	and 	(iii) 	voluntarily 	reporting 	product
information to the FDA. (Sage Rep. ¶¶ 174–175.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “did not establish or maintain the safety of its” talc
products. Even though Johnson & Johnson “knew its products contained
carcinogens, including asbestos, fibrous talc, and heavy metals,” Johnson
& Johnson did not: (i) perform studies to address rising concerns; (ii)
notify the FDA that the talc products contained ingredients that “may be
associated with a health hazard”; or (iii) accurately register its products,
inform the FDA of positive test results, or consistently report adverse
events. (Sage Rep. ¶¶ 176–177, 180, 182.)
• 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson 	did 	not 	(i) 	provide 	consumers 	with 	“required
warnings” of “health hazards associated” with the talc products, (ii) inform
consumers that consuming talc products posed risks, or (iii) disclose that
the safety of the talc products “had not been determined.” (Sage Rep. ¶¶
178–179, 183.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “misled” consumers with “continued reassurance
about safety and purity,” and “marketed and sold a misbranded and
adulterated product. (Sage Rep. ¶¶ 181, 183.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson “did not follow its own safety standards or corporate
pledge of legal compliance and ethical self-governance beyond what the
marketplace had always accepted.” (Sage Rep. ¶ 184.)
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments
Defendants assert four main arguments for excluding Dr. Sage’s testimony,
each of which Plaintiffs dispute:
First, Defendants argue that Dr. Sage is unqualified to opine on the alleged
relationship between the talc products and ovarian cancer, and that the opinions he
does offer are not the product of a reliable method. (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. 31–33.)
In response, Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Sage “is not offering any general causation
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opinions regarding whether talcum powder products cause ovarian cancer,” and
merely “discusses the scientific literature, including opinions by Plaintiffs’ other
experts, as part of his broader discussion and opinions related to regulatory practices
and standards.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 49.)
Second, 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	Dr. 	Sage’s 	opinions 	constitute 	legal
conclusions about whether Johnson & Johnson violated federal regulations and legal
duties. These include his opinion that Johnson & Johnson (i) marketed and sold a
misbranded and adulterated product, (ii) did not substantiate the safety of the talc
products, and (iii) failed to provide legally required warnings. (See Defs.’ Regulatory
Br. 13–16.)
Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Sage is a “legal expert on health law and corporate
responsibility” who “should be allowed to offer his opinions on industry standards
and 	the 	regulatory 	framework 	and 	whether 	Defendants 	complied 	with 	these
standards in the marketing and sale” of the talc products. Plaintiffs argue that Dr.
Sage explains those industry standards and regulatory framework “through the lens
of Defendants’ actions,” but does not offer “ultimate legal conclusions about
Defendants’ liability.” (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 22–23.)
Third, Defendants argue that Dr. Sage renders ethical judgments about
Defendants’ corporate conduct and state-of-mind opinions that are speculative and
unduly prejudicial. According to Defendants, this includes opining that Johnson &
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Johnson: (i) knew about health risks associated with the talc products, (ii) did not
engage in “responsible corporate behavior,” and (iii) violated its own representations
regarding ethics. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br. 19–25.)
Plaintiffs disagree, pointing to portions of Dr. Sage’s deposition transcript
where he promises not to offer opinions on Defendants’ intent. Plaintiffs assert that
Dr. Sage may testify about what information Defendants possessed at certain points
in time and whether their actions were reasonable. Plaintiffs also contend that Dr.
Sage may testify about whether Defendants complied with industry, regulatory, and
internal guidelines, and will not state his personal feelings about Defendants’ actions
at trial. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 30–31, 34–36, 40–41).
Fourth, Defendants argue that Dr. Sage narrates corporate documents—
including Johnson & Johnson communications, a patent application, and CIR
communications—without adding any expert analysis. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br.
11–13.) Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that Dr. Sage’s analysis adds helpful context on
the applicable regulatory and industry framework. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br.
19.)
I address these disputes when analyzing the reliability and fit of Dr. Sage’s
opinions below.
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iv. 	Reliability and Scope
Plaintiffs must show that it is more likely than not that Dr. Sage’s testimony
is based on sufficient facts, reliable methods, and a reliable application of those
methods. Fed. R. Evid.702. I find that Plaintiffs have met that burden only as to a
limited portion of Dr. Sage’s testimony.
Dr. Sage “formulated” his opinions by using his “professional knowledge,
experience, 	and 	expertise” 	to 	review 	corporate 	documents, 	“peer-reviewed
literature,” “laws and regulations,” and industry standards. (Sage Rep. ¶ 12.)
According to Dr. Sage, this is the same methodology that he has “applied in [his]
professional and academic career.” (Sage Rep. ¶ 12.) He identifies no other scientific
or non-scientific methodology, such as a comparative analysis of other cosmetic
manufacturer’s practices.
While “extensive and specialized experience” can serve as a reliable method
for making non-scientific observations under Kumho, that only gets Dr. Sage so far.
526 U.S. at 156. As noted above, Dr. Sage’s experience and expertise is in health
law and regulatory design, including industry self-regulation. Given his specialized
background, I find that Dr. Sage’s qualifications and methods are sufficient to permit
him to explain the FDA’s overall regulatory scheme for cosmetics (including the
distinction between the FDA’s oversight of drugs and cosmetics) and the concept of
self-regulation generally and in the cosmetics sector.
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But the balance of Dr. Sage’s opinions are not the product of specialized
expertise or a reliable method. Dr. Sage has no experience working for the FDA or
analyzing FDA disclosures or communications. Nor has he worked for a cosmetic
manufacturer or otherwise previously analyzed compliance efforts or obligations of
a cosmetic company. Because Plaintiffs rely only on Dr. Sage’s experience—
identifying no other methodology—his inexperience in these areas renders the rest
of his testimony unreliable. See In re Rezulin, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (excluding
opinions on compliance with FDA standards as unreliable where experts lacked
relevant experience and cited no other methodology). That inadmissible testimony
includes his opinions that Johnson & Johnson (i) failed to substantiate safety, (ii)
failed to warn and misled consumers, and (iii) marketed and sold misbranded and
adulterated products. It also includes all of Dr. Sage’s compliance opinions, such as
Johnson & Johnson’s purported violations of FDA regulations and disclosure
requirements, industry standards, and internal policies. Finally, it includes his
opinions about Johnson & Johnson’s actions or the information that Johnson &
Johnson allegedly possessed.192
192 	Plaintiffs and Dr. Sage submit that he “is not offering any general causation opinions
regarding whether talcum powder products cause ovarian cancer.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 49;
Sage Dep. at 396:5-6 (“I’m not offering a scientific expert opinion on causation.”).) For the
avoidance of doubt, I recommend the Court find that Dr. Sage is not qualified to opine on any
alleged relationship between talc products and ovarian cancer—either from a tort-law or risk-
assessment perspective—and that such testimony would not stem from a reliable methodology.
Moreover, given the limitations I have recommended be imposed on his testimony, Dr. Sage should
also be precluded from offering any testimony related to: Johnson & Johnson’s knowledge or risks,
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v. 	Fit
With these limitations, Dr. Sage’s cabined testimony will help the factfinder
understand evidence or determine a fact in issue, and thus satisfy Rule 702’s fit
requirement. As noted above, Dr. Sage may testify about the regulatory scheme
applicable to cosmetics manufacturers, including the role of self-regulation. This
information will help the jury understand the complex regulatory environment in
which Defendants operated, and thus better evaluate Defendants’ conduct in relation
to the standard of care. See United States ex rel. Silver v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 11-
1326, 2023 WL 2808098, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2023) (“Qualified experts may
provide background on a statutory or regulatory scheme so long as their opinions do
not state whether the statute or regulation was violated.”).
By contrast, many of the opinions that I recommend be excluded above also
fail the fit requirement or are unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. Dr. Sage’s opinions
that Johnson & Johnson violated FDA regulations and other legal requirements—
including regulations on labeling, disclosures, and substantiating product safety—
are improper legal conclusions. See Rowland v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 9 F. Supp.
3d 553, 561 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (allowing expert to “testify as to the general FDA
alleged hazards posed by the talc products (e.g., whether they contained asbestos, posed health
risks, or cause cancer), or Defendants’ testing methods. Indeed, in their own Daubert motion,
Plaintiffs state that “opinions on what [Johnson & Johnson] knew—and when—about the alleged
presence of asbestos . . . require the application of knowledge about mineralogy, geology, or talc
mining and testing.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 11). Because Dr. Sage lacks such knowledge,
he fails Plaintiffs’ own test.
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regulatory scheme governing pharmaceutical drugs,” but finding opinion on whether
“specific conduct . . . complied with FDA regulations” was “an improper legal
conclusion”); In re Rezulin, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (finding “[e]xpert testimony
interpreting [defendant’s] conduct in disclosing information to the FDA” would “not
assist the fact-finder.”) The same finding applies to his opinion that Johnson &
Johnson misled consumers and sold adulterated and misbranded products. These
statements apply the law to the facts and thus invade the province of the Court and
the jury.
Similarly, during his deposition, Dr. Sage made the types of subjective “bad
company” comments that courts regularly exclude as irrelevant, unhelpful, and
unduly prejudicial. (See, e.g., Sage Dep. at 302:2–7 (describing content of Johnson
& Johnson’s website as “disappointing, frankly shocking, and directly at odds with
its regulatory obligations”)); see Bartoli, 2014 WL 1515870, at *6 (explaining “‘bad
company’ opinions are not admissible”).
Dr. Sage also made speculative inferences about Johnson & Johnson’s state-
of-mind or motives based on his review of documents. (See, e.g., Sage Rep. at 8
(“Johnson & Johnson has known about risk and uncertainty regarding talc and
ovarian cancer for decades.”); id. ¶ 176 (“Johnson & Johnson knew its products
contained carcinogens”); id. ¶ 50 (“Johnson & Johnson’s resistance to the presence
in talcum powder products of fibrous constituents that pose risk to human health is
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strikingly at odds with the factual history.”).) Because Dr. Sage is unqualified to add
scientific or industry context to these documents, the jury can draw these inferences
without his expert testimony. See In re Diet Drugs, 2000 WL 876900, at *9 (finding
if expert “witnesses’ bases for the opinions concerning improper intent come from”
letters and employee statements, “that is what the jury should hear and the question
of . . . intent would flow from such evidence to be determined by the jury.”); In re
Rezulin, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (explaining whether defendant purposefully
“‘buried’ certain lab results” was a “simple inference” drawn from documents
“plaintiffs’ counsel may present directly to the fact-finder”.)193
For these reasons, I recommend the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Sage.
4. 	Dr. Newman
i. 	Dr. Newman’s Qualifications
Plaintiffs proffer Dr. Newman as an expert on “marketing, advertising, and
consumer psychology.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. 43.) Dr. Newman holds three
post-graduate degrees from Yale University: an M.S. in Psychology (2005); an M.
Phil. in Psychology (2006); and a Ph.D. in Cognitive Psychology (2008). (ECF No.
193 	Based on the limits that I have imposed on Dr. Sage’s testimony, I need not reach
Defendants’ factual narrative objection. If the need arises, Defendants may raise a factual narrative
objection at trial, similar to my discussion of this issue, supra Part VII.A.1.iii.a.
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33000-13 (“Newman Rep.”) ¶ 2.) In 2011, he completed a three-year post-doctoral
associate program in Marketing at the Yale School of Management. (Id.)
Between 	2011 	and 	2022, 	Dr. 	Newman 	was 	an 	associate professor 	of
management and marketing at the Yale School of Management. (Id. ¶ 1.) During
that tenure, he also held affiliations with Yale University’s Psychology and
Cognitive Science departments and the Yale Center for Customer Insights. (Id.)
Since 2022, Dr. Newman has served as an associate professor of organizational
behavior, human resource management, and marketing at the University of Toronto.
(Id.) He also has served as a visiting professor of marketing at New York University,
the University of Hawaii (Manoa), and Seoul National University. (Id. ¶ 4.) During
his career in academia, Dr. Newman has “taught classes in marketing, consumer
behavior, and marketing management at the undergraduate and graduate (MBA and
PhD) levels.” (Id.)
Dr. Newman also has “taught several seminars on the topics of marketing and
management to executives in senior leadership positions in industry and the U.S.
federal government.” (Id.) He has held advisory roles for academic and professional
organizations, including serving on the editorial boards of the Journal of Consumer
Psychology and the Journal of Sustainable Marketing. (Id. ¶ 5.) And he has published
book chapters and dozens of peer-reviewed articles, including “on the topics of
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marketing 	communications, 	brand 	heritage, 	brand 	authenticity, 	consumer
perceptions of trust, and corporate social responsibility.” (Id. ¶ 7.)
Based on these facts, Defendants do not dispute—and I find—that Dr.
Newman is qualified to testify as an expert witness in marketing, branding, and
consumer psychology, in accordance with the limitations set forth below. To that
end, in connection with limiting portions of Dr. Newman’s testimony on reliability
and fit grounds below, I explain that certain opinions (such as his statements about
the alleged health risks posed by consumption of the talc products) exceed the scope
of his marketing expertise.
ii. 	Summary of Dr. Newman’s Opinions
Dr. Newman states that he was engaged to (i) review Johnson & Johnson’s
marketing practices for the talc products, and (ii) “assess whether the company
engaged 	in 	misleading 	and 	deceptive 	conduct 	that 	created 	confusion 	and
misunderstanding among consumers by failing to communicate and appropriately
inform consumers of health risks associated with” the talc products. (Newman Rep.
¶ 9.) Dr. Newman reviewed Johnson & Johnson consumer marketing materials
(including print advertisements, messaging, and promotions), internal corporate
documents, testimony from Johnson & Johnson employees, and newspaper and
magazine articles. (Id. ¶ 10.)
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Dr. Newman submits that he considered those materials in light of his
professional experience, and in consideration of established principles in the
disciplines of psychology, consumer behavior, and behavioral economics. (See id.
¶¶ 	10–11.) 	Based 	on 	his 	review, 	Dr. 	Newman 	reached 	the 	following 	main
conclusions:
• 	For over a century, Johnson & Johnson’s marketing communications—
including 	“product 	labeling, 	advertisements, 	public 	statements, 	and
endorsements from medical professionals” reflect a strategy that centered
on making the “brand synonymous with trust.” Johnson & Johnson’s
messaging 	“promised 	to 	prioritize 	the 	health 	and 	well-being” 	of
“customers above all else.” (Id. ¶ 12.)
• 	As part of its effort to build a “Trustmark” and “deep, personal trust,”
Johnson & Johnson associated its talc products with the “mother-infant
bond.” (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson succeeded in building consumer trust. Consumers
perceive Johnson & Johnson as a “caregiver” and “innocent” brand. These
favorable consumer perceptions 	created a brand 	“halo” that 	shaped
consumer beliefs on the safety of Johnson & Johnson’s products, reduced
consumers’ sensitivity to risk information, and led to increased sales. (See
id. ¶¶ 14, 37–44.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson was aware of potential health risks concerning the talc
products as early as the 1970s and developed a feasible, market-tested
cornstarch alternative in the 1980s. Even so, Johnson & Johnson continued
to market and sell talc products as safe in the U.S. and Canada until 2020
and globally until 2023. (See id. ¶¶ 16–19.)
• 	By continuing to market the talc products as safe after it knew of potential
health 	risks, 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson 	violated 	its 	promise 	to 	prioritize
customers’ safety and well-being above all else. Through its marketing
efforts, including its targeting of specific demographics, Johnson &
Johnson engaged in “misleading and deceptive conduct that created
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confusion and misunderstanding among consumers.” (See id. ¶¶ 18–19,
98.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson’s “actions needlessly exposed millions of women to a
potential hazard and violated the central promise of trust and safety upon
which their relationship with customers was built.” (Id. ¶ 20.)
iii. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments
Defendants argue that Dr. Newman’s opinions should be excluded for five
main reasons, each of which Plaintiffs contest:
First, Defendants argue that Dr. Newman’s marketing opinions are unreliable
because he considered only Johnson & Johnson internal market research to conclude
that Johnson & Johnson cultivated trust with consumers. Defendants contend that
Dr. Newman failed to conduct experiments or cite any empirical data or hard
evidence—such as public opinion surveys, anthropological, market, or sociological
studies, or other impact evidence—to support those opinions, departing from his
normal professional practices and rendering his testimony speculative. Defendants
argue that the same problems plague Dr. Newman’s opinions that Defendants
engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 25–29.)
In response, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Newman used a methodology that courts
and the consumer-behavior industry accept as reliable, and that he uses in his
professional and academic career. That is, after starting with a null hypothesis, Dr.
Newman compared (i) what he learned about Defendants’ marketing and advertising
practices to (ii) industry codes of conduct promulgated by the American Marketing
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Association, Association of National Advertisers, American Advertising Federation,
and Federal Trade Commission. Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Newman permissibly relied
on Defendants’ own internal documents and communications, deposition testimony,
and marketing materials, studies, and surveys to reach conclusions on the impact of
its marketing over time. Plaintiffs dispute that Dr. Newman was required to conduct
his own survey. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 42–48.)
Second, Defendants argue that even if Dr. Newman’s method were reliable,
his opinions do not fit the facts here. In that regard, Defendants contend that Dr.
Newman’s marketing opinions would not help the factfinder understand evidence or
determine a fact in issue because (i) he does not attempt to tether his opinions to
marketing that any individual plaintiff reviewed, and (ii) his opinions about the
factsabouttalc.com website lack relevance because the website was created years
after any bellwether plaintiff used talc products. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 30.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Newman’s experience and testimony will help
explain how Johnson & Johnson’s marketing practices impacted consumers. (See
Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 42–43.)
Third, Defendants argue that Dr. Newman offers an improper narrative by
regurgitating facts from “straightforward documents.” (See Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at
12 (arguing Dr. Newman rehashes Johnson & Johnson’s internal documents, a 1982
study on talc, the 1994 and 2008 Citizens’ Petitions to the FDA, an FDA request,
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and Health Canada’s 2021 report.).) Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that Dr. Newman
“offers meaning to Defendants’ actions and inactions and the purposes served in
developing Defendants’ brand.” (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 20.)
Fourth, Defendants argue that Dr. Newman speculates on Defendants’ state
of mind based on his review of documents. (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 20.) In
response, Plaintiffs argue that based on his review of “thousands of corporate
internal documents,” Dr. Newman opines on the “messaging” that Johnson &
Johnson conveyed—“what J&J promised to its consumers, what J&J stated its
motivations were, and what J&J was aware of and when”—but does not speculate
as to Defendants’ state of mind. (Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 34.)
Fifth, Defendants argue that Dr. Newman renders subjective ethical opinions
by stating that Defendants violated both Johnson & Johnson’s own company “credo”
and “what he teaches as ‘best practices’” by “not disclosing” any “health risk
associated with” talc products. (Defs.’ Regulatory Br. at 22–23.) Defendants also
argue that any probative value of these statements is vastly outweighed by their
tendency to encourage the jury to improperly impose liability, requiring their
exclusion under Rule 403. (Id. at 25.)
Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that Dr. Newman’s testimony on Defendants’
compliance with marketing and advertising codes of conduct promulgated by
professional organizations informs the standard of care and will help the jury
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understand how Johnson & Johnson’s marketing practices impacted consumers.
Plaintiffs also contend that Dr. Newman can testify about Johnson & Johnson’s
corporate credo. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 34–36, 41–43.)
I resolve each of these disputes in connection with analyzing the reliability
and fit of Dr. Newman’s opinions below.
iv. 	Reliability
Plaintiffs have met their burden on reliability by demonstrating, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that some—but not all—of Dr. Newman’s opinions
are based on sufficient facts and data, a reliable methodology, and the reliable
application of that methodology.
For topics that do not involve scientific testimony, the “relevant reliability
concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience,” rather than the
traditional Daubert reliability factors. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150. Courts within and
outside the Third Circuit have held that a “marketing professional’s review and
analysis of company documents to extrapolate marketing strategies, coupled with
the expert’s experience and background may be enough to establish that the expert’s
methodology is reliable.” In re: Tylenol, MDL No. 2436, 2016 WL 807377, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2016) (collecting cases).
In Tylenol, for example, consumers proffered an expert who had taught
marketing research, consumer behavior, and consumer psychology, in addition to
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publishing many articles on how advertising affects consumer perceptions of a
product’s health effects. 2016 WL 807377, at *4. That expert “synthesized” the
defendants “own extensive market research and consumer surveys” and “offered
opinions about how the defendants employed various marketing and psychological
techniques to build the Tylenol brand” as “the ‘safest’ analgesic.” Id. at *5. He also
explained how those techniques “created a certain effect on consumers’ perception
of Tylenol products,” including why it was “reasonable for a consumer” to downplay
certain overuse risks. Id. Because the expert “drew on his background and expertise
in rendering his opinions,” and because his methods reflected a “careful review of
the information presented,” the court found his methodology to be reliable. Id.
Here too, I find that Dr. Newman used a reliable method and reliably applied
it. Starting with a null hypothesis, Dr. Newman used the same systematic analysis
that he applies in his professional and academic career to analyze Defendants’
marketing materials and communications, internal corporate documents about the
talc products, and other data and information. In conducting that review, he
identified and considered six areas of inquiry: relevance; messaging; strategy;
impact; product risks; and response. (See Newman Rep. ¶ 10.) Based on his expertise
in marketing, branding, and consumer psychology, Dr. Newman identified recurring
themes across a century of Johnson & Johnson marketing evidence, linked them to
research on “halo effects,” and contextualized them within Johnson & Johnson’s
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brand-heritage strategy. Subject to the limits discussed herein, those steps constitute
a reliable application of a reliable qualitative method.
Defendants argue that because Dr. Newman did not perform his own survey
or conduct his own experiments, his opinions lack empirical support and his
testimony must be excluded. I disagree, in part. Based on his methodology, Dr.
Newman may synthesize Johnson & Johnson’s branding and messaging strategies,
provide context on industry standard marketing codes, and explain how he expects
messaging themes (including those he identifies) influenced consumer beliefs. See,
e.g., In re Juul Labs, Inc. Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 19-cv-02913,
2022 WL 1814440, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2022) (finding “marketing experts’
experience, review of relevant literature,” and “review of [defendant’s] own
documents provide[d] a reasoned and reliable basis” to “opine generally” about
defendants’ “health messaging and its impact”).194 Dr. Newman also may explain
consumer-psychology principles concerning brand trust, halo effects, and risk
perception.
Other portions of Dr. Newman’s report, however, lack a reliable foundation
or are otherwise inadmissible. While Dr. Newman 	may analyze Johnson &
194 	In rendering those opinions, Dr. Newman does not simply regurgitate facts. He identifies
common themes and adds explanatory context, which courts permit. See, e.g., In re: Tylenol, 2016
WL 807377, at *9 (rejecting factual narrative argument because marketing expert “translate[d] the
meaning of” defendants’ actions in creating Tylenol brand and explained “what purpose they serve
in branding”). If Dr. Newman starts to quote or simply rehash corporate documents at length at
trial, Defendants can object.
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Johnson’s marketing evidence and offer objective opinions on how those materials
could influence consumer perceptions, he cannot testify on how Johnson &
Johnson’s marketing actually impacted or influenced consumers. To that end,
because Dr. Newman did not validate the Johnson & Johnson consumer surveys that
he relied on—by conducting his own experiments, issuing his own surveys, or
speaking to any individual plaintiffs—his conclusion that Johnson & Johnson in fact
“engaged 	in 	misleading 	and 	deceptive 	conduct 	that 	created 	confusion 	and
misunderstanding among consumers” is speculative and does not reliably flow from
his methodology.
Put differently, Dr. Newman may testify about how the advertising themes he
identifies could influence consumer perceptions but may not testify that Johnson &
Johnson’s marketing in fact influenced consumer perceptions. See Montera v.
Premier Nutrition Corp., No. 16-06980, 2022 WL 1225031, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
26, 2022), aff’d in part, 111 F.4th 1018 (9th Cir. 2024) (permitting marketing expert
to explain general marketing principles and synthesize defendant’s marketing
strategies based on review of defendant’s documents, but precluding testimony on
“how consumers actually interpreted the messages” given lack of impact data.)
For the same reasons, Dr. Newman cannot offer causation opinions linking
Johnson & Johnson’s marketing to product use or injury. Dr. Newman engages in
no scientifically accepted methodology to render such testimony. Thus, his opinions
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that Johnson & Johnson’s marketing “needlessly exposed millions of women to a
potential hazard” are inadmissible. (Newman Rep. ¶ 20.)
Dr. Newman also makes several inadmissible assertions about Johnson &
Johnson’s state of mind and corporate conduct. (See, e.g., Newman Rep. at 12 (“By
as early as 1966, Johnson & Johnson was aware of health risks associated with the
use of talcum powder products.”); id. ¶ 65 (opining on Johnson & Johnson’s
awareness of “the potential links between talcum powder use and ovarian cancer”).)
As noted above, this type of subjective testimony does not stem from reliable
principles and usurps the role of the factfinder. See, e.g., O’Bryant, 2022 WL
7670296, at *12 (barring testimony concerning “alleged knowledge and state of
mind,” including whether defendant misled and what defendant “knew at the time”
it developed warnings and labeling.) At trial, Dr. Newman cannot speculate about
Johnson & Johnson’s state of mind or testify that Johnson & Johnson violated ethical
duties.
v. 	Fit and Scope
Dr. Newman’s admissible testimony (as set forth above) fits the case because
it will help the factfinder understand how branding, imaging, and messaging could
shape consumer perceptions of safety. Indeed, because “[a]dvertising methodologies
are esoteric; the average juror could be helped by an explanation of how they work
and were used by defendants.” Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 04-cv-1945,
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2005 WL 2401647, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005); see In re: Tylenol, 2016 WL
807377, at *6 (“The average person may not know about the subtle applied
psychological techniques drug companies use to market their products.”). Here, Dr.
Newman’s analysis of Johnson & Johnson’s “Trustmark” and “mother-child”
marketing themes may help the jury evaluate whether Johnson & Johnson’s marking
conveyed an impression of safety inconsistent with the alleged risks.
By contrast, Dr. Newman’s opinions about Johnson & Johnson’s state of
mind, corporate intent, and alleged false and misleading advertising invade the
province of the factfinder, and are inadmissible. See In re: Tylenol, 2016 WL
807377, at *8 (“[A]n opinion that the advertising was misleading or false would
properly come from the jury, not from an expert.”). And to avoid unfairly prejudicing
the factfinder and exceeding the scope of his expertise, other than offering limited,
general references needed to contextualize the admissible marketing opinions noted
above, Dr. Newman cannot opine on (i) whether using talc products posed health
hazards, (ii) when Defendants were allegedly aware of such risks, or (iii) the history
or purpose of Defendants’ development of a cornstarch alternative.
For these reasons, I recommend the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Newman.
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5. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend the Court grant in part and deny
in part Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Drs. Kessler, Plunkett, Sage,
and Newman, as follows:
1. Dr. Kessler may testify, within the bounds of his expertise, regarding the
regulatory framework governing cosmetics and general industry practices.
But 	he 	is 	precluded 	from 	offering 	legal 	conclusions, 	opinions 	on
Defendants’ intent or state of mind, ethical judgments, or testimony
outside his qualifications, including on the technical validity or aspects of
any particular test or the geological properties of talc.
2. Dr. Plunkett may testify concerning toxicological and risk-assessment
principles and industry practices relevant to cosmetic safety. But she may
not offer legal conclusions, definitive causation opinions, testimony about
Defendants’ knowledge or motives, or subjective ethical assessments.
3. Dr. Sage may offer limited testimony regarding regulatory structures and
industry standards from a policy perspective. But he is barred from
offering legal conclusions, causation opinions, speculative inferences
regarding Defendants’ intent or knowledge, as well as subjective “bad
company” characterizations.
4. Finally, Dr. Newman may testify regarding general marketing principles
and 	consumer-behavior 	concepts. 	But 	his 	opinions 	concerning
Defendants’ 	intent 	and 	definitive 	statements 	about 	how 	Defendants
marketing materials in fact influenced consumers are excluded.
5. To the extent any expert testimony veers into impermissible factual
narrative, legal conclusion, or speculation at trial, appropriate objections
may be raised at that time.
B. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Dr. Kathleen Sutcliffe
Plaintiffs move to exclude the opinion testimony of Dr. Kathleen Sutcliffe, an
expert proffered by Defendants to opine on Johnson & Johnson’s corporate
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knowledge 	and 	conduct. 	(See 	ECF 	No. 	32998-1 	(“Pls.’ 	Regulatory 	Br.”).)
Defendants oppose exclusion. (See ECF No. 33116 (“Defs.’ Regulatory Opp. Br.”).)
My prior Opinion did not cover Dr. Sutcliffe’s testimony. In addressing Plaintiffs’
arguments for excluding Dr. Sutcliffe below, I make independent findings on
qualification, reliability, and fit.
1. 	Summary of Dr. Sutcliffe’s Opinions
Defendants proffer Dr. Sutcliffe as an “expert in organization science,
behavior, and theory.” (Id. 	at 4.) They state that Dr. Sutcliffe “studies how
companies process and respond to information in order to determine what they could
have done better in a given situation and how they can anticipate and prevent future
issues.” (Id.) Dr. Sutcliffe claims particular expertise in understanding “how
organizations process and make sense of ambiguous and equivocal information” and
“make decisions under uncertainty.” (ECF No. 33116-2 (“Sutcliffe Rep.”) ¶ 2.)
Dr. Sutcliffe defined the scope of her work as assessing: (i) what Johnson &
Johnson “knew—and when—about the alleged presence of asbestos in its cosmetic
talc products,” (ii) “what actions it took to acquire this knowledge,” and (iii) “the
extent to which Johnson & Johnson’s actions were consistent with an organizational
commitment to the wellbeing of consumers.” (Id. ¶ 9.) To answer those questions,
Dr. 	Sutcliffe 	reviewed 	internal 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson 	documents 	and 	other
information, 	drew 	on 	her 	experience, 	and 	applied 	a 	qualitative 	method 	and
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“sensemaking” framework that she describes as “widely used and highly cited” in
the field of organizational science. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 42.) In her report, Dr. Sutcliffe reaches
the following main conclusions:
• 	The early 1970s was a period of “disruptive ambiguity” regarding the
safety 	of 	cosmetic 	talc. 	During 	that 	period, 	“confusion 	regarding
definitions of asbestos, and how to identify asbestos in talc, collided with
a lack of regulatory testing standards and evolving science on these
questions.” (See id. ¶ 90.)
• 	In this period of disruptive ambiguity, Johnson & Johnson “actively
pursued knowledge regarding the potential health risks associated with its
baby powder.” That pursuit included Johnson & Johnson’s engagement, in
the “early 1970s,” with “consumers, regulators, scientists, the media, other
manufacturers, suppliers, and trade organizations to make sense of new
scientific knowledge and competing perspectives.” These efforts “were
intended 	to 	advance 	the 	science—and 	to 	promulgate 	accurate
information—related to whether asbestos was present in cosmetic talc.”
Johnson & Johnson’s efforts led to the creation of a “new ‘map’” of
knowledge that “codified Johnson & Johnson’s understanding of the
potential health risks associated with exposure to asbestos and talc and the
safety of its baby powder.” (Id. ¶¶ 14, 91, 161.)
• 	The creation of Johnson & Johnson’s “map” in the mid-1970s “resolved
much of the earlier ambiguity.” (Id. ¶¶ 120, 161.) Over that period, “some
of the key figures who instigated the disruptive ambiguity abandoned their
stances and acknowledged the safety of cosmetic talc, reaffirming Johnson
& Johnson’s ‘map.’” One testing lab and the “FDA would later remark that
much of the testing from this time period was incorrect or suspect, or used
inappropriate definitions of asbestos.” (Id. ¶¶ 120, 161.)
• 	“Since the disruptive ambiguity of the early 1970s, J&J has devoted
significant 	resources 	and 	attention 	to 	developing, 	validating,
disseminating, and challenging” its “map” that “codifies the existing
scientific knowledge regarding the detection of asbestos in talc and the
safety of talc.” Those efforts include (i) “developing and implementing
industry-leading methods for testing its talc sources and its baby powder
for the presence of asbestos,” and (ii) committing “to continued discussion,
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validation, and dissemination of scientific knowledge among researchers
and external stakeholders.” (Id. ¶¶ 15, 190.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson’s “active pursuit, testing, and validation of knowledge
regarding the potential health risks associated with its baby powder reflect
best practices in organizational sensemaking.” Sensemaking “enables
organizations to understand, articulate, and act on knowledge in ways that
are consistent with organizational perspectives and priorities.” (Id. ¶ 16.)
• 	Johnson & Johnson’s actions, during and after the period of disruptive
ambiguity, demonstrate: (i) behavior that Dr. Sutcliffe “would expect to
see in an organization committed to the wellbeing of consumers,” (ii)
Johnson & Johnson’s “ongoing concern about the quality and safety of its
baby powder,” and (iii) proactive engagement “in sensemaking with
regards to the possibility it was not safe.” “Put differently, J&J’s actions
and decisions have been, and continue to be, consistent with the actions of
a responsible company that prioritizes the wellbeing of consumers.” (Id.
¶¶ 16, 189–190, 192.)
• 	By contrast, Johnson & Johnson’s actions “are inconsistent with behaviors
that 	indicate 	carelessness 	or 	disregard” 	for 	consumer 	wellbeing.
“Allegations that J&J ‘knew’ or hid the ‘truth’ about the alleged health
risks associated with its baby powder are inconsistent with the record of
J&J’s actions, decisions, and organizational commitment to the wellbeing
of consumers.” (Id. ¶ 17.)
• 	Plaintiffs 	make 	“broad 	generalizations” 	about 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson,
including that Johnson & Johnson: knew of and concealed “test results
showing that its baby powder contains asbestos and research studies
linking its baby powder to cancer”; manipulated testing results to conceal
asbestos findings from the FDA; violated a duty to warn consumers; had
unethical interactions with regulators; and declined to replace talc-based
baby powers with a cornstarch-alternative to protect profits. (Id. ¶¶ 20–30.)
• 	Plaintiffs’ conclusions 	about 	Johnson & Johnson 	are “based on 	an
incomplete and biased view of the evidence that is not grounded in a
framework for understanding it or a scientific approach to evaluating it.”
To “adequately support their conclusions,” Plaintiffs “would need to
conduct 	an 	organizational 	assessment” 	that 	uses 	“an 	established
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conceptual framework and research methodology based in organizational
theory. Instead, they engage in cherry-picking, a biased review of the
evidence, and inappropriate extrapolation.” (Id. ¶¶ 31, 191.)
2. 	The Parties’ Exclusion Arguments
Plaintiffs move to exclude Dr. Sutcliffe’s opinions for three main reasons,
each of which Defendants dispute:
First, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Sutcliffe is unqualified to testify about
“scientific, technical,” and regulatory topics covered by her report. For example,
Plaintiffs argue that because Dr. Sutcliffe is “no expert in mineralogy, geology, talc
mining, talc testing, or microscopy,” she cannot opine on what Johnson & Johnson
knew and when about the alleged presence of asbestos in talc and “how it responded
to science” on asbestos, talc, testing, and mining. They also argue that she cannot
opine 	on 	“J&J’s 	warnings” 	because 	she 	knows 	“nothing 	about” 	cosmetic
manufacturers’ responsibilities under the FDCA, and “has never consulted with the
FDA or any company regulated by the FDA.” (See Pls.’ Regulatory Br. 1, 8–13.)
In response, Defendants explain that Dr. Sutcliffe is not offering an opinion
on the presence of asbestos in talc, testing or sensitivity, or other “scientific aspects
of talc safety.” Instead, Defendants submit that Dr. Sutcliffe opines “on J&J’s
corporate knowledge and corporate actions”; i.e., “what information J&J knew over
the past several decades and how it responded to that information.” Because Dr.
Sutcliffe has focused her career researching and assessing how organizations process
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information and make decisions under uncertainty, Defendants contend that Dr.
Sutcliffe “has the precise qualifications necessary to offer that opinion.” (See Defs.’
Regulatory Opp. Br. at 1–3, 8–10.)
Second, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Sutcliffe’s opinions fail the reliability test. In
that regard, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Sutcliffe’s “sensemaking” is a subjective,
qualitative methodology that cannot be tested or repeated. Plaintiffs also argue that
Dr. Sutcliffe fails to reliably apply her own standards, instead “cherry-picking
evidence that supports Johnson & Johnson’s litigation position, while ignoring (and
not even reading) evidence that is harmful to J&J.” According to Plaintiffs, these
information gaps make Dr. Sutcliffe’s opinions unreliable. (See Pls.’ Regulatory Br.
at 1–2, 13–30.)
Defendants submit that Dr. Sutcliffe employed a qualitative methodology
within the “widely cited conceptual framework of ‘sensemaking.’” Defendants
contend that this methodology draws on decades of organizational science research,
and that similar qualitative research has been accepted in analogous social science
contexts. Defendants dispute that Dr. Sutcliffe ignored information or limited
research to the 1970s. (See Defs.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at 2, 10–23.)
Third, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Sutcliffe’s opinions do not fit the facts. To that
end, Plaintiffs contend that their product liability claims turn “on the presence of a
defect in J&J’s products at the time those products left J&J’s hands, which defect
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made the products unreasonably dangerous.” Plaintiffs argue that these “questions
are answerable by straightforward reference to hard sciences: toxicology; medicine;
epidemiology; material science; the science of consumer warnings.” They submit
that “J&J’s organizational behavior,” ability to engage in “sensemaking,” and “pure-
hearted feelings about the ‘wellbeing’ of consumers” is not on trial. (See Pls.’
Regulatory Br. at 33–35.)
Defendants contest Plaintiffs’ characterization of their claims, arguing that
Plaintiffs 	assert 	negligence 	and 	fraud 	claims 	that 	“put 	J&J’s 	organizational
knowledge, motivations, and behavior at issue.” Defendants highlight Plaintiffs’
allegations that Johnson & Johnson (i) knew “for decades that talc may pose health
risks to consumers,” (ii) “ignored data regarding these risks,” (iii) concealed or
misrepresented material facts, and (iv) “failed to adequately ensure the safety of its
consumers.” According to Defendants, Dr. Sutcliffe’s testimony fits because she
explains that Plaintiffs’ allegations are “inconsistent with the record of J&J’s actions,
decisions, and organizational commitment to the wellbeing of consumers.” (See
Defs.’ Regulatory Opp. Br. at. 24–25.)
3. 	Dr. Sutcliffe’s Qualifications
Dr. Sutcliffe holds a Ph.D. in organization theory and behavior from the
University of Texas at Austin. (Sutcliffe Rep. ¶ 1.) She currently serves as a
Bloomberg Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University, with appointments
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in its Carey Business School, School of Medicine, School of Nursing, and
Bloomberg School of Public Health. (Id.) Dr. Sutcliffe previously had a twenty-plus-
year tenure on the faculty of the University of Michigan’s Stephen M. Ross School
of Business and a three-year tenure on the faculty of Minesota’s Carlson School of
Management. (Id. ¶ 1.) Dr. Sutcliffe has taught many courses on organizational
behavior and theory. (Id. ¶ 6.)
For 	decades, 	Dr. 	Sutcliffe 	has 	researched 	organizational 	behavior 	and
decision-making. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3.) Her work focuses on how organizations interpret
complex information, respond to risks, and make decisions under uncertainty. (See
id.) Dr. Sutcliffe is a prolific publisher of peer-reviewed research, having authored,
co-authored, or co-edited four books and dozens of journal articles on organizational
behavior. (Id. ¶ 4.) Her research spans many industries, including healthcare,
manufacturing, and transportation. (Id. ¶ 3.) She touts her published research
assessment of “Toyota’s organizational design and sensemaking system as it
pertained to the problem of its slow recognition” of “unintended acceleration
difficulties.” (Id. ¶ 4.)
Dr. 	Sutcliffe 	also 	has 	consulted 	for 	government 	agencies, 	healthcare
institutions, and private companies. (Id. ¶ 5.) That includes helping reshape a
multinational firm’s organizational processes and practices. (Id.) Among other
professional organizations, Dr. Sutcliffe is a member of the of the Academy of
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Management, the European Group for Organizational Studies, the Institute for
Operations Research and Management Sciences, and the Strategic Management
Society. (Id. ¶ 1.) By appointment of the National Academy of Sciences, Dr.
Sutcliffe also sits on the Committee on Emerging Trends in Aviation Safety. (Id..)
Based on these facts and my full review of Dr. Sutcliffe’s report and
deposition transcript, I find that Dr. Sutcliffe is qualified by specialized knowledge,
under Rule 702, to testify on organizational behavior and theory, including the
structures, processes, and information-management of large corporations. See In re
Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741 (explaining “Rule 702’s liberal policy of admissibility” extends
to experts qualified by “specialized knowledge”). As applied to Johnson & Johnson,
she is qualified to testify generally as to the manner in which Johnson & Johnson
processed and acquired information, subject to the relevance and fit limitations
discussed below.
While Dr. Sutcliffe is generally qualified to opine on how corporations
(including Johnson & Johnson) process information and acquire knowledge, her
report is replete with opinions that exceed the scope of her knowledge, skill,
experience, training, and education. The claims at issue in this case involve highly
technical, scientific inquiries. Both parties have retained a host of experts trained in
hard sciences. At trial, those experts will be called upon to help the jury understand
issues related to the alleged presence of asbestos and other materials in the talc
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products, talc mining, talc testing, and the alleged link between the talc products and
ovarian cancer.
Dr. Sutcliffe lacks the scientific, technical expertise needed to offer opinions
in those areas. See Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 322. To that end, Dr. Sutcliffe never worked
for the FDA or consulted for the FDA. (ECF No. 32998-6 (“Sutcliffe Dep.”) at
57:15–20, 63:15–16.) She has never advised a consumer products company on
complying with the FDCA or assessing product risks. (See Sutcliffe Dep. at 57:21–
60:1.) She has no expertise in FDA regulations, including the standards for cosmetic
warnings, adulteration, or misbranding. (Id. at 55:4–20.) As of her deposition, she
did not know the “ins and outs” of the FDCA, had never taught about the FDCA,
and did not know whether the talc products were subject to the FDCA. (Id. at 27:16–
28:16, 67:10–17.) She is not a mineralogist, geologist, toxicologist, microscopist,
expert in mining for talc, or expert for testing in talc. (Id. at 49:12–50:12.)
Despite disclaiming expertise those areas, Dr. Sutcliffe’s report reached many
conclusions that required this technical and scientific knowledge. For example,
despite disclaiming any expertise in testing, she characterized Johnson & Johnson’s
“testing program” as “rigorous.” (Sutcliffe Rep. ¶ 192; id. ¶ 95 (“J&J invested time
and resources to refine its own testing methodology, which was more rigorous than
that adopted by the industry.”).) Even though she lacks expertise in cosmetics safety,
talc, and asbestos, she testified at deposition that after the 1970s ‘it was pretty clear
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that talc was safe.” (Sutcliffe Dep. at 141:8–10.) And even though she lacks any
expertise on the FDA’s regulatory structure, she challenged Plaintiffs’ labeling and
failure to warn claims by relying on communications with the FDA. (Sutcliffe Rep.
¶ 33 (“Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations disregard the fact that the FDA as the
relevant regulatory body had considered and rejected both asbestos and ovarian
cancer warning labels for talc on several separate occasions.”).)
In sum, Dr. Sutcliffe is qualified to explain generally how corporations
process and acquire information, the sensemaking framework, and the general types
of decision-making structures or information channels characteristic of corporations
focused on safety and consumer well-being. Subject to the limitations discussed
herein, she may also opine—generally, and without crossing the line into scientific
inquiries outside her expertise—on whether Johnson & Johnson’s information
acquisition and decision-making processes aligned with that framework. But Dr.
Sutcliffe is not qualified to offer opinions on any of the scientific or technical matters
described above, including Johnson & Johnson’s testing methods, the safety or
health risks of the talc products, and the presence of asbestos or other materials in
Talc. This means that Dr. Sutcliffe can testify, generally, about how Johnson &
Johnson processed information, but cannot testify as to the technical details of what
information Johnson & Johnson processed.
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4. 	Reliability
“Daubert’s reliability requirement ensures that an expert’s testimony is ‘based
on the methods and procedures of science, not on subjective belief and unsupported
speculation.’” Cohen, 125 F.4th at 461–62 (citation omitted). Meeting reliability
does not require that “a particular scientific opinion has the best foundation, or even
whether the opinion is supported by the best methodology or unassailable research.”
Karlo, 849 F.3d at 81 (citation omitted.) Instead, the court examines whether the
testimony “is supported by ‘good grounds.’” Id. This “inquiry ‘applies to all aspects
of an expert’s testimony: the methodology, the facts underlying the expert’s opinion,
[and] the link between the facts and the conclusion.” Cohen, 125 F.4th at 462
(citation omitted).
The Rule 702 analysis is a “flexible one.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594; see
Pineda, 520 F.3d at 248 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining Daubert reliability factors “‘are
neither exhaustive nor applicable in every case’” (citation omitted)). As the Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules has explained:
Some types of expert testimony will be more objectively
verifiable, and subject to the expectations of falsifiability,
peer review, and publication, than others. Some types of
expert testimony will not rely on anything like a scientific
method, and so will have to be evaluated by reference to
other standard principles attendant to the particular area of
expertise.
Fed. R. Evid.702, advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
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When 	expert 	testimony 	is 	based 	on 	“‘soft 	social 	sciences’”—like 	Dr.
Sutcliffe’s testimony—such “flexibility is necessary.” Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 564 F. Supp. 2d 322, 361 (D.N.J. 2008); see United States v.
Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115, 1123 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Because there are areas of expertise,
such as the ‘social sciences in which the research, theories and opinions cannot have
the exactness of hard science methodologies,” courts have “broad discretion to
determine ‘whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures
of 	reliability.’” 	(citations 	omitted)). 	Thus, 	a 	social 	science 	approach 	is 	not
necessarily unreliable based on “inherent methodological limitations” or because it
cannot “produce ‘a testable hypothesis’ or a ‘known or potential rate of error.’”
Bowers, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 361 (citation omitted). Instead, the Court “must perform
its gatekeeping assessment on measures of reliability that are appropriate to the
particular testimony in question.” Id.
Applying those principles, courts have found that qualitative, social-sciences
methods are reliable when experts review “data, documents, and testimony,” apply
specialized “knowledge and experience,” use a peer-reviewed framework, and
support conclusions through the discussion of relevant literature. Id.; see, e.g., Louis
Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Sunny Merch. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 3d 485, 505 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (admitting testimony when expert used “qualitative” method based on
experience, review of documents and deposition testimony, and field research).
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Here, 	Dr. 	Sutcliffe 	followed 	a 	qualitative 	method 	for 	assessing 	how
corporations process ambiguous information that is generally accepted in the field
of organizational behavior. Dr. Sutcliffe’s method draws on peer-reviewed literature
from leaders in her field, including Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman’s
publication on qualitative data and Karl E. Weick’s publication on sensemaking in
organizations. (See Sutcliffe Rep. ¶ 40 & n.18; id. ¶ 42 & n.20.) Dr. Sutcliffe has
researched the same or similar methods for decades, published dozens of scholarly
works on sensemaking and organizational behavior more generally, and has personal
experience applying that method. See Fed. R. Evid.702, advisory committee’s note
to 2000 amendment (explaining non-scientific testimony must “be evaluated by
reference to other standard principles attendant to the particular area of expertise”;
i.e., a showing that the testimony is “grounded in an accepted body of learning or
experience in the expert’s field”). Within the narrow area in which I found Dr.
Sutcliffe qualified to testify, Dr. Sutcliffe’s method was reliable and she reliably
applied it.195
195 	As noted above, Dr. Sutcliffe is not qualified to offer opinions on the scientific or technical
matters discussed in her report, including Defendants’ testing methods, the safety of the talc
products, and the presence of certain substances in Talc. While that ends the inquiry with respect
to those subjects, even putting qualifications aside, Dr. Sutcliffe’s conclusions in many of those
areas do not reflect a reliable application of a reliable method. For example, Dr. Sutcliffe lacks
good grounds to opine that “much of the ambiguity and concern regarding the safety of cosmetic
talc had been resolved” by 1978, (Sutcliffe Rep. ¶ 118), when she admits that she did not review
“specific studies” (Sutcliffe Dep. at 335:18–21).
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5. 	Fit and Scope
Under Rule 702’s fit restriction, even reliable methods that are reliably
applied will be excluded if there is no connection between the expert’s testimony
and the disputed factual issues in a case. In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743. Here,
Defendants have met their burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Dr. Sutcliffe’s testimony (as limited above and below) will assist the jury.
To that end, Plaintiffs assert state law negligence and fraud claims that place
Defendants’ corporate knowledge and conduct squarely at issue. (See, e.g., ECF No.
226636-2, Pls.’ 2d Amend. Compl. dated Aug. 14, 2023 ¶ 208 (“Defendants engaged
in wrongful conduct and were negligent” by “selling talcum powder products which
contained asbestos and fibrous talc, which Defendants knew or should have known
were dangerous and posed substantial risks of harm”).) Dr. Sutcliffe can help jurors
evaluate those claims by providing background information on how reasonable
corporations process information and make decisions under uncertainty. In that way,
her 	organizational 	framework 	could 	provide 	a 	useful 	context 	for 	evaluating
Defendants’ conduct. Cf. Bridges, 2022 WL 4244276, at *8 (explaining “an expert
educating a jury on general principles of sex trafficking and sexual abuse can be
helpful to the fact finder in assessing fact witnesses’ credibility”).
For these reasons, I recommend the Court to grant in part and deny in part
Plaintiffs’ 	Motion 	to 	Exclude 	the 	Opinions 	of 	Dr. 	Sutcliffe. 	Based 	on 	her
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qualifications and experience, Dr. Sutcliffe can offer general testimony on how
organizations process information and make decisions under uncertainty. That
includes explaining the types of decision-making structures or information channels
she sees in corporations focused on consumer safety and, subject to the limits herein,
whether 	Johnson 	& 	Johnson’s 	information 	acquisition 	and 	decision-making
processes aligned with that framework.
Given her lack of scientific expertise or regulatory experience in the areas
relevant to this case, Dr. Sutcliffe cannot opine on Defendants’ testing methods, the
safety of the talc products (including when any period of “disruptive ambiguity”
regarding Talc began or ended), and the presence of certain substances in Talc. And
for the same reasons discussed in my analysis of Defendants’ motion to exclude
Plaintiffs’ regulatory and marketing experts, Dr. Sutcliffe cannot draw legal
conclusions, opine on Defendants’ state of mind, or make subjective assessments of
Defendants’ conduct, such as what Defendants “knew” or whether they acted like a
good company.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Mindful of the significance of this MDL and the impact the pending Rule 702
motions may have on its course, this Report and Recommendation reflects the
seriousness with which I approached my assignment as a limited-purpose Special
Master. I have undertaken an exhaustive review of the seventeen motions referred to
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me by the Court, engaging closely with an extensive record that includes, inter alia,
voluminous 	briefing, 	expert 	reports, 	deposition 	testimony, 	and 	the 	scientific
literature—including new scientific evidence since my 2020 Opinion—on which the
parties rely. In evaluating the admissibility of the challenged expert opinions, I
applied Rule 702 as clarified by the 2023 amendments, while remaining within the
bounds established by the Court’s April 30, 2024 Memorandum Order. Having
afforded the parties’ submissions the careful consideration they warrant, and for the
foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that the pending Rule 702 motions be
resolved in accordance with the determinations set forth in this Report and
Recommendation, as summarized in the chart that follows. A second Report and
Recommendation addressing the motions on which I have reserved decision will
issue following the two Daubert evidentiary hearings presently scheduled for
January 26 and February 6, 2026.
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Hon. Freda L. Wolfson (ret.)
Special Master
Dated: 	January 20, 2026
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