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2:26-cv-01251Njd24 de fev. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GIORGI ONANASHVILI,
Petitioner,
v.
Civil Action No. 26-1014 (JXN)
LUIS SOTO, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NEALS, District Judge
Before the Court is Petitioner Giorgi Onanashvili’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his continued detention by
immigration authorities without an individualized bond hearing (ECF No. 1) and Respondents’
letter response (ECF No. 6). Also before the Court is a motion for pro hac vice admission of
attorney Sergey Risko, Esq. to represent Petitioner in this matter. (ECF No. 5.)
Petitioner, a citizen of Georgia, entered the United States without inspection in 2022. (ECF
No. 6 at 1.) On February 5, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by Immigration Customs and
Enforcement (“ICE”) agents and has been detained since his arrest. (Id. at 1-2.) Following
Petitioner’s arrest and detention by ICE, he has not been afforded an individualized bond hearing
because he is being held in mandatory detention under 8 U.S. C. § 1225(b)(2). (Id.)
On February 8, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to file an answer. (See ECF No. 3.)
On February 22, 2026, Respondents filed a letter response. (ECF No. 6.)
The Petition contends Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
(See generally ECF No. 1.) Respondents do not dispute the salient facts and acknowledge that here
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they assert the same position they have in many other similar cases in this District, including the
position they took before this Court in the recent matter Fuentes Velasquez v. Noem, No. 25-16797
(JXN). (See ECF No. 6.) In Fuentes Velasquez, Respondents argued DHS has implemented a new
policy interpreting INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), to require mandatory detention of
noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or inspection and to render them
ineligible for release on bond, a position that the Board of Immigration Appeals recently adopted
in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). See Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797
(ECF No. 5).
In Fuentes Velasquez, this Court rejected Hurtado’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2). Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797 (ECF Nos. 8, 9). In a factually similar situation, the
Court held that Fuentes Velasquez was unlawfully held in mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)
and must be treated as being held under the discretionary authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See id.
In Fuentes Velasquez, this Court explained the following:
The issue of whether Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b) or § 1226(a)
is similar to that of many cases in this District and around the country. “The line
historically drawn between these two sections . . . is that section 1225 governs
detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the country,’ whereas section
1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already in the country.’” Martinez v. Hyde,
No. 25-cv-11613, 2025 WL 2084238, at *8 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288–89); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL
2496379, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that
Section 1226(a), and not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has
resided in this country for over twenty-six years and was already within the United
States when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival at
the border.”). “[T]he provisions at issue here are mutually exclusive—a noncitizen
cannot be subject to both mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary
detention under § 1226 . . . .” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-5937, 2025 WL
2371588, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025).
. . .
For nearly 30 years, § 1225 has applied to noncitizens who are either seeking entry
to the United States or have a close nexus to the border, and § 1226 has applied to
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those aliens arrested within the interior of the United States. The Supreme Court in
Jennings explicitly adopted this distinction, describing § 1225 as the detention
statute for noncitizens affirmatively “seeking admission” into the United States,
and § 1226 as the detention statute for noncitizens who are “already in the country.”
583 U.S. at 289. And although the Jennings Court characterizes § 1225(b)(2) as the
“catchall” detention provision for noncitizens who are “seeking admission,” it
identifies § 1226(a) as the “default rule” for the arrest, detention, and release of
non-criminal aliens who are already present in the United States. Id. at 303.
The 	vast 	majority 	of 	courts 	confronting 	this 	precise 	issue 	have 	rejected
Respondents’ interpretation, as well as the BIA’s interpretation in Hurtado, as
contradictory to the plain text of § 1225.1 See, e.g., Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7
(finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e.,
affirmatively, “seeking admission” to the United States and not petitioners who
have been residing in the United States); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3682,
2025 WL 2802947 at * 6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (noting that “the government’s
proposed interpretation of § 1225(b) [is] at odds with the context and structure of
the provisions governing detention of noncitizens who are arriving at the border
and those who are already present in the country”); Zumba, 2025 WL 2753496 at *
3 (noting that “up until July 8 the predominant form of detention authority for
petitioner and other noncitizens arrested in the interior of the United States was §
1226(a)”); Salazar v. Dedos, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17,
2025); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01684, 2025 WL 2710211 (D. Nev. Sept. 23,
2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-4048, 2025 WL 2712427 (N.D. Iowa Sept.
23, 2025); Singh v. Lewis, No. 25-cv-0096, 2025 WL 2699219 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22,
2025); Barrera v. Tindall, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19,
2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 25-cv-1408, 2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19,
2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25–cv–01542, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept.
17, 2025); [collecting additional cases].
Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797 (ECF No. 8 at 5-10).
Based on this Court’s statutory interpretation in Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797, the
Court finds the facts asserted in the Petition establish Petitioner’s detention is authorized only by
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2).
Additionally, Sergey Risko, Esq., who is seeking admission pro hac vice, has submitted a
motion through local counsel of record, Carolina T. Curbelo, Esq., that contains a certified
1 This Court is not required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225 because “[w]hen the meaning of a statute [is]
at issue, the judicial role [is] to ‘interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.’” Loper
Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385 (2024) (quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 503 (1840)).
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statement from Attorney Curbelo that comports with Local Civil Rule 101.1(c). (See ECF No. 5.)
Attorney Curbelo affirms that Attorney Risko is admitted to practice before the courts of the State
of New York and various District Courts, that he is a member in good standing, and that he is not
subject to any disciplinary proceedings pending against him. (Id. at 2.) Accordingly, Attorney
Risko will be permitted to appear pro hac vice in the above-captioned matter in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to Local Civil Rule 101.1(c). Accordingly,
IT IS, on this 24th day of February 2026,
ORDERED that the motion for pro hac vice admission of Sergey Risko, Esq. (ECF No. 5)
is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Sergey Risko, Esq., a member in good standing of the bar in the State of
New York, be permitted to appear pro hac vice in the above-captioned matter in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to L. Civ. R. 101.1(c); it is further
ORDERED that all pleadings, briefs, and other papers filed with the Court shall be signed
by Carolina T. Curbelo, Esq., who is admitted to the Bar of this Court, and who shall be held
responsible for said papers, for the conduct of the case, and the conduct of the attorney admitted
pro hac vice pursuant to this Order; it is further
ORDERED that, unless previously paid for in the current calendar year, Sergey Risko,
Esq., shall pay the annual fee to the New Jersey Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection in accordance
with L. Civ. R. 101.1(c)(2) and New Jersey Court Rule 1:28-2 within twenty (20) days from the
date of the entry of this Order; it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to L. Civ. R. 101.1(c)(3), Sergey Risko, Esq., shall make a
payment of $250.00 to the Clerk, United States District Court, within twenty (20) days from the
date of the entry of this Order; it is further
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ORDERED that Sergey Risko, Esq. shall be bound by the Rules of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, including but not limited to the provisions of Local
Civ. R. 103.1, Judicial Ethics and Professional Responsibility, and Local Rule 104.1, Discipline
of Attorneys; it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to L. Civ. R. 101.1(c)(4), Sergey Risko, Esq., shall be deemed
to have agreed to take no fee in any tort case in excess of the New Jersey Court Contingency Fee
Rule, Rule 1:21-7, as amended; it is further
ORDERED that local counsel may file a request with the Clerk of the Court for pro hac
vice counsel to receive electronic notifications in this matter, the form of which is available at the
Court’s website; it is further
ORDERED that the Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Respondents shall treat Petitioner as detained under 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
it is further
ORDERED that, as soon as practicable but no later than 7 days from the date of this
Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an immigration judge who shall assess whether he presents a flight
risk or a danger to the community; it is further
ORDERED that within three (3) days of that bond hearing, Respondents shall file a
written notice of the outcome of that proceeding with the Court; and it is finally
ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order and the accompanying
Opinion upon the parties electronically and CLOSE the case.
________________________
JULIEN XAVIER NEALS
United States District Judge
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